LETHAL IN
DISGUISE 2
How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact
Health and Human Rights

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

This report is a joint project of the International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations
(INCLO) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) in collaboration with the
Omega Research Foundation (Omega).

ABOUT INCLO
The International Network of Civil Liberties
Organizations (INCLO) comprises 15
independent
national
human
rights
organizations
working
to
promote
fundamental rights and freedoms by
supporting
and
mutually
reinforcing
the work of member organizations
working in their respective countries and
collaborating on bilateral and multilateral
bases. Each organization is multi-issue,
multi-constituency, domestic in focus and
independent of government, and advocates
on behalf of all people in its country through
litigation, legislative campaigning, public
education, and grassroots advocacy.
The members of INCLO are Agora
International Human Rights Group (Agora)
in Russia; the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) in the USA; the Association for
Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI); the Canadian
Civil
Liberties
Association
(CCLA);
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales
(CELS) in Argentina; the Commission
for the Disappeared and Victims of
Violence (KontraS) in Indonesia; Dejusticia
in Colombia; the Egyptian Initiative for
Personal Rights (EIPR); the Human Rights
Law Centre (HRLC) in Australia; the Human
Rights Law Network (HRLN) in India; the
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU); the
Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL); the

Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC);
the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) in South
Africa; and Liberty in the United Kingdom.
Police brutality, discrimination, and protest
rights are priority areas for INCLO. INCLO
members partner to advocate against
government and police repression of protests
and to promote human rights activism.
INCLO also seeks to promote and protect
the right to protest by combining technical
work–the compilation of standards and
analysis–with creating materials intended
for a wider audience. Previous reports
include: Take Back the Streets: Repression
and Criminalization of Protest Around the
World (2013); Defending Dissent: Towards
State Practices That Protect and Promote
the Right to Protest (2018), in partnership
with The Global Human Rights Clinic of
the University of Chicago Law School;
and Protesting During a Pandemic: State
Responses During COVID-19 (2021).
The INCLO members that participated in this
report are the ACLU, ACRI, Agora, CCLA,
CELS, KontraS, Dejusticia, HCLU, HRLC,
HRLN, ICCL, KHRC and the LRC. Liberty is
not an author or party to the report.
For more information, visit inclo.net.

INCLO
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF
CIVI L LIBERTIES ORGAN IZATIONS

2

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

ABOUT PHR
For nearly 30 years, Physicians for Human
Rights (PHR) has used science and medicine
to document and call attention to mass
atrocities and other severe human rights
violations. PHR is a global organization
founded on the idea that health professionals,
with their specialized skills, ethical duties
and credible voices, are uniquely positioned
to stop human rights violations.
PHR’s investigations and expertise are used
to advocate for the protection of persecuted
health workers, prevent torture, document
mass atrocities and hold those who violate
human rights accountable. In 1999, PHR
led the effort to develop the internationally
recognized Manual on the Effective
Investigation and Documentation of Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, also known
as the Istanbul Protocol, which PHR was
instrumental in updating in 2022. PHR has a
long history of advocating against weapons
that can cause grave injury to civilian
populations including organizing against
the use of landmines for which PHR shared

the Nobel Prize in 1997. As to crowd-control
weapons in particular, PHR has assessed the
adverse health effects in a number of places,
including Bahrain, Egypt, the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (OPT), the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), Thailand and Türkiye.
PHR’s studies have documented severe
injuries due to birdshot and rubber bullets
in Panama and the OPT, abuse of tear gas
posing risks to health in Bahrain, South Korea
and Turkey, as well as beatings using batons
and sticks.
Through direct examination of victims, desk
research and scientific evaluation of weaponry
and its potential adverse consequences
(when used both appropriately and
inappropriately), PHR has brought relevant
information to advocates and policymakers
seeking to curtail responses by police and
security forces that not only suppress lawful
dissent, but also harm human health.
For more information, visit phr.org.

Physicians for
Human Rights

3

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

ABOUT OMEGA
Founded in 1990, the Omega Research
Foundation (Omega) is a UK-based
nongovernmental research organisation.
Omega investigates and exposes the global
manufacture, trade, procurement, and use of
a wide range of military, security, and policing
weapons, including small arms and light
weapons as well as large weapon systems,
surveillance technologies, vehicles, and a
wide range of law enforcement equipment.
Omega works to ensure that human rights
and international humanitarian law violations,
including torture and other ill-treatment, are
not committed or facilitated by people using
such equipment and techniques, so that
people are free to exercise their full range of
human rights without the threat of violence
and repression.

as batons with metal spikes, which have no
lawful use. Omega also strives to strengthen
controls on other weapons that are frequently
used for repression and human rights
violations, including torture and ill-treatment,
such as batons, handcuffs, and tear gas.
Omega looks to increase transparency and
improve controls on the trade of military,
security, and policing equipment worldwide.
Omega is working to strengthen use of force
standards and their application, support
human rights monitors and researchers
around the world, force governments to
change laws, campaign to control the trade in
weapons and equipment, hold corporations
and individuals to account, and secure justice
for survivors of torture.

Omega’s years of specialist research and For more information, visit
investigation have generated an unrivalled omegaresearchfoundation.org.
source of evidence on equipment used
for torture and repression. Using this data,
Research Foundation
Omega seeks to end the manufacture, trade,
and use of inherently abusive weapons, such

CD

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The report was written by Rohini J. Haar,
MD, MPH, Medical Advisor, Physicians for
Human Rights, Assistant Adjunct Professor,
Division of Epidemiology, School of Public
Health and Research Fellow, Human Rights
Center, University of California, Berkeley,
and Emergency Physician, Kaiser Medical
Center, Oakland and Scott Reynhout, PhD,
Researcher for Physicians for Human Rights
(PHR). Section 3 on the laws on the use

4

of force and crowd-control weapons was
written by Michael Power, Attorney of the
High Court of South Africa, Director and Cofounder of ALT Advisory, and consultant for
Protest Rights and Policing, INCLO.
This report is based on research conducted
by Rohini J. Haar, Scott Reynhout, and
James Smith, MBBS, with support from
Sunsaara Shergill and Arthi Inagandla. Tara

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

Davis and Wendy Trott assisted Michael
Power with the preparation of Section 3.
The primary contributors and editors
of the report were Sherylle Dass
(Regional Director, LRC), Sofia Forero Alba
(Researcher, Dejusticia), Laura Kauer Garcia
(Protest Rights and Policing Project Manager,
INCLO), Martin Mavenjina (Senior Program
Advisor, KHRC), Luciana Pol (Senior Fellow,
Security Policy and Human Rights, CELS),
Michael Power (Director, ALT Advisory),
Lucila Santos (Program Director, INCLO),
Anne Suciu (Attorney, ACRI), and
Jennifer Turner (Human Rights Researcher,
ACLU). The main working group met for an
editing meeting in Bogota, Colombia, on 9-11
May 2022. We are grateful to the Dejusticia
staff that welcomed and hosted us.

are particularly grateful to Rebecca Shaw for
her contributions to drafting, reviewing, and
preparing for the launch of this report.
Representatives of PHR who reviewed
and edited this report include Michele
Heisler, MD, MPA, David Berry, Kevin Short,
Karen Naimer, JD, LLM, Erika Dailey, MA,
Michael Payne, Gerson H. Smoger, JD, PhD,
and Christian DeVos, JD, PhD. This report
also was reviewed by two content experts
who are part of PHR’s Advisory Council,
Vincent Iacopino MD, PhD, and Howard Hu
MD, MPH, ScD.
INCLO and PHR thank Taryn McKay for the
design of this report and its accompanying
webbased
platform
(lethalindisguise.
org), Tali Mayer for photo editing,
Kale Vandenbroek and Oleh Kolisny
for illustrations, and ALT Advisory for
copyediting. We also thank Myriam Selhi
for her support in the design of the report,
sourcing photos, reviewing copy for the
website, and communications materials.

Other INCLO members contributed to the
drafting of case studies and reviewing the
executive summary and recommendations,
including Jamil Dakwar (ACLU), Kirill
Koroteev (Agora), Abby Deshman (CCLA),
Juliana Miranda (CELS), Sehba Menai
(HRLN), Alice Drury (HRLC), Szabolcs Hegyi
(HCLU), Doireann Ansbro (ICCL), Auliya INCLO is grateful to the Wellspring
Rayyan, Nadine Sherani and Rozy Brilian Philanthropic Fund, the Ford Foundation,
Dosik (KontraS), and Devon Turner (LRC).
the Oak Foundation, the Open Society
Foundation and the Bertha Foundation for
The
Omega
Research
Foundation their generous support of its work in this
contributed with research on the trade and area. PHR expresses its gratitude to the Piper
manufacture for the Colombia and South Fund, an initiative of the Proteus Fund, which
Africa case studies, as well as with drafting funded this research.
and reviewing of the recommendations. We

5

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................................4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................................8
Summary of findings ..................................................................................................................................10
Summary of recommendations ............................................................................................................14

Section 1

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................19
Methodology and limitations .................................................................................................................21
Trends and context of recent protests and movements ...........................................................23
History and culture of policing ..............................................................................................................25

Section 2

CROWD-CONTROL WEAPONS AND THEIR IMPACTS ..................................................................26
Kinetic Impact Projectiles

Chemical irritants

28
Disorientation devices

56
Acoustic weapons

88
New Frontiers

112

6

Water cannons

79
Blunt force weapons (batons)

98

103

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

Section 3

LAWS AND STANDARDS ON THE USE OF FORCE AND
CROWD-CONTROL WEAPONS ................................................................................................................123
International human rights law ...........................................................................................................124
International standards and best practices ..................................................................................132
Regional and national standards and best practices ...............................................................142
Implementation of the law: experiences from the field ..........................................................144

Section 4

NEW AND REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD..............................151
Observations .............................................................................................................................................. 151
Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................154
Pre-deployment of CCWs ...............................................................................................................154
Use of force and deployment of CCWs ....................................................................................159
Post-deployment of CCWs and medical assistance ...........................................................164
Next steps ....................................................................................................................................................165
Final remarks ..............................................................................................................................................168
USEFUL RESOURCES .....................................................................................................................................169

7

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
fundamentally undermine the rights to free
expression and assembly. The unnecessary
and disproportionate use of force often
serves not to disperse crowds and quell
dissent but rather leads to acrimony and
further escalation of conflict. Such uses of
force often involve crowd-control weapons
(CCWs), weapons ostensibly designed to
inflict sublethal pain on individuals.1 The
rising popularity of CCWs by state actors
highlights alarming trends in policing across
the world: growing authoritarianism, the
militarization of law enforcement, unregulated
and precipitous use of weapons against
peaceful, unarmed people, politically biased
decisions to use force, little transparency
Protests against authoritarian governments around when, how and why CCWs are used
were also seen in places such as Hong and no meaningful accountability. The
Kong in 2019, in Myanmar, Israel and the result is thousands of people worldwide
Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2021, who have been seriously injured or killed by
and more recently in Iran, Russia and China these weapons, and the chilling effect of this
in 2022. Recent demonstrations have also violence on millions more.
played out against the backdrop of the
COVID-19 pandemic, in which global protests Rigorous documentation of injuries resulting
have occurred in response to perceived from the use of CCWs is necessary for
government ineptitude or overreach. Whether understanding their impacts both on health
this pattern of ongoing protests represents and on assembly, association and free
a momentary period of turbulence or a new expression rights. In 2016, the International
normal is yet to be seen. What is clear is Network of Civil Liberties Organizations
that people-driven protest movements are (INCLO) and Physicians for Human Rights
becoming an increasingly common aspect (PHR) published Lethal in Disguise (LiD1),
of the 21st-century geopolitical landscape.
which was the first report to systematically
catalogue the health risks and consequences
Law enforcement and security forces have of CCWs. Our 2016 report leveraged an
frequently responded to these protests extensive review of the peer-reviewed
with excessive force and violence that medical literature, augmented by reviews
Public protests have surged across the
world in recent years, often led by grassroots
movements seeking to challenge social and
economic injustices, express discontent and
demand transformative change from their
governments. Economic inequity led to the
2018 “Yellow Vests” protests in France, and
echoes of these protests were felt in the
2019 Chile protests, the 2020 Indian farmers’
protests, and those across Colombia in 2021.
George Floyd’s 2020 murder by a policeman
set off a historic wave of protests across
the United States and globally, while similar
cases of police brutality were behind the
#EndSARS protests in Nigeria.

1
It is important to note that the violent repression of protesters is not always or solely supported by the use of CCWs. In many
countries, including where INCLO member organizations are based (e.g. the United Kingdom), tear gas, water cannons and other CCWs
discussed in this report are not used or are banned in the context of peaceful assemblies. However, there are still serious challenges to the
full enjoyment of assembly, association and free expression rights.

8

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary

not just to health but also to the meaningful
exercise of assembly, association and free
expression rights? In raising awareness
about the misuse of CCWs, we seek to answer
these questions and foster a global debate
Since then, the nature, scale, and to develop further international standards
documentation
of
protests–and
the and guidelines on the deployment of CCWs.
weapons used–have evolved considerably. Ultimately, our goal is to prevent injury,
There are numerous reports in the media disability and death by providing information
and medical research about thousands of about CCWs and enabling people to exercise
people with severe injuries resulting from assembly, association, and free expression
CCWs: kinetic impact projectiles (KIPs) have rights safely and freely.
caused permanent blindness, brain damage
and internal bleeding; chemical irritants This report examines many categories of
have caused trauma from the canisters, as CCWs used around the world: including kinetic
well as respiratory, skin, and eye injuries impact projectiles (KIPs), chemical irritants,
from the chemicals; stun grenades have water cannons, disorientation devices and
burned people; and acoustic weapons have acoustic weapons. Because weapons not
damaged hearing. Many more injuries likely traditionally considered riot control agents
are increasingly being used to police crowds,
went unreported.
this report also addresses blunt force
These accounts and the significant medical weapons (i.e. batons) and new frontiers in
and scientific advances that have been CCW technology such as drones, electronic
published since the initial report’s release control devices and direct energy weapons.
demanded that we revisit the findings of International law concerning the use of
LiD1. This updated publication, and the force, with specific mention of CCWs, is
additional resources published on the Lethal also discussed.
in Disguise web platform, aim to advance
our understanding of the health impacts of The title of this update and our prior report is
CCWs since the publication of LiD1 and seek designed to make a fundamental reality clear
to continue to raise awareness about the -- CCWs are dangerous and can be lethal. It is
misuse and abuse of CCWs, the detrimental time for this to be widely acknowledged. The
health effects that these weapons can have, global use of CCWs by government-controlled
and the impact of their use on the meaningful security forces on protesters has severe
exercise of assembly, association and free consequences to the physical health of both
those targeted and bystanders not targeted,
expression rights.
on the mental health of everyone involved,
We attempt to answer a number of and on the enjoyment and safe exercise of
questions. What has changed in our medical fundamental civil and political rights.
understanding of the consequences of the
use and misuse of CCWs globally? What new Based on multiple expert interviews, this report
threats do we recognize these weapons pose also demonstrates that injuries have been
of news and human rights organisations’
reports and other data, to elucidate the range
and scope of injuries from the use–and
misuse–of CCWs.

9

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of findings

repeatedly exacerbated by disproportionate,
indiscriminate and excessive use of these
weapons. We are not intending to claim that
public order and safety are not a legitimate
state obligation. Too often, however, the use of
force and CCWs are used in violation of local,
state and international protocols, resulting
in disproportionate and excessive use.
Nearly all weapons can and are frequently
used as indiscriminate tools of collective
punishment against peaceful protesters,
bystanders and disruptors alike, regardless
of their vulnerabilities, actions or potential for
causing harm. Some are inherently unlawful,
just because they are indiscriminate.

Summary of findings2
Kinetic impact projectiles

KIPs–commonly referred to as “rubber
bullets” or “baton rounds”–are bullet-like
missiles used by law enforcement and
security forces to deter conduct through the
pain of impact. The findings of a systematic
review of medical literature indicate that
KIPs can cause serious injury, disability, and
even death. Our updated research identified
2,190 people with injuries from KIPs reported
in medical literature published over the last
six years (2016-2021) globally; and at least
twelve of the identified people died from
Police
violence
is
also
frequently
their injuries with 945 suffering permanent
discriminatory
and
biased
against
disabilities. Ocular injuries, including
marginalised groups, including racial, ethnic,
blindness, account for 1,575 of the injuries
political, religious, and other minorities, who
reported (65% of the total number of injuries).
too often face disproportionate deployments
of force and weapons during protests. While
These data demonstrate that severe
the use of certain CCWs may be warranted in
injuries are most likely when KIPs are fired
some cases to ensure the safety of the public
at close range, when KIPs contain metallic
and law enforcement officials, this study
components or when multi-projectile KIPs
demonstrates that the vast majority of CCWs
are used. Of note, the number of injuries
are not only unnecessary for this purpose,
from metal birdshot found in our literature
but their use runs directly counter to the
review dwarfs those from other KIPs (82%
objective of “public safety and order”.
of all injuries). Additionally, we found that
from close range, some types of KIPs have
a similar ability to penetrate the skin as
conventional live ammunition and can be
just as lethal. When launched or fired from
afar, these weapons are inaccurate and
can strike vulnerable body parts and cause
unintended injuries to bystanders, especially
when multiple projectiles are scattering from
one firearm simultaneously. Our conclusion
2
The health effects of KIPs and chemical irritants are described in detail because there is adequate medical data on associated
injuries to conduct a robust analysis. For other weapons, we harness the growing social media landscape and the growth of online news
media sources to identify and catalogue injuries reported resulting from weapons.

10

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of findings

is that it is doubtful that these weapons can
be used in a manner that is both safe and
effective in a protest setting.

as a result of metal birdshot, a hunting
munition pressed into service in
several countries as a KIP. This report
illustrates metal pellets’ imprecision,
indiscriminate nature, and unmatched
capacity to maim.

Key findings on KIPs

›

›

›

Increase in use and injuries: Since
the publication of LiD1, data on the
use of KIPs to suppress mass dissent
has more clearly illustrated the true
health cost of the proliferation of KIPs
in law enforcement and security forces
worldwide. Focusing on literature
published from 2016-2021, 2,190
persons were injured or killed by KIPs,
mostly in protest settings, a number
greater than LiD1’s total of 1,984
persons reported as injured and
killed based on literature published
before 2016.
Multi-projectiles: The finding of
widespread injuries from multi-projectile
KIPs–where
multiple
projectiles
are fired at once–demonstrates the
harmful effects of these inherently
indiscriminate weapons. They cannot
effectively target a single individual or
a single body part, and their use has
resulted in serious injuries to targeted
individuals (when they impact sensitive
body parts) and to bystanders (when
the projectiles miss the intended target,
instead affecting those not targeted).
The results of our analysis suggest that
these weapons are more dangerous
than single projectiles and leading us
to call for a prohibition on their use as a
first step in limiting harm from KIPs.
Metal pellets: The vast majority of
reported severe injuries (82%) occurred

›

“Hybrid” weapons: The development
and proliferation of “hybrid” weapons
that combine characteristics of KIPs
with other CCWs, such as “pepper balls”
or stun grenades that disperse rubber
balls, are proliferating technologies
that must be closely observed and
evaluated.

›

Canisters misused as KIPs: Tear
gas canisters, when fired directly
at protesters, can be extraordinarily
hazardous. These devices and their
resultant injuries are reviewed in the
chemical irritants section, but the ad
hoc use of other weapons as KIPs must
be further examined and regulated.

Chemical irritants
Commonly referred to as “tear gas” and
“pepper spray,” chemical irritants include a
variety of chemical compounds intended to
irritate the senses. The general perception
is that these weapons have mostly shortterm effects that include irritation of the eyes,
dermal pain, respiratory distress, and the
psychological effects of disorientation and
agitation. A systematic review of medical
literature documenting the health effects
of chemical irritants identified over 100,000
people who have been injured since 2015. At
least fourteen people have died, all of them

11

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of findings

because of trauma inflicted by the canister.3
While chemical irritants are often thought
of as causing minimal transient harm, our
findings also identify longer-term risks,
including permanent disability and death
from their use and misuse.

recent medical literature associated
with tear gas have occurred due
to impacts from military-grade tear
gas canisters.

›

New hazards recognized as a result of
the airborne transmission of viruses,
such as COVID-19: The extensive
use of chemical irritants during the
pandemic has increased the risk of
adverse medical effects due to COVID19’s effects on breathing and the lungs,
as well as the risk of infection through
induced coughing or sneezing. While
there is limited information on the
incidence of COVID-19 in the setting of
tear gas exposure, this issue continues
to be of concern as the pandemic
continues, and others will likely follow.

›

Psychological
impacts:
The
psychological impacts of the use
of CCWs have not been extensively
studied nor documented in the medical
literature, but cases documented in
this review indicate that exposure
to chemical irritants may result in
significant
psychological
effects,
including potential long-term disability.

Key findings on chemical irritants

›

3

12

Extensive use, limited evaluation:
Tear gas has continued to be used
extensively around the world. While
chemical irritants continue to be the
primary crowd-control agent used by
law enforcement and security forces
to repress and disperse protests,
there is almost no publicly accessible
manufacturer
or
governmentsanctioned
literature
on
the
composition, health or environmental
safety standards on the use of
these weapons.

›

New ways of deployment: Beyond the
use of traditional canisters, sprays, and
grenades, the use of chemical irritants
diluted in water cannons is a growing
problem, with reports of resulting skin
irritation and pain. There has also
been growing use of other composite
weapons, such as pepper balls or water
cannons laced with chemical irritants,
which complicate the identification
of weapons, as well as the treatment
of injuries.

›

Canisters misused as KIPs: Dense and
metallic tear gas canisters can easily
cause fatal injuries when fired at the
head or torso. All deaths reported in
The deaths reported were primarily in Iraq where military-grade canisters were used.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of findings

Other weapons4

Acoustic weapons

Water cannons

Acoustic weapons, sometimes called sound
cannons or sonic cannons, indiscriminately
emit painful, loud sounds that have the
potential to cause significant harm to the
eardrums and delicate organs of the ears
and may cause hearing loss. Eardrum injury
and hearing loss have been reported in a
handful of lawsuits and other cases; serious
questions remain about their safety and
efficacy in protest contexts.

Water cannons are inherently indiscriminate,
particularly at long distances. They can also
make communicating with protesters difficult.
Their intimidating size and appearance may
cause panic leading to stampedes among
protesters. We found that blunt trauma from
their force has resulted in blindness, head
trauma and fractured bones in a number of
people. The use of coloured dyes, chemical
irritants, or malodorants in conjunction
with a water cannon is a form of collective Blunt force weapons
punishment which underscores the potential
Blunt force weapons (i.e. batons) are perhaps
for abuse of these weapons.
the most recognizable police weapon used
against protestors. These include many
Disorientation devices
variations of a stick or club, depending on
Disorientation devices, also known as “flash- history, culture and context. Batons can be
bangs” or stun grenades, create a loud defensive weapons, but in the context of
explosion and, in some instances, a bright protests, they are frequently used as offensive
flash of light. They are made of both metal weapons, sometimes in conjunction with
and plastic parts that may fragment during other weapons, to shove, strike, hold or apply
the explosion and therefore carry risks of pressure on people. Batons, depending on
blast injuries to targeted individuals and the force and the location of the strike, can
bystanders. Explosions that occur close to cause anything from mere bruising to lifepeople have led to amputation, fractures, threatening blunt trauma. We highlight cases
burns and death. Additionally, the ability in Italy, India, Chile and Kenya that illustrate
to precisely place these thrown devices the potential for abuse of batons in protests
is questionable, especially when used in and demand broad regulation of the use of
protest settings. There are frequent news this type of weapon in protest settings.
reports and anecdotal evidence of injuries
and deaths from these weapons, including
reports of injuries to military, corrections,
and other law enforcement officials while
handling these devices.

4
Although to date there is limited evidence in the medical literature on the safety of water cannons, disorientation devices,
acoustic weapons, blunt force weapons (batons) and remotely operated vehicles, case studies involving these weapons demonstrate their
capacity for causing significant harm to protesters.

13

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of recommendations

New frontiers 5
Electronic conduction devices
Electronic conduction devices (ECDs), such
as tasers and electric shields, are transitioning
from weapons used primarily in arrest or
carceral settings to protest contexts. Cardiac
arrhythmias, muscle damage and electric
burns (both on the skin and internally) may
result from electrical conduction, and there
may be trauma from the barbs or shields that
compounds the danger. ECDs have been
identified as contributing factors in over 100
incustody deaths in the United States as well
as thousands of injuries globally. Expanding
the use of these weapons to more people
poses the risk of far more injuries.

is appropriate. Mistakes are frequent in
military drone strikes, and, by extension,
any deployment of drones capable of firing
CCWs in protest settings is concerning. To
our knowledge, although drones that fire
CCWs have only been used by Israeli law
enforcement and security forces, a large
number of countries have purchased these
technologies, leading to concerns about
their expanding use.

Access to medical care

The health effects described in this report
may be exacerbated by factors that serve
to impede access to medical care. These
include restricted access to medical
transport, forbidding or restricting medical
assistance at protests, direct attacks on
medical professionals and street medics,
Remotely operated vehicles
and the chilling effect of detaining those
Remotely operated vehicles, more commonly injured by CCWs at medical facilities, which
known as drones, have seen massive growth leads people not to seek necessary medical
in the past decade. Civil liberties experts attention. These barriers to access to timely
note that the use of drone technology is the medical care have played a significant
most concerning CCWs development in role in increasing the risk of serious injury,
the past five years. To date, they have been permanent disability, or death from CCWs.
primarily used for surveillance, but they are
increasingly being used to carry and fire
CCWs. Both of these uses are problematic
in terms of injury and the potential to violate
Since LiD1 was published in 2016, we have
fundamental rights.
seen both improvements and mounting
challenges to limiting the dangerous use of
These weapons may cause additional risk
CCWs. The initial report was well received and
of injury because they can be employed
led to numerous national and international
remotely from the actual physical location of
discussions around better regulation,
law enforcement or security forces, which
resulting in the development of the 2020
can limit in-person judgements of how, when,
United Nations Human Rights Guidance on
on whom, and how much of a response
Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement

Summary of recommendations

5
drones.

14

New frontiers in protest contexts include the use of electric weapons (such as tasers) and remotely operated vehicles such as

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of recommendations

(UN Guidance).6 Protesters are now more
aware of potential injuries and have better
tools to report on their experiences. At the
same time, weapons manufacture and use
have proliferated, resulting in more injuries
and less accountability for their harm. In many
countries, there is still a lack of documentation,
reporting and investigation of CCWs injuries.
Meaningful accountability for CCWs abuses
remains rare.
In the light of the evidence gathered in this
report, INCLO and PHR, with contributions
from the Omega Research Foundation,
propose several recommendations on all
aspects of CCWs use, including: regulating
manufacturing and transparency in their
design, composition, and testing, to
regulating their trade and use; promoting the
reporting of all uses of CCWs and seeking
accountability for misuse. The purpose of the
recommendations, found in detail in Section
4, is to reduce injuries, disabilities and deaths
caused by CCWs; to bolster international
guidelines for the use of CCWs; to ensure
the protection and promotion of assembly,
association and free expression rights; to seek
accountability in cases of harm; and to develop
safe practices for the occasions where these
weapons are deployed.
These recommendations are based on
two core principles: (1) protecting health
and limiting injuries; and (2) ensuring the
meaningful exercise of the right of assembly,
association and free expression.

Design, development, and
procurement
›

CCWs and related equipment intended
for use in the context of protests must
be designed and produced in a way that
ensures that they meet legitimate law
enforcement objectives and comply with
international law and standards. This
duty applies to states and their agents as
well as to companies that manufacture
weapons
for
law
enforcement
(recommendation 1).

›

Information on CCWs, including
manufacturer testing data and safety
data sheets, must be made publicly
accessible (recommendations 5-6).

›

International, regional and national
controls should be adopted on the trade
in CCWs and equipment. These should
prohibit the trade in inherently abusive
weapons and equipment and control
the trade in CCWs that are misused to
ensure that they are not used in human
rights abuses (recommendation 7).

›

Testing, evaluation and approval should
include a multidisciplinary approach
that, in addition to law enforcement and
manufacturers, includes policymakers,
academics, health professionals and
other relevant civil society actors. Testing
of CCWs should consider, at the least,
legality, level of target accuracy, risk of
lethality, risk of serious injury or disability,
level of pain inflicted, operational

6
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal
Weapons in Law Enforcement, 2020 (UN Guidance on LLWs), accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_
Guidance.pdf.

15

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of recommendations

lifespan, reliability (i.e., minimal risk of
malfunction) and other relevant factors
(recommendations 8-13).

›

Selection and procurement of weapons
must comply all domestic and
international standards, and information
about the process and the inventories
should be made publicly accessible
(recommendations 14-16).

Regulations and training
›

States should engage with and support
internationaland
regional-level
processes to develop trade controls,
including the United Nations (UN)
process on controls on the trade in tools
of torture (call to the UN number 4).

›

Regulations,
procedures,
and/or
protocols on the use of CCWs should be
developed for law enforcement based
on applicable domestic, regional and
international laws. Treaty obligations
and international standards should be
observed and operationalized in the
protocols. These should also reflect
the findings from independent testing.
Law enforcement should never rely
solely on manufacturers’ instructions
(recommendation 17).

›

16

Law enforcement should be trained in
human rights and legal standards as
well as human rights-compliant use
of CCWs. In addition to teaching the
technical aspects of the weapon and
its use, training should be contextual,
including addressing the specific
aspects and challenges of managing
protests in compliance with all

international, national and local laws
(recommendations 19-27).

Use of force
›

The use of any kind of force,
including CCWs, must always comply
with the principles of necessity,
proportionality, legality, precaution,
non-discrimination, and accountability
(recommendation 28).

›

Appropriate de-escalation techniques
should be used to minimise the risk
of violence. Law enforcement officials
should be aware that even the display
of CCWs may escalate tensions during
protests. Where force is proportionate
and is necessary to achieve a legitimate
law enforcement objective, all possible
precautionary steps must be taken to
avoid, or at least minimise, the risk of
injury or death (recommendations 2930).

›

Where a decision to disperse a crowd
is taken in conformity with domestic
and international law, force should be
avoided. Where that is not possible
under the circumstances, only the
minimum force necessary may be used,
with consideration of proportionality,
and then only after very clear warnings
and opportunities to comply have been
made (recommendations 31-34).

Deployment of crowd-control
weapons
›

This report makes it clear that KIPs
can cause serious injuries, permanent
disability and even death. Severe injuries

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of recommendations

are more likely when KIPs are fired at
close range. When launched from afar,
these weapons are often inaccurate
and can strike vulnerable body parts
or bystanders. Therefore, the medical
evidence in this report underscores
that KIPs should never be fired
indiscriminately into groups and are, in
general, an inappropriate weapon in any
protest context (recommendation 36).

›

Chemical irritants, when deployed
using canisters or grenades, are
inherently indiscriminate by nature,
cause severe pain and injuries and
frequently escalate tensions. Therefore,
extreme caution must be used before
and during deployment, including
considerations of the presence of
bystanders and the existence of areas of
egress and airflow to minimise any risk
of overexposure due to serious risk of
injury (recommendation 41).7

›

Many CCWs, including water cannons
and acoustic weapons, are indiscriminate
in nature and must be restricted and, if
used at all, used with extreme caution in
protest contexts (recommendations 4446 and 51-53).

›

Batons should only be used in
exceptional circumstances and only
against violent individuals posing

significant risks to themselves or others
(recommendations 54-56).

›

Some weapons have already been
determined to cause disproportionate
harm to health, undue collective
punishment, or both, and must be
prohibited. These include any kind of
live ammunition (recommendation
36); KIPs that fire multiple projectiles
at once, also known as “scatter shot”
(recommendation 38); any projectiles
with metal components or cores,
including rubber-coated metal bullets,
bean bag rounds and PVC-metal
composite material, any projectiles
with lead (recommendation 39); and
pellet rounds, such as “birdshot”
(recommendation
40);
chemical
irritants, including launchers that fire
multiple chemical irritant canisters,
such as the Venom system, excessively
dense or high-grade canisters, canisters
with additives or ingredients within
them, sprays and grenades that are
determined to be toxic or hazardous,
have passed their expiration date or are
otherwise in disrepair (recommendation
42); dye, chemical irritants or
malodorants mixed with or sprayed
with water cannons (recommendation
47 and 48); disorientation devices,
such as stun grenades, explosive
grenades or other flash bang weaponry
(recommendations 49 and 50); direct

7
INCLO member, the ACLU, supports these recommendations and, additionally, calls for a full prohibition of chemical irritants
and all indiscriminate CCWs on any mass gathering or assembly. In July 2020, the ACLU submitted a statement to the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) which among other things stated that: “[p]olice response to protests and other mass assemblies should
not involve militarized displays or mass violence by the government, and law enforcement should never deploy indiscriminate weapons,
such as tear gas and stun grenades, on any mass gathering or assembly.” Several cities and states in the United States have proposed
bills to ban or severely restrict the use of tear gas and/or KIPs in the context of protest. For example, the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
has categorically banned the use of chemical weapons and kinetic energy munitions by the police against any individual engaging in First
Amendment activities.

17

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Executive summary: Summary of recommendations

contact electric shock weapons;
some blunt force weapons, such
as whips and weighted or spiked
batons (recommendation 56); and
fully autonomous weapons systems
(recommendation 58).

›

›

Some weapons are concerning because
of the risk of severe injuries or human
rights violations. A moratorium on the
use of these weapons in protest contexts
should be issued until further evidence of
their impacts has been collected and the
boundaries of their lawful use have been
established. These weapons include
remotely operated armed drones, the
development or use of directed energy
weapons, and all other electric shock
devices (recommendation 58).
For some weapons, the methods and
contexts of use can exacerbate injuries,
escalate tensions and compound
rights violations. As a result, their
methods of use must be restricted and
limited. Specifically, firing in enclosed
or confined spaces, using excessive
quantities,
exposing
vulnerable
individuals, including children, the
disabled and older persons, and/or
firing weapons directly at individuals or
into dense crowds (recommendations
37 and 43, 54-55, and 57).

Post-deployment procedures and
accountability
›

18

Medical care for sick and wounded
people must not be restricted or
interfered with and identities of those
seeking care should not be released to

law enforcement (recommendations
59-61).

›

Law enforcement officials should record
and report any use of CCWs, including
specific models of CCWs deployed, the
distances from the targeted individuals
and/or bystanders and duration of
deployment, the number of each type
of CCW used, and the specifics of any
injuries caused by CCWs. Review of this
reporting must confirm that the reporting
is accurate, and that the that the use of
CCWs was proportionate, necessary,
and lawful (recommendation 62).

›

There should be a visible identification
and a clear chain of command whenever
CCWs are used, in order to ensure
responsibility and accountability. All
decisions taken should be traceable,
and those who have taken them must be
held accountable (recommendations
63-64).

›

All deaths, injuries and suspected
misuses of CCWs should be thoroughly
investigated by a body independent
of the implicated officials, with a view
to establishing responsibilities and
accountability of the officials involved,
including the various levels of the
command structure in charge during
the incident. Where there is evidence
of unlawful conduct, commanders
and responsible officers should face
administrative disciplinary measures
and/or criminal prosecution, as
appropriate (recommendations 65-67).

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

Section 1

INTRODUCTION
LONDON, ENGLAND, UK - MAY 1, 2021: “KILL THE BILL” PROTEST AGAINST POLICE, CRIME, SENTENCING AND COURTS BILL
2021. LOREDANA SANGIULIANO | SHUTTERSTOCK

Freedom of assembly and expression are environmental rights and climate justice,
under threat around the world.
indigenous and land rights, women’s rights,
LGBTQ+ rights, minority rights, labour and
Respect for assembly, association and free political rights, public health-related matters,
expression rights is one of the key indicators and thousands of other issues that together
of a government’s respect for human have swept across the world, leaving no
rights8 and one of the pillars of modern continent untouched.
democracies. The respect for the exercise
of these fundamental freedoms often rapidly In many cases, law enforcement has
declines when people exercising their rights responded in a manner that profoundly
challenge or criticise their governments undermines fundamental human rights,
or when protests are organised to oppose including freedom of peaceful assembly
government policy, leaders, or powerful non- and association and freedom of expression,
among others - often leading to escalations in
state actors.
violence through unwarranted, inappropriate,
Since 2020, there has been growing or disproportionate uses of force. This
awareness of the role and power of popular trend is not exclusive to authoritarian
protests in which people have taken to the governments; democratic governments
streets to express grievances and claim their have often responded with unlawful violence
rights. Widespread protest movements have to lawful acts of protest. Most notoriously,
pursued causes relating to racial justice, law enforcement around the world has
8
See, among others, United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 1990 (UN Basic Principles), accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instrumentsmechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement.

19

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Introduction: Summary of recommendations

used crowd-control weapons (CCWs), also
known as less-lethal weapons, to disperse
protests, arrest protesters, and quash any
form of assembly. The consequences of the
extended and growing use of these weapons
have ranged from mild to severe injuries,
including deaths.
In 2016, the International Network of
Civil Liberties Organisations (INCLO)
and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR)
published a first-of-its-kind report, Lethal
in Disguise: The Health Consequences of
Crowd-Control Weapons (LiD1). It provided
the most comprehensive evaluation to date
of the medical issues around the use of
CCWs and how they are used to repress the
rights to free speech and assembly. Since
LiD1, CCWs are still used in responses by
law enforcement9 to popular protests, mainly
through interventions consisting of largescale crowd dispersal operations using these
weapons indiscriminately.
Also known as “riot-control weapons,” “nonlethal,” “less lethal,” or “less than lethal”
weapons, CCWs include kinetic impact
projectiles (KIPs),10 chemical irritants,
acoustic weapons, water cannons, stun
grenades, electrical conduction devices, and
directed energy weapons, among others. We
employ the term “crowd-control weapons”

(CCWs) to denote both the weapons being
discussed and the context of their use. As
protests continue, despite the COVID-19
pandemic, and more repressive responses by
states, including CCWs abuses, continue to
expand, we now update and strengthen our
initial reporting. Lethal in Disguise 2: How
Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and
Human Rights examines the continued use
and abuse of CCWs, expands the discussion
of legal and contextual dimensions, and
explores historical and modern trends in
policing. As a result of our ongoing research,
we have also established the Lethal in
Disguise platform, a web-based portal which
includes additional CCWs-related resources.
It is accessible at lethalindisguise.org.
CCWs have been misused in many flagrant
incidents around the world since LID1 was
published six years ago, and they became
more prominent during the COVID-19
pandemic - whether as a part of ongoing
social movements as in Chile, Hong
Kong, and India or catalysed by ineffective
governmental responses to the pandemic as
in Brazil.11 New protests have also emerged
during the pandemic in response to police
brutality, both inspired by the Black Lives
Matter (BLM) movement and due to ongoing
human rights violations like the anti-SARS
protests in Nigeria and the national strike in

9
Throughout this report, we use the term “law enforcement” to encompass a broad definition of police and security forces. In
particular, we rely on the definition of “law enforcement officials” used in the Basic Principles id, which “includes all officers of the law,
whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention. In countries where police powers
are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by [s]tate security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall
be regarded as including officers of such services.”
10
KIPs are among the types of weapons police use in the context of protests, but there is debate on whether it is proper for them
to be included under the umbrella term of “crowd-control weapons.” This infers that they are appropriate tools for the management of
assemblies, including to disperse assemblies. However, as the research in this section demonstrates, KIPs are dangerous weapons that are
difficult to target in the context of protests and can cause serious injuries or even death.
11
See INCLO, Protesting during a pandemic: State responses during COVID-19, April 2021, accessible at: https://files.inclo.net/
content/pdf/55/Protest-and-State-Response-V7.pdf.

20

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Introduction: Methodology and limitations

Respect for assembly, association and free expression rights
is one of the key indicators of a government’s respect for
human rights and one of the pillars of modern democracies.
Colombia. These cases and others point to
a growing trend of law enforcement using
CCWs against crowds in inappropriate,
unnecessary, unlawful, and disproportionate
ways, causing severe and even fatal injuries.

Methodology and limitations
The findings in this report are based on
research conducted jointly by INCLO and
PHR, first from 2014-2015 and then from
2021-2022. This additional research expands
on and updates our original findings and
recommendations in LiD1. There are
complex linkages among laws and policies
directed at protests, policing norms, and
technological advances in CCWs that put
both human rights and health at risk. We
cannot properly understand the health
impacts of CCWs without exploring the
legal standards, the cultural and historical
practices of law enforcement, the push-pull
tensions between entrenched practices and
reform, and the medical evidence. As such,
this report is based on a triangulation of
multiple methods: interviews, desk research,
systematic reviews of peer-reviewed medical
literature, and case study analysis.
In this version, we have updated our extensive
research on CCWs, including chemical
irritants, KIPs, acoustic weapons, water
cannons, stun grenades, directed energy

weapons, and added reviews of blunt force
weapons (i.e. batons), electrical conduction
devices, and other emerging tools and
technologies. Research topics included
a history of the weapons, mechanisms of
action, and an analysis of the harms produced
by their use. Significantly, we developed case
study examples from INCLO members to
demonstrate the concrete realities on the
ground in different contexts.
The analysis of the identified CCWs, their use,
and their impact required diverse methods
of inquiry and investigation. We followed the
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA)
guidelines to conduct systematic literature
reviews of peerreviewed publications that
documented the health impacts of KIPs and
chemical irritants. The searches for these
two weapons were limited to peer-reviewed
medical journals and publications to ensure
high-quality data. Papers were included if
they were published between 1 January 2015
and 28 February 2022 and documented
symptoms, injuries and/or deaths associated
with these weapons. Given the dearth
of published studies, searches included
publications discussing the use of these
CCWs in protests, military or police training
exercises, accidental discharges, and other
police use in different contexts. Full details
on the methodology we used is available in

21

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Introduction: Methodology and limitations

previously published research papers.12 In
this report, prior data were updated, and the
findings were revised to highlight changes
and emphasise ongoing concerns.13
For other weapons categories, including
water cannons, disorientation devices,
acoustic weapons, batons, and other
weapons, there is even less published data
for review. In these cases, we also analysed
case-series14 describing the health effects
of using these CCWs, using data available in
medical journals, news media, social media,
grey literature, human rights organisational
reports, government reports and legal
documents, among other sources.
While we sought to identify the full scope and
range of injuries possible, the absence of
systematic reporting requirements for deaths
and injuries in crowd-control and protest
settings makes it likely that the numbers of
reported deaths and injuries are significantly
underestimated. Moreover, comparative and
risk analyses are not possible due to the
lack of global data on the health impacts of
these weapons.
To further contextualise documented
injuries, between October 2021 and March
2022, we interviewed 22 civil liberties
advocates from eighteen countries across six
continents who litigate, advocate and work

on protest-related issues. These experts,
all civil liberties lawyers who collectively
bring years of experience in human rights,
CCWs, and policing and civil liberties, were
interviewed in their professional capacity.
We conducted teleconference interviews
and used deductive and inductive analysis
to identify key themes from the interviews.
The countries represented through these
interviews are Australia, Argentina, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Nigeria,
Russia, South Africa, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States of America.
These countries have a wide range of
political and legal systems, recent protest
themes, and cultural practices. The interview
process was reviewed and approved by the
UC Berkeley Committee for the Protection
of Human Subjects (Protocol ID: 2021-0814599).
In 2016, LiD1 was the first rigorous effort to
explore how law enforcement uses CCWs
to perpetrate human rights violations in the
course of managing protests and the health
effects of these practices. This second edition
builds on that foundation by expanding our
knowledge of the health impacts of CCWs
while also exploring the legal and practical
contexts in which they are used. This research
underpins concrete recommendations for
strengthening standards and regulations

12
RJ Haar et al., “Health impacts of chemical irritants used for crowd control: a systematic review of the injuries and deaths caused
by tear gas and pepper spray,” BMC Public Health 17, no 1b (October 2017): 831, doi:10.1186/s12889-017-4814-6; and RJ Haar et al.,
“Death, injury and disability from kinetic impact projectiles in crowd-control settings: a systematic review,” BMJ Open 7 (2017): e018154,
doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2017-018154
A systematic review of the literature is a rigorous methodology to identify literature on a subject. The PHR team adhered to
13
PRISMA guidelines on the development of a systematic review protocol. See: D Moher, A Liberati, J Tetzlaff, and DG Altman, PRISMA
Group Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Metaanalyses: The PRISMA statement, PLoS Med. 2009;6:e1000097. doi:
10.1371/journal.pmed.1000097.
14
This refers to review and analysis of compilations of injuries prepared by other groups, and found in other sources, including
news reports, government reports and medical literature.

22

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Introduction: Trends and context of recent protests and movements

around the manufacture, trade, and use of
these weapons with the aim of strengthening
accountability, enhancing oversight, and
cultivating human rights norms.

took to the streets in recent years include
those advocating for racial justice, women’s
and LGBTQ+ rights, and student and
indigenous rights.

In analysing the results of our review of the
published literature, we recognize that this
literature fails to document the entire scope of
harm from CCWs. Our analysis can therefore
provide only some insight into the range of
potential injuries. Similarly, interviews with
individuals working to advance human rights
and civil liberties were designed to present
a range of expert opinions and personal
and professional experiences in diverse
contexts. Our interviews were by no means
comprehensive or representative of entire
countries or populations.

Anti-government protests, whether to
protest authoritarian activities or economic
corruption, have also been widespread.
Public health protests since the beginning
of the COVID-19 pandemic to protest maskwearing or other lockdown measures also
occurred in all regions of the world.16 The
health, economic and social emergency
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic
aggravated inequities affecting already
marginalised communities in many countries.
These included unjust labour practices, a
lack of basic sanitation, inadequate living
conditions and education, and unfair land
use policies. Labour protests may not have
received as much attention, but they were
widespread and frequent.

Trends and context of recent
protests and movements
Interviews with the 22 civil liberties experts
highlighted some overarching trends in
social movements that may provide insight
into why and when CCWs are used and
the mechanisms by which they can cause
injuries. These interviews were by no means
representative of the geography or scope
of protests in current times, but they build
on decades of experience and expertise
in countries with INCLO members.15
Protests are complex and dynamic, and it is
difficult to compare the frequency or size of
demonstrations, marches, protests and other
campaigns over the years. It is important,
however, that the social movements that

The climate justice movement has also
seen dramatic growth in the past five
years; climate-related protests have been
characterised by traditional marches and
protests, but also school strikes by students.
There have also been incidents of locking-on
or protesting on private property, especially
in relation to corporations engaging in oil
and gas manufacture by those who have
settled or function on indigenous land. Many
of the above movements are interrelated
and have mutually shared goals, participant
communities and activities.

15
I Ortiz et al., “An Analysis of World Protests 2006-2020,” in World Protests (2022), pp 13-81, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham,
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-88513-7.
16

See https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker/.

23

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Introduction: Trends and context of recent protests and movements

In almost every case, law enforcement has
been responsible for the management of
protests. In some cases, special public order
units have been deployed. In others, varying
combinations of federal, state or local police
have been deployed. In rare cases, the military
or government security agencies have
supported local police. On occasion, private
security organisations or non-state actors
have supported law enforcement operations.
Within law enforcement institutions, specific
public order response teams that mobilise or
respond to protests are frequently used. This
is an area where experts noted increased
militarization techniques, weapons and
strategy. The use of private security
personnel has also increased in responding
to climate justice protests, such as in protests
led by environmental activists against
construction activities.

rights, the management of assemblies, and
the appropriate use of CCWs. In general
terms, they noted that police units had not
been sufficiently trained in de-escalation
techniques. That failure is evident in the
way that law enforcement officials respond
to protests and how often they resort to
the use of force. In many countries, there
is also a lack of training or any knowledge
of protocols for the management of
assemblies. Additionally, when military
or reserve units are mobilised to support
police, these units often have even less
training in how to manage public gatherings
or how to deploy CCWs safely.

Interviewed experts noted that law
enforcement has also responded to protests
in other ways beyond the use of force. Among
these, surveillance of protests and protesters
and arrests of organisers and others appear
to be the most common measures. In almost
Many of our interviewees noted that the every country studied, some form or another
training of law enforcement officials and of surveillance technology is being used:
other personnel is often suboptimal and tapping of the phones or social media activity
highly variable in the amount and quality of organisers; the use of video surveillance
of training on the foundations of protest and facial recognition technologies during

24

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Introduction: History and culture of policing

protests; media monitoring programs; closed
circuit televisions (CCTV); drone surveillance;
and even UV-related or coloured dye in water
cannons have been used to identify and
track individuals.

assemblies across the world. This history has
often resulted in a military mentality of police,
who treat protesters as the “enemy” rather
than fellow members of their community
whom they are entrusted to protect.

Interviewees stated that, in many cases,
protesters are arrested or detained,
purportedly for being violent or threatening
public order, safety, or national security,
with limited to no justification. Frequently,
these arrests are of non-violent people who
are only exercising their rights to assemble
and speak. While most people are released
soon after their detention or arrest, there
are many instances of ongoing cases. Land
occupier movements are especially at risk
of conviction. Intimidation and arrests have
resulted in both the explicit and implicit
chilling of protest rights.

This history and culture, according to the
interviewees, may also influence how police
use the laws and their powers to restrict some
protests and not others. Interviewed experts
noted that often political protests and antigovernment or anti-police brutality protests
were treated with far more aggression than
other types of demonstrations. In many
contexts in which we conducted interviews,
there is disproportionate repression of
protest rights among socioeconomically,
ethnically
or
culturally
marginalised
populations such as Black people, LGBTQ+
groups, Roma, indigenous groups, migrants
and refugees. Journalists, particularly women
journalists, have been targeted specifically
or through a lack of specific protections in
many protests. Interviewees noted that the
level of repression of protests due to the
viewpoints of the protesters had been based
on a number of factors, including political
affiliation and if the cause was perceived as
opposing government or law enforcement
practices. Anti-police violence protests, such
as the BLM marches, for example, have been
met with disproportionately high levels of
violence. Per our interviews, the repression of
environmental protesters has been a growing
and concerning trend. In some countries,
progressive or leftwing protesters also
appear to face more severe uses of force or
other repressive measures than conservative
or right-wing protests.

History and culture of policing
Civil liberties experts also spoke of the
importance of the history and culture of
policing and the crucial role the police play
in understanding current police behaviours,
especially concerning protests and the use
of CCWs. There are significant differences
across regions, countries, and even police
departments within a country, and this
section touches only on issues reported by
the experts interviewed. They noted that
historically, and in many contexts, racism,
classism, and legacies of colonialism,
political repression, authoritarianism, and
slavery have influenced law enforcement
practices. A deeply rooted culture of impunity
has resulted in the normalization of excessive
uses of force and repressive policing of

IMAGE LEFT: POLICE IN RIOT GEAR SURROUNDED BY TEAR GAS AND PINK COLOR SMOKE BOMB IN TACTICAL TRAINING
MR. NINO | SHUTTERSTOCK

25

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

Section 2

CROWD-CONTROL
WEAPONS AND
THEIR IMPACTS
WATER CANNON USED FOR CROWD CONTROL IN JERUSALEM DURING THE 2020 PROTESTS AGAINST BENJAMIN NETANYAHU
OR BARENHOLTZ VIA WIKIPEDIA. | CREATIVE COMMONS

This section investigates CCWs in common
use today: kinetic impact projectiles
(KIPs), chemical irritants, water cannons,
disorientation devices, acoustic weapons,
blunt force weapons (i.e., batons), and
several CCWs currently in the early stages
of development. For each type of weapon,
we review the weapon profile (history and
description of the device), the mechanism of
action (how the weapon works), and what is
known about the health effects. In updating
this report, we also summarise notable
changes in the use, misuse, or advocacy
related to each weapon since the publication
of LiD1 in 2016. Recommendations regarding
each type of weapon appear in section 4.

reviews of peer-reviewed literature to update
the literature discussed in the first report. This
allowed for a detailed analysis of new patterns
of injury observed over the last six years.
We consulted with partner organisations of
INCLO members who offered invaluable and
alarming insights on the health impacts of
CCWs. While not used as primary sources
for this study, social media accounts of the
misuse of CCWs brought to our attention
emerging trends in these weapon systems.

In addition to updating the sections on
KIPs, chemical irritants, water cannons, and
acoustic weapons, we have added new
sections on disorientation devices (“stun”
grenades) and batons. In an additional
This analysis is based on a review of medical section, we highlight emerging technologies
literature, peer-reviewed scientific studies, and tactics–such as electronic control
legal documents, government reports, devices, directed energy weapons, and
journalism, and photo-visual evidence. For the drones–that have the potential to be widely
sections concerning impact projectiles and deployed in the near future.
chemical irritants, we conducted systematic

26

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts

Kinetic Impact Projectiles

Disorientation Devices

Chemical Irritants

Acoustic Weapons

Water Cannons

Blunt Force Weapons (Batons)

0

27

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

KINETIC IMPACT
PROJECTILES
BERKUT RIOT POLICE SHOOT RUBBER BULLETS TOWARD ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTERS ON INDEPENDENCE SQUARE ON
FEBRUARY 19, 2014 IN KIEV, UKRAINE. BRENDAN HOFFMAN | GETTY IMAGES

Weapon profile
Kinetic impact projectiles (KIPs) are bulletlike missiles used in various law enforcement
contexts as a deterrent through the pain of
impact. Shot from firearms, these weapons
were developed to offer the deterrent
power of handheld baton strikes from
greater physical distances. The staggering
variety of KIPs has led to an abundance
of common and trade names for what are
often referred to as “baton rounds.” KIPs are
most commonly dubbed “rubber bullets”
regardless of their composition: modern KIPs
are most commonly made of plastic (“foamtipped plastic bullets,” “plastic baton rounds,”
“sponge grenades,” “Flashball rounds”),
metal (“rubber-coated metal bullets,”
“pellets,” “birdshot,” “flexible baton rounds,”
“bean bag rounds,” “Super-sock”), or other
materials such as wood or rock salt.

28

The development of KIPs for crowd control
is linked to the colonial policing of the
British Empire. Early forms of KIPs used in
protests were sawed-off pieces of wooden
broom handles that were shot at rioters
in Singapore in the 1880s. In the 1960s,
slightly more advanced wooden bullets were
developed in the United Kingdom and used
against protesters in Hong Kong, Malaysia,
and Singapore. The British Army initially
developed wooden and then plastic polyvinyl
chloride (PVC) and rubber bullets for use
during the conflict in Northern Ireland. In
parallel, the United States introduced rubber
bullets to quell Vietnam War protests but
temporarily halted their use in protests after
a fatality in 1971. Over the past 40 years,
the production of KIPs has spread from a
few manufacturers in the United States and
the United Kingdom to dozens of producers
throughout the world. Manufacturers now
produce more than 75 different types of

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

bullets and launchers.17 Today, KIPs have
found widespread use both in everyday
policing and in crowd control as an addition
to an arsenal that includes firearms, batons,
chemical irritants, and more. The global
CCW market was estimated at $867.4 million
in 2019 and is expected to continue to grow
well into this decade.18
Some bullets are designed to be fired as
a single missile, while others are fired as
a group of small projectiles. The latter are
sometimes known as “pellets,” “scatter
shot”, or “multiple projectile rounds”, where
many small- to medium-sized spheres are
fired at a broad target. “Bean bag rounds”
also consist of small metal pellets that are
stitched into a synthetic cloth bag designed
to expand on impact and therefore behave as
a single projectile. Newer weapons include
projectiles with a hard outer shell encasing
chemical irritants that explode upon impact,
or “attenuated energy projectiles,” where
a hollow tip can limit the risk of ricochet or
penetration by crushing into itself on impact.

bullets designed as KIPs have been used
for crowd control, and LiD1 highlighted the
extreme danger posed by these weapons.
This report highlights the impact of metal
hunting bullets that have been arbitrarily
designated “less-lethal” by virtue of protocols
intended to reduce their lethality. While both
types of weapons are used for crowd control
in a similar manner to other KIPs, their
inherent killing power has left a huge number
of injuries, disabilities, and deaths in the wake
of their use, as detailed further below.

KIP weapons exemplify the “elephant in the
room” problem of less-lethal weapons: To
date, no organisation, study, or report has
clearly and objectively defined what makes
a weapon lethal, less-lethal, or non-lethal–
much less acceptably “safe.” The decision is
typically left to the very organisations tasked
with procuring CCWs–or the government
entities demonstrators often protest against–
to determine whether said weapons achieve
a level of acceptable lethality. There are
heterogeneous rules across countries and
jurisdictions, ranging from allout bans to free
Of special concern are metallic rounds used use of all KIPs and many permutations in
for crowd control. Due to their density and between.
typically high velocities of impact, these pose
greater inherent risks than rounds made of
any other material. Rubber-coated metal

17
Omega Research Foundation, “Crowd Control Technologies: An Appraisal of Technologies for Political Control” (Manchester,
UK: European Parliament, Directorate General for Research, The STOA Programme, (June 2000), accessible at: http://www.
omegaresearchfoundation.org/assets/downloads/publications/19991401a_en.pdf. See, also, Global Non-Lethal Weapons Market Report
2013-2018. Manufacturing of KIPs takes place in locations as diverse as Brazil, China, Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and the United
States.
18
Grand View Research, “Less Lethal Ammunition Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Weapon Type (Shotguns,
Launchers), By End Use (Law Enforcement, Military), By Product, By Region, And Segment Forecasts, 2020 - 2027,” accessible at: https://
www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/less-lethal-ammunition-market.

29

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Sidebar

Defining “lethal” versus “non-lethal”
Clearly defining “lethal” versus “non-lethal”
projectiles has proven difficult. Most physical
based guidelines for defining less-lethal
impact projectiles stem from a 1977 pilot
study by the United States Army’s Human
Engineering Laboratory, which established
an “extensive damage” threshold of 90 footpounds (approximately 120 joules) of kinetic
energy of impact, beyond which severe
damage to the human body was highly
likely.19 However, this threshold was arrived
at through tests with approximately 1-inch
diameter rubber spheres; while kinetic
energy considers only mass and velocity, the
form of a projectile strongly also affects its
terminal behaviour.
For instance, a pellet of U.S. #6 birdshot
(a common size used by Indian police,
approximately 3mm in diameter) has an
approximate mass of 0.126g and a muzzle
velocity of 365 m s-1, yielding a kinetic energy
at the muzzle of ~8 joules, well below the
so-called lethal threshold. However, metal
birdshot is universally accepted to be lethal
at close range and hazardous to the eyes at

longer distances, due in large part to its ability
to penetrate tissues even at extreme ranges.
“Energy density”–or how much kinetic energy
is distributed over impact area–is a more
relevant metric for evaluating penetration.
Birdshot’s energy of impact is focused on a
very small area (birdshot ranges in diameter
from <1 to 6 mm), which accounts for its
high risk of penetration and accordingly high
potential for injury.
The ambiguous physical principles behind
projectile lethality must be kept in mind
when authorities claim a particular CCW is
“non-lethal.” This uncertainty can, in some
circumstances, allow for exceptionally
hazardous weapons to be utilised in crowd
control contexts. A more nuanced approach
to evaluating lethality would rigorously test
factors beyond impact energy, such as energy
density, projectile precision, and human
factors of use,20 although to date testing that
is both comprehensive and publicly available
has not proven forthcoming.

19
DO Egner, “Evaluation of Less-Lethal Weapons,” U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory Technical Memorandum, 37-77,
(December 1977) at p 194, accessible at: https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/evaluation-less-lethal-weapons.
20
The “SWAPDEC” testing protocol considering speed, weight, accuracy, precision, density of impact energy, effective range, and
consistency comes closest to a standard of testing that could effectively anticipate health risks of an impact munition under consideration
for use. See RT Wyant and T Burns, Risk management of less lethal options: evaluation, deployment, aftermath, and forensics, CRC Press,
(2014).

30

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Mechanism of action
Kinetic Impact Projectile

Rubber or plastic bullets

Alternative Name(s)

Baton rounds, Riot rounds, “Flash-Ball”
rounds

Composition/Description

•
•

Solid, spherical or cylindrical projectiles
of variable sizes made solely of hard
rubber, plastic, or polyvinylchloride (PVC)
May be fired as single shots or in groups
of multiple projectiles within a cartridge

Mechanism of Action

Less dense than metal bullets to limit force
on impact

Range and Usage

•

•

Many guidelines suggest they are
designed to fire at the target’s legs or at
the torso (to avoid hitting the head, face
or genitalia)
Muzzle velocity and force on impact are
dependent on variable shapes and fills
within cartridges that can affect flight
patterns

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Scattershot or multiple projectile rounds

Alternative Name(s)

Multi-projectile, Sting ball, Rubber pellet
rounds

Composition/Description

Similar to baton rounds (above) but are fired
in groups of multiple projectiles within one
cartridge. Can range from 2 to dozens of
projectiles ejected at once

Mechanism of Action

•
•

Range and Usage

Similar to above in striking with force.
Multiple projectiles splay out over
distance so farther distances will result
in more spread of the shot and less
discrimination in target. Closer ranges
may result in multiple projectiles hitting
a single individual

ROBIN BALLANTYNE | OMEGA RESEARCH FOUNDATION

ROBIN BALLANTYNE | OMEGA RESEARCH FOUNDATION

Muzzle velocity and force on impact are
dependent on variable shapes and fills
within cartridges that can affect flight
patterns

31

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Attenuated Energy Projectile (AEP)

Alternative Name(s)

AEP

Composition/Description

Hard plastic body and a hollow nose

Mechanism of Action

Hollow tip is designed to collapse on
impact, limiting penetrative injury

Range and Usage

•
•

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Rubber- coated metal bullets

Alternative Name(s)

(misleadingly called) plastic or rubber
bullets

Composition/Description

•
•
•

Spherical or cylindrical projectiles with
solid lead or metal core surrounded by
a 2 mm coating of plastic or rubber
(Core weight: about 16 g; diameter:
15.75 mm)
May be fired as single shot or in groups
up to 15

Mechanism of Action

Outer coating made of rubber to limit
penetrating trauma but dense metal core
augments operational range and force on
impact.

Range and Usage

•
•
•

32

Intended to only fire at target’s legs
Specific weapon used primarily in the
UK

Intended to only fire at target’s legs
Similar to solid baton rounds, although
metal core allows for greater retained
velocity and impact force
Primarily used in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory by Israeli security
forces

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Flexible baton round

Alternative Name(s)

Bean bag rounds,“Super-Sock”

Composition/Description

•
•

Synthetic cloth bag filled with about 45
g of small metal pellets (100 pellets of
#9 lead shot is most common)
Greatest diameter for the bag is usually
6 cm

Mechanism of Action

A cartridge has wadding meant to expand
and drop the wadding as it travels, creating
a wider surface area blow

Range and Usage

•
•

Intended to only be fired at target’s legs
Expansion of the bag is problematic at
short distances leading to injuries

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ROBIN BALLANTYNE | OMEGA RESEARCH FOUNDATION

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Sponge rounds

Alternative Name(s)

Foam-tipped plastic bullet, Sponge grenade

Composition/Description

•
•

Projectile with a high-density plastic
body and a hard foam nose designed
to collapse upon impact
Fired from 37- or 40-mm grenade
launchers

Mechanism of Action

Large surface area and relatively soft tip
intended to limit penetrative injury

Range and Usage

•
•

Minimum engagement range is 10 – 15
m, and maximum effective range is 50 m
Designed as “direct fire” at target’s less
vulnerable anatomy (legs)

-.IJ!j'jWMfRWliWWfMWNWMWi"!WtSN
ROBIN BALLANTYNE | OMEGA RESEARCH FOUNDATION

33

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Pellet rounds

Alternative Name(s)

Birdshot, buckshot

Composition/Description

Cartridges filled with plastic, rubber, steel
or lead balls that spread out when fired.

Mechanism of Action

Smaller than scattershot (multiple projectile
rounds), these smaller pellets have a wider
dispersal pattern and less acute aim. Metal
pellets are dense and have a higher kinetic
energy.

Range and Usage

Causes an indiscriminate spray of
munitions that spreads widely and
cannot be aimed. Lead and steel pellets
in particularly cause significant injuries,
especially if they hit the eyes.

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Plastic-metal composite bullets

Alternative Name(s)

(misleadingly called) plastic or rubber bullets

Composition/Description

A composite of plastic and silica, metal
fragments, or small shards of metal (lead or
steel) within a rubber, plastic, or PVC base

Mechanism of Action

Have higher density than solid plastic but
less than metal bullets
designed to extend firing range or force on
impact from traditional baton rounds

Range and Usage

•
•
•

34

Intended to only fire at target’s legs
Similar to solid baton rounds with
higher speed and force on impact
possible
Variable shapes can affect flight
patterns and force on impact

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Kinetic Impact Projectile

Pepper-spray projectiles

Alternative Name(s)

“Pepperballs”, FN 303

Composition/Description

Plastic capsules fired from a compressed
air gun similar to recreational paintballs,
filled with PAVA/OC (“pepper” agent) or
marking dye

Mechanism of Action

Combines kinetic impact from a projectile
with a secondary chemical irritant

Range and Usage

•
•

Up to 50 meters advertised
Questions about accuracy

Figure 1: Selected types of Kinetic Impact Projectiles*
*Note: this table only includes some common types of KIPs and information gleaned from accessible sources

KIP weapons exemplify the “elephant in the room”
problem of less-lethal weapons: To date, no organisation,
study, or report has clearly and objectively defined what
makes a weapon lethal, less-lethal, or non-lethal–much
less acceptably “safe.”

35

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

A projectile weapon works by transferring
kinetic energy (i.e., energy from movement)
from an object in flight to a person. While lethal
projectiles are constructed to maximise the
likelihood of death by penetrating the skin to
compromise vital organs, KIPs are ostensibly
constructed to minimise penetration while
delivering sufficient kinetic energy to
produce significant pain and/or incapacitate
an individual.
A projectile’s impact force and propensity
to penetrate depend on a number of factors,
foremost among them their cross-sectional
area and speed. Small, fast projectiles are
more likely to penetrate the skin than large,
slow projectiles. Many KIPs are designed to
maximise the surface area of presentation
to distribute impact force and reduce the
probability of skin penetration or to minimise
weight so that the projectile will quickly lose
speed while in flight. The plasticity of a round,
the number of projectiles fired at once, and
protocols governing their use will all also
affect how a projectile functions. In spite of
design efforts to reduce lethality, KIPs can
cause serious injury, permanent disability,
and death if they hit critical parts of the body
with significant force. To avoid potentially
lethal uses of KIPs, manufacturers often
establish protocols to avoid circumstances
in which KIPs could prove fatal. First, as
projectile velocity is greatest as soon as it
enters ballistic flight (i.e. immediately after a
bullet is fired), manufacturers often establish
minimum use distances to reduce the impact
velocity of KIPs.

Complexity arises when considering
distance: older projectiles had a reputation
for inaccuracy (especially when “bouncefired” off the ground). While ballistic testing
of newer designs has shown them to be
capable of sufficient precision to keep
rounds within the lower third of the body
at operational distances, these operational
distances can differ between weapons, be
unclear in practical terms, and are frequently
not maintained.21 Second, manufacturers
sometimes issue warnings that KIPs should
never be shot at vital parts of the body, such
as the head. However, guidelines on targeting
parts of the body tend to be contradictory,
some saying that the bullets should be aimed
in the torso “box” between the clavicles and
the hips, others noting that the upper torso
should be avoided, and bullets should be
aimed towards the lower legs. Given that
police departments purchase multiple
weapons for use in the same protests, and
each weapon can have vastly different
instructions, there is frequent confusion and
misuse.
Use protocols help to mitigate the human
hazard of KIPs, although they are by nature
imperfect and do not eliminate the objective
hazard inherent in ballistic weapons such as
KIPs. Minimum engagement distances are
often difficult to follow in dynamic, high-stress
situations, such as crowd control, which can
lead to inadvertent deployment at dangerous
ranges. Directives to target specific body
parts are heavily contingent upon the
training and stress response of users, with
the latter having been demonstrated to add

21
I Ndindabahizi et al., “Error Budget of Non-lethal Projectiles Using Stochastic Simulations,” Human Factors and Mechanical
Engineering for Defense and Safety 3, (August 2019),a p 10, doi:10.1007/s41314-019-0029-1.

36

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

significantly to the inaccuracy of KIPs.22
These human factors are exacerbated by
the minimum operational ranges imposed
to limit the damage caused by KIPs–longer
engagement distances make it more difficult
to accurately target specific body parts and
more likely that projectiles may fly astray.

Multiple projectile KIPs
Multiple projectile KIPs, which fire more than
one projectile per shot, best illustrate the
irreconcilable nature of protocols demanding
pinpoint accuracy at extended ranges. When
fired, these projectiles spread out in a cone
from the muzzle of the weapon, resulting
in progressively greater imprecision with
distance. At longer distances, projectile
dispersion renders these projectiles
impossible to place precisely, increasing the
likelihood that projectiles may accidentally
impact other parts of a target’s body
or other individuals entirely. This risk is
greatly exacerbated by the large number
of projectiles in flight with the use of these
weapons, which is tens to hundreds of times
greater than that of single projectile rounds.

The metal pellets described earlier in this
section illustrate the danger posed by a
failure to understand the interaction among
these risk factors. Colloquially known as
“birdshot,” these are hunting rounds fired as
a single group of tens to hundreds of highvelocity metal spheres. While indisputably
lethal at close range, the minimum distance
of use (e.g., 50 metres in India)23 is designed
to be far enough to ensure that pellets have
lost sufficient velocity so as to render them
non-lethal. However, even beyond 50 metres,
pellet guns have the ballistic capacity to
penetrate some organs, such as the eyes,
causing blindness.24 The vast number of
individuals gravely injured by birdshot used
as a CCW is a testament to the regrettable
ignorance of the danger posed by any use of
these potentially lethal rounds.
The use of potentially lethal weapons as
KIPs is perhaps unsurprising given that there
is little published research on the safety of
KIPs. There is an overall lack of transparency
by manufacturers and policing organisations
regarding the type of safety testing KIPs
have undergone and under what conditions.
The dozens of weapon types on the market

Multiple projectile KIPs, which fire more than one projectile
per shot, best illustrate the irreconcilable nature of protocols
demanding pinpoint accuracy at extended ranges.

22
J Taverniers and J Suss, “A user-centred assessment of a less-lethal launcher: the case of the FN 303 in a high-pressure setting,”
Ergonomics 62, no. 9, (2019), at pp 1162-1174, doi:10.1080/00140139.2019.1626916.
23
ScSaaliq, “Pellets: Lethal or not?” Hindustan Times, (July 28, 2016), accessible at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/static/lethalpellets/.
24
B. Perrigo, “Faces in the Darkness: The Victims of ‘Non-Lethal’Weapons in Kachmir,” Times, 6 September 2018. Acessible at:
https://time.com/longform/pellet-gun-victims-kashmir/.

37

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

can generate considerable confusion about Health effects
their proper use, as protocols developed for
some KIPs may not apply to others. Lack of Overview
transparency on the part of manufacturers
also limits the information that health care The health impacts of KIPs depend on a
providers can use in assessing injuries.
number of factors, including the type of
projectile, the characteristics of the weapon
KIPs are marketed to military, police, and it is shot from, the distance from which the
private security forces in nearly every country, shot is fired, the user’s skill, and the inherent
with little or no regulatory oversight or imprecision of the weapon itself. Although
accountability. Protocols on the use of KIPs KIPs are designed to minimise penetration
by police and military or by manufacturers are and limit the force of blunt trauma,
not usually publicly available. Available use- injuries from both mechanisms have been
of-force guidelines generally recommend documented.
that KIPs be used only for individual forcecontrol rather than on groups of people. Most KIPs are propelled by a powder charge
Nonetheless, evidence from photographs, and are best considered a subcategory
video cameras, and testimonials in many of firearm. KIP injuries, like all trauma and
countries identifies the frequent violation specifically firearm injuries, can be nonof these guidelines. There are examples of penetrating, where the pellet does not enter
KIPs being aimed at the upper body or face, the skin or tissue (such as blunt force trauma)
being fired from very short distances, being or penetrating (where the pellet does enter
used against non-threatening individuals, and in the case of perforating injuries, also
and being fired indiscriminately at crowds exits the tissue). KIPs can cause both types
as a means of collective punishment.25 Even of injury. The severity of injury from bullets is
when used according to protocol, slight dependent on the missile energy on impact
errors in distance estimation or aim can (related to projectile mass, distance, and
instantaneously make a supposedly “less- muzzle velocity), missile design (including the
lethal” weapon lethal. Worldwide reports of calibre and shape), and the characteristics of
KIP injuries to critical areas of the body–as the target tissue.26
well as injuries to innocent bystanders–are
testaments to this unacceptable risk.
KIPs can cause severe injuries through both
blunt and penetrating trauma. Blunt trauma
directly damages tissue by crushing but
can also lead to potentially life-threatening
injuries from organ rupture, bone fracture,
and internal haemorrhage. Blunt impacts to

25
S Reynhout, RJ Haar, and M Heisler, “Shot in the Head,” Physicians for Human Rights (14 September 2020), accessible at:
https://phr.org/our-work/resources/shot-in-the-head/.
26
Z Gugala and R Lindsey, “Classification of Gunshot Injuries in Civilians,” Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research 408,
(March 2003), at pp 65-81, accessible at: https://journals.lww.com/clinorthop/fulltext/2003/03000/classification_of_gunshot_injuries_in_
civilians.7.aspx.

38

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

the head pose a very high risk of traumatic
brain injury. Tissue damage from penetrating
and perforating wounds can cause laceration
of skin and solid organs, stretching of tissue
in the track of the projectile and shockwaves
of pressure in the tissue. Penetrating trauma
to the brain causes traumatic brain injury,
such as skull fractures and intracranial
haemorrhage and is often instantly
fatal. Piercing the heart or lungs directly
compromises the circulation system and
the body’s oxygen exchange system, which
can result in death within minutes. Severed
arteries can also lead to rapid death through
exsanguination (bleeding out). Spinal cord or
nerve injuries can be permanently debilitating,
causing motor and/or sensory deficits.
Injuries to other organs may require rapid
emergency surgery to avoid fatality, given
the risks of internal bleeding, organ damage,
and secondary infection (particularly from
bowel perforation). Furthermore, the risk
of permanent disfigurement or disability is
high from both blunt and penetrating trauma,
either through compromise of non-vital
organs (such as the eyes) or damage to the
skin or musculoskeletal system.

least 1,245 individuals have likely sustained
permanent injuries as a result of KIPs.
Nineteen new studies were identified that
met the inclusion criteria. (See the list of
reviewed studies in the Appendix.) These

Persons injured and
killed, total

12
1984

2190

53

Major injuries

Ocular injuries

310

2232

1521
1575

Head injuries
(minus ocular injuries)

Results of the updated
systematic review
We updated the systematic review of medical
literature conducted in the previous version
of this study with literature published from
2016 to 2021, following the same search and
selection process that was followed in the first
report.27 Collectively, the systematic reviews
identified 4,174 individuals injured by KIPs
and 65 fatalities as a result of KIP impact. At

Persons killed

Persons permanently
injured

300

121
344
945

pre-2016

■ 2016-2021 (this study)

Figure 2: Comparison of selected statistics from Lethal in
Disguise (2016) and this study (2016-2021).

27
The updated review identified scientific and medical literature pertaining to KIPs injuries published since the printing of the last
version of Lethal in Disguise (2016-2021). Nineteen articles met inclusion criteria, had clear causation by KIPs, contained health impact
data, and were of sufficient quality to include.

39

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

bias guided by research priorities, resources,
geographic bias, and many other issues.
Many individuals will not seek medical
attention for their injuries due to economic
constraints or fear for their personal safety
and will, therefore, not be counted per our
methodology.

KIPs of special concern
Our report revealed injuries from metallic
rounds (including “bean-bag” rounds),
rubber rounds, plastic rounds, as well as
hybrid rounds (such as “pepper-ball” guns,
■ Metal core ■ Rubber bu llets ■ Plastic bullets
classified as “other”). In the previous report,
■ Bean bag rounds D Other
so-called “pellet guns” firing metal pellets
Figure 3. Types of weapons represented in the literature review. used for crowd control were not included in
the literature review of KIPs. Since then, a
Several publications referenced multiple types of KIPs.
host of literature regarding these weapons
detailed 2,190 individuals injured by KIPs, has been published, illustrating the highly
compared to 1,984 found in the last report. indiscriminate and dangerous nature of
Of these 2,190, 12 perished as a direct metallic birdshot. The vast majority of the
result of being shot with impact projectiles. casualties from multi-projectile rounds come
All deaths occurred secondary to injuries from the use of metal birdshot in Indianinflicted by metallic projectiles. Compared to
the previous report, over the last five years,
the medical and scientific literature identified
higher numbers of total individuals affected,
major injuries, permanent injuries, head
injuries, and ocular injuries (Figure 2). Deaths,
on the other hand, declined. This does not
necessarily indicate a relative increase in the
use of less lethal weapons; rather, the high
number of injuries over the past five years
could represent an increasing awareness
of and interest in documenting the health
hazards posed by impact projectiles.
These numbers should be considered a
minimum estimate of the true health impacts
■ Multi-projectile injuries D Single projectile injuries
of KIPs. Our review is limited in scope to
solely the medical and scientific literature. Figure 4. Total injuries (major and minor) from single and
Literature reviews are subject to selection multi-projectile KIPs, this report.

40

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

controlled Kashmir. Their deleterious effect
on public health is far out of proportion
relative to any other kind of KIP. Birdshot is
also unique as an unmodified lethal munition
made non-lethal only on a technicality by
protocols of use and laws in a given country.
While fewer than half (n=9) of the studies
identified pertain to these weapons, they are
responsible for 82% of the injured and killed
in this review (Figure 4).

2000

1500

1000

500

839

0

Two countries are almost wholly responsible
for this tally: India and Chile, where different
kinds of multi-projectile KIPs are widely used
for crowd control.

0

294
100

0
Other KIPs

■ Permanent

Rubber pellets

■ Recovered fu lly

Metal pellets

Ooead

Figure 5. Deaths, permanent injuries, and recoverable injuries

Shotgun shells carrying hundreds of metal
pellets have been used for over a decade for
crowd control in the Indian Union Territory
of Jammu and Kashmir. Often referred to as
“birdshot” or, locally, “pellets,” these lethal
rounds historically were used for hunting
small game. Local police have arbitrarily
labelled them “less-lethal” when fired from
distances of over 50 metres; however,
beyond this distance, the expanding cloud
of dense, high-velocity pellets still have
ample capacity to penetrate the skin and
inflict grievous injuries. Metal birdshot from
Kashmir alone accounts for 76% (n=1,669)
of all dead and injured individuals captured
in our review of the medical literature and
85% (n=1,323) of all ocular injuries. This tally
is certainly an undercounting of the true
prevalence of birdshot injuries in the region,
which by independent accounting, is likely
in the thousands.28 In many cases, surgical

are sorted by single-projectile and multi-projectile KIPs

removal of birdshot is not feasible, and the
social and economic cost of the longterm
effects provoked by Kashmir’s “epidemic of
dead eyes” will persist for decades.29
In Kashmir and elsewhere, the metal birdshot
is primarily composed of lead, which, even in
small doses, is known to cause physical and
mental developmental and behavioural harm
that can be devastating. Lead pellets, having
once penetrated the skin, are difficult to
remove. Moreover, due to their indiscriminate
nature, children may be struck. Thus, the
longer-term effects of lead poisoning from
pellets must be better studied.
Multi-projectile KIPs are also responsible for
the upsurge in ocular injuries reported in the
literature in countries where they are being

28
Human Rights Watch, “India: Stop Using Pellet-Firing Shotguns in Kashmir,” Human Rights Watch, (4 September 2020),
accessible at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/04/india-stop-using-pellet-firing-shotguns-kashmir.
29
E Barry, “An Epidemic of ‘Dead Eyes’ in Kashmir as India Uses Pellet Guns on Protesters,” The New York Times, (29 August
2016), accessible at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/asia/pellet-guns-used-in-kashmir-protests-cause-dead-eyes-epidemic.
html

41

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

n=64(4%)

~11\111(9B}

These projectiles, fired as a group of 12, are
made of a composite material far denser than
pure rubber. Although less hazardous than
birdshot, “rubberized buckshot” shares the
characteristic of uncontrollable dispersion
at a distance with its metal counterpart.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the pattern of injuries
in our literature review is similar, with a high
number of ocular injuries occurring (n=182)
over a period of less than two months.

The number of injuries from metal birdshot
found in our literature review dwarfs those from
■
O
otherKIPs
other KIPs. Metal birdshot is also responsible
for all deaths not attributable to rubber-coated
Figure 6. Ocular injuries caused by single projectile vs
metal bullets. The disproportionate health
multi-projectile KIPs, this report.
impacts of metal birdshot demonstrate that
these weapons should be considered lethal
used. These injuries are severe and consist
and must never be used for crowd control.
of both closed- and open-globe injuries,
Furthermore, the alarming similarities in
which often require surgical intervention
ocular injury prevalence between metal
and, in almost all cases, leave the victim with
birdshot and rubberized buckshot strongly
reduced visual acuity or permanent vision
suggest multiple projectile KIPs, in particular,
loss in the affected eye(s).
pose a grave risk of disability. They likewise
Another example of the harms of multi- should be banned for crowd control.
projectile KIPs comes from Chile. Chilean
security forces used a kind of multiple
projectile KIP known as “rubberized
buckshot” during the nationwide protests
starting in October of 2019, resulting in over
400 ocular injuries as a result of these KIPs.30
Multi-projectiles

The disproportionate health impacts of metal birdshot
demonstrate that these weapons should be considered lethal and
must never be used for crowd control.

30
N Larsson, “He saw white: Why the eye became a symbol of Chile’s unrest,” Al Jazeera, (16 March 2020), https://www.aljazeera.
com/features/2020/3/16/he-saw-white-why-the-eye-became-a-symbol-of-chiles-unrest.

42

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Sidebar

Pellets, buckshot, and birdshot
Historically, police have used shotguns to fire
loads of metal pellets as an extreme method
of crowd control. These weapons were used
during the Attica Prison riot in 1971 and
“Bloody Thursday” at People’s Park in 1969
in the United States, as well as throughout
pre- and post-apartheid South Africa. While
lethal rounds have been replaced by a host
of kinetic impact projectiles in most parts of
the world, birdshot–shotgun loads of small
(<6 mm diameter) pellets–are still frequently
deployed across the Middle East and South
Asia as a crowd management strategy. Over
the past decade, birdshot use in crowd
control has been documented in Bahrain,
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, and, most
notably, India.

being shot from a range no greater than five
metres, often in the back.31 Despite these
deaths and hundreds of injuries attributed to
these weapons, birdshot is still extensively
deployed by Bahraini security officials,
causing high numbers of deaths in 2012,32
2014,33 2015, and 2017.34 In Egypt, Shaimaa
al-Sabbagh, an Egyptian poet and activist,
was killed after being shot in the back from
close range with birdshot. More recently,
birdshot from security forces killed protesters
in Iraq in 202035 and in Sudan in 2022.36

By far the most sustained use of birdshot
has been in the Indian Union Territory of
Jammu and Kashmir, where police birdshot–
fired from what are often mislabelled “nonlethal pellet guns” –has claimed the lives
Birdshot is frequently deadly at close to of at least 24 and injured thousands.37 Our
medium ranges. The 2011 Bahraini uprising review of the scientific and medical literature
saw at least seven deaths directly attributed regarding KIPs also identified eight studies
to police birdshot, with the majority of victims about pellet injuries in Kashmir, which
31
“Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” (23 November 2011) accessible at: http://files.bici.org.bh/
BICIreportEN.pdf.
32
W Al-Jawahiry and H Mohammed, “Bahrain protester died of birdshot wounds: relative,” Reuters, (23 April 2012), accessible at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-protester/bahrain-protester-died-of-birdshot-wounds-relative-idUSBRE83M1BS20120423.
33
Human Rights Watch, “Bahrain: Gunshot Deaths Require Swift Investigation,” Human Rights Watch, (11 June 2014), accessible
at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/11/bahrain-gunshot-deaths-require-swift-investigation.
34
Amnesty International, “Bahrain: At least one dead and hundreds injured as government violently cracks down on opposition,”
Amnesty International, (23 May 2017), accessible at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/05/bahrain-at-least-one-dead-andhundreds-injured-as-government-violently-cracks-down-on-opposition/.
35
Reuters Staff, “Iraqi security forces kill protester in Baghdad – police sources,” Reuters, (25 February 2020), accessible at: https://
www.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-protests-violence-idINKBN20J2LR.
36
AFP, “Sudanese protester killed as thousands march against coup,” France 24, (28 February 2022), accessible at: https://www.
france24.com/en/live-news/20220228-sudanese-protester-killed-as-thousands-march-against-coup.
37
Business Standard, “Pellet guns have killed 24, blinded 139 in Kashmir since 2010: Report,” Business Standard, (2 August 2019),
accessible at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/pellet-guns-have-killed-24-blinded-139-in-kashmir-since-2010report-119080200151_1.html.

43

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

recorded 1,669 individuals killed or injured
by pellets–almost three times the number of
KIP injuries previously recorded in literature
published from 2017-2021. These injuries
disproportionately resulted in permanent
injury relative to other KIPs (see Figure 4).
Birdshot use is associated with a very high
incidence of ocular injuries. In Kashmir,
hundreds of civilians have suffered severe
eye injuries as a result of the small-diameter,
high-velocity
shot,
which
disperses
uncontrollably with increasing distance
from the shooter.38 This phenomenon is not
unique to India; in one week of November
2012, Tunisian police’s use of birdshot led to
at least 20 cases of severe ocular trauma.39
Ocular trauma stands out due to the oftenpermanent nature of the disability created,
generating additional physical, mental, and

economic burdens for those maimed by
these weapons.
Lead poisoning has also been reported due
to the use of lead pellets, especially when
they are embedded in the tissues of children
and young people and not removed. Chronic
exposure to even small doses of lead can lead
to devastating physical and mental injuries.
Lead is now known to produce a spectrum of
injury across multiple body systems, affecting
children’s brain development and resulting in
reduced intelligence quotient (IQ), behavioural
changes such as reduced attention span and
increased antisocial behaviour, and reduced
educational attainment. Lead exposure
also causes anaemia, hypertension, renal
impairment, immunotoxicity, and toxicity to
the reproductive organs. The neurological
and behavioural effects of lead are irreversible.

38
See the case of Farzan Nazir Sheikh in INCLO, “Unhealed Wounds,” accessible at: https://www.inclo.net/projects/unhealedwounds/.
39
CL Belhadj, “A Decade After Cops Took Their Eyes, Siliana Victims Still Seek Justice,” Meshkal, (30 December 2021), accessible
at: https://meshkal.org/a-decade-after-cops-took-their-eyes-siliana-victims-still-seek-justice/.

44

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

protests of October 2019 resulted in
a wave of ocular injuries from “rubber
buckshot.”41 In the United States, the
police response to protests in the
wake of George Floyd’s murder saw
extensive use of a wide variety of
impact projectiles, resulting in a surge
in potentially life-threatening injuries. In
Colombia, the use of impact projectiles
during the protests of the spring of 2021
resulted in more than one hundred
ocular injuries.42

What has changed?
›

›

Increase in injuries: Since the
publication of LiD1, the use of KIPs
to suppress mass dissent has rapidly
accelerated, with a corresponding
increase in documentation of the
resulting injuries. Of the 2,434 total
injuries reported in the medical literature
from 2016-2021, 2,232 were severe (92
per cent), a ratio higher than that found
earlier (70 per cent). We note, however,
that this proportion may be skewed
by the under-reporting of less-severe
injuries. At least 945 individuals (43 per
cent) suffered permanent disability as
a result of KIP injury, a ratio of maiming
greater than that of the previous report
(15 per cent). Ocular injuries also made
up a much larger share of total reported
injuries, with 1,575 cases (73 per cent)
versus 310 cases (16 per cent) from the
earlier literature. This total is due almost
wholly to multi-projectile KIPs (1,511
cases, or 96 per cent).
Increase in use: Novel weapons have
come to the fore over the last five years.
In France, impact projectiles–notably
a variety of KIPs commonly known as
“flash-balls” –were widely used during
the gilets jaunes protests of 2018-2020,
resulting in life-threatening injuries
to the face and eyes.40 The Chilean

›

Multiple-projectiles: The widespread
use of multi-projectiles (where multiple
projectiles are fired at once) has allowed
for a more in-depth analysis of these
weapons in this report that demonstrates
their particular harms. 82% (n=1994) of
all injuries and deaths recorded in our
updated literature review of KIPs were
a result of multiple projectile rounds–
KIPs that consist of more than a single
missile fired at the same time (Figure
4). Furthermore, multiple projectile
rounds were involved in a staggering
96% (n=1,511) of all ocular injuries from
KIPs. Multiple projectiles are inherently
indiscriminate: they cannot target a
single individual or a single body part,
resulting in excessive injury to targeted
individuals (when they impact sensitive
body parts) and to bystanders (when
the projectiles spread to those not

40
R Lartizien et al., “Yellow vests protests: facial injuries from rubber bullets,” The Lancet 394, no. 10197 (2019): 469-470,
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(19)31764-7 and A Chauvin, et al., “Ocular injuries caused by less-lethal weapons in France,” The Lancet 394, no.
10209 (2019): 1616-1617, doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(19)31807-0.
41
A Rodríguez et al., “Ocular trauma by kinetic impact projectiles during civil unrest in Chile,” Eye 35 (2021): 1666-1672, doi:10.1038/
s41433-020-01146-w.
42
O Griffin, “Over 100 Colombian protesters suffered eye damage by police in 2021 marches - report,” Reuters, 26 November 2021.
Acessible at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/over-100-colombia-protesters-suffered-eye-damage-by-police-2021-marchesreport-2021-11-26/

45

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

targeted. The results of our analysis
suggest that these weapons are more
dangerous than single projectiles, and
restrictions on their use must be one of
the first steps in limiting harm from KIPs.

›

‘Hybrid’ weapons: The development
and proliferation of novel ‘hybrid’
weapons that combine characteristics
of KIPs with other less-lethal weapons
add complexity to the assessment
and treatment of injury from these
weapons. Foremost among these
are KIPs laced with chemical agents
designed to deter through impact and
chemical irritation concomitantly, most
notably compressed-air weapons such
as the “Pepperball’’ gun or the FN 303,
which shoot irritant-filled spherical
gelatine capsules. Stun grenades,
also known as distraction devices,
with a kinetic component–such as
grenades designed to project rubber
balls across their blast radii (“Stingball” grenades) along with a flash and
report–are increasingly seen in protest
settings, where they act in effect as
indiscriminate KIPs.

›

Canisters misused as KIPs: Weapons
not designed to function as impact
projectiles are increasingly being
pressed into service as improvised KIPs.
Tear gas canisters, when fired directly
at protesters, act as KIPs; however, they
can be extraordinarily hazardous when
used in this manner as they are dense,
metallic, large and often heated or midexplosion. These devices and their
resultant injuries are reviewed in the
chemical irritants section. Projectilelaunched distraction devices, such
as the Airborne Warning/Signalling
Munition (AW/SM),43 are designed to
deflagrate 6 metres above the heads
of crowds but have been directly fired
towards individuals or crowds, risking
serious injury and death.

43
Defense Technology, “40MM WARNING / SIGNALLING MUNITIONS; OC, CN, CS AND INERT MARKING; 50, 100, 200 AND
300 METERS,” accessible at: https://www.defense-technology.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/40mm-Warning_Signaling-Munition-w_
Payload.pdf.

46

On 10 March 2021, Mthikozisi Ntumba, a
35-year-old civil servant, was shot and killed
by police using double-ball rounds as he was
leaving a medical clinic in Johannesburg city
centre during protests.50 Ntumba was leaving

before being lethally wounded by doubleball rounds fired from a police shotgun.45
Fana’s son, Andile, noted that he saw 16
shell casings lying around his father’s
lifeless body.46 He further noted that Fana
was shot under the arm–further evidence
of his surrender47 in the wake of impending
death by CCW. Significantly, Fana was the
only breadwinner in his family and was
described as a community leader.48 Research
conducted in the wake of this tragedy found
that the death of Thembekile Fana appears
to have been linked to the use of double-ball
rounds at close range.49

Id.

D Bruce, “Rubber bullets are high risk when used at close range”, Polity, (2019).

49

50
U Nkanjeni, “Mthokozisi Ntumba: Know the man who was killed in the Wits protest crossfire”, Times Live, (12 March 2021),
available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-03-12-mthokozisi-ntumba-know-the-man-who-was-killed-in-the-witsprotest-crossfire/.

Id.
48

47
Another prominent case of an individual shot while raising their arms and surrendering to law enforcement was the case of
actor Patrick Shai who was shot eleven times in 2019, including in the neck, back, and arms by police using rubber bullets. Mr Shai had
been seeking to intervene between police and protesters. See: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-11-11-actor-patrickshai-shot-11-times-by-cops-during-soweto-protest-over-disconnected-electricity/.

46

45
DispatchLive, “Protester ‘killed by cops’”, (20 March 2018) at: ‘https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2018-03-20-protester-killedby-cops/.

44
D Bruce, “Rubber bullets well past their sell-by date”, Mail & Guardian. (6 December 2019), accessible at: https://mg.co.za/
article/2019-12-06-00-rubber-bullets-well-past-their-sell-by-date/.

On 19 March 2018, Thembekile Fana, a
61-year-old man, died during a protest in the
Eastern Cape after being shot by police.44
According to a witness on the scene, Fana,
who had been running for cover from police,
stopped and raised his arms in surrender

Among the “less-lethal” weapons that the
South African Police Service (SAPS) possess
are the “double-ball rounds”, more commonly
known by the generic name “rubber bullets”.
They consist of double-ball rounds containing
two hard rubber balls fired from a shotgun.
Manufactured by a number of companies,
around the world and in South Africa, the
use of these inherently inaccurate weapons
in policing protests and public gatherings
have changed the lives of many people in
South Africa, both through tragic deaths
and injuries.

South Africa

Inherently inaccurate ‘double-ball rounds’ cause
deaths and injuries of demonstrators
and bystanders

Case study

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

0

47

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

STUDENT SPEAKS DURING THE DEMONSTRATION. SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE MOVED TO DISPERSE STUDENTS PROTESTING
AGAINST REFUSAL BY WITS UNIVERSITY TO REGISTER THOSE STUDENTS IN ARREARS WITH TUITION FEES. POLICE CLASHED
WITH PROTESTERS WHO WERE BLOCKING THE ROADS WITH RUBBLE AND DISRUPTING TRAFFIC IN JOHANNESBURG. POLICE
VIOLENTLY REPRESSED THIS STUDENT PROTEST AT WITS UNIVERSITY IN JOHANNESBURG WITH DOUBLE BALL ROUNDS,
FATALLY SHOOTING PASSERBY MTHOKOZISI NTUMBA. THABO JAIYESIMI | SOPA IMAGES/SIPA USA/AP IMAGES

his doctor’s rooms, when he caught himself in
the crossfire of running protests over historical
debt between police and students.51 It was
also reported that three students, who were
waiting outside the Johannesburg Institute of
Engineering and Technology College, were
also shot and injured by police using doubleball rounds that day.52 According to a CCTV
video of the alleged incident, police violently
pursued a group of people standing on a

sidewalk and can be clearly seen firing their
shotguns indiscriminately as people flee for
safety.53 Four Johannesburg Metropolitan
Police Department (JMPD) officers were
subsequently arrested and charged with one
count of murder and three counts of attempted
murder.54 An investigating officer with the
Independent Police Investigative Directorate
reported that she found “Ntumba’s body with
wounds on the left side of his chest, under

51
B Wicks, “SERI wants answers after acquittal of cops accused of Mthokozisi Ntumba’s murder” Eyewitness News, (8 July 2022),
accessible at:https://ewn.co.za/0001/01/01/seri-wants-answers-after-acquittal-of-cops-accused-of-mthokozisi-ntumba-s-murder.
52
J Chabalala, “Cops accused of killing Mthokozisi Ntumba amid student protest want case thrown out”, News24. (4 July 2022),
accessible at: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/cops-accused-of-killing-mthokozisi-ntumba-amid-student-protestwant-case-thrown-out-20220704.
53
SERI, “The excessive use of force: We demand accountability for Mthokozisi Ntumb”, (7 July 2022), accessible at: http://www.
seri-sa.org/index.php/latest-news/1235-press-statement-the-excessive-use-of-force-we-demand-accountability-for-mthokozisi-ntumba7-july-2022.
54

48

See above 50.

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

his armpit and under his left eye”.55 During
Ntumba’s postmortem, a ballistics expert
“confirmed that the deceased was shot by a
rubber bullet at close range”.56 Ntuma’s case
is not the only recent case of the tragic death
of a bystander: In 2017, in Bela-Bela, Karabo
Kuhmalo, an 11-year old boy, died after being
hit in the head by rubber bullets fired by the
South African police.57
Siphesihle Mtsweni, 21, then a student at the
Johannesburg Institute of Engineering and
Technology was also shot by police using
double-ball rounds during the protest that
day. Mtsweni, who sustained injuries from
the double-bullet rounds to the face, said he
dropped out of college later that year due
to trauma following the shooting incident.58
“When I would go back to the college, I was
reminded of what happened when I was
shot. I am reminded of the dead body I saw,”
said Mtsweni.59

Owing to their design, cartridges that
contain multiple projectiles are inaccurate.
Once fired, the projectiles separate, and can
rapidly disperse, resulting in unpredictable
impacts. This inaccuracy only increases
over longer distances. As a result of this
design, projectiles from double-ball rounds
may impact unintended parts of the body,
including the head, face or neck, which
could cause serious injury. Despite their
inherently inaccurate nature, the use of
different types of rubber bullets continues to
be a key part of police responses to protests
and other public gatherings in South Africa.
This tendency to rely on less-lethal weapons
and equipment for public order policing was
addressed in the Panel of Experts Report on
Crowd Management, published following
the Marikana Commission of Inquiry60
(a case included in LiD1) although the
recommendations of that Report have not
been prioritised.

Double-ball rounds are a particularly
dangerous type of kinetic impact projectile.

55
C Mahamba, “Mthokozisi Ntumba shot at close range with rubber bullets, court told”, The Star. (25 March 2021), accessible
at: https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/mthokozisi-ntumba-shot-at-close-range-with-rubber-bullets-court-told-cd1ba027-d380-4707-b0f02d90561cbb7a.
56

Id.

57
See above n 43 and J Bornman, “Family angry over death of 10-year-old boy allegedly shot by police in BelaBela”, Times Live,
9 February 2017, accessible: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-02-09-family-angry-over-death-of-10-year-old-boyallegedly-shot-by-police-in-bela-bela/.
58
M Koka, “Former student testifies about being shot on day Mthokozisi Ntumba was killed”, Sowetan Live. (10 February 2022),
accessible at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-02-10-former-student-testifies-about-being-shot-on-day-mthokozisintumba-was-killed/.
59

Id.

60
Panel of Experts Report on Policing and Crowd Management, Established by the Minister of Police in Terms of the
Recommendations of the Marikana Commission of Inquiry, Final Report, (27 May 2018).

49

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Sidebar

Manufacture and procurement of double-ball rounds
Double- and triple ball rounds are
manufactured and procured by a wide range
of companies. Many of the double-ball rounds
used in South Africa are manufactured
in South Africa, but there are companies
manufacturing double- and triple-ball rounds
across the world. Among these are believed
to be: the Spanish company, Trust Eibarres
SA, manufactures both double- and tripleball
rounds for law enforcement;61 the Turkish
company, ZSR;62 the Czech company, Sellier
& Bellot;63 the Brazilian company, Condor;64
and the US-based company, Defense
Technology, makes a ‘Multiple Rubber Baton
Round’ with three projectiles.65
Several companies within South Africa
manufacture a range of kinetic impact
projectiles – including the double-ball round.
The most notable historical South African
manufacturer of kinetic impact projectiles

was Swartklip Products, which became a
Denel (now Rheinmetall Denel) subsidiary
during the 1990s. In 2014, the then-Chief
Executive of Rheinmetall Denel Munition,
Norbert Schulze, was confident that “locally
produced rubber bullets, flash-bangs and
tear gas [would soon be] used by police”.66
Another manufacturer is Industrial Cartridge,
that currently markets ‘2 ball baton’ and ‘3
ball baton’ 12-gauge ammunition among its
‘Law Enforcement Shotshells’ range67 and
that reported to have seen “high demand
for less lethal ammunition for crowd control,
with orders from South African entities
taking up much of its production capacity”
in 2019.68 That same year, the South African
Police Service published a tender to supply
“shotgun, 12 gauge/bore baton double ball,
soft silicone, smokeless propellant, orange to
the South African Police Service: nationally
for a period of three (3) years.”69 In July 2020,

61

Trust Eibarres SA, “Law Enforcement”, available at: https://www.cartuchostrust.com/en/cartridges/law-enforcement/.

62

ZSR Patlayıcı Sanayi A.Ş, “Traumatic”, accessed at https://zsrpatlayici.com/traumatic-en.

63
Sellier & Bellot, “Law enforcement products: 12/67.5 rubber ball”, accessible at: https://www.sellier-bellot.cz/en/products/lawenforcement-products/12-67-5-rubber-ball/list/.
64
Condor Tecnologias Nãa-Letais, “AM-403/A TRIMPACT – TRÊS PROJETIS DE BORRACHA”, accessible at: https://www.
condornaoletal.com.br/am-403-a/?lang=en.
65
Defense Technology, “Multiple Rubber Baton Round 40mm”, accessible at: https://www.defense-technology.com/product/
multiple-rubber-baton-round-40mm/.
66
K Helfrich, “Exports essential for Rheinmetall Denel Munition”, (4 February 2014), accessible at: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/
industry/industry-industry/exports-essential-for-rheinmetall-denel-munition/
67
Industrial Cartridge SA, Less Lethal Ammunition – 12 Gauge. Law Enforcement Shotshells, accessible at: https://
industrialcartridgesa.com/less-lethal-ammunition/.
68
defenceWeb, “High demand for less lethal rounds”, (6 December 2019), accessible at: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/
high-demand-for-less-lethal-rounds/.
69

50

Awarded Bid. Bid Number 19/1/9/1/03TT(19), accessible at: https://www.saps.gov.za/services/bidthumbnail.php?id=2679.

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

BANGKOK, THAILAND - MARCH 20, 2021: RIOT POLICE FIRE RUBBER BULLETS TO PRO-DEMOCRACY PROTESTERS DURING A
CRACKDOWN AT SANAM LUANG AND RATCHADAMNOEN NAI RD. DIRACH TOUMLAMOON | SHUTTERSTOCK

the successful bidder, IT Empowerment
Technologies, was awarded a three-year
R30.5 million contract. Although the contract
between the SAPS and IT Empowerment
Technologies was cancelled later in 2020,70
it is unclear if the tender was re-issued or
if a previous supplier has been contracted
instead of IT Empowerment Technologies.

standards regarding the manufacture of
these weapons around the world, their testing
before purchase by governments and their
procurement72 creates immense challenges
for organizations seeking to monitor abuses
related to these weapons and the fight for
justice by victims and their families.

Civil society actors in South Africa have
repeatedly criticised the nature of the use of
these kinetic impact projectiles within South
Africa.71 Despite this, police forces continue
to procure new stocks of double-ball rounds.
The lack of transparency and clear global
70
defenceWeb, ‘‘Inflated’ SAPS rubber bullet tender cancelled”, (23 September 2020), accessible at: https://www.defenceweb.
co.za/land/land-land/inflated-saps-rubber-bullet-tender-cancelled/.
71
See, for example, M Rayner, L Baldwin-Ragaven, with S Naidoo, “A Double Harm: Police misuse of force and barriers to necessary
Health Care Services”, Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa and D Bruce, “Rubber bullets are high risk when used at close range”,
ISS Today( 28 November 2018), accessible at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/rubber-bullets-are-high-risk-when-used-at-close-range.
72
In the case of the IT Empowerment Technologies’ successful bid, it was alleged that the SAPS “paid five times what they should
have for less lethal ammunition” and a whistleblower, Colonel (ret.) David Peddle, alleged that “the ammunition was not tested to the latest
SAPS specifications before the bid was approved”. See defenceWeb, “Concern over ‘inflated’ SAPS rubber bullet tender”, (2 September
2020), accessible at: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/industry/industry-industry/concern-over-inflated-saps-rubber-bullet-tender/.

51

52

75
Capitán del ESMAD fue citado a juicio disciplinario por muerte de Dylan Cruz, Revista Semana, (10 December 2021), accessible
at: :https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/capitan-del-esmad-fue-citado-a-juicio-disciplinario-por-muerte-de-dylan-cruz/202115/.

74
Medicina Legal confirmó que Dylan murió por disparo del ESMAD. El Tiempo, (28 November 2019), accessible at https://www.
eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/dylan-cruz-medicina-legal-confirmo-que-el-joven-murio-por-el-disparo-del-esmad-438524.

73
D Cruz, Colombian teenager injured by police projectile, dies, BBC News, (26 November 2019), accessible at: https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-latin-america-50557496.

Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic
Sciences confirmed in his autopsy that the
cause of death was “secondary to penetrating
cranioencephalic trauma, caused by low
impact ammunition, which causes severe
and irreversible damage to the brain.”74 That
is to say, he was killed by the impact of the
bean bag ammunition, which complied with
the manufacturer’s technical data sheet and
had not been modified. His death fuelled
On 23 November 2019, Dilan Cruz, an 18-year- further protests, including demands for the
old, was participating in demonstrations in end of police violence and the end of impunity
the centre of Bogota, the country’s capital. for deadly police conduct.
ESMAD (Escuadrón Móvil Antidisturbios),
the police unit responsible for crowd and Cruz’s death was followed by almost two
riot management, began to throw tear years of disagreement regarding whether the
gas and stun grenades to disperse the ordinary justice system or the military criminal
demonstrators. In videos, Cruz can be seen justice system had the authority to investigate
picking up a grenade, throwing it back at and criminally prosecute the ESMAD agent.
the agents and, within seconds, being hit in The Constitutional Court, the highest court
the back of the head by a flying object. The in Colombia on constitutional matters, ruled
projectile that hit him was a bean bag, fired that the investigation should continue in
by Captain Manuel Cubillos Rodríguez from the ordinary justice system. In December
a 12-gauge shotgun, which is one of the less 2021, the agent was required to attend a
lethal weapons authorised for police use disciplinary trial by the Procuraduría General
under Colombian law.
de la Nación (the national prosecutor’s
office), which is in charge of investigating
Dilan Cruz died two days after the incident, and sanctioning public officials for actions
while in intensive care.73 The National taken in their official capacity.75 According

On 21 November 2019, a series of social
demonstrations in Colombia was called by
unions, students, pensioners’ associations,
and other groups in response to several
factors, including proposed modifications
to the pension, labour, and tax regime; noncompliance with the peace agreements; the
murders of human rights defenders; and
socioeconomic inequalities.

Colombia

Man killed by ESMAD with bean bag shot

Case study

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

0

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

THE MOTHER OF DILAN CRUZ WHO WAS KILLED BY THE POLICE IN A BOGOTÁ PROTEST SHOWS A PICTURE OF HIM IN DURING
THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL STRIKE AGAINST THE IVAN DUQUE GOVERNMENT. BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA. 19 MAY, 2021.
SEBASTIAN DELGADO C. | SHUTTERSTOCK

to the prosecutor’s office, “The investigated
officer did not take the necessary care when
activating the shotgun he was carrying,
since regardless of whether the weapon is
listed among the least lethal weapons, it will
always affect the integrity of the people.”76
Despite this finding, to date there has been
no decision on the merits of the case.

arbitrary intervention of the public forces in
demonstrations and protests.” The court’s
ruling suspended the use of 12-gauge
shotguns, the weapon used to shoot the bean
bags, by ESMAD. The suspension continues
to this day, and the Ombudsman’s Office of
Colombia is obliged to monitor compliance
with this order.

In December 2019, days after Cruz’s death,
civil society organisations and concerned
individuals filed a legal action seeking
protection of the fundamental right to protest.
In September 2020, the Supreme Court of
Justice finally issued a ruling77 protecting the
right of all persons to protest and clarifying
the duty of authorities to “avoid, prevent
and sanction the systematic, violent and
76
Procuraduria General de la Nacion, Procuraduría formuló cargos a capitán de la Policía Nacional por la muerte de Dilan Cruz,
(10 December 2021), accessible at: https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/portal/PROCURADURIA-FORMULO-CARGOS-A-CAPITAN-DE-LAPOLICIA-NACIONAL-POR-LA-MUERTE-DE-DILAN-CRUZ.news
77

See https://www.dejusticia.org/en/supreme-court-of-justice-protects-the-right-to-protest-against-police-violence/.

53

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

Case study

Expanding bullets among multiple CCWs
used in Minsk demonstrations
Belarus
On 9 August 2020,78 after the results
of Belarus’s presidential election were
announced, mass protests broke out to
denounce what many Belarusians - and
international observers - saw as an unfair,
rigged election. Aliaksandr,79 a 37-year-old
driver, joined other protesters seeking to
gather in the centre of Minsk. He was among
approximately 20 people who, trying to make
their way to the main protest site, approached
a police van and a group of policemen. When
Aliaksandr’s group was approximately 15
metres from the police van, at least three
rounds of ammunition were fired, and
Aliaksandr was struck in the abdomen. He
tried to run away but managed to stumble
only 150 metres before being picked up by
strangers and taken to a hospital by car.

severe pain for many days. He spent 15 days
in intensive care and had to undergo further
operations abroad, as the treatment available
in Belarus was limited and expensive. It took
him five months to recover.

Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians
protested over several weeks after the
elections, and these demonstrations were
regularly dispersed violently, using CCWs
such as rubber bullets, tear gas, and stun
grenades. It is estimated that hundreds of
protesters were severely injured, and at least
15 protesters died during the 2020 protests.80
Mediazona, an independent media outlet,
reported the number of arrests at over
33,00081 and Viasna, a major human rights
group, counts over 1,300 of those as political
prisoners. Hundreds have been reportedly
Aliaksandr was operated on, and the surgeon beaten and tortured in custody.82
later told him that a rubber bullet had been
extracted from his body. According to the A report by the UN Office of the High
surgeon, the bullet was made of plastic, Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
but its core was made of small metal balls, published on 5 March 2022, detailed
which expanded on impact and were easily excessive and inappropriate uses by Belarusian
visible in an X-ray image. Aliaksandr was in security forces of batons, water cannons, tear
78

This is a summary of the incident reported at https://august2020.info/ru/detail-page/292.

79
Republic of Belarus has two official languages, Belarusian and Russian. For the sake of consistency, the transliterations follow
the Belarusian versions of names, even where sources are in Russian.
80
FIDH, “Supplying the means for repression in Belarus,” December 2021. Accessible at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/548344402supplying-the-means-for-repression-in-belarus_1_.pdf.
81

See http://mediazona.by/number/2022/08/22/detained.

82
Human Rights Watch, “Belarus: Systematic Beatings, Torture of Protesters,” Human Rights Watch (15 September 2020), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-beatings-torture-protesters.

54

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Kinetic impact projectiles

A WOMAN ON HER KNEES STANDS IN FRONT OF THE RIOT
POLICE IN A PUBLIC UNREST STARTED IN THE STREETS OF
MINSK, BELARUS, ON AUGUST 9, 2020 AT THE END OF THE
VOTING DAY WITH PEOPLE CLAIMING FOR A GOVERNMENT
CHANGE AND PROTESTING BECAUSE FRAUD ELECTIONS
FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF BELARUS. CELESTINO ARCE |
NURPHOTO VIA GETTY IMAGES

gas, and kinetic impact projectiles, including
rubber-coated steel bullets. The UN report
stated, “On the basis of an analysis of 26 firsthand witness accounts, their medical records
and photographic material, in conjunction
with a review of the injuries of more than
1,000 individuals treated by the Minsk medical
emergency services during the protests, along
with open source material, OHCHR found that
injuries resulting from the use of force in several
cities across Belarus between 9-12 August
included tramline bruises and hematomas on
the torso, buttocks, and back of the legs, head
injuries (such as brain contusion), concussion,
traumatic wounds, fractures and burns, ear
drum perforations as a result of acoustic
trauma, and eye injuries. More severe injuries
included multiple organ injuries sustained from
rubber-coated steel bullets and internal organ
damage caused by shrapnel from stun grenade
fragments and burns caused by explosions.”83

Not only has Belarus failed to investigate these
actions of security forces, but some of the
civilians who complained were themselves
prosecuted. According to authorities, a
complaint about police brutality was an
admission of “participation in mass disorder.”
A report from the human rights group FIDH84
highlighted the issue of the unregulated
transfer of CCWs from the European Union (EU)
to Belarus. After the crackdown on the protests
in Minsk and other cities, journalists found KIP
ammunition produced in Turkey (STERLING 12
gauge less lethal cartridge with rubber bullet),
Latvia (D Dupleks 12/70 cartridge with rubber
bullet), and Poland (Fam-Pionki 12/70 light
and sound cartridge ONS 2000).85 Multiple
testimonies were collected by human rights
activists and journalists about police use of
CCWs. It is a striking commonality in many of
these testimonies that the police used CCWs
not when the protests were at their largest,
but at times when the demonstrators barely
started gathering or were dispersing. It may
reasonably be inferred that CCWs were used
not in self-defence, but to frighten and punish
the protesters.

83
OHCHR, “High Commissioner’s report on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election
and in its aftermath, A/HRC/49/71, paras 25-30” 4 March 2022. Accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ohchr-belarus/
index
84
FIDH, “Supplying the means for repression in Belarus,” December 2021. Accessible at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/548344402supplying-the-means-for-repression-in-belarus_1_.pdf.
85

Id at p 18

55

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

CHEMICAL
IRRITANTS
06 APRIL 2018, PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, KHAN YUNIS:’PALESTINIAN PROTESTERS RUN FOR COVER WHEN ISRAELI SOLDIERS
BOMB THEM WITH TEAR GAS. 2 PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 250 INJURED SINCE THE MASSIVE PROTESTS STARTED
LAST FRIDAY. A SPEAKER OF THE PALESTINIAN HEALTH SERVICE TOLD THE PRESS THAT MORE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN CRITICALLY
WOUNDED. MOHAMMED TALATENE | PICTURE ALLIANCE/DPA/AP IMAGES

Weapon profile
Chemical irritants include a variety of
chemical compounds intended to produce
sensory irritation and pain. Conventionally
referred to as “tear gas” or “riot control
agents,” chemical irritants come in a variety
of formulations, sizes, concentrations, and
delivery mechanisms, depending on the
manufacturer and the context for which they
are intended. Historically categorised as nonlethal or less lethal, the general perception is
that the weapon does not cause permanent
injury or death but instead has mostly shortterm effects such as transient lacrimation
(flowing of tears), ocular irritation and pain,
blepharospasm (eyelid spasm), dermal
pain, respiratory distress, and transient
psychological effects of disorientation and
agitation.86 This perception is now being
challenged, with more evidence of associated
86

56

longer-term and even permanent injuries as
well as deaths.
Chemical irritants include a wide range
of agents that have been developed and
deployed for many decades, in addition to
ones that are currently under development.
There are four chemical compounds that
have been most frequently cited in purchase
orders, reports, and studies in the past
three decades: chlorobenzalmalononitrile
(agent CS), chloroacetophenone (agent CN),
oleoresin capsicum (agent OC, known as
pepper spray), and OC’s synthetic form, PAVA.
Of these four, the two most commonly used
by law enforcement agencies in recent years
for crowd control are agents CS and OC.
Lacrimator (tear-producing) agents are
older and still frequently used across the
globe. They act on TRPA1 receptors that are

MM Stark, “CS Spray,” Journal of Accident & Emergency Medicine 15, no. 4 (July 1998): 288.

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

located on the plasma membranes of many
human cells and are sensors for pain, cold,
itch, and for environmental irritants to initiate
protective responses such as tears, airway
resistance, and cough. Of the lacrimator
agents, agent CS is the most commonly used.
It was developed in the 1920s in the United
States and was introduced as a weapon by
the US military to replace agent CN in the
1950s.87 Agent CS then became a frequently
used military weapon in the second half
of the twentieth century and was famously
deployed by the U.S. military in the Vietnam
War.88 Military use is now banned, but agent
CS is now widely used by law enforcement
agencies in many countries – often as the
weapon of choice in the context of protest
and civilian crowd management. While the US
is still the largest manufacturer of CS, many
other countries have developed the industry,
among them Brazil, South Korea, India,
Israel and France. Despite the United States
remaining the biggest producer of CS, the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
not set a minimum threshold of concentration
at which the general population could
experience “notable discomfort, irritation,
or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory but
transient effects,”89 because even the lowest
concentrations cause these symptoms. The
volume of chemicals in each spray and gas

varies considerably among manufacturers
and countries.90
Agent OC, the second most-commonly
cited capsaicin agent, is essentially a highly
concentrated form of hot pepper and acts as
an agonist on TRPV1 pain receptors, causing
a burning sensation from stimulation of
the nerve. Agent OC and its synthetic form,
PAVA, have recently increased in popularity
as potent and effective crowd-control agents.
Also developed by the United States and
originally used as a deterrent against wild
animals (and by the U.S. Postal Service
against dogs), OC was developed in the
late 1970s and became a law enforcement
weapon in the late 1980s.91 It is now available
both as a spray and in gas form, with lower
concentrations being available as a selfdefence “pepper spray” for the public. More
potent variants are developed for military
and law enforcement agencies. These have
increasingly become weapons of choice for
crowd control. The potency of these weapons
depends both on the concentration of OC
within the solvent and the strength of the
“capsicum” – the active chemical that makes
pepper spicy. It is worth noting that OC may
also potentially include toxic chemicals, such
as alcohol, halogenated hydrocarbons, and
propellants, such as Freon.

87
BB Corson and RW Stoughton, “Reactions of Alpha, Beta-Unsaturated Dinitriles,” Journal of the American Chemical Society 50,
no. 10 (1 October 1928): 2825–37, doi:10.1021/ja01397a037; M Lenhart, ed., Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (Office of the Surgeon
General. Department of the Army, United States of America, 2008), chap. 13.
88
EJ Olajos and H Salem, “Riot Control Agents: Pharmacology, Toxicology, Biochemistry and Chemistry,” Journal of Applied
Toxicology: JAT 21, no. 5 (October 2001): 355–91.
89
B Ballantyne and S Callaway, “Inhalation Toxicology and Pathology of Animals Exposed to O-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile
(CS),” Medicine, Science, and the Law 12, no. 1 (January 1972): 43–65.
90
“Acute Exposure Guidelines Levels (AEGLs) for Tear Gas (CS)” (National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline
Levels for Hazardous Substances, September 2009), accessible at: http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/tear_gas_interim_sept_09_v1.pdf.
91

Lenhart, Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare, chap. 13.

57

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

Chloroacetophenone (CN), chloropicrin (PS),
bromobenzylcyanide (CA), dibenzoxazepine
(CR), and combinations of these chemicals–
also classified as lacrimator agents, riot
control or “tear gas”–function similarly,
albeit with myriad toxicity and potency
profiles. Agent CN, the oldest among them
and the active ingredient in “Mace,” is used
by the military and law enforcement and is
also available to the general public in many
countries for personal protection or animal
protection sprays. It has been less commonly
used in public policing since the advent
of CS because it is more potent and less
toxic. Chloropicrin (PS), best known as an
agricultural fumigant, was developed as a
chemical warfare agent (military designation,
PS). It was used in large quantities during
World War I and was stockpiled during World
War II. Agent PS is known to have a strong
irritating smell and can cause extended
lung, gastrointestinal and neurological injury
at high doses. Dibenzoxazepine (CR); was
developed by the British military in the 1950s
and 60s. Six to ten times stronger than Agent
CS, CR has been frequently called “firegas”.
Agent CR is less toxic than Agent CS at
comparable doses, but it can be lethal in
high doses or poorly ventilated spaces, even
in short time spans and tight spaces; It is also
known as a carcinogen and can persist on
porous surfaces for weeks. Significantly, CR
was used in Northern Ireland and Vietnam in
military operations.

protests and, more recently, in Egypt and
France. CS1 and CS2 are newer versions
of CS: they reduce degradation and extend
the shelf life of CS or, in the case of CS2,
increase weather resistance and flow into the
respiratory system by microencapsulating
the CS in silicone. Other lacrimator agents
include Bromobenzyl cyanide (CA) and
bromoacetone (BA). These are older, highly
toxic lacrimators that have not been used in
recent decades. Diphenylchlorarsine (DA),
diphenylaminearsine chloride (Adamsite
(DM)) and diphenylcyanarsine (DC) are
known as vomiting agents and may be used
in combination with lacrimators in some
contexts.

Riot-control agents are banned by the 1997
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) for
military use or as “a method of warfare.”
Discussions at the time reflected concerns
about the indiscriminate nature of the
weapons, the possibility of escalation, the
uncertainty around the use of CCWs versus
lethal chemical agents, and the unnecessary
suffering they cause.92 Despite this ban, there
continues to be military use of riot control
agents, albeit with caveats. For example,
although the United States signed and
ratified the CWC, it has reserved the right to
use riot-control agents in certain situations,
including counter-terrorist and hostagerescue operations, as well as military
operations against non-state actors initiating
armed conflict. And while military use of
In policing, reports suggest it has been chemical irritants is limited, the CWC does
used by Turkish and Ukrainian police during not restrict or regulate its use by domestic

92
Chemical Weapons Convention below n 333; and International Committee of the Red Cross, “Practice Relating to Rule 75. Riot
Control Agents,” Customary IHL Database (2005), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, accessible at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule75.

58

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

law enforcement in civilian contexts. Several
countries have limitations93 on the possession
and use of OC and CS, in either spray or gas
form, but they are wholly unregulated in
most countries.94

Mechanism of action
Chemical irritants are utilised for crowd dispersal
or for individual control or incapacitation by
causing pain and sensory irritation. Commonly
used lacrimator agents are synthetic organic
halogen compounds that are potent triggers of
the TRPA1 pain receptors present on the skin
and mucous membranes (eyes, nose, mouth,
respiratory tract) and cause pain, irritation,
tearing, sensations of heat, cold, and itching
(pruritis), and a host of involuntary reactions
such as eyelid spasm (blepharospasm) and
coughing. CS and CN have been found to
be 10,000 times more potent than naturally
found agonists of these receptors (such as
mustard, garlic, very high temperatures and
low pH compounds). CR is known to be twice
as potent as Agent CS. Oleoresin capsicum
(OC) and PAVA, the synthetic and more highly
concentrated form of OC, produce similar
effects compared to the lacrimator agents and
are also common pathways of inflammation,
resulting in more generalised sensations of
inflammation and pain.

food. They are typically deployed in two ways: in
the form of a spray or as a canister/grenade in
crowd-control settings. However, mechanisms
of delivery vary. These include pellets and pepper
balls, used in targeting individuals, as well as
water cannons, which, along with grenades and
canisters, provide more indiscriminate means
of crowd control. Pellets can be designed for a
“pepper spray gun”, which uses a compressed
gas cartridge capable of firing 21 rounds. Per
the manufacturers, the rounds travel at 320 feet
per second, with an effective range of over 150
feet and release a 4–5-foot cloud of smoke when
they explode.95 Newer forms include plastic
balls filled with chemical irritants that act as a
combination of plastic bullet and gas weapon.
The spray variant for CS, OS, and other gases is
usually available in the form of an enclosed unit
under pressure and is released as a fine spray
by means of a propellant gas. These aerosolised
forms of chemical irritants are typically released
from 0.3 to 3 metres from the target, and the
spray pattern can be variable depending on the
design of the weapon, the pressure of the spray
mechanism, and wind conditions. Powder
forms of chemical irritants are contained in
canisters or grenades and typically are triggered
to conduct a thermal explosion and disperse
widely in the surrounding area.

Chemical irritants are indiscriminate weapons
CS and other gases can be released into the air by design, especially when delivered by firing
as fine particulate smoke, vapour or liquid spray a grenade or a canister. Limiting the exposure
(aerosol). They can also contaminate water and to individuals or small groups is virtually
impossible, and the risk of affecting bystanders
93
Limitations vary by country. Some countries have limitations on use by law enforcement, especially regarding concentration,
amount of volume carried, etc. Many other countries have limitations on possession/use by the general population.
94
Medical News Today, “What Is Pepper Spray? Is Pepper Spray Dangerous?,” Medical News Today, (25 November 2011,
accessible at: http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/238262.php.
95
SALT Supply Co., “s1 Pepper Spray Gun Starter Kit,” accessible at: https://www.saltsupply.com/collections/pepper-spray-gun/
products/s1-pepper-spray-gun-starter-kit.

59

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

and individuals other than the intended targets
is high. In addition, the diagnosis and treatment
of chemical irritant exposure is complicated
because of the combination of different
chemicals and the lack of transparency about
the agents used.

consequences and even death. When used
outside, a CS grenade or canister produces a
cloud of chemicals, usually within 60 seconds,
with the highest CS concentration of 2,000
to 5,000 mg/m3 detected at the centre of the
cloud. Because of the nature of the weapon, it
is difficult to measure these concentrations in
Agent CS, the most commonly used chemical practical situations of deployment or to have
irritant, is not actually a gas but rather a powder accurate estimates in retrospect.
at room temperature that is aerosolized by a
triggered thermal explosion and disperses Agent OC, most commonly found in spray form,
widely from a canister. A gas canister is is available in different concentrations from 1 to
estimated to have between 80 and 120 grams of 10 per cent of capsaicinoids as oil in a solvent.
CS, usually in concentrations between 0.1 and Studies suggest that even very low (0.003 mg/
10 per cent, but much higher concentrations are m3) concentrations can lead to ocular irritation.98
also commercially available.96 The concentration Because of the complexities in measuring
of CS, however, can be significantly increased concentrations of agent OC, lethal dose levels
by the firing of multiple canisters in the same are difficult to verify.
location. This practice often occurs in crowdcontrol situations and further complicates To our knowledge, there are no known
the analysis of the toxicity of the chemical as biomarkers that can be used to determine the
actually used.
presence of any chemical irritants in biological
systems. Some on-scene testing for air samples
To accurately understand the effect of exposure can only be conducted by government bodies,
to CS, a measurement of density or concentration and this testing only determines whether
(milligrams per cubic metre) for exposure time chemical irritants are present or absent. No
is necessary. Based on animal and human additional testing is currently in place for
models, it is estimated that exposure to agent environmental samples (e.g., filters, swabs,
CS at a concentration of 140 mg/m3 for 10 or wipes).99
minutes or 11 mg/m3 for one hour, or as little as
1.5mg/m3 for four to eight hours, can be lethal.97
Individuals exposed to high concentrations
in closed spaces or for extended amounts of
time, for instance, can suffer serious health

96
“Combined Systems Inc, ”Company site, CSI Inc. Supporting Military Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies World-Wide, (24
April 2015), accessible at: https://www.combinedsystems.com/products/?cid=13.
97
National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances, “Acute Exposure Guidelines
Levels (AEGLs) for Tear Gas (CS).”
98

RC Gupta, Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents (Academic Press, 2015).

99
United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Selected Analytical Methods for Environmental Remediation and Recovery
(SAM),” accessible at: https://www.epa.gov/esam/selected-analytical-methods-environmental-remediation-and-recovery-sam.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

Type

Name

Characteristics
and properties

Duration
of action

Treatment
ID50 and
Considerations
LD50 (mg/
min per m3) –
Incapacitating
Dose and
Lethal Dose**

Lacrimator
Agents

Agent
CN

Apple odour;
white powder
or emulsion;
insoluble in
water

10 – 20
minutes

20-50

Agent
CS

10 – 30
Yellow solid or
powder, pepper minutes
odour; soluble
in water

Agent
CR

Pale yellow
solid or powder,
pepper odour,
known as
“firegas”, very
soluble in water

10
minutes
to 48
hours

Agent
OC
and
PAVA

Pepper odour
or odourless
white solid;
soluble in oil.
OC is naturally
concentrated,
PAVA is
synthetic (and
can be more
potent)

30 – 60
minutes

Act on
TRPA 1 pain
receptors

Capsaicin
Agents
Act on
TRPV1 pain
receptors

Environmental
Considerations

Other
information

Fresh air typically Powder at room
effective in
temp, degrades
decontamination quickly on
surfaces

Historically
in riot
control,
now
primarily
in sprays
(MACE

Water and fresh
air commonly
used, Alkaloids
known to be a lay
treatment

CS degrades
in hours on
surfaces, CS1
and CS2 can
last on surfaces
and skin for
longer times

Most
commonly
used in
riot control
canisters
globally

unknown

Use of water
may exacerbate
CR pain and
inflammation up
to 48 hours

Can last on
surfaces > 60
days

Can be
delivered
in aerosol
or water
solution
(for water
cannons)

Not
established

As an oil, must
typically be
washed off with
soap and water

Persists for long Most
periods as oil or commonly
solid
used in
sprays,
growing
use in riot
control
dispersals

8,500 – 25,000

4-20
25,000 –
100,000

Figure 7: Characteristics of selected chemical irritants*
* Table adapted from Carron and Yerson, Management of the Effects of Exposure to Tear Gas, 2009.100 ** The Median
Incapacitating Dose (ID50) is the amount of agent expected to incapacitate 50 per cent of a group of exposed,
unprotected individuals. The Median Lethal Dose (LD50) is the amount of agent expected to kill 50 per cent of a group
of exposed, unprotected individuals. In pharmacology, the margin of safety is the range between the usual effective
dose and the dose that causes severe or life-threatening side effects. Agent CS has a lower effective dose and a higher
toxicity dose than agent CN, resulting in a wider margin of safety.

100

P Carron and B Yersin, “Management of the Effects of Exposure to Tear Gas,” BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 338 (2009): b2283.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

Health effects
The health effects of chemical irritants are
highly dependent on the specific chemical
of exposure, the dose (based on quantity
and time), the conditions of exposure, the
deployment mechanism, the risk factors of
the individual, and the access to egress and
care. Most exposures to chemical irritants
result in temporary pain and discomfort
lasting less than one hour. However, the
lacrimator gases are known overall to be
more toxic than the capsaicin agents,
particularly to the respiratory system, and
both have the potential for more serious or
longer-lasting injury at higher doses. Dose
exposure is dependent on numerous factors
that together can lead to higher or lower
concentrations of the chemicals to which
individuals are exposed. The amount of
chemical released per canister, the number
of canisters released, the context (indoors,
outdoors, wind conditions), and how long
an individual is exposed can all change the
dose exposure.

number of breaths per minute and limited
cardiovascular stress response compared
to adults magnifies the harm of agents
such as tear gas.”101 For many irritants, early
decontamination can avoid the most severe
injuries. Thus, the availability of water, soap,
fresh air, or other treatments is an important
factor to consider. Of note, different agents
have different treatment considerations: fresh
air is effective for all, but water can cause
a transient exacerbation of symptoms for
CS, CR and CN with eventual improvement,
while soap is usually necessary for oil-based
compounds such as OC and PAVA.

Transient and common symptoms from
chemical irritant exposure include tearing,
eye pain and redness, blepharospasm
(eyelids involuntarily spasm and stay closed)
and sensations of pain and burning on the
skin. Exposed individuals often also feel pain
in their mouth, airways and lungs and can
have trouble breathing or have involuntary
coughing fits. More serious injuries can
affect all organ types: eye injuries, lung
damage, skin burns and others. Perhaps most
The individual health risks for an individual are concerningly, the canisters and grenades
related to the exposure as well as personal that are directed at crowds are known to be a
characteristics and access to care. For significant source of traumatic injury.
instance, certain groups that are particularly
at risk from the effects of chemical irritants Results of the updated
and for whom it may be life-threatening systematic review
include older people, children, or people
with respiratory problems or skin sensitivity. We updated the systematic review of the
According to the American Academy medical literature documenting the health
of Paediatrics, “[c]hildren are uniquely impact of different chemical irritants, which
vulnerable to physiological effects of chemical was initially carried out in 2016, to identify
agents. A child’s smaller size, more frequent additional documented cases of injuries,
deaths, and permanent disability. We
101
American Academy of Pediatrics, “AAP Statement in Response to Tear Gas Being Used Against Children at the U.S. Southern
Border,” 26 November 2018, accessible at: https://www.aap.org/en/news-room/news-releases/aap/2018/aap-statement-in-response-totear-gas-being-used-against-children-at-the-us-southern-border/.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

followed the same search process but also
included case reports describing injuries of
five people or fewer in an effort to elucidate
the more severe injuries documented in
smaller case reports in order to deepen
understanding of the health impacts of
chemical irritants (There is no standard
reporting mechanism for deaths and severe
injuries from these weapons, so case reports
are a critical source of information). Based
on our systematic review findings, we have
catalogued additional injuries documented
in the medical literature between 1 January
2015 and 28 February 2022 (the previous
study reviewed data between 1 January 1990
and 15 March 2015). A total of 41 studies
(36 in English, 5 in other languages) were
included in our analysis of health effects as
well as the frequency, context of injuries, and
risk factors (See the appendix for a list of the
referenced papers).
The majority of papers utilised a crosssectional analysis (n=20) or case report
(n=18) methodology (3 were surveys). The
majority of studies described health effects
from events in which chemical irritants were
used in the USA (n=16), followed by Turkey
(n=8) and Hong Kong (n=4). There were
also studies from Belgium, Canada, France,
Iraq, Lebanon, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland
and Tunisia. Eleven of the studies reported
that injuries occurred secondary to public
demonstrations, six studies explored events
that occurred in training, three studied
injuries in accidental exposures, and others
included police use of force cases and
experimental studies.

The review identified 119,113 people who
were exposed to chemical irritants since
2015 reported in the medical literature.
They had 129,451 injuries (some people had
more than one injury). Of those injuries, 56%
(n=72,468) resulted in transient symptoms
such as pain, tearing, or respiratory distress
that resolved quickly and spontaneously.
37% (n=47,629) constituted minor injuries
that were visible on medical examination
but expected to spontaneously resolve
either with time or through first aid or other
short-term interventions. Four per cent of
injuries (n=5246) were severe, requiring
medical interventions such as a hospital
stay or surgery. And 3 per cent (n=4108) did
not specify the severity. In this analysis, 19
people were permanently disabled, and 14
people died.
These numbers represent a significant
increase in reporting and publication of data
from the previous study. Our earlier study
identified 8311 people who suffered injuries (of
whom 13 people died and 70 people suffered
permanent disability). Of note, the updated
review includes three papers summarising
large database analyses of persons reporting
to toxicology centres or documented in
national databases that include data on
104,940 people with tear gas and pepper
spray exposures which significantly expands
the sample for this updated review. While
greater numbers of people were reported
on, these large databases provide limited
information beyond deaths and general injury
categories, limiting analysis of their raw data.
The majority of people from 1900 and 2015
who were injured also fully recovered from

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

Nineteen people reported permanent
disabilities, including permanent vision loss
(two from a pepper ball that hit the eye and
another from a direct spray of OC into the
eye). Three people suffered from cardiac
arrests (heart-stopping and requiring CPR),
and two suffered permanent heart damage
after exposure to chemical irritants. One
person developed Guillain-Barre Syndrome, a
neurological syndrome that causes paralysis
after exposure.
■ Mild

■ Moderate

D

Severe

■ Unspecified

Figure 8: Severity of injuries caused by chemical irritants.

Severe injuries surveyed included injuries
to multiple body systems, with the majority
of injuries being to the skin, eyes, and
cardiopulmonary system (lung, heart,
and chest).

their injuries (98.7%).102 Similar proportions of
individuals had severe injuries in the updated
Many of the studies reviewed for this report
analysis to the previous report (8.7% in the
included injury data on children (some as
past report).
The updated analysis further found more
cases of blunt trauma from canisters. All of
the people who died suffered blunt head
trauma from canisters being fired directly at
them (11 individuals in Iraq, 3 in Syria). In all of
these cases, the canisters were suspected to
be highdensity military-grade canisters. The
deaths were documented in the literature
review; one as a result of respiratory arrest
after CS was fired inside a home, and twelve
from traumatic brain injury sustained after
the victim was directly hit by a canister. Ten
of the deaths from head injury were reported
in a study from Iraq on violence occurring
during protests in 2019 and another from
a separate case report in Iraq. No cases of
death associated with OC were identified.

■ Mild

■ Moderate

D

Severe

■ Unspecified

Figure 9: Severity of injuries caused by chemical irritants
by body system.

102
RJ Haar, V Lacopino, N Ranadive, SD Weiser, and M Dandu. “Health impacts of chemical irritants used for crowd control: a
systematic review of the injuries and deaths caused by tear gas and pepper spray.” BMC Public Health 17, no. 1 (2017): 1-14.

64

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

young as three months old). Studies suggest
that children are more vulnerable to severe
injuries from chemical toxicity.103 The elderly
and those with chronic diseases may also
be more prone to worse outcomes from
chemical irritants.104 The data also identified
chronic respiratory conditions and allergic
skin conditions in people who had previous
medical conditions and severe lung and
heart injuries in individuals with no past
history of any medical concerns (including
police officers).

cause unexpected skin reactions, such
as chemical burns and hypersensitivity
reactions, as well as respiratory illness.
OC can also cause such reactions.
Significant severe reactions, such as
cardiac arrest, strokes and skin burns,
were reported with both agents.

›

The review also found that the severity of
injuries from chemical irritants was correlated
with the kind of chemical agent used and the
method of deployment.

›

Type of chemical agent: Most of the
injuries documented were caused by
CS or OC, but the injuries were rarely
disaggregated by the chemical involved.
In many cases, the specific agent was
not known. Among the studies where
the chemical agent was identified as
CS, 573 injuries were reported. Of
those, 10% suffered severe injuries,
38% suffered moderate injuries, and
51% experienced mild injuries. Among
the studies where the chemical agent
was identified as OC or PAVA, 2925
injuries were reported. Of those, 12%
were severe, 18% were moderate, and
70% were mild.
Narrative data collected from reviewed
literature suggested that agent CS can

Deployment mechanism: The selected
studies documented injuries caused
by both spray and gas forms of
both chemicals. While the previous
review demonstrated that gas forms
of chemical irritants (contained in
canisters or grenades and released
and widely dispersed by a thermal
explosion) contributed to a marginally
higher percentage of severe injuries,
the updated data does not deepen

2500

-

2000

1500

1000

500

~

~
I

MILD

I

MODERATE

D es

n,

SEVERE

■ oc

Figure 10: Injury severity by chemical agent.

103
PJ Landrigan, “Children as a Vulnerable Population,” International Journal of Occupational Medicine and Environmental Health
17, no. 1 (2004): 175–77.
104
PA Routledge, MS O’Mahony, and KW Woodhouse, “Adverse Drug Reactions in Elderly Patients,” British Journal of Clinical
Pharmacology 57, no. 2 (February 2004): 121–26, doi:10.1046/j.1365-2125.2003.01875.x.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

this analysis given the lack of quality
data on deployment. The current
review reinforced the importance of
both distance/proximity to the area
where the chemical was released and
the force of the propellant as factors
influencing the severity of the health
effect on individuals.
The additional data since 2016 has
underscored the concern over blunt trauma
injuries from chemical irritant canisters.
Direct hits by the canisters themselves were
documented to have caused 59 injuries, 55
of which were to the head. A study from Iraq
highlights the importance of the design of
the canister and the apparently deliberate
targeting of the heads of individual protesters.
The canisters developed in Iran were denser
than most other canister designs.
Many of the reviewed studies identified
additional factors that may potentiate injuries,
such as environmental conditions (heat,
humidity, and wind conditions), prolonged
exposure, and exposure in enclosed
spaces. Utilising the weapons in confined
spaces and in areas where people could
not easily escape was noted to potentially
increase the exposure to the irritant either
in quantity or over time.105 Use of chemical
irritants in areas with high heat or humidity
potentially exacerbated skin irritation, and
windy conditions risked the contamination

of law enforcement officers, bystanders, or
nearby residences and businesses.106 Direct
targeting of the face and eyes by spray has
been noted to cause trauma and toxicity to
the cornea and conjunctiva of the eye.
In addition to documenting injuries, the review
identified other factors that may affect injury
severity. Inherent qualities of the chemical
agents may play some role in injuries.
Chemical irritants, especially those deployed
in gas forms, are inherently indiscriminate
and can impact not only the intended targets
but also other demonstrators, bystanders,
neighbourhood businesses and residences,
and law enforcement officers themselves.
Several of the reviewed studies demonstrated
that accidental exposure is common and
sometimes difficult to avoid. Because of the
indiscriminate nature of chemical irritants,
limiting the exposure to individuals or small
groups is difficult, while exposing large and
diverse groups to the weapons poses the
risk of widespread injuries, including to
potentially vulnerable people.
We also note that combinations of OC and CS
are becoming more common, both in spray
and gas forms as well as within projectiles
such as the “pepper ball.”107 These forms,
along with chemical agents dissolved in
water cannons, have not been well studied
and could cause other injuries.108 Perhaps
even more concerning are the unknown

105
AMB Zekri et al., “Acute Mass Burns Caused by O-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (CS) Tear Gas,” Burns 21, no. 8 (1995):
586–89, doi:10.1016/0305-4179(95)00063-H.
106
RJ Thomas et al., “Acute Pulmonary Effects from O-Chlorobenzylidenemalonitrile ‘Tear Gas’: A Unique Exposure Outcome
Unmasked by Strenuous Exercise after a Military Training Event,” Military Medicine 167, no. 2 (February 2002): 136–39.
107
EJ Olajos and H Salem, “Riot Control Agents: Pharmacology, Toxicology, Biochemistry and Chemistry,” Journal of Applied
Toxicology: JAT 21, no. 5 (October 2001): 355–91.
108
Tear Gas Devices, Code of Federal Regulations, vol. 173.340, 2001, accessible at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/
text/49/173.340.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

effects of these chemical agents in chronic
exposure settings in which safety has
never been studied and cannot reasonably
be assumed. This should be particularly
concerning for law enforcement officers with
repeated exposure, frequent protesters, and
health workers who may sustain multiple
occupational exposures. More research
on these possible health harms is needed.
(For specific recommendations on chemical
irritants, see Section 4).

What has changed?

a growing problem, with reports of
resulting skin irritation and pain. There
has also been growing use of other
composite weapons, such as pepper
balls. These composite weapons are
anecdotally considered less dangerous
than
traditional
kinetic
impact
projectiles but must be regarded as
both projectile and chemical weapons
and have been few studies.

›

Much of the research in the past six years
amplifies the concerns presented in LiD1.
In addition, a number of new concerns
have emerged.

›

›

Extensive use: Tear gas has continued
to be used extensively across the globe.
From Hong Kong to Chile, chemical
irritants continue to be the primary
riot control agent utilised by police to
repress and disperse demonstrations.
In the United States, the police response
to anti-police violence protests in
the wake of George Floyd’s murder
included widespread use of different
forms of tear gas in dozens of cities.
New ways of deployment: In Colombia,
the use of the US-made “venom”
launchers, which can deploy dozens
of grenades at once from stations
mounted on vehicles, shields or static
installations, led to the rapid diffusion of
massive quantities of chemical irritants
at protests across the country in 2021.
Beyond the use of traditional canisters
and grenades, the use of chemical
irritants diluted in water cannons is

Few advances in knowledge or
dissemination of knowledge on
composition: In the past six years, there
have been little to no efforts on the part
of governments or regulating bodies
to better understand the composition
of chemical irritants or make that
knowledge available to the public or to
healthcare workers. As examples:

» The

»

United States National
Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) still does not
index Agent CS in its database
(though it does have Agent CN).
Data on the chemical makeup
of various formulations, made by
numerous manufacturers, are
challenging to obtain and remain
opaque to the public.

» Police documentation of the use

of force is haphazard and limited:
deployment records are not readily
available and, when they are,
frequently lack sufficient quality to
analyse records.

›

A review of recent papers also highlights
that in light of the lack of a clear standard
for how to report chemical irritant

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

injuries, studies are heterogeneous in
their approaches. This heterogeneity
makes systematic comparisons across
studies difficult.

›

New hazards recognized as a result of
the airborne transmission of viruses,
such as COVID-19: Since 2020, the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has
resulted in millions of deaths from
respiratory illness. In this context, the
extensive use of chemical irritants during
the pandemic has increased the risk of
adverse medical effects due to COVID19’s effects on breathing and the lungs,
as well as the risk of infection through
induced coughing or sneezing. This risk
is especially high for those in enclosed
or indoor spaces, or for communities
with high incidence of COVID-19 and
low vaccination rates. Numerous health
organisations demanded a moratorium
on the use of chemical irritants during
demonstrations, citing the lack of
crucial research, the escalation of tear
gas use by law enforcement, and the
likelihood of compromising lung health
and promoting the spread of COVID-19”
(American Thoracic Society, 2020).
They were specifically worried that the
use of chemical irritants could increase
the risk of COVID-19 by making the
respiratory tract more susceptible
to infection, exacerbating existing

inflammation, and inducing coughing
(Greiner et al., 2020). While there is
limited information on the incidence
of COVID-19 in the setting of tear gas
exposure, this issue continues to be of
concern as the pandemic rages on and
others likely will follow.

›

The effects of chemical irritants
on women: An area of increasing
importance, but where no clinical
studies have yet been published, is
the growing awareness of the effects
of chemical irritants on women and
reproductive health. Anecdotal reports
have suggested that there may be a
relationship between the use of tear
gas and miscarriage, but following the
widespread use of large quantities
of chemical irritants during BLM and
other protests in the US in the summer
of 2020, media reports also emerged
of irregular menstruation, exacerbated
cramping, or both of these in the weeks
after chemical irritant exposure.109
Self-reported menstrual issues were
documented in Portland in 2020 in a
convenience sample survey where, of
people who could menstruate, 36%
reported increased cramping, and 24%
reported increased bleeding. Stress
and other confounders may also play a
role. As a result of such reports and the

109
See, for example, A Slisco, “Tear Gas May Have Led To Abnormal Menstrual Cycles in Seattle and Portland,” Newsweek
(5 September 2020), accessible at: https://www.newsweek.com/tear-gas-may-have-led-abnormal-menstrual-cycles-seattleportland-1529912; M Stunson, “Protesters complain of unexpected side effect from tear gas: Period changes,” Miami Herald (14 July 2020),
accessible at: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article244212707.html; and C Nowell, “Protesters Say Tear Gas
Caused Them to Get Their Period Multiple Times in a Month,” Teen Vogue (2 July 2020), accessible at: https://www.teenvogue.com/story/
protestors-say-tear-gas-caused-early-menstruation.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

lack of research, several organisations
are undertaking further research.110

›

Environmental and long-term risks:
The mounting worries about the
environment have led to more thoughtful
consideration of the contamination of
ground and water by the deployment of
chemical irritants. There is a concern
not only about the locations immediately
surrounding where chemical irritants
are used but also areas where their
degradation products may spread. A
study by members of this research team
in Aida Camp in Palestine examined
the effects of tear gas canister rounds
left on the street (see case study
below).111 Children and others who
handled these canister rounds days
after they had been fired reported
symptoms and signs consistent with
chemical irritant exposure. In multiple
settings, concerns have been reported
about the degradation products of
chemical irritants such as cyanide (a
deadly poison). While the dose from a
small canister may be low, evidence of
expired canisters being used across
the globe underscores the risk that
numerous expired canisters could
harm demonstrators, members of
surrounding communities, and the
environment. Degradation products in
both ground and run-off streams are

now being studied by several groups to
answer some of these questions.

›

Psychological
Impacts:
The
psychological impact of the use of
CCWs has not been well studied or
documented in the medical literature,
but cases documented in this review
indicate that exposure to chemical
irritants may result in significant
psychological symptoms and long-term
disability. In one study of 297 individuals
seeking care and/or evaluations of
injuries following the 2013 Gezi Park
protests in Turkey, 117 psychiatric
evaluations were conducted. Some 43
per cent of the victims met the diagnostic
criteria for acute stress disorder, 23 per
cent met the diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and
7.7 per cent met the diagnostic criteria
for major depressive disorder.112 In
2020, 1635 (72.4%) of 2257 adults who
reported tear gas exposure in Portland,
US, described in a web-based survey
that they were experiencing increased
feelings of fear, fatigue, anxiety, and/or
a startle response.

›

Scant evidence on the treatment of
chemical irritant exposure: Treatment of
chemical irritant exposure has gained
increased attention over the past six
years. Studies and commentaries have
reiterated prior recommendations that

110
Planned Parenthood North Central States, “Tear Gas and Reproductive Health Study,” plannedparenthood.org, accessible at:
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-north-central-states/about-ppncs/research/tear-gas-and-reproductive-healthstudy.
111
Human Rights Center, “No Safe Space: Health Consequences of Tear Gas Exposure Among Palestine Refugees,” University of
California Berkeley, accessible at: https://humanrights.berkeley.edu/programs-projects/past-projects/no-safe-space.
112
Umit Unuvar, et al. “Usage of Riot Control Agents and other methods resulting in physical and psychological injuries sustained
during civil unrest in Turkey in 2013.” Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 45 (2017): 47-52.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

most symptoms of chemical irritant
exposure should resolve spontaneously
within an hour of the end of the
exposure. There is anecdotal evidence
to suggest that tear gas (CS and CN)
exposure is best treated with fresh air or
copious amounts of water irrigation and
that pepper spray (OC and PAVA) might
be best treated with soap and water
(as it is an oil-soluble compound).113 A
small, randomised control trial noted
that treatment with baby shampoo was
no different than irrigation with water
alone for both CS and OC exposures.114

» While

there are anecdotal
reports of a variety of substances
helping with symptoms, there is
little evidence to support their
use. Nevertheless, antacids and
alkaloids, such as Maalox or milk
of magnesia, are commonly used
around the world for symptomatic
relief. In some cultures, onions,
citrus fruits, CocaCola, and

strong-smelling salts are used to
counteract the immediate effects
of chemical irritants. In one study,
pre-treatment of police officers
with Diphoterine (a common
chemical rinsing agent) resulted
in slightly less facial pain when
they were exposed.115 Current
evidence suggests that exposed
individuals should attempt to
remove contaminated clothing,
and those with contact lenses
should remove them immediately.
Individuals with severe respiratory
symptoms, prolonged palpitations,
blisters/burns, or any symptoms
lasting longer than an hour should
seek medical attention. Anyone
with blunt trauma from a tear gas
canister, especially to the head
or face, should seek immediate
medical attention.

The psychological impact of the use of CCWs has not been
well studied or documented in the medical literature, but cases
documented in this review indicate that exposure to chemical
irritants may result in significant psychological symptoms and longterm disability.
113
See Fine, Kennet., Bassin, and Stewart. “Emergency care for tear gas victims.” Journal of the American College of Emergency
Physicians 6, no. 4 (1977): 144-146; and Carron, Pierre-Nicolas, and B Yersin. “Management of the effects of exposure to tear gas” BMJ 338
(2009).
114
JD Barry, RHD James, and JG McManus Jr. “A randomized controlled trial comparing treatment regimens for acute pain for topical
oleoresin capsaicin (pepper spray) exposure in adult volunteers”, Prehospital Emergency Care 12, no. 4 (2008): 432-437.
115
M Brvar, “Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile tear gas exposure: Rinsing with amphoteric, hypertonic, and chelating solution.”
Human & Experimental Toxicology 35.2 (2016): 213-218.

70

Over the same period, 84.3% were exposed
to tear gas in the home, 9.4% at work, 10.7%
in school, and 8.5% elsewhere (in a car for
instance). Fifty-three people (22.5%) said
that they had been hit directly with a tear gas
canister in the past. Community focus groups
consistently and independently reported
experiences of fear, worry, physiological
reactivity, hyper-arousal, poor and disrupted
sleep, lack of safety, and daily disruptions
in basic activities of daily living–including
caring for children and the sick, participating

Responding to the request for support,
researchers at UC Berkeley and UC San
Francisco put together a team to study the
issue. The aim of the study was to: (1) identify
the frequency of exposure to tear gas among
refugees who live in Aida and Dheisheh
camps; and (2) categorise potential medical
and psychological symptoms (both acute
and chronic) associated with this exposure.
In the summer of 2017, researchers travelled
to Bethlehem to conduct the research. The
findings, published in the report No Safe
Space by the Human Rights Center at UC
Berkeley School of Law, revealed that the
use of chemical irritants in these camps
likely far surpassed anything seen anywhere
else on the globe. And because the camps
are tightly packed with poor ventilation, tear
gas was entering homes and lingering in
the air as well as on the ground. Children
were playing with used canisters, and nearly

everyone, from babies to the elderly, was
experiencing symptoms from the chronically
high exposure. There truly was “no safe
space” and no way out.
Researchers conducted 10 focus groups
with over 75 participants and interviewed 236
individuals in the camp, ages ten and older,
as part of a household population survey.
Fully 100% of residents surveyed reported
being exposed to tear gas in the past year.
Respondents also reported being exposed
in the past several years to stun grenades
(87%), skunk water (a foul-smelling liquid;
85%), and pepper spray (54%). Respondents
also reported witnessing the use of rubber
bullets (52%), and several (6%) also reported
witnessing the use of live ammunition (6%).
Over half (55%) of respondents described
between three and 10 tear gas exposures in
the month before the survey was carried out,
both indoors and outdoors. Indoor locations
included homes, schools, and places of work.

After the publication of LiD1 in 2016, aid
workers in the Aida and Dheisheh refugee
camps outside of Bethlehem, in Palestine,
reached out to the authors. The camps are
decades old, small, densely-populated–and
adjacent to the Separation Wall in some
places. Residents reported exposure to tear
gas two to three times a week for more than
a year. In some months, the exposure was
almost daily. Staff in the camps worried the
tear gas was used in breach of international
norms and to the significant health detriment
of the community.

Palestine

No safe space in refugee camps

Case study

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

0

71

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

ISRAELI FORCES FIRE TEAR GAS INTO AIDA REFUGEE CAMP, BETHLEHEM, WEST BANK, SEPTEMBER 27, 2013. THE CLASHES
WERE IN REACTION TO RECENT PROVOCATIONS AT JERUSALEM’S AL AQSA MOSQUE BY RIGHT-WING JEWISH SETTLERS.
RYAN RODRICK BEILER | ACTIVE STILLS

Theschool
in
use ofand
military-grade
work life, and
ammunition
engaging for
in No Safe Space was published in December
basic control
crowd
family is
lifeunusual,
activities.
and typical
Responses
tear gas
to 2017 to widespread notice in Israel, the
the household
canisters
do not pose
survey
theand
same
the
magnitude
qualitative
of Occupied Palestinian Territories, and
interviews
hazard.
However,
added to
with
thelittle
medical
to noknowledge
regulation globally. Subsequent meetings with various
regarding
of
chemical
symptoms
irritants, of
these
repeated
weapons
tearwere
gas UN entities and the Israeli government
exposure. Acute
manufactured,
purchased,
symptomsand
included
used against
loss of related important information to the policy
consciousness,
civilians,
with no breathing
limitations.difficulties,
Worryingly,rashes,
direct makers. Within weeks of these meetings, the
and severe
impacts
to the
pain,head
all offrom
which
“civilian
lastedgrade”
many use of chemical irritants in these camps all
hoursgas
tear
beyond
canisters
the time
havevictims
been were
documented
directly but ceased. Even two years later, chemical
exposed
to
cause toinjuries
the gas.
ranging
Whilefrom
several
traumatic
years irritant use was limited in the Aida and
1
2
of frequent
brain
injury, tear
gasfracture,
exposureenucleation,
normalised3 Dheisheh camps. No Safe Space stands as
skull
4
the death.
experience
to some extent, there was an important example of how community
and
widespread fear among respondents health research can drive advocacy and
regarding the long-term impacts of chemical policy change regarding the use of CCWs.
1
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Video journalist injured by tear gas canister at Hong Kong protest,” Committee to Protect
exposure.
Journalists, 5 August 2019, accessible at: https://cpj.org/2019/08/video-journalist-injured-by-tear-gas-canister-at-h/

2
Charis McGowan, “Mom Loses 3 Senses After Cops Threw Tear Gas Canister Into Her Face, Sparking a Movement Against
‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons in Chile,” VICE News, September 17, 2020, accessible at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/wxq3qw/this-mom-lost3-of-her-senses-after-being-hit-by-a-teargas-canister-sparking-a-movement-against-non-lethal-weapons-in-chile.
3
A Srikanth, “Indiana journalist loses eye to tear gas canister during demonstrations against George Floyd’s death,” The Hill,
June 1, 2020, accessible at: https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/equality/500467-texas-journalist-loses-eye-to-tear-gas-canisterduring/.
4
Wani et al., “Head injury caused by tear gas cartridge in teenage population,” Pediatric Neurosurgery, 2010, vol. 46, no. 1, pp.
25-28, doi:10.1159/000314054

72

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

Case study

Shrapnel in stun grenades and tear
canisters cause over 28 deaths
9

Iraq

The 2019 October protests that affected
central and southern Iraq were initially
violently repressed by government and
paramilitary forces, resulting in over 500
fatalities.116 Although the majority of deaths
resulted from live fire, the second wave of
protests in late October was characterised
by the deadly use of CCWs, with 28 deaths
attributed to shrapnel from stun grenades and
impacts from tear gas canisters.117 Extensive
video documentation revealed that tear gas
canisters were direct-fired at protesters along
a horizontal trajectory,118 a method of use that
poses a high risk of severe to fatal injury.119

The rounds responsible for these wounds
were military-grade Serbian M99 grenades
or Iranian M651 tear gas / M713 smoke
grenades.120 Although government sources
denied the use and import of these weapons,
instead blaming non-government instigators,
further research revealed the Serbian
grenades were part of a $235 million arms deal
struck between Serbia and Iraq in 2008, with
the intended end user being the Iraqi Ministry
of Defense.121 These “barrier-penetrating”
rounds can have effects comparable to those
of a 12-gauge shotgun slug and pose extreme
danger in crowd-control settings.122 A typical
US CS canister weighs 25-50 grams. These
weigh 250-280 grams.

116
Reuters Staff, “Iraq says nearly 560 killed in anti-government unrest,” Reuters, (30 July 2020), accessible at: https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-iraq-protests-government/iraq-says-nearly-560-killed-in-anti-government-unrest-idUSKCN24V2JL.
117
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Demonstrations in Iraq:
October 2019 to April 2020,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, (August 2020), Baghdad, Iraq, accessible
at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/IQ/Demonstrations-Iraq-UNAMI-OHCHR-report.pdf.
118
Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Teargas Cartridges Killing Protesters,” Human Rights Watch, 8 November 2019, accessible at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/08/iraq-teargas-cartridges-killing-protesters.
119
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Demonstrations in Iraq: update,” Human Rights Special Report, 25 October - 4
November, 2019, Baghdad, Iraq, accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/IQ/3rd_UNAMI_report_
Human_Rights_and_Demonstrations_9_Dec_2019.pdf.
120
Amnesty International, “Gruesome string of fatalities in Iraq as new tear gas grenades pierce protester’s skulls,” Amnesty
International, (13 October 2019), accessible at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/gruesome-string-of-fatalities-in-iraq-as-newtear-gas-grenades-pierce-protesters-skulls/.
121
M Ristic et al., “‘Epic’ Serbian Arms Deal Led to Pierced Skulls in Baghdad,” Balkan Insight, (13 December 2019), accessible at
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/13/epic-serbian-arms-deal-led-to-pierced-skulls-in-baghdad/.
122
Amnesty International, “Smokescreen - Iraq’s use of military-grade tear gas grenades to kill protesters,” Amnesty International,
accessible at https://teargas.amnesty.org/iraq/.

73

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

SECURITY FORCES FIRED TEARGAS CARTRIDGES DIRECTLY AT PROTESTERS IN BAGHDAD, IRAQ ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS
SINCE PROTESTS RESUMED ON OCTOBER 25, 2019, KILLING DOZENS OF PROTESTERS, ACCORDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH. YOUTUBE | HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

The use of military-grade ammunition for
crowd control is unusual, and typical tear gas
canisters do not pose the same magnitude of
hazard. However, with little to no regulation
of chemical irritants, these weapons were
manufactured, purchased, and used against
civilians, with no limitations. Worryingly, direct
impacts to the head from “civilian grade”
tear gas canisters have been documented
to cause injuries ranging from traumatic
brain injury,123 skull fracture,124 enucleation,125
and death.126

123
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Video journalist injured by tear gas canister at Hong Kong protest,” Committee to Protect
Journalists, 5 August 2019, accessible at: https://cpj.org/2019/08/video-journalist-injured-by-tear-gas-canister-at-h/
124
Charis McGowan, “Mom Loses 3 Senses After Cops Threw Tear Gas Canister Into Her Face, Sparking a Movement Against
‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons in Chile,” VICE News, September 17, 2020, accessible at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/wxq3qw/this-mom-lost3-of-her-senses-after-being-hit-by-a-teargas-canister-sparking-a-movement-against-non-lethal-weapons-in-chile.
125
A Srikanth, “Indiana journalist loses eye to tear gas canister during demonstrations against George Floyd’s death,” The Hill,
June 1, 2020, accessible at: https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/equality/500467-texas-journalist-loses-eye-to-tear-gas-canisterduring/.
126
Wani et al., “Head injury caused by tear gas cartridge in teenage population,” Pediatric Neurosurgery, 2010, vol. 46, no. 1, pp.
25-28, doi:10.1159/000314054

74

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

Case study

Byron Guatuca and the lethality of tear gas canisters
0

Ecuador

Byron Guatatuca, a member of the Kichwa
community from San Jacinto, Puyo, a town in
the Ecuadorian Amazon, was killed in a police
operation while participating in a peaceful
demonstration that was part of a national
indigenous strike called by the Confederation
of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador. On
the night of 21 June 2022, the Ecuadorian
national police and military began to clear
roads blocked by the demonstrators. Security
forces fired tear gas canisters, causing panic
and choking among the crowd, including
elderly people, women, and children. A
tear gas canister fired from close range hit
Guatatuca in the face, fractured his skull, and
entered his brain, causing his death. He was
shot from the front and at a short range. The
impact from the canister had a grave effect
on the cerebral region, which produced a
haemorrhage, loss of consciousness and,
finally, his death.
Videos posted on social media and local
news127 show clouds of tear gas, choking
and running civilians, and chaos. Guatatuca
is seen as he is hit by a tear gas canister
and falls to the ground, smoke pouring from
his head.128 Mia Sonovision, a local media
outlet, interviewed a demonstrator who was
standing next to Guatatuca, who stated: “The
boy was killed when he got shot from the front.

127

See https://bit.ly/3Carg89.

128

See https://bit.ly/3Su3SYA.

129

https://bit.ly/3xXID9R.

He was next to me. I tried to take the canister
out of his eye.” The witness then showed his
arm, stained with Byron’s blood.129
The police issued a statement arguing that
Guatatuca died from “handling an explosive
device,” an account that was later supported
by the Ministry of the Interior. However, shortly
thereafter, images of the CT scans performed
on Guatatuca at the Puyo Regional Hospital
were posted on social media, showing a
tear gas canister lodged in his skull. This
evidence not only undermined the official
account but showed that it was a deliberate
falsification. The veracity of the medical
studies was confirmed by the director of the
Puyo Hospital.
The attack on Guatatuca represents an
excessive and illegal use of force and led to a
request for the State Attorney General’s Office
to open a criminal investigation. The Attorney
General’s Office of Pastaza Province involved
more than 80 police officers in the preliminary
investigation but has not yet made progress
on key elements such as the list of officers
who were carrying weapons capable of
firing tear gas canisters. According to Jessika
Delgado–the local lawyer who is leading the
case alongside the Regional Human Rights
Advisory Foundation (INREDH) –the attorney

75

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

SCAN IMAGES SHOW THE GAS CANISTER LODGED INSIDE THE VICTIMS’ SKULL. | IMAGE PROVIDED BY LA CONFEDERACIÓN DE
LAS NACIONALIDADES INDÍGENAS DE LA AMAZONIA ECUATORIANA (CONFENIAE) VIA TWITTER @CONFENIAE1

general’s office seems to be deliberately
delaying the investigation. Two months have
elapsed and only six statements have been
taken, none of which came from officers who
admitted to being at the scene.
Byron Guatatuca was 42 years old and
had four children. His family and several
organisations continue to demand a thorough
investigation to determine criminal liability
and the chain of command and to hold those
responsible accountable for the use of force,
including the use of so-called “less-lethal
weapons.” Guatatuca’s case makes clear
that tear gas canisters can cause serious
injury and even death, depending on how
they are fired. Accordingly, they require far
greater regulation and scrutiny than they
currently receive.

76

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

Case study

Tear gas used by police causes panic in
Kanjuruhan Stadium and 135 deaths
0

Indonesia

the tear gas–prohibited in sports venues under
Indonesian police protocol–was indeed the
main cause of deaths. The Malang chief of
police was dismissed and an investigation was
opened on scores of police officers. In its 124page report, the investigation team also asked
for the resignation of the chairman and the
executive board of PSSI, Indonesia’s football
That night, as the referee’s whistle sealed the association.132
game’s results, fans took to the pitch. Police
immediately replied by shooting chemical Indonesian human rights NGO and INCLO
irritants at the field and then at the stands. More member Commission for Disappeared Persons
than 40 rounds of tear gas, flash bangs and and Victims of Violence (KontraS) took part in the
flares were shot at fans within ten minutes130, Civil Society Coalition Fact-Finding Team which
creating mass panic and a rush towards the led a parallel independent inquiry133 of the police
scant and narrow exits. The gates were only intervention. They discovered another set of
wide enough for two persons to exit at a time, facts also pointing to the police’s responsibility
and some were locked.131
in the tragedy, but they also highlight the
systematic nature of these human rights
These events were largely reported by local violations whose planning involved high-ranking
and foreign media. In the outcry following officials who were not accountable under
the tragedy, a multidisciplinary investigation the government commissioned investigation.
was ordered by President Joko Widodo. The KontraS also discovered that witnesses had
team, composed of government officials and suffered intimidation on behalf of authorities
football and security experts, concluded that
On 1 October 2022, the deadliest football
tragedy of the 21st century unfolded at
Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang, Indonesia, after
police shot tear gas in a packed stadium. As a
result, 135 fans were crushed in the ensuing
chaos, among which 40 children and over 500
supporters were injured.

130
R Tan, J Sohyun Lee, S Cahlan, I Piper and A Llewellyn, “How police action in Indonesia led to a deadly crush in the soccer
stadium,” The Washington Post, 6 Ocotber 2022. Accessible at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/19/indonesia-to-demolishfootball-stadium-where-scores-died-in-crowd-crush
131
See Guardian, Indonesia to demolish football stadium where scores died in crowd crush (19 October 2022), accessible at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/19/indonesia-to-demolish-football-stadium-where-scores-died-in-crowd-crush.
132
CNN, Police’s tear gas main cause of death in Indonesia soccer stampede: investigators, accessible at: https://edition.cnn.
com/2022/10/14/asia/indonesia-stadium-disaster-tear-gas-investigation-intl-hnk/index.html.
133
KontraS, 12 Initial Findings of the Civil Society Coalition Fact-Finding Team Regarding the Human Rights Violation Incident at
Kanjuruhan Stadium, accessible at: https://kontras.org/en/2022/11/05/12-initial-findings-of-the-civil-society-coalition-fact-finding-teamregarding-the-human-rights-violation-incident-at-kanjuruhan-stadium/.

77

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Chemical irritants

FOOTBALL SUPPORTERS ENTER THE PITCH AS SECURITY OFFICERS TRY TO DISPERSE THEM AFTER A SOCCER MATCH AT
KANJURUHAN STADIUM IN MALANG, EAST JAVA, INDONESIA, 01 OCTOBER 2022. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AT
LEAST 174 PEOPLE INCLUDING POLICE OFFICERS WERE KILLED MOSTLY IN STAMPEDES AFTER RIOTS FOLLOWING A SOCCER
MATCH. SURYANTO | ANADOLU AGENCY VIA GETTY IMAGES

after the events which are considered a means 2020 UN Guidance on the Use of Less-Lethal
to deter survivors from telling their story.
Weapons in Law Enforcement134 and reiterated
by FIFA guidelines. Following numerous
KontraS interviewed many witnesses, some football stadium tragedies across the globe in
of which were still recovering from the array similar circumstances, the international soccer
of injuries provoked by the stampede, ranging federation has also regulated against the use of
from bruises to fractures, concussions, rashes tear gas in international games, but has done
on the face and body, respiratory distress and little or nothing for this to be enforced locally.
post-traumatic stress. Most deadly victims are
suspected to have perished from suffocation On 18 October 2022, Indonesia announced
and internal bleeding, some crushed against its plans to demolish Kanjuruhan Stadium
walls, others trampled against the ground.
and rebuild another one compliant with FIFA
regulations. At that point, six people, including
Numerous witness accounts claim that police officers and organizers, were facing
authorities gave no verbal warning before charges over the crush for criminal negligence
shooting, first at the pitch and then at the stands. and causing death, which carries a maximum
Firing chemical irritants into closed spaces sentence of five years.135
or open spaces where there is no safe egress
should be prohibited, as clearly stated in the
134

See UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6 at 29.

135
BBC, Kanjuruhan stadium: Indonesia to demolish site of arena disaster, accessible at https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-63301863.

78

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

WATER
CANNONS
PROTEST AGAINST POLICE BRUTALITY AND RACISM AGAINST THE ISRAELI-ETHIOPIAN COMMUNITY, TEL AVIV, ISRAEL, MAY 3,
2015. YOTAM RONEN | ACTIVE STILLS

Weapon profile

Mechanism of action

Streams of water are commonly used as
CCWs. Typically referred to as water cannons,
these weapons include various types of water
hoses that are either connected to in-ground
water supplies or mobile bladders (often
on trucks) and are used to disperse crowds
or limit access to certain areas.136 Water
cannons were first used for crowd control
in the 1930s in Germany, and by the 1960s
were in frequent use in the United States
during civil rights protests.137 Water cannons
have been used as a crowd-control weapon
in protests all over the world and continue to
be used regularly, now most often as vehiclemounted devices.

Water cannons function by propelling
streams of water towards protesters. These
can be either high-pressure streams aimed
at pushing back crowds or low-pressure
streams intended to douse. High-pressure
water cannons can have flow rates (volume
of fluid) of up to 20 litres of water per
second, with an operating pressure of 15 bar
(220 psi) and can stream water 67 metres
away.138 By comparison, a typical residential
showerhead has a pressure of 3 bar (40 psi).
High-pressure, high-volume water cannons
can knock individuals down and push them
backwards with significant force, particularly

136
“White-Washing the Water Cannon: Salesmen, Scientific Experts and Human Rights Abuses,” openDemocracy, August 27,
2014, accessible at https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/white-washing-water-cannon-salesmen-scientific-experts-andhuman-rights/.
137

MA Berger, Seeing through Race: A Reinterpretation of Civil Rights Photography, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

138
Author redacted, “Medical Implications of the Use of Vehicle Mounted Water Cannon (Issue 2.0),” (Defence Science
and Technology Laboratory UK, February 2004), 67, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/445174/040201_DSTL_3_-_Feb_2004_-_TR08591_-_Ready_for_publication.pdf.

79

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

when this pressure is sustained and exerted
over a wide surface area.139

fire ultraviolet dyes to assist in the delayed
identification and arrest of protesters.142

Recently, these weapons have evolved to
include tear gas, coloured dyes, or other
chemicals that are fired concurrently with
the water. These additives increase the
effectiveness of water cannons and also
increase the likelihood of property damage
or severe injury or death to protesters who
are hit. The use of water cannons that include
tear gas or other chemicals appears to be
growing in popularity.

Most modern water cannons can also be used
with chemical irritants such as agent CS or OC,
and chemical irritant manufacturers produce
powdered versions for this purpose.143
Foulsmelling chemicals have also been
used in water cannons in recent years, often
coating not only individuals but also nearby
homes and businesses in malodorous and
difficult-to-remove chemicals of unknown
toxicity.144 There are no publicly available
guidelines on the appropriate use of water
cannons, including details on minimum
distance, water pressure, and use-of-force
protocols. The 2016 LiD1 report found that
foul-smelling chemicals were only used in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in
East Jerusalem. Since then, the purchase or
testing of malodorants has been reported in a
handful of other countries including Georgia
and India, suggesting a rise in the use of
this tactic and underscoring the expanding
market for this new technology.145

Coloured dyes, often semi-permanent
and requiring several days and numerous
cleanings with strong detergents to remove,
have been used for more than 25 years
in many places, including Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Northern Ireland, South
Africa, South Korea, and Uganda.140 Coloured
dyes have been used to humiliate protesters.
Coloured dyes have also been used to publicly
mark protesters, including so they can be
arrested later.141 Some water cannons even

139
“Turkey Protest Turns Violent , Headshot of a protester by a water cannon,” Youtube (Turkey, 2013), accessible at: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=ow8o9yxU0Gg.
140
Anna Feigenbaum, “White-washing the water cannon: salesmen, scientific experts and human rights abuses,” openDemocracy,
25 February 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/white-washing-water-cannon-salesmen-scientific-experts-andhuman-rights/.
141
Agence France-Presse, “Hong Kong protests: police fire water cannon with blue dye as crowds defy ban,” The Guardian, 20
October 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/21/hong-kong-protests-police-fire-water-cannon-with-blue-dye-as-crowdsdefy-ban.
142
Anna Feigenbaum, “White-washing the water cannon: salesmen, scientific experts and human rights abuses,” openDemocracy,
25 February 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/white-washing-water-cannon-salesmen-scientific-experts-andhuman-rights/.
143

Id.

144
Patrick Strickland, “Israel Sprays ‘Skunk Water’ into Palestinian Homes,” The Electronic Intifada, September 22, 2014, http://
electronicintifada.net/blogs/patrick-strickland/israel-sprays-skunk-water-palestinian-homes.
145
Sue Surkes, “Indians unfazed by Israeli-made stink bomb,” The Times of Israel, 30 July 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/
indians-unfazed-by-israeli-made-stink-bomb/; and Margarita Antidze, “In new protests, foul-smelling substance interrupts Georgian
assembly,” Reuters, 12 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-politics-protests/in-new-protests-foul-smellingsubstance-interrupts-georgian-assembly-idUSKBN1YG1ZT.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

Health effects

injuries from close-range exposure. One
article documented “reduced visual acuity
bilaterally, extensive eyelid ecchymosis,
subconjunctival haemorrhages, hyphema,
iris sphincter rupture, transient increase
in intraocular pressure” in three people
with direct high-pressure water trauma to
the face.151

Because of the limited literature on water
cannons and scarcity of medical literature on
injuries, it was not possible to conduct a full
systematic review of the injuries caused by
water cannons. However, a review of articles
identified in our systematic search of data
published in secondary sources identified a
number of cases of serious injury directly or In recent years, personal reports on social
media, as well as news reports, have
indirectly caused by water cannons.
highlighted the inherent dangers of water
High-pressure water can cause direct cannons. There are several documented
injuries, such as trauma directly to the body cases of bone and musculoskeletal
or internal injuries from the force of the water injuries and fatalities from falls and trauma
stream.146 There are a handful of case reports secondary to the force of the water. Since the
that describe facial injuries such as blindness publication of our prior report, Baek Nam-Gi,
or eardrum rupture from the force of the a South Korean farmer, went into a coma after
water. The blunt force of high-velocity water being knocked over by a water cannon and
152
cannons can cause indirect injuries from died of his injuries. In a similar case from
forced falls into the ground or obstacles.147 May 2015, Chilean student Rodrigo Aviles
Case reports describe contusions,148 skull suffered serious head injuries (subdural
fractures,149 and lacerations150 secondary hematoma) after he was knocked over by
to water cannon strikes. Occupational water cannons fired from a distance of less
injuries to law enforcement officers during than five metres. After being in a coma, Aviles
training included accidental musculoskeletal finally recovered but still has seizures and

146
Dietrich Wagner, “‘People of Britain, Beware of the Water Cannon’: A Warning from Dietrich Wagner, Near-Blinded in Stuttgart,”
February 21, 2014, sec. News, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10654956/People-of-Britain-beware-of-the-watercannon-a-warning-from-Dietrich-Wagner-near-blinded-in-Stuttgart.html.
147

Author redacted, “Medical Implications of the Use of Vehicle Mounted Water Cannon (Issue 2.0).”

148

See https://twitter.com/NTarnopolsky/status/1287352851581284352.

149
Samuel Osborne, “Woman left with fractured skull after being blasted with water cannon during Dutch lockdown riots,” The
Independent, 29 January 2021, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-lockdown-riots-woman-fractured-skull-watercannon-b1794374.html.
150
Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Water cannons pose real danger in hands of trigger- happy police,” Amnesty International,
10 August 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/08/hong-kong-police-water-cannon-danger/.
151
D Landau and D Berson, “High-Pressure Directed Water Jets as a Cause of Severe Bilateral Intraocular Injuries,” American
Journal of Ophthalmology 120, no. 4 (October 1995): 542–43.
152
Phil Robertson, “South Korea Activist Dies After Water Cannon Attack,” Human Rights Watch Dispatches, September 29, 2016,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/29/south-korea-activist-dies-after-water-cannon-attack#.

81

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

other health issues.153 In 30 cases of injury
from water cannons in Turkey, injuries varied
in severity based on the pressure, distance,
and duration of exposure as well as whether
victims experienced collisions, falls, or being
swept away by the force of the water.154
There are also several videos on social media
sites documenting water cannons directly
hitting people, causing them to fall, rendering
them unconscious, or causing traumatic
injuries.155 In one notable example caught on
video in 2021, a Dutch woman sustained a
skull fracture and required sutures secondary
to direct targeting by a water cannon, forcing
her to hit a nearby concrete wall.156 Years later,
her case is still in the courts, and she has
ongoing physical and mental disabilities.157
In July 2020, a 19-year-old Israeli protester
was hit by a jet of water on his head from
a distance of a few metres during a mass
protest against Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in Jerusalem. The protester was

knocked to the floor, lost consciousness,
bruised his head and his eardrum was torn.158
All water cannons douse protesters in
water. In colder climates, this may cause
hypothermia and frostbite; conversely,
the use of scalding hot water may expose
individuals to the risk of thermal injury, such
as skin burns. During the 2014 Euromaidan
protests in Ukraine, police employed water
cannons in -10C weather,159 resulting in one
death160 from pneumonia attributed to their
use. Hypothermia was also reported when
water cannons were used in subfreezing
temperatures near the Standing Rock Indian
Reservation in the United States161 and even
in milder temperatures in Hong Kong.162 In
Nigeria, there were reports of scalding hot
water being used on demonstrators, causing
several people to sustain thermal injuries
and burns.

153
Constanza Hola Chamy, BBC Mundo, “Rodrigo Avilés, El Estudiante En Coma Por El Que Miles Se Movilizan En Chile,” BBC
Mundo, May 29, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/05/150529_rodrigo_aviles_estudiante_coma_chile_ch.
154

Umit Unuvar et al., “Medical Evaluation of Gezi Cases - HRFT” (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, December 2013).

155

See above n 138.

156
Reuters, “Dutch woman bloody and injured by police water cannon at Netherlands protest,” Youtube, 27 January 2021, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=79PrfqkUhqs.
157
Tom van der Meer, “Agent die met waterstraal in gezicht van Denisa spoot tijdens rellen in Eindhoven wordt vervolgd,” ad.nl,
15 August 2022, https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/agent-die-met-waterstraal-in-gezicht-van-denisa-spoot-tijdens-rellen-in-eindhoven-wordtvervolgd~a4ee86b4/.
158
“Knesset panel debates cops’ use of water cannons at anti-Netanyahu protests” The Times of Israel, July 28, 2020. https://www.
timesofisrael.com/knesset-panel-debates-cops-use-of-water-cannons-at-anti-netanyahu-protests/.
159
Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukrainian govt lifts restrictions on use of water cannons against rioters in cold weather,” Interfax-Ukraine,
January 22, 2014, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/187027.html.
160
Kyiv Post, “Protester dies of pneumonia, allegedly caused by water cannons,” Kyiv Post, January 30, 2014, https://www.kyivpost.
com/post/9370.
161
Derek Hawkins, “Police defend use of water cannons on Dakota Access protesters in freezing weather,” The Washington
Post, November 21, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/21/police-citing-ongoing-riot-use-watercannons-on-dakota-access-protesters-in-freezing-weather/.
162
Julie McCarthy, “Protesters Hunker Down Inside A Hong Kong University,” National Public Radio, November 19, 2019, https://
www.npr.org/2019/11/19/780713458/protesters-hunker-down-inside-a-hong-kong-university.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

The addition of chemical irritants to water
cannons compounds the health risks,
particularly because the lack of transparency
regarding the type and quantity of chemicals
used can make treatment challenging. Early
reports of water cannons using an “ammonia
solution” in Indonesia were accompanied
by reports of chemical burns, presumably
as a result of these chemicals.163 More
recently, powdered OC in suspension and/
or liquid CS has been confirmed to be used
in water cannons in Chile,164 Hong Kong,165
Malaysia,166 Thailand,167 and Turkey,168
among other countries. The addition of CS
compound to water is particularly troubling
given the propensity of the agent to cause
contact chemical burns,169 as has been
reported in Chile170 and elsewhere.

Another type of preparation used in water
cannons is water mixed with malodorant
compounds that are thought to be ammonia
produced in the fermentation of yeast and
sodium bicarbonate. Those exposed have
reported nausea, vomiting, and headaches.
An additional concern is that the substance
often persists for several days or more,
raising the risk of longer-term toxicity.171 To
date, there is little research on health effects
specific to this substance.

163
Sue Lloyd-Roberts, “British arms help Jakarta fight war against its own people,” The Independent, March 27, 1997, https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/british-arms-help-jakarta-fight-war-against-its-own-people-oveyr-2-1275264.html.
164
Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, “Circular 1832: Uso de la fuerza: actualiza instrucciones al respecto,” Biblioteca del
Congreso Nacional de Chile, March 4, 2019, https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1129442.
165
Chan Chi-chuen, “LCQ18: Coloured water sprayed by specialised crowd management vehicles,” The Government of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, November 13, 2019, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201911/13/P2019111300485.htm.
166
Celine Fernandez and James Hookway, “Malaysian Police Fire Tear Gas on Protesters,” The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2012,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304811304577371110260111368.
167
Amnesty International, “Thailand: ‘My face burned as if on fire’: Unlawful use of force by Thailand’s police during public
assemblies,” Amnesty International, July 2, 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa39/4356/2021/en/.
168
Hurriyet Daily News, “14 tons of water mixed with tear gas used in May Day crackdown by Istanbul police,” Hurriyet Daily
News, May 26, 2013, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/14-tons-of-water-mixed-with-tear-gas-used-in-may-day-crackdown-by-istanbulpolice-47656.
169
Tsang et al., “Health risks of exposure to CS gas (tear gas): an update for healthcare practitioners in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong
Medical Journal 26, no. 2 (April 2020): 151-3 https://www.hkmj.org/abstracts/v26n2/151.htm.
170
Daniela Silva, “Expertos advierten en comisión de DD.HH. del Senado que carro lanzaguas está provocando graves quemaduras
a manifestantes: ‘Si afectan a un niño o a un adulto mayor, pueden ser mortales,’” La Tercera, December 9, 2019, https://www.latercera.com/
nacional/noticia/expertos-advierten-comision-dd-hh-del-senado-carro-lanza-agua-esta-provocando-graves-quemaduras-manifestantesafecta-nino-adulto-menor-pueden-mortales/931860/
171
Anne Suciu, “Ending the Use of Skunk Spray in East Jerusalem,” 24 November 2011, http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/EJ-Skunk-Spray-Letter-Nov-14.pdf.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

Sidebar

Supreme Court ruling on “skunk water’ in Israel
In August 2020, the Supreme Court of Israel
made a ruling on one of the most notorious
types of water cannon, which fires so-called
“skunk water,” which has been used in Israel
and reportedly is now being used in several
other countries. Skunk water was developed
by an Israeli company. It was first used
against Palestinian protesters in the occupied
territories, and since 2015 the Israeli police
have used it mainly against Palestinian
protesters in East Jerusalem and ultraOrthodox Jewish protesters in Jerusalem.
Its use in dense residential neighbourhoods
leaves entire communities- shops, houses,
streets - awash in a horrible, overpowering
smell for several days. The smell has been
described as the smell of sewage mixed with
rotting corpses.

houses next to protest areas that were filled
with the odour of skunk water. The Court
ruled that: “[t]he petition and the evidence
attached to it presented a disturbing picture
of the situation regarding the use of the skunk
as a means of dispersing demonstration. . .
. In particular, there seemed to be difficulty
with the police spraying skunk on narrow,
crowded residential streets, in a way that may
cause significant damage to parties who are
not involved in the demonstration at all.”

Unfortunately, the petition did not lead to a ban
on the use of skunk water in residential areas,
but only to its limitation. The police revised
regulations limiting the use of skunk water
in residential areas, “only after considering
the effects of its operation on an innocent
population and the possible environmental
The Supreme Court heard a case brought by damage to be caused.”172
people who were either hit by skunk water
while protesting or who run shops or live in

172

84

High Court of Justice 5882/18, Kroiss v Israel’s Police (19.8.2020).

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

While evidence on the health impacts of
water cannons suggests the possibility
of serious injury, there are also significant
practical, legal, and human rights concerns.
Practically, the water cannon is a truckmounted machine operated from inside a
closed, elevated cab, making it difficult to
communicate with protesters, hear their
responses, and assess imminent danger.173
The imposing size and shape of water
cannons may intimidate protesters, perhaps
purposefully, causing increased panic and,
potentially, stampedes.174 Because the
vehicles are large, the use of multiple vehicles
at once can also block roadways and deter
demonstrators from egress. Water cannons
are inherently indiscriminate, particularly
at longer distances. The added collective
punishment of utilising chemical irritants,
coloured dyes, ultraviolet marker pigments,
or malodorants only serves to highlight the
potential for abuse of water cannons. In
the context of a public demonstration, this
large weapon cannot be used discriminately
against disruptive individuals and has a high
likelihood of harming bystanders. (For specific
recommendations on water cannons, see the
Recommendations Section.

What has changed?
In recent years, the use of water cannons
has expanded in many countries around the
world, as has the number of reported cases
of injuries. The use of malodorants, dyes
and chemical irritants also appears to be
expanding beyond the few countries that used
these measures in our 2016 report. The rise
of Twitter and other social media platforms
has facilitated greater awareness of the
use of water cannons and the damage they
can do, including through videos and other
testimonies coming directly from victims.
Although it is possible that greater awareness
may lead to great opprobrium and increased
regulation of water cannons, for now, their
use appears to be growing unchecked.

In recent years, the use of water cannons has expanded in many
countries around the world, as has the number of reported cases of
injuries. The use of malodorants, dyes and chemical irritants also
appears to be expanding beyond the few countries that used these
measures in our 2016 report.
173
Reuters, “Around the World; Frankfurt Police Charge Crowd at Banned Protest,” The New York Times, October 6, 1985, sec.
World, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/06/world/around-the-world-frankfurt-police-charge-crowd-at-banned-protest-crowd.html.
174
“Stampede in Cambodia Kills Hundreds, Government Says,” accessed October 23, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/
asiapcf/11/22/cambodia.festival.deaths/index.html?hpt=T2.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

Case study

Long-term ocular injuries from water
high pressure cannons
9

Honduras

On 15 September 2020, Independence Day
in Honduras,175 a massive demonstration
called by trade unions, students and other
sectors of society gathered in Tegucigalpa’s
Central Park to protest against corruption and
mismanagement of public funds with regard to
the COVID-19 pandemic. The demonstrators
intended to read a proclamation against the
policies of the then president Juan Orlando
Hernández. They also demanded to know
what had happened to the five young Afrodescendants that had disappeared three
months before. The National Police fired tear
gas canisters at demonstrators and used
water cannons to disperse the crowd.
The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras
condemned the use of force against citizens
by the police. It found that these actions
constituted a violation of fundamental rights
in the midst of a suspension of constitutional
guarantees dictated in Honduras by the then
President Juan Orlando Hernández, who
had established a state of emergency and
a curfew in the whole country. This decree
nullified guarantees as broad as freedom of
thought, freedom of movement, and freedom
of association, allowing the State to detain
citizens for an indefinite period of time and to
search private homes.

175

86

Several protesters were injured during
the repression and had to be taken to the
hospital. Among them was Cristian Espinoza,
a 26-year-old artist who was hit in the eyes
by a jet of high-pressure water mixed
with chemicals.
Cristian testified in court that while he was
in the park, the police began to break up
the demonstration. Some demonstrators
responded by throwing stones at police
officers, while people were being arrested
and others started running away. Cristian was
trapped at the center of the park; he moved
back looking for a way out and then saw a
blue water cannon tank with tinted windows.
The water cannon fired a jet of high-pressure
water at him. The water hit him violently in the
eyes and detached his eyelids. The pressure
was so strong that he lost sight and fell to
the ground. Some people came to his aid
and carried him on their backs when Cristian
fainted. He regained consciousness in the
emergency room of the Hospital Escuela
Universitario (HEU), where he was told that
the retina of his right eye was detached, and
that he would need surgery to have both
eyelids repaired.

See https://www.dw.com/es/honduras-onu-condena-violencia-en-manifestaci%C3%B3n-social/a-54940397.

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Water cannons

CRISTIAN ESPINOZA UNDERWENT SEVERAL SURGERIES DUE TO THE EYELID AND RETINA INJURIES SUSTAINED FROM A WATER
CANNON BLAST TO THE FACE DURING THE SEPTEMBER 2020 ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS IN TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS.
PHOTO COURTESY OF COMITÉ DE FAMILIARES DE DETENIDOS DESAPARECIDOS EN HONDURAS (COFADEH)

The first surgery took place that same night.
Espinoza remained in hospital for eight days
due to the severity of his eye injuries which
almost rendered him blind. In the following
months, he went through a difficult recovery;
his vision was affected both by artificial
light and sunlight, and he suffered strong
headaches. This prevented him from working
as a craftsman and circus performer. He
underwent two more surgeries to recover
his sight.
Cristian points out that he was always
committed to political activism, but that after
what happened in 2020, on that September
day, everything changed; it was not just him
who was affected, but also his family, mainly
his mother.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

DISORIENTATION
DEVICES
SMOKE RISES AS POLICE CLASH WITH PROTESTERS DURING A BLACK LIVES MATTER PROTEST NEAR THE SEATTLE POLICE
EAST PRECINCT HEADQUARTERS ON JULY 25, 2020. TED S. WARREN | AP PHOTO

Weapon profile
The UN considers “disorientation or
distraction devices” as bomb-like instruments
designed to daze or warn groups or individuals
through some combination of noise, light,
overpressure, or fragmentation.176 Common
names for handheld weapons of this class
include stun grenades, flash-bang grenades,
blast balls, sting-ball grenades, stinger
grenades, lasers, or concussion grenades.
Flash-bang explosive devices were initially
developed by the British Special Air Service
in the 1960s and have been used for military
176

combat training for decades.177 The first
documented use of these devices outside
of training was at Entebbe, Uganda in 1976,
when the Israeli army used them in efforts
to rescue hostages.178 They were used in
1977 in Mogadishu, Somalia, and at a siege
of the Iranian embassy in London in 1980.179
The transition from military operations to
police use occurred slowly over time. Use
in urban settings and on civilian populations
altered how the weapons were used, as well
as the resulting injuries. Specialised law
enforcement agencies like Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) initially developed similar
weapons to use in hostage situations.180

UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6.

177
“Flash Bang Stun Grenades and Their Use in Boston: What You Need to Know,” accessed May 7, 2015, http://
thebostonmarathonbombings.weebly.com/flash-bang-stun-grenades-and-their-use-in-boston-what-you-need-to-know.html; Steve James,
“Flash Bang 101,” Sponsored by TASER INTERNATIONAL, PoliceOne, (October 21, 2005), http://www.policeone.com/police-products/
tactical/tactical-entry/articles/120100-Flash-Bang-101/
178

Steve James id.

179

Id.

180
Abbie Nehring et al., “‘Less Lethal’ Flash-Bangs Used in Ferguson Leave Some Feeling the Burn,” ProPublica, accessed January
15, 2016, http://www.propublica.org/article/less-lethal-flash-bangs-used-in-ferguson-leave-some-feeling-the-burn.

88

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

The use of stun grenades in crowd control
has increased significantly over the past
several years, and now these weapons are
manufactured by dozens of companies
worldwide. They are frequently used
alongside other weapons, such as chemical
irritants and/or projectiles. With poor
regulation and almost no quality control,
defective and misfiring stun grenades have
been identified in several settings where
there were limited regulations or guidelines
on use.181

Mechanism of action
Flash-bang or stun grenades are usually
constructed like a conventional grenade, with
an explosive powder that ignites when struck
by a fuse. These devices typically generate
noise and a bright flash by the rapid oxidation
of a pyrophoric metal, such as magnesium
or aluminium; this process can generate
temperatures in excess of 3,000 degrees
Celsius. Some devices generate sound that
has been measured in excess of 178 decibels
(dB), at least ten times louder than most
gunshots. Both the flash and the bang usually
last less than one second, momentarily
activating photoreceptor cells in the eye and
causing blindness for about five seconds
until the eye restores itself to its normal,
unstimulated state. The loud blast causes
temporary loss of hearing and of balance
and generates a sense of disorientation.
The concomitant blindness, hearing
loss, and disorientation can result in falls.
Moreover, groups of people simultaneously
experiencing these symptoms can result

in panic. With concomitant use of other
weapons, stampedes have been reported.182
Dazzling lasers are a subset of distraction
devices that are designed to use laser or
LED lights at long-range distances (1000
metres in light, 3000 metres in the dark) to
temporarily disrupt vision. Dazzling laser
weapons can be rifle-shaped, baton-shaped,
or mounted onto other weapons. Even brief
exposures (especially at close range) can
result in temporary blindness and, in some
cases, long-term vision loss, headaches,
blurred vision, and sensitivity to light.
When distraction devices detonate, the case
ruptures with significant force, so individuals
standing near an explosion may suffer
traumatic injury from the resulting pressure.
The case can also rupture in such a way that
high-velocity metal or plastic fragments are

Examples of disorientation devices. Robin Ballantyne |
Omega Research Foundation

181
Kaye Beach, “Stun Grenades,” AxXiom for Liberty, September 15, 2009, https://axiomamuse.wordpress.com/tag/stungrenades/.
182

Steve James, “Flash Bang 101” above n 177.

89

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

sent in multiple directions. These fragments
are often unevenly distributed in size, shape,
and direction and can pose a generalised
hazard to anyone nearby.183 In addition to
the shrapnel risk posed by fragmentation
of the device casing, some devices are
designed to deliberately scatter highvelocity
rubber or plastic projectiles around the blast
radius. Finally, projectiles with disorienting
characteristics can be direct-fired at
individuals, carrying with them similar risks
as KIPs.

Health effects

Stun grenades are–as explosive devices–by
nature indiscriminate. When they are used
either as distraction devices to facilitate entry
or as means of crowd dispersal, the limited
control users have over their placement
may expose unintended targets to the risk
of serious injury. A 2015 report documented
more than 50 cases of severe injuries and
deaths from the use of stun grenades since
2000 in the U.S.184 When used indoors or
in dense crowds, these risks are amplified
Given the lack of regulation of these weapons and can create additional hazards through
internationally, defective or poorquality fires as well as psychological panic they
weapons are reported frequently. These may provoke.
weapons can explode spontaneously or have
more dangerous components that can spark As with all explosives, stun grenades carry the
fires and cause severe injuries.
risk of blast injury. These injuries are complex
and result from pressure waves created by

Type of Blast Injury

Cause

Outcome

Primary blast injury

Supersonic pressure shock waves from Internal injuries, especially of delicate membranes
the blast.
like the eardrum and the lung membranes.

Secondary blast injury

Explosion and fragmentation of objects. Blunt and penetrating trauma from explosive
devices.

Tertiary blast injury

Displacement of air causes blast wind Blunt and penetrating trauma, including fractures
that can push people into solid objects. and head trauma.

Quaternary blast injury

Miscellaneous injuries caused by other Burns, respiratory injuries from flames and smoke,
parts of the explosion.
crush injuries, eye injuries, psychiatric trauma
(PTSD).

Figure 11: Blast injury.

183
Charlie Mesloh et al., “An Exploratory Study of Stingball Grenades,” Florida Gulf Coast University, Report Number 2009-DIBX-K008, 2011, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263808368_An_Exploratory_Study_of_Stingball_Grenades.
184
Julia Angwin, Abbie Nehring, and ProPublica, “Hotter Than Lava: Every Day, Cops Toss Flashbang Grenades With Little Oversight
and Horrifying Results,” ProPublica, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.propublica.org/article/flashbangs.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

The use of stun grenades for crowd control is an example
of the inappropriate, inadequatelyregulated use of military
weapons for crowd management.
the blast. Blast injuries from close proximity
explosions can lead to internal haemorrhage,
eardrum rupture, lung injury, amputation,
fractures, and degloving injuries (extensive
skin removal that exposes underlying tissue).
In 2011, a U.S. SWAT officer died of internal
bleeding when a stun grenade exploded
in his hand while he was checking it.185 A
French activist was killed in 2014 by an OFF1 “blast-ball” style grenade–a weapon now
prohibited in France–when it detonated
after becoming lodged between his jacket
and backpack.186 During the George Floyd
protests in Seattle, United States, a woman
went into cardiac arrest after being hit in the
chest with a “blast-ball” style hybrid projectile
that combined a concussive detonation with
chemical irritants.187
In addition to injuries caused directly by the
primary blast wave, such as ear-drum rupture
or lung injury, secondary and tertiary injuries
can also occur as a result of these explosive
devices. All weapons are made of both metal

and plastic parts that may fragment during
the explosion and act as shrapnel. Some
weapons, such as “sting-ball” grenades,
are specifically designed to fragment and
forcefully eject shrapnel across the blast area.
These weapons behave as KIPs in terms of
ballistics but are incapable of being aimed,
resulting in weapons that are both completely
indiscriminate and impossibly imprecise.
Serious injuries have been documented from
these unaimed impact projectiles.188 These
include penetrating injury, skull fracture,
severe ocular trauma, and enucleation.189
Tertiary injuries occur from being thrown
on the ground by their force, and quaternary
injuries result from fires and other results of
the blast.
Stun grenades burn extremely hot and can
cause life-threatening thermal injuries. A
2015 report by ProPublica, summarised in
our first Lethal in Disguise report, identified
more than 50 people seriously injured or
killed by stun grenades since 2000, with

185
Daily Mail Reporter, “Veteran SWAT Officer Killed in His Home after Stun Grenade He Was Safety-Checking Explodes,” Daily Mail,
February 26, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361010/Veteran-SWAT-officer-killed-home-stun-grenade-safety-checkingexplodes.html.
186
AFP, “Mort de Rémi Fraisse: la Cour de cassation confirme le non-lieu en faveur du gendarme,” Le Point, March 23, 2021, https://
www.lepoint.fr/societe/mort-de-remi-fraisse-la-cour-de-cassation-confirme-le-non-lieu-en-faveur-du-gendarme-23-03-2021-2419009_23.
php.
187
Liz Jones and Isolde Raftery, “This woman ‘died three times’ after Seattle Police hit her with a blast ball,” KUOW, June 10, 2020,
https://www.kuow.org/stories/this-26-year-old-died-three-times-after-police-hit-her-with-a-blast-ball.
188
Aurore Chauvin et al., “Ocular injuries caused by less-lethal weapons in France,” The Lancet 394, no. 10209 (November 2019):
1616-1617 https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)31807-0/fulltext.
189
V Scolan et al., “Risks of non-lethal weapon use: case studies of three French victims of stinger grenades,” Forensic Science
International 223, (212): e18-21 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22981215/.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

an improvised KIP. In Portland, US, two
individuals were severely injured in 2018 by
“airborne warning/signalling munitions” fired
by police directly at protesters. One suffered
a traumatic brain injury after being shot in
the back of the head with such a round,194
thermal injury being the primary mechanism while another suffered third-degree burns
of injury.190 Furthermore, stun grenades can and impact wounds after being shot in the
cause fires in structures; these fires have led chest and arm.195 Concerns about directto fatalities.191 Defective and poorly designed fire injuries also have been raised following
weapons may play a role in injury severity.192 numerous reported accounts from Colombia
In one notable case from 2014 that illustrates of the Venom system being used in a directthe complexity of injuries arising from stun fire capacity with stun grenades.196
grenades: after a stun grenade was thrown
into his crib during a raid of his home, an The use of stun grenades for crowd control is
18-month-old boy sustained a chest wound an example of the inappropriate, inadequately
so deep it exposed his ribs. He also suffered regulated use of military weapons for crowd
third-degree burns that required him to management. While the stated objective of
be placed in a medically induced coma, stun grenades is to cause disorientation and
endure weeks of ICU-level care, and undergo a temporary sense of panic, the potential
numerous skin grafting surgeries.193
for severe blast injuries and even death

Stun grenades are–as
explosive devices–by nature
indiscriminate.

In addition to the risks associated with their
blast, some distraction devices are designed
to be fired from grenade launchers or similar
platforms. When aimed (inappropriately) at
individuals, the blast risk is compounded
by the kinetic risk of what is essentially

caused by the pressure of the blast or by
shrapnel from the fragmentation of plastic
and metal constituents of the grenade is
disproportionately high. The blinding light
and deafening sound they produce can also
cause injuries indiscriminately.

190
Julia Angwin, Abbie Nehring, and ProPublica, “Hotter Than Lava: Every Day, Cops Toss Flashbang Grenades With Little Oversight
and Horrifying Results,” ProPublica, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.propublica.org/article/flashbangs.
191
KSBW, “Monterey County to pay Greenfield family $2.6 million for father’s flash-bang death,” KSBW, August 19, 2013, https://
www.ksbw.com/article/monterey-county-to-pay-greenfield-family-2-6-million-for-father-s-flash-bang-death/1052306#.
192
Julia Angwin, Abbie Nehring, and ProPublica, “Hotter Than Lava: Every Day, Cops Toss Flashbang Grenades With Little Oversight
and Horrifying Results,” ProPublica, accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.propublica.org/article/flashbangs.
193
Alison Lynn and Matthew Gutman, “Family of Boy Injured by ‘Grenade’ Has $1M in Medical Bills,” ABC News, December 22,
2014, http://abcnews.go.com/US/family-toddler-injured-swat-grenade-faces-1m-medical/story?id=27671521.
194
Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, “’It felt like a war zone’: Portland protester hit in head by police flash-bang speaks,” Oregon Live, August
11, 2018, https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2018/08/it_felt_like_a_war_zone_portla.html.
195
J Wilson, “Woman says she was permanently disfigured by Portland police at protest,” The Guardian, August 5, 2019, https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/05/portland-police-protests-woman-claims-disfigured.
196
Chloé Lauvergnier, “Protests in Colombia: Videos show ‘dangerous’ use of grenade launchers by police,” France 24, May 24,
2021 https://observers.france24.com/en/americas/20210526-colombia-police-protests-venom-grenade-launchers.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

after the Yellow Vests protests.
Fragmentation injuries from stun
grenades used to disperse the
Gezi Park protests were also
reported in the medical literature in
Turkey.198 During the Euromaidan
protests in Ukraine, at least 133
individuals suffered traumatic
injuries as a result of stun grenade
usage, mostly because of the
fragmentation of the weapons.199
In the United States, stun grenades
were widely used during the
George Floyd protests, resulting in
numerous injuries.200

What has changed?
›

Fragmentation injuries: Since 2016,
there has been a growing recognition
of the hazards posed by the shower
of fragmented pieces from distraction
devices. Upon detonation, distraction
devices may–unintentionally or by
design–disperse dozens of metal or
plastic shards as shrapnel in a spherical
radius without any control of what they
hit. Each fragment behaves, in effect,
as a kinetic impact projectile, with
one crucial difference: the user of the
distraction device has no more than
the most rudimentary control of the
trajectory of these projectiles. These
weapons are, therefore, fundamentally
indiscriminate impact weapons when
used in the context of crowd control.

» Severe

kinetic injuries from
distraction devices, including
amputation and loss of sight, have
been recorded in the medical
literature over the last decade
in France,197 both before and

›

Multiple stun grenade launchers:
A worrisome trend in weapons
research and development is “areaeffect” stun grenades and delivery
systems designed to project multiple
bomblets across great distances. The
commercial Venom multiple-launch
system has already been restricted by
a court201 order in Popayán, Colombia,
over concerns about the indiscriminate
nature of the unaimed projectiles.202

197
V Scolan et al., “Risks of non-lethal weapon use: case studies of three French victims of stinger grenades,” Forensic Science
International 223, (212): e18-21 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22981215/.
198
Umit Unuvar et al., “Usage of Riot Control Agents and other methods resulting in physical and psychological injuries sustained
during civil unrest in Turkey in 2013,” Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 45 (2017): 47-52 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/abs/pii/S1752928X16301573.
199
VD Mishalov et al., “Forensic assessment of gunshot injuries in Maidan Nezalezhnosti protesters,” World of Medicine and
Biology 69, no. 3 (2019): 118-122, https://womab.com.ua/en/smb-2019-03/8015.
200
Sonoma County Commission on Human Rights, “Human Right Violations in Santa Rosa California Policing the Black Lives
Matter Protests,” Sonoma County Commission on Human Rights, July 2020, https://srcity.org/DocumentCenter/View/32184/ReportBLM-Human-Rights-Abuses-July2020; and Lewis Kamb, “Seattle police continue to use ‘flash-bang’ grenades during protests, despite
recommendations,” The Seattle Times, August 12, 2020, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-police-continue-to-use-flashbang-grenades-during-protests-despite-recommendations/.
201
Juzgado Décimo Administrativo Mixto de Oralidad Circuito de Popayán No. 065 de 2021, file 19001-33-33-010-2021-00085-00
ACUMULADO AL PROCESO 1900133-33-010-2021-000089-00, 2 June 2021, pp. 35 and 36.
202
MF Romoleroux, “Juez ordena al Esmad no hacer uso del arma Venom en Popayán,” El Tiempo, June 4, 2021, https://www.
eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/juez-ordena-a-esmad-no-usar-arma-venom-en-popayan-593528.

93

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

Meanwhile, the United States Defense
Department is developing a “nonlethal indirect fire munition” fired from
an 81-mm mortar that would disperse
multiple flash-bang bomblets over a
kilometre away.203 Similar to outlawed
cluster munitions, the flash-bang mortar
represents a disturbing trend towards
greater and more indiscriminate use
of these weapons, in spite of mounting
evidence of their potential harm.

›

Growth of combined weapons: Blast
balls are a type of hybrid stun grenade
combining bright lights and loud
sounds with chemical irritants. Blast
ball grenades are similar to so-called
“sting-ball” or “stinger” grenades that
combine a flash-bang capability with
a load of pellets designed to disperse
randomly from the point of deflagration.
Blast balls, however, replace the
pellets with CS agents. Unlike many
distraction devices, which function
primarily through the ignition of a
pyrotechnic metal and are not designed
to fragment, these grenades, by nature,
are designed to explode to release
the irritant or KIPs. Stinger grenades
and blast balls, therefore, carry an
inherent risk of generating shrapnel
upon deflagration, possibly dispersing
a shower of sharp, irregular projectiles
around the detonation site. This hybrid
weaponry poses specific health risks:
chemical burns and traumatic injuries
combined with explosive injuries can
be painful, debilitating, and challenging
to treat.

203
Kyle Rempfer, “Marines ‘hang’ flash-bang mortar rounds for first time,” Marine Corps Times, July 18, 2018, https://www.
marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-military/2018/07/18/marines-hang-flash-bang-mortar-rounds-for-first-time/.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

Case study

Deaths and maimings from explosive stun grenades
France
The French police and gendarmerie (military
police) frequently use explosive grenades
for crowd control. Unlike many “flash-bang”
grenades, which generate light and noise
without rupturing the grenade case, these
grenades carry an explosive charge that
creates a violent blast upon deflagration.
Numerous cases of severe injuries
associated with these grenades have led to a
reconsideration of their use in crowd control.

at the proposed Sivens dam site.206 Their use,
as well as the use of other high-explosive
“offensive grenades,” was subsequently
banned in France.207

However, similar weapons remain in use
under the moniker of “defensive” grenades.
The GLI-F4 exploding tear gas grenade was
extensively used during the Yellow Vests
protests of 2018 and 2019. This “hybrid”
weapon combines a concussive blast
The “OF-F1” offensive stun grenade was produced by TNT with a payload of CS agent. It
first deployed in the 1970s,204 and as early is allegedly responsible for at least 30 injuries
as 1977 the grenade, which contains TNT, (including five disabling hand injuries) during
was implicated in the death of a protester.205 the Yellow Vests protests.208 The GLI-F4 was
Its use was brought to national attention withdrawn from use in early 2020,209 although
in 2014, when one such grenade fired by a concerns persist about its successor210 (the
gendarme killed an environmental protester GM2L defensive grenade), which substitutes

204
Jean-Louis Courtois, “ Le retrait de la grenade OF F1: Bonne ou mauvaise idée?” L’Essor de la Gendarmerie Nationale, 2017,
https://web.archive.org/web/20181208132326/https://lessor.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/grenade-OF-F1.pdf.
205
Louise Fessard, “Grenades offensives: enquête sur le précédent de Creys-Malville en 1977,” Mediapart,17 December 2014,
https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/171214/grenades-offensives-enquete-sur-le-precedent-de-creys-malville-en-1977.
206
Le Monde, “Mort de Rémi Fraisse: six ans après, le non-lieu confirmé pour le gendarme qui a tiré la grenade,” Le Monde,
23 March 2021, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/03/23/mort-de-remi-fraisse-la-cour-de-cassation-confirme-le-non-lieu-enfaveur-du-gendarme_6074170_3224.html.
207
MINISTÈRE DE L’INTÉRIEUR, “Décret no 2017-1029,” Journal officiel de la République Français, 10 May 2017, no. 0110, https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/download/pdf?id=q7JUH89szWx_8vz2eKWIaxePHm3gxbQ9XWraqEbQhRg=.
208
Amnesty International, “France: Call for suspending the use of rubber bullets fired with the LBD40 and for banning grenades
GLI-F4 in the context of policing protests,” Amnesty International, 3 May 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/
EUR2103042019ENGLISH.pdf.
209
Agence France Presse, “France withdrawals controversial grenade from police use,” France24, 26 January 2020, https://www.
france24.com/en/20200126-france-withdraws-controversial-grenade-from-police-use.
210
“Question écrite n° 14458 de Mme Laurence Cohen,” senat.fr, 27 February 2020, p. 954, https://www.senat.fr/questions/
base/2020/qSEQ200214458.html.

95

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

RÉMI FRAISSE AT THE PROTEST AGAINST THE
SIVENS DAM PROJECT ON OCTOBER 25, 2014,
FRANCE. CREATIVE COMMONS/WIKIPEDIA

TNT for black powder yet still operates as an
explosive device.211 Within a year of being put
into use, serious injuries have already been
reported from the GM2L.212
In regular use throughout this time period
have been so-called “de-encirclement”
grenades, known as “DBD” or “DMP,”
which are explicitly designed to explode
and project small rubber fragments across
its blast radius.213 These fragments act as
multi-projectile KIPs that cannot be aimed,

resulting in a highly indiscriminate weapon.
In 2016, one civilian suffered severe head
trauma214 and another lost an eye215 to injuries
with a de-encirclement grenade thrown by
Paris police. Further reports of injuries from
“sting-ball” grenades during the Yellow Vests
protests–including a demonstrator who
lost four fingers216–are consistent with this
weapon profile.

211
Caroline Piquet, “Retrait de la grenade GLI-F4: la GM2L est-elle moins dangereuse?” Le Parisien, 27 January 2020, https://www.
leparisien.fr/faits-divers/retrait-de-la-grenade-gli-f4-la-gm2l-est-elle-moins-dangereuse-27-01-2020-8245689.php.
212
Amnesty International, “France: Abusive and illegal use of force by police at Redon rave highlights need for accountability,”
Amnesty International, 14 September 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/france-abusive-and-illegal-use-of-forceby-police-at-redon-rave-highlights-need-for-accountability/.
213
Maxime Davoust, “Manifestation à Paris : Alsetex a fabriqué les grenades de ‘désencerclement,’” Les Nouvelles, 18 June 2020,
https://actu.fr/pays-de-la-loire/precigne_72244/manifestation-a-paris-alsetex-a-fabrique-les-grenades-de-desencerclement_34369970.
html.
214
Paul Conge, “Romain D. grièvement blessé: faut-il interdire les grenades de désencerclement?,” L’Express, 7 June 2016, https://
www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/romain-d-grievement-blesse-faut-il-interdire-les-grenades-de-desencerclement_1799886.html.
215
Greg Sandoval, “I saw a man lose his eye to a ‘less-lethal’ police weapon,” The Verge, 22 September 2016, https://www.theverge.
com/2016/9/22/13022262/laurent-theron-paris-protest-police-crowd-control-weapons.
216
Peter Stubley, “Yellow vest demonstrator injured by grenade as protesters try to storm French National Assembly,” The
Independent, 9 February 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/yellow-vest-protests-paris-police-grenade-sting-ballnational-assembly-gilets-jaunes-macron-a8771701.html.

96

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Disorientation devices

Case study

Dangers of shrapnel from blast-balls in Seattle
United States
Police in Seattle, Washington, US, have
made extensive use of “blast balls.”217 These
are a type of hybrid distraction device
that combines the explosive lights and
sounds of flash-bang grenades with tear
gas grenades.218 While these grenades are
not explicitly advertised as fragmentation
devices, shrapnel generated by their
detonation has been implicated in a number
of injuries dating back to 2016, including a
journalist struck in the face219 and several
other persons injured during the George
Floyd protests of 2020.220

In June of 2020, the Seattle City Council
voted unanimously to prohibit the use of
many CCWs for protest, including blast
balls.221 A court ruling later found the Seattle
Police Department in contempt of court for
violating the prohibition.222 In the order, U.S.
District Judge Richard Jones expressed
special concern over the indiscriminate
and imprecise nature of blast balls and the
risk they pose to peaceful demonstrators,
noting that several violations of the
prohibition represented use that was either
indiscriminate or disproportional.223

DEMONSTRATORS CLASH WITH POLICE NEAR THE SEATTLE POLICE
DEPARTMENTS EAST PRECINCT ON JUNE 7, 2020 IN SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON. EARLIER IN THE EVENING, A SUSPECT DROVE INTO THE
CROWD OF PROTESTERS AND SHOT ONE PERSON, WHICH HAPPENED
AFTER A DAY OF PEACEFUL PROTESTS ACROSS THE CITY. LATER, POLICE
AND PROTESTERS CLASHED VIOLENTLY.
DAVID RYDER | GETTY IMAGES

217
Amy Radil, “Blast balls and projectiles: Seattle police have a history of crowd control criticism,” KUOW, June 26, 2020, https://
www.kuow.org/stories/unanswered-letters-buried-reports-critics-say-spd-response-on-crowd-control-is-overdue.
218
Spec sheet on the “blast balls” used by Seattle PD: https://www.lesslethal.com/product-specifications?task=document.
viewdoc&id=109.
219
KOMO News Staff, “Man files suit against city over injury suffered during Seattle May Day protests,” KOMO News, August 16,
2016, https://komonews.com/news/local/man-files-lawsuit-against-city-of-seattle-over-injury-suffered-during-may-day-protests.
220
See in particular Seattle Office of Police Accountability reports 2020 OPA-0335, 2020 OPA-0344, 2020OPA-0492, and 2020OPA0495: https://www.seattle.gov/opa/case-data/demonstration-complaint-dashboard.
221
https://council.seattle.gov/2021/01/22/faq-ban-on-seattle-police-use-of-tear-gas-pepper-spray-blast-ball-other-crowd-controlweapons/.
222
Angela King and Dyer Oxley, “Seattle police found in contempt of court over use of pepper spray, blast balls,” KUOW, December
8, 2020, https://www.kuow.org/stories/seattle-police-found-in-contempt-of-court-over-use-of-pepper-spray-blast-balls.
223

See https://publicola.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/order-12-7-20.pdf.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Acoustic weapons

ACOUSTIC
WEAPONS
PROTESTERS PLUG THEIR EARS SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 AS POLICE USE A SONIC WEAPON AGAINST AN UNPERMITTED
PROTEST MARCH THAT BEGAN AT ARSENAL PARK IN LAWRENCEVILLE DURING THE G-20 SUMMIT.
MICHEAL HENNINGER | © PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, 2016, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Several
other
companies,
including
Hyperspike, now sell the weapons as well.225
Acoustic or sonic weapons (also known According to the LRAD Corporation, these
as long-range acoustic devices, sound weapons are sold to police departments in
226
cannons, hailing devices, sonic bullets, and more than 100 countries.
noise bazookas) are devices that deliver
very loud sounds over long distances. They The LRAD brand weapon has a range of
can be designed to deliver painful audible 8,900 metres for intelligible speech and a
or inaudible sound waves or to act more like maximum output of 162 decibels (dB) at one
very loud voice amplifiers to deliver voice metre and can cause pain (110 – 130 dB) at
20 metres.227
messages or other sounds.

Weapon profile

This technology has been used for crowdcontrol purposes since the early 1990s. It
was originally developed by the LRAD (Long
Range Acoustic Device) Corporation.224

98

A different form of acoustic weapon emits
very high-pitched sounds that are audible
and painful to younger people (teenagers and
those in their 20s), while leaving older people
(30s and older) unaffected.228 This ultrasonic

224

LRAD, “LRAD Corporation - PRODUCT OVERVIEW,” accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.lradx.com/site/content/view/15/110/.

225

HyperSpike, “Civil and Defense,” accessed March 3, 2023, https://www.ultra-hyperspike.com/solutions/civil-and-defense/.

226

Genasys, “LRAD The Global Leader in Acousting Hailing,” accessed March 3, 2023, https://genasys.com/.

227

LRAD, “LRAD Corporation - PRODUCT OVERVIEW.”

228
com/.

MST, “Mosquito Device Anti Loitering,” Moving Sound Technologies, accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.movingsoundtech.

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Acoustic weapons

device, sometimes branded “the Mosquito,”
is used in several countries, primarily in
private security settings, despite ongoing
litigation against its use. It has been used
as a deterrent device by the British police
to disperse underage crowds with a shrill

sound and by civilians for personal use since
2008. As the marketing of these devices is
unregulated, their use has the potential to
expand rapidly.229

Sound origin

Sound level in decibels (dB)

Normal conversation

60 dB

Lawnmower

90 dB

Threshold of pain

110 – 130 dB, depending on tolerance

Sound cannon (continuous capability)

150 – 162 dB at 5 metres, 80 dB at 500 metres

Jet craft take-off

160 dB at 25 metres

Eardrum rupture

160 – 185 dB

Figure 12: Examples of sound levels.
Note: Adapted from “The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health” (NIOSH): http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
topics/noise/230

Since the 1990s, the U.S. military and private
companies have also researched ultra- or
infra-sonic devices that could theoretically
cause tinnitus (ringing in the ears), pain, and
cognitive and/or behaviour changes at either
very high or very low frequencies that might
not be heard by the human ear. While there
are some reports of symptoms, sometimes
called “Havana syndrome,” from such devices,
there is no documented evidence that these
weapons exist or have ever been used.

Health effects
Sound cannons are used to emit painful,
loud sounds that have the potential to
cause significant harm to the eardrums and
delicate organs of the ears and/or cause
permanent hearing loss. The use of earplugs
or firmly blocking the ears with hands can
decrease the sound by 20–30 dB, but this
may not be enough to avoid significant injury.
Manufacturer guidelines indicate that sound
cannons should only be used at a minimum
distance of 10–20 metres.231 There is a
significant risk of injury to law enforcement
officers, particularly those operating the

229
S Bungey, “London Anti-Riot Gear Gets High-Tech to Combat Youths,” Daily Beast, August 14, 2011, https://www.thedailybeast.
com/london-anti-riot-gear-gets-high-tech-to-combat-youths.
230
“Noise and Hearing Loss Prevention,” The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), December 5, 2014,
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/noise/.
231
LRAD, “Memorandum: LRAD Corporation’s Position Statement on Product Classification” (LRAD Corporation, April 29, 2014),
https://www.uscommunities.org/fileadmin/hb/usc/Suppliers/Safeware_Mallory/LRAD_Position_Statement_121814.pdf.

99

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Acoustic weapons

devices, who are advised to wear ear
protection. In addition to auditory effects,
acoustic weapons may also injure or rupture
internal membranes of the middle and inner
ear and, at close range, can damage other
organs such as the lungs.
There is little medical literature regarding
the effects of acoustic weapons on people.
Some literature notes that acoustic weapons
were first developed by the military and that
any early evaluations of their health effects
were biased and, in some cases, produced
indeterminate findings. The weapons are
indiscriminate, causing harm or pain to
protesters, bystanders, and law enforcement,
despite the narrow beam in which sound
is concentrated. Abuse or lack of operator
knowledge about the health effects can

easily lead to incorrect use of the weapon
and exacerbate injuries. Serious questions
remain about the safety and efficacy of
acoustic weapons in crowd-control contexts.

What has changed?
Since 2016, there has been a rapid expansion
in the manufacture and sale of LRAD and
other acoustic weapons. Sonic weapons
have been widely deployed in countries such
as Australia,232 Hong Kong,233 New Zealand,234
and the United States,235 prompting warnings
from professional associations such as
Audiology Australia236 and the American
Speech-Language-Hearing Association.237

232
RMIT ABC Fact Check, “‘Sonic weapons’ were used by police in Canberra’s protests, but only to broadcast messages rather than
do harm,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, 17 February 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-18/coronacheck-sonicweapons-lrad-police-canberra-protests/100839612/.
233
Danny Mok, “Hong Kong protests: police use controversial anti-riot sound device for first time, rejecting claims it is harmful,”
South China Morning Post, 17 November 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3038133/hong-kong-protestspolice-use-controversial-anti-riot-sound.
234
Oscar Francis, “Revealed: Police used sound cannons against Parliament protesters,” Otago Daily Times, 28 June 2022, https://
www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/revealed-police-used-sound-cannons-against-parliament-protesters/PIBFZEHRIOEADS7SK4Y4SWM464/.
235
Genasys Inc., “Genasys™ Inc. LRAD® Systems Deployed by First Responders and Law Enforcement for Critical Crowd
Communications,” GlobeNewswire, 04 June 2020, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/06/04/2043685/0/en/GenasysInc-LRAD-Systems-Deployed-by-First-Responders-and-Law-Enforcement-for-Critical-Crowd-Communications.html.
236
Audiology Australia, “Position Statement: Hearing Health and the Use of Long-Range Acoustic Devices,” Audiology Australia,
November 2020, https://audiology.asn.au/Tenant/C0000013/AudA%20Position%20Statement%20-%20Hearing%20Health%20and%20
the%20Use%20of%20Long-Range%20Acoustic%20Devices.pdf.
237
The American Speech-Language-Hearing Association, “Long Range Acoustic Devices for Crowd Control Can Cause Serious
Hearing Loss and Harm: Protestors Need Ear Protection and to be Aware of the Dangers (Full Statement),” asha.org, 11 June 2020, https://
www.asha.org/news/2020/long-range-acoustic-devices-for-crowd-control-can-cause-serious-hearing-loss-and-harm/.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Acoustic weapons

Case study

Court limits LRAD use by New York
Police Department
9

United States

After sustaining significant physical injuries as
a result of the New York Police Department’s
(NYPD) use of a Long Range Acoustic
Device (LRAD) sound cannon, protestors and
journalists brought a lawsuit in March 2016
against the City of New York, challenging the
NYPD’s excessive use of force in violation
of constitutional rights. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit ruled that purposely
using LRAD in a manner capable of causing
serious injury to non-violent protesters is a
violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment prohibition against excessive
force.238 In June 2018, the court ruled that the
device was an instrument of force designed
for “incapacitating and painful effects” and
that “the problem posed by protesters in the
street did not justify the use of force, much
less force capable of causing serious injury,
such as hearing loss.”239
Subsequently, the NYPD agreed to a legal
settlement that included policy changes to
the NYPD’s use of LRADs.240 Under the April
2021 settlement agreement, police officers
are prohibited from using the painfully loud
and high-pitched “deterrent” or “alert” tone,
though they may make voice announcements

on the devices. The agreement also requires
the department to change its training
materials on the devices and states that while
police supervisors and department lawyers
may authorise the use of LRADs, officers
“must make reasonable efforts to maintain
minimum safe distances between the LRAD
and all persons within its cone of sound.”
The protestors who brought the lawsuit had
attended racial justice demonstrations in
New York City in December 2014 in their
capacity as photojournalists, observers,
filmmakers, or active protestors objecting to
a grand jury decision not to indict the NYPD
officer who killed Eric Garner. In the early
morning hours of 5 December 2014, NYPD
officers employed a type of LRAD called
100X to disperse nonviolent protesters. This
acoustic weapon can “project messages up
to 600 metres away, produce a maximum
continuous output of 136 dB at one metre
away, and has the capacity to overcome 88
dBs of background noise at 250 metres.”241
NYPD officers indiscriminately employed
the device’s deterrent tone between 15 and
20 times over a span of three minutes. At
various points, NYPD officers angled and

238
Edrei v Bratton, No. 17-2065 (2d Cir. 2018); available at https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/17-2065/172065-2018-06-13.html.
239

Id.

240
Colin Moynihan, “N.Y.P.D. to Limit Use of ‘Sound Cannon’ on Crowds After Protestors’ Lawsuit,” The New York Times, April 19,
2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/19/nyregion/nypd-sound-cannon-protests.html.
241

Edrei v City of N.Y., 254 F. Supp. 3d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

101

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Acoustic weapons

A POLICE OFFICER HOLDS A LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICE
(LRAD), OR SOUND CANNON, AS THEY BLOCK PROTESTORS
ON A MARCH THROUGH TIMES SQUARE DURING A PROTEST
AGAINST A GRAND JURY’S DECISION ON MONDAY NOT TO
INDICT FERGUSON POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON IN THE
SHOOTING OF MICHAEL BROWN, TUESDAY, NOV. 25, 2014,
IN NEW YORK. THE GRAND JURY’S DECISION HAS INFLAMED
RACIAL TENSIONS ACROSS THE U.S.
AP PHOTO | JOHN MINCHILLO

fired the device fewer than 10 feet away are now afraid to attend protests, which,
from protestors.242
for some, has negatively impacted their
professional opportunities as journalists.245
Due to their exposure to LRAD’s ear-splitting
sound, the plaintiffs suffered from physical In 2020, the company that manufactures
injuries, such as “migraines, sinus pain, LRADs, Genasys Inc., reported that
dizziness, facial pressure, ringing in ears, and law enforcement agencies and police
sensitivity to noise.”243 One was diagnosed departments in more than 100 countries,246
with tinnitus in both ears following the including 500 U.S. cities used the devices.247
NYPD’s use of the LRAD, while another was With the policy changes resulting from the
diagnosed with hearing loss due to nerve April 2021 settlement agreement, the NYPD
damage. Another plaintiff testified that he became one of the first large U.S. police
was told by his doctor that “the pressure of the departments to ban the use of LRADs’ shrill
extreme level of the noise from the LRAD had “deterrent” or “alert” tone.
pushed a bone in his ear inwards, impacting
and damaging a nerve in his ear.”244 Several
of the plaintiffs named in the lawsuit say they

242

Id.

243

Id.

244
See above n 234; Alex Pasternack, “Piercing sound can be excessive police force, federal court rules,” Fast Company, June 14,
2018, https://www.fastcompany.com/40585221/piercing-sound-can-be-excessive-police-force-federal-court-rules.
245

Id.

246
LRAD, “LRAD Products,” accessed March 9, 2023, “Case Study Law Enforcement,” accessed March 3, 2023, genasys.com/lradproducts/
247
Colin Moynihan, “N.Y.P.D. to Limit Use of ‘Sound Cannon’ on Crowds After Protestors’ Lawsuit,” The New York Times, April 19,
2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/19/nyregion/nypd-sound-cannon-protests.html.

102

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

BLUNT FORCE WEAPONS
(BATONS)
PORTLAND, OREGON - NOV 17: POLICE IN RIOT GEAR HOLDING THE LINE IN DOWNTOWN
PORTLAND, OREGON DURING A OCCUPY PORTLAND PROTEST ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF
OCCUPY WALL STREET NOVEMBER 17, 2011. JPL DESIGNS|SHUTTERSTOCK

or sticks. Blunt force weapons, in this broader
sense, are generally constructed out of wood,
The baton is perhaps the iconic police rubber, PVC, or metal alloys and function
weapon, used as a symbol of authority, through blunt trauma, with the level of injury
as a defensive tool, and as the most basic dependent on a number of factors.
offensive armament available to police
personnel throughout policing history. The Mechanism of action
classic baton is most broadly defined as a
club-like, handheld, blunt, striking device, Blunt force weapons are typically classified
and many variations of the classic truncheon as defensive weapons, and a variety of
exist. There are other weapons that also blocking or parrying techniques can be used
cause blunt force trauma and are included in to accomplish this task. Blunt force weapons
the analysis of these weapons in this section. are also offensive impact weapons and
These include the expandable baton, tonfa or function by transferring kinetic energy to a
side-handle baton, sjambok (rigid whips), and person to produce pain and temporary motor
lathi (long sticks),248 as well as innumerable dysfunction.249 They are typically used in this
objects with the potential to be used as clubs capacity to strike by swinging the weapon

Weapon profile

248
Amnesty International, “Blunt Force: Investigating the misuse of police batons and related equipment,” Amnesty International,
September 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/09/blunt-force/.
249
Andrew Borrello, “Police Impact Weapons: A Foundation for Proper Selection,” Law and Order, August 1999, v. 47, no. 8, p.
65-71, https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/police-impact-weapons-foundation-proper-selection. See, also, Aled Roberts
et al., “Impact characteristics of two types of police baton,” Forensic Science International, June 1994, v. 67, no. 1, p. 49-53 https://doi.
org/10.1016/0379-0738(94)90411-1.

103

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

with one or two hands against a targeted However, peculiarities in the designs of
body part, often producing much more force police batons create scenarios in which
than hands alone could.
they may be misused. Police directives
regarding batons often mandate strikes be
Studies of typical duty-length batons in the targeted at the extremities. To do this, side
United Kingdom and Canada (0.6-0.7 m) strikes (swinging the baton in a horizontal
show comparable levels of peak impact to a subhorizontal plane) are necessary.
forces between PVC, wood, and metal However, longer weapons can be difficult to
batons constructed for police use. By design, deploy in this fashion, especially in crowds,
however, longer weapons impart greater resulting in their being used in an overhand
impact by increasing the length of the lever.250 strike where the baton is swung in a vertical
A one-metre-long wooden stick weighing plane. This use makes strikes to the head
approximately 0.4kg can transfer in excess of much more likely.
200 joules of energy to a target at speeds of
over 30 metres per second.251 Given the force The tonfa, or side-handle baton, is a t-shaped
multiplication involved, strikes are typically baton featuring a small handle projecting
aimed away from the head, where strikes away from the main body of the baton. Used
could be fatal; protocols dating to the 1960s properly, it is held either by the handle as
advise against strikes to the head and other a defensive tool, or by the main body with
the handle close to the hand of the user.
sensitive body parts.
Used improperly, with the side-handle near
In protests, batons are frequently employed the striking end of the baton, the weapon
with a two-handed grip, with both hands becomes a hammer. Reports from South
grasping opposite ends of the baton. The Africa252 and Italy253 detail how the tonfa
baton can be used to shove and strike has been used in this manner to cause
with the butt ends. Batons wielded in this severe injuries.
manner can also be used for joint locks or
chokeholds and can be used to apply directed Certain blunt-force weapon tactics can
pressure to parts of the body as part of pain expose nonviolent individuals to the risk of
compliance techniques.
police assaults. The police baton charge–a
coordinated rush by baton-armed police
All blunt-force weapon strikes must be to disperse crowds through pain and
deliberately targeted by the user. Thus, intimidation–creates a chaotic environment
the potential for “accidental” strikes is low. in which any individual may be a target for
250
Pierre Gervais et al., “Comparative analysis between police batons,” Forensic Science International, January 1998, v. 91, no. 1, p.
7-17, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0379-0738(97)00177-1.
251
Florian Sprenger et al., “The influence of striking object characteristics on the impact energy,” International Journal of Legal
Medicine, 2016, v. 130, p. 835-844 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00414-015-1268-1.
252
David Bruce, “The use of less-lethal weapons in South African prisons and crowd management,” Institute for Security Studies
Monographs, November 2019, monograph 201 https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC-1d321dbe67.
253
g8.

104

Nick Davies, “The bloody battle of Genoa,” The Guardian, 16 July 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/17/italy.

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

police baton strikes. The ensuing panic is
indiscriminate in nature and exposes civilians
to the additional risks of falls and trampling. In
India, the “lathi charge” is a common police
tactic used to disperse crowds; deaths related
to lathi charges frequently occur, including
those of young children and individuals not
involved in protests or gatherings.

Health effects
Blunt force trauma of any kind can produce
injuries ranging from bruises to lifethreatening injuries. Contusions (bruising)
are most common and caused by ruptured
capillaries under the skin surface. Abrasions
or lacerations from the force of the weapon
can result in external bleeding. The force
of the strike can cause internal injuries
as well, including bone fractures, internal
bleeding, and organ damage. Strikes of
sufficient force can break bones, rupture
organs, and potentially kill. Blunt force
weapons used for chokeholds or joint locks
can cause strangulation injuries and joint or
neck trauma.
Strikes to the head are most likely to cause
life-threatening
injuries.
Retrospective
studies of homicide victims have shown that
the vast majority (>80%) of victims of blunt
force trauma suffered injuries to the head.254
Blunt force trauma to the head and neck can
cause death through traumatic brain injury,
internal haemorrhage, or paralysis. Sharp
impacts to the face can rupture eyes and
eardrums as well as delicate facial bones,

with potentially permanent consequences.
Strikes to the neck or back can injure the vital
central nervous system. Strikes to the torso
can cause serious internal injuries. In the
chest, rib fractures and lung injuries such
as punctured, bleeding, or bruised lungs
can result in life-threatening respiratory
complications. Injuries to the heart can
result in cardiac tamponade that requires
emergent management for survival. In the
abdomen, organ rupture (especially of solid
organs such as the liver, lungs, spleen, or
kidneys) can result in severe pain and severe
internal bleeding. Hollow organs such as the
intestines can rupture well, but these are less
likely. Pregnant women with blunt trauma
to the abdomen can miscarry. Strikes to the
limbs can fracture bones or injure nerves and
vessels, which may result in further bleeding
or injury. Strikes anywhere on the body
can cause permanent impairment through
musculoskeletal or nerve injury. In the long
term, infections from wounds, psychological
trauma, and disfigurement can occur. While
most injuries are temporary, depending on
the site and degree of injury, permanent
disability is not uncommon. .
A comprehensive investigation of police
baton uses by Amnesty International
highlights the numerous health risks of
baton strikes, including the risk of permanent
disability or death, even when used against
non-vital areas such as the limbs.255 Decades
of case reports in the medical literature
describe batons’ characteristic parallel linear
contusions and abraded contusions, as well

254
Vipul Namdeorao Ambade and Hemant Vasant Godbole, “Comparison of wound patterns in homicide by sharp and blunt force,”
Forensic Science International, January 2006, v. 156, no. 2-3, p. 166-170 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forsciint.2004.12.027.
255
Amnesty International, “Blunt Force: Investigating the misuse of police batons and related equipment,” Amnesty International,
September 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/09/blunt-force/.

105

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

as the associated internal injuries and longterm disabilities. Descriptions of the scarring
patterns and potential injuries produced
by baton strikes are detailed in the Istanbul
Protocol as well.256

that the actions of police with regard to one
of the protesters severely beaten with batons
at the Diaz-Pertini school constituted torture
under Article 3.258 The ECtHR sustained their
opinion in a separate ruling, Bartesaghi Gallo
and Others v Italy, declaring that the misuse
Case law on baton use in protests is limited. of police batons on individuals in the DiazThe attack on the Diaz-Pertini school in Pertini school similarly constituted torture.259
Genoa during the 27th G8 Summit in 2001
was one important example. Over 150 police, Perhaps uniquely among the less-lethal
armed principally with rubber side-handle weapons described in this report, police
batons, indiscriminately attacked the 93 blunt force weapons have been frequently
occupants of the school. Court proceedings used as instruments of sexual assault in the
illustrate the nature of injuries suffered by the context of protests. Protesters in Belarus,260
protesters specifically attributable to batons, Chile,261 France,262 and the United States263
including traumatic brain injury; epidural have recently alleged sexual assault at the
hematoma; pneumothorax; fractures to hands of police using batons, with some of
the skull, jaw, and ribs; fractured teeth; these assaults captured on video.
lacerations; contusions; hearing loss; and
permanent muscle weakness.257 Several
protesters took their cases to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), claiming
violations of Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Prohibition of
torture). In Cestaro v Italy, the ECtHR ruled
256
See, also, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “ISTANBUL
PROTOCOL,” United Nations, 2022, no. 8, rev. 2, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/2022-06-29/IstanbulProtocol_Rev2_EN.pdf.
257
AFFAIRE BARTESAGHI GALLO ET AUTRES c. ITALIE, European Court of Human Rights, Requêtes nos 12131/13 et 43390/13
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-174443%22]}. See, also, CASE OF CESTARO v ITALY, European Court of Human
Rights, Application no. 6884/11 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-153901%22]}.
258

Id.

259

See above n 254.

260
Human Rights Watch, “Belarus: Systematic Beatings, Torture of Protesters,” Human Rights Watch, 15 September 2020, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/15/belarus-systematic-beatings-torture-protesters.
261
CNN, “La grave denuncia por tortura y abuso sexual de un joven en medio de la crisis en Chile,” 1 November 2019, https://www.
cnn.com/videos/spanish/2019/11/01/denuncia-abuso-sexual-policia-carabineros-chile-protestas-crisis-protestas-pkg-cristopher-ulloa.
cnn.
262
Liselotte Mas, “French police investigate officer caught on video wedging baton in protester’s pants,” France24, 6 May 2019,
https://observers.france24.com/en/20190506-france-police-investigate-baton-protester.
263
David Sachs, “Everything we know – and don’t – about the claim that a Denver police officer violated a protester with a baton,”
Denverite, 21 September 2020, https://denverite.com/2020/09/21/everything-we-know-and-dont-about-the-claim-that-a-denver-policeofficer-assaulted-a-protester-with-a-baton/.

106

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

Moderate to serious level of
resultant trauma. Injury tends to be
more long-lasting, but may also be
temporary.

Highest level of resultant trauma.
Injury tends to range from serious to
long-lasting rather than temporary
and may include unconsciousness,
serious bodily injury, shock or
death.

Psychological Trauma

Head Injuries

Emotional trauma

Bleeding, bruising and facial
deformities, facial fractures, eye
injuries: vision or eye movement
loss, facial paralysis, ear deformities
and hearing loss, traumatic
brain inuries from skull fractures
or internal bleeding (subdural,
subarchnoid and epidural
hematomas)

Neck and Back
Temporary or permanent paralysis or
pain syndromes, spinal cord injuries

Chest
Rib fractures, Punctured or bruised
lungs (Pneumo/hemothorax),
Cardiac injuries including bruising or
tamponade

Abdomen
Solid organ injuries: Diaphragm,
spleen, kidney, pancreas and liver:
internal or external bleeding, rupture,
organ failure. Hollow organ injuries:
intestines: bruising, tears

Limbs
Skin bruising and pain, muscle, joint
and/or bone injuries (could result
in permanent disabilities), nerve
injuries, vessel injuries and bleeding

Groin
Severe pain, bruising, bleeding loss
of sexual function or reproductive
capacity

Image 2: adapted from Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/09/blunt-force/

107

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

Case study

Lathi charge, a deadly holdover from colonial times
India
The lathi is a type of baton used across South
Asia, consisting of a 1-1.8 m rod usually made
of bamboo. While traditionally associated
with South Asian martial arts, the adoption
of the lathi as a policing tool followed the
United Kingdom’s promotion of its use for
crowd control in British India during the 19th
century.264 Today, the lathi continues to be
omnipresent in the hands of modern Indian
police, and its use in crowd control has been
implicated in dozens of deaths over the
past decade.

2014

2016

2018

Civilian deaths during lathi charges, national

2020

Police use of the lathi is inextricably tied to
a tactic known in India as the lathi charge.
In essence, a baton charge consists of a
coordinated rapid advance by police, using
lathis to strike at individuals and disperse
a crowd through the threat of pain. Like
baton charges around the world, the chaotic
environment created by a sudden rush of
armed police leads to direct injuries from lathi
strikes and indirect injuries from the panicked
crowd. Unlike other nations’ baton charges,
however, the Indian police’s extensive use
of the tactic is linked with a startling number
of deaths.
The medical literature of the earliest 20th
century recognized the danger posed by
lathis. One report from 1902 specifically
noted 14 deaths from skull fractures and
three deaths from a cerebral haemorrhage at
a single medical centre in Bihar.265 Perhaps
the best-known victim of a lathi charge lived
during this period of violence. Lala Lajpat
Rai, a leader of the Indian independence
movement, was fatally wounded in 1928
during a lathi charge ordered by the
British superintendent of police in Lahore
(modern Pakistan).266

264
Delhi News, “Symbol of power and control, a lathi story,” Hindustan Times, 22 December, 2019, https://www.hindustantimes.
com/delhi-news/symbol-of-power-and-control-a-lathi-story/story-FHVzYKALGQYX4g8kwpgBRN.html.
265
R.K. Gupta, “Injuries Caused by Lathi Blows,” Indian Medical Gazette, 1902, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 243-244, https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5156271/.
266
Hindustan Times, “Lala Lajpat Rai Birth Anniversary: The legacy of the famed nationalist,” Hindustan Times, 27 January
2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/more-lifestyle/lala-lajpat-rai-birth-anniversary-the-legacy-of-the-famed-nationalist/storyituwNX2DVDKdWm4Qas2Z8J.html.

108

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

INDIAN SECURITY FORCES INTERVENE IN FARMERS DURING
A RALLY AS THEY CONTINUE THEIR PROTEST AGAINST THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S RECENT AGRICULTURAL REFORMS
IN NOIDA, INDIA ON JANUARY 26, 2021. PANKAJ NANGIA | AA

Over a hundred years later, little has changed
about the prevalence of the lathi in policing.
Victims span demographic divides, although
lathi charges have been especially pervasive
in police response to student protests,
enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions,267
and response to demonstrations by rural
workers.268 The chaotic nature of lathi charges
results in serious injuries to bystanders, such
as one case in which a 18-month-old died from
head injuries in 2021269 and another in which
an eight-year-old boy died in a stampede
produced by lathi charges in 2019.270

No details are available pertaining to the
injuries that led to the fatalities, and it is
likely that at least some of the deaths may be
attributed to crowd crushing or trampling in
the panicked environment that often follows a
lathi charge. Strikes to the head likely account
for many of the fatalities from lathis. The
significant length of the lathi may account for
the high number of fatalities. Impact energy
at the tip of a baton increases in proportion
to the length of the lever (baton and arm),272
so the exaggerated length of the typical lathi
can cause severe injuries. Furthermore, in
crowds, the length of the lathi limits the use
Since 2015, the Indian National Crime of slashing strikes from the sides, leaving
Records Database has recorded in its annual the dangerous overhand strike as the most
Crime in India reports the civilian injuries and viable option.
fatalities resulting from police lathi charges.271
These reports found 78 civilians have died in
police lathi charges since 2014. Over 2,000
civilian injuries from police lathi charges
were recorded during this time period.

267

See https://thewire.in/law/police-lathi-coronavirus-lockdown.

268
See https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/reaching-karnal-to-seek-justice-for-farmer-killed-in-lathi-charge-byharyana-police-alleges-rakesh-tikait20210907160123/ and https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/56-year-old-migrant-worker-onhis-way-to-home-dies-on-road-28-year-old-migrant-dies-in-police-lathicharge-in-surat/story-O1NI1kDAWYRAAQOg4dkT6M.html.
269
See https://www.freepressjournal.in/bhopal/watch-video-6-month-old-girl-died-in-police-lathi-charge-in-shivpuri-one-policeofficer-sustains-head-injuries and https://www.thequint.com/news/india/15-year-old-dies-allegedly-during-lathi-charge-by-cops-onvillagers-in-mps-shivpuri.
270

See https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/lathi-fuelled-stampede-kills-child-in-varanasi/cid/1729257.

271

See https://ncrb.gov.in/en/crime-india.

272
Komaal Collie, “A Pilot Study of Kinetic Energy Transfer Based Upon Police Baton Designs,” Law Enforcement Executive
Forum, 2009, v. 9, no. 1, pp. 119-126, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263808533_A_Pilot_Study_of_Kinetic_Energy_Transfer_
Based_Upon_Police_Baton_Designs.

109

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

Case study

Baby Pendo’s death from batons
during a police operation
9

Kenya

“Jose, Jose, they have killed our child,” cried
the mother of six-month-old Samantha
Pendo after Kenyan police officers used tear
gas and batons to attack the mother, her
husband, and their infant child. The brutal
use of baton strikes by the police left baby
Pendo with severe head injuries, from which
she later died.
On 8 August 2017, Kenyans went to the
polls in a presidential election. Following the
announcement of results by the Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission
(IEBC), the incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta was
declared the winner after garnering 54.3 per
cent of the votes; his main rival, opposition
leader Raila Odinga, garnered 44.74 per cent
of the votes. Odinga rejected the results and
claimed the election process was marred
by fraud and numerous irregularities.273
Violent protests soon erupted in opposition
strongholds, including Nairobi, the Coast
and Western Kenya. Using live ammunition,
batons, teargas, and other CCWs, the
police carried out violent house-to houseoperations, beating and shooting protestors
who objected to the outcome of the election.
On 11 August 2017, Joseph Abanja, his
wife Lenser Achieng Abanja, and their baby

273

daughter Pendo were woken up at about
12.30 am by the screams of a neighbour who
was being attacked by police. Their house
in Nyalenda Estate, an informal settlement
outside Kisumu, was soon surrounded by
police officers. The police lobbed a tear gas
canister through a crack in the door, forcing
the family out of their house and toward the
waiting police.
Achieng cradled Baby Pendo in her left arm,
pleading with the police not to beat her with
their batons, especially because of her infant.
But two officers descended on her, beating
her on her left side and striking Baby Pendo
on the head.
Baby Pendo was rushed by her parents to
Aga Khan hospital in Kisumu where she
spent four days in the intensive care unit and
then died.274 A post-mortem report found that
she had suffered a fractured skull. A public
inquest ordered by the Magistrate Court in
Kisumu found that Baby Pendo had indeed
died from injuries sustained from officers
who had broken into her parents’ house while
pursuing residents protesting the outcome of
the presidential election.

See https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/world/africa/kenya-election-results-raila-odinga.html.

274
See https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/nyanza/article/2001251483/kisumu-s-baby-pendo-who-was-hit-by-police-officers-losesfight-for-life-after-five-days-in-coma.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: Blunt force weapons (batons)

IN KISUMU, KENYA, WHERE PRESIDENTIAL, GENERAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS WERE BEING HELD, OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS
WERE MET BY POLICE AS THEY CONTESTED THE RESULTS ON AUGUST 9, 2017. PHOTO BY STINGER | AA

On 14 February 2019, a Magistrate’s Court
found five police officers culpable for
the death of Baby Samantha Pendo.275 In
addition, the court established that under
the doctrine of command responsibility,
the respective commanders failed to take
reasonable measures to prevent the officers’
criminal action. In her ruling, Magistrate
Beryl Omollo placed particular responsibility
on senior officers involved in the policing
of the protests, stating that, “based on the
command responsibility in the National
Police Service, the commanders in charge of
the operations were found liable for the death
of the deceased baby Samantha Pendo.”
The magistrate also recommended charges
against 30 General Service Unit officers from
the Kenya Police Service who were involved in
the operation.276 At the end of 2022, Director
of Public Prosecutions Noordin Haji called for
275

the arrest and prosecution of involved police
officers for crimes against humanity under
“superior/command responsibility” principle
of international law. This could finally lead to
some form of accountability as the officers
(at the time of this report’s publication) had
not been penalised in any way despite the
court’s findings.
According to the Kenya National Commission
on Human Rights, there were 57 fatalities,
including of minors, during the 2017 electionrelated protests in Kenya. None of those
cases has been conclusively investigated.
There is an urgent need for the Kenyan
Government to comprehensively investigate
the multiple incidents in which police used
lethal CCWs against peaceful demonstrators
and bystanders.

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oR3RiW4BAFo&t=4s.

276
Harold Odhiambo, “Baby Pendo: Police officers to be charged,” The Standard, December, 2022. https://www.standardmedia.
co.ke/article/2001459310/at-last-justice-on-the-way-for-baby-pendo

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

NEW
FRONTIERS
“A US MARINE CORPS TRUCK IS SEEN CARRYING A PALLETIZED VERSION OF THE ACTIVE DENIAL SYSTEM, MARCH 9TH, 2012,
AT THE US MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, VIRGINIA.” PAUL J. RICHARDS | AFP/GETTY IMAGES

for policing or military purposes but are now
increasingly being used for crowd control.
The market for CCWs continues to expand and Other weapons are still in development.
evolve. Every year, manufacturers make more
CCWs and develop new ones, increasing the Electronic control devices
likelihood of people being injured or killed
by them. It is not possible to adequately Weapon profile
assess the risk of CCWs developed in secret
until either manufacturers become more An electronic control device (ECD), also
transparent in their testing processes or known as a conducted energy device or
civilians become unwitting guinea pigs in electric shock weapon, refers to any of several
the streets. In this report, we have attempted weapons that use painful electric currents to
to note the technological developments immobilise or deter aggressors.
shaping existing CCWs in the respective
sections describing each weapon type. But Primitive ECDs - cattle prods - gained notoriety
in this section, we highlight novel, emerging after their use in suppressing protests during
technologies being used for crowd control the Civil Rights movement in the United
and attempt to describe the potential risks States during the 1960s.277 In the recent
of these newer weapons. Some of these past, ECDs are occasionally used for crowd
weapons have been available for decades control either during protests278 or during

Overview

277
Lisa Rogers, “Brutal tactics used against area protestors,” The Gadsden Times, April 24, 2003 https://www.gadsdentimes.com/
story/news/2003/04/25/brutal-tactics-used-against-area-protestors/32343966007/.
278
Current Time, “Russian Police Try To End Navalny Rallies With Shock Batons, Beatings, Wide-Sc” https://en.currenttime.tv/a/
russian-police-try-to-end-navalny-rallies-with-tasers-beatings-and-massive-detentions/31079064.html. See, also, https://dailynewshungary.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

sporting events,279 but elsewhere their use is
uncommon outside of carceral settings. ECDs
are extensively used in prisons worldwide,280
both as instruments of individual control and
to suppress mass dissent within the carceral
system. Their increasing appearance on the
streets represents a disconcerting shift in
policing philosophy, wherein a technology of
prisoner control is leveraged against civilians
exercising their basic rights.

hooked barbs that serve as electrodes and
can shock an individual from a distance (the
TASER XREP).281 They may also be capable
of both modes of operation (TASER X26)282
or be part of body-worn electric conduction
devices (such as stun belts or cuffs).283
Newer, wireless, long-range ECDs consist
of projectiles containing electrodes that
are shot from firearms and use a remote
power source.284

There are three main kinds of electric
shock weapons (direct contact weapons,
projectile electric shock weapons, and bodyworn electric shock devices), although only
direct contact and projectile electric shock
weapons are discussed in this report.

If the electrodes are in contact with the
human body, the body completes the
circuit and the current is passed through
the individual, resulting in pain and possibly
electrical injury. They are advertised as
non-lethal because they generate pulses of
very high open-circuit voltages (at times in
excess of 50,000 volts) and very low average
amperages (several milliamperes or less).
However, in practice, closed-circuit voltages
and actually measured amperages can differ
significantly from the values advertised
by manufacturers.285 Furthermore, some
professional-grade ECDs can generate over
ten times the electrical charge per pulse
(typically measured in micro coulombs)

Mechanism of action
ECDs function by passing a high-voltage,
low-amperage
current
between
two
electrodes. These electrodes may be placed
in handheld devices (known as “shock
prods,” “stun guns,” or “shock shields”) that
must be pressed against an individual to take
effect, or they may use compressed air to fire
com/police-shocked-a-demonstrator-in-budapest/.

279
Marc Roseblade, “Zenit St Petersburg Player Tasered by Police After Handing Shirt to Young Fan,” Bleacher Report, June 21,
2011, https://bleacherreport.com/articles/743283-zenit-st-petersburg-player-tasered-by-police-after-handing-shirt-to-young-fan.
280
Omega Research Foundation, “Compliance through Pain: Electric shock equipment in South African prisons,” Institute
for Security Studies, Policy Brief 86, (June 2016): https://omegaresearchfoundation.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Publications/
Compliance%20through%20pain.pdf
281
Circuits Today, “XREP - A Combination of Taser and Shotgun,” Circuits Today, July 6, 2011, https://www.circuitstoday.com/xrep%E2%80%93-a-combination-of-taser-and-shotgun.
282
A note that at the time of the report, Taser discontinued TASER XREP and TASER X26. Giron, Lisa, “More power, more risk and
a quiet exit for Taser’s best-selling product,” Reuters, September 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-taserx26/#:~:text=After%20signs%20of%20the%20outsize,end%2C%20Taser%20abandoned%20the%20effort.
283
Omega Research Foundation, “Visual Guide to Law Enforcement and Security Equipment,” Omega Research Foundation, 2021,
https://omegaresearchfoundation.org/sites/default/files/uploads/uploads/Visual%20Guide%20Final_ENG_0.pdf.
284
See https://www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebb-hireink/zsaru-magazin/rendszerben-a-sokkolo for guidance on
Hungarian police training.
285
U.S. Department of Justice, “Study of Deaths Following Electro Muscular Disruption,” NIJ Special Report NCJ 233432, May 2011,
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/233432.pdf.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

than their commercial counterparts.286 This
electrical charge generated is sufficient
to cause severe pain and involuntary
muscle contractions.

Health effects
Electronic control devices are considered by
law enforcement to cause significant pain
but carry a limited risk of death, but this claim
is controversial.287 Although the risk of death
from electrocution from better-tested models
of ECDs has been shown to be low,288 the use
of ECDs are associated with potentially fatal
injuries,289 and ECDs have been identified as
contributing factors in over 100 in-custody
deaths in the United States.290 291 Repeated
shocks can result in more significant injuries,
as can extended shock durations. Electrical

conduction devices that carry more powerful
electrical charges can also produce more
significant injuries. Cardiac arrhythmias,
muscle damage, and electric burns (both
on the skin and internally) may result from
the electrical conduction itself. There are
numerous case reports of injuries from
ECDs, but few systematic reviews examining
the scope and scale of these injuries. Fatal
and debilitating injuries can also occur
as a result of falls secondary to loss of
neuro-muscular control while the current is
active292 or burns caused by arc ignition of
flammable vapours.293 Barb-style electrodes
are designed to penetrate skin and can result
in serious traumatic injuries, such as skull
penetration294 and enucleation of the eye.295
Wireless long-range ECDs are in effect KIPs,
with experimental studies showing that

286
Lisa Girion, “The X26,” Reuters Investigates, September 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usataser-x26/.
287
Amnesty International, “USA: ‘Less than lethal’? The use of stun weapons in US law enforcement,” Amnesty International,
December 16, 2008, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR51/010/2008/en/.
288
Sebastian N. Kunz et al., “Functioning and Effectiveness of Electronic Control Devices Such as the TASER M- and X-Series: A
Review of the Current Literature,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 57, no. 6 (2012), 1591-1594 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1556-4029.2012.02167.x.
289
Mathieu Pasquier et al., “Electronic Control Device Exposure: A Review of Morbidity and Mortality,” Annals of Emergency
Medicine 58, no. 2 (2011): 178-188 https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0196064411001004.
290
Reuters Staff, “Reuters finds 1,005 deaths in U.S. involving Tasers, largest accounting to date,” Reuters, August 22, 2017, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-axon-taser-toll-idUSKCN1B21AH.
291
Jo Ciavaglia et al., “Lethal force? Tasers are meant to save lives, yet hundreds die after their use by police,” USA Today, April
23, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2021/04/23/police-use-tasers-ends-hundreds-deaths-like-dauntewright/7221153002/.
292
Kroll et al., “Fatal traumatic brain injury with electrical weapon falls,” Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 43 (2016): 12-19
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1752928X16300695.
293
Kroll et al., “Fatal and non-fatal burn injuries with electrical weapons and explosive fumes,” Journal of Forensic and Legal
Medicine 50 (2017): 6-11 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1752928X17300768.
294
Isabelle Le Blanc-Louvry et al., “A brain penetration after Taser injury: Controversies regarding Taser gun safety,” Forensic
Science International 221, no. 1-3 (2012): e7-e11, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0379073812001521.
295
Leon Rafailov et al., “Impaled Orbital TASER Probe Injury Requiring Primary Enucleation,” Ophthalmic Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgery 33, no. 3S (2017): S176-177, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0379073812001521.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

malfunctioning wireless ECDs can penetrate TASER-branded products (produced by Axon
the human body.296
Enterprise, Inc). The conclusions drawn by
these studies cannot be applied to weapons
So-called “shock shields” or “e-shields”– produced by other manufacturers, which
polycarbonate shields embedded with metal may use different electrical parameters,
conductors designed to deliver electric pulse durations, and delivery systems.302 Of
shocks–have been carried by riot police in note, as ECDs were marketed and their use
India297 and in the United States.298 Shock increased in the 1990s, research on and use
shields are commonly used by prison of kinetic impact projectiles is thought to have
guards in the United States299 and South concurrently dropped. But as more research
Africa.300 They have been implicated in at on the dangers of ECDs has emerged, the
least one death–a corrections officer who manufacture, research into, and use of kinetic
suffered cardiac arrest after being subjected impact projectiles have once again risen.
to compulsory training shocks from an
e-shield.301 The amount of electrical charge Directed energy weapons
permitted in these weapons is not public
information and therefore challenging Active Denial System (ADS)
to measure.
As ECDs proliferate throughout the world, their
risk is amplified. The lack of manufacturing
transparency and regulation limits the
ability of health workers and advocates to
understand the quality and range of these
weapons. A large number of the experimental
and retrospective scientific studies found
in this review were funded by and describe

The previous version of this report described
the Active Denial System (ADS), a “heat ray”
developed by the United States Department
of Defense. This vehicle-mounted device
would direct millimetre-wave energy
towards a crowd, heating the epidermis and
generating radiation burns on the surface of
the body of those it hit. To date no operational
uses of this weapon have been recorded, in

296
Scott R. Lucas, et al., “Assessment of the TASER XREP Blunt Impact and Penetration Injury Potential Using Cadaveric Testing,”
Journal of Forensic Sciences 58, no. s1 (2013): S60-S68, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2012.02298.x.
297
Express News Service, “Delhi: Shield that emits shock new part of force’s anti-riot gear,” The Indian Express, December 28,
2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/shield-that-emits-shock-new-part-of-rapid-action-forces-anti-riot-gear-6188184/.
298
WREG Web, “Here’s the story behind those electrified ‘e-shields’ authorities were carrying during Memphis protests,” Fox40
News, September 26, 2020, https://fox40.com/news/national-and-world-news/heres-the-story-behind-those-electrified-e-shieldsauthorities-were-carrying-during-memphis-protests/.
299
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Corrections, “Report of Subcommittee on Conditions of Confinement
on the Use of Stun Shields by the New York City Department of Correction,” New York City Bar Association, 2001, https://www.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/stun%20shield%20report.pdf.
300
David Bruce, “The use of less-lethal weapons in South African prisons and crowd management,” Institute for Security Studies
Monograph 201, November 2019, https://media.africaportal.org/documents/The_use_of_less_lethal_weapons_in_SA_prisons.pdf.
301
Anne-Marie Cusac, “Stunning Technology,” The Progressive Magazine, July 1, 1996 https://progressive.org/magazine/stunningtechnology-cusac/.
302
Christos Baliatsas et al., “Human Health Risks of Conducted Electrical Weapon Exposure:
A Systematic Review,” JAMA Network Open, 2021, vol. 4, no. 2, e2037209, doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.37209.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

spite of requests by US military police to use
it against protesters,303 and requests by US
Customs and Border Patrol to use it against
migrants.304 There are several reasons for
the reluctance to deploy the Active Denial
System. These include safety concerns,
ethical and human rights considerations,
as well as practical concerns–such as the
weapon’s weight and long warm-up time.305

available on injuries to Iraqi civilians, the
introduction of high-powered laser dazzlers
was associated with a spike in accidental
exposures to soldiers, including 45 injuries
and one case of permanent blinding.308

Newer devices under development blur the
lines between directed energy weapons,
distraction devices, and acoustic weapons.
The US Department of Defense continues to
invest in research and development of “laserOther directed energy weapons
induced plasma effect” (LIPE) weapons.
The laser “dazzler,” also known as the LIPE weapons use high-energy pulsed laser
“blinding laser” or “blinding dazzler,” uses beams to produce and manipulate a cloud of
intense, directed radiation to temporarily plasma. Prototypes allow for effects including
disorient individuals with (purportedly superheating a surface, creating a series
temporary) blindness from very bright laser of loud explosions, or transmitting spoken
lights. Dazzlers have been quietly deployed instructions over long distances.309
by the United States military in Iraq as a lesslethal option to “deter non-combatants” in Remotely-operated vehicles (drones)
conflict settings.306 These devices–largely
class 3B green lasers–were used as signalling Weapon profile
or deterrent devices at checkpoints,307 similar
to acoustic weapons such as the LRAD. Remotely-operated vehicles (ROVs) have
They are designed to be flashed at vehicles been increasingly used over the six years
or individuals to draw attention, warn off, since our previous report, both to provide
or disorient/distract. Although no data are
303
Dina Temple-Raston, “Military Confirms It Sought Information on Using ‘Heat Ray’ Against D.C. Protesters,” NPR, September 16,
2020 https://www.npr.org/2020/09/16/913748800/military-police-leaders-weighed-deploying-heat-ray-against-d-c-protesters.
304
Sebastien Roblin, “Border Patrol Officials Proposed Using Pain-Inducing Heat Ray On Migrants. Here’s Why The U.S. Hasn’t Used
It – Yet,” Forbes, August 27, 2020 https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/08/27/customs-and-border-patrol-proposed-usingpain-inducing-active-denial-heat-ray-on-border-migrants/?sh=2ffbdf1b7457.
305
Tim Elfrink, “Safety and ethics worries sidelined a ‘heat ray’ for years. The feds asked about using it on protesters,” The
Washington Post, September 17, 2020 https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/09/17/heat-ray-protesters-trump-dc/.
306
Jeff Hecht, “PHOTONIC FRONTIERS: NONLETHAL LASERS: Nonlethal lasers deter attacks and warn away noncombatants,”
Laser Focus World, 01 April 2013, https://www.laserfocusworld.com/lasers-sources/article/16556977/photonic-frontiers-nonlethallasers-nonlethal-lasers-deter-attacks-and-warn-away-noncombatants.
307
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, “Non-Lethal Optical Distracters Fact Sheet,” May 2016, https://jnlwp.defense.gov/
Portals/50/Documents/Press_Room/Fact_Sheets/NL_Optical_Distracters_Fact_Sheet_May_2016.pdf.
308
Jennifer H. Svan Heath Druzin, “Military sees rise in eye injuries from lasers,” Stars and Stripes, June 14, 2009, https://www.
stripes.com/news/military-sees-rise-in-eye-injuries-from-lasers-1.92467.
309
David Hambling, “The Secret History of Plasma Weapons,” Popular Mechanics, November 14, 2018, https://www.
popularmechanics.com/military/research/a25091957/plasma-weapon-history/.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

-,.'.
IMAGE LEFT: A POLICE OFFICER USES A TASER STUN GUN ON AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTOR JUST OUTSIDE THE MEDIA
CENTER FOR JOURNALISTS COVERING EVENTS RELATED TO WORLD YOUTH DAY, ON THE COPACABANA BEACHFRONT, IN RIO
DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL, FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2013. VICTOR R. CAIVANO | AP PHOTO. IMAGE RIGHT: AN ISRAELI DRONE DROPS GAS
CANISTERS ON PALESTINIAN PROTESTERS DURING A DEMONSTRATION AT THE DCO CHECKPOINT NEAR RAMALLAH, WEST
BANK, PALESTINE. 30 JANUARY, 2020. PHOTO: OREN ZIV

surveillance and to carry and fire CCWs.310
The use of ROVs to deploy surveillance
technologies
against
protests
and
311
protesters has increased sharply in recent
years to the point that in many countries, it is
now a routine element of law enforcement’s
response to demonstrations.312 This raises
concerns about ROVs being used to create
a chilling effect on civil activism and infringe
on the right to privacy of protesters and
bystanders.313 There was a consensus among
the interviewed INCLO-affiliated civil liberties
experts that the use of drone technology is
the most concerning CCW development in
the past five years. One expert noted that

drones are “regularly used in large cities
for surveillance. We can’t confirm, but we
speculate they are used for facial recognition
because people are detained several days
later after a rally.” Another noted, “They are
always watching.”
The increased use of ROVs with the capacity
or express design to be used as dispersal
mechanisms raises many concerns,
including potential violation of privacy rights
and the possible indiscriminate use of CCWs
fired from ROVs. An additional, less obvious
concern is the potential reduction in the
number of police physically present in crowd-

310
Omega Research Foundation, “Tear Gassing by Remote Control: The development and promotion of remotely operated means of
delivering or dispersing riot control agents,” Omega Research Foundation, December 2015, https://omegaresearchfoundation.org/sites/
default/files/uploads/Publications/Tear%20Gassing%20By%20Remote%20Control%20Report.pdf.
311

INCLO, “Spying on Dissent”, June 2019, accessible at: https://www.inclo.net/pdf/spying-on-dissent-report.pdf.

312

From interviews with civil liberties experts, October 2021 to March 2022.

313

General Comment No 37 below n 353 at para 10.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

The first confirmed operational use of UAVs during
demonstrations was by Israeli security forces, who have used them
to drop tear gas grenades on protesters in the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank, and Jerusalem.
control situations, with officers replaced by
ROVs.314 The judicious use of force is heavily
dependent upon police judgement in these
complex and dynamic settings. The removal
of vital scene-specific context through the
use of ROVs may lead to greater use of
unnecessary or disproportionate force, likely
with no feedback on the consequences of
this use of force.315

Mechanism of action
ROVS include unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs, or “drones”). Since the mid-2010s,
UAVs have possessed operational capabilities
with clear application to crowd control, such
as the capacity to fire CCWs,316 OC spray,317
and tasers.318 There are also land-based,
remotelyoperated vehicles that have not been

used in crowd-control settings. Israel has
demonstrated their capability to drop “skunk
water” from UAVs,319 while South Africa has
also pioneered the development of weapons
for use on UAVs, including grenade delivery
systems320 and pepper-ball guns.321
Although the deployment of CCW drones
has only been confirmed in Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories at the date
of this report, there has been an increase
in countries procuring these types of
ROVs. In 2015, police in the Indian city of
Lucknow announced they had acquired five
pepper-spraying drones for crowd-control
purposes.322 In 2021, media reported that
the Rapid Action Force, a wing of India’s
Central Reserve Police Force specialised
in crowd control, would deploy a suite of
surveillance drones and at least one drone

314
Jay Stanley, “Five Reasons Armed Domestic Drones Are a Terrible Idea,” ACLU, August 27, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/blog/
privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/five-reasons-armed-domestic-drones-are-terrible.
315
Christian Enemark, “Armed Drones and Ethical Policing: Risk, Perception, and the Tele-Present Officer,” Criminal Justice Ethics
40, no. 2 (2021): 124-144 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0731129X.2021.1943844.
316

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GafJexL9SjA&t=226s.

317
BBC, “India: City police to use pepper-spray drones,” BBC, April 7, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-fromelsewhere-32202466.
318
Sam Biddle, “Startup Pitched Tasing Migrants From Drones, Video Reveals,” The Intercept, December 13, 2021, https://
theintercept.com/2021/12/13/brinc-startup-taser-drones-migrants/.
319

See https://twitter.com/MoDIsrael/status/996735837541777408.

320
pdf.

“Skunk Riot Copter,” Desert Wolf, https://ezone.idexuae.ae/storage/brochures/sdZtdPs512ER9vkcK7cfTicjPzwUSKcjaLh4dHkH.

321
Guy Martin, “Desert Wolf adding grenades to Skunk riot control UAV,” defenceWeb, October 7, 2015, https://www.defenceweb.
co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/desert-wolf-adding-grenades-to-skunk-riot-control-uav/.
322
The Guardian, ‘Pepper-spraying drones could be used on unruly crowds by Indian police’, 8 April 2015, available here: https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/08/pepper-spraying-drones-could-be-used-on-unruly-crowds-by-indian-police.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

capable of deploying tear gas during farmers’
protests in New Delhi.323 In the United
States, local law enforcement agencies have
expressed interest in equipping drones with
CCWs. In 2011, Texas media reported that
a county sheriff’s department outside the
city of Houston had acquired a $300,000
ShadowHawk drone that, according to the
manufacturer, includes capabilities to fire
lethal and “less-lethal” weapons. In 2015, the
state of North Dakota passed a bill permitting
law enforcement drones to be equipped
with “less than lethal” weapons (though the
bill prohibits law-enforcement drones being
equipped with lethal weaponry).324
The first confirmed operational use of UAVs
during demonstrations was by Israeli security
forces, who have used them to drop tear gas
grenades on protesters in the Gaza Strip,325
the West Bank,326 and Jerusalem.327 Within
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, at least
three types of drones deployed CCWs during
sustained protests and conflict at the Gaza
border in 2018. These include the Cyclone,
which carries a set of light-weight aluminium
cartridges that burn up after release; another

model that sprays gas directly from the craft,
like an aerosol; and a third that drops “rubber
bursting grenades with metal tops that
disperse gas as they fall.”328
The latest development for remotely operated
crowd control technologies is a remoteoperated shooter that was installed at a
checkpoint in the West Bank city of Hebron/
Al-Khalil in September 2022.329 The system
placed in Hebron/Al-Khalil was apparently
created by “Smart Shooter”, an Israeli
company that designs fire control systems
that follow and lock in on targets using image
processing based on artificial intelligence.330
Although the Israeli army has said that it plans
to only use sponge bullets in the pilot phase,
this technology is capable of firing different
kinds of projectiles, including stun grenades
and chemical irritants.

Health concerns
Health concerns related to drone-deployed
CCWs are directly linked to the type of weapon
deployed and its impacts (as described

323
India Today TV, ‘Farmer’s tractor rally on Republic Day: RAF deploys anti-riot drone’, 21 January 2021, available here: https://www.
indiatoday.in/india/story/farmer-s-tractor-rally-on-republic-day-raf-deploys-anti-riot-drone-1761481-2021-01-21.
324
The Daily Beast, ‘First state legalises taser drones for cops, thanks to a lobbyist’, 26 August 2015, available here: https://www.
thedailybeast.com/first-state-legalizes-taser-drones-for-cops-thanks-to-a-lobbyist.
325
Daniel Hilton, “Drones over Gaza: How Israel tested its latest technology on protesters,” Middle East Eye, May 18, 2018, https://
www.middleeasteye.net/news/drones-over-gaza-how-israel-tested-its-latest-technology-protesters.
326
Josh Breiner, “Israel Using Drones to Tear Gas Palestinian Demonstrators in West Bank,” Haaretz, April 28, 2021, https://www.
haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-police-using-drones-to-drop-tear-gas-on-palestinian-demonstrators-1.9752997.
327
Josh Breiner et al., “Israel Police Use Drone to Fire Tear Gas Grenades in Temple Mount Clashes,” Haaretz, 22 April 2022, https://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-04-22/ty-article/.premium/israel-police-use-drone-to-fire-tear-gas-grenades-in-temple-mountclashes/00000180-655f-d5ca-a986-7f7fa1ad0000.
328
The Middle East Eye, ‘Drones over Gaza: How Israel tested its latest technology on protesters’, 18 May 2018, available here:
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/drones-over-gaza-how-israel-tested-its-latest-technology-protesters.
329
Hagar Shefaz, “Israeli Army Installs Remote-control Crowd Dispersal System at Hebron Flashpoint, “ Haaretz, September 23,
2022, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-09-24/ty-article/.premium/israeli-army-installs-remote-control-crowd-dispersal-systemat-hebron-flashpoint/00000183-70c4-d4b1-a197-ffcfb24f0000.
330

Smart Shooter website at https://www.smart-shooter.com/.

119

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

above). The utilisation of drones for weapon
deployment may carry additional risks
secondary to the lack of in-person monitoring,
the height from which weapons are deployed,
and changes in force or targeting from these
weapons. There are concerns about the
increased force of chemical irritant canisters
that fall from great heights. Moreover, they
may fall on protesters with no warning. These
weapons may be far more indiscriminate
in their deployment as visual feedback
loops around the demonstration site will be
limited. De-escalation could be rendered
impossible if there are no officers with whom
protesters can seek to communicate, and
there could be challenges in allowing for the
safe dispersal of demonstrators if airborne
drones outmanoeuvre demonstrators. These
concerns make the growing sale and early use
of drone technology deeply concerning both
from a health and human rights perspective.
Beyond any weaponry they may carry, drones
themselves are increasingly causing injuries.
They can cause injuries because of their
function and mechanism: they can operate
too close to the ground or hit objects and

fall. Additionally, their rotating blades, sharp
edges, metallic and plastic parts, and rapid
and unpredictable movements can injure
both users and others in the vicinity. News
and social media reports describe numerous
injuries from drones: children, bystanders,
and others have all been struck, leaving some
with head trauma and others with permanent
disability. A 2021 review of emergency
department visits in the United States
between 2015 and 2020 identified more
than 3,700 drone-related injuries. The most
common injury diagnoses were lacerations
(72%), followed by contusion/abrasion
(10%), strain/sprain (5%), and internal injury
(5%). The most frequently injured body
parts were upper extremities (mostly fingers
[56%]), head (24%), lower extremities (14%),
and trunk (6%). Hearing injuries have been
reported as well. The US National Electronic
Injury Surveillance System recommends
avoiding injuries by taking care where the
drone is flown and not flying a drone over a
crowd, among other precautions.

IMAGE BELOW: ISRAELI TROOPS FIRE TEAR-GAS AT PALESTINIAN PROTESTERS DURING CLASHES AFTER PROTESTS NEAR THE
BORDER WITH ISRAEL IN THE EAST OF JABALIYA IN THE NORTHERN GAZA STRIP, 14 MAY 2018. 51 PALESTINIANS PROTESTERS
WERE KILLED AND MORE THAN 2000 OTHERS WERE INJURED DURING THE CLASHES ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN ISRAEL
AND GAZA STRIP. NIDAL ALWAHEIDI | PACIFIC PRESS/LIGHTROCKET VIA GETTY IMAGES

120

Following its use against protesters in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Israeli
police used drone-deployed tear gas for
the first time against Israeli citizens in 2022.
In January 2022, thousands gathered in the
Negev region in southern Israel to protest the
dispossession of Palestinian Bedouin citizens
of Israel.334 The Israeli police dispersed this
demonstration brutally with sponge bullets,
stun grenades, and tear gas launched from
drones. In April and May 2022, the police used
this weapon against Palestinian worshipers
in the El-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in
response to riots inside the mountain
compound. The photos showed crowds of
worshipers, including women, children, and
the elderly,

the 2018 protests in Gaza found that a drone
had dropped tear gas onto a field hospital that
was clearly marked with medical insignia.333

334
Haaretz ‘Bedouin Protest in Jerusalem Demands End of ‘Neglect’ in Israel’s South’ 30 January 2022. available at: https://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-01-30/ty-article/.premium/bedouin-protest-in-jerusalem-demands-end-of-neglect-in-israelssouth/0000017f-e172-df7c-a5ff-e37ac2ae0000.

333
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the independent international Commission of inquiry on the protests
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (A/HRC/40/CRP.2) p 167, 18 March 2019. available here: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/
RegularSessions/Session40/Documents/A_HRC_40_74_CRP2.pdf; Al Jazeera, ‘Israeli forces open fire on Palestinians; hundreds wounded
‘, 9 July 2021, available here: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/9/israel-forces-open-fire-on-palestinians-hundreds-wounded.

332
The Middle East Eye, ‘Drones over Gaza: How Israel tested its latest technology on protesters’, 18 May 2018, available here:
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/drones-over-gaza-how-israel-tested-its-latest-technology-protesters.

331
The Times of Israel, ‘Israel deploys drones to drop tear gas on Gaza protesters,’ 31 March 2018, available here: https://www.
timesofisrael.com/israel-deploys-drones-to-drop-tear-gas-on-gaza-protesters/.

The first widespread use of this weapon
was in 2018 during the weekly Gaza border
protests. Along with firing live ammunition
that led to the killing of about 200 Palestinian
protesters and the injury of thousands,
drones were used to fire tear gas canisters
indiscriminately at the protesters, with
no distinction made between peaceful
protesters, including children and elderly, and
violent ones.331 One foreign correspondent
reported seeing a drone dropping tear gas
about 500 metres beyond the Gaza border,
above a communal tent occupied by women
and children who were not engaged in
protest.332 The UN Commission of Inquiry into

Many CCWs used by the police within Israel
have previously been tried by the military
against the Palestinian population in the
Occupied Territories. This was the case with
sponge bullets and skunk water, and so it was
with the use of tear gas fired from drones.
The police “imported” this weapon in 2022
for use inside Israel after it had been used in
the Occupied Territories since 2018.

Gaza and Israel

The first use of drone-deployed CCWs

Case study

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

C>

121

Lethal in Disguise 2 - Crowd-control weapons and their impacts: New frontiers

PALESTINIANS CLASH WITH ISRAELI FORCES FROM ACROSS THE BORDER FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION, EAST OF RAFAH IN
THE SOUTHERN GAZA STRIP, ON SEPTEMBER 6, 2019. ABED RAHIM KHATIB | SIPA USA VIA AP IMAGES

fleeing in all directions while multiple tear is a weapon that is inherently inaccurate,
gas capsules were falling onto them from and it is doubtful whether it can be used
a drone.
proportionately. Another concern is that the
capsules may fall directly onto protesters’
The tear gas-carrying drone includes a heads or into their eyes. Especially when
camera and can carry multiple capsules and several capsules are used at the same time,
fire them all together or individually. Israeli the chance of harming peaceful protesters
security forces purchase the system from is very high. Finally, the aerial deployment of
two Israeli companies: the gas capsules from tear gas risks sowing confusion and chaos
ISPRA by E.I LTD and the system that fires the among crowds rather than fostering an
orderly dispersal.335
capsules from SPECRYS LTD.
This is a new weapon whose risks are
still unclear. It is clear, however, that this

335
The Middle East Eye, ‘Drones over Gaza: How Israel tested its latest technology on protesters’, (18 May 2018), accessible here:
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/drones-over-gaza-how-israel-tested-its-latest-technology-protesters.

122

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

Section 3

LAWS AND STANDARDS ON
THE USE OF FORCE AND
CROWD-CONTROL WEAPONS
NEW DELHI, INDIA-JAN 14 2020: MUSLIM WOMEN PROTEST THE CAA ACT DURING A SIT IN. PRADEEP GAURS | SHUTTERSTOCK

Overview

restricting the application of these rights in
real-world protest contexts.

Over the six years since the publication of
LiD1, there has been a rapid development
of international and regional laws and
standards relating to the protection and
promotion of assembly, association and
free expression rights. These include new
international laws and standards regulating
the development, testing, trade, use and
misuse of CCWs. Underpinned by existing,
binding international instruments, these new
laws and standards strengthen assembly,
association and free expression rights, as
well as rules on the use of CCWs in protest
contexts. However, the implementation and
adoption of these new laws and standards at
the nationallevel have been limited, severely

The most notable legal developments
include the 2020 UN Guidance on LLWs,336
which INCLO and PHR helped inform.337 It
provides detailed guidance on the principles
concerning the lawful use of LLWs in policing,
prohibitions on the use of certain LLWs,
and instructions on the lawful deployment
of LLWs in both protest and custodial
settings. In addition, the UN Human Rights
Committee–an authoritative body of legal
experts mandated to monitor implementation
of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)–has produced
two General Comments which, alongside
various UN Human Rights Resolutions338 and

336

See above n 6.

337
The UN Guidance on LLWs and other groups use the term less-lethal weapons (LLWs) while our report uses the term crowdcontrol weapons (CCWs). Our report uses the term CCW to avoid suggesting that these weapons are not dangerous. Lethality is based not
only on the weapon profile but on how it is used. A more objective term in this sense is CCWs, as it covers all weapons used in assemblies. In
the context of this section, and where necessary, we use LLW as that is the term the UN uses. In practice, they can be used interchangeably.
338

See, for example, UNHRC Res. 25/38 (2014) and UNHRC Res. 38/11 (2018).

123

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

regional standards, give further guidance to
states and law enforcement on the assembly,
association and free expression rights of
protesters, and the lawful use of LLWs.

supporting the development of a treaty to
limit trade in the “tools of torture”–and ensure
the domestication of these standards in
order to bring meaningful change at the local
and national levels, advance and develop
Despite this expansion of international assembly, association and free expression
legal standards, there is limited evidence rights, and foster a culture of participation
of the implementation of these standards and dissent in democratic spaces.
at the national level. Resultantly, consistent
violations of human rights and civil liberties
in protest contexts stubbornly persist and,
in some instances, have increased over the
In the context of CCWs, the internationally
past six years. There is no question that
recognised right to life and the right to
standard-setting at the international and
freedom from torture or ill-treatment play
regional levels is critically important. Equally
foundational roles in the development of
essential, however, are local and national
instruments that regulate the use of force and
standard-setting efforts and the revision of
CCWs, as do assembly, association, and free
policies, operational protocols, and training
expression rights contained in international
manuals for law enforcement officials to
conventions and treaties. They do so by
bring them in line with prevailing international
placing an obligation on law enforcement
norms. Monitoring and reporting on, and
officials to respect and protect life during their
accountability for, the use of CCWs by law
operations and to respect, protect, and fulfil
enforcement officials remains a key area
assembly, association and free expression
of concern, despite clear international law
rights.
guidance on the need to ensure oversight
over policing operations in protest contexts.
The right to life is recognised in article 6(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and
Policy-makers, civil rights activists, and
Political Rights (ICCPR),340 among other
protesters must continue to work tirelessly to
treaties.341 The right to freedom from torture
advocate for stronger laws and standards at
or ill-treatment is recognised in article 7 of
the international level–including advocating
the ICCPR, and it is further expounded upon
for amending the Chemical Weapons
in the Convention Against Torture and Other
Convention339 to ban the use of chemical
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
weapons against civilian populations and

International human rights law

339
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), (3 September 1992), accessible at: https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpdpsucw/cpdpsucw.html.
340
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (16 December 1966), accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
341
See, among others, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ( 27 June 1981), accessible at https://achpr.au.int/en/
charter/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights.

124

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

Punishment (CAT).342 In addition, the ICCPR,
which constitutes binding international law
on state parties, guarantees the rights to
expression, assembly, and association in
articles 19, 21, and 22.343 These rights are
equally provided for in binding regional
treaties and place an obligation on law
enforcement agencies to protect life and
prohibit the excessive use of force during their
operations.344 Additional instruments, like the
UN Guidance on LLWs, expand on this duty
by regulating the use of force and CCWs.

foreseeable and preventable life-terminating
harm or injury, caused by either an act or
omission, and that the deprivation of life
goes beyond injury or threats to bodily or
mental integrity.346 The obligation on states
also extends to reasonably foreseeable lifethreatening situations, including in protest
contexts, even if those threats do not actually
lead to a loss of life.347

The General Comment notes that any
potentially lethal use of force for law
enforcement purposes is an extreme
measure that should be resorted to only
UN Human Rights Committee
when strictly necessary in order to protect life
General Comment No 36
or prevent serious injury from an imminent
348
States are expected to take all
In 2018, the UN Human Rights Committee threat.
published General Comment No 36,345 which necessary measures to prevent arbitrary
elaborates on the right to life in the ICCPR. deprivation of life by their law enforcement
General Comments constitute the treaty officials, including soldiers charged with law
body’s authoritative interpretation of its enforcement missions. These preventative
respective human rights treaty provisions and measures include:
are intended to give expert guidance on the
› Appropriate legislation controlling the
fundamental rights contained in the ICCPR
use of lethal force by law enforcement
and other binding international treaties.
officials.
General Comment No 36 states that the
deprivation of life should be interpreted
broadly to include intentional or otherwise

›

Procedures designed to ensure that
law enforcement actions are adequately
planned in a manner consistent with

342
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; (10 December 1984), accessible
at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx.
343

See above n 340.

344
Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, Overview of Global and Regional Human Rights Standards on the Police Use of
Force, (20 May 2020), accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/general-comment-no-36-article-6-right-life.
345
General Comment No 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, adopted
by the Human Rights Committee (General Comment No 36), accessible at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20
Documents/1_Global/CCPR_C_GC_36_8785_E.pdf).
346

Id at para 6.

347

Id at para 7.

348

Id at para 12.

125

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

the need to minimise the risk they pose
to human life.

›

Mandatory reporting, review and
investigation of lethal incidents
and other life-threatening incidents
and supplying officials responsible
for the management of assemblies
with effective, less-lethal means and
adequate protective equipment in
order to obviate their need to resort to
lethal force.349

In particular, the General Comment reaffirms
that all operations of law enforcement officials
should comply with relevant international
standards, including the UN Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officials350 (UN Code of
Conduct) and the UN Basic Principles.351 By
way of key principles, the General Comment
provides that:

›

349

States engaged in the deployment, use,
sale, or purchase of existing CCWs and
in the study, development, acquisition,
or adoption of these weapons must
always consider their impact on the
right to life.352

›

CCWs must be subject to strict
independent testing and evaluation
in order to monitor their impact on the
right to life353

›

CCWs must be restricted to law
enforcement officials who have
undergone appropriate training and
must be strictly regulated in accordance
with applicable international standards,
including the UN Basic Principles.354

›

CCWs must be employed only subject
to strict requirements of necessity and
proportionality, in situations in which
other less harmful measures have
proven to be or clearly are ineffective.355

›

States should not resort to CCWs in
situations of crowd control that can
be addressed through less harmful
means, especially situations involving
the exercise of the right to peaceful
protest.356

» Non-state

actors, such as
privately-hired security officers,
empowered or authorized by
the state to employ force with
potentially lethal consequences

Id at para 13.

350
United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December
1979 available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/lawenforcementofficials.aspx#:~:text=Law%20enforcement%20
officials%20shall%20at,responsibility%20required%20by%20their%20profession.

126

351

See above n 8.

352

Id at para 65.

353

Id at para 14.

354

Id.

355

Id.

356

Id.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

are equally subject to the dictates The General Comment directly addresses
of the General Comment.357
the issue of police use of force in the context
of assemblies stating that:
› States must investigate and prosecute
unlawful deprivations of life, such as
All law enforcement officials
allegations of excessive use of force
responsible for policing assemblies
with lethal consequences and the use
must be suitably equipped,
358
of live fire against protesters.
including where needed with
appropriate and fit-for-purpose
less-lethal weapons and protective
UN Human Rights Committee
equipment. States parties must
General Comment No 37
ensure that all weapons, including
less-lethal weapons, are subject to
In 2020, the UN Human Rights Committee
strict independent testing, and that
produced General Comment No 37, which
officers deployed with them receive
elaborates on the right to peaceful assembly
specific training, and must evaluate
in the ICCPR.359 It states that the right to
and monitor the impact of weapons
peaceful assembly is important in its own
on the rights of those affected.361
right. It also constitutes the foundation of
participatory and democratic systems, and
it is a tool to recognise many other rights.
It constitutes an individual right that is
exercised collectively.360 Inherent in the right
is an associative element but the right applies
to individuals, and law enforcement officials
must be cautious about viewing individual
protesters as a group.

357

Id at para 15.

358

Id at paras 27 and 29.

The General Comment also states that “law
enforcement agencies must be alert to the
potentially discriminatory impacts of certain
policing tactics, including in the context
of new technologies, and must address
them.”362 In general terms, General Comment
37 follows the principles stated in the UN
Guidance on LLWs, which is discussed
further below.

359
General Comment No 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly (article 21), adopted by the Human Rights Committee (General
Comment No 37), accessible at: https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=CCPR/C/GC/37&Lang=E.
360

Id at paras 1-2.

361

Id at para 81.

362

Id.

127

128

L Buchanan, Q Bui and JK Patel, “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” The New York Times, (3 July

366
T Thomas, A Gabbat and C Bar, “Nearly 1,000 Instances of Police Brutality Recorded in US Anti-Racism Protest,” The Guardian,
(20 October 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/29/us-police-brutality-protest.

365
M Kelly, J Sohyun Lee and J Swaine, “Partially Blinded by Police,” The Washington Post, (14 July 2020), accessible at: https://www.
washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/07/14/george-floyd-protests-police-blinding/.

364
L Szabo, J Hancock, K McCoy, D Slack and D Wagner, “Fractured Skulls, Lost Eyes: Police Break Their Own Rules When
Shooting Protesters With ‘Rubber Bullets’,” USA Today News, (19 June 2020), accessible at: https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/
nation/2020/06/19/police-break-rules-shooting-protesters-rubber-bullets-less-lethal-projectiles/3211421001/.

2020), accessible at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html.

363

The murder of George Floyd on 25 May 2020,
after a Minneapolis police officer kneeled
on his neck for 9 minutes and 29 seconds,
sparked nationwide protests against police
brutality. In June 2020, about 15 to 26 million
people participated in BLM protests, making
it one of the largest protest movements in
US history.363

protests that followed the murder of George
Floyd.366 These instances are symptomatic of
the differentiated police response to those
protesting racism and police brutality and
illustrate the disproportionate impact of the
violent policing on people of African descent
and other people of colour. Moreover, while
covering these protests, journalists became
targets for assault and arrest by police
Law enforcement agencies indiscriminately officers. The violent and militarized response
deployed CCWs, including KIPs, such as to BLM protesters stood in stark contrast to
foam/sponge bullets, rubber bullets, pepper the largely passive police response to the
balls, beanbag rounds, chalk grenades and violent insurrection by a white supremacists
flashbang grenades against protesters, at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021.
the vast majority of whom were peacefully
assembled. Countless protesters, bystanders Foam/sponge bullets
and journalists sustained critical wounds,
broken bones, traumatic brain injuries and In May 2020, the Minneapolis Police and
even blindness as a result of the projectiles the Minnesota State Patrol tear-gassed,
fired by police.364 In just one day, 30 May peppersprayed, shot in the face with rubber
2020, police partially blinded eight people and foam bullets, arrested without cause, and
threatened journalists at gunpoint, all after
across the country.365
these journalists identified themselves and
There were more than 950 incidents of police were clearly covering BLM protests. Linda
violence against civilians recorded during the Tirado, a freelance photographer, was one of

United States

Police usage of KIPs during summer 2020 Black
Lives Matter protests

Case study

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

0

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

POLICE AND FEDERAL AGENTS USED TEAR GAS, PEPPER BALL, AND RUBBER BULLET WEAPONRY AGAINST PROTESTORS IN
PORTLAND, OREGON, UNITED STATES IN JULY 2020. ANDREW STANBRIDGE | PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

the many people severely injured.367 Despite
being clearly identifiable as a member of the
press, on 29 May 2020, an officer shot a 40mm
impact foam bullet round at her head.368
Tirado was permanently blinded in her left
eye and suffered traumatic brain injury,369
and has undergone multiple eye surgeries
to address ongoing complications.370 As a
result of the attack, Tirado still suffers from
constant headaches, has trouble recalling
words, and uses a walker due to her loss of

depth perception. In June 2020, the ACLU
of Minnesota filed a lawsuit on behalf of
Tirado and other journalists targeted in the
BLM protests371 that resulted in a settlement
agreement which included various policy
changes, including prohibiting the arrest,
threat or use of physical force or chemical
agents against journalists.372

367
L Reyes, “Journalists Blinded, Injured, Arrested Covering George Floyd Protests Nationwide,” USA Today, (31 May 2020),
accessible at: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/31/journalists-blinded-injured-arrested-covering-george-floydprotests/5299374002/.
368
Tirado v City of Minneapolis, 521 F. Supp. 3d 833 (D. Minn. 2021), accessible at: https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/20491477-2021-02-22-memorandum-opinion.
369
T Webster, “Minneapolis Settles Lawsuit With Linda Tirado, Journalist Blinded In One Eye During May 2020 Unrest,” Minnesota
Reformer, (26 May 2022), accessible at: https://minnesotareformer.com/2022/05/26/minneapolis-settles-lawsuit-with-linda-tiradojournalist-blinded-in-one-eye-during-may-2020-unrest/.
370

See above n 362.

371

See https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/cases/jared-goyette-et-al-v-city-minneapolis-et-al.

372
Goyette v City of Minneapolis, 20-CV-1302 (WMW/DTS), 2022 WL 370161 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2022), accessible at: https://www.
aclu-mn.org/en/press-releases/goyettesettlement.

129

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

Rubber bullets and pepper balls

trial, and it also marks the first time that a jury
held a city liable for violating the civil rights
In Denver, Colorado, protesters and of protesters.
bystanders were injured by rubber bullets and
pepper balls deployed by law enforcement. Beanbag rounds
Michael Driscoll filed a civil rights lawsuit
after he was struck in the face with a rubber In Austin Texas, Justin Howell, a 20-year-old
bullet shot by police on 30 May 2020.373 The protester, was severely injured by a beanbag
impact shattered his sinus and fractured round during a protest against police brutality
multiple parts of his face, including the in late-May 2020.375 An officer was allegedly
orbital bone around his left eye. Driscoll was shooting beanbag ammunition at a protester
forced to undergo surgery to reconstruct his who was throwing objects at police, but
skull, which had collapsed between his eyes. instead inadvertently struck Howell in the
Bystander Jax Feldman was struck in the eye middle of his forehead.376 Howell suffered
with a pepper ball launcher when walking from a fractured skull and brain damage.
home near a protest and permanently blinded Police continued to fire beanbag rounds at
volunteer medics and protesters who were
in one eye.374
carrying Howell to safety. Maredith Michael,
In a landmark lawsuit brought by the ACLU a volunteer medic wearing a firefighter shirt
of Colorado and two law firms, a federal jury with a red medical cross sewed on, was shot
held the city of Denver accountable for its in the hands and suffered severe injuries.377
response to the BLM protests and in March Both Michael and Howell sued the city and
2022 awarded $14 million to twelve protesters later reached a settlement.378
injured by rubber and foam bullets, pepper
balls, flash bang grenades, and tear gas while Flash-bang grenades
protesting police violence. The lawsuit was
the first lawsuit in the US challenging the use In Santa Rosa, California, Marqus Martinez
of force by police against protesters to go to was peacefully taking a knee with his hands
in the air when officers began firing tear gas,
373
Driscoll v City of Denver, Case No. 1:21-cv-02866 (25 October 2021), accessible at: https://kdvr.com/wp-content/uploads/
sites/11/2021/10/Driscoll-Complaint-2.pdf.
374
S Towle and B Miller, “Attorneys For Denver Man Shot In Eye By Officers During Protests Call For Criminal Investigation,
Settlement,” Denver7, (15 June 2020), accessible at: https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/attorneys-for-denver-man-shotin-eye-by-officers-during-protests-call-for-criminal-investigation-settlement.
375
J McCullough, “Black Protester Who Was Critically Injured By Police In Protest Is Identified, Student Newspaper Reports,” The
Texas Tribune, (1 June 2020),accessible at: https://www.texastribune.org/2020/06/01/austin-police-george-floyd-mike-ramos/.
376
A Jamieson, “A College Student’s Family Say He Has Brain Damage After Police Shot Him With A Beanbag Round,” Buzzfeed
News (4 June 2020), accessible at: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/amberjamieson/justin-howell-protester-shot-head-policeaustin-beanbag.
377

Id.

378
A Weber, “Austin Oks $850,000 Settlement For Volunteer Medic Shot With ‘Less-Lethal’ Ammunition During Protest,” Austin
Monitor, (6 May 2022), accessible at: https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2022/05/austin-oks-850000-settlement-for-volunteer-medicshot-with-less-lethal-ammunition-during-protest/.

130

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International human rights law

rubber bullets and flash-bang grenades at
protesters. Police hit Martinez in the face
with a flash-bang grenade379 which broke
Martinez’s jaw in multiple locations and split
his upper lip in three places up to his nose.
His teeth also broke off and drove into the
roof of his mouth and through his tongue.380
Martinez still requires numerous surgeries to
repair the extensive damage caused to his
face. The city of Santa Rosa settled a lawsuit
brought by Martinez and four others injured,
agreeing to pay $1.9 million.

Tear gas canisters
In Fort Wayne, Indiana, 21-year-old protester,
Balin Brake, lost his eye after being hit in the
face by a tear gas canister while participating
in a racial justice protest on 30 May, 2020.381
Brake suffered two eyelid lacerations, four
occipital fractures, and permanent loss of
vision and light perception in his right eye.382
The impact completely ruptured Brake’s
eye, which had to be surgically removed and
replaced with a prosthetic eye. Following
the incident, Brake continues to experience
severe headaches, pain where his eye
once was, loss of depth perception and
mental suffering. The lawsuit was settled in
March 2022.383

There were more than 950 incidents of police violence
against civilians recorded during the protests that
followed the murder of George Floyd.

379
K Bryant, “Santa Rosa Police Sued for Brutality Against BLM Protestors,” Top Class Actions, (25 June 2020), accessible at: https://
topclassactions.com/civil-rights/santa-rosa-police-sued-for-brutality-against-blm-protesters/.
380
Martinez v City of Santa Rosa, 2020 WL 9762698 (N.D.Cal.) (23 June 2020), accessible at: https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.
com/2020/06/1-complaint-8.pdf.
381
J Stanton, “Demonstrator, 21, loses an EYE after being struck in the face by a police tear gas canister while peacefully
protesting death of George Floyd in Indiana,” Daily Mail, (31 May 2020), accessible at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8374743/
Demonstrator-21-loses-EYE-struck-face-police-tear-gas-canister.html.
382
Brake v City of Fort Wayne, Case No. 1:20-cv-00345 (2 October 2022), accessible at: https://www.aclu-in.org/sites/default/files/
field_documents/brake_v_ftwayne_-_complaint.pdf.
383
D Rowley, “Settlement Reached Between City Of Fort Wayne And Protester Who Lost Eye,” Wane Local News, (5 March 2022),
accessible at: https://www.wane.com/news/local-news/settlement-reached-between-city-of-fort-wayne-and-protester-who-lost-eye/.

131

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

International standards and
best practices
A series of codes of conduct, basic principles,
and guidelines have also been developed,
which apply directly to questions on the use
of force in protest contexts, including CCWs.

UN Code of Conduct

UN Basic Principles
In addition to the UN Code of Conduct, the
UN Basic Principles,387 adopted in 1990, is
also recognised as one of the foundational
instruments on the use of force. It recognises
the important role that law enforcement
agencies play in the protection of the right
to life, liberty, and security of the person388
and requires that governments adopt and
implement rules concerning the use of force
in domestic law.389 The UN Basic Principles
include specific references to CCWs.

The UN Code of Conduct,384 adopted
by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1979, is recognised as one of the
foundational instruments on the use of force Notably, the UN Basic Principles require
by law enforcement agencies.385 It defines law states to:
enforcement agencies to include all officers of
the law who exercise police powers, including
› Equip law enforcement officials with
military authorities and state security
a variety of different weapons that
forces when exercising police powers, and
allow for a differentiated use of force,
recognises that law enforcement officials
which may include the development
may use force in circumstances where it is
of CCWs.390
strictly necessary–for the prevention of a
crime or to effect a lawful arrest–but its use
› Evaluate the development and
must be exceptional.386 It further requires
deployment of CCWs to mitigate the
that national legislation must be enacted
risk of injury to bystanders and ensure
to ensure compliance with the principle of
that “the use of such weapons should
proportionality which directs that the use of
be carefully controlled.”391
force must be proportionate to its objective.

›

132

384

See above n 350.

385

See above n 345 at 1.

386

Article 2(a), Commentary on the UN Code of Conduct.

387

UN Basic Principles, above n 8.

388

Id at preamble.

389

Id at principle 1.

390

Id at principle 2.

391

Id at principle 3.

Use
non-violent
means
before
resorting to the use of force; the use
of force may only be used if other

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

means are ineffective in achieving the
intended result.392

UN Guidance on LLWs

›

Ensure that when the use of force is
required, restraint is exercised in such
use and officials act in proportion to
the seriousness of the offence and the
legitimate objective to be achieved,
minimise damage and injury, respect
and preserve human life, ensure that
assistance and medical aid are rendered
to any injured or affected persons at the
earliest possible moment, and ensure
that relatives or close friends of the
injured or affected person are notified
at the earliest possible moment.393

›

The primary international law document
on CCWs is the 2020 UN Guidance on
LLWs.397 While technically non-binding, it
was published by the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and was
prepared by an international group of experts.
It was informed by an extended and broad
public participation process carried out
under the auspices of the Geneva Academy
and the University of Pretoria, which
included states, academics and academic
institutions, policing institutions, civil society
organisations and activists.398 INCLO and
PHR were actively involved in this process,
based on our research in LiD1.

Criminalise the arbitrary or abusive use
of force in domestic criminal law.394
As a result, the UN Guidance on LLWs
is highly persuasive and consolidates
Ensure that in the dispersal of protests, the most up-to-date and comprehensive
law enforcement officials avoid the use international thinking on the development,
of force or, where that is not practicable, testing, deployment, use and trade in CCWs.
restrict such force to the minimum It substantially clarifies both the UN Code of
extent necessary395 and that law Conduct and the UN Basic Principles, which,
enforcement officials may use firearms to some extent, lack specificity.
only when less dangerous means are
not practicable and only to the minimum The UN Guidance on LLWs acknowledges
the lack of clear directives concerning the
extent necessary.396
deployment of CCWs in compliance with
human rights law399 and aims to supplement

›

392

Id at principle 4.

393

Id at principle 5.

394

Id at principle 7.

395

Id at principle 13.

396

Id at principle 14.

397

UN Guidance on LLWs, see above n 6.

398
For more information, see Geneva Academy, United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons, accessible at:
https://www.adh-geneve.ch/research/publications/detail/500-united-nations-human-rights-guidance-on-less-lethal-weapons-in-lawenforcement.
399

UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6 at page v..

133

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

existing standards codified in the UN Code of
Conduct and the UN Basic Principles. It does
so by providing guidance on the responsible
and lawful use of CCWs and stipulates the
circumstances under which such weapons
may be deployed. It also goes beyond the
use of CCWs and provides guidance on
their design, production, procurement,
testing and training. It applies to the acts
of all law enforcement officials at all times,
including during counterterrorism activities,
extraterritorially, and during instances of
internal disturbances, including riots and
acts of violence. It also applies to military
personnel when they are acting in the
capacity of law enforcement officials.
Importantly, the UN Guidance on LLWs
recognises the misuse of CCWs and their
potential to inflict serious or lethal harm,
reinforcing some of the recommendations
contained
in
LiD1.
Specifically,
it
acknowledges that killings and torture, which
are serious violations of international law,
have previously been committed by using
CCWs improperly.400 It also notes that CCWs
may be used to reduce the risk of serious
harm in one of two circumstances: either as
a less dangerous alternative to a firearm, or
in a circumstance where the use of force is

134

400

Id at page iii.

401

Id at page 1.

402

Id at principle 2.1.

403

Id at principle 2.2.

404

Id at principle 2.3.

405

Id at principle 2.4.

406

Id.

407

Id.

necessary but the use of a firearm would not
be lawful.401

The “six principles”
The UN Guidance on LLWs reaffirms the
principle that all law enforcement officials
must respect and protect fundamental
human rights, particularly in circumstances
that may require the use of force.402 It provides
that force may only be used as a last resort,
after using nonviolent means, and only if
alternative measures appear ineffective.403
Any use of force must comply with the
principles of legality, precaution, necessity,
proportionality, nondiscrimination and
accountability:404

›

Legality: The principle of legality
requires that rules concerning the use
of force must be regulated in domestic
law.405 Law enforcement officials must
act in compliance with such laws and
the use of force may only be justified
when it is used in pursuit of a legitimate
objective.406 Importantly, it provides that
the use of force must never be used
punitively.407 The Guidance mandates
that only authorized CCWs and related
equipment can be used under specific
conditions and that domestic laws must

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

and absolutely necessary in order to
achieve a legitimate law enforcement
objective.411 Necessity requires that
no reasonable alternative to the use of
force exists. The principle places an
obligation on law enforcement officials
to deescalate situations and to seek a
peaceful resolution where possible.
Further, the principle directs that in
circumstances where the use of force
is necessary, the least amount of force
must be used, and must not persist
beyond what is required.

impose limitations for minimizing the
risk of injury. 408 The principle further
requires that legislative instruments
be sufficiently clear to ensure legal
certainty and they must be widely
published to enable accessibility.

›

›

Precaution: The principle of precaution
requires that the planning and execution
of law enforcement operations should
aim to avoid the use of force and
minimise the severity of injury.409 It
provides that law enforcement officials
should delay contact with protesters
if doing so poses no risk and would
decrease the possibility of requiring
the use of force or violence. The
principle also acknowledges the value
of precautionary measures such as
training and the provision of appropriate
protective equipment and CCWs. It
further requires that due consideration
be accorded to the consequences of
the use of force and CCWs on vulnerable
members of society. The Guidance
considers the following persons to be
vulnerable: “children, pregnant women,
the elderly, persons with disabilities,
persons with mental health problems
and persons under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.”410
Necessity: In terms of the principle of
necessity, law enforcement officials
may only use force when it is strictly

408

Id at principle 2.5

409

Id at principle 2.6.

410

Id at principle 2.7.

411

Id at principle 2.8.

412

Id at principle 2.10.

›

Proportionality: The principle of
proportionality requires that any use
of force and its consequent harm must
be proportionate to the threat posed
by any person or potential offence.
The use of force must not exceed
its intended objective. The principle
further places an obligation on law
enforcement officials to minimise the
potential for their use of force to harm
“bystanders,
passers-by,
medical
412
personnel and journalists.”

›

Non-discrimination: The principle of
non-discrimination places an onus
on law enforcement officials to not
discriminate against any person on
one of the listed grounds. The grounds
are non-exhaustive and include “race,
ethnicity, colour, sex, sexual orientation,
language, religion, political or other

135

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

opinion, national or social origin,
disability, property or birth.”413 To comply
with this principle, law enforcement
officials must exercise a heightened
level of care concerning individuals
who are likely to be more vulnerable to
a particular weapon. Doing so requires
active monitoring of the use of force.

›

136

Accountability: The Guidance reaffirms
the principle that law enforcement
officials must be held accountable
for their actions, which includes
their use of force as well as acts of
omission, i.e., where law enforcement
officials fail to meet their duty to
protect members of the public.414
The Guidance recognises the role
played by additional actors in ensuring
accountability–including members of
the judiciary, civil society and human
rights organisations. Accountability is
enabled through effective monitoring,
reporting and transparency. The
principle also places an obligation on
law enforcement agencies to establish
internal accountability mechanisms
that are effective and independent
and recommends that states establish
an external body that is appropriately
resourced and able to provide an
oversight function.415

413

Id at principle 2.11.

414

Id at principle 3.1.

415

Id.

416

Id at principle 3.3.

417

Id at principle 3.7.

418

Id at principle 3.12.

Notably, the Guidance recommends
that all law enforcement officials
should be identifiable, all weapons
should be marked, the allocation of
weapons should be recorded, and
incidents of the use of force should
be reported.416 Such reporting should
include sufficient detail to determine
whether the use of force complies with
the principles. The Guidance provides
that in the event of death or injury as a
result of CCWs, the incident should be
reported to the officer’s superiors and
a competent authority. Such authority
must be authorised to conduct an
investigation into the instance. If
the outcome of an investigation
concludes that death or injury was
caused unlawfully, states must ensure
that perpetrators are prosecuted and
punished, if found guilty. Every law
enforcement official is responsible
for his or her decision.417 Importantly,
the Guidance provides victims with a
right to a remedy which may include
“compensation, guarantees of nonrepetition, rehabilitation, reparation,
restitution and satisfaction.”418

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

by an independent party to assess the
capability and potential consequences
of the weapon. Testing should be
conducted in accordance with a set of
generally accepted standards and must
consider the impact of the weapon
on vulnerable individuals. Weapons
that do not comply with the principles
outlined in the Guidance should not
be procured.

Additional considerations
The UN Guidance on LLWs provides
further direction concerning the design and
production of CCWs and considerations
on legal review, testing and procurement,
monitoring, transparency and training.
Significantly less detail is provided on
these topics, but the broad principles are
outlined below:

›

›

Design and production: The Guidance
places an obligation on states and
private companies to design and
produce CCWs and equipment
that meets lawful law enforcement
objectives and complies with human
rights law.419 Identified risks must be
communicated to the user, purchaser
and the general public, and there should
be greater transparency concerning
the specifications of the weapon. The
Guidance further notes that the design
and production of CCWs should duly
consider the limitations constraining
the use of force remotely.
Legal review, testing and procurement:
The Guidance directs that before
procuring CCWs, states must conduct
a legal review to determine whether it
would be prohibited by any domestic
or international law, specifically any
provision of human rights law.420 Such a
review should include testing conducted

419

Id at principle 4.1.1.

420

Id at principle 4.2.1.

421

Id at principle 4.3.1.

422

Id at principle 4.4.1.

423

Id at principle 4.5.1.

›

Monitoring: An obligation is placed on
states and law enforcement agencies
to monitor the deployment of CCWs.421
The process should capture the
circumstances of each use and the
details of the people against whom
force is used. It should also include
spotchecks on CCWs. The results
of the monitoring should be made
publicly available.

›

Transparency: The Guidance provides
that states and law enforcement
agencies should be transparent
concerning the use and regulation of
CCWs.422 It further provides that the
anonymity of law enforcement officials
may be protected in some instances,
but it may not justify the non-publication
of data.

›

Training: Training for law enforcement
officials on the use of force is also
prescribed.423 Training should include

137

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

a focus on the applicable human
rights standards and techniques to deescalate situations, including mediation,
communication and identification of
the vulnerabilities of certain groups of
people. The training should be updated
where necessary, and law enforcement
officials should receive periodic
refresher training.

›

Medical assistance: The Guidance
reaffirms the principle that medical
assistance should be provided to
any person as soon as possible and
without discrimination.424 It provides
that law enforcement officials should

424

Id at principle 4.6.1.

425

Id at principle 4.7.1.

be equipped with medical equipment
and should fully cooperate with
medical personnel.

›

Transfer and international cooperation:
Concerning the transfer of CCWs, the
Guidance provides that States shall
regulate export and import of CCWs
and related equipment in line with their
international obligations.425

Case study

Venom launchers, a dangerous new technology
used by police during 2021 social protests
9

Colombia

Between 28 April and 30 June 2021, a
national strike occurred in Colombia. This
strike was called by different sectors and
social movements (trade unions, students,
indigenous people and youth, among others)
because of “public discontent over a tax
reform proposal, the economic and health
crises in the context of COVID-19 and the
increase in massacres and assassinations of

138

social leaders and human rights defenders
from across the country.” The strike was
impactful at the national level and was harshly
repressed by the security forces. Although
Colombian government accounts reported
that the protests were largely peaceful,
official figures recorded 59 protest-related
deaths by the end of May 2021. The Venom
launcher system (Venom) was one of several

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

RIOT POLICE (ESMAD) TRY TO DISBAND DEMONSTRATORS WITH TEAR GAS AND STUNT GRANADES IN PASTO, NARINO ON MAY
26, 2021 AT THE START OF THE 4TH WEEK OF ANTI GOVERNMENT PROTESTS IN COLOMBIA THAT HAVE RESULTED IN AT LEAST
40 DEAD IN POLICE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY CASES AND UNREST. CAMILO ERASSO | LONG VISUAL PRESS/UNIVERSAL IMAGES
GROUP VIA GETTY IMAGES

weapons and equipment used by Colombian and firing directly at protesters rather than
security forces during the policing of the overhead.426 Such use would be expected to
2021 protests.
cause movement of the launcher on firing,
resulting in poor aiming or flat and direct firing
Venom is a multi-tube grenade launcher trajectory. For law enforcement, the Venom
which is either mobile (mounted on a vehicle) 38mm munitions are advertised as having a
or static (placed on the ground). It includes range of between 100 and 160 meters.427
up to 30 tubes (smaller models are available)
that can fire different grenades or canisters Venom is an inaccurate weapon which
(for example, 38mm, 40 mm or 66mm). fires numerous canisters at the same time
The tubes on the launcher are fixed, which or successively in different directions. In
means that while the system can generally addition, the canisters are fired at high velocity
be aimed in a particular direction, the angle to long distances, which turns the canisters
of elevation cannot be altered. Security into KIPs. These features turn Venom into a
forces were documented placing the Venom dangerous weapon that can never comply
system on the ground, holding it by hand, with the principles of legality, precaution,
426
Temblores, Indepaz and PAIIS, “Informe de Temblores, Indepaz y Paiis a la CIDH sobre las violaciones a los derechos humanos
cometidas por la fuerza pública contra la población civil colombiana en el marco del Paro”, (June 2021), accessible at: http://www.derechos.
org/nizkor//////colombia/doc/duque54.html#disparos.
427
Combined Systems Inc, CSI The Less-Lethal Product Source, product catalogue, available at: https://www.combinedsystems.
com/download-our-catalog/.

139

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

and proportionality. Some weapons have no of Venom being placed on the ground and
place in the policing of protest.
held by police officers and fired directly at
protesters. Several reports document similar
As of mid-June, NGOs Temblores, Indepaz instances where Venom was fired directly at
and PAIIS reported that they had recorded crowds, rather than overhead.
28 instances where Venom had been used On 14 May 2021, Sebastián Quintero Múnera,
against protesters. In one instance of use a young protester, was killed during protests
in Bogotá, it was reported that “at least in Popayán. Múnera was allegedly killed by
20 detonations were counted in less than a Venom projectile. At the time of his death,
10 seconds”. Newspaper El Espectador Venom was being used by security forces on
reported multiple uses of Venom, firing the streets of Colombian cities to disperse
both stun grenades and tear gas towards protesters. Its use was suspended by an
protesters in Bogotá. The use was described administrative judge in Popayán in June 2021,
as “flashes and sparks (like missiles), then although only in that city. The suspension is
thunderous explosions, ending in a rain of tear to be maintained until a protocol for its use is
gas that filled the streets” which appeared to developed as “the way it is being used, can
be “heavy artillery” and “indiscriminate”.428 make it lethal”.
Video footage indicated significant numbers
of cartridges being fired in quick succession. Following Múnera’s death, the Inter-America
This type of use may cause panic among Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) called
people in a crowd, risking a stampede, on the Colombian government to respect
which may itself cause injuries, in addition life and human rights, and warned against
to those caused by the impact or effects of the indiscriminate use of CCWs, particularly
noting “anti-riot weapons–like the Venom
the projectiles.
rocket launcher–that have an indiscriminate
Use of Venom in the city of Popayán has been impact on mostly peaceful protests”.429
widely reported. France24 reported that
“security forces fired the grenade launcher There is no evidence that Venom has been
several times at protesters, who [were] permanently retired from its use in Colombian
located less than 80 metres away. Most law enforcement. Use of military-designed
of the protesters [were] sheltered behind weapons, such as Venom, to police protests
shields and barricades.” In a joint report, is indicative of a worrying trend towards
Temblores, Indepaz and PAIIS noted that violently suppressing the right to protest and
one of the incidents in Popayán on 12 May freedom of expression.
2021 was the first clear and recorded use

428
El Espectador, ‘Venom: el arma en la tanqueta del Esmad, que causó pánico en el sur de Bogotá, en el Paro Nacional’, (5 May
2021), accessible at: https://www.elespectador.com/bogota/venom-el-arma-en-la-tanqueta-del-esmad-que-causo-panico-en-el-sur-debogota-en-el-paro-nacional-article/.
429
Organization of American States, “IACHR Condemns Serious Human Rights Violations in the Protest Context in Colombia,
Rejects All Forms of Violence, and Stresses that the State Must Comply with its International Obligations”, ( 25 May 2021), accessible at:
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2021/137.asp.

140

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: International standards and best practices

Sidebar

Manufacture and procurement of Venom
Developed by Combined Systems Inc (CSI),
a US-based company, Venom is described
as “a lightweight, high capacity, non-lethal
grenade launcher”.430 According to CSI’s
marketing materials, Venom “delivers nonlethal flash and sound, smoke obscuration,
irritant and blunt trauma effects”.431 Initially,
Venom was created for use by the United
States Marine Corps, but not used by them.
It has also been used for more than a decade
by the Israeli army in the West Bank.432

reportedly cost the Colombian government
between 400 million and 445 million pesos,
although the precise figure is unclear.434 In
addition to the system itself, the Colombian
government purchased cartridges from CSI
for Venom, including, for example, signing a
745 million pesos contract for stun and tear
gas cartridges.435 In 2020, the Colombian
Ministry of Defense stated that Venom cost
the Colombian government $118,000, with
each launched cartridge valued at $71.436

In Colombia, Combined Systems Inc has
reportedly supplied a range of munitions to
the Colombian “riot control” agency, ESMAD
(Escuadrón Móvil Antidisturbios or the Mobile
Anti-Disturbance Squadron).433 Venom has
430

Combined Systems Inc, Venom, accessible at: https://www.combinedsystems.com/Venom/.

431

Combined Systems Inc, Venom®, accessible at: https://www.combinedsystems.com/Venom/.

432
B’Tselem, “Crowd Control: Israel’s Use of Crowd Control Weapons in the West Bank”, (January 2013) at p 13, accessible at: https://
www.btselem.org/download/201212_crowd_control_eng.pdf.
433
For more information on this relationship and the weapons and equipment in question, see Omega Research Foundation,
“Tools of torture and repression in South America: Use, manufacture and trade”, (2016), accessible at: https://omegaresearchfoundation.
org/publications/tools-torture-and-repression-south-america-use-manufacture-and-trade-july-2016. See, also, Dirección General de
la Policía Nacional, Proceso Número PN DIRAF CD 144 2013, accessible at: https://www.contratos.gov.co/consultas/detalleProceso.
do?numConstancia=13-12-1984581; Colombia Licita, Antimotin importado – PONAL: ADQUISICION EQUIPO ANTIMOTIN IMPORTADO,
(2022), accessible at: https://colombialicita.com/licitacion/1919; and Cuestión Pública, “Los millonarios contratos de armas ‘no letale’ para
la Policía y el Esmad”, (6 February 2021), accessible at: https://cuestionpublica.com/los-millonarios-contratos-de-armas-no-letales-para-lapolicia-y-el-esmad/.
428
El Espectador, “Venom: el arma en la tanqueta del Esmad, que causó pánico en el sur de Bogotá, en el Paro Nacional”, (5 May
2021), accessible at: https://www.elespectador.com/bogota/venom-el-arma-en-la-tanqueta-del-esmad-que-causo-panico-en-el-surde-bogota-en-el-paro-nacional-article/ and Contagioradio, “Venom: una de las costosas armas del ESMAD”, (9 May 2020), accessible
at:
https://www-contagioradio-com.translate.goog/venom-una-de-las-costosas-armas-del-esmad/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_
hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp.
435

See above n 420.

436
Information cited in S Torrado, “Venom, la cuestionada arma de los antidisturbios en Colombia”, El País, (21 May 2021), accessible
at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-05-21/venom-la-cuestionada-arma-de-los-antidisturbios-en-colombia.html. See, also, report
from Temblores, Indepaz and Paiis Id, each cartridge is costed at 270,000 pesos, which is approximately similar to the account from El País,
accounting for fluctuations in exchange rates.

141

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Regional and national standards and best practices

Regional and national
standards and best practices

to comply with the UN Code of Conduct
and the UN Basic Principles, and expressly
notes concerns with increasing levels of
sexual violence against women protesters,
including cases of rape and sexual assault
during protests. It calls on states to refrain
from the disproportionate use of force
against protesters and to conduct impartial
and independent investigations into all
human rights violations to ensure that all
perpetrators are held accountable.439

In addition to international law and legal
standards, regional organisations such
as the African Union (AU) and the IACHR,
among others, each have binding human
rights treaties and standards on the use
of force and CCWs, which should be read
alongside international law and standards.
Africa and the Americas present some
notable examples and are detailed below for Resolution 375 from 2017 urges states to
illustrative purposes.
ensure that their “domestic laws on the use of
force by law enforcement officials are in line
Africa
with regional and international standards”
and to provide law enforcement officials with
In Africa, the right to life and related rights “appropriate personal protective equipment
are detailed in the 1980 African Charter and weapons less likely to cause an injury
on Human and Peoples’ Rights437 (African than firearms.”440 Resolution 474, the most
Charter). The African Commission on Human recent statement on the use of force which
and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), was issued in 2021 during the COVID-19
which is the organ of the AU responsible for pandemic, reaffirms that law enforcement
monitoring the implementation of the African officials must comply with the principles
Charter, has issued a series of resolutions of legality, necessity, proportionality, and
on the use of force and CCWs. In 2017, it accountability and must not endanger
also published Guidelines for the Policing human life.441
of Assemblies by Law Enforcement Officials
in Africa (African Commission Guidelines), a In addition to these resolutions, the African
precursor to the UN Guidance on LLWs.438
Commission Guidelines provide clear
guidance on the use of CCWs and note
Resolution 281 from 2014 on the right to that “less lethal weapons, designed for the
peaceful demonstrations mandates states purposes of crowd control, may be abused
437

See above n 341 at articles 4, 9, 10 and 11.

438
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Guidelines for the Policing of Assemblies by Law Enforcement Officials in
Africa, (2017), accessible at: https://achpr.au.int/index.php/en/node/898.
439
African Commission, 281 Resolution on the Right to Peaceful Demonstrations - ACHPR/Res.281(LV)2014, accessible at: https://
ecnl.org/sites/default/files/files/2021/ACHPRResolution181-2014_0.pdf.
440
African Commission, 375 Resolution on the Right to Life in Africa - ACHPR/Res.375(LX)2017, accessible at: https://www.acdhrs.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Resolution-on-the-Right-to-Life-in-Africa.pdf.
441
African Commission, 474 Resolution on the Prohibition of Excessive Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officers in African States
- ACHPR/Res. 474 (EXT.OS/ XXXI) 2021, https://www.achpr.org/sessions/resolutions?id=505.

142

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Regional and national standards and best practices

by law enforcement officials who presume the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
that such weapons are never lethal.”442 The have developed a series of standards–and
jurisprudence–to protect the right of peaceful
Guidelines further provide that:
assembly. Both the IACHR and the Court
have recognised that protest is linked to
[L]ess lethal crowd control
the promotion and defence of democracy446
weapons should only be used by
well-trained law enforcement
as a form of expression, participation, and
officials in order to prevent and
a demand for the guarantee of political,
minimise deaths, injuries and harm,
economic, social, and cultural rights. Also,
and in a manner that complies with
the IACHR’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom
regional and international human
of Expression (FreeEx) has recognised that
rights standards. Prior to use, there
states have different obligations under the
must be in place precautionary
right to assembly: the obligations to respect,
measures such as appropriate
protect, and facilitate and the obligation
independent testing of and training
to guarantee.447
in the use of each type of device,
in a range of situations, and in
Regarding the use of force and CCWs, a 2019
accordance with international
report by the IACHR’s Special Rapporteur for
443
standards.
FreeEx notes that “the use of public force can
be an important element in guaranteeing the
right to protest and protecting the integrity
Americas
of demonstrators. On the other hand, it also
In the Americas, the right to peaceful assembly represents an important source of violations
is recognised in various treaties and other of these same rights.”448 Therefore, the use
human rights instruments, including article of force must be exceptional and justified by
21 of the American Declaration of the Rights satisfying the principles of legality, absolute
and Duties of Man444 and article 15 of the necessity, and proportionality.449

American Convention on Human Rights.445
Following these treaties, the IACHR and The IACHR has also issued statements
regarding the acquisition, use, and control
442

African Commission Guidelines above n 438 at 21.2.8.

443

Id.

444

See article XXI.

445

See article 15.

446
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, “Protesta y Derechos
Humanos: Estándares sobre los derechos involucrados en la protesta social y las obligaciones que deben guiar la respuesta estatal”
(IACHR FreeEx report), (CIDH/RELE/INF, 22/19) at para 4 and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, López Lone et al v Honduras (5
October 2015) at para 148.
447

IACHR FreeEx report id. See, also, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/publications/Protesta/ProtestHumanRights.pdf.

448

IACHR FreeEx report id at para 101.

449

Id at paras 102-106.

143

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Implementation of the law: experiences from the field

Implementation of the law:
experiences from the field

of CCWs.450 It considers the distinction
between lethal and non-lethal weapons
difficult to draw as “not only the design or
characteristics of the weapon must be taken
into account, but also other factors related Implementation of the law
to its use and control.”451 It also warns of the
indiscriminate effect of these weapons in the While standards on the use of force and
CCWs in protest contexts are expressed in
context of protests.
international and regional law and standards
The IACHR has also called for the introduction and, in some cases, integrated into national
and use of tests related to the acquisition regulations, our research indicates that there
and incorporation of new CCWs and types of is a significant gap between these legal
ammunition.452 These tests should be based frameworks and their implementation on the
on criteria provided by multidisciplinary and ground by law enforcement officials.
independent experts, should incorporate
detailed regulations covering these weapons, Experts in all 18 countries studied for this
and require specific training for officials report noted that there are international and
in the appropriate use of each specific regional instruments and constitutional,
weapon. Finally, the IACHR notes that special federal, state and local regulations which
attention should be paid to the development protect the right to life, and expression,
of new technologies in this area, such as assembly, and associative rights.453 The
experts cited the importance of these laws
remotecontrolled devices.
as the foundation for their advocacy and
litigation work. At the same time, many
interviewees reported frequent restrictions
on the freedom of assembly in implementing
the protections as they are written. In fact,
the vagueness of applicable laws has, at
times, been leveraged to strengthen policing
powers. As one expert we interviewed noted:

The general perception of CCWs, as non-lethal, has resulted
in weaker or non-existent controls over their deployment.

144

450

Id at para 120.

451

Id at para 121. Direct quotation from interviews with civil liberties experts conducted between October 2021 and March 2022.

452

From interviews with civil liberties experts conducted between October 2021 and March 2022.

453

See Section 1: Introduction for more information on the interview methods.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Implementation of the law: experiences from the field

There is a long history of peaceful
protest and critical social change
thanks to protests but there has
been repression at each stage. Many
times, overbroad public order laws
give a lot of discretion to the police
(e.g., overly broad riot laws, street/
nuisance laws, public order laws,
orders about public spaces, and
trespass laws). In some countries,
the authorities introduce order laws
to outlaw demonstrations, despite
the existence of constitutional
freedoms.454
According to many experts, the most
common justifications for declaring protests
“unlawful” include an alleged risk to public
safety and the possibility of property damage
or blocking traffic. The extent to which
protests are prevented, therefore, depends
largely on local authorities, by-laws, and city
ordinances. As one expert noted, “[i]n many
places, the landscape is ‘piecemeal’, making
enforcement challenging.”455 In general, there
are “major issues with anti-riot bills. They
are too broad as they can arrest people for
just being in a group. Also, it doesn’t require
violence but the threat of the violence, so it is
very much a judgement call for police.”456

interviewee noted that “over the past 4 to
6 years, there has been a shrinking of civic
space. Over time, the challenge has been to
ensure that good pieces of legislation are
actually enacted. The card of national security
is used to trump people’s rights.”457 Another
interviewee noted that “national security [is
used] as an excuse over the right to freedom
of expression, exacerbated by a history of
terrorist attacks.”458 Experts note that this is a
fine needle to thread between hate speech,
which may require certain limitations, and
using hate speech laws as a pretext to curb
free speech.

Implementation of use of
force guidelines

In addition to vague legal provisions and
overbroad exceptions, a lack of transparency
appears to be a barrier to implementing and
relying on national use of force principles and
guidelines. Most experts noted that while there
are national or local use of force guidelines,
these are often not publicly available and
are either classified or inaccessible to the
public: “the police manuals–when is a certain
thing deployed, when are these weapons
to be deployed, how to use them–all of that
is obscured.”459 In other cases, guidelines
may exist, but police may be unfamiliar with
According to the experts interviewed for them. As one interviewee stated, “there are
this report, the use of national security, anti- some guidelines, service standing orders–
terrorism, or anti-hate speech laws has also how police should conduct themselves,
been co-opted to restrict protest rights. An
454

See above n 446.

455

Id.

456

Id.

457

Id.

458

Id.

459

Id.

145

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Implementation of the law: experiences from the field

talk to protesters–that are publicly available
for anyone to read. . . but we doubt that all
the police are reading all 1,000 pages or
downloading it. [It] needs to be abridged.”460
Operationalising those guidelines is another
matter: “[g]overnment makes the guidelines
but the police have to create its own definitions
on how to operationalize those guidelines.”461

protest or may end it by “kettling”. In this
method, protesters are blocked into a certain
limited space and ordered to sit or stand, often
for hours. They are not allowed to leave and
are surrounded by police. Technically, police
do not use violence during kettling, allowing
them to evade use of force guidelines but
interviewees noted that kettling is effectively
“mass incarceration” for a short period
Most experts noted that working directly of time.
with law enforcement to ensure that
protests are well organized and planned is Experiences with the use of force
a critical component of organising marches,
demonstrations, and other large events. In In many countries, the primary law
many contexts, there are established and enforcement response to protest is dispersal,
functional pathways for activists to be in full including the use of force and arrest to
communication with law enforcement before, intimidate protesters. In addition to being
during and after protests to ensure the safety deployed to disperse assemblies, the use of
of all parties. In some cases, however, there force is deployed in response to other forms
are either dominant protocols requiring a of conduct by protestors, such as refusing
permit for a protest or a notification system to disperse, chaining themselves to objects,
which in practice becomes a permission damaging property, or wearing masks. But
system. When permission is not granted, most often, the use of force is deployed
assemblies are declared illegal and the use for no reason at all. As one expert noted,
of force to disperse them is justified by law “When is force used in protests? Basically, all
enforcement. There are numerous other the time.”463
laws that can be used to limit protest rights.
Public order laws such as curfews, transport In describing the use of force by law
regulations, and noise and nuisance rules enforcement against protesters, the primary
can be used to neuter the right to protest.
concern of most experts was the failure
to issue warnings before weapons were
Even where public order laws exist, the deployed. Some interviewees noted:
primary tactic used by police is much more
basic: to disperse protesters and end the
› “Police don’t always give a sufficient
assembly altogether. “There is generally
warning, especially if there has been
no de-escalation, the first instinct is to shut
an injunction, and [there is] not enough
462
down.” Police may actively disperse the
time between when the police issue a

146

460

Id.

461

Id.

462

Id.

463

Id.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Implementation of the law: experiences from the field

dispersal warning and when they start
beating people.”464

by many interviewees to be a significant
impediment to any real accountability.

›

“Usually they will warn people but
start repressing as people are trying to
disperse and very quickly escalate to
[the] use of LLWs.”465

›

There are even situations of “hunting
protesters that were trying to run
away.”466

›

[There is] no apparent relation
between the actual threat to public
order and level of force used.”467

The experts shared that internal accountability
for police misuse of force, or for injuries
caused, was not evident and, most often,
non-existent. On occasion, once-existing
independent oversight systems have been
deliberately dismantled. Therefore, human
rights organisations engage in lawsuits
on behalf of survivors and victims to seek
accountability through the local or national
judicial system. However, the lack of judicial
independence and lack of independent
investigation of individual officers hampers
litigation. Even when there is a successful
lawsuit, punishment of the offenders or
reparations for the victims are limited
and take an excessive amount of time to
materialise. Although judicial accountability
is often limited, lawsuits can serve other
purposes, including bearing witness, naming
the crimes, informing the public, and making
sure it is clear that someone is watching.
As one interviewee noted, “[w]e remind the
government of their obligations.”469

Police accountability for
misuse of force
As detailed above, international law and
standards define the state’s obligation to
report, investigate, and seek justice for any
misuse of force. However, experts from all
countries described a lack of accountability
and noted that very few offending law
enforcement officials have been convicted
for misuse of force or injuring protesters.
The general perception of CCWs, as nonlethal, has resulted in weaker or non-existent
controls over their deployment. Officials are
not convicted because accountability systems
often lack transparency, allowing government
officials to collude with offenders.468 The
lack of an independent judiciary was noted

464

Id.

465

Id.

466

Id.

467

Id.

468

Id.

469

Id.

147

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Implementation of the law: experiences from the field

Investigations of the misuse of force
When there are allegations of the misuse
of force, investigations of those incidents
are
complicated
and
challenging.
Research indicated that “[t]here is very little
accountability in terms of police violence.
There is very little transparency in terms of
how and by what chain of command decisions
are made.”470 The corporate culture of law
enforcement institutions was also mentioned
as a barrier to achieving justice because “it
is police investigating police. [There is] really
no independent oversight.”471
Complex protocols for reporting police abuse,
laws protecting law enforcement, corruption,
a lack of independent accountability systems
or judges, and a lack of evidence make
accountability nearly impossible. There is
also the difficulty of the “individualization
of responsibilities” in the context of an
assembly: it is difficult to name offending
police officers because they are rarely
identifiable by helmet numbers or identity
badges. This is particularly problematic
where law enforcement officials are either

148

470

Id.

471

Id.

472

Id.

masked with protective gear or have their
faces covered. Some police officers also
deliberately hide their name tags from view.
Evidence needed to investigate police use
of force often comes from video recordings
of the incidents, both by police and by
activists. Regarding the use of police helmetmounted or body-mounted video cameras
for accountability purposes, most experts
responded that cameras are typically used
to document criminal activity by protestors
but are not shared with the public when it
is the law enforcement officers who have
used force. “It is used to identify, arrest,
intimidate, and prosecute protesters but it
is not available to . . . civil society groups to
highlight abuse or unlawful use of force by
police.”472 The use of mobile phone cameras
by protesters and bystanders has become an
increasingly effective method to document
the management of assemblies, and the
widespread availability of civilian-shot video
on social media and news reports has the
potential to improve police behaviour.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Implementation of the law: experiences from the field

Case study

Deaths and severe injuries from police violence
during protests against new criminal code
0

Indonesia

or rubber bullets during the demonstration.474
Eventually, the police declared that six
policemen had carried firearms during
the protest and, as a consequence, they
were suspended. Initially, only disciplinary
proceedings475 were opened against the
police officers, and light punishments
were issued against them. Following
widespread public protests over the lack of
accountability, the authorities were obliged
to initiate a criminal investigation. In the
Among the numerous deaths documented case of Immawan’s death, the bullet fired at
in the context of these protests, on 26 him matched the gun held by a policeman
September, two students died of gunshot who was sentenced to four years in prison
wounds after a violent clash between the for the misuse of firearms. In Yusuf’s death,
protesters and police in front of the provincial the process is still ongoing due to numerous
legislative council building in Kendari, shortcomings in the investigation.
Southeast Sulawesi.
The police have claimed that they
Immawan Randy, a 21-year-old student from encountered several difficulties in the case’s
Halu Oleo University, died after being hit in proceedings: no key witnesses, insufficient
the chest by a bullet fired by police. A fellow evidence, and no autopsy to establish Yusuf’s
protester, Yusuf Kardawi, who was 19-years- cause of death. The family refused to allow
old and a student from the same university, an autopsy, as Yusuf had already been
died after being shot in his head.473 The buried. The police used this refusal to justify
police initially denied using live ammunition the lack of a thorough investigation. Despite
Between 23 and 29 September 2019, students
in many cities in Indonesia protested against
new legislation that reduces the authority
of the Corruption Eradication Commission
(KPK), and against several bills, including a
new criminal code that penalizes extramarital
sex and defamation against the president. In
Jakarta and other cities, protesters clashed
with the police, resulting in many injuries and
some deaths.

473
LINE Indonesia, Pengumuman Terkait Penutupan LINE TODAY di Indonesia, accessible at https://www.merdeka.com/teknologi/
line-today-tutup-layanan-di-indonesia.html.
474
IA Arbi, “One student dies, one in critical condition after protest turns violent in Kendari, Jakarta Post, (26 September 2019),
accessible at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/26/one-student-dies-one-in-critical-condition-after-protest-turns-violent-inkendari.html.
475
Ikhwan Hastanto, “Police Officers Linked to Two Student Deaths in Indonesia Protests are Basically off the Hook,” VICE, 31
October, 2019. https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kxezv/police-officers-linked-to-two-student-deaths-in-indonesia-protests-are-basicallyoff-the-hook

149

Lethal in Disguise 2 – Legal framework: Implementation of the law: experiences from the field

POLICE FIRED TEARGAS AND USED WATER CANNONS TO DISPERSE DEMONSTRATORS PROTESTING AGAINST GOVERNMENT
REFORMS IN SEPTEMBER 2019. @FULLMOONFOLKS | TWITTER

the absence of an autopsy, some pieces of
evidence, including a surveillance camera
recording and the projectile itself, have been
recovered and could be used to further
the investigation.

the investigation by the police regarding
this case.

These deaths add to the long ledger of
impunity for police violence in the context
of protests, a list that keeps growing due
Another student, Dicky Wahyudi, was gravely to unsolved cases and new ones that keep
injured during the September 2019 protests. arising. The trend is clear: police use violence
Dicky was struck by a police Barracuda during protests and cause casualties, yet
armoured vehicle on 27 September while it is only low-ranking officers who are held
he was trying to escape the tear gas used to accountable, to the extent there is any
disperse protesters. The right side of his face accountability at all. Typically, there is no
was bruised and a wound was found on the chain of command accountability nor any
right side of his chest. According to the South evaluation as to how police should better
Sulawesi police chief, the massive armoured manage and facilitate protests in the future.
vehicle had accidentally crashed into Dicky.
There is no further information about

150

Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

Section 4

NEW AND REVISED
RECOMMENDATIONS
AND THE WAY FORWARD
PROTESTS IN PERU’S CAPITAL, LIMA, ON JANUARY 23, 2023 BY DEMONSTRATORS DEMANDING PRESIDENT DINA BOLUARTE’S
RESIGNATION AND ELECTIONS. DURING THE POLICE INTERVENTION IN REACTION TO THE PROTEST, DEMONSTRATORS
SUFFERED INJURIES AND RESPIRATORY DISTRESS DUE TO THE USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS. KLEBHER VASQUEZ | AA

Observations
The injuries inflicted by CCWs are as
widespread as they are devastating. The use
of KIPs, chemical irritants, water cannons,
disorientation devices, acoustic weapons,
and batons, among others, has produced
a diverse array of negative health impacts
which extend beyond the physical. Beyond
individual injuries, the full toll of CCWs
must include the psychological trauma
they produce, the permanent disability
they cause, the social cost of CCWs paid
by targeted communities, and, significantly,
the disproportionate impact CCWs have on
certain vulnerable groups. The continued
use and growing potency of CCWs since the
publication of LiD1 in 2016 is particularly
concerning. The potential use of inherently
indiscriminate impact weapons that are new
or were not emphasised in the last report,
including multi-projectile KIPs, stun grenades

with shrapnel, and Venom, are cause for even
more significant concern.
It is worth emphasising that the health effects
described in this report may be exacerbated
by factors that serve to impede access to
medical care. These include CCW-related
hazards to medical professionals, restricted
access to medical transport, forbidding
of medical assistance at protests, direct
attacks on medical professionals and street
medics, and the chilling effect of detaining
those injured by CCWs at medical facilities,
which leads people not to seek necessary
medical attention. These barriers to access
to timely medical care play a significant
role in increasing the risk of serious
injury, permanent disability, or even death
from CCWs.
Around the world, awareness of the use,
dangers and harms of CCWs is increasing.
The past six years have produced more–

151

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

and more rigorous–evidence documenting
the severe health harms from CCWs used
in crowd control. The proliferation of CCWs
in all aspects of policing will result in a
corresponding increase in death and injury,
while novel mechanisms of injury will come
to the fore as new CCW technologies are
developed and refined. Without effective and
immediate action, these avoidable harms
will increase and intensify. Therefore, there
is a pressing need for states to change their
perceptions regarding the role of CCWs and
adopt more stringent rules for their use. There
is also an urgent need to engage in further
research and empirical studies to develop
clear scientific standards and parameters to
regulate CCWs and their use and to further
develop and clarify applicable international
law and standards.
In this section, we outline recommendations
with respect to pre-deployment, deployment,
and post-deployment of CCWs in order
to minimise the risk of these weapons for
occasions when they are deployed. In addition,
we make recommendations on international
law and standards and detail challenges
to the development and implementation of
these standards at the national level. These
recommendations are premised on several
guiding principles that should be followed
for the management of assemblies and for
all uses of force and expand on the existing
principles and recommendations detailed in
LiD1. They are based on protecting health
and limiting injuries, and ensuring the full
exercise of free expression and assembly.

Core principles
›

152

In the context of managing protests,
the role of law enforcement officials

is to protect the right to life and to
facilitate assembly, association and
free expression rights while ensuring
public safety.

›

Given the duty of law enforcement
to protect health and uphold rights,
the most effective method to prevent
violence in the context of protests is to
engage in negotiations and dialogue
with protesters and deploy associated
de-escalation techniques.

›

The use of CCWs in protests should be
an absolute last resort when dealing
with genuine and imminent threats to
safety, and only after all other means
have been exhausted.

›

The mere fact that an assembly may be
considered unlawful under domestic
law does not justify dispersing the
assembly or the use of CCWs.

›

Where there are people in the context of
protests who either engage in or incite
others to engage in acts of violence
which require police intervention,
the explicit goal of any intervention
should be to de-escalate the situation
and, where needed, focus on targeted
interventions that do not infringe upon
the rights of peaceful protesters.

›

If CCWs are deployed in the context
of protests, their use should always
be based on the principles of legality,
precaution, necessity, proportionality,
non-discrimination, and accountability,
and the use of CCWs must be tested
against the genuine threat faced and
the legitimate aim pursued. Where any

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

of these principles cannot be satisfied,
CCWs should not be deployed.

›

We
note
that
the
inherently
indiscriminate nature of most CCWs
renders highly unlikely their ability to
meet the proportionality and necessity
requirements for targeted policing
interventions in the context of protest.

›

Weapons
that
are
inherently
indiscriminate are effectively dispersal
agents used for forcibly terminating
the entire assembly, and they restrict
the ability of peaceful protesters to
exercise their rights to free speech
and assembly.

›

States must investigate any injuries
or deaths related to the use of CCWs
to ensure accountability and to better
train and educate law enforcement
officials on the lethal and harmful
effects of CCWs.

Patterns of risk

safety and effectiveness can lead to the
unregulated proliferation of CCWs.

›

Second, the erroneous presumption
that CCWs are non-lethal has several
consequences: (1) that law enforcement
and security personnel are not always
trained in the proper use of such
weapons; (2) that they are subject to
fewer controls and regulations; (3) that
they resort quickly to their use without
trying other de-escalation techniques
first or exhausting all other means
before using CCWs; and (4) that the
cases of injury and death from their use
are then not properly investigated.

›

Third, some of the CCWs that are used
in the management of protests are
inherently inaccurate and indiscriminate
in their effects, risking serious injury
and death to the people targeted, other
demonstrators, bystanders, and law
enforcement officers themselves.

›

Fourth, the capacity of CCWs to achieve
the goal of safe crowd dispersal is limited.
The infliction of pain and incapacitation
occasioned by CCWs is unlikely to result
in the safe dispersal of protesters. On
the contrary, the use of CCWs for crowd
dispersal is often counterproductive, as
they can cause confusion and panic,
resulting in additional injuries as well as
an escalation of violence.

›

Fifth, CCWs are intentionally misused
as weapons for political repression
rather than for legitimate crowdcontrol purposes.

In addition to the core principles, certain
patterns of risk in the use of CCWs in protests
have emerged in our research.

›

First, the development of new CCWs
and aggressive marketing by arms
companies to law enforcement
institutions is, in some cases, driving
demand. Not all of these newer
weapons are adequately tested, and
some have been specifically developed
for military purposes. The marketing,
trade and use of such weapons in the
absence of demonstrated data on

153

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

Recommendations
Pre-deployment of CCWs

practices violate the objectives of safe
crowd management.
5.

Design and trade
1.

CCWs and/or policing equipment that
can be used as a CCW, intended for
use in the context of protests, must be
designed and produced to ensure that
they meet legitimate law enforcement
objectives and comply with international
law and standards. This duty applies to
6.
states and their agents as well as to
companies that manufacture weapons
for law enforcement as recognised in
the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights.476

2.

Weapons designed for military
purposes are inappropriate for use
in protests unless they have been
adapted for crowd-control purposes
and
independently
tested
for
appropriateness and effectiveness.

3.

Weapons’ design should not be
altered or modified to produce
lasting and painful effects as a means
7.
of punishment.

4.

The redesign of chemical irritants to
extend half-life, increase resistance to
the weather, and prolong the effects of
chemical agents must be halted; these

Public and private manufacturers of
CCWs and related equipment should
make publicly available an assessment
of specific weapons risks to law
enforcement institutions, their officials,
and the public. States, law enforcement
agencies, and manufacturers should
make freely accessible the technical
specifications of weapons in use.477
All safety data information and any other
relevant information should be provided
by manufacturers and should be made
publicly accessible. Publicly available
data should include each weapon’s
design features and parameters with a
view to facilitating medical treatment
and public knowledge of potential
hazards. Manufacturers should also
periodically publish updated medical
studies regarding the safety of their
weapons, along with the names of
experts who have contributed to safety
analyses, indicating the sources of
funding or compensation.478
International, regional and national
controls should be adopted on the trade
in CCWs and equipment. These should
prohibit the trade in inherently abusive
weapons and equipment and control
the trade in CCWs that are misused to

476
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, (2011), accessible at: https://www.ohchr.org/documents/
publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf and UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6 at para 4.1.1.

154

477

UN Guidance on LLWs id at para 4.1.2.

478

Id.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

ensure that they are not used in human
rights abuses.

Testing and legal review
8.

9.

10.

enclosed v open), possible collateral
effects, and participant demographics.
11.

Testing of new and existing CCWs
should not rest solely in the hands of
manufacturers. States should ensure
that CCWs are subject to rigorous
independent testing prior to making 12.
procurement decisions.479 Testing,
evaluation and approval should include
a multidisciplinary approach that, in
addition to law enforcement, includes 13.
technical
specialists,
academics,
policymakers, health professionals,
and civil society and consultation
with communities that might be most
impacted by the deployment of these
weapons.
Testing of CCWs should consider
legality, level of target accuracy and
precision, risk of lethality, risk of severe
injury or disability, level of pain inflicted,
lifespan, reliability (i.e., minimal risk of
malfunction), human factors that may
affect their intended use, and any other
relevant factors.
Testing to determine safe environmental
parameters for the use of CCWs should
occur in conditions that are similar to
protest situations and under varied
scenarios. The following factors,
among others, should be considered:
distance of engagement, urban or
rural environment, expected weather
conditions, nature of space (e.g.,

479

General Comment No 37 above n 359 at para 81.

480

UN Guidance above n 6 at para 4.2.1.

The testing process should inform
domestic regulations and guidelines
for the lawful use of CCWs. The results
from the testing should be made
publicly available.
Newly acquired weapons should be
subject to a pilot program to allow for
evaluation and assessment.
A legal review should be conducted prior
to procurement of a CCW, and it should
be conducted to determine whether
the procurement and use of a CCW
would, in some or all circumstances, be
prohibited by any rule of international
or domestic law, in particular, human
rights law.480 As part of the legal review,
testing must—
13.1.

be conducted independently of
the manufacturer and account
for both the required and the
potential
capabilities
and
effects of the CCW;

13.2.

evaluate the effects of all
reasonably, likely, or expected
uses of the CCW;

13.3.

be based on impartial legal,
technical,
medical,
and
scientific
expertise
and
evidence; and

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Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

consider the potential effects of
Regulations, training and planning
use on individuals who may be
especially vulnerable, including 17. Regulations,
procedures,
and/or
481
pregnant persons.
protocols on the use of CCWs should
be developed for law enforcement
Selection and procurement
based on applicable domestic, regional
and international laws. Human rights
14. CCWs, and/or policing equipment
treaty obligations and international
that can be used as a CCW, whose
standards should be observed and
“designated, expected, or intended
operationalized in the protocols.
use” does not comply with domestic
These protocols should also reflect the
and international law and standards, or
findings from independent testing. Law
which presents undue risk of loss of life
enforcement should never rely solely
or serious injury to anyone, including
on manufacturers’ instructions when
intended targets, bystanders, or law
defining protocols on acceptable use.
enforcement officials themselves,
should not be authorised for 18. Regulations,
procedures,
and/or
482
procurement, deployment, or use.
protocols on the use of CCWs should
be publicly accessible and include
15. Where states and law enforcement
details of—
institutions intend to procure or trade
CCWs, details of the procurement and
18.1. when and how weapons may
trade must be made publicly accessible
be used;
and must be subject to a public
participation process, including publicly
18.2. training requirements;
accessible and independently verifiable
human rights impact assessments on
18.3. the risks associated with the
the specific CCWs in question. This
use of these weapons, both
includes transparent political oversight,
individually and in crowdapproval, and accountability.
control situations, including
specific reference to vulnerable
16. Prior to deployment, CCWs and
populations; and
ammunition should be clearly identified,
inventoried, and stored to facilitate
18.4. accountability measures.
accountability in the post-deployment
phase. When CCWs and ammunition 19. Law enforcement officials should be
are distributed, there should be a
trained in human rights standards,
clear means of tracking distribution to
including the role of law enforcement
individual law enforcement officials.
in promoting and protecting the right to
13.4.

156

481

Id at para 4.2.2.

482

Id at paras 4.2.3 and 6.3.2.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

life, the rights to freedom of assembly 24.
and freedom of expression, the right
to be free from violence and arbitrary
arrest, the right to be free from torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment and punishment, and due
process rights.
20.

Law enforcement should be trained
in the human rights-compliant use
of CCWs. In addition to teaching the 25.
technical aspects of the weapon
and its use, training should be
contextual, including addressing the
specific aspects and challenges of
managing protests.
26.

With chemical irritants, training must
include a discussion of concentration
levels and an understanding that the
effects of the weapons vary depending
on, among others, environmental
conditions, the density of the crowd,
duration of exposure, pre-existing
medical conditions, and the vulnerability
of specific populations.
Law enforcement officials who have
not received the appropriate training
(as described above) should not be
permitted to carry or use CCWs.
Pre-deployment
planning
should
always consider contextual factors,
including the nature of the area where
the protest is occurring, whether the
protest is static or mobile, the weather
conditions, access to exits, and the size
and demographics of the crowd, among
other factors.

21.

Training
should
be
continuous
and ongoing and should include
simulations and exercises that review
past cases to identify inappropriate or
unlawful weapon use and consider
alternative approaches.

22.

Training must include information 27.
about the medical and health effects
and risks of using particular CCWs, and
precautions that should be taken in
using particular weapons.

23.

Training of projectile weapons should
mirror that of formal firearms training,
with emphasis placed on the recognition
of unsafe firing conditions. Training Use of force and deployment of CCWs
should include the determination of safe
firing distances, given the importance 28. The use of any kind of force, including
of distance in attenuating the effects of
CCWs, must always comply with the
impact projectiles.
principles of necessity, proportionality,

Pre-deployment planning should also
have clearly designated command
roles and authorities. Authorization
should come from a senior-level officer
on the scene, who is able to assess the
conditions where CCWs may be used
and is responsible for the manner and
scope of their deployment.

legality, precaution, non-discrimination,
and accountability.483

483

General Comment No 37 above n 359 at para 78.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

29.

30.

31.

158

Law enforcement officials must always
aim to avoid the use of force and use
non-violent tactics wherever possible.484
In exceptional circumstances and
where there is an imminent and actual
threat, law enforcement officials may
only use the minimum force necessary
to address the threat and, if possible, 32.
should take all reasonable measures to
engage in de-escalation techniques.485
Appropriate de-escalation techniques
should be used to minimise the risk
of violence. Law enforcement officials
should be aware that even the display
of CCWs may escalate tensions and
increase the potential for violent
conflict during protests. Where force 33.
is proportionate and is necessary to
achieve a legitimate law enforcement
objective, all possible precautionary
steps must be taken to avoid, or at least
minimise, the risk of injury or death.486
When a decision is made to use
force in response to acts of violence,
law enforcement officials should
not treat crowds as a single violent
entity because of the actions of some 34.
individuals. Law enforcement officials
must make every effort to identify and
isolate violent individuals without
unnecessarily interfering with the rights

484

UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6 at para 2.2.

485

General Comment No 37 above n 353 at para 78.

486

UN Guidance on LLWs above above n 359 at para 6.3.1.

487

Id at para 6.3.2.

488

Id.

489

Id at para 2.7.

of other protesters.487 If it is decided
that CCWs are an appropriate means
of stopping individual acts of violence,
the final decision to use CCWs must
account for the likely proximity of third
parties and bystanders.488
Law enforcement officials should avoid
the use of CCWs towards those who are
particularly vulnerable to the harmful
consequences of the use of force in
general and to the effects of specific
CCWs, including children, pregnant
persons, older persons, persons with
disabilities, and persons with mental
health conditions and impairments.489
Law enforcement officials must use
proportional means to effect an arrest
in the context of a protest when
individuals are passively resisting. In
such circumstances, law enforcement
officials should only use targeted
interventions and the minimum force
necessary and must avoid resorting
to any force that carries the risk of
serious injury.
CCWs should not be used without first
clear verbally warning protesters and
giving them adequate and appropriate
opportunity to comply with a lawful
order to exit and/or find safe shelter.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

A safe route to disperse must be
guaranteed.490 CCWs with wide-area
effects, such as tear gas and water
cannons, have indiscriminate effects.
When such weapons are used, law
enforcement officials are responsible
for mitigating the risk of injury through
stampedes or “crowd crushes”.491
38.

The use of firearms and live
ammunition
35.

The use of firearms and live and/or
lethal ammunition should be entirely 39.
prohibited in the context of managing
crowds and facilitating protests.

Kinetic impact projectiles
36.

37.

Kinetic impact projectiles (KIPs) can
cause serious injuries, permanent
disability, and death. Severe injuries
are more likely when KIPs are fired at
close range. When launched from afar,
these weapons are often inaccurate
and can strike vulnerable body parts 40.
or bystanders. Therefore, the medical
evidence in this report underscores
that KIPs should never be fired
indiscriminately into groups and are,
in general, an inappropriate weapon in
any protest context.
KIPs must be expressly prohibited for
the sole purpose of crowd dispersal;
they cannot be used effectively and

490

Id at para 6.3.3.

491

General Comment No 37 above n 359 at para 87.

492

UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6 at para 6.3.2.

493

Id.

safely in groups of people. KIPs must
never be fired at close range and should
never be targeted at the head or other
vital areas of the body, where impact
typically causes serious injury and, in
some instances, death.
Any KIP that fires multiple projectiles is
inherently indiscriminate492 and must be
prohibited in the context of protests. It is
not possible to deploy these weapons
safely against crowds or individuals.
Pellet rounds, which fire multiple
projectiles that follow uncontrollable
trajectories, are both indiscriminate
and dangerous. Their frequently small
size and high velocity render them
exceptionally hazardous. As a result,
pellet rounds (birdshot, buckshot, and
multiple projectile munitions) must
be expressly prohibited in all protest
settings; metallic pellets may never be
categorised as a CCW.
KIPs that have a metal component as
part of their composition, especially
those with metal cores, are not safe
for crowd management and should be
expressly prohibited. These weapons,
including rubber-coated metal rounds,
lead pellets, small calibre rifle or pistol
rounds, and bean bag rounds, impact
targets with excessive energy and high
velocities and have a very high potential
to cause serious injury and death.493

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Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

Chemical irritants
41.

42.

Chemical irritants, when deployed
using canisters or grenades, are
inherently indiscriminate by nature,
cause severe pain and injuries and
frequently escalate tensions. Therefore,
extreme caution must be used before
and during deployment that considers
the presence of bystanders and the
existence of areas of egress and airflow
to minimise any risk of overexposure
due to the serious risk of injury.

42.2. “Barrier-penetrating,” “barrierblind,” “barricade,” tear gas
rounds, or any round designed
to defeat physical barriers or
that are excessively dense or
considered “military grade”.
42.3. Chemical
irritants
with
components that are determined
to be hazardous or in quantities,
proportions,
concentrations,
or admixtures that may be
considered toxic.
42.4. Chemical irritants that have
passed their expiration date or
are otherwise in disrepair.

160

Specific methods and patterns of
chemical irritant deployment are
associated with an elevated risk of
serious injury or death. Use of chemical
irritants in the following circumstances
constitutes reckless and dangerous
use of these weapons and must
be prohibited:
43.1.

In confined spaces or in spaces
where a crowd cannot safely
disperse (including sports
stadiums, prisons, and other
high-density enclosed spaces
with limited egress capacity)
- this significantly increases
the risk of death or serious
injury from crowd crush and
stampedes.494

43.2.

Firing
chemical
irritant
canisters or throwing grenades
directly at individuals or groups,
particularly when they strike the
head or sensitive body parts, as
they can result in blunt trauma,
burns and severe or permanent
disability and death.

43.3.

Exposing
children,
older
persons or other vulnerable
groups to chemical irritants
indiscriminately.

43.4.

In situations of purely passive
resistance. (In accordance with
the principle of necessity, once
a person is already under the
control of a law enforcement

Chemical irritants that should be
expressly prohibited in the context of
protests due to the risk of death and
serious injury include:
42.1. Launchers that fire multiple
chemical irritant canisters, such
as the Venom system.

494

43.

Id at para 7.2.7.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

official, no use of a chemical
irritant will be lawful.)
43.5.

43.6.

Repeated
or
prolonged
exposure for demonstrators
or for residents who may
be exposed in their homes,
workplaces, and communities. 46.
After exposure, restraining a
suspect by placing them in
the prone position (i.e., where
the person is lying flat with the 47.
chest down and back up). If an
individual suffering from the
effects of a chemical irritant is
restrained, his or her breathing
must be monitored constantly. 48.
Any unexpected or long-lasting
effects should be referred
for
medical
assessment
495
and treatment.”

Water cannons
44.

45.

persons in elevated positions or in any
situation wherein the force of the water
jet can push targets into dangerous
objects. Water cannons should not be
used in cold weather due to the risks of
hypothermia and cold-water shock.497
Water cannons should never be used
against restrained persons or persons
otherwise unable to move or escape a
specific situation.498
Alterations to the properties of water
designed to provoke pain, such as
heating or the addition of chemical
irritants, must be prohibited.
Other water cannon additives–such
as chemicals that emit foul odours or
coloured dye–must be prohibited. The
primary purpose of these weapons
appears to be excessive or collective
punishment and humiliation, which
are unlawful and do not constitute
legitimate policing tactics.

The use of water cannons against
individuals at short ranges should be
Disorientation devices
prohibited, owing to the risk of injury
from the water jet itself or from injuries 49. Disorientation devices can cause
due to slips, trips, and falls secondary to
significant injuries, and they are difficult
496
the impact of a water cannon.
to deploy in a manner that ensures only
isolated targets are affected without
the risk of injury to bystanders. As a
The decision to deploy water cannons
result, these indiscriminate weapons
must consider potential environmental
(including stun grenades, flash bangs
hazards that may heighten the risk of
and other disorientation devices)
injury resulting from their use. Water
cannons should not be used against

495

Id at para 7.2.4.

496

Id at para 7.7.4.

497

Id at para 7.7.3

498

Id at para 7.7.4.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

should not be used in protest contexts
or crowd settings.
50.

Explosive stun grenades that have been
engineered to fragment or disperse
projectiles behave similarly to multiple
Blunt force weapons
projectile KIPs in that the user cannot
control the trajectory of each fragment 54. Batons should only be used in
to ensure bystanders or vital parts of the
exceptional circumstances and only
body are not affected. As a result, they
against violent individuals posing
are inherently indiscriminate and have
significant
risks
to
themselves
500
no legitimate law enforcement role.
or others:

Acoustic weapons
51.

52.

53.

prudent maximum sound intensities,
determine minimum distances of use,
and establish limits on the duration of
continuous operation.

The use of acoustic weapons or
signalling devices at any distance and
exposure time at which the decibel
output is likely to cause permanent
threshold shift (permanent hearing
damage) should be prohibited.499
The use of acoustic weapons or hailing
devices to dissuade or deter individuals
should only be limited to cases in which
it is unlikely other individuals may be
subject to the potentially hazardous
effects of focused sound.
55.
Acoustic weapons may cause hearing
damage if thresholds of sound intensity
and duration are exceeded. These
thresholds may vary from weapon to
weapon. Accordingly, rigorous testing
should be conducted to identify

499

Id at para 7.8.5.

500

Id at 7.1.3.

501

Id.

502

Id at para 7.7.4.

54.1.

Batons should never be
used against a person who
is neither engaged in or
threatening violent behaviour;
such use is likely to amount to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or torture.501

54.2.

Batons should never be used
against persons in restraints
or
persons
otherwise
unable to move or escape a
specific situation.502

Batons should not be used to cause
considerable injury and excessive pain,
such as strikes to the knees, elbows,
wrists, and groin areas:503
55.1.

Jabs or driving strikes with
a baton at the thorax, neck
or head should be avoided

503
See Amnesty International, “Blunt force: Investigating the misuse of police batons and related equipment, accessible at: https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/09/blunt-force/.

162

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

because of the risk of injury to
and damage to vital organs.504
55.2.

56.

contexts should be issued
until further evidence on the
impacts of armed drones in
protest contexts has been
collected and their lawful use
has been established.

Batons should never be used in
neck or choke holds.505

Some blunt force weapons, such as
whips, direct contact electric shock
weapons and weighted or spiked batons,
have no legitimate law enforcement
role that cannot be fulfilled through
less harmful means. Their use by law
enforcement should be prohibited.

58.2.

Fully autonomous weapons
systems must never be used
by law enforcement during
a protest.506

58.3.

Direct contact electric shock
weapons–such as stun guns
and stun shields, for example,
as well as projectile electric
shock weapons in a direct
contact mode –are designed to
cause compliance through pain
and deliver an electric shock
through contact between
the weapon and the target
individual. These weapons
carry an unacceptable risk
of arbitrary force, and their
use fulfils no legitimate law
enforcement purpose that
cannot be achieved through
less harmful means. As such,
the use of direct contact
electric shock weapons by
law
enforcement
should
be prohibited.

58.4.

Because
directed
energy
devices (DEDs) are not
commonly used in law
enforcement, and there is no

New frontiers
57.

New technologies being developed
for crowd control should aim to be
less prejudicial and less dangerous to
the physical integrity of people. These
new technologies should be tested
for compliance with human rights
standards and existing guidelines
before procurement and use. They
should also be tested to ensure their
use complies with the principles of
necessity, proportionality, legality, and
accountability.

58.

Recommendations on new or envisaged
weapons are based on precaution and
existing operational data:
58.1.

As the use of armed drones
has a risk of causing significant
head injuries, a moratorium on
the use of remotely operated
armed drones in protest

504

UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6 at paras 7.1.4 and 7.1.5.

505

Id at para 7.1.5.

506

General Comment No 37 above n 359 at para 95.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

sufficient understanding of their
Accountability
safety in crowdcontrol settings,
such weapons should not be 62. Law enforcement officials should record
used for crowd management.
and report any use of CCWs, including
There are serious concerns
specific models of CCWs deployed,
about prolonged exposure,
the distances from the targeted
the risk of cellular damage and
individuals/bystanders and the duration
high-degree burns, and the
of deployment, the number of each
potential for abuse. If these
type of CCW used, and the specific of
concerns are confirmed, the
any injuries caused by CCWs. Review
development and sale of these
of this reporting must confirm that the
weapons for law enforcement
reporting is accurate, and that the use
purposes and especially for
of CCWs was proportionate, necessary,
crowd control must be halted,
and lawful.
as the use of these weapons will
be disproportionate by design. 63. Law enforcement officials should
wear visible identification whenever
CCWs are used, in order to facilitate
Post-deployment of CCWs and
accountability.
medical assistance

Medical assistance
59.

164

64.

Law enforcement must ensure that
proper medical assistance is available
to protesters and provide prompt
access to aid when CCWs are deployed.
Identities of those seeking care should
not be released to law enforcement 65.
officials.

60.

Medical care for the sick and wounded
must not be restricted or interfered
with. Medical workers should never be
targeted, blocked, attacked, arrested
or interfered with for fulfilling their
obligations.

61.

Medical objects, such as ambulances
and clinics, should not be used for any
law enforcement purposes.

There should be a clear chain
of command, responsibility, and
accountability. All decisions taken
should be traceable, and those who
have taken the decisions must be held
accountable for them.
All deaths, injuries and suspected
misuses of CCWs should be thoroughly
investigated by a body independent
of the implicated officials, with a
view to establishing responsibilities
and accountability of the officials
involved, including the various levels
of the command structure in charge
during the incident. Where there
is evidence of unlawful conduct,
commanders and responsible officers
should face administrative disciplinary
measures and/or criminal prosecution,
as appropriate.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

66.

Police officers under investigation for
the misuse of CCWs or for any other
abuse of force should be removed from
active frontline duty or suspended until
their case is resolved.

67.

Legal provisions should ensure that
victims can obtain redress, even in
the absence of a criminal conviction
of the perpetrator(s), as well as
fair and adequate compensation,
including the means for the fullest
rehabilitation possible.

Next steps
Since INCLO and PHR started researching
CCWs, progress has been made at the
international, regional and national levels.
There has been substantive progress since
the approval of the UN Basic Principles and,
more recently, General Comment No 37 and
the UN Guidance on LLWs, both issued in 2020,
have shown notable advances in standard
setting regarding the regulation of CCWs and
outlining specific recommendations. There
has also been increased media coverage
of protests worldwide and more nuance in
the coverage that speaks of the use of “lesslethal” as opposed to “non-lethal” weapons,
an important conceptual distinction. Most
importantly, we have seen law reform in
different jurisdictions aiming to regulate the
use of CCWs.507

However, further development is needed.
There is a pressing need for the introduction
of these standards into domestic legal
frameworks
and
police
protocols.
International and regional organisations have
a role in promoting these tools and advising
states on operational ways of strengthening
their protections. However, in addition to
the implementation and proper application
of international laws and standards, other
changes are necessary. Around the world,
national-level laws, policing practices, police
culture, transparency, and accountability
measures often fall short of international
standards. This gap risks rendering
international law and standards as toothless
“paper rights” overridden by more restrictive
national and local laws. Much more must be
done to bring national and local laws in line
with more progressive international laws
and standards.
We hope that the recommendations in this
report can inform processes at the UN and
other regional fora to adopt stronger and
more evidence-based standards on the use
of CCWs. Additionally, General Comment
No 37 and the UN Guidance on LLWs,
both issued early in the global COVID-19
pandemic, have not been properly promoted
to States. It is of utmost importance that
these standards reach law enforcement and
security institutions and that their provisions
are adopted and operationalized by internal

507
In Canada, a motion was presented at the City Council to withdraw tear gas from the SPVM (Service de Police de la Ville de
Montréal) arsenal, which was supported by a coalition of 30 organizations. The final motion adopted by the City Council on 15 December
2020, asked the Public Health authority to provide an opinion as to the effect exposure to tear gas has on health and instructed Montreal’s
Public Security Commission to consider that finding as well as to examine the impact of tear gas on civil liberties. In Chile, in September
2020, a bill to modify the law on Arms Control (Law N° 17.798) was introduced in the House Chamber to regulate the use of CCWs. The bill
did not pass, but the precedent is significant. See https://www.diarioconstitucional.cl/wp-content/uploads/5010/2024/1597418972.pdf. In
the US, a 2020 document (from the Safe Coalition, North Carolina) calls on Charlotte City Council to build upon the protections stated in the
2015 Civil Liberties Resolution including analysis and recommendations regarding the proper use of CCWs. See: https://charlottenc.gov/
CityCouncil/Committees/Safe%20Communities/Sept%2015%202020%20Safe%20Communities%20meeting%20materials.pdf.

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Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

protocols. We also want to see regional fora
adopt regional standards on these issues, in
line with the UN. Lastly, more research on
and testing of these weapons is needed. This 2.
testing should inform processes to develop
more standards, especially around new
technologies and trade.
Below we outline specific calls:

The UN Guidance on LLWs must be
reviewed in 2025, and civil society
should be invited to participate in that
process.

United Nations

During the next review of the UN
Guidance on LLWs,509 the group of
experts should:

1.

3.1.

Detail which weapons are
expressly prohibited in protest
contexts.

3.2.

Provide detailed guidance
on the lawful use of drones
in the context of protests and
highlight instances in which
the use of drones is unlawful.

3.3.

Provide detailed guidance on
the lawful use of autonomous
weapons systems, including if
their deployment can ever be
lawful, and highlight instances
in which the use of autonomous
systems is unlawful.

1.

166

3.

in relation to CCWs in their periodic
country reports.

The Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights and/or the Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly
and of Association should be directed
to prepare reports on:
1.1.

The health consequences of
the use of CCWs.

1.2.

The
current
domestic
regulatory regimes applicable
to CCWs in States Parties,
including the preparation of
a draft model law on the predeployment, deployment, and
post-deployment of CCWs in
policing contexts.

1.3.

The application of the UN 4.
Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights508 to
manufacturers of CCWs.

States should engage with and support
internationaland
regional-level
processes to develop trade controls,
including the UN process towards a
Torture-Free Trade Treaty.510

The UN Human Rights Committee
should direct States Parties to report on
current domestic regulatory regimes

508

See above n 476.

509

UN Guidance on LLWs above n 6 at para 8.1.

510

See https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/2d9b2865e511428aa6b74cce84e984c5.

Lethal in Disguise 2 – New and revised recommendations and the way forward

African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights
1. The African Commission should
conduct a review of domestic
regulations,
protocols,
and
standing orders in States Parties
which pertain to the trade511
and use of CCWs and prepare a
report on the compliance of State
Parties’ regulations, protocols, and
standing orders with international
law and standards.
2. The African Commission should
create a working group to
investigate and report on the
misuse of CCWs in Africa and
to suggest appropriate revisions
to the 2017 Guidelines for the
Policing of Assemblies by Law
Enforcement Officials in Africa.

Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights
1. The IACHR should conduct a
review of domestic regulations,
protocols, and standing orders in
States Parties which pertain to the
use of CCWs. Particular attention
should be paid to the policing
practices in the management of
assemblies, dispersal techniques,
and the recent cases of misuse of
CCWs, particularly in relation to the
hundreds of eye injuries produced
by KIPs.
2. The IACHR should promote further
controls on the manufacture and
trade of CCWs in the region. For
example, it should issue a resolution
with the view to prohibiting and
preventing the use, production,
export, and trade of equipment
designed to inflict torture or illtreatment and the abuse of any
other equipment or substance to
these ends in accordance with
ongoing processes at the UN and
other regional mechanisms512.

511
See African Commission, 472 Resolution on the prohibition of the use, production, export and trade of tools used for torture.
ACHPR/Res.472 (LXVII) 2020, accessible at: https://www.achpr.org/sessions/resolutions?id=497.
512

Id.

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Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights

Final remarks
Achieving the proper use of CCWs is a complex task that can only be achieved by multiple
actors: from political and governmental authorities and law enforcement and security
institutions to international and regional organisations, academia, healthcare experts and
civil society. Of utmost importance is engaging the medical community on this issue: they
are able to document injuries, not only to improve their treatment but also to be able to
properly investigate the misuse and abuse of CCWs and enable accountability for abuses
and wrongdoings, which is key to preventing these violations. The proper use of CCWs is
fundamental to ensure the protection and facilitation of the exercise of the right to protest.
Law enforcement and security institutions have a role to play in this facilitation. This report’s
contribution is to inform this role and appropriate intervention to enable the lawful and harmfree management of assemblies.

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CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf.

Section 1: Introduction
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Section 2: Crowd-control weapons and their impacts
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Section 3: Laws and standards on the use of force and crowdcontrol weapons
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African Commission, 281 Resolution on the Right to Peaceful Demonstrations - ACHPR/Res.281(LV)2014,
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sites/default/files/field_documents/brake_v_ftwayne_-_complaint.pdf.
Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, Overview of Global and Regional Human Rights Standards on
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Driscoll v City of Denver, Case No. 1:21-cv-02866 (25 October 2021), accessible at: https://kdvr.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2021/10/Driscoll-Complaint-2.pdf.
General Comment No 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on
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Section 4: New and revised recommendations and the way
forward
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https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.

ENDS.

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