JUSTICE
P.LICY

COMMON GROUND:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FIVE STATES THAT REDUCED
JUVENILE CONFINEMENT BY MORE THAN HALF
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE | FEBRUARY 2013

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 2
MEASURING REFORM: FOCUS ON JUVENILE CONFINEMENT ............. 4

Mission: Reducing the use of
incarceration and the justice
system and promoting policies
that improve the well-being of
all people and communities.

METHODS..................................................................................................... 5
CAVEATS ABOUT THE ANALYSIS: .................................................................... 6
THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONFINEMENT, 2001 - 2010 ........... 8
FEWER YOUTH ARE BEING HELD FOR LESS SERIOUS OFFENSES. ...................... 9
DISPROPORTIONATE CONFINEMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR INCREASED FROM
2001 TO 2010. ....................................................................................... 11
COMMON ELEMENTS AMONG STATES THAT WERE THE ‘TOP
PERFORMERS’ ........................................................................................ 12
LITIGATION ................................................................................................. 12
THE CASES ................................................................................................. 14
MOVING AWAY FROM ADULT CORRECTIONS AND TOWARD CHILD WELFARE
INTEGRATION.......................................................................................... 15
CROSSOVER AND DUALLY-INVOLVED YOUTH ................................................. 17
COLLABORATION COMMISSION OR COORDINATING BODY ............................... 18
ENLIST THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OF NATIONAL INITIATIVES......................... 19
RECOMMITMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENTALLY APPROPRIATE TREATMENT OF
YOUTH ................................................................................................... 19
DIVERSIONARY AND RESTORATIVE INTERVENTIONS ....................................... 20
THE AGE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE JURISDICTION AND ADULT TRANSFERS ........... 21
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES ...................................................................... 24
AREAS OF CONTINUED NEED........................................................................ 24
THE CONFINEMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH....................................................... 24
DETENTION ................................................................................................ 25
A NOTE ABOUT ARREST RATES..................................................................... 26
BRIEF DATA ANALYSIS OF ‘TOP PERFORMERS’ ................................. 28

th

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CONNECTICUT ............................................................................................ 28
TENNESSEE................................................................................................ 29
LOUISIANA .................................................................................................. 31
MINNESOTA ................................................................................................ 33
ARIZONA .................................................................................................... 35
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................ 37

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After decades of expanding correctional populations in the United States, there is a
growing awareness that we need to end the era of over-incarceration. Primarily this
realization has formed around the adult correctional population, with less attention
paid by the media or the general public to young people who are confined for
delinquent behavior or prior to adjudication. This is perhaps because of the small
percentage of youth that makeup the total incarcerated population: in 2010,
approximately 2,270,100 adults were incarcerated in the U.S., compared to 70,792
youth.1
Simply by its scale, the “adult problem” dominates

counties and local jurisdictions to send youth to

the conversation. However, as confinement is the

state-run and state-funded institutions. Certainly,

least effective method of addressing delinquent

the current economic environment has played a

behavior in young people and increases the

role in states wanting to reduce their juvenile

likelihood that they will become justice-involved

corrections expenses, which run upwards of $240

adults, systemic reforms that will reduce the

per day, per youth.3 Creating financial incentives

number of confined youth are urgently needed.

for counties to keep youth close to home has the

2

potential to lower net costs (state confinement and
Such reforms–including reducing the number of

local community-based services), and improve

youth held in secure confinement, improving the

outcomes for youth. Because this approach has

conditions of juvenile facilities and expanding

showed early success in several states, other

community-based services that can be used instead

jurisdictions are considering whether they, too,

of confinement, among other issues–have been

should reform the fiscal architecture of their state

aggressively pursued in a number of states around

juvenile justice systems to reduce youth

the country for over a decade. In fact, juvenile

confinement.

correctional populations have dropped by about a
third, nationally, since 1999, when they peaked at

Four years ago, the Justice Policy Institute, in its

over 107,000 confined youth.

publication, Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile
Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense, highlighted

Restructuring the “fiscal architecture” of juvenile

fiscal reform as a promising practice. Given the

justice is one approach to reducing youth

drop in juvenile confinement just in the past four

confinement that has attracted national attention.

years, we decided to look at what role fiscal

This approach seeks to remove the incentive of

changes–and other reforms–have played in

the creation of a juvenile justice reform committee

reducing the number of youth locked up in the U.S.

within a state is one way to further
deinstitutionalization reforms but this process is

We discovered that adjusting funding schemes was

often the result of settlement agreements among

just one of many successful strategies for juvenile

litigants over poor juvenile justice conditions. In

confinement reform and, in fact, there are many

this report, each of these strategies will be

states that have significantly reduced their juvenile

addressed.

confined populations without fiscal reform. States
have initiated top-down policy changes, requiring

After discussing commonalities of reform activities

police and courts to treat juveniles differently,

among the states, we provide a brief overview of

resulting in fewer youth confined. Others have

each state’s experience. These are not case studies

simply closed their state’s juvenile correctional

per se of specifics of each state’s work, but more of

facilities, forcing judges to adopt less restrictive

an aerial view to further describe the

responses to juvenile delinquency. What follows is

transformations made.

a critical analysis of those elements that appeared to
contribute to the greatest reductions in rates of

Through the diversity of strategies, as well as the

confinement over the past decade.

commonalities between states, we hope advocates
and policymakers who seek better outcomes for

Keeping in mind juvenile justice in each state

youth will find inspiration and pursue those

operates as a system, the actors, policies and

strategies that are fiscally and politically achievable

problems are necessarily intertwined. For example,

in their jurisdictions.

Juvenile corrections is a multi-faceted and complex topic with policies and practices
that vary from state to state and sometimes from courthouse to courthouse. Finding
uniform measures and comparable data can be challenging. For that reason, the
current report takes the snapshot approach; examining states within a set time period
across a limited number of variables.
Such a method is imperfect and will surely miss

placement per 100,000 in the population between

examples that lie outside of such rigid criteria, but

the years 2001 and 2010 were chosen. They are:

the goal is to engage the reader in a conversation

Connecticut (-57.2%), Tennessee (-55.0%), Louisiana

about reducing juvenile confinement and to open

(-52.7%), Minnesota (-50.6%) and Arizona (-50.2%).ii

minds to new paths to juvenile correctional reform.

These states managed to reduce their youth

The methods used to look at various juvenile justice

confinement rates by at least half during the

outcomes are described in detail in this section.

period. iii

Data from the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and

However, using the same criteria within a different

Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) Easy Access to

date range, say between 1997 and 2006, changes the

the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement

above list of states dramatically, with only

(EZACJRP) were used for our analysis.4 It provides

Louisiana remaining. Again, this method and this

the only federal repository of such information but

report are meant to expand the conversation about

is limited in its coverage and how it defines various

confinement reform rather than provide a detailed

aspects of youth incarceration such as ‘residential’

history of all such efforts.

and ‘diversion.’ It is, however, the only data set
available at this time.i
Using these data, the five states that showed the
greatest drop in the rate of juveniles in residential

For a more detailed discussion of the methods and
limitations of the EZACJRP data, see
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/methods.asp.
i

One explanation as to why these states, all with above
average confinement rates in 2001, would have lower
rates in 2010 is the phenomenon of regression toward the
mean. That is, the tendency of sample outliers to move
closer to the group mean on subsequent measurement.
iii This example further illuminates the imperfect nature
of the snapshot method.
ii

States and National Juvenile Confinement Rates and Ranking, 2001 and 2010
2001
Rate*

2001 Rank**

2010 Rate

2010 Rank

% change

Connecticut

215

42

92

49

-57.2

Tennessee

260

34

117

44

-55.0

Louisiana

505

3

239

19

-52.7

Minnesota

322

24

159

38

-50.6

Arizona

305

28

152

40

-50.2

United States

335

n/a

225

n/a

-32.8

State

*Youth under the age of 18 confined per 100,000 youth in population.
**Of 50 states and District of Columbia, with “1” having highest youth confinement rate.
Source: Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement,
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/.

This report will examine the ‘top performers’ (the

meant to provide a definitive picture of all state

term to be used throughout) for the 2001 to 2010

reform efforts, only to shine a light on some recent

period, defined as those states with the greatest

successes and the themes that connect them.

decrease in juvenile incarceration rates (see above
Table), according to the EZACJRP data. These

Types of confinement: In this report the

states, each unique in its makeup, history and

term ‘confinement’ is used to describe the

approach to juvenile justice, share some

experience that some juveniles face when held in

commonalities in their decreasing juvenile

secure or semi-secure residential facilities as a result

incarceration rates. Areas of continued need, such

of contact with the juvenile justice system. The

as the disproportionate incarceration of youth of

OJJDP, which provides the data, defines three types

color, will also be addressed.

of confinement as follows:
1.

placed in the facility as part of a court

Time: For the current analysis, data on states’

ordered disposition.

juvenile confinement were gathered for the time
period between 2001 and 2010. This period was

Commitment: juveniles include those

2.

Detention: juveniles include those held

chosen because it is the most recent for which

awaiting a court hearing, adjudication,

useful data are available and allows a look at recent

disposition or placement elsewhere.

success stories.
The risk of looking at many states across one time
period is that such analysis may overlook states
that successfully reduced their juvenile

3.

Diversion (Shock): juveniles include those
voluntarily admitted to the facility in lieu of
adjudication as part of a diversion
agreement.

confinement numbers prior to 2001 or have more

The term ‘diversion’ carries a different meaning in

recently begun to make gains in that area. Readers

the juvenile justice community than the OJJDP

should keep in mind that the current analysis is not

definition. It typically describes an intervention that

steers youth away from the justice system, rather
than one that uses incarceration, even short-term, as
a response. The OJJDP definition of the term
describes what we will refer to as “shock”

Sources: Almost invariably, as states reshape

incarceration; that is, short-term periods of

the way they handle youth in the juvenile justice

confinement meant to shock youth into compliance

system, there is a need is for richer, more accurate

by introducing them to the harsh realities of

and complete data and for greater data accessibility.

incarceration.

The current analysis uses data from a variety of
sources which readers may find differ from what is

Offenses: This report also examined the type of

available through alternative sources. For example,

offense for which accused or adjudicated youth are

juvenile arrest counts, which have taken almost

confined. Typically, as states attempt to reduce the

exclusively from state sources, often differ from the

use of confinement, one method is to limit

numbers provided by the FBI’s Uniform Crime

confinement eligibility to those charged with

Reporting program. In fact, state arrest counts may

offenses against other persons or to youth deemed

differ from other state sources as some databases

to be serious or repeat offenders.

and reports are not always updated when numbers

Ethnicity: The OJJDP data we used provides a
limited view of the ethnicity of confined youth. As

change. By exploring data across time from the
same source, we can accurately show trends, even if
the numbers may differ from source to source.

the disproportionate confinement of youth of color
remains a problem across the juvenile and adult

Ranking: The states have been ranked from 1 to

justice systems, it is crucial to determine if current

51, including the District of Columbia, by the

reform movements address such disproportionality

percent change in juvenile confinement rates

or if the inequity has increased in recent years.

between 2001 and 2010. Ranking is a notoriously

Arrests: Juvenile arrest rates have fallen steadily

touchy endeavor as one party will inevitably bristle
at having been placed below another in a list. While

in recent years across the United States, decreasing

this ranking does not account for limitations and

by 27 percent between 2000 and 2010.5 Most states

confounding factors that impact states’ reduction of

have experienced a drop in the arrests of young

confinement rates, this approach is valid for this

people, to a greater or lesser extent. However, some

report’s purposes for two reasons. First, by using

states with minimal changes in arrest rates have

rate per 100,000 youth, states with large and small

made great gains in reducing confinement while

juvenile populations are leveled, proportionally.

others with significant arrest decreases have

Second, the ranking is not intended to put states

actually increased their rates of confinement. The

into ‘good’ or ‘bad’ categories, rather, the ranking

absence of a correlation between arrest rates and

are designed to continue an important discussion.

confinement rates makes it clear that a state need

Ranking improvement allows us to examine

not dramatically reduce the number of youth

potentially effective strategies and areas for

arrested in order to begin reforming their

improvement.

confinement practices.

Context: As this report will show, there are
many reasons why a state’s juvenile confinement
population has or has not fallen between two points
in time. We have placed the data in the context of

each state’s unique reform history. For all states,

accompanying detail to produce a reader-friendly

local juvenile justice experts were consulted to help

document of reasonable length. Any of the

make sense of the numbers and trends.

indicators we discuss in this report can be explored

Depth: Reporting on five states’ experiences
requires a balance of broad strokes and

further and in much more detail; such analysis is
encouraged.

In 2001, 21 states had juvenile incarceration rates greater than the national average of
335, with the highest in Wyoming, where 526 out of every 100,000 youth were held in
secure confinement.
Almost a decade later in 2010, 24 states were above

between those youth who were committed,

the much-lower average of 225, with South Dakota

detained or diverted. The data show that the

at the top end with 575 youth in secure confinement

number of youth in detention decreased by almost

per 100,000. Although many states made great

7,000 from 2001 to 2010. However, because the

strides in reducing the rate at which they

percentage decrease in detention didn’t keep pace

incarcerate young people, 17 out of the 21 above

with that of commitments, their proportion

average states in 2001 remained above average in

increased relatively, from 26.3 percent to 29.1

2010.

percent of all confined youth.

For all states and the District

The total number of youth in secure confinement in the
U.S. has dropped dramatically in the past 15 years.

of Columbia, the number of
youth in residential

105,055

from its high of 107,493 in
1999 to 70,792 in 2010.
The confinement data used
for the analysis in this report
provide a breakdown

Number of youth confined

placement dropped steadily

107,493

104,219
96,531

92,721
86,814

70,792

1997

1999

2001

2003

2006

2007

Source: Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement,
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/.

2010

The proportion of detentions to
commitments increased from 2001 to 2010.

Juvenile justice experts and practitioners
typically agree on a few standards regarding

2.5%

0.5%

the imprisonment of children. The first is that
confinement, if used at all, should be reserved

26.3%

for cases where a young person is a threat to

29.1%

their community. In keeping with this, youth
adjudicated delinquent for non-violent
offenses and even youth with records of
delinquent behavior who aren’t a public safety
risk generally can and should be supervised in
the community, preferably at home. Reforms

73.1%

68.4%

2001

2010

over the past decade, as reflected in national
data on youth confinement, have shown some
improvement in terms of a decreased
percentage of youth in confinement for nonviolent delinquent behavior.

Committed

Detained

Shock

confinement is more often being used to respond to
violent behavior, such as assault, and less in
response to property offenses, such as theft or
vandalism.
In looking at the offenses for which youth were
confined, the proportion of youth held for offenses

Likewise, there was a shift away from holding

against a person increased from 33.5 percent in 2001

youth for drug offenses, moving from 8.7 percent of

to 36.7 percent in 2010. Confinement for property

all confined youth in 2001 to 7.0 percent in 2010.

offenses decreased from 28.2 percent to 24.1 percent

Youth accused or adjudicated for drug offenses–of

during the period. These changes are in line with

which 73.2 percent and 79.3 percent were

the ideals of reform in that they suggest that

possession charges in 2001 and 2010, respectively–

Fewer youth are being confined for property and drug offenses.
36.7%
33.5%
28.2%
24.1%

14.8%
8.7%

Person

Property

7.0%

Drug
2001

16.4%

4.5%
Tech Vio

2010

4.3%

Status

are better served through treatment or diversion

status offense only changed from 4.5 percent in

programs, not by confinement in institutions where

2001 to 4.3 percent in 2010. This small percentage

access to services is secondary to punishment and

still represents over 3,000 young people held in

security.

confinement in 2010 for behavior that would not be
considered an offense if they were adults.

However, other offense categories for which
confinement should rarely, if ever, be used showed

Relative increases in confinement for technical

proportional increases or stagnation nationally.

violations may actually mask the continued practice

Offenses against the public order, a wide category

of incarcerating youth for status offenses. Following

that includes minor infractions along with

the JJDPA prohibition of the detention or

potentially dangerous activities, increased from 10.4

commitment of youth for status offense violations,

percent of the total to 11.5 percent. Public order

many youth receive terms of probation for such

offenses range from disorderly conduct to bringing

offenses.8 If that youth fails to comply with the

a weapon to school. However, on whole, these

conditions of probation, they may be charged with

offenses are skewed toward being non-violent in

a technical violation. In some jurisdictions, certain

nature and those for which confinement should not

technical violations, such as contempt of court, are

be a response.

classified as serious offenses for which a child may
be incarcerated.

The proportion of youth confined for technical
violations also increased from 14.8 percent to 16.4
percent. These are cases in which a youth under the
supervision of the juvenile justice system, such as
those on probation, has been accused of breaking

In 2010 youth of color comprised a
greater proportion of all youth
confined than they did in 2001

the conditions of that supervision. The use of
incarceration as a response to technical violations
has plagued the adult correctional system and a
body of evidence exists showing that a graduated
response of increased supervision and non-

60.3%

restrictive interventions can be more effective than

67.6%

incarceration; the same applies to juvenile justice.6
Finally, the percentage of confinement totals
comprised of status offenses–that is, offenses which
are not considered criminal and are only a violation

39.7%

due to a juvenile’s age, such as truancy and running

32.4%

away–barely fell. The U.S. Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) “prohibits the

2001

2010

use of secure detention or confinement for status
offenders and nonoffenders.” 7 The Act calls for the
“deinstitutionalization of status offenders” and
carries negative funding consequences for
noncompliance. Nationally, the proportion of
confined youth whose most serious offense was a

White

Youth of color

deinstitutionalization policies and laws. However,
the problem persists in many states, as reflected in
the national averages. Disproportionality in the
juvenile justice system permeates every stage of the
process: from who and where we police, to the
sentencing stage of adjudication, to community
supervision policies and practices. Scant research
Despite representing only about 13 percent and 16

has been done on why these disparities are

percent of the U.S. population, respectively,

deepening. A renewed focus not just on the juvenile

African American and Latino youth are confined at

justice system, but the failings of the other youth

disproportionately high rates, a trend that has

serving social systems, will be needed to truly drive

gotten worse since 2001.

down the over-incarceration of African American

9

and Latino youth.
Reducing this disparity has become a reform
movement of its own and is often woven into

A number of factors were common to states with the greatest declines in the youth
they confined.
The following commonalities were the most

numbers of youth of color at every level of its

frequent:

juvenile justice system and to detain low-risk youth



prior to adjudication. There are instances where
The state was the target of class action

these states improved some of these factors but, on

litigation concerning conditions of

the whole, they continue to wrestle with these

confinement or other legal or

issues.

administrative scrutiny;


Juvenile corrections split from the adult
system and/or partnered with child
welfare;





Finally, all states would benefit from improved data
collection and public accessibility. In addition to
collecting data on the number of youth arrested,
adjudicated and treated, states should document

There was improved inter-agency

systemic developments and changes to provide a

collaboration and communication, often

historical context for understanding the changes, or

through the formation of a high-level task

lack thereof, in the system. Two states provided

force or commission ; and

such a timeline that proved useful in tracking

State leaders recommitted their systems to

developments.

a holistic juvenile justice ideal that
acknowledges that youthful behavior is
inherently different than adult behavior

According to the OJJDP, litigation-based reforms

and that it requires different interventions

“are the most divisive and protracted means of

and services.

achieving systems change” and may involve ”years

Despite dramatic reductions in confinement, the
juvenile justice systems in these states have areas
that are of needed improvement. Each state
continues to experience disproportionately high

of expensive investigation and negotiation to reach
a settlement.” However, they also “may be the only
way to achieve systemic reforms.”10

As documented in No Place for Kids: The Case for
Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, state-run juvenile
facilities are frequently overcrowded, outdated,
and dangerous. Too often, they lack sufficient
numbers of properly-trained personnel or
adequate health care, education or other
rehabilitative programming. These and other
negative conditions place states at risk of
lawsuits. In fact, sometimes the threat of
litigation is enough to kick start reform in a state.
State leaders and stakeholders understand that
successful lawsuits may result in costly
settlements and other sanctions if remedies are

not met. Savvy community leaders also recognize
that negative media attention on a state’s
treatment of young people–adjudicated
delinquent or not–influences public opinion
about their government.
Whether litigation or the threat of litigation opens a
state’s eyes to problems previously overlooked or it
motivates a state through the threat of sanctions or
funding cuts, several of the top performing states
began confinement reform in earnest following
litigation. Of the five states examined in this report,
four were the target of litigation following claims of
mistreatment of youth in confinement.

Lawsuits played a part in several states’ confinement reform activities.

State

Year of
litigation/action

Year of
decline

Claim

11

Suit initiator

Emily J. v. Rowland
Connecticut

complaint: 1993
settlements: 1997, 2002,
2005

By 2001*

Harsh detention used for status offenses in
lieu of treatment or therapeutic placement.

Connecticut Civil
Liberties Union

By 2003

Dysfunctional child welfare system with poor
management and oversight. Child welfare
was coupled to juvenile corrections as DCS
in 1996.

Children's Rights

By 2001

Unconstitutional conditions in state’s facilities

Juvenile Justice
Project of Louisiana
and DOJ

By 2006

Widespread physical and sexual abuse in
facilities

DOJ

Brian A. v. Haslam
Tennessee†

complaint: 2000
settlement: 2001

Louisiana

United States v.
Louisiana
complaint: 1998
settlement: 2000

United States v. Arizona
Arizona

complaint: 2004
settlement: 2004

* Because confinement data are only available at 2 to 3 year intervals, the years shown are those following the highest rates of confinement..
**Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. † The suit in Tennessee was brought against the child welfare system in the state, which
shares a department with juvenile corrections. This report assumes some collateral changes as a result of that settlement.
Sources: Dick Mendel, Juvenile Justice Reform in Connecticut: How Collaboration and Commitment Have Improved Public Safety and Outcomes for
Youth (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2013); Children’s Rights, “Tennessee (Brian A. v. Haslam): Overview,” February 2013.
http://www.childrensrights.org/reform-campaigns/legal-cases/tennessee/; State of Louisiana, Office of Juvenile Justice, “History of Juvenile
Justice in La.,” February 2013. http://ojj.la.gov/index.php?page=sub&id=229; Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, “A History of the
Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” February 2013. http://www.azdjc.gov/FactsNews/ADJCHistory/ADJCHistory.asp

The table demonstrates three important points

According to Beth Rosenberg of the Children’s

relevant to juvenile confinement reform. First,

Action Alliance (CAA), an Arizona-based youth

measurable decreases in each of the four states’

advocacy organization, ”judges certainly reduced

confinement rates appeared soon after litigation

the number of kids sent to ADJC [Arizona

was initiated.

Department of Juvenile Corrections] when the DOJ
said the facilities conditions were

Second, despite the hundreds of employees in a

unconstitutional.”12

state’s juvenile facilities, outside service contractors
and counselors who visit and work in those

Connecticut: A lawsuit brought against the

facilities and the thousands of children and their

state of Connecticut is another example of

families who experienced confinement in the

litigation-based reform. It is also a lesson on the

facilities, in many instances legal action was

sometimes-delayed nature of that reform. The case,

initiated when heinous conditions were exposed by

known as the “Emily J. suit,” named after one of the

a tragic event such as a suicide or abuse of residents

plaintiffs in the case, was originally filed in 1993.

by staff.

However, settlements weren’t reached until 1997,
2002 and 2005. The state now finds itself held up as

Finally, the process has been initiated and pushed

a model for juvenile justice reform, 20 years after

by non-profit advocacy groups. The Civil Rights

this “crucial first step in Connecticut’s juvenile

Division of the U.S. The Department of Justice

justice reform movement.”13

(DOJ) joined the suit in Louisiana and spearheaded
the action in Arizona, but for the states profiled

Louisiana:

here, it has been the tireless efforts of the juvenile

DOJ and the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, a

justice and child welfare advocacy communities

juvenile justice advocacy non-profit organization.

that have forced change.

The suit alleged abuse and mistreatment of the

In 1998, Louisiana was sued by the

roughly 1,600 youth the state held in secure
confinement. The original complaint was filed

Arizona:

The state had been the target of

following a 1995 Human Rights Watch

lawsuits related to poor conditions in youth

investigation that reported “that substantial

confinement since the late 1980s, but had only

numbers of children in the state training

achieved minimal success in improving the system.

institutions are regularly physically abused by

In 2004, a Department of Justice CRIPA (Civil

guards, are kept in isolation for long periods of

Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act)

time, and are improperly restrained by

investigation found “widespread physical and

handcuffs.”14 In 2000, the state entered into a

sexual abuse of youth by staff, ... excessive and

settlement agreement with the DOJ and other

inappropriate use of disciplinary isolation, as well

plaintiffs. Among other things, the settlement

as failure to protect youth from attacks by other

mandated immediate and sweeping improvements

youth” in three of Arizona’s juvenile correctional

to juvenile incarceration in Louisiana.

facilities. By 2006, the next year for which there are
data, the state’s juvenile confinement numbers had
begun to decline, falling by over seven percent from
the 2003 level.

Louisiana is a prime example of how litigation can
help a state begin its journey to a safer, more fair
and more effective juvenile justice system. Since the
suit was brought against the state rather than

against a town or parish, the response took the form

welfare and the harsher approach of juvenile

of top-down, state-level reform. Rather than

justice. In 2000, the child welfare side of DCS was

address each of the agreement’s conditions

hit with a civil rights lawsuit that forced them to

piecemeal, Louisiana formed a Juvenile Justice

undergo major reform, much of which had already

Commission (JJC) to investigate and advise on the

begun. The suit’s settlement agreement held DCS to

best way forward (more on advisory committees

implementing changes that “actually spurred much

later in this report). When the JJC released its

of the department's progress.”15

recommendations in 2001, the focus shifted from
cleaning up the state’s secure facilities to
restructuring and rethinking the juvenile justice
system as a whole. Rather than merely “hire 220
additional staff to work with the juveniles” or
“develop substance abuse treatment programs
throughout the facilities”–both conditions of the
settlement agreement–the state embarked on a
holistic reform program that addressed issues from
improved prevention efforts to re-entry services for
youth released from secure confinement.

There was a time in our nation’s history when
young people found guilty and sentenced for
breaking the law were treated like adults: they were
tried in adult courts, sentenced as adults and, as
prison was used less frequently at the time, youth

Tennessee: Tennessee provides an

were sent to adult correctional facilities. More

opportunity to bridge the notion of litigation-based

recently, overwhelming research–much of it

reform with another characteristic of the five ‘top

produced through the MacArthur Research

performers’: attention to the appropriate placement

Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile

of youth corrections within the state’s bureaucracy.

Justice–has shown that young people are

In 1996, Tennessee restructured some of its youth

fundamentally different in their perceptions of risk

services, combining juvenile justice with child

and harm, their ability to control their behavior,

welfare into a Department of Children’s Services

amenability to change and, perhaps most

(DCS). The new department struggled to find its

importantly, they respond to punishment

identity between the therapeutic ideals of child

differently than adults.16 Decades of juvenile justice

Four of the five top performing states uncoupled juvenile and adult corrections and/or integrated juvenile
corrections with child welfare services.
State

Department

Last year changed

Connecticut

Dept. of Children and Families (juvenile
corrections and child welfare)

1976, coupled with child welfare

Tennessee

Dept. of Children’s Services (juvenile
corrections and child welfare)

1996, coupled with child welfare

Louisiana

Office of Juvenile Justice (placement and
support of adjudicated youth)

2004, split from Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections

Arizona

Dept. of Juvenile Corrections

1990, split from Dept. of Corrections; 2006 Child
Welfare/Juvenile Justice Integration Initiative formed

Connecticut Department of Children & Families, “About DCF,” February 2013. http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a=2565&Q=314326; Child
Welfare League of America, “Six to One: The Evolution of Children’s Services in Tennessee,” February 2013.
http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0211cstn.htm; Gregg Halemba, Gene Siegel, Charles Puzzanchera and Patrick Griffin, Louisiana Models for
Change Initiative Background Summary (Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2006); Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, “A
History of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” February 2013. http://www.azdjc.gov/FactsNews/ADJCHistory/ADJCHistory.asp

practice and brain research has led to contemporary

as abuse, neglect or exposure to trauma, and

theories that hold young people apart from adults

behaviors that can lead to justice involvement. 19

and promote the use of the least-restrictive

The same research has found that obstacles exist

response to unwanted behavior as a more effective

that impede collaboration between the two systems,

strategy for public safety and better outcomes for

often as a “structural barrier, such as a clear

the youth themselves.

statement of understanding concerning the sharing
of information, assessment processes, and joint case

Throughout the 20th century, the ideals and

management.”20

methods of juvenile justice drifted away from those
of the adult systems, bringing laws and policies that

The importance of the connection between these

formalized the inherent differences between the

two systems has recently been recognized at the

two groups. High youth crime rates in the 1980s

national level in the 2003 amended version of the

and 1990s began a trend of “get tough” policies for

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act

youth as well as “adult time for adult crime”

(CAPTA). The Act lists as one of its purposes,

approaches to violations committed by young

“Supporting and enhancing interagency

people, but those changes have already begun to

collaboration between the child protection system

erode.

and the juvenile justice system for improved

17

delivery of services and treatment, including
Some states split their juvenile corrections agencies,

methods for continuity of treatment plan and

philosophically and bureaucratically, from adult

services as children transition between systems.”21

corrections decades ago–in fact, of the ‘top
performers,’ Minnesota is the only state that

Two states in our purview, Connecticut and

continues to operate a combined system and is one

Tennessee, have bridged this service gap by

of only about a dozen states to do so–but some have

combining their juvenile justice and corrections

done so more recently as part of reform efforts.

departments with the state child welfare agencies.

For example, in Louisiana, prior to 2004, juvenile

Tennessee’s merging of departments is the most

corrections was housed within the Department of

recent–changing the Department of Youth Services

Public Safety and Corrections. Several years into its

to Department of Children’s Services (DCS) in

recent reform movement, justice services for youth

1996–and very likely a valuable precursor to that

split off into the Office of Youth Development,

state’s subsequent improvement in juvenile

renamed Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) in 2008. The

confinement indicators. Initially, the move bred fear

new department, given cabinet-level status,

that the punitive nature of juvenile justice would

allowed for more focused attention to the reforms

taint the healing approach of child welfare,

underway at the time and, according to the OJJ,

however the opposite seems to have occurred.

“provided the framework for reform.”

Thanks in part to the mandated reforms following

18

the Brian A. v. Haslam case,22 the juvenile justice side
In addition to different correctional systems for

of the department has benefitted from the

youth and adults, the ‘top performers,’ including

improved connection of youth to appropriate

Minnesota, have some integration between their

services that child welfare provides and a

juvenile justice and child welfare systems. Recent

recognition of the benefits of early positive

research has overwhelmingly shown a clear

intervention. Coupling post-adjudication services

connection between a child’s needs that might put

with child welfare services allows a state to better

them in contact with the child welfare system, such

provide ‘wrap-around’ care–that which

dual involvement in the child welfare and juvenile

encompasses health, social and family, as well as

justice systems.”25

justice-related, factors–and to access a wider range
Louisiana’s experience has been similar to that of

of alternatives to confinement.

Arizona. When the state split adult and youth
The creation of Connecticut’s Department of

corrections in 2004, it kept its child welfare

Children and Families (DCF) in 1976 cannot be

department separate. However, the Governor’s

directly linked to that state’s recent drop in youth

Louisiana Children’s Cabinet has been coordinating

confinement, but it likely helped contemporary

policy between the five state departments that

changes take hold more easily, accelerating reform.

provide services for young people since 1992. Most

Many components go into the kind of systemic

recently, in 2011, the Children’s Cabinet has

change that can cut a state’s youth confinement rate

partnered with another Governor’s office project,

in half in ten years or less, such as visionary

Coordinated Systems of Care (CSoC) that seeks to

leadership, public sentiment, growing awareness

do just what its title implies: coordinate care

that a problem exists and organizational structure.

between systems that service youth. The Children’s

Although Connecticut’s child welfare and juvenile

Cabinet, with its state-level and legislative

justice services have shared a department since

connections, is able to smooth legal and policy

1976, other conditions did not exist to take full

roadblocks that hamper such coordination.

advantage of such a design. The DCF makes full
acknowledgement of the benefits of its structure on

Crossover and dually-involved youth

its website, stating, “This comprehensive approach

Children who experience the child welfare system

enables DCF to offer quality services regardless of

and the juvenile justice system can be described by

how a child's problems arise. Whether children are

two main terms: crossover youth and dually-

abused and/or neglected, are involved in the

involved youth. Crossover youth are those who

juvenile justice system, or have emotional, mental

move from one system to the other, typically from

health or substance abuse issues, the Department

child welfare to juvenile justice. Dually-involved

can respond to these children in a way that draws

youth are those who experience both systems at

upon community and state resources to help.”

once, e.g., a foster child who is arrested for

23

runaway. Regardless of the category, determining
The Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections

the numbers of these youth has proved frustrating

(ADJC) was created in 1990 as a cabinet-level

for researchers and practitioners alike.

agency, splitting juvenile services from the larger
Department of Corrections as a result of class action

Depending on one’s starting point, figures may be

lawsuit involving the State’s treatment of juveniles

as high as a 79 percent delinquency rate for child

in confinement.24 While Arizona has not made the

welfare-involved youth or 83 percent of justice-

structural changes seen in Connecticut and

involved youth reporting a history of

Tennessee, former Governor Janet Napolitano

maltreatment.26 The reason that exact numbers of

“recognized the need to address the link between

youth within these systems are difficult to come by

child welfare and juvenile justice” as early as 2003.

is a lack of coordination and shared information,

After several years of research and planning, the

not to mention competing organizational cultures.

state produced a blueprint to direct “better

Combining juvenile justice and child welfare

coordinated responses to, and improved outcomes

responsibilities into one agency or directing

for, youth who are dually involved or at risk of

cabinet-level bodies to provide such coordination

are ways that some of the top performing states

associated with and in compliance with the Juvenile

have sought to bridge this service gap.

Justice and Delinquency Prevention Program
(JJDP), but the groups discussed here go beyond

Collaboration commission or
coordinating body

that role.27 They focus on nurturing collaboration
and maintaining focus on reform ideals. All of the

Because of the complex needs of many juvenile

top performing states have some form of juvenile

justice involved youth, juvenile correctional

justice oversight body. Arizona and Louisiana are

systems cannot function in a vacuum. They must

examples of states that have formed such groups as

coordinate with a myriad of other service agencies

part of recent reforms with great success.

ranging from court support to mental health and
substance abuse counseling in order to provide a

In 2004, Arizona reached a settlement agreement

full spectrum of supervision and services to justice

with the DOJ to address the findings of a CRIPA

system involved youth. Coordination between

investigation. To facilitate resolution efforts,

agencies and service providers is important in the

Governor Napolitano created a Task Force on

adult criminal justice system, but perhaps more so

Juvenile Corrections Reform. The Task Force is

in the juvenile system, where the urgency and

composed of experts and professionals in the areas

delicacy of serving troubled youth is heightened.

of juvenile justice, behavioral health, education, and
medicine. Its mandated functions fill the basic

States that have been successful in reducing youth

requirements of such a committee: it exists to

confinement have created coordinating bodies that

provide oversight and to advise. More importantly,

appear to have had a marked influence on

as a state-level body, the Task Force has been able

confinement practices. Each state has a State

to help coordinate the various parts of the system

Advisory Group (SAG) to carry out work

while promoting the overall vision of a smaller,

State Commissions and Task Forces
State

Coordinating body

Year formed

Arizona

Task Force on Juvenile
Corrections Reform

2004

Connecticut

Connecticut Juvenile Justice
Strategic Plan Task Forces

~2006

Louisiana

Juvenile Justice Commission,
replaced by Juvenile Justice
Implementation Commission

2001, 2003

Minnesota

Minnesota Juvenile Justice
Task Force

1999

Tennessee

Tennessee Commission on
Children and Youth

1955, statutory update
in 1988

Source: Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, “Juvenile Justice & Youth
Development,” February 2013.
http://www.ct.gov/opm/cwp/view.asp?a=2974&q=383614; State of Louisiana Juvenile
Justice Initiative, “Juvenile Justice Implementation Commission,” February 2013.
http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutCommiss;
Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, “2012 Minnesota Statutes,” February 2013.
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=299c.65.

safer and more equitable
juvenile justice system in
Arizona.28
The Juvenile Justice
Commission of Louisiana
was formed in 2001 in order
to facilitate changes required
from the settlement of federal
investigations reached one
year earlier. The body has
since morphed into the
Juvenile Justice
Implementation Commission
(JJIC). A state website states
the group’s “main purpose is
to oversee the reform of the
state’s juvenile justice system
by implementation of the
recommendations contained

in the Juvenile Justice Reform Act and House

timing. As a means to achieve its mission of

Concurrent Resolution 56, both of Regular Session

reducing the detention of pre-adjudicated youth,

2003,” which seek to reform the state’s system

the initiative promotes improved collaboration

beyond the demands of the settlement agreement.

among agencies. Also, the Center for Juvenile

However, the site also describes the group’s role as

Justice Reform at Georgetown University seeks to

to oversee, evaluate, make recommendations,

enable agencies in participating jurisdictions to

advocate, scrutinize, and study alternatives.

“create a seamless process from case opening to

29

Perhaps most importantly, the JJIC “listen(s) to

case closing that improves outcomes” for youth.33

testimony from stakeholders and hold(s)
accountable those responsible in the system.”30
Another benefit to collaborative groups is their
ability to coordinate ‘stream of offender’ decisions
and resources. So, if a decision is made to divert a
particular group of justice-involved youth, the
collaborative group can recognize that these youth

Distinguishing the impact of various actions–such

will need other services and make funding and

as separating juvenile corrections from the adult

policy decisions accordingly.31

system or forming a juvenile reform advisory
committee–in the analysis of confinement reform is

Enlist the technical expertise of
national initiatives

a difficult, if not impossible, task; the system

States need not recreate the wheel when forming a

changes presented here can be described by one

coordinating body to help steer reform. The

overriding theme: the developmentally appropriate

technical expertise of national, foundation-

treatment of youth or what Barry Krisberg calls, the

supported initiatives is available; groups for whom

“American juvenile justice ideal.”34

reforms are interconnected. However, many of the

increased collaboration and communication is a key
part of their strategy.

Krisberg tells of a group of foreign judges who
described to him the American model of justice that

For example, in Louisiana the Models for Change

their own juvenile systems have been built upon.

initiative, a project funded by the John D. and

Such a model emphasizes “compassionate and

Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, assisted in

enlightened care for vulnerable children” and seeks

promoting collaboration at the state and parish

“to substitute treatment and care in lieu of a stark

levels to explore alternatives to formal processing

regimen of punishment for wayward youths.” They

and secure confinement as well as in the areas of

then expressed surprise at America’s abandonment

Drug Courts, family welfare and juvenile indigent

of those philosophies for the heavy-handed

defense.32 The Annie E. Casey Foundation’s

approaches of mass incarceration and transfer to

Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) is

adult courts.

another program that may bring technical
assistance to the reform process. Four of the five top

The history of juvenile justice and corrections is

performing states have some level of JDAI

often portrayed as a pendulum: swinging from one

involvement, though it is difficult to attribute

extreme to another, from punitive and harsh to

reductions in overall confinement to that program,

forgiving and therapeutic. The reform work of the

given the limited scope of JDAI rollout and the

last decade or so to correct the extreme policies of
the “get tough” era of juvenile justice represents

systems seeking equilibrium. States are now

focus on more developmentally appropriate

coming to understand that adult-style punishment

diversion programs.

for young people is more harmful than helpful. As
these states ratchet down the use of incarceration,

Minnesota, for example, has a long history of

they are looking to more developmentally

programs that divert youth from the more formal

appropriate models and trying to create systems

aspects of the justice system. The state, recognizing

that simultaneously acknowledge the physiological

the importance of such an approach in 1995,

and behavioral differences of young people, while

required for counties to have at least one juvenile

holding them accountable for delinquent actions.

diversion program in place.36

The juvenile justice ideal aligns neatly with what

Another example of a diversion policy is the

many practitioners and researchers consider to be

program in Louisiana’s 16th Judicial District.

elements of best practices. Across the nation, a

Established in 2006, the program seeks to divert

rediscovery is taking place that the methods of

youth accused of status offenses or other minor

juvenile justice that work best are those based on

offenses from formal processing. Participants in the

philosophies that shaped the founding of the

Prosecutor’s Early Intervention Programs must take

juvenile justice system in the U.S.

part in a family meeting where a team decides on a
schedule of services and expectations. Once

In addition to commonalities among the ‘top

program requirements are met, the youth is

performers’ already mentioned, these states have

released from obligation with no formal charges on

enacted or implemented other changes that adhere

his or her record. This kind of program enables the

to the developmentally appropriate treatment of

state to address unwanted behavior and demand

youth.

accountability without saddling youth with the

Diversionary and restorative
interventions

negative collateral consequences of justice system
involvement.

Rather than funnel all youth accused of violating

Other diversionary programs do not steer youth

the law into the justice system, many jurisdictions

away from formal processing but rather direct

have created or enhanced programs that steer them

adjudicated youth away from out-of-home

out of the system and toward services such as

placement. Allowing youth to stay at home while

family, mental health or substance counseling.

being sanctioned and treated has numerous

Utilizing diversionary responses demonstrates the

benefits, not the least of which is immense savings

recognition that juvenile behavior is often driven,

when compared to the costs of confinement. It also

not by bad intent or ‘bad kids,’ but as a reaction to

enables the youth’s family to take part in services,

other influences in a child’s life.

the child to continue to attend his home school.
This approach also enables interventions and their

Many states’ juvenile justice systems began to

benefits to continue over a longer period of time.37

enhance or create diversion programs in the 1990s

Obviously, if the youth’s home environment is

as a part of the national trend toward alternative

harmful or not conducive to providing services, the

sanctions. Unfortunately, some of these included

child may be placed out-of-home, but the trend

Scared Straight programs or harsh interventions

nationally, and in the top performing states, is to

such as boot camps.35 Those ineffective and harmful

keep the child at home when possible.

practices have begun to wane in recent years,
allowing states, the ‘top performers’ included, to

Tennessee, for example, recently clarified its rules

complicated the placement of these youth. The

on the processing of “unruly” children, stating that

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of

a juvenile-family crisis intervention program must

1974 declared that youth, even when convicted and

first determine there is “no other less drastic

sentenced as adults, must be held separately, using

measure than court intervention” before

the sight and sound rule (meaning, there can be no

committing a child to state custody.38

visual or auditory contact between adults and
young people who are imprisoned).41

Another approach, often a part of diversionary
programs, is the use of balanced and restorative

Many states, including the ‘top performers,’ have

justice (BARJ). BARJ programs seek to treat not

begun to reverse the laws that encouraged courts to

only accused or adjudicated youth but also crime

treat more youth as adults, some going as far as to

victims through involving victims in some decision-

increase the age limit of juvenile jurisdiction in their

making aspects of the justice process and by more

states.

directly linking punishment to the harm caused.
Some restorative justice sentences give victims a

Connecticut is perhaps the poster child of the ‘raise

chance to address adjudicated youth and some

the age’ movement. In 2012, after a seven-year

require youth to perform services that benefit their

struggle, juvenile justice advocates successfully

community. The end goal is the same: to heal the

managed to change state law so that 16 and 17 year-

harm caused by an offense and restore the sense of

olds were no longer automatically under adult

community and trust among community

court jurisdiction.42 Prior to that, Connecticut had

members.39

one of the nation’s lowest juvenile jurisdiction
limits at age 15. Critics worried that shifting 16 and

Four of the five ‘top performers’ (excluding

17 year-olds, the ages with the highest arrest and

Tennessee) are among a minority of states that

adjudication rates, would overwhelm the system.

articulate ideals of BARJ or some variation in their

However, because advocates were correct in

juvenile justice legislation, according to a 2008

acknowledging that these youth would respond

survey. For example, Connecticut incorporates the

better to services and treatment rather than

balanced approach with the goal of the juvenile

imprisonment, the system has improved rather

justice system to: “provide individualized

than collapsed.

supervision, care, accountability and treatment in a
Of the five ‘top performers,’ only Louisiana has an

manner consistent with public safety to those
juveniles who violate the law.” Minnesota also

upper age limit below 17, at age 16, youth in that

specifies victim-offender mediation in statute.

state are considered adults in the eyes of the courts.

40

The other four states treat all youth under the age

The age of juvenile justice
jurisdiction and adult transfers

of 18 as juveniles, with limited exceptions for
statutorily defined serious or repeat offenses.

Through the perceived youth crime scare of the
1980s and 1990s, several states either lowered the

Statutory allowances for a transfer of a young

upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction or

person to the adult criminal justice system may also

increased the number and type of crimes for which

have an impact on juvenile confinement rates, not

a young person could be tried as an adult. The

to mention crime and recidivism in general as the

movement increased the numbers of teens who

practice has been shown to garner worse outcomes

received sentences of imprisonment and

than keeping youth within the juvenile system.43
Despite recent reforms that have limited when a

transfer can occur, according to the Department of

merit, it seems, as the top performing states do

Justice, “The surge in youth violence that peaked in

have, on average, higher numbers of youth held in

1994 helped shape current transfer laws.” In many

adult facilities. Unfortunately, there are critical

cases, these laws stipulate a mandatory transfer to

information gaps in what we know about the

adult court if certain conditions are met, thwarting

numbers of youth who are sent to adult correctional

the discretion of courts that embrace a more

institutions, what services they receive and what

developmentally appropriate response.

becomes of them upon release and we are once

44

again at the mercy of very shallow data provided
Arizona, Connecticut, Louisiana and Tennessee

by the United States Department of Justice in their

have all made changes in recent years regarding

Prisoners series.46

which youth may be treated as an adult in criminal
court. Some, like Connecticut’s, have been

In comparing the 10 states that reduced their youth

sweeping; while others, such as in Tennessee,

confinement the most between 2001 and 2010 with

merely allow more judicial discretion in the

the 10 states that showed the smallest reductions or

matter.45 They all are part of a national trend to

increases (see table on page 23) we find a difference

restrict the numbers of youth tried in the adult

in the average rate of youth held in adult facilities,

system and to care for those youth in more

5.6 versus 1.4, respectively. As rates, these figures

developmentally appropriate ways.

should allow comparison between states with
differences in population. It is beyond the scope of

In the context of the current analysis, an important

this report to examine this issue in the detail it

question is whether the top performing states have

requires. The figures illuminate an area of future

fewer youth in confinement because they send

research.

more young people to adult prisons. The notion has

States with reductions in youth confinement have a higher average
rate of youth held in adult facilities.

Confinement change in
juvenile facilities,
2001-2010

Number of youth held in
adult facilities, 2010

Rate of youth held in
adult facilities, 2010, per
100,000

Connecticut

-57.2%

217

26.6

Tennessee

-55.0%

29

1.9

Louisiana

-52.7%

22

2.0

Minnesota

-50.6%

32

2.5

Arizona

-50.2%

131

8.0

Massachusetts

-47.2%

3

0.2

Mississippi

-46.7%

25

3.3

Texas

-44.4%

150

2.2

New Jersey

-44.3%

18

0.9

North Carolina

-42.3%

184

8.1

State

Average:

5.6

Alaska

-11.9%

7

3.7

Missouri

-10.5%

22

1.5

Maine

-7.8%

0

0.0

Pennsylvania

+7.1%

58

2.1

North Dakota

+9.3%

0

0.0

Nebraska

+10.2%

23

5.0

Arkansas

+10.6%

9

1.3

South Dakota

+11.9%

1

0.5

Hawaii

+16.9%

0

0.0

West Virginia

+24.4%

0

0.0

Average:

1.4

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Prisoners in 2010, (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). Easy Access to the
Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, “US & State Profiles,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/ .

Evidence-based practices

Evidence-based practices are not limited to the

The most effective interventions for justice-involved

therapeutic programs discussed in Greenwood’s

young people are those supported by evidence of

work. An EBP can be any type of program leading

achievement. Peter Greenwood’s recent study of

to a desired and positive outcome that has been

evidence-based practices, or EBPs, defines them as

proven effective through evidence. Many times,

practice that “involves the use of scientific

programs for youth are implemented and

principles to assess the available evidence on

continued because they seem intuitive or strike a

program effectiveness and develop principles for

chord with politicians or the public. For example,

best practice in any particular field.” Evidence-

the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.)

based programs and this way of assessing them–

program was repeatedly found to have "a limited to

through outcome-related evidence–has been a

essentially non-existent effect" on drug use in

growing trend in the fields of juvenile justice

young people.48 Despite this, the program, the most

prevention and intervention for at least the past

expensive anti-drug program in the United States at

decade.

the time, was refunded for many years because of

47

its political and public support.
In these fields, Greenwood assesses states on their
“number of “therapist teams” from “proven
programs” divided by the total population” and
produces his own ‘top five’ list. These programs
included Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care

The confinement of minority youth

(MTFC), Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and

A 50 percent reduction in the rate of juvenile

Multisystemic Therapy (MST). Greenwood’s top

confinement in a state over a ten-year period is

five group includes two of this report’s top five

remarkable and deserves high praise. However, it is

confinement reducers, Connecticut and Louisiana,

only one aspect of the state’s justice system. It is

which have 10 or more family therapy teams per

equally important to critically examine other

million people. In fact, all ‘top performers’ but

aspects of confinement practices in the top

Tennessee show up on the author’s list of states

performing states that need improvement.

utilizing significant numbers of EBPs.

One area where most states, the ‘top performers’

Arizona has recently taken part in a study to score

included, have not made much progress is in

and track EBPs in the state using a tool called the

addressing the disproportionate confinement of

Standardized Program Evaluation Protocol (SPEP)

youth of color. In these states, youth of color

to enable a more uniform cataloging and

continue to be confined at rates from two to four

measurement of effective programs. Use of such a

times higher than their percentage in the

protocol not only helps a state maximize its use of

population. For example, in Arizona where youth

EBPs but also helps to find and fill gaps in the data

of color comprise about 17 percent of the juvenile

collection processes that enable evaluation of the

population, they were 66.5 percent of all confined

EBPs’ effectiveness.

youth. This disproportionality increased from 2001
when youth of color made up 59.9 percent of the
confined population in the state.

whole. For example,
in Louisiana in 2001,

Percent of confined population
that are of color

The disproportionate representation of youth of color
increased in all five states, following the national trend.

detained youth

81.0%

78.0%
73%
66.5%
60%

61.2%

58.2%

58%

accounted for 23.4
67.6%
60%

51%

46%

percent of all
juveniles confined.
In 2010, this had
increased to 32.2
percent. Arizona’s
detention
proportion did fall
from 39.7 percent in

LA

AZ

MN

TN

2001

CT

US

2001 to 34.4 percent
in 2010, but that
figure is still

2010

relatively high
The movement to reduce the disparity of minority

compared to the national average of 29.1 percent.

youth in the juvenile justice system is a national one
embraced by OJJDP and the Models for Change

The national average increased as well, from 26.3

initiative, among others. However, as the data

percent in 2001. However, with the exception of

show, even among states leading in the reduction of

Arizona, the top performers saw a larger increase in

juvenile confinement, the problem remains.

their ratio of committed youth to detained youth.
What do these figures indicate? It is difficult to say

Nationally, the decrease in youth confinement has

with authority, however they do seem to point to a

not been borne evenly among racial groups. In fact,

greater focus on commitment reduction over

across most offense categories white youth saw the

detention reduction in these states and the nation as

greatest reduction in commitments, compared to

a whole.

African American and Latino youth.
Only within the drug offense

Except for drug offenses, white youth in the U.S. saw
the largest drops in the committed population for all
offenses from 2001-2010.

category did the reduction in
commitments of youth of color
outpace that of white youth.
0%

Detention
As confinement rates have declined,
the rates of detained and committed
Looking at the percent of confined

-40%

youth who were classified as

-50%

the five states increased the
proportion of detained youth to the

Drug

-20%
-30%

prior to a court appearance–four of

Property Violent Crime
Crime Index**
Index*

-10%

youth have not fallen equally.

“detention”–that is, held securely

Total

-60%
-70%
White

African American

Latino

Status
offense

In all the states in question, the

In the U.S. and 4 of the 5 top performers the ratio of
detained youth increased.

number of youth being held in

29.1%

26.3%

41.0%
23.3%

24.0%

17.1%

23.4%

in post-adjudication commitments.

14.3%

32.2%

detentions did not match the decrease

23.0%

analysis, the rate of decrease of

34.4%

reasons beyond the scope or our

39.7%

detention did go down; however, for

During the period under analysis, the
youth arrest rate fell by 27 percent in

LA

AZ

MN

TN

CT

US

the United States. Three of the five
top performing states saw their youth
arrest rates drop greater than the national average:
Connecticut by 32.4 percent, Minnesota by 34.3
percent and Louisiana by 50.1 percent. Arizona’s
rate dropped just less than the national rate, falling
by 24.2 percent. Tennessee was the only top
performing state with an increase in its juvenile

2001

2010

a helpful, but not prerequisite, part of confinement
reform. Indeed, West Virginia decreased its youth
arrests by 28.3 percent, greater than the national
average, but its confinement rate actually increased
by 24.4 percent.

arrest rate, increasing 11 percent to a rate of 2,472

Reformers in states with stagnating arrest rates who

youth arrested per 100,000 in the population.

may be waiting for a “break in the action” during

Fewer arrests allow a state’s juvenile justice system
more “breathing room” within which to make
changes. However, the unclear pattern between
arrest rates and confinement rates in the top
performing states and the increase in Tennessee
demonstrate that a decline in youth arrests may be

which to push for change should take note: arrest
rates do not necessarily need to decrease in order to
reduce the number of young people sent to
confinement. In fact, changes that limit the number
of youth who are committed or detained may force
changes upstream, prompting police and courts to
divert or counsel and release more youth.

From 2002 to 2010 the arrest rate of young people fell in the U.S. and in all top
performing states but Tennessee.

Rate of youth arrests per 100,000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000
2002

2003

2004

LA

MN

2005

TN

2006

AZ

2007

CT

2008

2009

2010

US

Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reports,” February 2013. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr
Uniform Crime Reports: Publications & Queriable Statistics, “State of Connecticut Department of Public Safety,” February
2013. http://www.dpsdata.ct.gov/dps/ucr/ucr.aspx ; Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, “Tennessee Crime Statistics,”
February 2013. http://www.tbi.tn.gov/tn_crime_stats/stats_analys.shtml

In 2010, Connecticut's confined youth
population was 40 percent of its 1999 peak.
Number of youth confined

The number of young people confined in
Connecticut in 2010 was about 40 percent of
what it was in 1999. Those numbers dropped
by 20 percent–from the high of 783 in 1999 to
680 in 2001–then leveled off for a few years.
Between 2003 and 2010 the number of youth
confined decreased by half to 315.
Connecticut’s significant decreases can

783
684

630

627
498
426
315

1997

1999

2001

2003

2006

2007

2010

mostly be attributed to a concerted statewide
effort to change the culture of juvenile justice in the
state, sparked by a 1999 civil rights lawsuit and

child welfare services to enhance wraparound care

subsequent settlement. Following that, Connecticut

services and to refocus its programs on evidence-

formed high-level collaborative commissions and

based models such as multisystemic therapy (MST)

task forces to ensure compliance with the reform

and restorative justice interventions.

agenda and facilitate communication between

The numbers of committed and detained youth

agencies and partners. The state was also able to

both fell during the period, however the proportion

take advantage of the existing organizational
structure of a juvenile justice system partnered with

CT
2001

2010

of detained youth within all those confined

Total

Commitment

Detention

Shock

630

483

147

0

Percent of total

76.7%

23.3%

0.0%

315

183

129

3

Percent of total

58.1%

41.0%

1.0%

color are confined at a higher rate than

Drug offenses accounted for a smaller percentage
of confined youth in Connecticut in 2010, however
a greater proportion of youth were held for
technical violations.

percent of the confined youth
population was of color, while

35.2%

representing only about 20 percent of
the state’s youth population.
The number of young people arrested
in Connecticut fell by 32.4 percent

3.8%

6.2%

20.5%

12.4%

15.7%

3.8%

11.9%

15.7%

14.3%

30.5%

30.0%

in previous years. As of 2010, 81

between 2001 and 2010, outpacing the
national decline of 27 percent. This

Person

Property

Drug

Public order Tech vio

2001

Status

decrease, a reflection of progressive,

2010

systemic reforms in how the state treats
young people in contact with the justice

increased from 23.3 percent of confined youth in

system, allowed reformers to capitalize on a less-

2001 to 41 percent in 2010.

burdened system to achieve greater gains.
Connecticut’s confinement reduction applied fairly
evenly to the ‘person’ and property’ offense
categories, maintaining a similar distribution in

During the time period covered in this report,

2010 as in 2001. However, there was an increase in

Tennessee decreased its youth confinement by 55

the percent of youth confined for technical

percent. However, if we examine the trend in

violations–breaking a court-ordered condition such

confinement beginning in 1997, the state has

as probation–and, in 2010, more than a third of all

reduced confinement by nearly 63 percent,

confined youth in Connecticut were held for such a

dropping from 2,118 youth confined in 1997 to 789

charge.

in 2010. As with the other ‘top performers,’ such an
astounding shift can be attributed to a convergence

Despite laudable progress in reducing overall

of factors in the state’s juvenile justice system.

confinement in the state, Connecticut’s youth of

Disporportionate minority confinement endures in
Connecticut's secure facilities.

76.5%
67.1%

69.7%

81.0%
73.9%

64.6%
58.1%

16.3%

17.0%

17.3%

17.7%

18.3%

18.5%

20.8%

1997

1999

2001

2003

2006

2007

2010

Youth of colorin residential confinement
Youth of color in state population

Source: OJJDP, “Easy Access
to Juvenile Populations:
1990-2011,” February 2013.
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezap
op/.

First, a restructuring in 1996 coupled

Apart from a bump in 2001, youth confinement
inTennessee has steadily decreased since 1997.

Tennessee’s juvenile corrections
Number of yout confined

department with child welfare
services, enabling better access to
health and treatment services for
court-involved youth. Then, in 2000, a
civil rights lawsuit against the state’s
child welfare system brought
sweeping changes. As conjoined
agencies, it is very likely that the

2,118

procedural and cultural reforms

1,533

1,434

1,419
1,263
789

1997

brought on by the suit had a collateral

1,656

impact on the correctional half of the agency. In

1999

2001

2003

2006

2007

2010

youth in 2010, an increase from 47.5 percent in 2001.

fact, a Deputy Commissioner in the department
stated that, about ten years ago (circa 2002) “there

Other states have been able to capitalize on a

was a clear message that there was going to be a

decrease in youth arrests in realizing systemic

change in culture.”49 The department then began to

reforms, but Tennessee has not experienced the

forge and strengthen relationships with

same reduction. In fact, between 2002 and 2009 (the
years for which

TN

Total

Commitment

Detention

Shock

1,656

1,410

237

9

Percent of total

85.1%

14.3%

0.5%

789

594

189

6

Percent of total

75.3%

24.0%

0.8%

quality data was
available), the

2001

2010

number of young
people arrested
increased.
Tennessee’s
experience is a good
example of how

community-based service providers and increase
the resources that would allow youth to be served

lower arrest rates may be helpful in achieving

at or close-to-home. Also at that time a state

reform, but are not essential.

forecast recognized that a plan to

youth of color in its juvenile justice
system. Despite comprising only 21.8
percent of the population, AfricanAmerican youth in Tennessee made
up over half (54.4 percent) of confined

2006

2007

36,958

2004

36,578

2003

37,747

see disproportionate numbers of

37,636

The state is another that continues to

36,649

based care over state commitment.

35,766

with one that promoted community-

32,566

advisable. That plan was replaced

Number of youth arrested

people was neither necessary nor

35,880

In contrast to other states, Tennessee's juvenile
arrests have increased in recent past.

build more secure facilities for young

2002

2005

2008

2009

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, “Tennessee Crime Statistics,” February 2013.
http://www.tbi.tn.gov/tn_crime_stats/stats_analys.shtml

The offense types for which

In Tennessee, African American youth continue to be
confined at over twice their numbers in the population.

youth were held in
confinement did not

75.8%

significantly change, apart
from drug offenses. In

54.4%

49.5%

Louisiana, the percent of youth

47.5%

held for drug offenses

39.2%

decreased from 10.9 percent in
21.8%

2001 to 5.5 percent in 2010.
These decreases also resemble
the national-level changes.

White
% committed 2001

Despite a significant decrease

African American
% committed 2010

% in pop.

in youth confinement between
2001 and 2010, the

disproportionate representation of minorities–in
Louisiana, particularly African American youth–
In 2001, Louisiana had the third highest juvenile

increased during the period. The ratio of white

confinement rate in the nation at 505 youth per

youth to African American youth in the general

100,000. With such a high baseline rate, it seemed

population remained mostly the same over the

likely that Louisiana would show a
Number of youth confined

reduction by 2010. The state was able to
lower its rate to 239 in 2010, making it
only the nineteenth highest for that year
and representing a 52.7 percent decrease
in its rate of confinement.
Within the 52.7 percent drop, the bulk
can be attributed to a decrease in postadjudicated, committed youth. There

The number of youth held in Louisiana fell from
2,745 in 1997 to 1,035 in 2010
2,775

2,457
1,821
1,200

1997

was a much smaller drop, a -34.7

2,745

1999

2001

2003

2006

1,350
1,035

2007

2010

percent change, in detained youth. In
fact, the percent of detention cases with all confined

decade, with white youth making up roughly 60

youth increased from 23.4 percent to 32.2 percent.

percent of the youth population and African-

This mirrors the national experience.

American youth counting for around 40 percent.
However, in 2001, African American youth made

LA
2001

2010

Total

Commitment

Detention

Shock

2,457

1,857

576

241

Percent of total

75.6%

23.4%

1.0%

1,035

687

333

15

Percent of total

66.4%

32.2%

1.4%

From 2001-2010, confinement fell for drug offenses but
remained mostly unchanged for person and property
offenses in Louisiana.
37.1%

36.5%
32.4%

31.0%

10.9%
Person

Property

2001

5.5%
Drug

2010

up 71.9 percent of all confined youth, compared
to 26.9 percent for whites. By 2010, the African
American share of confined youth had risen to

In Louisiana, the proportion of committed
African American youths increased between
2001 and 2010.

76.5 percent, and white confinement dropped to
22 percent of the total.

71.9% 76.5%

During the period, arrests of young people fell

57.8%

by 55.6 percent, a change greater even than the

39.5%

52.7 percent change in juvenile confinement.

26.9% 22.0%

However, Louisiana’s success in reforming
juvenile confinement was not the static result of
White

fewer cases at the front end of the juvenile
justice system. Rather, it represents the

African American

% committed 2001

% committed 2010

% in pop.

commitment and collaboration of many key
players and departments as well as a sense of

urgency driven by deplorable
conditions within the state’s
institutions.
Because of Louisiana’s involvement
the state’s methods and successes

35,055

thoroughly. The following timeline is

16,582

18,674

a simplified description of activities
19,068

24,445

22,355

have been tracked and documented
23,806

35,285

in the Models for Change initiative,
35,560

37,382

Number o fyouth arrested

Juvenile arrests in Lousiana fell by more than
50 percent, from 2001 to 2010.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: OJJDP Juvenile Arrests Series. http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/jar.asp

that played a role in helping
Louisiana reduce its population of
confined youth.

Timeline:
1995

Human Rights Watch report critical of
confinement conditions

1998

DOJ and JJPL lawsuit charging Office of Youth

A court-appointed expert, after a 1999
inspection, wrote of Tallulah's teen inmates: "If
we can't control them and make some difference
in their lives now, God help us when we meet
them on the street."

Development (OYD) with “chronically abusing
and mistreating its incarcerated juvenile
population”50

Source: “Louisiana shuts down youth prison -- Move comes
after decade of abuse allegations,” CNN, May 27, 2004.
http://www.nospank.net/n-m20r.htm

2000

Suit settlement agreement, subsequently amended in 2003 and 2004

2001

State legislature created the Louisiana Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC)

2003

Legislation passed intended to, among other things: close one of the state’s most notoriously abusive
facilities, restructure the juvenile justice system to develop community-based interventions, better fund
juvenile indigent defense and create a juvenile justice planning and coordination board 51

2004

Separation of Youth Services from Correctional Services; creation of Children and Youth Planning
Boards in each judicial district

2005

OYD released strategic plan, emphasizing contemporary evidence-based best practices

2006

State joined JDAI project

2007

MacArthur Foundation funded survey showed broad public support for juvenile justice reform

2009

Introduction of a therapeutic model at the Jetson Center for Youth in 200952

After peaking in 2001, Minnesota has reduced its
youth confinement by more than half.

confinement, more than half since
2001, is all the more interesting
because the state experienced no
obvious catalyst to drive such
change. There was no lawsuit
forcing the reform of overcrowded or poorly run facilities
and no major changes to state’s

Number of youth confined

Minnesota’s decline in youth

juvenile justice organizational

1,947
1,761
1,527

1,521

1,623
1,317
912

1997

structure.

1999

2001

2003

2006

2007

2010

result of two factors: decreasing youth arrests and

According to juvenile justice professionals and

significant changes to Minnesota’s juvenile statutes

advocates in the state, the reduction was likely the

as part of the state’s 1999 crime bill.

MN

Total

Commitment

Detention

Shock

1,944

1,557

333

54

Percent of total

80.1%

17.1%

2.8%

912

681

210

21

Percent of total

74.7%

23.0%

2.3%

2001

2010

Overall, the number of young people arrested in

increase in the percent of confined youth who were

Minnesota fell by 35 percent from 2002 to 2010, a

awaiting adjudication, up from 17.1 percent in 2001

change slightly greater than the national average.

to 23 percent in 2010. Like other states profiled in

Minnesota’s declining arrests may also have been

this report, minority youth continued to be

lowered through a change in how young people

confined at a disproportionate rates as the overall

were processed for certain offenses, following an

rate of juvenile confinement fell.

update to the state’s statutes in 1999.
Youth of color continue to be confined
disproportionately in Minnesota in 2010.

Those changes effectively decreased the
pool of arrested youth who would be
eligible for detention or commitment by

58.2%

53.9%
46.1%

expanding the list of offenses considered

41.8%

‘petty misdemeanors.’ The new list included
many charges that would be considered
misdemeanors if the accused were an adult.

17.4%

13.0%

Since youth charged with petty
misdemeanors cannot be detained or
committed according to Minnesota law,

2001

confinement rates dropped as a result of the

white

revised statutes.53

2010
youth of color

% pop. of color

Minnesota lowered youth confinement fairly evenly
compared to other states, showing only a slight

Number of youth arrested

In Minnesota, juvenile arrests fell 35 percent from their
peak in 2002.
59,348
54,384

52,266

52,452

50,942

50,949

47,229
44,615

43,170
38,795

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Source: Federal Bureau of
Investigation, “Uniform Crime
Reports,” February 2013.
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr

confinement rate in Arizona following a
2004 CRIPA investigation that found
unconstitutional and abusive conditions in
some of Arizona’s youth facilities.
According to state advocates, after the
investigation, judges were reluctant to
send youth to the facilities because of the

Number of youth confined

The graph shows a steady decline in the

recognition that they were substandard or
even dangerous. Add to this sentiment a

Confinement of youth in Arizona decreased
dramatically follwing a 2004 CRIPA
investigation.
1,869

1,902

1,890

1,884

1,737
1,485

1,092
1997

1999

2001

2003

2006

2007

2010

concerted effort by the governor and the

state is still above the national average of 29.1

Department of Juvenile Corrections to improve

percent.

community-based services and access to care and

As seen in other states, decreases in youth

the stage was set for a drop in confinement.

confinement have not been borne evenly across
racial groups. In

AZ
2001

2010

Total

Commitment

Detention

Shock

1,881

1,128

747

6

Percent of total

60.0%

39.7%

0.3%

1,074

693

Percent of total

64.5%

Arizona, despite
comprising only 17.6
percent of the youth

Disproportionate
minority
confinement has
369
12
increased in Arizona since 2001.

34.4%

1.1%

66.5%

59.9%

The Governor’s Task Force on Juvenile
Corrections Reform was instrumental in
coordinating the changes necessary for

40.3%
33.5%

shifting from a reliance on confinement
to a focus on local services and

17.6%

15.0%

evidence-based practices. All these
factors were likely enhanced by a 25
percent drop in youth arrests during the
period, slightly lower than the national

2001

2010

average.

white

Of the five states examined in this report, Arizona

population, young people of color are confined at

is the only one that reduced the proportion of

nearly four times that rate, accounting for two-

detentions within all confined youth during the

thirds of all securely held youth. This disparity

period. With detained youth accounting for 34.4

increased from 2001.

percent of all youth confined in 2010 however, the

youth of color

% pop of color

45,318

51,602

2006

54,259

51,697

2005

53,346

51,291

53,697

52,941

52,373

Overall, arrests of youth in Arizona fell 24.2 %
from 2002 to 2010.

2002

2003

2004

2007

2008

2009

2010

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reports,” February
2013. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr

The national trend to confine fewer youth for the suspicion of or adjudication for
breaking the law is good news for young people and for juvenile justice systems
across the country. The experiences of five states that have reduced juvenile
confinement in recent years provide lessons for other jurisdictions seeking the same
result. The Justice Policy Institute recommends the following:
1. Consider the legal route. Many of the most

litigation-driven reforms and falling arrest rates

effective reform movements have begun through

to shift their systems from confinement-heavy to

the process of settling litigation. If a case can be

ones that favor treatment and the least restrictive

made against poor conditions or
unconstitutional treatment, advocacy

sanctions.
6. Address issues that may be collateral to

organizations have it in their power to kick start

confinement reduction. The problems of pre-

reform by litigating changes in practice.

adjudication detention and the disproportionate

2. Create or re-energize existing juvenile justice
commissions or cabinet-level task forces that
will promote collaboration and communication
amongst stakeholders.
3. Utilize experts for technical assistance.

confinement of youth of color should not be
neglected in a state’s reform strategy.
7. Utilize the experience and lessons learned from
states that have reduced youth confinement.
The methods of reform are many: fiscal

Initiatives such as the John D. and Catherine T.

architecture reform, statutory changes,

MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change

organizational restructuring or a combination of

and the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile

all of the above and more. Through research and

Detention Alternatives Initiative are designed to

collaboration, states can craft a unique reform

help states coordinate reform and tailor it to

strategy that is relevant to their circumstances.

their unique situation.
4. Promote the American juvenile justice ideal of

8. Establish a richer data repository. The data
used for this report came from the OJJDP

treating young people differently than adults.

EZACJRP data set. These data suffer from major

States need to use developmentally appropriate,

limitations of scope and accuracy. The OJJDP

therapeutic interventions rather than harsh

should improve the data for better tracking and

punishment.

analysis of youth incarceration and out-of-home

5. Recognize opportunities to push change. The
top performing states were able to capitalize on

placement.

Note: Unless otherwise noted the source for all graphs and tables is: Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in
Residential Placement, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/.

1

U.S. Department of Justice, Prisoners in 2010, December 2011, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.

2

Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights From Pathways to Desistance: A Longitudinal Study of Serious Adolescent Offenders (Washington,
DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2011); Richard A. Mendel, No Place for Kids: The Case for
Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, (The Annie E. Casey Foundation: Baltimore, MD, 2011)
http://www.aecf.org/OurWork/JuvenileJustice/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceFor
Kids/JJ_NoPlaceForKids_Full.pdf

3

Justice Policy Institute, The Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense (Washington, DC,
2009) http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsofConfinement_JJ_PS.pdf.

4

Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, “US & State Profiles,” February 2013.
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/ .

5

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Statistical Briefing Book,” February 2013.
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 .

The National Academies, Committee on Law and Justice, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach (Washington,
DC: The National Academies, 2012).
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/dbassesite/documents/webpage/dbasse_073318.pdf
7 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders Best Practices Database,”
February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/dso/dsoAbout.aspx
6

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders Best Practices Database:
Background,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/dso/dsoAboutBackground.aspx
9 United States Census Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 (Washington, DC: 2011)
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
8

10

James Austin, Kelly Dedel Johnson and Ronald Weitzer, Alternatives to the Secure Detention and Confinement of Juvenile
Offenders (Washington, DC: OJJDP, 2005).

11

Disability.gov, “Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA)” February 2013.
https://www.disability.gov/home/i_want_to/disability_laws/civil_rights_of_institutionalized_persons_act_(CRIPA); Beth
Warren, “Tennessee child welfare system reforms still under court-ordered oversight,” July 16, 2012.
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/jul/16/tennessee-child-welfare-system-reformsstill/?print=1;http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/fc_docket/alpha/emilyjvweicker/

Personal correspondence with Beth Rosenberg, Director of Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice
Children's Action Alliance.
13 Richard A. Mendel, Juvenile Justice Reform in Connecticut: How Collaboration and Commitment Have Improved Public Safety and
Outcomes for Youth, (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2013).
12

14

Human Rights Watch Children’s Rights Project, Children in Confinement in Louisiana (New York: Human Rights Watch,
2000) http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Us3.htm.

15

Child Welfare League of America, “Six to One: The Evolution of Children’s Services in Tennessee,” February 2013.
http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0211cstn.htm.

16

Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights From Pathways to Desistance: A Longitudinal Study of Serious Adolescent Offenders (Washington,
DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2011).

17

Emily A. Polachek, “Juvenile Transfre: From “Get Better” to “Get Tough” and Where We Go From Here,” William Mitchell
Law Review 35, no. 3 (2009): 1162-1193.

18

State of Louisiana, Office of Juvenile Justice, “History of Juvenile Justice in La.,” February 2013.
http://ojj.la.gov/index.php?page=sub&id=229.

19

Shay Bilchik and Judge Michael Nash, “Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin,” Juvenile and
Family Justice Today (Fall 2008): 16-20.; 19 Shay Bilchik and Judge Michael Nash, “Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Two
Sides of the Same Coin, Part II,” Juvenile and Family Justice Today (Winter 2009): 22-25. Gina M. Vincent, Screening and

Assessment in Juvenile Justice Systems: Identifying Mental Health Needs and Risk of Reoffending (Washington, DC: Technical
Assistance Partnership for Child and Family Mental Health, 2011).
20

Denise Herz, Philip Lee, Lorrie Lutz, Macon Stewart, John Tuell and Janet Wiig, Addressing the Needs of Multi-System Youth:
Strengthening the Connection between Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice (Washington, DC: Center for Juvenile Justice Reform,
2012).

21

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (Washington, DC:
Administration on Children, Youth and Families Children’s Bureau, 2003).

22

Children’s Rights, “Tennessee (Brian A. v. Haslam): Overview,” February 2013. http://www.childrensrights.org/reformcampaigns/legal-cases/tennessee/

23

Connecticut Department of Children & Families, “About DCF,” February 2013.
http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a=2565&Q=314326.

Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, “A History of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” February
2013. http://www.azdjc.gov/FactsNews/ADJCHistory/ADJCHistory.asp
25 Arizona Governor’s Office for Children, Youth & Families, State of Arizona Blueprint Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice
Systems Integration Initiative (Phoenix: 2008).
24

26

Denise Herz, Philip Lee, Lorrie Lutz, Macon Stewart, John Tuell and Janet Wiig, Addressing the Needs of Multi-System Youth:
Strengthening the Connection between Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice (Washington, DC: Center for Juvenile Justice Reform,
2012).

27

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “State Advisory Group (SAG) Training Grant,” February 2013.
http://www2.dsgonline.com/sag/Default.aspx.

28

The Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, Creating a Difference for Arizona’s Youth: FY ’04 Annual Performance Report,
(Phoenix: 2004). http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/78513/content/AnnualRpt04.pdf

29

State of Louisiana, February 2013. http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutCommiss

30

State of Louisiana, February 2013. http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutCommiss

31
32

Personal correspondence with Jason Ziedenberg.
Models for Change, Models for Change Louisiana Work Plan, (Chicago: 2007).
http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/118/Models_for_Change_Louisiana_Workplan.pdf.

Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, “Crossover Youth Practice Model,” February 2013.
http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pm/practicemodel.html,
34 Krisberg, Barry (2006). “Rediscovering the Juvenile Justice Ideal in the United States,” in Comparative Youth Justice,
(London: Sage Publications, 2006), 6-18.
33

35

Anthony Petrosino, Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino and John Buehler, "Scared Straight and Other Juvenile Awareness Programs
for Preventing Juvenile Delinquency: A Systematic Review of the Randomized Experimental Evidence,” The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 589, no. 1 (2003): 41-62.

36

State of Minnesota, Minnesota Juvenile Diversion: A Summary of Statewide Practices and Programming, (St. Paul, MN:
Minnesota Department of Public Safety Office of Justice Programs, 2012).

37

Jacob Z. Hess, Wayne Arner, Eliot Sykes and Andrew G. Price, “Helping Juvenile Offenders on Their Own “Turf”:
Tracking the Recidivism Outcomes of a Home-based Paraprofessional Intervention,” Journal of Juvenile Justice 2, no. 1
(2012). http://www.journalofjuvjustice.org/JOJJ0201/article02.htm.

38

State of Tennessee, “TENNESSEE COMPILATION OF SELECTED LAWS ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 2011
EDITION,” February 2013. http://www.state.tn.us/tccy/tnchild/37/37-1-132.htm.

39

South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Balance and Restorative Justice: Approaching Juvenile Crime in a Different Way
(Columbia, SC: 2012).

40

Sandra Pavelka, “Restorative Juvenile Justice Legislation and Policy: A National Assessment,” International Journal of
Restorative Justice 4, no. 2 (2008): 100-118.

41

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Legislation,” February 2013.
http://www.ojjdp.gov/about/legislation.html .

42

Raise the Age CT, “Raise the Age Timeline,” February 2013. http://www.raisetheagect.org/timeline.html

43

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 1994-1996,”
February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_j.html.

44

Patrick Griffin, Sean Addie, Benjamin Adams and Kathy Firestine, Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer
Laws and Reporting (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2011).

45

National Juvenile Justice Network, Advances in Juvenile Justice Reform: 2009-2011 (Washington, DC: NJJN, 2012).

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Publications & Products: Prisoners,” February 2013.
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=40.
47 Peter W. Greenwood, Brandon C. Welsh and Michael Rocque, Implementing Proven Programs for Juvenile Offenders
(Downington, PA: Association for the Advancement of Evidence-Based Practice, 2012).
46

48

Dennis Cauchon, “Studies Find Drug Program Not Effective: Yet high-level supporters argue "it's better to have it than not
have it",” USA Today, October 11, 1993.

49

Personal correspondence with Albert Dawson, Deputy Commissioner, Juvenile Justice, Department of Children’s Services,
State of Tennessee.

50

State of Louisiana Juvenile Justice Initiative, “Office of Juvenile Justice,” February 2013.
http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutOfficeOf

51

Sarah Alice Brown, Trends in Juvenile Justice State Legislation: 2001-2011 (Washington, DC: National Council of State
Legislators, 2012). http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf.

52

WBRZ.com, “Local News: Jeston Center for Youth making changes,” November, 2012. http://www.wbrz.com/news/jetsoncenter-for-youth-making-changes/.

53

Personal correspondence with Cheryl Kreager, Director, Juvenile Justice Coalition of Minnesota and Dana Swayze,
Juvenile Justice Analyst, Minnesota Department of Public Safety, Office of Justice Programs.

This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation.
The Justice Policy Institute would also like to express gratitude to Sarah Bryer, Jason Ziedenberg, Dick
Mendel, Beth Rosenberg, Dana Swayze, Cheryl Kreager, Linda O’Neal, and Albert Dawson for their
technical assistance and insightful contributions to this report.
JPI staff includes Paul Ashton, Spike Bradford, Zerline Hughes, Adwoa Masozi, Melissa Neal, Kellie Shaw,
and Keith Wallington.

Spike Bradford is a data analyst, project manager and educator with experience in criminal justice, drug
policy and public health. Prior to joining the JPI team, Spike lived in Kenya and Zambia where he taught
English and applied his data analysis skills to public health issues, especially related to women’s health.
Spike’s work at JPI includes: Working for a Better Future: How Expanding Employment Opportunities for D.C.’s
Youth Creates Public Safety Benefits for All Residents, For Better or For Profit: How the Bail Bonding Industry
Stands in the Way of Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice and Crime, Correctional Populations and Drug Arrests Down
in 2011.
Spike has also worked at the Department of the Attorney General of Hawai`i evaluate a variety of criminal
and juvenile justice initiatives and oversee the collection of data for the Uniform Crime Reports. Spike
holds a Master of Education from Bowling Green State University and a Master of Arts from the University
of Hawai`i.

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