Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.
Governor

TO:

STATE OF INDIANA
Department of Correction
Indiana Government Center – South
302 W. Washington Street • Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-2738
Phone: (317) 232-5711 • Fax: (317) 232-6798 • Website: www.in.gov/indcorrection/

J. David Donahue
Commissioner

J. David Donahue, Commissioner
Indiana Department of Correction
Dora Schriro, Director
Arizona Department of Corrections

FROM:

Rondle Anderson, Regional Director
Indiana Department of Correction
Craig Hanks, Warden
New Castle Correctional Facility

DATE:

May 23, 2007

SUBJECT:

Post Event Analysis of the New Castle Correctional Facility Disturbance
on April 24, 2007

INTRODUCTION:
This Report analyzes the events that preceded the April 24, 2007 disturbance at the New
Castle Correctional Facility in Henry County, Indiana. It examines causational factors,
and outlines recommendations for changes that will enhance operational security,
improve facility efficiency, and better guard against similar disturbances in the future.
HELPING ARIZONA WITH OVERCROWDING:
The New Castle Correctional Facility (“NCCF”) was built in 2001-2002, and began
operations in April 2002. This medium-security male prison is comprised mostly of
dormitory housing. Each housing unit includes a day room in which offenders can watch
television and engage in indoor recreational activities. The NCCF was funded to operate
only at about one-quarter capacity. In early 2005, using appropriations earmarked for
contract beds, Indiana Department of Correction was able to double the capacity at
NCCF, but still nearly half the facility (six housing units [1260 beds]) remained unused.
The GEO Group is the vendor who, by separate contract, provides management and
supervision and NCCF.

EOE

In October 2006, an Agreement had been reached between IDOC and the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that was intended to help the State of
California with its overcrowding by allowing their offenders to reside at NCCF. This
Agreement failed to be implemented due, in large part, to a conflicting California law.
The following month, officials from the State of Arizona contacted the Indiana
Department of Correction with a proposal for contracting up to 1260 available beds at the
New Castle Correctional Facility to help that State alleviate its prison overcrowding
problem.
The two Departments of Correction immediately commenced negotiations towards an
Intergovernmental Agreement. A delegation from the Arizona Department of Correction
(ADC) inspected NCCF. It was subsequently reported by ADC that this delegation was
impressed with the Facility.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT LOADING SCHEDULE:
Between December 8, 2006 and March 9, 2007 when the parties entered into an
Agreement they considered a number of options and consulted with the vendors that
would be providing offender services. Initially, the parties contemplated leasing
approximately 630 beds with a loading schedule of about 50 inmates a week. The signed
Agreement included a 10-week schedule with 105 inmates to be added each of the first
eight weeks and 210 inmates each of the last two weeks by which time 1,260 mediumsecurity ADC inmates would be transferred to NCCF.
By April 17, 2007, 630 Arizona inmates had been transferred to NCCF. On April 23,
2007, the ADC contacted IDOC officials and proposed a postponement of additional
transfers of inmates to, among other things, allow staff to gain experience, the placement
of additional staff to work out the logistics with respect to offender movement and
tracking, and to increase the level of programming to match the influx of Arizona
inmates. Both parties agreed to the postponement until the issues could be defined and
resolved. The following day a disturbance broke out at NCCF.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:
On April 24, 2007, at approximately 12:40 p.m. E.S.T., during noon meal, 30-40 Arizona
offenders were walking to the dining hall wearing white undershirts without their stateissued green offender uniforms.1 These offenders ignored staff orders to return to their
1

It should be noted that the requirement to wear smocks became an issue with the offenders in the days
preceding the event. Written protocols were vague on the issue, so staff began giving verbal direction to
the offender population to begin wearing their smocks during meals. Although the numbers of offenders
going to chow without their state-issued tops was decreasing, there were still offenders refusing to comply
with this direction. On Monday, April 23, 2007, during breakfast some Arizona offenders again proceeded
to chow wearing undershirts. Orders were given for them to return to their housing units to put on their
smocks. After expressing to staff their opinion they should be permitted to wear only T-shirts, these

Page 2 of 13

housing units to comply with the dress code, and instead proceeded to the chow hall.
These offenders were stopped at the gate which separates the portion of the compound
reserved for the Arizona offenders from the dining hall and the rest of the compound.
Rather than abide by orders to return to their housing units and put on proper clothing,
approximately 20 of these offenders began pushing their way past staff through the
internal gate, while 6 or 7 other offenders attempted to climb the separation fence to join
those that had already pushed their way through the gate.
Other Arizona offenders, on hearing the commotion, became restless and argumentative.
Housing Units were locked down, but offenders became disruptive and using items
available to them in the housing units were able to damage doors and compromise
security windows to get out of their housing units.2 These items included clothes irons,
fire extinguishers, and tool boxes taken from on-grounds maintenance staff, as well as the
offenders’ metal property containers. The offenders then had access to the recreation
yard where they were able to watch or engage in the disturbance. As Arizona offenders
were running out of their housing units, Officer Holder was attacked, then knocked to the
ground and beaten and was injured. Staff made a request by radio for medical assistance,
and medical staff subsequently escorted Holder out of the housing unit to the infirmary.
Some of the offenders on the Indiana side of the compound followed suit, and also stayed
on their side of the yard, refusing to return to their housing units. Offenders had access
and control of the inner yard, and even placed a ladder on the recreation fence inside the
compound that separates Indiana from Arizona offenders. Orders had been given by
Department of Correction Commissioner J. David Donahue that, should any offender
attempt to escape from the NCCF, staff may use whatever force is necessary, including
lethal force to prevent their escape, but there was never an attempt by any offender to
compromise the exterior security perimeter of NCCF.
Captain Deaton began talking to the Arizona offenders at the gate, trying to convince
them to return back through the gate toward the housing units. Captain Deaton then
walked toward the housing units to talk to the offenders in the yard. Shortly afterward
Captain Deaton turned and began walking back toward the gate. He was stopped by a
group of Arizona offenders and they began to surround him. By this time NCCF’s
Emergency Response Team was activated and reported to the ready room.
The offenders that surrounded Captain Deaton knocked him down and several of them
began kicking and stomping on him. One of the offenders then said “He has had
enough”, and they stopped the attack on Captain Deaton. Deaton was allowed to get up
offenders returned to their housing units to either not go to breakfast or to put on their smocks and proceed
to the chow hall. Following that encounter, a representative group of offenders were assembled by NCCF
staff, and clear direction was given that the requirement of wearing their smocks while eating would be
strictly enforced. It was during the following meal that Arizona offenders again resisted this order.
2
For the classification of offenders being kept at NCCF the doors should be of detention grade. Upon
inspection following this incident it was discovered these doors were of commercial grade and not
detention security grade. Likewise the windows were supposed to be much more difficult to defeat than
what offenders proved them to be. Adjustments to the physical plant have been designed, and are being
installed that will effectively discourage offenders from climbing through these windows in the future.

Page 3 of 13

and walk out of the gate. The NCCF Emergency Response Team arrived and formed a
skirmish line in front of the programs service building. Emergency Response Operations
then focused on removing all staff from these housing units and the NCCF yard, or
otherwise identifying their location and status. It appears that no offender attempted to
hold any staff hostage, but some offenders did take radios, keys, and non-lethal weapons
from staff. Throughout the disturbance the offenders were repeatedly ordered to return to
their respective housing units.
In addition to destroying windows and littering debris throughout the recreation yard,
ADC and IDOC offenders also began setting fires in the yard, and in the recreation
building and against the side of one housing unit. Although piles of mattresses, furniture,
picnic tables and debris were set fire in the yard, none of the buildings caught fire.
In addition to NCCF Emergency Response Teams, staff from Henry County Sheriff’s
Department arrived approximately 2:12 p.m., and the Henry County Fire Department
arrived and was placed on standby at 2:28 p.m. Backup also arrived from the Indiana
State Police (including ISP’s Emergency Response Team and Tactical Intervention
Police), and the Department of Correction’s Emergency Response Teams from Pendleton
(including its K-9 Unit) and Plainfield, as well as the Delaware County Sheriff’s SWAT,
K-9, and Special Emergency Response Teams.
As the assault teams prepared, many of the offenders either returned to their housing
units, or sat or laid down and prepared to be restrained by staff. Once all staff was
accounted for, orders were given by the Commissioner at Central Command to retake the
compound. Chemical agent was used to control the offenders. No lethal weapons were
used against any offender3, and no serious injuries were inflicted as the offenders began
to follow staff orders to cuff up. At approximately 4:30 p.m. the last offender was placed
in flex cuffs, and all offenders engaged in the disturbance were restrained and sitting in
the compound under close supervision by armed Special Emergency Response Teams.
During the course of the next 90 minutes, staff made several attempts to count and
identify offenders.4 Final count was cleared at approximately 6:58 p.m., and all offenders
were identified and accounted for.
When the offenders were under control, staff immediately began assessing the population
for medical issues needing treatment. Eight offenders were sent to the infirmary to have
their eyes flushed or to treat respiratory issues as a result of the use of tear gas. A more
thorough review was conducted throughout the course of the next 24 hours, and revealed
twenty-seven offenders requiring on-site medical service that might be attributed to the
disturbance. None of these offenders suffered from injuries that required them to be
transported to a hospital. Injuries to Arizona and Indiana offenders included:
• 6 offenders complaining of back or chest pains
• 6 offenders with lacerations
3

There were warning shots fired by staff responding to the emergency. These warning shots were effective
in persuading offenders to comply with staff orders.
4
The process for identifying offenders was made even more difficult by the fact that many of the offenders
discarded their state-issued photo identification badge during their disturbance.

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•
•
•
•
•

4 offenders that fainted
3 offenders complaining of difficulty with breathing
3 offenders with blood sugar or blood pressure issues
3 with injuries to their hand, wrist or finger
2 with injuries to their collarbones (It should be noted that the medical records
of one of these offenders showed he had a broken collarbone three months
earlier [before he arrived in Indiana] which may have been re-injured during
the disturbance). The other offender suffered a dislocation of his collarbone.

No offender suffered injuries so serious that they had to be transported off grounds for
treatment. The two injured staff members were taken to an area hospital where they were
treated and released. Upon release, Captain Deaton returned to the NCCF to help address
the aftermath of the disturbance.
Damages to NCCF included broken security glazing from windows of many of the
housing units, significant internal damage to the recreation building and the case worker
offices, significant damage to one of the housing units which included destruction of
some of its plumbing fixtures, damage to internal doors, graffiti throughout the
compound and destruction of various pieces of equipment. It should be noted that the
offenders’ living quarters were largely untouched.
Investigations were immediately commenced by the Indiana Department of Correction in
partnership with the Indiana State Police and Henry County Prosecutor’s Office.
Investigations were also started by the Arizona Department of Corrections and the GEO
Group. Preliminary investigation conducted the evening of the event identified 219
offenders for removal to a more secure IDOC facility.

CAUSES OF THE EVENT:
The primary cause of the disturbance, including the harm to staff and the damage to
NCCF, rests with the offenders. There is no credible evidence to suggest that staff action
in any way caused the disturbance. The conditions of confinement during the Arizona
offender transfer phase of the Agreement, though in some respects were more austere
than what the offenders were accustomed to in Arizona, were not such that offenders
were routinely deprived of any necessity. Furthermore, to the extent that reliable
evidence exists to prove that any offender refused staff orders, harmed staff, or destroyed
government property, those offenders, whether they be from Arizona or Indiana, have
been or will be subject to sanctions following individual Due Process hearings pursuant
to established prison disciplinary protocols. At the time of this writing the Indiana State
Police indicated that criminal charges would be recommended against one Indiana
offender and 25 offenders from Arizona. Aggregate recommended charges include
Rioting, Battery, Unauthorized Possession of Weapons, Intimidation, Theft, Criminal
Mischief, Criminal Confinement, and Battery by Bodily Waste.

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Secondary factors that contributed to the disturbance and the failure to dissuade or
contain the disturbance include:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Too much offender idleness. Recreation schedules were shorter than the ADC
offenders were accustomed to, and the time periods some ADC offenders
were permitted to recreate stretched into late evening or early morning hours.
The times which offenders recreated were inconsistent, and often differed
from the schedule posted at NCCF.
Breakdown in communication to offenders as to the plans for implementing
programs and expanding privileges, as to expectations with respect to offender
behavior, and listening to and attempting to resolve offender complaints.
Too many unseasoned staff on duty and a lack of veteran staff in key
positions, an insufficient number of case managers, and different Monitors
placed at NCCF by ADC.5
The fact that offenders were transferred so quickly to Indiana from the date
the Intergovernmental Agreement was signed, coupled with the quick rate at
which Arizona offenders were being transferred to NCCF.
Offenders who were not informed about the differences in confinement
between the Arizona prison they were being transferred from and the New
Castle Correctional Facility.
Failure to impose consistent sanctions for offender misbehavior.
Security doors and windows that were not of proper strength or design to
contain offenders to their housing units.
Additional monitoring by IDOC regarding issues that were developing, in
order to devise and facilitate timely resolutions that meet good correctional
practices.

The Post Event investigation revealed a number of ways to improve NCCF security, to
enhance correctional services provided at this facility, and to strengthen the partnership
between the Indiana and Arizona Departments of Correction, and the third-party service
providers at the NCCF.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS:
At the outset of the disturbance Command Centers were opened at bothNCCF and IDOC
Central Office. The swift reaction by NCCF and IDOC staff, as well as local and state
law enforcement and emergency teams quickly contained the disturbance and the show of
such force served to de-escalate the event without serious harm to any person. The
response that was made did give rise to questions, issues and new ideas for
improvements.

5

During the six-week period in which Arizona offenders resided at NCCF prior to the disturbance, ADC
sent five different staff members to act as monitor, each one a week or more at different times.

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■

As the population of the NCCF continues to grow, the number of emergency
response squads needs to grow proportionately. Current protocols and
training need to be enhanced to improve staff reaction time with the goal of
responding to small incidents quickly and preventing them from escalating. It
is vital that a backup Quick Response Team be identified at all times to allow
the NCCF to respond to two emergencies at the same time.

■

During the disturbance NCCF administrators were not confident as to the
number, identities and whereabouts of all non-offender persons inside the
secured perimeter. This contributed to a delay in directly moving to restrain
the offenders until all staff was accounted for. This also contributed to early
false speculation that some staff could be hostages. Protocols for keeping
track of non-offenders should be improved.

■

During the disturbance staff members carried keys inside the secured
perimeter, which had been taken from them by offenders. Although the locks
were changed, and new keys were issued, in the future new protocols and
practices should permit only single keys with limited accessibility inside the
compound.

■

Current protocols call for radio frequencies to be changed, and specific radios
deactivated, if it is believed that offenders may have access to a NCCF radio.
This was not done in a timely fashion, and further training is required
regarding this vital emergency protocol.

■

The NCCF needs to keep an up-to-date inventory of security equipment
readily available, so that in times of emergency there can be a more timely
determination of what is accounted for and what is not.

■

Immediately following the quelling of an emergency, all staff involved should
submit written statements of what they observed, in order to better facilitate
event investigations.

■

A staging area should be contemplated and put in place in an emergency to
accommodate police, emergency teams, and members of the media that are
assisting or reacting to the event.

■

On-the-ground emergency response teams need to include a video camera
operator to record the events that are transpiring, the offender misconduct, and
the measures being taken to end the event.

■

Some staff members were trained to participate on two different types or
response teams (e.g. weapons team as well as SERT), and were uncertain as to
which team they should report, inasmuch as both were activated. Protocols
need to be put in place to establish these priorities.

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■

Two days following the disturbance IDOC attempted to slowly begin
removing NCCF off lockdown by assessing how the offenders react when
given the chance to eat a warm meal in the dining hall. Approximately ten
offenders from one Arizona housing unit refused to put on their shirts to
comply with dress code, and refused to go to chow. Because NCCF was in
locked down status, offenders were not being provided the option of staying in
their housing units, and after this was explained to the offenders the order was
repeated and some still refused to follow staff directions. An IDOC E-Squad
on standby was called to remove the defiant offenders, while the remaining 80
or so were escorted to the dining hall. After the E-Squad escorted the noncompliant offenders to segregation they went to the Dining Hall to respond to
a request made by the NCCF’s Chief of Security for assistance with removing
two additional non-compliant offenders. After the E-Squad took position
inside the Dining Hall, at least one offender approached the team in what team
members purported to be a threatening manner. After orders were given for
the offender to back away, a member fired a CN Muzzle Dispersion Cartridge
from a gas gun and offenders were escorted from the Dining Hall back to their
housing unit. Because of the close proximity of the approaching offender to
the weapon when it was discharged, this offender received chemical burns to
one side of his face that required medical treatment. These injuries were not
serious, and the offender was escorted to segregation immediately following
medical treatment. The IDOC assembled a Firearms Review Committee
composed of staff not from NCCF. The conclusion of the Committee was that
the discharge of the weapon was justified. However, questions were raised as
to why the E-Squad responded to direction from NCCF personnel without
direct confirmation by IDOC command on site. Although this Squad did not
use lethal weapons, the fact that they were armed with lethal weapons and
positioned themselves inside the Dining Hall did not comport with established
emergency protocols. This must serve as a training scenario to ensure staff
follows protocols in the future.

NCCF STABILIZATION PLAN:
All Offenders Accounted For - Immediately following the event, the offenders were
restrained and supervised in the yard while staff confirmed the count. Many offenders
discarded their identification badges, and so staff systematically identified which
offenders went to which housing units.
NCCF Locked Down - The offenders were immediately placed on lockdown status, and
only escorted movement was permitted. Some offenders were detailed to help clean
debris from the NCCF compound, and inside housing units. Investigators immediately
began interviewing NCCF staff, working to identify offenders that needed to be separated
from the Facility and placed in more secure cells in other facilities.

Page 8 of 13

Offenders Transported - The evening of April 24th, following the event, three security
buses transported 69 Arizona offenders to segregation at the Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility, 18 Indiana offenders were sent to the Miami Correctional Facility, and 132
Indiana offenders were transported to the Reception & Diagnostic Center at Plainfield.
Of the 69 Arizona offenders sent to Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, 50 were
suspected to have been involved in the disturbance, and the remaining 19 inmates were
moved for non-disturbance related reasons.
Immediate NCCF Repairs - Staff began replacing broken security windows, and had all
of them replaced with temporary inserts within four days following the event. Permanent
replacement windows have been ordered, and are expected to be installed within eight
weeks of the event. Staff and contractors replaced ceiling tiles, repaired broken
plumbing, and removed or painted over graffiti. Staff designed additional security bars
that will be fitted over the interior windows to enhance security. The NCCF has ordered
replacement furniture that will be provided by the IDOC’s Prison Industries at GEO’s
expense. Pursuant to the subcontract with GEO, that vendor will reimburse the
Department for expenses associated with addressing the disturbance, and the repairs
needed to return that NCCF to normal operation.
Return To Normal Operations - The NCCF is currently in the process of being lifted
off lockdown in stages. Offenders are being provided hot meals. At the time of this
writing, offenders were being permitted to eat in the dining hall for all three of their daily
meals. They are also being permitted out of their housing units on an increasing basis, as
long as order is maintained. Sick call was continued. Telephone, television, and
commissary privileges have been restored, and video visitation privileges are being
implemented. Hygiene items have been provided to the offenders, and laundry and
shower privileges have been reinstituted. Some offenders have been permitted to return
to their job assignments, and new job assignments (many associated with NCCF
restoration and clean up) have been created to keep more of the population meaningfully
engaged during the day.
Program Delivery - NCCF teachers are preparing to deliver program materials to
offender/students. Educational schedules are being devised to accommodate both
Arizona and Indiana offenders without allowing them to intermingle.
Recreation Schedule - A new recreation schedule has been developed that allows for
small groups of offenders to recreate for one half hour a day to start. If this proves
successful additional time and frequency will be added, and larger groups may be
permitted to recreate, and potentially engage in team recreational activities for longer
periods of time.
NCCF is being closely monitored, but it appears the offender population has stabilized.

Page 9 of 13

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Too much offender idleness. Recreation schedules were shorter than the ADC
offenders were accustomed to, and the time periods some ADC were permitted to
recreate stretched into late evening or early morning hours. The times which
offenders recreated were inconsistent, and often differed from the schedule posted
at NCCF.
■

Program and job assignments need to be better coordinated with the influx of
offenders to reduce the level of offender idleness. It is important that all
offenders not in disciplinary segregation be given ample opportunity to leave
their housing units. This calls for as many offenders as feasible to be given
job assignments, or assigned to rehabilitative programming, especially
following the completion of their orientation phase.

■

Arizona offenders need to be scheduled for recreation and meals at times
similar to the Indiana offenders. Recreation schedules should be posted, and
adhered to, and of a duration that is similar to what offenders are used to in
Arizona.

Breakdown in communications with offenders as to NCCF’s plans for
implementing programs and expanding privileges, as to expectations with respect to
offender behavior, and with respect to listening to and attempting to resolve
offender complaints.
■

There are many aspects of offender management and oversight that are not
detailed in the current Intergovernmental Agreement. There are several
processes that were or are being conducted at NCCF that differ from the
practices conducted at ADC facilities. These include protocols such as the
way offenders are routinely counted to ensure that all are accounted for, the
way bunks are assigned, and how requests for sick call are collected. To the
extent feasible, NCCF should work to mirror ADC practices so as to reduce
the level of unfamiliarity amongst the offender population.

■

Communication between both Agencies and NCCF Service Providers must be
improved. It is important that IDOC be made aware by both ADC and the
NCCF of all serious issues or disputes that have arisen. Likewise, grievances
being raised by the offenders to NCCF staff must be communicated
effectively to IDOC. It is vital that, moving forward, all parties continually
apprise other stakeholders of important information regarding the
management, monitoring and care of the offender population, including the
routine reporting of any life and safety issues.

Page 10 of 13

Too many unseasoned staff on duty and a lack of veteran staff in key positions, an
insufficient number of case managers, and different Monitors placed at NCCF by
ADC.
■

Additional staff maturation is needed to instill confidence and ensure better
familiarity with protocols and policy. A large number of NCCF custody staff
has less than one year of correctional experience, and several custody staff
have less than two months experience, inasmuch as most were hired
immediately after the Intergovernmental Agreement was executed.

■

Each shift of NCCF should be supervised by a custody staff member who is of
the rank of lieutenant or above. It is vital that NCCF management daily tour
each housing unit and talk with staff and offenders to determine what issues
need to be resolved. Likewise, Unit Team and Casework Managers need to be
permanently in place, spending more productive time with the offenders
within their units to continually work to resolve issues informally.

■

The Monitor(s) and classification team detailed by Arizona is responsible for
many important processes. Among other things the monitor is responsible for
overseeing the offender disciplinary process. It is important that a monitor be
permanently assigned to NCCF to insure consistent and lasting oversight of
offender discipline, classification, and other processes.

The fact that offenders were transferred so quickly to Indiana from the date the
Intergovernmental Agreement was signed, coupled with the quick rate at which
Arizona offenders were being transferred to NCCF.
■

Arizona offenders began arriving just three days after the Intergovernmental
Agreement was executed. The transfer schedule of Arizona offenders was not
realistic given the fact that the side of the NCCF that was being occupied had
never been used or staffed before. As already mutually agreed to by each
Agency, a longer, more staged transfer of inmates must be planned that
permits the NCCF to hire, train, and place staff into position to meet the needs
of these new NCCF offenders.

■

ADC and NCCF staff must continue to work together to insure that Facility
staff are in place and trained and able to access ADC’s Adult Information
Management System (A.I.M.S.) at the NCCF. Other issues impacted by the
quick implementation and loading schedule concern offender commissary,
telephones, inmate trust accounts, and video visitation. Although many of
these issues have been or are being resolved, these services must expand in
step with NCCF population expansion.

Offenders who were not informed about the differences in confinement between the
Arizona prison they were being transferred from and the New Castle Correctional
Facility.

Page 11 of 13

■

Before being transferred to NCCF, offenders must receive proper notice and
accurate information about the differences in conditions of confinement they
can expect. Some of the offenders transferred to NCCF were unaware that it
was a nonsmoking prison, and that there would be restrictions on the amount
and type of property they are permitted to possess. For example, many of the
offenders came from Arizona facilities that permitted personal televisions,
whereas NCCF provides television viewing in each housing unit dayroom.
Arizona offenders are also not permitted to possess any sort of pornography
while residing in an Indiana prison. Some offenders complained that much of
their property was left back in Arizona. Since the start of the Agreement and
following the disturbance, subject matter experts from Arizona have been
visiting the NCCF to help devise ways to correct this. It is expected that
increasing the number of case managers at the NCCF would also help mitigate
this issue.

Failure to impose consistent sanctions for offender misbehavior.
■

Discipline must be strictly enforced in a timely manner. In addition to
reviewing staffing levels, ADC’s monitors are to ensure that offender
behavior is controlled through proper meting out of disciplinary sanctions. It
is vital that NCCF staff work closely with a permanently assigned ADC
Monitor to ensure that all statutory and Constitutional requirements with
respect to offender disciplinary procedures are followed, that offender
discipline is imposed in a fair and consistent manner so that the population
understands the importance of abiding by established prison rules, and to
promote a smooth-running Facility.

Security doors and windows that were not of proper strength or design to contain
offenders to their housing units.
■

■

■

The disturbance revealed physical plant changes that can be made to improve
offender control and supervision. This includes installing stronger more
secure doors in certain locations, placing security bars on identified interior
windows, fortifying certain areas of fencing with additional razor
wire, installing a crash gate and sally port to better control offender
movement, providing more fire retardant mattresses, and adding cameras to
enhance offender monitoring.
Security will also be improved through routine Facility housing unit
shakedowns, enhanced tool control protocols and practices, and the
introduction of additional equipment (e.g. radios) to permit more complete
and timely communication of accurate information. Also, offender line
movement should be tightly controlled. Before offenders are permitted out of
their housing units, staff must be in place to monitor their movement.

Page 12 of 13

Additional monitoring by IDOC regarding issues that were developing, in order to
devise and facilitate timely resolutions that meet good correctional practices
■

IDOC’s Facility monitor was detailed to review only the Indiana offenders
being held at the NCCF. The IDOC will detail a monitor who can review
compliance with the Intergovernmental Agreement and ensure that the Thirdparty Contractor meets these terms and provides adequate conditions of
confinement in all other respects. ADC has pointed out a number of issues
that, perhaps not directly linked to the disturbance, should have been
addressed as a matter of routine. These issues include the need to improve
how medical or religious-based special diets are provided to the offenders that
need or want them, shortening the length of time offenders must wait to start
ordering off commissary, improving the accuracy and availability of deposits
to an offender’s trust account, and providing more timely laundry services.
Resolving these issues is primarily the responsibility of unit team and
casework managers, but a monitor hired by IDOC could help ensure both
adequate communications between the parties and timely follow-up.

INVESTIGATION WRAP UP:
It was the intent of the Indiana Department of Correction to provide ADC representatives
with access to all parts of NCCF, and all documents related to the confinement of
Arizona offenders and the April 24, 2007 disturbance. ADC sent investigators and
subject matter experts to NCCF to talk with offenders and staff and comb through
documents and review video footage.
The investigative team from IDOC and the Investigative team from ADC compared
findings following their independent investigations, and have worked together to identify
as many of the causational factors related to the disturbance as the evidence would
support, and to identify the actions that can be taken to help avoid such disturbances from
taking place moving forward. To the extent that offenders are still undergoing
disciplinary processes related to the disturbance, and there remains the possibility that
additional information relating the disturbance could surface, this Report may be
supplemented.
As reflected in this report, moving forward, the parties involved in this Intergovernmental
Agreement are working together in a cooperative partnership to promote the safety,
security and the smooth running of the New Castle Correctional Facility.

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