Little Hoover Commission, Solving California's Correction Crisis, 2007

• Topics: Cost of Prison Systems, Conditions of Confinement, Overcrowding

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State of California

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
January 25, 2007
The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger
Governor of California
The Honorable Don Perata
President pro Tempore of the Senate
and members of the Senate

The Honorable Dick Ackerman
Senate Minority Leader

The Honorable Fabian Núñez
Speaker of the Assembly
and members of the Assembly

The Honorable Michael Villines
Assembly Minority Leader

Dear Governor Schwarzenegger and members of the Legislature:
California’s prisons are out of space and running out of time.
The State already has ceded control to the federal courts for prison mental health, juvenile
justice and the prison health system. In December, a federal judge ordered the State to fix the
overcrowding problem within six months, or face the prospect of a prison population cap.
The State is past the point for assigning blame. The urgency of the crisis demands we look
now to those who can produce a solution. That responsibility lies with the Governor and the
Legislature. You have the authority and, as California’s leaders, must share the duty of fixing
California’s failed corrections system.
A default strategy of waiting until federal judges order needed changes is not governing. The
Governor and Legislature need to take the initiative away from federal courts by demonstrating
you have a better plan. That way, the Governor and Legislature can regain the confidence of
the courts as well as the Californians they govern.
You must assess your options frankly and move forward together on a solution. The Governor
has taken a first step with proposals that acknowledge the key issues and signal willingness to
engage in the process of developing solutions. But proposals have been made before only to
stop short of full implementation. The Governor and Legislature need to lay out plans that
include strategies and timetables for major milestones. And you need to deliver on your
commitments.
The Governor and Legislature must find the political will to move past rhetoric and address
ways to solve the prison population crisis and make good on promises to improve public safety.
“Tough on Crime” sentencing laws have to be judged by outcomes and matched with fiscal
responsibility. To ensure public safety, reforms will have to jettison posturing to make room
for smart on crime policies.
You must act decisively on the problem or turn it over to an independent body, insulated from
politics, that can. Our recommendation and preference is for you to do it yourselves.
The problem does not need further study. The State knows what the answers are, thanks to
nearly two decades of work by such groups as the Blue Ribbon Commission on Population
Management, the Corrections Independent Review Panel and a series of reports by this
Commission.
Despite ample evide nce and recommendations, policy-makers have been
unwilling to take on the problem in a purposeful, constructive way.

The consequences of failing to act aggressively now leave the State open to losing control of the
State correctional system and with it, control of the state budget. The debacle developed over
decades. Solutions, likewise, will be years in the making. But making a start now is essential.
The bare facts have earned California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation an
ignoble distinction for systemic failure . Inmates have swelled prisons far past capacity. With
cells already full, new inmates camp out in hallways, gyms and classrooms. The goals of
punishment and confinement have left little room, or budget, for rehabilitation. The bulk of the
State’s prisoners are not succeeding once released. California’s recidivism rate, at 70 percent,
is near the highest in the nation. The ranks of correctional officers have not kept pace with the
rising prison population. The department has thousands of openings, resulting in huge
overtime bills and mounting stress for correctional officers.
These are some of the problems you must solve.
During the past five years, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation budget has
surged 52 percent. California taxpayers legitimately can ask what return they are getting in
increased public safety and question the trade -offs the State implicitly makes in spending an
increasing portion of its general fund dollars on corrections.
The status quo is not acceptable. But even federal court intervention, a special legislative
session and a Governor’s emergency proclamation have yet to generate a level of alarm that
reflects the size of the crisis.
The choices are stark. The price of failure is unimaginable. It is not too late to act.
Sincerely,

Michael E. Alpert
Chairman

SOLVING CALIFORNIA ’ S CORRECTIONS CRISIS
TIME IS R UNNING OUT
Table of Contents
Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………………………..i
Time is Running Out………………………………………………………………………………………1
Managing the Population……………………………………………………………………………….17
Making Sense of Sentencing……………………………………………………………………………33
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................49
Study Process...................................................................................................................51
Appendices
Appendix A: Public Hearing Witnesses............................................................................................55
Appendix B: Sentencing Reform Advisory Committee Members......................................................57
Appendix C: Parole and Juvenile Justice Reform Roundtable Discussion Participants.......................59
Appendix D: Prior Recommendations..............................................................................................61
Appendix E: History of Sentencing Commission Legislation............................................................63
Appendix F: Sentencing Enhancements Since 1976........................................................................67

Notes...............................................................................................................................77

Table of Sidebars & Charts
Civilian Corrections Committee………………………………………………………………………..3
Assessing Risks and Needs……………………………………………………………………………….7
Court Ordered Correctional Reform………………………………………………………………...10
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC)………………………………….11
Expert Panel on Reentry and Recidivism Reduction……………………………………………..12
Successful Inter-Agency Corrections Task Forces………………………………………………...14
Inter-Agency Task Force...................................................................................................15
Milestones in California Corrections………………………………………………………………...18
California Prison Capacity……………………………………………………………………………..19
Major Prison Disturbance in Chino…………………………………………………………………..20
Comparison of California Corrections Spending, 1984-85 and 2006-07…………………....21
Prior Parole Policy Recommendations………………………………………………………………22

Failed Implementation of the New Parole Model............................................................23
Earned Discharge from Parole………………………………………………………………………..26
Percent of Felony Convictions Sentenced to State Prison by County, 2002……………….27
Citizen’s Option for Public Safety and Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act……………28
Involving the Courts in Reentry………………………………………………………………………29
Trial Court Consolidation………………………………………………………………………………30
Expanding Community-based Punishment Options..........................................................31
Judicial Empowerment…………………………………………………………………………………..32
Impact of Sentencing Laws on Women............................................................................34
Overview: Sentencing Guidelines and Commissions........................................................39
Data Collection and Analysis...........................................................................................41
Dissolved or Abolished Sentencing Commissions.............................................................42
Strengths and Weaknesses of Sentencing Commissions...................................................45
Membership of a Sentencing Commission........................................................................46
University of California Board of Regents........................................................................47
Link Sentencing Laws to Fiscal Appropriations................................................................48
Immediate Opportunities to Address Overcrowding.......................................................50

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary
California’s correctional system is in a tailspin that threatens public
safety and raises the risk of fiscal disaster. The failing correctional
system is the largest and most immediate crisis facing policy-makers.
For decades, governors and lawmakers fearful of appearing soft on crime
have failed to muster the political will to address the looming crisis. And
now their time has run out.
State prisons are packed beyond capacity. Inmates sleep in classrooms,
gyms and hallways. Federal judges control inmate medical care and
oversee mental health, use of force, disabilities act compliance, dental
care, parolee due process rights and most aspects of the juvenile justice
system. Thousands of local jail inmate s are let out early every week as a
result of overcrowding and court-ordered population caps. The State
may soon face the same fate.
The Governor declared a state of emergency. But even that didn’t bring
action, only more reports to federal judges that underscore the fact that
the State’s corrections policy is politically bankrupt. As a result, a
federal judge has given the State six months to make progress on
overcrowding or face the appointment of a panel of federal judges who
will manage the prison population.
For years, lawmakers and government officials have failed to do their
jobs. This failure has robbed the State of fiscal control of the correctional
system and placed it in the hands of federal courts.
The court-appointed receiver for inmate medical care has threatene d to
“back up the truck to raid the state treasury” – if that is what it will take
to bring the system into constitutional compliance.1
The receivership has set up a parallel management structure between
the courts and the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) that impedes the State’s ability to attract and
retain the exceptional leadership required to guide the State out of the
quagmire. In 2006, the department saw two secretaries resign abruptly
before the current secretary was appointed in November. In testimony
before a federal judge, both former secretaries stated that politics
trumped good policy in correctional reform efforts.
A nationally
recognized correctional administrator told the Commission that no one

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
with the competency and leadership skills required to succeed as
secretary would be willing to take the job under these circumstances.
Unlike other states, California relies almost completely on CDCR to
improve correctional outcomes. It fails to tap the resources of other
agencies that could assist in reducing crime and improving chances for
offenders to improve themselves before they are released.
Despite the rhetoric, thirty years of “tough on crime” politics has not
made the state safer. Quite the opposite: today thousands of hardened,
violent criminals are released without regard to the danger they present
to an unsuspecting public.
Years of political posturing have taken a good idea – determinate
sentencing – and warped it beyond recognition with a series of laws
passed with no thought to their cumulative impact.
And these laws
stripped away incentive s for offenders to change or improve themselves
while incarcerated.
Inmates who are willing to improve their education, learn a job skill or
kick a drug habi t find that programs are few and far between, a result of
budget choices and overcrowding. Consequently, offenders are released
into California communities with the criminal tendencies and addictions
that first led to their incarce ration. They are ill-prepared to do more than
commit new crimes and create new victims.
Not surprisingly, California has one of the highest recidivism rates in the
nation. Approximately 70 percent of all offenders released from prison
are back within three years – mostly due to parole violations, many of
which are technical in nature. California’s parole system remains a
billion dollar failure.
If the problems are not fixed, the consequences will be severe. While
many Californians and their policy-makers have heard or read about the
corrections crisis, few are aware of how serious the crisis has become
and what the consequences will be . The fiscal ramifications will affect
funding for virtually every other government program – from education to
health care .
Governor Schwarzenegger proposed an ambitious plan in December 2006
to increase the number of prison cells, expand space in county jails and
establish a sentencing commission. That is an encouraging start, but
insufficient given the seriousness of the situation that require s
immediate action and demonstrable results.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Once, policy-makers had ample opportunities to make choices that could
have put the State on a different path. Now, policy-makers are down to
just two:
•

The Governor and the Legislature can summon the political will to
immediate ly implement reforms to improve the corrections system to
ensure public safety and eliminate federal involvement.

•

Or, they must turn over the task to an independent commission –
free from political interference – with the authority to fix this broken
system.

It will not be easy and change will not happen overnight. It will require
cooperation and courage on the part of the Governor and the Legislature.
And the solutions will require skillful and determined implementation.
The top priority should be to take back control of the prison medical
system, by developing a plan to work with an organization such as Kaiser
Permanente or a university that can run the system for the State. This is
a critical step in restoring confidence that the State can run the entire
system and demonstrate the professional competence needed to attract
top managers.
The State must immediately take action to improve its management of
the correctional population and implement the recommendations made
by this and other commissions, including expanding in-prison programs,
improving prisoner reentry, and reallocating resources to communitybased alternatives. The State must use all of its human resources, not
just the personnel of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The State must re-invent parole, moving to a system of post-release
supervision for certain prisoners to ensure public safety.
At the same time, the State should begin a comprehensive evaluation of
its sentencing system by establishing an independent sentencing
commission to develop guidelines for coherent and equitable sentencing
guided by overarching criminal justice policy goals. This is not a shortterm solution, but a way to create rational long-term policy. Critics who
suggest that a sentencing commission is code for shorter sentences are
misinformed.
Other states have used sentencing commissions to
lengthen sentences for the most dangerous criminals, develop
community-based punishment for nonviolent offenders and bring fiscal
responsibility to criminal justice policies.
As they start the process, the Governor and Legislature should set goals
and targets and insist on performance management to meet them. These
reforms must not be allowed to fail in implementation, as they have

iii

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
before. From start to finish, policy-makers must provide consistent
support and oversight. In doing so, they can demonstrate progress to the
public and the courts and begin to rebuild confidence in the State’s
ability to manage this critical responsibility.
Each of these proposals presents opportunities to fix a portion of
California’s corrections system. But they must be undertaken together,
guided by a comprehensive strategy. Each reinforces the others as
California embarks on changing the culture of its corrections system and
restori ng its status as a national model of success.

Recommendation 1: The Governor and Legislature should immediately implement a
comprehensive strategy to reduce prison overcrowding and improve public safety in
California communities. Specifically, the Governor and the Legislature should:
q Implement prior reform recommendations. Policy-makers do not
need to further research solutions.
They must immediately
implement the evidence -based recommendations made by this
Commission and others over the past two decades in order to
regain control of major areas of prison operations where court
intervention exists and avoid additional court intervention. To
improve the performance of the correctional system, policymakers must re-invent parole; expand educational, vocational
and substance abuse treatment programs in prisons; reallocate
resources to expand local punishment alternatives; and, expand
judicial discretion.

q Establish a corrections inter-agency task force. The State should
establish an inter-agency task force to develop partnerships with
CDCR to bolster in-prison and reentry programs with a goal of
reducing recidivism and improving public safety.
The interagency task force should include all government entities that
currently or potentially could assist offenders in improving their
education, getting a job, finding housing, getting photo
identification or a driver’s license or treating an addiction or
mental health problem.

Alternative Recommendation: If the Governor and Legislature are unwilling or unable to
advance these critical correctional reforms, they should turn the job over to a board of
directors with the power and authority to enact reforms. Specifically:
q The board should be an independent entity modele d after the
federal Base Realignment and Closure Commission with members
appointed by the Governor and legislative leaders.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
q The board of directors should have the authority to enact criminal
justice policies that become law unless rejected by the Governor
or two-thirds of the Legislature.
q The secretary of CDCR should report to the board of directors and
should be accountable for implementing the policies of the board.

Recommendation 2: To improve public safety and make the best use of correctional
resources, the State must immediately implement evidence-based policies to reduce
overcrowding and hold offenders accountable for improving themselves. Specifically, the
State should:
q

ü Provide opportunities for former offenders
to earn discharge from supervision by
maintaining employment, going to school,
completing drug treatment or achieving
other goals that reduce recidivism.
ü Authorize a grid of community-based
sanctions, including jail, for offenders
who violate the terms of post-release
supervisi on.

The State should reallocate resources to assist
communities in expanding community-based
punishment options for offenders who violate
the terms of post-release supervision. Working
with communities, the State should reallocate
resources to establish a continuum of
alternatives to prison, including electronic
monitoring, day reporting centers, drug
treatment, jail time and other communitybased sanctions.

q Try offenders who commit new crimes. Offenders on post-release
supervision who commit a new, serious crime should be charged and
tried in court, and if found guilty, sentenced to a new term.

q Shift responsibility. The State should shift post-release supervision
and responsibility, and accountability for offender reintegration, to
communities. It should begin with three or four willing counties and
develop agreements and provide funding for sheriffs or probation
departments in those counties, in pa rtnership with community
agencies, to provide supervision, services and sanctions for parolees.

q Expand programs and create incentives for completing them.
The State should expand programs that research shows reduce
recidivism. As programs are increased, the State should establish
incentives for offenders to participate, including:

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
ü

Linking credits toward early release to completion of education
and job training programs, as well as plans for a job and housing.

Requiring inmates to make progress toward educational or drug
treatment goals before becoming eligible for work assignments.

q Expand local capacity. The State should reallocate resources to assist
counties in expanding local capacity including jail space, drug
treatment programs, day reporting cente rs and other locally-based
punishment options. The State also should reallocate resources to
assist counties in expanding intensive probation as an alternative
sanction to jail or prison and to enhance crime prevention.

q Expand the role of judges. Guided by an offender risk assessment
tool prior to sentencing, judges should be empowered to set goals
that offenders should achieve, whether they are put on probation or
sentenced to jail or prison. Additionally, the State should assist
willing counties in establishing reentry courts where judges oversee
the reentry of selected offenders back to the community.

Recommendation 3: California should establish a sentencing commission to guide the
State’s criminal justice sentencing policies to enhance public safety. Specifically, the
sentencing commission should be:
q Protective.

The Governor and the Legislature should establish a
sentencing commission whose primary goal should be to enhance
public safety and use public resources wisely.
A sentencing
commission is not a vehicle to revisit indeterminate sentencing, but a
way to ensure sentencing laws match sentencing goals.
Consideration should be given to successful strategies of sentencing
commissions in other states.

q Independent. The sentencing commission should be permanent and
independent from all branches of government with dedicated funding
to support a small staff that would include criminologists,
statisticians, legal experts and policy advisors.

q Diverse. The sentencing commission should be geographically and
culturally diverse and its members must have demonstrated
leadership capabilities.
Members could include judges, district
attorneys, public defenders, local law enforcement officials, academic
experts, including an expert in gender responsive strategies for
female offenders, victims’ rights representatives, correctional leaders,
former offenders or families of offenders and members of the public.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
q Authoritative. The sentencing commission should have the authority
to develop sentencing guideli nes, as well as post release supervision
and revocation guidelines that become law unless rejected by a
majority vote of the Legislature.

q Data-oriented. The sentencing commission should be the State’s
clearinghouse for all sentencing and offender data. Policy-makers
should immediately task and fund one or more California universities
to perform this function for the commission.

q Accountable. The sentencing commission should assess all proposed
sentencing law changes for their potential effect on criminal justice
policies and correctional system resources.

vii

TIME IS RUNNING OUT

Time Is Running Out
California’s correctional crisis has been brewing for years. But time is
running out for the State to solve it. Solutions will not be quick or easy.
But the problems can be solved if policy-makers can muster the political
will.
If policy-makers are unwilling or unable to address the crisis, the federal
court will step in to fill the void.
Lawsuits filed in three federal courts alleging that the current level of
overcrowding constitutes cruel and unusual punishment ask that the
courts appoint a panel of federal judges to manage California’s prison
population. U.S. District Judge Lawrence Karlton, the first judge to hear
the motion, gave the State until June 2007 to show progress in solving
the overpopulation crisis.
Judge Karlton clearly would prefer not to manage California’s prison
population. At a December 2006 hearing, Judge Karlton told lawyers
representing the Schwarzenegger administration that he is not inclined
“to spend forever running the state prison system.” Howeve r, he also
warned the attorneys, “You tell your client June 4 may be the end of the
line. It may really be the end of the line.”2
The Governor and the Legislature must take this crisis seriously and
resolve to fix it or they should turn it over to an independent body to do
so. The State must take the initiative to gain control of the system and
to regain the confidence of the courts and the public.
The Governor called a special legislative session in the summer of 2006
to address the crisis, yet not one new law or policy shift came out of it.
The Governor declared a State of Emergency in October 2006, and still
the crisis continue d. On December 21, 2006, the Governor unveiled a
proposal which builds on the prison bed expansion proposed by the
Administration in the special session. It also would expand local jail
space and establish a sentencing commission.
On the following pages the Commission offers comprehensive
recommendations.
If implemented, they will result in correctional
policies that research shows are effective in improving public safety and
managing public dollars.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

Lack of Political Will
It is clear that substantive reform cannot go forward without the
combined effort of the Governor and the Legislature – this means political
support as well as the necessary resources.
Absent such backing, the State’s correctional system has been in a
downward
spiral
for
decades.
Well-intentioned
correctional
administrators have attempted the reforms that experts agree are
required, but none have materialized.
Policy-makers have paid lip
service to reform, but withheld the political support and funding required
to get the job done.
At a Commission hearing, former CDCR Secretary Roderick Hickman
testified that corrections reform has been stalled by internal and external
forces.
“Corrections is still years away from sustainable change,”
Hickman said. “The environment needed to truly reform corrections is
still overly influenced by special interests wedded to the status quo.” 3
Appearing before a federal judge to explain their abrupt resignations in
2006, Hickman and former CDCR Secretary Jeanne Woodford testified
that election-year politics had thwarted their efforts to fix the corrections
crisis.4
With the 2006 election behind us, the Governor and the Legislature have
the opportunity to look beyond scoring quick political points to focusing
on solutions. A look at the most recent significant attempt at reform
shows pitfalls to be avoided.
In November 2003, Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected Governor and
vowed to make prison reform a top priority. He took several promising
steps to tackle the problem.
He authorized his newly appointed
corrections secretary, Roderick Hickman, to implement a “new parole
model,” which expanded alternatives to prison for parole violators. He
also established the Corrections Independent Review Panel (IRP), chaired
by former Governor Deukmejian, to evaluate the correctional system and
make recommendations.
Attempts to implement the “new parole model” began in early 2004. The
plan was designed to expand alternatives to prison for low-level parole
violators, including jail time, residential substance abuse treatment and
other community-based punishments. The department projected cost
savings of approximately $150 million over two years and even closed the
correctional officer training academy, anticipating a reduced need for
new officers.5

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
However, the department stumbled in its efforts to implement the new
parole model. After more than a year of only limited implementation,
Crime Victims United, an organization funded by the California
Correctional Peace Officers Association, began airing television
advertisements charging that the Governor’s parole reform policies put
communities at risk – that the parole policies “kept murderers, rapists
and child molesters on our streets.”6
In reality, the parole reform policies targeted non-violent, non-serious
offenders, but the political ramifications from the opposition to the parole
reforms proved to be too much at a time when the Governor was
defending his 2005 “Year of Reform” against numerous other special
interests, including nurses, teachers, firefighters and others.
.
In April 2005, the new parole model was abruptly terminated. Roderick
Hickman issued an official explanation stating there was no evidence the
new parole policies were working. However, the shift in policy was
thought by many to be an expedient,
easy way to squelch a political hotspot.
Civilian Corrections Commission
Hickman asserted at the time that the
The first recommendation made by the Corrections
department would have the opportunity
Independent Review Panel (IRP) was to “create a
to re-evaluate and re-introduce parole
Civilian Corrections Commission at the highest level
reform policies.
of the organization and assign the commission
authority to approve policy and provide direction to
The Governor’s other major corrections
the correctional administration.”
initiative , the establishment of the
The commission would report to the Governor and
Independent Review Panel, was more
would perform the following functions:
successful.
In June 2004, the IRP
• Adopt integrated plans and policies for CDCR
published 239 recommendations for
• Conduct performance oversight
reforming corrections. Using the IRP
• Approve the overall department budget
recommendations as a guide , the
• Issue directives to the secretary of CDCR
Governor submitted a plan to this
• Perform other duties as may be appropriate
Commission in January 2005 to
The panel recommended the commission consist of
reorganize what was then the Youth
five members, each to be appointed by the Governor
and Adult Correctional Agency into the
and confirmed by the Senate for staggered five-year
California Department of Corrections
terms. The commissioners would serve at the
pleasure of the Governor for a period no longer than
and Rehabilitation. In its review of the
10 years. No commissioner would be eligible for
plan, the Commission noted several
appointment if he or she had been affiliated with
areas of concern, but stated the
CDCR or its predecessor entities prior to his or her
reorganization overall was an important
appointment.
step in the right direction.
The
The commission would recommend a CDCR
Commission recommended that the
secretary to be appointed by the Governor who
Legislature allow the plan to go into
would serve at the pleasure of the commission.
effect, but also recommended that the
Source: Final Report. June 2004. Corrections Independent
Legislature continue to work with the
Review Panel.
Administration to address the flaws.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
One of the Governor’s critical departures from the IRP recommendations
was the omission of an independent civilian oversight panel which was to
have functioned as a board of directors for the department. At the time,
then-Secretary Hickman said that the Administration did not believe the
civilian commission was necessary and that concerns about public
scrutiny are addressed by the Little Hoover Commission, the Bureau of
State Audits and the Legislature.7
However, in testimony to the California Performance Review Commission,
former Governor Deukmejian and the panel’s executive director
emphatically stated that the agency does not have the capacity to
“correct” itself and without independent oversight, meaningful reform
would not occur. 8
Their testimony illuminates the imbedded cultural challenges that have
thwarted meaningful progress. The deep-seated resistance to change
requires more than support from the Governor and the Legislature, but
also close, focused oversight which they have not shown the capacity for.
In July 2005, the Governor’s reorganization plan went into effect creating
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. While no
one expected an organization that had been headed in the wrong
direction for several decades to shift course overnight, conditions in the
months since have deteriorated further.
In June 2006 the courts continue d to signal that the system remained at
risk for further court intervention and John Hagar, the special master
overseeing one of the court cases issued a report expressing his concerns
over the Governor’s “retreat from prison reform.”9
Shortly after,
Governor Schwarzenegger called an August 2006 special legislative
session to review a package of reform proposals that focused heavily on
new prison construction. Although a highly revised version of the plan
was adopted by the Senate, the Assembly failed to act on the proposal.
In October 2006, the Governor declared a state of emergency in the
prison system and called for the voluntary transfer of inmates to facilities
in other states.
As of January 17, 2007, 278 inmates had been
transferred to Arizona and Tennessee.10
On December 21, 2006, the Governor unveiled a new $11 billion prison
reform package, which include d many of the measures that the
Administration proposed in the special session, but added new elements.
Highlights of the plan include 16,000 new prison beds on existing sites,
5,000 to 7,000 new secure re -entry beds, 10,000 medical and mental
health beds and 45,000 local jail beds. The plan also includes resources
to implement Jessica’s law, which voters overwhelmingly supported in
the November 2006 election, creates a sentencing commission and

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
modifies California’s parole structure to focus on offenders at the highest
risk for committing another crime.11
The Governor is to be commended for embracing a plan that includes
more than just building new prisons, and which also addresses
sentencing and parole reform. However, CDCR has a dismal track record
for turning talk into action. To fully implement the Governor’s ambitious
agenda, the department will have to employ more consistent leadership,
management and communication than it has in recent years. It will need
to establish performance measures and track and report progress on
reaching goals, such as lower recidivism rate s and program completion.
And it will need the consistent and vocal support of a united Governor
and Legislature.

The Leadership Void
A key condition for reform is consistent state leadership. The Governor
and the Legislature must create the conditions for CDCR to successfully
fend off attempts to dull or deflect its efforts to move forward.
This is particularly crucial to helping CDCR to mount
“Stability in a corrections
bureaucratic hurdles that can unintentionally stall or thwart
agency is of the utmost
change.
importance. Of course…it’s
To the extent that CDCR has not enjoyed such leadership, its
efforts to change have been eroded.
The departures of
secretaries Hickman and Woodford in quick succession
undercut efforts to communicate and push a consistent
reform agenda through the department.
Hickman and then Woodford were thwarted by external forces
in their attempts to hire senior managers who could advance
the reorganization reforms.
In his testimony to the
Commission,
Hickman
stated
that
the
corrections
reorganization was essentially the only major government
reform to come out of the California Performance Review
(CPR).
None of the changes recommended by the CPR
relating to the fiscal control agencies or oversight bodies were
advanced by the Administration. As a result, he stated that
“we
had
this
new
structure
modeled
after
the
recommendations that came from CPR…attempting to
communicate, operate and change within a government
structure and Governor’s Office that were operating from a
different model.
Consequently, the goals and objectives
articulated in the strategic plan, organizational design and
reorganization were not recognized or adequately funded.”12

important to have sustained
leadership at the Secretary
level, but it also is
important at other
executive level posts.
When there isn’t stability,
leadership is often
disregarded…Stability alone
isn’t enough. Support,
especially from the
Governor’s office and the
Legislature, must be
provided. The best
managers and leaders will
ultimately fail without
assistance from policymakers.”
Dr. Reginald Wilkinson, former
Director, Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction.
November 16, 2006. Testimony
to the Commission.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
That cannot be allowed to happen again. If the Governor and the
Legislature agree on a plan, they need to provide the political support
and resources for it to succeed.
This is not the first or only example of external forces stopping reform
efforts. In the 2003-04 budget, the Legislature directed the department’s
parole division to implement the reforms outlined in the “new parole
model.” But the Department of Finance denied the deputy director of the
parole division the staff and management team required to successfully
implement the reform.13
When there is political support at the top, things can get done quickly.
Current Secretary James Tilton has been at the helm since April 2006,
first as an interim secretary and now in a permanent capacity. His first
order of business was to eliminate the vacancies in senior management
that hobbled the abilities of his predecessors to execute a plan. In his
first six months, he appointed more than 50 officials to management
positions.
Mr. Tilton told the Commission that his success was
facilitated by an expedited appointment process within the Governor’s
office. He also said, compared to other state agencies, positions that
require a Governor’s appointment go much deeper in the CDCR
organizational structure . While his ability to appoint top managers has
been facilitated by the current crisis, the large number of appointees in
the organization could impede the ability of future secretaries to fill
positions quick ly.14

“Trained Incapacity”
Tilton’s new management team, in addition to grappling with halfimplemented reforms, has the challenge of establishing its credibility
with U.S. District Judge Thelton Henderson and other parties. In his
October 2005 findings prior to establishing the medical receivership in
the Plata lawsuit, Henderson coined the phrase “trained incapacity” to
describe what he called the “can’t do” attitude of corrections staff toward
implementing reforms. Citing multiple failures to comply with court
orders for reform, Henderson found “that the CDCR leadership simply
has been – and presently is – incapable of successfully implementing
systemic change or completing even minimal goals toward the design and
implementation of a functional medical delivery system.”15
Robert Sillen, the court-appointed receiver over inmate medical care, in
his July 2006 report to the court, stated that the “trained incapacity”
was understated and presented a major cultural obstacle to
implementing reform. Sillen asserted that the “trained incapacity” is
“both a vertical and horizontal issue, i.e., it involves not only CDCR but
all other state agencies and departments whose performance significantly

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
affects CDCR’s ability to perform adequately and appropriately.” Sillen
took aim at, among others, the Department of Finance and the State
Personnel Board for making the hiring process overly complex. 16

Failed Implementation
In 2003, the Little Hoover Commission recommended the department
implement a risk and needs assessment tool to evaluate offenders upon
entry into prison. This has not happened.
However, one of the
objectives of the department’s 2005 strategic plan was to “provide
offender risk and needs assessment at the time of initial incarceration
and at designated time periods,” by January 2006.17 Queried on the
progress in late 2005, the department said that it had begun to use risk
and needs assessment as part of pre-release planning for offenders
nearing parole release . In a September
2005 meeting, the deputy director of the
Assessing Risks and Needs
parole division said that 45,244 offenders
had been assessed using the COMPAS
Many correctional organizations in the United States,
Canada and other countries use offender information to
North Point risk assessment tool and that
develop correctional policies, cost-effectively target
the department was validating the tool for
correctional strategies and improve public safety. In its
18
California’s
correctional
population.
2003 report on parole policies, the Commission
Some meeting participants questioned
recommended that CDCR implement a proven,
whether staff had been adequately trained
validated risk and needs assessment tool to assess
with the tool and whether offenders were
inmates when they enter prison.
being matched with programs once
Information developed through structured risk and
assessed. When queried again in October
needs assessments allows correctional administrators to
2006,
the
department
told
the
distinguish among offenders who present real risks to
public safety and those who do not and to target
Commission that the tool had been
resources effectively. These assessments can help
implemented in March 2006 and that
prison administrators strategically allocate available
16,916 inmates had been assessed
education, job training, treatment and pre-release
between March and August 2006.
opportunities.
Additionally,
the
department
was
Assessments also can guide transition planning and be
evaluating the possibility of using the tool
used to link offenders with critical post-release
at intake.19 However, at a roundtable
services. With reliable information, more resources
meeting
the
Commission
held
in
can be targeted to higher-risk offenders released to
November 2006 on parole reform, a parole
parole, while fewer resources can safely be spent on
lower- risk offenders.
agent told the Commission that she and
her colleagues had not seen any data
from parolee risk assessments.

Signs of Hope
The department has achieved some success since the July 2005
reorganization, particularly in the areas of gender responsive strategies.
While female and juvenile offenders make up less than 7 percent of the
state prison population, lessons learned from the strategies successfully

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
being implemented in this area could be applied to the overall
population.
In December 2004, the Commission recommended that the department
develop a strategy to hold female offenders accountable for their crimes,
but also make it easier for them to reintegrate into their communities.
The Commission recommended that the State create a continuum of
community correctional facilities to prepare female offenders for success
on parole. Shortly after, the department established the position of
associate director of female offender institutions, camps and community
correctional facilities. In February 2005, CDCR established the Gender
Responsive Strategies Commission to advise the department on the
development of a gender-specific strategic plan.
A key part of the plan is to move approximately 4,500 low-level, nonviolent female offenders into community-based correctional facilities with
a continuum of support services. The plan was introduced in the
Legislature in 2006 and then came under consideration during the
special session. Though it failed to gain approval from the Legislature, a
bill has been introduced in the 2007-08 legislative session and the
department has sent out requests for proposals for the community
correctional facilities.20 Other progress includes the elimination of male
correctional officer pat searche s of female offenders; a new law that limits
the practice of shackling pregnant offenders during childbirth; the
establishment of a mother-baby wing at the California Institute for
Women; gender-responsive training throughout the CDCR organization;
and, ongoing efforts to develop and implement evidence -based genderresponsive programs. 21

Changing the Culture
Communication will be key.
Success will depend on department
managers effectively expressing concrete sets of goals and objectives
throughout the department – in the institutions and in the parole offices.
But management must also be open to input coming from below the top
ranks and from outside the organization. This likely will require a
significant cultural change .
Correctional reforms often have been doomed because corrections
manage rs do not seek input from, nor effectively communicate with, staff
members on the front line who ultimately must implement new policies
or programs. The failure to effectively implement the risk and needs
assessment tool is one example of failed communication between
headquarters and the field.

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
Another recent example involve s the abrupt closure of a Los Angeles
psychiatric crisis clinic that served high risk parolees and sex offenders.
In letters to the Governor and to the Commission, the clinicians detailed
the negative ramifications of this policy decision. They said they were
not consulted on the closure decision and that the management staff in
the parole division at headquarters has no one with counseling
experience to understand the ramifications. Staff was dispersed to
parole units, duplicating mental health services already available, while
leaving behind a high risk transient parole population who found it
difficult, if not impossible, to get to counseling.22
When correctional reform goals are communicated to staff in the field,
the needed training often is lacking.
Many long-term corrections
employees simply choose to “wait out” implementation of new policies
until the next leader drops the initiative or unveils their own higher
priority plan.
In testimony to the Commission, former Secretary
Hickman said that one of the challenges he faced in implementing the
reforms outlined in the department’s strategic plan was that “managers
were unwilling to really step forward and challenge the status quo”
because of the “organizational thought that nothing will change.”
Additionally, Mr. Hickman said, even those who supported the changes,
“took a wait and see approach. Concerns led to them entering into the
pool of change with only one toe.”23
It is a problem nationwide,
according to Dr. Reginald Wilkinson, who added, it is related directly to
stability and consistency of leadership. 24

Ceding Management to the Courts
Absent action by policy-makers, inmate lawyers and the federal courts
have become de-facto managers and reformers of the system. Many
observers assert that the only meaningful correctional reforms that have
occurred in recent years are those that result from court intervention.
And those reforms have come at a staggering price.
ü

In the Plata lawsuit, the court appointed a medical receiver,
whose projected annual budget for operating and capital expenses
for 2006-07 is $8.38 million, primarily for salaries and
contractors. The biggest budgetary impact, however, will be
financing the improvements the receiver orders, which are
expected to run in the billions of dollars over the course of the
next several years.25

Approximately 18 percent of the $440 million budget for the
CDCR Division of Juvenile Justice for fiscal year 2006-07 is in
response to the Farrell v. Tilton consent decree. The State spends

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
approximately $120,000 per ward and the 2006-07 budget
authorized more than 4,200 positions to manage approximately
2,700 wards and 3,100 juvenile parolees.26
While the court’s intention in the Plata case is to save lives by bringing
the State into constitutional compliance for
inmate medical care, in testimony to the
Court Ordered Correctional Reform
Commission, Robert Sillen, the receiver,
Disability rights
indicated it would be 18 months before a plan
Armstrong v. Davis (2001) – Federal Court
was in place and many years before the State
ordered the State to comply with the
could expect to reassume control of the inmate
Americans With Disabilities Act during parole
medical system.27 That could be time during
hearings.
which the State will be unable to plan or budget
Prisoner treatment
for its inmate medical expenditures.
Madrid v. Gomez (1995) - Federal Court
ordered the State to end the use of excessive
Court intervention has resulted in more than
force at Pelican Bay State Prison.
just
unnecessarily
large
costs.
Court
Wilson v. Deukmejian (1983) – State Court
intervention has created a parallel management
ruled the conditions at San Quentin State
structure with a chain of command that is
Prison constituted cruel and unusual
punishment and ordered immediate
separate from the CDCR chain of command.
improvement.
While the receiver has expressed a willingness to
work in sync with CDCR, there is no mechanism
Prisoner health rights
to make sure that implementation of reforms is
Perez v. Tilton (2006) – Federal Court ordered
coordinated or that the two systems even have
the State to provide adequate and timely
dental care to all state inmates.
common goals.
Plata v. Schwarzenegger (2005) - Federal
Court placed California’s prison medical
The State and the Secretary of CDCR have lost
system under federal receivership.
control over a significant portion of corrections
Farrell v. Tilton (2004) – State Court ordered
operations and budget. Observers assert this
CDCR to improve virtually every aspect of the
parallel management compromises the State’s
State juvenile justice system.
ability to attract the caliber of leadership that is
Coleman v. Wilson (1995) - Federal Court
required
to
turn
around
this
complex
ordered the State to provide efficient mental
28
organization.
health treatment to mentally ill inmates.
Due process for parole revocations
Valdivia v. Davis (2002) - Federal Court
ordered the State to provide due process
protection to parolees returned to custody.
Source: Prison Law Office, www.prisonlaw.org.

To be able to attract the leadership it needs and
to save taxpayer dollars, the State must do
whatever it takes to speed the process to regain
control of areas where the court has intervened
and to avoid future court involvement.

TIME IS RUNNING OUT

Alternative Management Models
Other states have tackled and solved these and other tough problems.
And management models exist at both the state and federal level for
resolving seemingly intractable issues. One successful model is the
federal Base Closure and Realignment Commission. This independent
and authoritative commission assists the President and Congress in
making decisions on closing military bases which otherwise would not be
politically feasible.

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC)
Faced with the arduous and politically charged task of closing military bases, the United States
Congress in 1990 established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, commonly
referred to as BRAC. The commission was charged with providing an objective, accurate and nonpartisan review and analysis of a list of base and military installations which the Department of
Defense (DOD) recommended be closed or realigned.
The President appoints a chair of the commission and eight additional members with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Using selection criteria established by Congress, the commission can modify
or reject DOD recommendations and also add military installations to the list. The commission tours
sites and holds meetings and public hearings to gather public input.
The commission publicly reports its findings and recommendations to the President, who can either
forward the report to Congress or return it to the commission for further evaluation. If the report is
returned, the commission can modify and resubmit the report to the President. If the President
submits the report to Congress, Congress has 45 days to enact a joint resolution rejecting the report in
full, or the report becomes law. If the President does not submit the report to Congress, the BRAC
process is terminated.
Sources: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Also Charter of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. www.brac.gov. Web site accessed December 15, 2006.

Other Players Could Help
CDCR is not solely responsible for the corrections crisis, nor can it solve
it alone . CDCR, for example, has no control over which or how many
offenders the courts send to prison. Nor does it control, for the most
part, when offenders get out. Sentencing laws that send offenders to
prison and de termine how long they will stay are established not by
CDCR but by the Governor, the Legislature and, increasingly, by ballot
measures.
There are other state agencies that could play a role in helping prisoners
and parolees succeed, but they would need to expand their capacity and
vision, as well as partnerships, to measure up to the level of cooperation
seen in some other states. Dr. Reginald Wilkinson, former director of the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, told the Commission,

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
“You can’t succeed with just CDCR staff. You need the expertise of the
departments of health, mental health, aging…all the resources already in
place.” He added that if the correctional system is failing, “it is not only
the fault of CDCR, but the fault of California state government.”29
It will be critical for the Governor to communicate to all departments that
could and should have a role in offender re -entry, that they too will be
held accountable for the succe ss or failure of the State’s efforts; certainly
all departments would bear the cost of the failure should the State lose
control of the prison system.
CDCR currently has several partnerships with other state agencies, but
could do more. CDCR partners with the California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection to manage the California Conservation
Camp program. More than 4,000 low-level male and female offenders
join the fire line during fire season and assist with flood control, search
and
rescue
operations
and
other
Expert Panel on Reentry and Recidivism Reduction
community services. However, thousands
more are on waiting lists for the program.
The Legislature included $900,000 in the Budget Act of
CDCR partners with the Employment
2006 for CDCR to contract with correctional program
Development Department to provide
experts to perform a comprehensive evaluation of all
adult prison and parole programs designed to reduce
employment services in some, but not all
recidivism. CDCR has convened an expert panel coparole offices. CDCR also partners with
chaired by the chief deputy secretary of CDCR adult
the Department of Alcohol and Drug
programs and nationally-recognized criminologist Joan
Programs for community-based drug
Petersilia, director of the Center for Evidence-Based
treatment provided through the Parolee
Corrections at the University of California at Irvine. The
Services Network. CDCR manages the inpanel’s 15 other members include academic experts,
current and former correctional department leaders and
prison treatment programs and drug
successful re-entry program managers. The expert panel
treatment furlough programs, when it
is charged with three overarching tasks:
could collaborate more closely with ADP
for these programs. The State has
• Evaluate all adult prison and parole programs to
assess whether these programs are likely to have a
expanded its partnership with community
significant impact on recidivism and to estimate the
colleges so that college coursework is
number of offenders not currently participating in
available in all prisons, however, only 2
these programs who could benefit from them.
percent
of
the
inmate
population
30
• Design a model system to serve as a guide for
participates.
building an effective multi-year strategic plan for
programs that reduce crime and recidivism.
CDCR also participates on 10 councils,
• Recommend specific legislative and policy changes
work groups or committees with various
that could lead to a reduction in crowding and
missions from conquering homelessness
intake numbers.
to expanding collaborative courts.
In
CDCR is to report the findings and recommendations of
2006, the Legislature established a Re the panel to the Legislature by June 30, 2007.
entry Advisory Committee to bring
Sources: Budget Act of 2006. California Department of Corrections
together state and local agencies that can
and Rehabilitation. “Adult Programs – Expert Panel on Adult Offender
assist CDCR in improving offender re Reentry and Recidivism Reduction Charter.”
entry and also established an Expert

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
Panel on Reentry and Recidivism Reduction.31
Other agencies could be doing much more. The Department of Motor
Vehicles could better assist offenders in getting photo identification cards
and drivers license cards prior to release from prison. CDCR could
partner with the Department of Housing and Community Development to
identify transitional housing. As the bond measures passed in 2006 are
allocated for road construction and levee repairs, the inmate labor force
could be traine d and tapped for these projects.
California could learn from other states who are succeeding in
collaborative efforts. Several states have successfully implemented interagency teams to improve the transition from prison to the community.
Inter-agency teams in three states – Michigan, Missouri and Indiana –
are recognized by the National Institute of Corrections and by other
correctional system experts as models of collaborative efforts to improve
prisoner re -entry. In these states, inter-agency collaboration takes place
at multiple levels and has at least three phases: institutional, re -entry
and community.
Additionally, Michigan, Missouri and Indiana use evidence -based tools to
measure progress. The most important component of the inter-agency
collaboration is a clear mission shared by all of the participating agencies
to improve public safety through effective re -entry.32

Solutions Close at Hand
In moving forward, the Legislature and Governor can draw upon a wealth
of research and evidence -driven policy recommendations made over the
past two decades. In 1987 the Legislature established the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Inmate Population Management, which submitted its
recommendations in 1990.
The Little Hoover Commission has conducted studies and published
recommendations on corrections reform in 1994, 1998, 2003 and 2004.
The IRP made its comprehensive recommendations in June 2004. The
National Council on Crime and Delinquency convened a Task Force on
Prison Crowding with state, local and national experts and issued its
recommendations in August 2006. The key recommendations of these
prior efforts are summarized in Appendix D.
The ideas are there.
What has been lacking is the political will to solve the problem.
Lawmakers afraid of being labeled “soft on crime” have allowed the

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
correctional system to decay and as a result of their negligence,
California spends more on corrections than most countries in the world,
and reaps fewer public safety benefits.

Successful Inter-Agency Corrections Task Forces
Indiana Road to Re-entry Initiative
Inter-agency team leadership structure: Department of Correction, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Department of
Veterans Affairs, Attorney General’s Office, Family and Social Services Administration, Department of
Education, Criminal Justice Institute, Department of Natural Resources, Department of Transportation,
Housing and Community Development Authority, Department of Workforce Development, and the Council
of Community Mental Health Centers Inc.
Mission: To enhance public safety through improving the successful transition of offenders to the community.
The Plainfield Re- entry Educational Facility: In 2006, the Indiana Department of Correction created a reentry facility primarily focused on providing services to offenders returning to the greater Indianapolis area.
Offenders spend their last 6 to 24 months of incarceration at Plainfield and receive intensive education and
job training through local partnerships.
Michigan Prisoner Re- entry Initiative (MPRI)
Inter-agency team leadership structure: Department of Corrections, Department of Community Health,
Department of Labor and Economic Growth, Department of Human Service, and the Department of
Education.
Mission: Reduce crime by implementing a seamless plan of services and supervision developed with each
offender – delivered through state and local collaboration — from the time of their entry to prison through
their transition, reintegration, and aftercare in the community.
Local governance: The re-entry initiative is structured with 18 local implementation sites governed by a
steering team, administrative agency, board of directors, advisory council, prison facility coordination team,
field operations coordination team and a community coordinator. The purpose of the local governance
structure is to provide statewide consistency in the implementation of the plan and to ensure community
oversight and participation in key decisions about the design and implementation. The local governance
team also educates the public about the initiative.
Missouri Re-entry Process (MRP)
Inter-agency team leadership structure: Department of Corrections, Social Services, Mental Health,
Revenue, Health and Senior Services, Economic Development, Elementary and Secondary Education, and the
Office of the State Courts Administrator.
Mission: Integrate successful offender re-entry principles and practices in state agencies and communities
resulting in partnerships that enhance offender self-sufficiency, reduce re-incarceration and improve public
safety.
Transitional Housing Unit (THU): The Missouri Department of Corrections has established transitional
housing units in 12 correctional institutions where offenders serve the last 180 days of their sentence. While
in the unit, offenders receive job training, education, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment and other
services to prepare them for re-entry. Additionally, every offender in the unit is enrolled in the “GreatHires”
system to help them find employment and services in the community where they will be released.
Sources: National Institute of Corrections. Offender Transition and Community Re-entry. Available at the NIC Web Site:
http://www.nicic.org/WebTopic_454.htm. Missouri Re-entry Process Executive Order 05-33. Available at the Missouri Department of
Corrections Web site: http://www.doc.mo.gov/reentry/PDF/ExecutiveOrder05_33.pdf.

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
Recommendation 1: The Governor and Legislature should immediately implement a
comprehensive strategy to reduce prison overcrowding and improve public safety in
California communities. Specifically, the Governor and the Legislature should:
q Implement prior reform recommendations. Policy-makers do not
need to further research solutions.
They must immediately
implement the evidence -based recommendations made by this
Commission and others over the past two decades in order to
regain control of major areas of prison operations where court
intervention exists and to avoid additional court intervention. To
improve the performance of the correctional system, policymakers must re-invent parole; expand educational, vocational
and substance abuse treatment programs in prisons; reallocate
resources to expand local punishment alternatives; and, expand
judicial discretion.
The Commission’s detailed recommendations for population management
policies are included in the next section of this report.

q Establish a corrections inter-agency task force. The State should
establish an inter-agency task force to develop partnerships with
CDCR to bolster in-prison and re-entry programs with a goal of
reducing recidivism and improving public safety.
The interagency task force should include all government entities that
currently or potentially could assist offenders in improving their
education, getting a job, finding housing, getting photo
identification or a driver’s license or treating an addiction or
mental health problem.

Inter-Agency Task Force
The State should establish an inter-agency task force to develop partnerships
with CDCR. The State should ensure that all its available resources are used
to assist offenders in successful re- entry to reduce recidivism and improve
public safety. Possible task force participants include, but are not limited to:
• Department of Education
• Department of Motor Vehicles
• Employment Development Department
• Department of Social Services
• Department of Alcohol & Drug Programs
• Department of Mental Health
• Department of Health Services
• Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
• Department of Transportation
• Department of Housing and Community Development
• Department of Veterans Affairs
• Community colleges and the state university system

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Alternative Recommendation: If the Governor and Legislature are unwilling or unable to
advance these critical correctional reforms, they should turn the job over to a board of
directors with the power and authority to enact reforms. Specifically:
q The board should be an independent entity modeled after the
federal Base Realignment and Closure Commission with members
appointed by the Governor and legislative leaders.

q The board of directors should have the authority to enact criminal
justice policies that become law unless rejected by the Governor
or two-thirds of the Legislature.

q The secretary of CDCR should report to the board of directors and
should be accountable for implementing the policies of the board.

MANAGING THE POPULATION

Managing the Population
California’s correctional system is failing in its primary mission to protect
public safety. Overcrowded conditions inside the prison walls are unsafe
for inmates and staff. Packed beyond capacity, the State’s correctional
institutions provide few opportunities for willing offenders to turn their
lives around and prepare for their release .
Each year, California communities are burdened with absorbing 123,000
offenders returning from prison, often more dangerous than when they
left.33 Two-thirds of them will commit another crime, create another
victim or simply violate a condition of parole.34 They will return to prison
and repeat the cycle of crime.
Protecting public safety should be the top goal of policy-makers. Yet for
decades, policy-makers have neglected the correctional system that
spawns this dangerous cycle of crime.
As recommended in the previous chapter, the Governor and the
Legislature must act immediately to improve public safety or empower
another entity that can and will. The strategy must attack both the
immediate crisis of overcrowding as well as the underlying causes of this
perilous situation. The following pages describe ways to address the
immediate crisis. The next section of this report describes broa d
sentencing policy reforms the State can undertake to reverse the
decades-long correctional system decline and better plan for those who
are sent to prison.

Unsafe and Overcrowded
California’s prison population currently is at an all-time high with more
than 173,000 inmates housed in facilities designed to hold half that.
Growth in the State’s prison population unfolded in two distinct phases.
Until the 1980s, California’s inmate population grew at a relatively slow
pace, its prison population growing by an average of 500 inmates a year.
But from 1980 to 2006, the inmate population surged more than 600
percent, adding an average 5,500 inmates a year.35

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

Milestones in California Corrections
Commitment Offenses of the CA Prison Population,
August 2006
Violent and serious crimes
Violent crimes*
Serious crimes
Subtotal
Nonviolent and other crimes
Drug crimes
Property crimes
Crimes against people
Other
Subtotal
Total

69,462
18,501
87,963
34,080
28,567
10,789
9,076
82,512
170,475

Prison Population
170,475 prisoners
33 prisons

160,000

161,000 prisoners
33 prisons

* A list of violent felonies is provided in the end notes of this
report

99,145 prisoners
20 prisons

11,598 prisoners
4 prisons

1950

21,660 prisoners
8 prisons

22,339 prisoners
12 prisons

1960
1969
“Use a Gun, Go to Prison”
enacted by the Legislature

1970

110,000

60,000

27,916 prisoners
12 prisons

1980

1976
California invoked
determinate sentencing

1990

2000

2006

10,000

1994
Voters passed Three
Strikes Law

1988
Voters approved the sale of $817 million in general obligation
bonds for the construction of youth and adult correctional facilities
to relieve overcrowding.

Sources: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, July – August 2006; the California Department of Justice, “California
Criminal Justice Time Line, 1822-2000.” Sacramento, CA. California Department of Corrections. May 2003. “Correctional Facilities.”
Available at the CDCR Web Site: www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/docs/facility_map.pdf.

MANAGING THE POPULATION
To keep up with the growth, California in
1980 embarked on a building boom that
lasted through 1997. The State added 21
prisons and more than 120,000 inmates.36
One additional prison opened in June 2005,
adding nearly 3,000 beds. It wasn’t enough.
As of November 30, 2006, California’s 33prison system was operating at 200 percent
of the design capacity.37 Approximately
19,000 offenders are double- and triplebunked in dorms, hallways and classrooms.38
Overcrowding threatens the safety of prison
staff and inmates and obstructs the efficient
delivery of services needed to prepare inmates
for parole and prevent recidivism.

California Prison Capacity
Design capacity is a term used to designate the
number of inmates a prison is designed to
accommodate based on standards set by the
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections and
the American Correctional Association. The
number can be based on any combination of
single-occupancy or double-occupancy cells,
single or double-bunked multiple occupancy
rooms or dormitories. The standards reflect the
need for humane conditions, as well as the need
to prevent violence and safely move inmates to
and from programs.
In California, design capacity is based on one
inmate per cell, single bunks in dormitories, and
no beds in space not designed for housing.
Based on this, the CDCR design capacity is
83,219. However, offenders can be safely
housed much beyond the design capacity.
CDCR officials assert that the institutions could
safely house approximately 150,000 and that it is
the approximately 19,000 offenders tripledbunked and housed in hallways and classrooms
that are the cause of the current overcrowding.

Mike Jimenez, President of the California
Correctional Peace Officers Association, told
the
Commission
that
the
current
overcrowding, coupled with the current
understaffing, seriously hampers CDCR’s
ability to provide programs to inmates inside
the institutions. He said that in his 20-year
Sources: Corrections Independent Review Panel. June 2004.
career as a correctional officer, he has never
Final Report. CDCR, Monthly Report of Population.
seen conditions as oppressive as they are
November 30, 2006. Also, Bill Sessa, Deputy Press Secretary,
CDCR. Personal communication D ecember 29, 2006.
today. Correctional officers are unable to
safely move offenders between their cells and
programs. “We are stretched so terribly thin
at this point in time,” Jimenez said, adding that the department was
short approximately 3,900 correctional officers.
He also expressed
concern about losing control of a prison to an inmate riot, stating that all
the warning signs are “in our rear view mirror.” He added, “We are
sitting on the edge of what NASA calls catastrophic failure.”39
Violence behind bars has declined across the nation and in California in
the past two decades.40 However, California prisons are more violent
than other similarly sized correctional systems. California prisons have
nearly twice as many assaults as the Texas prison system and almost
three times as many assaults as the federal prison system. Inmates not
only assault other inmates, each year hundreds of staff are seriously
assaulted by inmates. During a recent three-year period, the Legislative
Analyst’s Office reported that 1,700 staff health and workers’
compensation claims were filed for injuries resulting from inmate
violence.41

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
California also has higher prison homicide and suicide rates than the
U.S. average. This in part is attributed to California’s overcrowding, but
also is a result of its violent prison gang culture. Addi tionally, data
indicate that suicide and homicide rates increase when an inmate
population ages and lengths of sentence s increase, both factors which
characterize California’s inmate population.42
While the initial surge in inmate growth in the 1980s was likely due to an
increase in drug-related crimes, changes in sentencing laws over the past
two decades, as well as changes in incarceration and parole policies
fueled further growth. Those policy changes established punishment as
the primary goal of incarceration and fundamentally changed the nature
of parole.
Major Prison Disturbance in Chino
On December 30, 2006 a major altercation erupted at the California Institute for
Men in Chino, resulting in one inmate suffering serious stab wounds and 27
others being taken to hospitals for medical treatment. Fortunately, no CDCR staff
was hurt during the disturbance. Although the incident is under investigation,
early reports indicate the fighting began between two individuals on the prison
yard, then quickly spread to five of the eight dorm rooms in the Reception Center
West Facility. Approximately 800 inmates were involved.
Correctional officers were commended for quickly containing the disturbance and
for preventing it from spreading further. Staff secured the facility within four
hours of when the fighting began, and effectively implement ed an emergency
plan which led to the rapid deployment of additional correctional officers from
nearby facilities and local law enforcement.
The California Institute for Men is severely overcrowded. Overall, the facility is
operating at 202 percent of design capacity, with 6,483 inmates in a facility
designed for 3,207. Crowding in the Reception Center West Facility, where the
disturbance occurred, is even greater, with 1,464 inmates housed in space
designed for 640, meaning it is operating at 229 percent of design capacity.
Sources: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Press Release. December 30,
2006. “Major Disturbance at the California Institution for Men in Chino.” Also, “Weekly Report of
Population as of Midnight December 27, 2006.

MANAGING THE POPULATION

Incredibly Expensive
This expansion of the prison population has come at a significant cost.
At the beginning of the building boom in the early 1980s, adult and
youth corrections accounted for 4 percent of California’s General Fund
expenditures at $1 billion per year.43 Today, it represents 8 percent of
the total General Fund, approximately $9 billion, and continues to grow.
Governor Schwarzenegger has proposed a budget of approximately $10
billion for 2007-08. 44

Comparison of California Corrections Spending, 1984-85 and 2006-07
Percent of General Fund
FY 1984-85

14.0

FY 2006-07

12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0

85 to 2006-07.” See Endnotes Page 82 for chart values.

Youth Corrections

Mental Health

California State
University

University of
California

Adult Corrections

Social Services

Health Services

Source: The Legislative Analyst’s Office. July 2006. “State of California Expenditures, 1984-

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

Parole is Broken
On any given day, 6 out of 10 admissions to California prisons are
returning parolees.45 The failure of the State’s parole policies are welldocumented in the Commission’s 2003 report, Back to the Community:
Safe and Sound Parole Policies. Its recommendations are as relevant
today as they were three years ago and more urgently needed.
California’s parole system is unlike any other in the nation. At 70
percent, California’s recidivism rate is one of the highest in the nation.46
California is one of just two states that places every felony offender on
parole and the only state where parole can last three years – in some
cases longer than the actual prison term served. 47

Prior Parole Policy Recommendations
In its November 2003 report on parole policies,
the Little Hoover Commission made the
following recommendations:
r To protect the public, the correctional
system must use proven strategies to
prepare inmates for release, supervise and
assist parolees in California communities,
and intervene when parolees fail. The State
should create the means to improve the
performance of the correctional system by
changing laws, budgets and programs to
increase success among parolees.
r To increase public safety, state and local
correctional agencies, community
organizations and the inmates themselves
should prepare for the predictable release of
inmates from prison.
r To maximize public safety, communities
must assume greater responsibility for
reintegrating parolees, and the State should
provide the leadership and funding to make
those efforts successful.
r The State should make better use of the
resources currently spent re-incarcerating
parole violators – and provide more public
safety – by developing a range of
interventions for failing parolees.
r To ensure public safety and fairness, the
State should scrutinize its responses to
parolees charged with new, serious crimes.
Source: Little Hoover Commission. November 2003. "Back
to the Community: Safe & Sound Parole Policies."
Sacramento.

The concept of parole as a reward for good
behavior and preparation for release for
determinately sentenced offenders has not
been valid in California since the 1970s. By
most accounts, when California enacted the
Determinate Sentencing Act, little, if any
discussion occurred about what it meant for
the State’s parole policies.48
Under the previous indeterminate sentencing
system, parole in California was a reward for
inmates who were deemed ready for release.
As defined, parole is a conditional release of a
prisoner
serving
an
indeterminate
or
unexpired sentence. Offenders who did not get
into trouble and could convince what was then
called the Adult Authority that they had
changed their behavior and had lined up
housing and a job, could be granted early
release to parole once they had served their
minimum sentence.
Policy-makers
eliminated discretionary parole release under
determinate sentencing and offenders now are
released from prison when they have served
their term – ready or not.
The exceptions are a small percentage of the
most serious and violent offenders, and those
sentenced under the three strikes law, who are
sentenced to an indeterminate term – usually
15 or 25 years to life in prison. They still must
go before the current Board of Parole Hearings,

MANAGING THE POPULATION
which determines whether or not to recommend parole. For the vast
majority of California offenders who are serving determinate sentences,
parole does not exist in the same form it does in other states and as it is
used for indeterminately sentenced offenders in California. Parole in
California, for offenders with determinate sentence s, is a one to threeyear community supervision sentence applied automatically to virtually
all offenders released from prison, regardless of whether they pose a
danger. This unusual hybrid of determinate sentencing and mandatory
parole supervision for all offenders is used by just one other state . As a
leading criminologist has stated, it “maximizes both risks to the
community and state expenses.”49
By using its limited resources to supervise all parolees, the system
hinders the State’s ability to closely supervise the most dangerous
parolees and results in the return to prison of many low-level “technical”
parole violators. By placing all offenders on parole and setting numerous
conditions, the State has greatly increased the chances that many will
violate parole. In 2005, 62,000 parolees were returned to prison for
parole violations and serve d, on average, a four-month prison term.50
Although parole violators cycle through the system quickly, they further
burden an already stressed intake system and add to the prison
overcrowding crisis, particularly in the State’s reception centers which
are some of the most dangerous and severely overcrowded facilities.
Failed Implementation of the New Parole Model
One of the earliest strategies to manage the correctional population under the Schwarzenegger
administration was the “new parole model.” The program was designed to expand alternative
sanctions for low-level parole violators to reduce the number of parolees returning to prison. The
department expected to implement the new program in January 2004 and erroneously based savings
estimates on the program being fully implemented at that time.
The new parole model modified some existing programs and added others. The “Halfway Back”
program converted existing work and drug treatment furlough facilities into facilities for parole
violators. The Substance Abuse Treatment Control Unit (SATCU) program revised and expanded a
program that included drug treatment and short jail stays. But both were underutilized in part because
of eligibility constraints. The department also had problems contracting with counties for jail space,
due to the $59 per day rate and the lack of space. Also, the Administration had imposed a statewide
contracting and hiri ng freeze, which limited the ability of the department to negotiate contracts and
hire additional staff to help implement the programs. The electronic monitoring program was delayed
due to protests in the contracting processes. When it was finally implem ented, parole agents
discovered numerous equipment failures.
The department was required to negotiate implementation of the new or modified programs with the
labor union, which also delayed implementation. Stakeholders also contended that parole agents were
reluctant to use the sanctions instead of returning parolees to custody, in part because the department
failed to implement a risk assessment tool to guide their decision-making. As a result, population
reductions never materialized nor did the projected $150 million in savings.
Sources: Bureau of State Audits. November 2005. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: The Intermediate
Sanction Programs Lacked Performance Benchmarks and Were Plagued With Implementation Problems. Little Hoover
Commission. September 25, 2005. Roundtable Meeting on Parole Reform.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Because parole violators serve such short sentences, many never move
out of the reception center before being released again. As a result,
reception centers no longer serve their original purpose – to quickly
process and classify incoming felons and recommend placement in an
appropriate facility. Reception centers should return to their original
purpose.
The decision to send a parole violator back to prison for an additional
sentence is made not by a judge, but by a correctional official – a parole
agent, a parole supervisor or a deputy commissioner at the Board of
Parole Hearings. Criminologists and academic experts have coined the
term “back-end sentencing” to describe the parole revocation process.
And not only are back-end sentences determined by corrections officials
instead of judges, the standard of evidence used is much lower than
would be required in a court of law.
Most frightening, the parole revocation process is frequently used to
respond to new and serious criminal behavior by parolees. In 2000, the
most recent year for which data is available, more than 47,000 parolees
were returned to custody on a parole violation for serious criminal
activities.
These serious parole violators served an average of five
months for criminal activities that included homicides, robberies and
rapes.51
Some states abolished parole completely when they eliminated
indeterminate sentences. In its place they use post-release supervision
to apply the greatest resources to the offenders who pose the greatest
risks. Some states established reentry courts where judges, instead of
correctional officials, control the outcome of a post-release supervision
violation. And many states do much more than California to help
inmates prepare for their inevitable release.

Just Doing Time…
Part of the reason for California’s high rate of parolee failure is that
prison time is not used to prepare inmates for their return to the
community. Educational programs, job training and substance abuse
treatment programs that could help an offender succeed upon release are
available only to a small percentage of the prison population. Prison
programs have not been a priority in California since the state shifted the
primary purpose of incarceration to punishment. The Legislature , when
it changed sentencing from indeterminate to determinate in 1976, made
that shift explicit, enacting an addition to the Penal Code that states,
“the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”52

MANAGING THE POPULATION
The lack of programs in prisons is well-documented in the Commission’s
previous reports, by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Inmate Population,
the Independent Review Panel and others.
The Governor, in his
correctional reorganization plan, emphasized the importance of programs
when he named the new department the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. However, most observers agree that little has been done
in the two years since the reorganization to support the “R” in the CDCR.
Until the population crisis is under control, the programs that can
improve public safety by reducing recidivism will continue to take a back
seat to custody -driven population management strategies. But the two
strategies are linked and efforts must be made to plan and implement
both.

…With No Incentive for Change
Even if programs were more available, the current system creates no
incentive for offenders to participate. That too, is a change brought by
determinate sentencing. Under the
old system, all inmates had to prove
Earned Discharge from Parole
they were ready for release by
In 2006, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed SB
participating
in
educational
1453 (Speier), a law that mandates that certain nonviolent
programs,
gaining
job
skills,
offenders who participate in substance abuse treatment
completing treatment programs and
while in prison, when possible, receive aftercare treatment
by demonstrating that they had a
in the community once released from prison. Offenders
who successfully complete 150 days of residential aftercare
job and a place to live in the
treatment will be discharged from parole supervision.
community.
Nearly two-thirds of California inmates have a serious need
for drug treatment, but just 2 percent participate in
Today, all determinately sentenced
professionally run treatment while incarcerated. Under the
offenders entering prison know
State’s current policy, aftercare is funded for only half of
exactly when they will be released,
those who have participated in treatment while in prison.
SB 1453 did not include additional funding for the
giving them little incentive to
anticipated increase in demand for aftercare, although the
change their behavior or prepare for
Governor’s 2007-08 Budget included nearly $1.3 million for
a more successful life on the
SB 1453. Additionally, it is anticipated that SB 1453 will
outside.
Good
time
credit
save money by reducing parole and re-incarceration costs.
frequently cuts a prison term down
Research has proven that the aftercare component of drug
to one half or even one third of the
treatment is key in reducing recidivism. The Little Hoover
Commission has previously recommended that the State, in
original sentence, but the credit
coordination with communities, should expand the
system is used more as a
availability of aftercare treatment for parolees who
population management tool than
participated in drug treatment while in prison.
an incentive for anything other
Sources: Governor’s Budget 2007-08. Also, Joan Petersilia and Robert
than staying out of trouble.
Weisberg. May 2006. “California’s Prison System Can’t Solve Prison Crisis
Good time credits are not awarded
for achieving a goal, they are given
to any offender who works to keep
the prison runni ng or who signs up

Alone: Sentencing Reform Urgently Needed.” Also, Harry K. Wexler.
1999. “Three-Year Reincarceration Outcomes for Amity In-Prison
Therapeutic Community and Aftercare in California.” The Prison Journal.
Also, Michael Prendergast, Ph.D., April 2003. “Outcome Evaluation of the
Forever Free Substance Abuse Treatment Program: One-Year Post-Release
Outcomes.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
for a program – even if they are just on a waiting list. The Prison Literacy
Act requires that inmates who do not have a 9th grade reading level
participate in educational programs. However, these offenders are often
given work assignments – precluding their participation in educational
programs. For many offenders, it is much easier to mop the floor or work
in the kitchen than to attempt to recover from years of addiction, learn to
read or learn a marketable job skill.
Additionally, where resources do exist, sentences, once good time credits
are figured in, often are too short to allow prisoners to complete an
effective program, such as drug treatment. As a result, many offenders
are released to the community with no more ability to succeed than when
they arrived. Not surprisingly, they fail and return to prison.
In the Commission’s 2003 report on parole reform, it recommended that
early release credits be linked with the completion of education and job
training programs, as well as plans for housing and employment. The
Commission also recommended that the State require inmates to make
progress toward educational or drug treatment goals before becoming
eligible for work assignments.

Local Correctional Resources and Judicial Discretion
While judges have very little discretion when sentencing offenders
convicted of serious felonies, they do have sentencing options for many of
the State’s low-level offenses. These options include probation, county
jail or state prison.53
If mandatory sentencing laws and sentence enhancements explicitly
define what a judge can do, a judge’s discretion also is implicitly limited
by the resources available at the local level, which varies widely by
county. Experts, judges and local law enforcement say this is one result
of a lack of systematic state investment in community correctional
programs and one that makes itself apparent in California’s surging
prison population.
In testimony to the Commission, former Sacramento Superior Court
Judge Roger K. Warren wrote that “the principal reason…judges are
sentencing too many non-violent offenders to prison is the absence of
effecti ve community corrections programs providing intermediate
punishments and necessary and appropriate treatment and
rehabilitation services to non-violent offenders.”54
The situation is exacerbated by court-ordered or self-imposed population
caps at jails in 32 counties around the state.55 In 2005, these counties

MANAGING THE POPULATION
release d more than 155,000 sentenced offenders early because of the
shortage of bed space.56
Lacking local alternatives, many offenders who could be sentenced to
county jail, probation or other community-based punishment
alternatives are sent to prison. In doing so, the State squanders its most
expensive resource on low-level offenders who could be more effectively
supervised by local authorities.
A look at how four counties have handled felony convictions shows the
disparities that can result. As illustrated in the table, in 2002, Lassen
County sentenced 30 percent of its convicted felons to prison, which
compares with 24 percent of convicted felons in Los Angeles County.
Only 8 percent of those convicted of felonies in San Francisco County
received prison sentences.
Percent of Felony Convictions Sentenced to State Prison by County: 2002
County

County
Population

Felony
Arrests

Felony
Convictions

% of felony
arrests that lead
to convictions

Sentenced
to Prison

9,817,400

62,528

37,062

9,016

% of felony
convictions
sentenced to
prison
24

San Francisco
Lassen

789,100
34,250

11,269
244

3,797
178

33
73

313
52

8
30

Inyo

18,250

Los Angeles

Sources: California Attorney General Web Site: http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statisticsdatatabs/DispoCo.php. California State Library,
Counting California Web Site: http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/pdfdata/csa03/B04.

Often, the low-level offenders sent to state prison serve fairly short terms.
With good time credit, some serve just six months.
In 2005, of
approximately 64,000 felons released to parole for the first time, the
median time served for nearly 45,000, or 69 percent, was less than a
year in prison.57 Most experts agree that these short prison stints do
little for public safety, while they do disrupt families and communities
where these offenders come from and return to, and diminish the
potential for offenders to get and keep jobs, maintain housing and
become law-abiding citizens.
At one time, the State subsidized counties to encourage them to sentence
offenders to local punishment programs instead of state prison. Under
the Probation Subsidy Act of 1965, the State paid counties up to $4,000
for every offender that remained at the county level who otherwise would
have gone to prison. The California Research Bureau estimated that
more than 45,000 offenders were diverted from state facilities under the
program. The State eliminated the subsidy in the late 1970s, primarily

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
due to increasing costs associated with an increasing offender
population.58 Public hearing witnesses and advisory committee members
told the Commission that the State should consider establishing an
incentive system similar to the probation subsidy.
The number of juveniles sent to state facilities dropped dramatically after
the State increased the fees charged to counties for wards sent to the
State in 1996. At the time, counties paid $25 per month for each ward.
The State increased the fee to $150 per month for the most serious
offenders and introduced a sliding scale fee that required counties to pay
the most for the lowest level offenders, up to a maximum of $31,200 per
year. The fees have since been raised slightly and counties pay $176 per
month for serious offenders and a maximum of $36,500 per year for lowlevel offenders. The state youth offender population dropped from an alltime high of more than 10,000 in 1996 to approximately 2,700 in
November 2006. While the sliding scale fee is not the only reason for the
decline, experts assert that the financial incentive to keep juvenile
offenders out of state facilities was key to the sharp decline in the state
juvenile offender population.59

Citizen’s Option for Public Safety (COPS) / Juvenile Justice
Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA)
COPS / JJCPA provide grants to counties and cities
to expand community-based services, and add law
enforcement, district attorneys and corrections
staff. This year, the Governor has proposed
allocating $238 million for COPS / JJCPA grants.
Counties receive a portion of the allocation based
on population.
In 2004-05, JJCPA grants supported 168 programs
to address locally-identified issues concerning
juvenile justice and crime, such as:
ü
ü
ü

Los Angeles County’s After-School Enrichment
Program
Nevada County’s Outreach School Truancy
Program
San Diego’s Community Assessment and
Working to Insure and Nurture Girls’ Success

Similarly, COPS grants are used to support locallyidentified “front-line” law enforcement needs such
as hiring additional police officers or buying new
equipment to support law enforcement activities.
Source; California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. March
26, 2006. “Partnering to Promote Public Safety: Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act Annual Report.”

In
1990,
the
Blue
Ribbon
Commission on Inmate Population
Management recommended adoption
of a Community Corrections Act to
provide state funds to significantly
expand
community-based
intermediate sanctions. As a result,
the
Legislature
enacted
the
Community-Based Punishment Act
of 1994, which established a
partnership between state and local
governments to create alternative
punishments at the local level for
prison-bound
non-violent
offenders.60
However,
the
collaboration has never been funded.
In a pilot project being implemented
in San Diego County, California is
testing the concept of involving local
probation departments and judges in
identifying offender risks and needs
at the time of sentencing, and
connecting
offenders
to
local
programs and services upon release
from prison to improve reentry

MANAGING THE POPULATION
outcomes. The law creating the pilot project authorized CDCR to assist
three counties and $3.42 million was allocated to the program for 200607. 61
Additionally, the Governor’s 2007-08 budget proposes $50 million in
funding to target at-risk 18 to 25 year-old probationers. The Governor
also has proposed $4.4 billion in lease revenue bonds to build additional
jail beds. 62
Judges testifying before the Commission stated that they use the
correctional resource that is best suited to the offender and the crime
and do not base sentences on available jail space or associated costs.
However, judges also told the Commission that they would sentence
more low-level offenders to community punishments if more local options
were available.

Involving the Courts in Re-entry
In 2005, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed SB 618 (Speier), a law that authorizes CDCR
to assist three counties in developing and implementing a multi-agency plan to prepare offenders for
successful reentry upon release from prison.
The San Diego Reentry Project is the first of three pilot programs authorized by the bill. San Diego
county probation will conduct offender needs assessments to create a “life plan” which will determine
education, job training and any drug treatment needs. At sentencing, judges will review the life plan
and recommend the offender participate in appropriate programs while in prison. Six months prior to
release, a county case manager will begin to work with the offender to determine program needs in the
community and to assist the offender in gaining access to local community service providers. Upon
release from prison, the case manager, working with a parole agent, will monitor the parolee.
Other counties that have expressed an interest in the pilot program include Orange, Riverside, Fresno,
Yolo, San Mateo and San Francisco.
Recommendation: The State should consider expanding this pilot program to all interested counties.
Additionally, the State should expand the role of judges in managing these offenders once they are
released from prison.

A Fragmented System
Many states manage their correctional populations in one seamless
system. The absence of an integrated state-local correcti ons program in
California is exacerbated because probation is treated almost solely as a
local responsibility, although the Governor has proposed $50 million in
probation funding in his budget for 2007-08. California is one of just
two states in which local government is the primary source of money for
probation services.63
California’s trial court system was similarly
plagued by fragmentation and financial insecurity until lawmakers

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
consolidated court funding in 1997 and voters later unified the county
courts into a state-run system.
In the court consolidation model, the State provided funding and support
to improve the function of the court system. In the Commission’s study
process for its 2003 parole report, local law enforcement representatives
told the Commission they would be willing to assume the responsibility
and accountability for offender reentry if adequately funded. The State
could consider applying the lessons learned in the court consolidation
model to streamline parole and probation into a seamless local function
with state support.
Trial Court Consolidation
The Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 consolidated all court funding at the state level and
gave the Judicial Council the authority to allocate resources to all California courts, including trial courts.
Previously, trial courts received the bulk of their funding from local boards of supervisors and were
consistently under-funded. In 1998, California voters approved Proposition 220 to allow the
consolidation of county municipal courts into a single superior court.
The unification allowed courts to expand programs such as drug courts, domestic violence courts and
services to juveniles. Also, unification dramatically decreased the caseloads of judges and narrowed the
types of cases heard by superior court justices. In 2001, the State’s Administrative Office of the Courts
gained responsibility for all former municipal court employees. The following year, the lawmakers
enacted the Trial Court Facilities Act which shifted the governance of California’s 450 courthouse
facilities from the counties to the State, completing unification of California’s court system.
Sources: The California Constitution, Article VI, Section 6. Also, the Judicial Council of California, www.courtinfo.ca.gov.

MANAGING THE POPULATION

Re-invent parole. For determinately sentenced offenders, the State
should eliminate parole and implement a system of post-release
supervision for certain offenders based on a validated risk and needs
assessment tool. Specifically, the State should:
ü Apply the greatest resources in post-release supervision to those
offenders who pose the greatest risk of re -offending and who are
the most serious, violent and dangerous.
ü Waive post-release supervision for
certain low-risk offenders with no
Expanding Community-based
history of violence .
Punishment Options
ü Provide
opportunities
for
former
The State should reallocate resources to assist
offenders to earn discharge from
communities in expanding community-based
supervision by maintaining employment,
punishment options for offenders who violate
going to school, completing drug
the terms of post-release supervision. Working
with communities, the State should reallocate
treatment or achieving other goals that
resources to establish a continuum of
reduce recidi vism.
alternatives to prison, including electronic
ü Authorize a grid of community-based
monitoring, day reporting centers, drug
sanctions, including jail, for offenders
treatment, jail time and other communitywho violate the terms of post-release
based sanctions.
supervision.

q Try offenders who commit new crimes. Offenders on post-release
supervision who commit a new, serious crime should be charged and
tried in court, and if found guilty, sentenced to a new term.

q Shift responsibility. The State should shift post-release supervision
and responsibility, and accountability for offender reintegration, to
communities. It should begin with three or four willing counties and
develop agreements and provide funding for sheriffs or probation
departments in those counties, in partnership with community
agencies, to provide supervision, services and sanctions for parolees.

Linking credits toward early release to completion of education
and job training programs, as well as plans for a job and housing.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
ü

Requiring inmates to make progress toward educational or drug
treatment goals before becoming eligible for work assignments.

q Expand local capacity. The State should reallocate resources to assist
counties in expanding local capacity including jail space, drug
treatment programs, day reporting centers and other locally-based
punishment options. The State also should reallocate resources to
assist counties in expanding intensive probation as an alternative
sanction to jail or prison and to enhance crime prevention.

Judicial Empowerment
The State should give judges the authority to sentence offenders who would otherwise be headed to
prison, to a community-based sanction. Judges should use a validated risk and needs assessment tool
to identify these offenders. Intensive case management could be handled by probation. The State
should reallocate funding equal to one-half the cost of state incarceration to pay for expanded services
and probation at the local level. Judges should oversee the progress of the offenders in the assigned
community sanctions.

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING

Making Sense of Sentencing
California lacks a coherent criminal justice sentencing policy as well as a
system of accountability for the impact of sentencing laws on public
safety and correctional resources. Unlike many other states who rely on
credible independent sentencing commissions to guide policy, California
has created a haphazard jumble of sentencing laws enacted
incrementally over three dozen years.
Critics often suggest that a sentencing commission is a code word for
shorter sentences or for limiting correctional capacity. This is
not supported by evidence in other states.
Sentencing
“California sentencing
commissions frequently lead to longer terms, particularly for
policy is currently neither
the most dangerous and serious offenders.
dynamic, nor grounded on
Sentencing commissions in both North Carolina and Virginia
increased sentences for violent criminals. North Carolina
increased sentences for violent crimes and simultaneously
increased spending on probation and drug treatment
programs to try to keep low-level offenders from becoming
more dangerous. The result was a decrease in crime and
savings of billions of dollars. 64 Virginia tripled sentences for
some of the worst offenders, but also diverted low-level
offenders to community-based punishment. The result also
has been cost savings and a decrease in crime.65
Prior attempts to establish a sentencing commission in
California have failed. These efforts and the lessons learned
are summarized in Appendix E. But today, California faces
unprecedented
challenges
and
the
momentum
for
establishing a sentencing commission is snowballing. Its
time has come.
A sentencing commission does not mean a return to
indeterminate sentencing and to the consequences that all
stakeholders agree were unacceptable.
The Determinate
Sentencing Act, enacted 30 years ago, dramatically changed
criminal sentencing in California.
The law addressed
egregious inequities that existed under California’s
indeterminate sentencing structure and put certainty in the
sentencing process for most offenders. While this significant

a policy-making process
that provides a thorough,
balanced, and informed
consideration of all of the
relevant evidence and
factors. Nor is the policymaking staffed by an
independent, credible,
professional non-partisan
entity with the skills and
ability to accurately
forecast the fiscal,
managerial and
programmatic
consequences of
alternative policy
decisions.”

Honorable Richard Warren,
former California Superior Court
Judge, Scholar-in-Residence,
Judicial Council of California
and Project Director, National
Sentencing Reform Project,
National Center for State Courts.
June 22, 2006. Written
testimony to the Commission.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
achievement brought necessary reform, it also produced significant
unintended consequences that reduced public safety and laid the
groundwork for the current corrections overcrowding crisis.
These public safety consequences include:
ü

The release of thousands of ill-prepared and often dangerous
offenders into California communities every month.

Over reliance on the most expensive sanction – state prison –
instead of local correctional alternatives that could provide more
effective and efficient punishment for many low-level offenders.

The absence of incentives for offenders to improve themselves in
prison or while on parole.

Complex and Confusing
What initially was a fairly straightforward determinate sentencing
structure has been radically rewritten – law by law – over a 30-year span
with no consistent or informed evaluation of the laws for their effect on
public safety and the state treasury. Today, there are more than 1,000
felony sentencing laws and more than 100 felony sentence
enhancements across 21 separate sections of California law.66
Impact of Sentencing Laws on Women
Women are the fastest growing segment of the California prison population. In a prison system as
large as California’s, it is easy to overlook the nearly 12,000 incarcerated women. The vast majority
of female inmates are not a threat to public safety. Two-thirds were convicted of property or drugrelated crimes. More of them have been victims of violent crimes than were convicted of violent
crimes.
Like thousands of men, many of these women were caught by the sentencing laws enacted to catch
violent drug dealers in the mid 80s. In 1980, nearly half of all women incarcerated in California had
committed a serious crime against another person, while just 13 percent were convicted of a drug
offense. Today, the percent age of women incarcerated for non-violent drug offenses is greater than
the percentage incarcerated for crimes against persons. As a result, the State has four over-packed
prisons filled primarily with nonviolent low-level female offenders.
The cost is immense. Each year, the State spends nearly a half a billion dollars for their incarceration
alone. And because of their roles as mothers, the costs and consequences go far beyond the criminal
justice system. Many of these women were single parents before their incarceration. Their children
are either raised by other family members or are sent to the State’s foster care system. Children who
have incarcerated parents are more likely to follow the path of their parents and become the next
generation of prisoners continuing the perpetual cycle.
In its 2004 report on women and parole policies, the Commission recommended that the State
develop coherent strategies for female offenders. The State also should consider gender in its
sentencing policy decisions.
Sources: CDCR. Weekly Report of Population as of Midnight January 3, 2007. Also, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Historical Trends 1985-2005 and Historical Trends 1980-2000. Also, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics. April 1999. “Prior Abuse Reported by Inmates and Probationers.”

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING
Legal scholars have dubbed the incremental changes “drive -by”
sentencing laws – often enacted as knee-jerk responses by lawmakers to
horrific, high-profile and frequently isolated crimes. The result is a
chaotic labyrinth of laws with no cohesive philosophy or strategy.
Some participants in the Little Hoover Commission’s advisory committee
process maintained that hundreds of sentencing laws and enhancements
have been enacted to increase incarceration time, while others suggested
that the only sentencing-related legislation enacted in the past decade
increased “good time” credit, thereby shortening incarceration. Advisory
committee members differed about whether longer sentences increase or
decrease public safety. The advisory committee agreed that additional
research and analysis in this area would be particularly useful to an
informed discussion.
As a result, this Commission asked the Stanford Criminal Justice Center
(SCJC) to analyze amendments to California’s sentencing structure. The
Stanford researchers focused solely on penal code amendments to
sections 1170 and 12022, two of the more substantial sections of
criminal justice sentencing code . They immediately found that a review
of just these two sections was labor-intensive and time consuming. The
final report states, “as most experts have already concluded, California’s
sentencing system is unbelievably complex and in dire need of
simplification.” The report also concluded:
1. There have been countless increases in the length of criminal
sentences since the enactment of the Determinate Sentencing
Act. The analysis of the two sections of penal code revealed 80
substantive increases in sentence lengths for specific crimes since
the enactment of determinate sentencing.
2. Statutes also “increase d” sentences in other ways. While the
Legislature occasionally increased the number of years to be
imposed upon conviction of a particular offense or imposition of a
particular enhancement, it also frequently increased sentences by
limiting the discretion of sentencing judges to make
determinations with respect to the imposition, aggravation, or
enhancement of a sentence.
The complete report, Increases in California Sentencing Since the
Enactment of the Determinate Sentencing Act, is included as Appendix F.
Although the focus of the review was limited due to time constraints, the
work not only illuminates how many changes have been made to the
Determinate Sentencing Act since 1976, but also the need for broader
analysis of this and other sections of code containing sentencing laws.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

Disparity Still Abounds…
Though determinate sentencing was designed to create uniformity, today
sentences for similar crimes can vary significantly by county and by
courtroom depending on the charges and enhancements filed by the
district attorneys and the sentencing choices made by judges regarding
probation, jail or prison. Outcomes for offenders also vary depending
upon the availability of correctional resources at the local level, creating
inequities along county lines. As a result, many offenders who could be
more effectively punished at the local level are given the most expensive
sanction – prison, at an annual cost of $36,000 per year.67
Judges also have discretion in determining stri kes under the Three
Strikes Law. As a result, similar crimes can produce wildly different
sentences.
Placer County Superior Court Judge Richard Couzens
described to this Commission a hypothetical situation in which, under
the State’s current laws, a judge would have multiple sentencing
options.68
Couzens presented the hypothetical case of a 40-year-old man with two
prior felony convictions accused of stealing a $350 chainsaw from Sears.
Upon finding the man guilty, a judge could:
a) Find the man guilty of a misdemeanor and sentence him to
probation and local jail time;
b)

Dismiss the two strikes from his record and sentence him to
felony probation and local jail time;

Dismiss the two strikes and sentence him to a prison term of 16
months to 3 years;

Dismiss one strike and sentence him to a prison term of 2 years
and 8 months to 6 years; or,

e) Issue a third strike and sentence him to a prison term of 25 years
to life.

…But Rigidity Still Limits Discretion
While judges have discretion in sentencing many low-level offenders and
in determining whether an offense counts as a strike, their flexibility is
limited. The sentencing structure is far more rigid for the more serious
crimes as well as for mandatory enhancements for firearms, gang
affiliations and dozens of other conduct or status enhancements. The
law treats many crimes alike, even when the circumstances of an
individual case or the characteristics of the offender might warrant a
different resolution that would better benefit victims and the community.

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING

Additionally, California’s sentencing laws can be inconsistent as new
crimes or enhancements are added without consideration of larger policy
goals and without coordination with other sentencing laws.

Release is Certain
One goal of the shift to determinate sentencing was to create certainty –
both for victims and offenders – in the length of a prison sentence.
Although it was a vast improvement over the ambiguity of an
indeterminate sentence, the new law eliminated the incentive for inmates
to participate in programs that could help them succeed in the
community once released, as described in the previous chapter.
In testimony before this Commission, a victims’ rights advocate stated
that “determinate sentencing is dangerous since it expects nothing from
the offenders.”69
And, because there is no hearing regarding the
suitability for release, there also is no opportunity for victims to provide
an impact statement or request special conditions for post-release
supervision.70

From the SHU to the Street
The certainty of determinate sentencing also means that the State lacks
a mechanism to prevent the release of violent and dangerous offenders
once they have served their time. Each year, hundreds of offenders
locked in the State’s most restrictive cells, the secure housing units
(SHU), who have been deemed too dangerous to participate in prison
programs, are shackled and escorted by correctional officers to the
prison door and then put on a bus bound for California communities.71
They are ill-prepared for anything more than committing additional
crimes and creating more victims.
Changes to restore incentive s to participate in programs have been
proposed by this Commission as well as by Governor Schwarzenegger’s
2004 Corrections Independent Review Panel, by the Legislature and by
others. As mentioned earlier in this report, one of the biggest hurdles
has been the lack of program availability in prisons. Most experts agree
that until the overcrowding issue is addressed, programs will be available
only to a very limited portion of the inmate population. Despite this
challenge, incentives can be built into the existing sentencing structure
to improve public safety and offender outcomes.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

A Lack of Accountability
As California grapples to find the resources to address prison
overcrowding spawned by its sentencing and parole policies, no single
entity can be held accountable for the failure to match resources with
changes in laws and policies. The vast majority of the incremental
sentencing laws that expanded crimes and enhanced sentences were put
on the books in the 1980s and early 1990s by legislators and Governors
who, for the most part, have long ago left the State Capitol.
Some stakeholders suggest that most, if not all, sentencing law changes
were necessary responses to crime. They add that voters have supported
lawmakers who enacted these measures. At the same time, however, the
State has given low priority to planning and paying for facilities and
staffing necessary to keep pace with the state’s prison population growth.
It is relatively easy for lawmakers to cast a vote for measures that appear
tough on crime when they are not also required to allocate money to pay
for the costs of those measures. In the same manner, ballot initiatives
that increase sentence lengths have not queried voters as to whether
they prefer cuts in other government services or new taxes to pay for the
resulting increase in the prison population and other correctional costs.

Sentencing Commissions Guide Decisions in Other States
Confronted by similar policy challenges, nearly two dozen other states
developed sentencing commissions to enact or recommend sentencing
laws and guidelines. Many of these states not only were
confronting overcrowding and fiscal challenges, they also had
“The experience of
indeterminate sentencing structures and the inequities that
many states has shown
frequently accompany those systems.
For many of these
that sentencing
states, the first order of business for the sentencing
commissions are
commission was to review sentencing practices and establish
emerging as the most
sentencing guidelines, either mandatory or voluntary.

successful modern
governmental institution
to prevent or cure the
kind of correctional
crisis that California
now faces.”
Kara Dansky, Executive
Director, Stanford Criminal
Justice Center. Written
testimony to the Commission.
August 24, 2006.

In the best models, a sentencing commission sets guidelines
that provide an overarching framework consistent with policy
goals, while allowing judicial discretion and appellate court
review of sentences that depart from the guidelines.72
Minnesota was the first state to establish guidelines and its
sentencing commission is frequently used as a model. There
are, however, several key variances among the two dozen
states
with
sentencing
guidelines
and
sentencing
73
commissions.

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING
The underlying goals for the majority of states that have established
sentencing commissions or adopted guidelines have been:
ü

To improve public safety by preventing the premature release of
dangerous offenders.

To make sentencing more uniform and reduce disparity.

To promote more rational policy formation that is at least
somewhat insulated from political pressure.

To develop data for informed resource management decisions.

States that use the knowledge and analysis of sentencing commissions
have been able to improve long-term forecasting and management of
correctional resources.
These states have benefited from accurate
computer simulations of the impact of sentencing law changes on prison
resources and the budget. States aided by this kind of data and analyses

Overview: Sentencing Guidelines and Commissions
In 1980, Minnesota pioneered the guideline-setting sentencing commission structure. Minnesota’s
sentencing commission was tasked by the Legislature with developing sentencing guidelines that would
go into effect unless voted down by the Legislature. Minnesota’s sentencing commission specifies
presumptive sentences through legally binding guidelines. The guidelines, however, also authorize and
invite substantial trial court discretion to deviate from presumptive sentences in cases with extraordinary
circumstances. When judges deviate from the presumptive sentence, they must explain for the record
why they deviated from the guidelines and there is an appellate review mechanism for these cases.
In written testimony to the Commission, Anoka County Attorney Robert M.A. Johnson said that the
primary goals of the commission “are to assure public safety, promote uniformity in sentencing, promote
proportionality in sentencing, provide truth and certainty in sentencing, and coordinate sentencing
practices with correctional resources.” Since the 1980 Minnesota model was enacted, a permanent
sentencing commission overseeing and setting sentencing guidelines has been emulated with adaptation
by nearly two dozen other states.
Sentencing guidelines have been adopted in 18 states and a half-dozen other states are considering
adopting guidelines. Several states, including Connecticut, Maine, Texas, Colorado, Nevada, New York
and Montana, considered guidelines and chose not to adopt them. In seven states, sentencing guidelines
are voluntary and are not subject to the appellate process. In some of these states, judges are required to
give reasons for departing from the guidelines. Because of this, compliance rates in voluntary guideline
states are often quite high.
Fourteen of the guideline states have permanent sentencing commissions; four do not. Alaska had a
temporary commission in the early 1990s, and the guidelines developed in Florida and Michigan were
written by sentencing commissions that were later abolished. New Jersey created a temporary
commission in 2004 and is currently evaluating whether or not to make the commission permanent.
Some states have sentencing commissions, but have not adopted sentencing guidelines. In all, 21 states
have sentencing commissions. Most sentencing commissions include judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, corrections officials, academics, public members and sometimes legislators. In all states with
permanent sentencing commissions, the commission (or occasionally another state agency) performs the
critical assessments of the impact of proposed sentencing guidelines and statutes on resources.
Richard S. Frase. May 2005. State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus and Unresolved Policy Issues. Columbia Law
Review. Volume 105, Number 4. Pages 1190-1232. Also, United States Sentencing Commission and National Association of State
Sentencing Commissions Web site. Accessed July 31, 2006. www.ussc.gov/states/nascaddr.htm.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
are able to more easily set policy priorities and make fiscal forecasts
whenever guidelines, amended guidelines or new punishment laws are
proposed or enacted. In these states, legislators and other policy-makers
know, with reasonable precision, the cost of a change in penalties for
crime. Armed with this data, most states with sentencing commissions
have reduced overall crime rates by increasing penalties for the most
dangerous offenders and expanded options for community-based
sanctions for certain low-level, nonviolent offenders.74
In California, CDCR provides inmate population projections. While its
short-term forecasts – two years or less – have been reasonably accurate,
the long-term projections have been significantly less accurate. In a
2005 assessment of the inmate projection process, the Bureau of State
Audits found the department’s projection unit used subjective variables
and that its credibility has been diminished by its lack of
independence.75
Two of the most respected sentencing commissions, particularly in the
area of providing credible unbiased data, are the North Carolina
Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission and the Virginia Criminal
Sentencing Commission.

North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission. The North
Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission was created in
1990 to bring certainty and rationality to a system in which incarcerated
felons were serving just a fraction of their sentences and the public
confidence in the criminal justi ce system had seriously eroded. It took
three years of political wrangling, but ultimately the commission
developed a structured sentencing system that was reviewed, amended
and adopted by the North Carolina General Assembly. The system set
sentencing guidelines based on the crime committed and the prior record
of the offender and also expanded community-based sanctions. The
reform eliminated early release to parole but include d mandatory postrelease supervision for certain offenders. As a result of the reform,
violent offenders sentenced after 1993 serve much longer sentences. To
accommodate the increased length of incarceration for violent offenders,
the state developed and adequately funded alternative sanctions for nonviolent, non-repeat offenders.
Since the passage of the structured
sentencing law, the 30-member commission continues to advise the
Legislature on sentencing policy by providing correctional resource
assessments and annually providing prison population projections.76

Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission.

The Virginia Criminal
Sentencing Commission was created during a politically tumultuous time
that demanded tougher penalties for violent felons. After a successful,
come-from-behind gubernatorial campaign that prominently touted

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING
longer sentences for violent offenders and abolishing parole, then newlyelected Governor George Allen established a Commission on Parole
Abolition and Sentencing Reform. The commission included Republican
and Democratic legislators, prosecutors, judges, crime victims, law
enforcement and legal scholars.
Additionally, the commission had
access to a fully-staffed and highly trained group of social scientists who
served in Virginia’s Criminal Justice Research Center. These experts had
doctoral degrees in criminology, government, psychology and statistics.
Additionally the center had developed one of the nation’s most detailed
databases on convicted felons.
The center’s research showed that
Virginia’s criminal justice system did not efficiently use incarce ration to
protect public safety and that Virginia incarcerated older, non-violent
offenders much longer than younger, violent offenders. Based on the
research, the commission developed voluntary sentencing guidelines that
resulted in violent and younger offenders serving longer prison terms,
abolished parole release and replaced it with post-release supervision for
certain offenders and expanded alternative sanctions and intermediate
punishment programs. The sentencing commission became permanent,
and its 17 members were charged with administering the guideline
system and annually making sentencing law revisions which take effect if
the Legislature takes no action to override the revisions. Additionally,
the commission was charged with developing a risk assessment tool for
low-level non -violent offenders to be used by judges at sentencing to
divert these offenders to community-based sanctions.77
These states are “tough on crime,” much more so than California. And in

Data Collection and Analysis
A critical responsibility of most sentencing commissions is to provide credible, nonpartisan data analysis to
policy-makers. In many states, sentencing commissions provide accurate forecasts and computer
simulations of the effect of sentencing laws on correctional resources. In these states, policy-makers know,
with reasonable precision, the cost of a change in penalties for crime. Data elements for individual
offenders often include:
§ Offense type and most serious offense
§ Drug or weapon use
§ Sentencing type and length
§ Total number of convictions
§ Concurrent or consecutive sentence
§ Treatment ordered
§ Fines, fees, victim compensation, restitution
§ Mitigating and aggravating circumstances
§ Prior criminal history
§ Offender demographics
§ Length of time served
§ Recidivism
Sources: Kevin Reitz, Reporter, Model Penal Code Revision Project. June 16, 2006. American Law Institute. Richard P. Kern, Ph.D.,
Director, Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission. David Wright, former Director of Research, Oklahoma Criminal Justice Resource
Center. “So You Want to Direct Sentencing Commission Research?” August 14, 2006. Web site accessed December 6, 2006.
http://correctionssentencing.blogspot.com/2006/08/so-you-want-to-direct-sentencing.html.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
these states, tough on crime does not equate to tough on tax coffers.
Crime rates in many of these states have declined more quickly than in
California as a result of the states’ willingness to evaluate sentencing
policies and promote cost-effective, evidence -based correctional policies.
Not all sentencing commissions have been successful. Usually the
commissions that have dissolved or been abolished lacked either judicial
or political support, or both. Some commissions that are now defunct
were created as temporary commissions and were dissolved once
sentencing guidelines were developed.
Experts agree that the best
commissions are permanent as the commission’s knowledge base is
required to evaluate and monitor sentencing policy over time.78
Dissolved or Abolished Sentencing Commissions
Several states established temporary sentencing commissions or abolished permanent commissions,
and California can benefit from the lessons learned in these states as well as from the states that have
had successful commissions.
The South Carolina Sentencing Guideline Commission was established as a temporary commission
charged with recommending sentencing guidelines to the legislature. However, the judiciary in the
state opposed the creation of the commission and, as a result, its recommendations were not enacted
by the legislature. New York also had a temporary commission and its guidelines also were not
enacted by the legislature.
In Michigan, the Supreme Court established sentencing guidelines based on sentencing practices of
trial courts. Wanting to take a more active role in sentencing policy, the Michigan legislature
established the Michigan Sentencing Commission in 1994. The Michigan Sentencing Commission
recommended guidelines that were enacted by the legislature in 1998. The commission stopped
meeting after it developed the guidelines and the legislature took over responsibility for evaluating,
monitoring and amending the guidelines. Experts suggest that the commission dissolved prematurely
due to the lack of political support from the legislature.
Florida’s sentencing guidelines originally were established through its judicial branch. The chief
justice of the Florida Supreme Court directed a research team to develop guidelines that would be tied
to existing practices and have little impact on resources, but would reduce sentencing disparities. By
the early 1980s, both the legislature and the governor became more interested in sentencing policy
and created the Florida Sentencing Guidelines Commission within the state’s department of
corrections. With the commission’s assistance, lawmakers enacted increasingly tough sentences,
particularly for drug crimes. The inmate population quickly increased, prisons became severely
overcrowded and the federal courts took control, imposing a population cap. As a result of the
mandatory minimums used to incarcerate drug offenders, the courts were unable to shorten sentences
for these offenders and instead were forced to reduce sentences for more violent and serious offenders.
As a result of this fiasco, the sentencing commission was abolished.
Sources: Little Hoover Commission. January 1994. “Putting Violence Behind Bars: Redefining the Roles of California’s Prisons.”
p. 18, citing Michael Tonry. July 1991. “The Politics and Processes of Sentencing Commissions,” Crime and Delinquency.
Also, Kara Dansky. Executive Director, Stanford Criminal Justice Center. August 24, 2006. Written testimony to the
Commission. Also, Richard P. Kern, Director, Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission. January 12, 2006. Personal
communication.

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING

Current National Reform Efforts
Efforts to reform sentencing laws are part of a broader campaign to
change the nation’s correctional policies, a campaign fueled by critics of
the status quo. They maintain the correctional system in the United
States is overly reliant on incarceration, negating alternatives that could
enhance public safety and protect public resources.

American Law Institute Model Penal Code Revision
In 2002, the American Law Institute (ALI) dedicated itself to the first-ever
revision of the Model Penal Code’s provisions to sentencing, established
in 1962. Established in 1923, ALI is a national organization of elected
judges, attorneys and law professors that works to “promote the
clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to
social needs.” 79 ALI members recognized a need to reduce U.S.
incarceration and recidivism rates. In a 2006 draft report, ALI members
recommended that state legislatures take the “administrative model
approach” to sentencing reform and establish “permanent sentencing
commission(s) with the authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines.”80
According to ALI members, states with sentencing commissions achieve
greater consistency in the application of law, are able to make more
accurate predictions of sentencing patterns and enjoy improved
information about how the sentencing system operates.81

The Justice Kennedy Commission
One of the most talked about sentencing and criminal justice reform
efforts in recent years has been the work done by the American Bar
Association’s Justice Kennedy Commission. The commission formed
shortly after a speech by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy
at the American Bar Association’s annual meeting in 2003 in which he
highlighted significant failings of the modern criminal justice system,
including the record-high number of people in prison, the
disproportionate impact of incarceration on minorities and the lack of
judicial discretion in sentencing. Kennedy challenged ABA members to
study and address these issues.
On August 9, 2004, the ABA adopted the recommendations of the Justice
Kennedy Commission outlined in its final report82 . On sentencing, the
commission recommended that the ABA lobby state and federal
lawmakers to:
a) Repeal mandatory minimum sentences;

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
b)

Require sentencing courts to state the reason for increasing or
reducing a sentence and allow appellate review of such
sentences;

Consider diversion programs for less serious offenses;

Give greater authority and resources to an agency responsible
for monitoring the sentencing system; and,

e) Develop graduated sanctions for violations of probation and
parole.

Cunningham v. California
On January 22, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that California’s
determinate sentencing structure violated a defendant’s right to a trial by
jury. The Supreme Court had heard arguments in the fall of 2006 on the
Cunningham v. California case that alleged California’s determinate
sentencing law violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by
permitting judges to impose enhanced sentences based on facts not
found by the jury. Specifically, the Cunningham case focused on the
State’s triad sentencing structure which provides judges three options for
sentencing, a middle or presumptive term, an aggravated term or a
mitigated term. For example, a first degree burglary charge could result
in a sentence of two, four, or six years in prison.83
The Supreme Court found that “because the Determinate Sentencing
Law allocates to judges sole authority to find facts permitting the
imposition of an upper term sentence, the system violates the Sixth
Amendment.”84
The Cunningham case is similar to Blakely v.
Washington, in which the Court ruled that juries – not judges – must find
virtually all facts that increase a defendant’s sentence.
As a result of the Cunningham ruling, California must adjust the
application of the Determinate Sentencing Law. The Supreme Court
suggested that juries could be called upon to find any fact that would
lead to an elevated sentence or the State could allow judges discretion in
sentencing within the entire range of the existing triad. 85 While these or
other possible modifications to make the Determinate Sentencing Law
constitutional may not result in a major overhaul of the State’s
sentencing system, it certainly provide s another impetus to evaluate the
State’s sentencing laws.

Moving Forward in California Sentencing Reform
In its public meetings, this Commission heard from a diverse group of
stakeholders who agreed that the State needs to re-evaluate its

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING
sentencing policies. They expressed the belief that this effort could best
be performed by an independent entity that could rise above the usual
political obstacles that have blocked prior attempts to improve
sentencing law. These stakeholders, listed in Appendix B of this report,
took the additional step of agreeing to support legislative efforts to
implement this concept.

Functions of a Sentencing Commission
Stakeholders in this Commission’s advisory committee meetings agreed
that the functions of a California sentencing commission should be to:
Ø

Collect offender data and conduct ongoing cost and population
projects.

Serve as an independent resource for the Legislature, charged
with analyzing the impact on correctional resources of alternative
sentencing and correctional policy options.

Develop a classification system based on a risk assessment for all
offenders in the State’s correctional system that judges could use
at the time of sentencing.

Examine the relationship between state and local governments
and conduct a thorough assessment of corrections infrastructure
and programming needs.

Educate the public on California’s correctional and sentencing
system.

Composition of a Sentencing Commission
Governor Schwarzenegger, in his corrections reform plan released in
December 2006, included a recommendation that the State establish a
17-member sentencing commission, to include the Attorney General, the
CDCR Secretary, and 15 members appointed by the Governor, including

Strengths and Weaknesses of Sentencing Commissions
In a 2006 national survey of state chief justices and court administrators, nineteen
states with sentencing commissions responded to questions regarding the
strengths and weaknesses of sentencing commissions. The two most common
strengths were that all components of the criminal justice system were
represented on the commission and that the commission provided reliable,
trustworthy data allowing for information-based decision-making and credibility.
The most frequently mentioned weaknesses were membership composition issues
– either the absence of key stakeholders or that the diversity of the commission
made it difficult to reach consensus. Additionally, the survey respondents noted
that commissions serving in an advisory capacity suffered from a lack of authority.
Source: National Center for State Courts. August 2006. “Getting Smarter About Sentencing: NCSC’s
Sentencing Reform Survey.”

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
legislators, a state judge, and representatives from law enforcement and
crime victim groups. The Governor indicated that re -evaluating the
purpose and nature of parole would be a priority for the commission.
The Governor’s 2007-08 Budget proposed $457,000 from the General
Fund to establish a sentencing commission within CDCR. 86
In January 2007, Senator Gloria Romero introduced a bill, SB 110 to
create “a balanced, nonpartisan, independently staffed sentencing
commission charged with the responsibility of collecting and analyzing
sentencing and other corrections data, developing statewide sentencing
and corrections policies, and achieving uniformity in our sentencing
practices.”87
Also in January 2007, Assemblymember Sally Lieber
introduced AB 160 which creates a sentencing commission based on
successful models from other states. Additionally, a working group
convened by the California Correctional Peace Officers Association, and
that includes many members from this Commission’s Sentencing
Advisory Committee, plans to sponsor legislation to create a sentencing
commission.

Membership of a Sentencing Commission
The American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code revision draft provides the
following template for the composition of an 11-member sentencing commission:
3
2
1
1
1
1
1

members from the state’s judicial branch
members from the state legislature
district attorney
criminal defense attorney
representative from probation or parole
academic with experience in criminal justice research
public member

An alternative template doubles the membership from the first template and includes
suggested appointing powers:
1 chief justice of the supreme court or designee
4 judges appointed by the chief justice
4 members from the legislature appointed by the majority and minority
leader of both houses
1 director of the corrections department
2 district attorneys
2 criminal defense attorneys including at least one public defender
1 probation official
1 parole or reentry official
1 chief of police
1 representative of local government
1 academic with experience in criminal-justice research
3 members of the public, one of whom shall be a crime victim and one of
whom shall be a rehabilitated former state prisoner
Source: Kevin R. Reitz, Professor, University of Michigan and Reporter, The American Law Institute,
Model Penal Code Revision Project. June 22, 2006. Written testimony to the Commission. The
American Law Institute. Model Penal Code: Sentencing. April 17, 2006. P. 48-50

MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING
Twenty-one states have active sentencing commissions. Membership
varies by state, but ranges from a low of nine members in Arkansas and
Oregon to a high of 31 members in Ohio.88 While experts agree it is
usually better to keep sentencing commissions small, advisory committee
members generally agreed that California would require a sentencing
commission large enough to include a diverse group of stakeholders
appointed by the Governor, the Legislature and the Judiciary.
The American Law Institute draft report on sentencing recommends that
states establish a sentencing commission, but does not recommend a
specific composition as each state will have to adapt existing models to
meet their own unique characteristics and political realities, although the
report does include two templates. Most importantly, the ALI report
states that a sentencing commission include “qualified persons to help
drive a process of ongoing knowledge development, consensus-building,
innovation, self-awareness and self-correction.”89
Experts assert that a sentencing commission in California will need to be
different than models in other states. It needs to be original and creative
and should include a geographically and philosophically diverse group of
leaders who have been successful in their chosen fields. Another model
to consider is the University of California Board of Regents.

University of California, Board of Regents
The University of California is governed by The Regents, which under the California Constitution has "full
powers of organization and governance" subject only to very specific areas of legislative control. The
Constitution states that "the university shall be entirely independent of all political and sectarian influence
and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its Regents and in the administration of its affairs."
The Board of Regents was established in 1878 after a decade of political conflict demonstrated the
importance of sheltering the university from shifting political winds. The board consists of 26 members:
•
•
•

18 regents are appointed by the Governor for 12- year terms
One is a student appointed by the Regents to a one-year term
Seven are ex officio members -- the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the Assembly,
Superintendent of Public Instruction, president and vice president of the Alumni Associations of UC
and the UC president.

In addition, two faculty members – the chair and vice chair of the Academic Council – sit on the board as
non-voting members.
The current membership includes leaders with diverse backgrounds including investment banking, law,
mass media, government, medicine, high tech, and real estate.
Source: University of California Regents Web site: http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/regents/about.html.
Accessed January 12, 2006.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Recommendation 3: California should establish a sentencing commission to guide the
State’s criminal justice sentencing policies to enhance public safety. Specifically, the
sentencing commission should be:
q Protective.

q Authoritative. The sentencing commission should have the authority
to develop sentencing guidelines, as well as post release supervision
and revocation guidelines that become law unless rejected by a
majority vote of the Legislature.

q Accountable. The sentencing commission should assess all proposed
sentencing law changes for their potential effect on criminal justice
policies and correctional system resources.

Link Sentencing Laws to Fiscal Appropriations
In Virginia, all sentencing changes proposed by lawmakers are evaluated by the Virginia Criminal
Sentencing Commission that projects the effect on correctional resources and any additional costs. All
proposed laws are given a price tag based on the commission’s analysis. When sentencing laws pass
the public safety committee, Virginia lawmakers must go before the appropriations committee to
identify cuts in other government services or increases in revenue to pay for the new law.
California lawmakers proposing changes to sentencing laws that increase correctional costs should be
required to tie fiscal appropriations to the proposed laws. Additionally, ballot initiatives that change
sentencing laws should be assessed by the sentencing commission to project correctional resource
requirements so that voters could better understand the fiscal implications of new sentencing law.
Source: Richard P. Kern, Director, Virginia Sentencing Commission. August 24, 2006. Testimony to the Commission.

CONCLUSION

Conclusion
“Our prison system is a powder keg. It poses a danger to the prisoners, a
danger to the officers… and a danger to the well-being of the public,”
Governor Schwarzenegger proclaimed in his January 2007 State of the
State address.
Policy-makers from both sides of the aisle and
correctional experts across the nation agree with this assessment.
The Governor and the current Legislature alone did not create the
problem – California’s leaders have neglected the correctional system for
decades.
But never before has the need to resolve the crisis been so imperative.
As California policy-makers failed to address the correctional crisis,
federal courts stepped in to fill the leadership void. The State ceded
control of its inmate medical system to a federal receiver. A new lawsuit
could hand the keys to the prison gates over to a panel of federal judges
who could decide who stays in and who gets released.
The Governor and the Legislature must act before that happens.
Decisions should be made by California lawmakers, not the federal
government. A federal judge has given California until June 2007 to
make progress.
In 2006, the Governor and the Legislature showed Californians they
could work together on contentious issues. They must do the same for
the prison crisis. The situation is i ntimidating, but not hopeless.
The solutions for the crisis are clear. But policy-makers must flex their
political muscle s and do the heavy lifting required to move ahead. This
Commission has concluded this is the best alternative. If policy-makers
do not take swift and decisive action, they should appoint an
independent entity that will.
Policy-makers must manage the correctional population. To do this,
capacity may need to be expanded, particularly at the local level. But,
the State should not settle for simply building more cells. It has done
that for nearly two decades and the State is still in a crisis.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Immediate solutions to address the overcrowding are summarized below.
Some are policy choices that can be implemented immediately, while
others require legislative action.
The State also must look at the correctional horizon. It must analyze its
sentencing policies and set priorities for who it wants to punish and how.
To do this, the State must follow the trail blazed by nearly two dozen
other states and establish an independent sentencing commission.
The sentencing commission must gather data and provide a credible
independent analysis of California’s correctional population. Armed with
knowledge, the sentencing commission should assist the State – before it
embarks on another prison building boom – in identifying what
correctional resources are needed to achieve the greatest public safety.

Immediate Opportunities to Address Overcrowding
? Expand the use of furloughs. Current law allows certain low-level offenders to be released to
community-based facilities 120 days prior to their parole date. CDCR should expand its use of
work and drug treatment furloughs.
? Expand community-based corrections for female offenders. The Legislature should authorize
CDCR’s plan to move 4,500 low-level non-violent female offenders to community-based facilities.
? Waive parole. Existing law provides that CDCR can waive parole. CDCR should waive parole
for offenders who pose no threat to public safety.
? Expand earned discharge. As currently allowed by law, the State should discharge low- risk
offenders who have successfully completed one year on parole. Additionally, the Legislature
should enact incentives for earned release for parolees who successfully achieve goals or complete
programs, similar to the earned release established in 2006 by SB 1453.
? Expand the San Diego Reentry Project. Continue to implement the San Diego Reentry Project
authorized in 2005 by SB 618 and expand the pilot project to other counties.
? Empower judges. Enact legislation enabling judges to identify and direct offenders otherwise
bound for prison into community-based sanctions and reallocate funding to pay for this.

THE COMMISSION’S STUDY PROCESS

The Commission’s Study Process
The Commission has examined the correctional system five times in the
past dozen years. In 1994, the Commission assessed the State’s overall
correctional policies and in 1998, reviewed the overcrowding problem. In
2004, the Commission reviewed the State’s parole policies and the
following year reviewed the effect these parole policies have on female
offenders.
Most recently, in 2005, the Commission reviewed the
Governor’s plan to reorganize the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency to
fold it into the newly create d California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
The majority of the Commission’s recent recommendations focused on
improving prison and parole policies.
The Commission studied
sentencing policies in its 1994 review. It also consulted experts on
sentencing during its 2003 assessment of parole, but did not embark on
a study at that point in time. Given the national efforts in sentencing
reform, the decades of experience available from other states and the
current correctional crisis in California, the Commission in 2006 decided
to again review sentencing policies as a critical element of overall
correctional policies.
The Commission’s goal was to provide wellresearched recommendations to policy-makers for reforming California’s
sentencing structure that, in conjunction with reforms in prison
programs and parole policies, will improve public safety and control
spiraling costs.
When the Commission reviewed the Governor’s reorganization plan in
2005, it recommended that the Legislature allow the plan to take effect,
but also committe d itself to oversight of the progress of the
reorganization.
This report is the result of the convergence of these efforts – the
Commission’s review of the State’s criminal justice sentencing policies
and its ongoing correctional oversight effort.
As part of its study process for this report, the Commission held four
public hearings. The first two hearings focused on sentencing reform.
The Commission received testimony from national experts on sentencing,
leaders from other states who had implemented sentencing reforms and
established sentencing commissions, judges, the California District
Attorneys Association, a victims rights advocate, legal scholars from the

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Administrative Office of the Courts, the Attorney General’s office and
Stanford University, local law enforcement, the president of the
correctional officers union, former offenders and family members of
current inmates.
The third hearing was designed to provide an update on the progress of
the reorganization effort. The Commission heard from the current and
former secretaries of CDCR, legislators dedicated to corrections oversight
and reform, local law enforcement and the president of the correctional
officers union. The fourth hearing examined correctional management
structure. The Commission heard from the court-appointed receiver
overseeing the inmate medical system, a prisoner rights lawyer, an
correctional management expert and former correctional director, and an
expert in corporate turnaround. Witnesses invited to participate in the
Commission’s public hearings are listed in Appendix A.
The Commission convened a sentencing reform advisory committee
comprised of diverse stakeholders impacted by the State’s sentencing
policies. The advisory committee met three times. Advisory committee
members are listed in Appendix B.
Finally, as part of the oversight effort, the Commission held two round
table discussions on juvenile justice and parole policies to explore in
greater detail the progress that had been made since the reorganization,
the barriers to progress and what it will take to overcome those barriers.
Participants from those meetings are listed in Appendix C.
All written testimony submitted electronically for each of the four
hearings and this report are available online at the Commission Web site,
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc.html.

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendices & Notes
ü Public Hearing Witnesses
ü Advisory Committee Members
ü Roundtable Meeting Participants
ü Prior Recommendations
ü History of Sentencing Commission Proposals in California
ü SCJC – Increases in California Sentencing Since the Enactment
of the Determinate Sentencing Act
ü Notes

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix A
Little Hoover Commission Public Hearing Witnesses
Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Public Hearing on Sentencing Reform, June 22, 2006
Kevin R. Reitz, Professor of Law, University
of Minnesota, and Reporter, the American
Law Institute, Model Penal Code Revision
Project

Les Kleinberg, Special Assistant Attorney
General, Legislative Affairs, Office of the
Attorney General
Sharon J. English, Crime Victim Rights and
Services Advisor

Roger K. Warren, Scholar-in-Residence,
Judicial Council of California,
Administrative Office of the Courts and
Project Director, National Sentencing
Reform Project, National Center for State
Courts

Gregory D. Totten, Ventura County District
Attorney and Member of the Board of
Directors, California District Attorneys
Association

Joshua Weinstein, Senior Attorney, Judicial
Council of California, Administrative Office
of the Courts and Staff to the Criminal Law
Advisory Committee

Mike Jimenez, President, California
Correctional Peace Officers Associati on

Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Public Hearing on Sentencing Reform, August 24, 2006
Thomas W. Ross, Executive Director, Z.
Smith Reynolds Foundation; former Chair,
North Carolina Sentencing and Policy
Advisory Commission; and, former Director,
North Carolina Administrative Office of the
Courts

Kara Dansky, Executive Director, Stanford
Criminal Justice Center
Steven Z. Perren, Judge, California Court of
Appeal, Second District
J. Richard Couzens, Judge, Placer County
Superior Court

Robert M. A. Johnson, Anoka County
Attorney, Minnesota

Joseph A. Gunn, Executive Director,
Independent Review Panel on Corrections

Richard P. Kern, Ph. D, Director, Virginia
Criminal Sentencing Commission

56LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Public Hearing on Correctional System and Sentencing Reform, October 26, 2006
James E. Tilton, Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation

Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, County of Los
Angeles

Senator Jackie Speier, Chair, Senate Select
Committee on Government Cost Control

James R. Milliken, Judge (Retired), San
Diego Superior Court

Senator Gloria Romero, Chair, Senate
Select Committee on the California
Correctional System

Tim Silard, Assistant District Attorney,
City and County of San Francisco, on
behalf of Kamala Harris, District Attorney,
City and County of San Francisco

Roderick Q. Hickman, Public Sector
Management and Consultant, XRoads
Solutions Group, LLC, and former
Secretary, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation

Mike Jimenez, President, California
Correctional Peace Officers Association

Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Public Hearing on Corrections Oversight – Management Structure, November 16, 2006
Robert Sillen, Court-appointed receiver
overseeing prison medical care (Plata v.
Schwarzenegger)

Reginald Wilkinson, Ph. D, former Director,
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, and Chair, National Institute of
Corrections Advisory Board

Donald Spector, Director, Prison Law Office
Dennis Simon, Managing Principal, XRoads
Solutions Group, LLC

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix B
Little Hoover Commission Advisory Committee on Sentencing Reform
Barbara Bloom, Associate Professor,
Criminology and Criminal Justice
Department, Sonoma State University

John Lum, Public Policy Coordinator,
Coalition for Effective Public Safety, and
Californians United for a Responsible
Budget

Susan Burton, Executive Director, A New
Way of Life Foundation

Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center
on Juvenile & Criminal Justice

Marci Coglianese, Co-Chair, The Family
Council

Jerome McGuire, Counsel, Senate Public
Safety Committee

Cathy Coyne, Legislative Analyst, California
State Sheriffs’ Association

Steven Meinrath, Counsel, Senate Public
Safety Committee

Kara Dansky, Executive Director, Stanford
Criminal Justice Center

Greg Pagan, Chief Counsel, Assembly
Public Safety Committee

Pam Douglas, Director, Corrections
Institute of America

Joan Petersilia, Director, Center for
Evidenced Based Corrections, University of
California, Irvine

Charlie Fennessey, Principal Consultant,
Office of Senator Charles Poochigian

Dale Rickter, Co-Chair, The Family Council
Susan Fisher, Governor’s Crime Victims
Advocate, Office of the Governor

Cory Salzillo, Senate Republican Policy
Consultant

James Fox, District Attorney, San Mateo
County

Tim Silard, Assistant District Attorney, City
and County of San Francisco

Mike Jimenez, President, California
Correctional Peace Officers Associati on

Norma Suzuki, Executive Director, Chief
Probation Officers of California

Greg Jolivette, Director, Criminal Justice,
Legislative Analyst’s Office

Steve Szalay, Executive Director, California
State Sheriffs’ Association

J. Clark Kelso, Director, Capital Center for
Government Law & Policy

Jeffrey Thoma, Solano County Public
Defender

Les Kleinberg, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General, State of Californi a

Joshua Weinstein, Senior Attorney, Judicial
Council of California, Administrative Office
of the Courts

David LaBahn, Executive Director,
California District Attorneys Association
Jim Lindburg, Legislative Advocate, Friends
Committee on Legislation of California

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix C
Little Hoover Commission Corrections Oversight Project
Roundtable Discussions on Parole Reform and Juvenile Justice
Participants, November 15, 2006
Robert Ambroselli, Parole Administrator,
California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation

John Monday, Acting Executive Director,
Board of Parole Hearings
Gary Olson, Assembly Republican
Consultant

Alison Anderson, Chief Counsel, Senate
Public Safety Committee

Greg Pagan, Chief Counsel, Assembly
Public Safety Committee

Michael Bien, Managing Partner, Rose, Bien
& Galvan, LLP

Karen Pank, Executive Director, Chief
Probation Officers of California

Sue Burrell, Staff Attorney, Youth Law
Center

Cory Salzillo, Senate Republican Policy
Consultant

Charlie Fennessey, Principal Consultant,
Office of Senator Charles Poochigian

Del Sayles-Owen, Director, Division of
Community Partnerships, California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation

Cindie Fonseca, Educator, California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Bargaining Unit 3, Service
Employees International Union Local 1000

Elizabeth Siggins, Chief for Juvenile Justice
Policy Division, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation

Joshua Golka, Government Relations
Advocate, Service Employees International
Union Local 1000

Melinda Silva, Parole Agent, California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation

Thomas Hoffman, Director, Division of
Adult Parole Operations, California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation

David Steinhart, Executive Director,
Commonweal Juvenile Justice

Steve Krull, Chief of Police, Livermore Police
Department

Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary for
Juvenile Justice, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation

Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center
on Juvenile & Criminal Justice
Jerome McGuire, Counsel, Senate Public
Safety Committee
Steven Meinrath, Counsel, Senate Public
Safety Committee

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix D
To Improve California Corrections and Manage Inmate Population
Blue Ribbon
Commission (1990)

Independent Review Panel
(2004)

Little Hoover Commission
(1994, 1998, 2003, 2004 and
2005)

Enact a Sentencing Law
Revision Commission to
review the impacts of
existing or revised
sentencing laws, establish
sentencing guidelines and
expand intermediate
sanctions for adult and
juvenile offenders.

Charter a Commission with
appropriate members to develop
a presumptive sentencing model
for non-second and third strike
crimes.

Create a sentencing commission in
California by action of the Governor and
the Legislature or by ballot initiative.
Pattern it after successful models in
other states.

Develop and expand
intermediate sanctions for
certain targeted short-term
offenders who are serving
less than one year in
prison.

Release low-risk inmates to
community supervision.

Fund community-based punishments
that improve public safety by reducing
recidivism. Begin with female
offenders.

Develop a series of
specialized, intensive, high
impact, short-term, inprison programs to prepare
inmates for the successful
return to society.

Provide inmate planning and reentry assessment at the time of
incarceration and expand the
Community Re-Entry Bridging
Program.

To protect the public, implement a risk
and needs assessment tool at intake and,
use proven strategies to prepare inmates
for release, supervise and assist parolees
in California communities, and
intervene when parolees fail.

Develop an automated
Corrections Management
Information System
designed to assist officers at
all levels of the
correctional system in
identifying and classifying
offenders statewide.

Develop a comprehensive data
collection and analysis system
that measures the effectiveness of
the department’s parole
programs. This system must also
link with other department data
analysis systems.

Efforts should be made to accelerate the
development of a robust technology
system to provide the department with
information to effectively manage its
efforts.

Sources: The Blue Ribbon Commission on Inmate Population Management Final Report. January 1990. Corrections
Independent Review Panel. Reforming California’s Youth and Adult Correctional System. June 30, 2004. Sacramento,
CA. Little Hoover Commission. January 1994. Putting Violence Behind Bars: Redefining the Role of California’s Prisons.
Sacramento, CA. Little Hoover Commission. January 1998. Beyond Bars: Correctional Reforms to Lower Prison Costs
and Reduce Crime. Sacramento, CA. Little Hoover Commission. November 2003. Back to the Community: Safe &
Sound Parole Policies. Sacramento, CA. Little Hoover Commission. December 2004. Breaking the Barriers for Women
on Parole. Sacramento, CA. Little Hoover Commission. February 2005. Reconstructing Government: A Review of the
Governor’s Reorganization Plan Reforming California’s Youth and Adult Correctional Agency. Sacramento, CA.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix E
History of sentencing commission proposals in California
California lawmakers have debated the merits of a sentencing commission for more than 20
years. Since 1984, seven different bills aimed at reforming California’s troubled prison system
proposed establishing an independent body of experts to recommend sentencing guidelines.
Three of these bills made it out of the Legislature and to the Governor’s desk; every attempt
ultimately failed. The following summarizes these bills including their amendments, common
aspects, main opponents and the reasons they failed.

Past attempts to create a sentencing commission
Year
1984
1992
1994
1994
1995
1995
1998
2006

Bill
SB 56 (Presley)
SB 25 (Lockyer)*
AB 43 (Polanco)
AB 2944 (Vasconcellos)
SB 166 (Polanco)
AB 1036 (Vasconcellos)
SB 670 (Vasconcellos)
AB 14 (Lieber)

Status
Vetoed by Gov. Deukmejian
Vetoed by Gov. Wilson
Failed to pass Committee
Vetoed by Gov. Wilson
Failed to pass Committee
Failed to pass Committee
Stalled in Assembly
In the Assembly

* SB 25 proposed a new sentencing structure with increased judicial discretion
and presumptive sentence ranges.

Common aspects of sentencing commission legislation
Four of the seven bills to establish a sentencing commission proposed the following
16-member panel with four ex officio members and 12 voting members90 :
Four ex officio members: The Attorney General; the Secretary of then Department of
Corrections; the Director of Finance; and, the State Public Defender.
Six members appointed by the Governor 91: One prosecuting attorney; one chief of police or
county sheriff; one public member who has never been an attorney, judge or law enforcement
official; one retired member of the California Supreme Court or California Court of Appeal; and,
one public member.
Three members appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly: One public member who has
never been an attorney, judge or law enforcement official; one prosecuting attorney; and, one
public member currently active in criminology research or academia in California.
Three members appointed by the Senate Rules Committee: One public member who has
never been an attorney, judge or law enforcement official; one public defender; and, one faculty
member of a law school in this state.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
The American Law Institute draft Model Penal Code on sentencing proposes, and other states
have formed, sentencing commissions that include more judicial and legislative members.

Duties and Considerations
In addition to devising sentencing guidelines, the duties and responsibilities charged to the
sentencing commission included several provisions that addressed sentence lengths, inmate
treatment plans, corrections data gathering and prison capacity.
Sentence length. All of the bills attempted to strike a balance between increasing and decreasing
sentence length. Although SB 25 increased sentences for 50 crimes, Governor Wilson vetoed
the bill because it would lower sentences for some crimes such as drug offenses. In later bills,
language was included to allow a sentencing commission to consider a system of indeterminate
sentencing for nonviolent offenders or the sentencing ranges proposed in SB 25.

SB 25 (Lockyer)
This bill placed determinate sentences into one of six sentencing ranges
with a minimum, maximum and middle, or presumptive, term. The
judge would have the discretion to select any sentence in the sentence
range. SB 25 would have created the following sentence schedules:
A
B
C
D
E
F

Minimum Term
5 years
3 years
3 years
3 years
2 years
16 months

Maximum Term
11 years
9 years
7 years
6 years
4 years
3 years

Presumptive Term
8 years
6 years
5 years
4 years
3 years
2 years

Inmate treatment. Several
bills
charged
the
sentencing commission
to devise a system of
granting and rescinding
sentence credits based
upon
individual
treatment plans.
The
Department
of
Corrections
criticized
this
provision
for
stripping it of authority
over inmates.

Data gathering and prison
capacity.
At least two
bills to establish a
sentencing commission directed the commission to establish a da tabase to trace crime
statistics, sentencing outcomes and other corrections-related information to monitor the state’s
sentencing code for stability and fairness. Along the same lines, several bills also charged the
commission to collect data on the curre nt and future capacity of state prisons and to consider
this information in devising sentencing guidelines.

Reasons for failure
Sentencing commission bills failed based on concerns that they were too harsh or too lenient
on offenders.92 Governors Deukmejian and Wilson each sited an objection to removing the
authority to create sentence law from the Legislature to an unelected commission in their veto
messages. Other bills failed because opponents equated a sentencing commission with a
return to indeterminate sentencing in California. Highlighted below are the major reasons
sentencing commission bills failed and arguments used by their challengers.
Fear of shorter sentences and / or a return to indeterminate sentencing. In his veto message of AB
2944, Governor Wilson decried what he interpreted as the Legislature’s attempt to return to an
indeterminate sentencing structure: “AB 2944, by its legislative intent, favors a return to an
indeterminate sentencing structure. Indeterminate sentencing, which was widely discredited
in the 1970s, remains in disfavor with the law enforcement community. [I]ts expanded use
eliminates the certainty in justice which the public desires.”93 Similarly, Governor Wilson

APPENDICES & NOTES
vetoed Senate Bill 25, which proposed presumptive sentencing, for fear that it would end “15
years of decisional law.”94
Opponents of a sentencing commission also have expressed the fear that a sentencing
commission would lower sentence lengths for some criminals. The Committee on Moral
Concerns vehemently opposed AB 1036 on the grounds that it would lower sentences for
nonviolent crimes such as drug offenses. “[AB 1036] calls for lesser penalties for nonviolent
offenses…with today’s current drug problems, this
is hardly the time to go easy on drug pushers.”95

Opponent’s Arguments

ACLU on SB 25:
“…it is our view that enactment of this
legislation will result in longer prison sentences
thereby exacerbating our already overcrowded
prison system.” (Letter to the Assembly, June
11, 1991)
Committee on Moral Concerns on AB 1036:
“…this bill calls for guidelines that are neither
based on public safety nor the will of the
people.”
(Letter
to
Assemblymember
Vasconcellos,
March 25, 1995)
California Correctional
Association on SB 166:

Peace

Officers

“[SB 166] would create another layer of
bureaucracy subject to the same ‘crime politic’
which some find so distasteful in the
Legislature.” (Letter to the Legislature, June
22, 1995)

Authority issues.
Many sentencing commission
opponents have been uncomfortable with the idea
of an unelected body making decisions that would
impact public safety.
In his veto message of
Senate Bill 56, Governor Deukmejian wrote: “I
strongly believe that the responsibility for setting
the ranges of prison sentences should rest with the
Legislature, which is directly responsible to the
voters of California, rather than a non-elective
commission.”96 Also on the issue of authority, the
Department of Finance opposed SB 166, because it
“would
both
delegate
authority
to
devise
sentencing guidelines to a new body while leaving
the authority with the Judicial Council.”97
Composition conflicts.
Opponents of sentencing
commission legislation expressed several concerns
over the composition and appointment process
used to select its members. California Attorneys
for
Criminal
Justice
opposed
SB 670 because they believed the proposed
commission membership was weighted too heavily
with law enforcement and correctional interests.
Instead, they wanted more public members
including a member of a prisoner’s rights group. 98

California District Attorneys Association on
AB 2944:

Stakeholders also have opposed legislation based
on the appointment process for the commission
members. Every bill except SB 56 gave authority
“We are strongly opposed to any effort to shift
to appoint commission members to the Governor,
to a sentencing structure that is primarily based
the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Rules
upon an indeterminate scheme.” (Letter to
Committee. SB 56 gave appointment authority to
Assemblymember Vasconcellos, July 1, 1994)
the Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly and the
Senate President Pro Tem. In opposition to AB
1036, the Office of Criminal Justice Planning
argued that the Governor should have a greater role in appointing commission members.99
However, Riverside Superior Court Judge Frank Moore, while supporting SB 56, opposed the
idea of allowing the Governor to appoint a majority of the commission’s members.
Cost. The Department of Finance repeatedly opposed sentencing commission legislation based
on the “indeterminable costs” to the General Fund that such a commission would incur.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix F
Increases in California Sentencing Since the Enactment of the Determinate Sentencing Act,
§§ 1170, et seq. and 12022, et seq
Project Description
In connection with its Sentencing Reform Project, the Little Hoover Commission has asked the Stanford Criminal
Justice Center (SCJC) to prepare a report summarizing amendments to the California sentencing structure that have
resulted in increased criminal sentences since the Determinate Sentencing Act became effective in 1977. The Little
Hoover Commission requested that we provide our results by the end of calendar year 2006.
Project Method
We began by convening a research team that included Kara Dansky, Executive Director of the SCJC; Kate Wilko,
Research Attorney at Stanford Law School’s Crown Library; and Laura Terlouw, third year Stanford Law Student.
Our first steps were to: (1) compile a list of all of the provisions of the California Code that relate in significant part
to sentencing; (2) identify the enactment date of and the date of every amendment to each of those provisions; (3)
locate the session law that correlates with each of those enactments and amendments; and (4) given the Little
Hoover Commission’s time frame, prioritize the sections according to their likelihood of having a substantial impact
on sentencing.
We decided to begin with the Determinate Sentencing Act itself, § 1170, et seq., and the conduct enhancements
located at § 12022, et seq., based on the likelihood that they would contain the majority of statutory provisions
relating to sentencing.
Laura Terlouw began the analysis by reviewing the historical and statutory notes for each enactment and
amendment. Laura quickly discovered that while these notes are useful as a guide, relying on them exclusively
would result in skipping over relevant amendments.
Laura proceeded to analyze the session laws themselves. She read the entire text of every session law that correlated
with every legislative enactment or amendment that could have an effect on sentencing. She compiled the session
laws that had a substantive effect either on sentence length or on the prescribed method for imposing sentences and
discarded those that had only grammatical or other non-substantive effects on sentencing. She then summarized her
findings in a chart.
Kara Dansky then reviewed the chart that Laura had prepared in order to determine which of the substantive changes
Laura had found could accurately be characterized as “increasing” sentences. Nearly every substantive amendment
to the two sections of the Code that we studied resulted in an increase in sentences.
Scope
As noted above, our research includes only the statutory provisions included in the Determinate Sentencing Act, §
1170, et seq., and the conduct enhancements located at § 12022, et seq., that substantively increased sentences.
We have not included grammatical or other non-substantive changes. We have also not included the following
provisions of the California Code:
•
•
•

Combination Determinate and Indeterminate Sentencing: §§ 668-678.
Conduct Credits: §§ 2933-2935. These sections relate to work credits.
Pre-sentence credits: §§ 4019-4019.5.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
•
•
•
•

Violent felonies: §§ 1192-1192.8. Many of these sections address plea bargaining.
Recidivism Enhancements under the following codes: California Penal Code; California Health & Safety
Code; and California Insurance Code.
Habitual Offenders and Three Strikes: §§ 667-667.17.
Specific Conduct Enhancements under the following codes: California Penal Code; California Health &
Safety Code; California Vehicle Code; California Welfare & Institutions Code.

Future researchers should review these provisions. We believe that these provisions have substantively affected
sentencing, and have likely contributed to the trend of increasing sentences. If there is additional time, future
researchers may want to also review the Indeterminate Sentencing Act. § 1168 was added in 1917, with only a few
amendments during the years relevant to this project (post-1977) and no amendments since 1984. § 1168 includes a
discussion of minimum penalties and good time credits. The other sections under the Act have been repealed.
Conclusions
1.

There have been countless increases in criminal sentences since the enactment of the Determinate Sentencing
Act. Our research revealed eighty substantive increases in sentencing since the enactment of the DSA included
in §§ 1170, et seq., and 12022, et seq.

Statutes “increase” sentences in several ways. We found that while the legislature occasionally lengthened the
term of years to be imposed upon conviction of a particular offense or imposition of a particular enhancement,
it also frequently increased sentences by limiting sentencing judges’ discretion to make determinations with
respect to the imposition, aggravation, or enhancement of a sentence.

Analyzing every amendment to every section of the Penal Code that involves sentencing is a labor-intensive
and time-consuming process. Notably, session laws for the years 1977 through 1986 are available only in hard
copy; Lexis Nexis contains session laws for the years 1987 to the present. To be done thoroughly and
accurately, this work requires a significant investment of time and resources.

Our research underscores the need for a comprehensive revision of the statutory provisions relating to
sentencing. As most experts have already concluded, California’s sentencing system is unbelievably complex
and in dire need of simplification.

Our research underscores the need for a Sentencing Commission. We believe that further analysis of this kind
will be key to reforming California’s sentencing system. A sentencing commission is the only type of entity
that has the expertise and the resources to undertake a thorough review of the provisions of the Code that we
were unable to review.

Chart Summarizing Increases in Sentencing Since the Enactment of the DSA

Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1977

7/1/1977

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1977
c. 165
§ 15
1977
c. 165
§ 91
1977
c. 165
§ 93

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§ 1170

Substantive Change

§ 12022

Added one year enhancement for being armed with or using a firearm in the commission or
attempted commission of a felony, to be served consecutively. Enhancement applies to all
principles if at least one principle is armed, even if the defendant was not personally armed.
Added enhancement for taking, damaging, or destroying property in the commission or
attempted commission of a felony, with intent to cause the taking, damage, or destruction.
One year, consecutive, where the loss exceeds $25,000; two years, consecutive, where the
loss exceeds $100,000.

§
12022.6

Permitted sentencing judges to consider a single fact multiple times to determine,
aggravate, or enhance a sentence.

APPENDICES & NOTES
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
7/1/1977

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1977
c. 165
§ 94
1978
c. 579
§ 40
1979
c. 944
§ 12
1979
c. 944
§ 17

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§
12022.7

1979
c. 944
§ 18
1981
c. 572
§1

§
12022.8

1/1/1983

1982
c.
1515
§8

§1170.1

1/1/1983

1982
c.
1099
§2

§
1170.15

1/1/1983

1982
c. 929
§1

§
1170.8

1/1/1983

1982
c.
1100
§2

§
1170.85
(formerl
y§
1170.8)

1/1/1979

1/1/1980

1/1/1982

§
12022.7
§
1170.1
§
12022.3

§
1170.7

Substantive Change

Added three year enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, with intent to inflict such
injury, on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony. To be
served consecutively.
Removed assault with a deadly weapon or assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury from the list of crimes to which the section does not apply.
Removed limitations on sex crime enhancements.
Provided that all sex crime
enhancements shall be a full and separately served enhancement and shall not be merged
with any term or with any other enhancement.
Added three year enhancement for using a firearm (loaded or unloaded) or any other deadly
weapon in the commission of a sex crime. Added two year enhancement for being armed
with a firearm (loaded or unloaded) or any other deadly weapon in the commission of a sex
crime.
Added five-year enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury on any victim during the
commission of a sex crime. Enhancement applies to each violation, to be served
consecutively.
Required sentencing judges to consider robbery or attempted robbery for the purpose of
obtaining any controlled substance when committed against a pharmacist, pharmacy
employee, or other person lawfully possessing controlled substances, a circumstance in
aggravation.
Provided that the subordinate term for each subsequent kidnapping conviction shall consist
of the middle term (rather than one-third of the middle term) for each kidnapping
conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed and one-third of any
enhancements imposed (versus one-third or none). Also provided that the 5-year limitation
on the total of subordinate terms doesn’t apply.
Provided for full middle term consecutive sentencing where a person is convicted of a
felony and of an additional felony that was committed against the victim of or a witness or
potential witness with respect to the first felony, or a person about to give material
information pertaining to the first felony. Amended again in 1998 to require full term
consecutive enhancements for being armed with or using a firearm or deadly weapon and
for inflicting great bodily injury.
Required sentencing judges to consider robbery or an assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument or by means of any force likely to produce great bodily injury committed
against a person while that person was in a church, synagogue, or building owned and
occupied by a religious educational institution, or any other place primarily used as a place
of worship where religious services are regularly conducted, or where the person
committed arson or intended to commit arson at one of these locations, a circumstance in
aggravation.
Required sentencing judges to consider any felony assault or battery offense where the
offense was committed to prevent or dissuade a person who is or may become a witness
from attending or testifying at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law, or if the
offense was committed because the person provided assistance or information to a law
enforcement officer, or to a public prosecutor in a criminal or juvenile court proceeding, a
circumstance in aggravation.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1983

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1982
c.
1551
§2

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§
12022.1

1/1/1983

1982
c. 950
§2
1982
c.
1404
§ 2.1
1985
c. 165
§1

§
12022.2

1985
c.
1108
§3
1985
c. 463
§4

§
1170.85

1985
c.
1375
§1
1986
c.
1429
§1
1987
c.
1423
§ 3.7

§
12022.9

1987
c.
1159
§1
1987
c.
1147
§2

§
12022.5

1/1/1983

1/1/1986

1/1/1987

1/1/1988

§
12022.5

§
1170.71

§
12022.4

§
1170.1

§
12022.5
5

Substantive Change

Added § 12022.1, which provides that any person convicted of a felony offense which was
committed while that person was released from custody on bail or on his or her own
recognizance pending trial on an earlier felony offense shall, upon conviction of the later
felony offense, be subject to a penalty enhancement as follows: if the person is convicted of
a felony for the earlier offense and sentenced to state prison, then convicted of a felony for
the later offense, then a state prison sentence for the later offense shall be consecutive to
the earlier sentence and 2 years should be added to the term for the later offense; if the
person is convicted of a felony for the earlier offense and granted probation, then convicted
of a felony for the later offense, then two years should be added to the term for the later
offense; if the earlier offense conviction is reversed on appeal, then the enhancement shall
be suspended pending retrial of that felony and reimposed upon reconviction.
Added three year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for being armed with a firearm
in the commission or attempted commission of a felony while having in one’s immediate
possession ammunition for the firearm designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor.
Added two year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for personally using a firearm in
the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

Required sentencing judges to consider the fact that a person who commits lewd or
lascivious acts with a child under age 14 has used obscene or harmful matter to induce,
persuade, or encourage the minor to engage in a lewd or lascivious act a circumstance in
aggravation.
Requires sentencing judges to consider fact that the victim of an offense is particularly
vulnerable, or unable to defend himself or herself, due to age or significant disability a
circumstance in aggravation.
Added two year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for, during the commission or
attempted commission of a felony, furnishing or offering to furnish a firearm to another for
the purpose of aiding, abetting, or enabling that person or any other person to commit a
felony.
Added five year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for, during the commission or
attempted commission of a felony, personally inflicting injury that results in the
termination of pregnancy, where the defendant knows or reasonably should know that the
victim is pregnant, with intent to inflict injury and, without the consent of the woman.
Added penetration of a genital or anal opening by a foreign object, oral copulation &
sodomy, as well as attempts to do so, to the list of crimes in which the court may impose
both one enhancement for weapons and one enhancement for great bodily injury.
Provided that in cases of penetration of a genital or anal opening by a foreign object, oral
copulation, sodomy, robbery, rape or burglary, or attempted penetration of a genital or anal
opening by a foreign object, oral copulation, sodomy, robbery, rape, murder, or burglary
the court may impose both one enhancement for weapons and one enhancement for great
bodily injury.
Added five year enhancement, to be served consecutively, where any person who is
convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, including murder or attempted
murder, discharged a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle which caused great bodily
injury or death to the person of another.
Added five year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person who, with the
intent to inflict great bodily injury or death, inflicts great bodily injury as defined in §
12022.7, or causes the death of a person, other than an occupant of a motor vehicle, as a
result of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle in the commission of a felony or
attempted felony.

APPENDICES & NOTES
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1988

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1987
c. 706
§5

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§
12022.7
5

1/1/1989

1988
c.
1487
§2
1988
c. 635
§2

§
1170.1

1/1/1989

1988
c.
1249
§2

§ 12022

1/1/1989

1988
c.
1249
§3

§
12022.5

1/1/1989

1988
c.
1597
§4
1989
c.
1378
§4

§
12022.8
5

1989
c.
1284
§2

§ 12022

1/1/1989

1/1/1990

§
1170.3

§
1170.13

Substantive Change

Added three year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person who, for the
purpose of committing a felony, administers by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other
means, any controlled substance listed in certain sections of the Health and Safety Code,
against the victim’s will by means of force, violence or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury to the victim or another person.
Amended subdivision (e) of § 1170.1 by adding lewd or lascivious acts upon or with a
child under the age of 14 years accomplished by means of force or fear and kidnapping, as
well as attempts to do so, to the list of crimes in which the court may impose both one
enhancement for weapons and one enhancement for great bodily injury.
Deleted subdivision (a)(5) of § 1170.3, relating to rules for uniformity in sentencing, which
had listed the imposition of an additional sentence for being armed with a deadly weapon,
using a firearm, an excessive taking or damage, or the infliction of great bodily injury as
criteria for judges to consider at the time of sentencing.
Added enhancement of three, four, or five years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who is personally armed with a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a
violation of certain sections of the Health and Safety Code.
Added enhancement of one, two, or three years, to be served consecutively, for any person
not personally armed with a firearm, who is a principal in the commission or attempted
commission of a violation of certain sections of the Health and Safety code, and knows that
another principal is personally armed with a firearm.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.
Permitted judges to strike additional punishment where interests of justice would best be
served.
Added enhancement of three, four, or five years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a violation of
certain sections of the Health and Safety Code.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.
Permitted sentencing judges to strike additional punishment where interests of justice
would best be served.
Added three year enhancement, for each violation, to be served consecutively, for any
person who violates one or more of the list of specified sexual offenses with knowledge
that the person has acquired AIDS or with knowledge that the person carries antibodies of
AIDS at the time of the commission of those offenses.
Provided that where a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed for two or more
convictions of willfully and maliciously communicating to a victim or witness of a crime
for which a person was convicted a credible threat to use force or violence, each
subordinate term shall be 100% of the prescribed middle term of imprisonment (as opposed
to the standard, one-third of the middle term).
Provided that the total term of imprisonment imposed may exceed 5 years, but shall not
exceed 15 years.
Amended again in 1997 to delete the 15-year limitation.
Amended again in 1998 to delete the five-year language.
Added three year enhancement, to be served consecutively, where the firearm used in the
commission or attempted commission of a felony is an assault weapon as defined in §
12276 or a machinegun as defined in § 12200, whether or not the arming is an element of
the offense of which the person was convicted. Enhancement applies to all principles if at
least one principle is armed, even if the defendant was not personally armed.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1990

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1989
c.
1167
§2

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§
12022.2

1/1/1990

1989
c.
1167
§3

§
12022.3

1/1/1990

1989
c.
1167
§4

§
12022.4

1/1/1990

1989
c.
1167
§5

§
12022.5

1/1/1991

1990
c. 777
§1
1990
c. 952
§1
1990
c.
1031
§1
1990
c.
1216
§1
1990
c. 41
§3
1991
c. 602
§7

§
1170.73

1991
c. 584
§1

§
12022.2

1/1/1991

1/1/1992

Substantive Change

§
1170.84

Added enhancement of three, four, or five years, to be served consecutively, where the
person was armed with a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of any felony
and had in his immediate possession ammunition for the firearm designed primarily to
penetrate metal or armor.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.
Added enhancement of three, four, or five years, to be served consecutively, where any
person convicted of certain sex offenses uses a firearm (loaded or unloaded) or any other
deadly weapon in the commission of the violation.
Added enhancement of one, two, or three years, to be served consecutively, if the person is
armed with a firearm (loaded or unloaded) or any other deadly weapon.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.
Added enhancement of one, two, or three years, to be served consecutively, where any
person who, during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, furnishes or
offers to furnish a firearm to another for the purpose of aiding, abetting, or enabling that
person or any other person to commit a felony.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.
Added enhancement of three, four, or five years, to be served consecutively, when a person
personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.
Added additional five year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person who
personally uses an assault weapon as defined in § 12276 or a machinegun as defined in §
12200 in the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
Required sentencing judges to consider quantity of controlled substance involved in
determining whether to impose an aggravated term under § 1170(b) when imposing
sentences for certain controlled substance offenses.
Required sentencing judges to consider the fact that the controlled substance is the
crystalline form of methamphetamine a circumstance in aggravation in imposing sentences
for certain controlled substance offenses.
Required sentencing judges to consider the fact that the intended victim of an attempted life
term crime was a peace officer, while the peace officer was engaged in the performance of
his or her duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim
was a peace officer engaged in his or her duties, a circumstance in aggravation.
Required judges to consider it a circumstance in aggravation that during the course of any
felony, the defendant engaged in the tying, binding, or confining of any victim.

§
12022.5

Removed discretion of sentencing judges to strike additional punishments where the
interests of justice would best be served.

§
1170.78

Required sentencing judges to consider it a circumstance in aggravation that the defendant
committed the offense of arson in retaliation against the (perceived) owner or occupant of
the property or structure burned, for any eviction or other legal action taken by the
(perceived) owner or occupant.
Added an enhancement of one, two, or three years for any person who wears a body vest
(any bullet-resistant material intended to provide ballistic and trauma protection for the
wearer) in the commission or attempted commission of a violent offense.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.

§
1170.74
§
1170.81

APPENDICES & NOTES
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1993

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1992
c. 695
§ 10
1992
c. 235
§1
1992
c. 104
§1

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§ 1170

1/1/1993

1992
c. 510
§2

§
12022.9

1/1/1994

1993
c. 611
§ 17
and §
17.98

§
1170.1

1/1/1994

1993
c. 592
§4

§
1170.1

Approved
11/8/1994
1/1/1994

Prop.
184
1993
c. 131
§1
1993
c. 611
§ 30

§
1170.12
§
1170.72

1993
c. 611
§ 31.5

§
12022.5

1/1/1993

1/1/1994

§
1170.1
§
12022.6

§ 12022

Substantive Change

Removed ability of sentencing judges to obtain information from Board of Prison Terms
concerning the sentences of other persons convicted of similar crimes under similar
circumstances.
Added sexual battery, as well as attempts to do so, to the list of crimes in which the court
may impose both one enhancement for weapons and one enhancement for great bodily
injury.
Added enhancement for taking, damaging, or destroying property in the commission or
attempted commission of a felony, with intent to cause the taking, damage, or destruction.
One year, consecutive, where the loss exceeds $50,000; two years, consecutive, where the
loss exceeds $150,000; three years, consecutive, where the loss exceeds $1,000,000; four
years, consecutive, where the loss exceeds $2,500,000.
Added four year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person convicted of
willfully and maliciously discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person
other than an occupant of a motor vehicle, if as a result of the defendant personally and
willfully and maliciously discharging the firearm, the victim suffers paralysis or
paraparesis of a major body part, including but not limited to the entire hand or foot.
Added four year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person convicted of
maliciously and willfully discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied
building, occupied motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited housecar or inhabited
camper.
Created a new felony offense for carjacking, with a base term of up to nine years in state
prison.
Added carjacking, as well as attempts to do so, to the list of crimes in which the court may
impose both one enhancement for weapons and one enhancement for great bodily injury.
Added three year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for using a dangerous or deadly
weapon during the commission or attempted commission of a carjacking.
Added six year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for using a firearm during the
commission or attempted commission of a carjacking.
Imposed a maximum sentence of 18 years for violent carjacking when the sentence is
coupled with an enhancement of 3 years for a violent prior offense.
Provided that the term of imprisonment shall not exceed twice the number of years
imposed by the trial court as the base term pursuant to §1170(b) unless an enhancement is
imposed pursuant to Section 12022.1 and both the primary and secondary offenses
specified in section 12022.1 are serious felonies as specified in § 1192.7(c).
THREE STRIKES.
Required sentencing judges to consider it a circumstance in aggravation that an individual
is convicted of a crime involving minors under 11 years of age.
Provided that if the person has been convicted of carjacking or attempted carjacking, the
additional term imposed shall be 1, 2 or 3 years (as opposed to the 1 year imposed for a
person who personally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission or attempted
commission of other felonies).
Provided that if the person has been convicted of carjacking or attempted carjacking, the
additional term imposed shall be 4, 5 or 6 years (as opposed to the 3, 4 or 5 years imposed
for a person who personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of
other felonies).

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1994

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1993
c. 608
§2

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§
12022.7

1/1/1995

1993/
1994
c. 33
§ 1.5
1993/
1994
c. 33
§4

§
1170.89

1/1/1995

1993/
1994
c. 33
§5

§
12022.3

1/1/1995

1993/
1994
c. 33
§6

§
12022.5

1/1/1995

1993/
1994
c. 33
§7

§
12022.5
5

1/1/1995

1994
c.
1188
§ 12.7

§
1170.1

1/1/1995

§
12022.2

Substantive Change

Added five year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person found to have
inflicted great bodily injury which causes the victim to become comatose due to brain
injury or to suffer paralysis of a permanent nature.
Added five year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person who, with the
intent to inflict such injury, personally inflicts great bodily injury on another person who is
70 years of age or older other than an accomplice in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony.
Required sentencing judges to consider it a circumstance in aggravation in imposing
firearm enhancements with triads that the person knew or had reason to believe that a
firearm was stolen.
Added enhancement of three, four, or ten years, to be served consecutively, where the
person was armed with a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of any felony
and had in his immediate possession ammunition for the firearm designed primarily to
penetrate metal or armor.
Added enhancement of one, two, or five years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who wears a body vest (any bullet-resistant material intended to provide ballistic and
trauma protection for the wearer) in the commission or attempted commission of a violent
offense.
Added enhancement of three, four, or ten years, to be served consecutively, for any person
convicted of certain sex offenses if the person uses a firearm (loaded or unloaded) or any
other deadly weapon in the commission of the violation.
Added enhancement of one, two, or five years, to be served consecutively, for any person
convicted of certain sex offenses if the person is armed with a firearm (loaded or unloaded)
or any other deadly weapon in the commission of the violation.
Added enhancement of three, four, or ten years, to be served consecutively, when a person
personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
Added enhancement of four, five, or ten years, to be served consecutively, if the person has
been convicted of carjacking or attempted carjacking.
Added enhancement of five, sex, or ten years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, including murder or
attempted murder, in which that person discharged a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle
which caused great bodily injury or death to the person of another.
Added enhancement of five, six, or ten years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who personally uses an assault weapon as defined in § 12276 or a machinegun as defined
in § 12200 in the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
Added enhancement of three, four, or ten years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a violation of
certain sections of the Health and Safety Code.
Added enhancement of five, six, or ten years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who, with the intent to inflict great bodily injury or death, inflicts great bodily injury as
defined in § 12022.7, or causes the death of a person, other than an occupant of a motor
vehicle, as a result of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle in the commission of a
felony or attempted felony.
Added spousal rape, as well as attempts to do so, to the list of crimes in which the court
may impose both one enhancement for weapons and one enhancement for great bodily
injury.

APPENDICES & NOTES
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1995

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1994
c. 352
§1

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§
1170.82

1/1/1995

1994
c. 873
§ 873

§
12022.7

1/1/1995

1994
c.
1263
§6

§
12022.9
5

1/1/1996

1995
c. 341
§1
1996
c. 421
§1
1996
c. 689
§3
1997
c. 750
§3

§
12022.7

1997
c. 750
§4
1997
c. 848
§1

§
1170.11

1/1/1997

1/1/1998

§
1170.16
§
1170.86
§
1170.1

§
1170.76

Substantive Change

Required sentencing judges to consider it a circumstance in aggravation when a defendant
is convicted of specified controlled substances offenses that the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the person to whom he or she was selling, furnishing,
administering, or giving away the controlled substance was pregnant, had been previously
convicted of a violent felony, or was in psychological treatment for a mental disorder or for
substance abuse.
Added enhancement of three, four, or five years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who personally inflicts great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic
violence in the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
Required imposition of middle term unless circumstances in aggravation or mitigation
stated on the record.
Added four year enhancement for each violation, to be served consecutively, for any
person convicted of a violation of endangering a child or causing or permitting a child to
suffer physical pain, mental suffering or injury, who under circumstances or conditions
likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer,
or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or injury that results in death, or having the
care or custody of any child, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or
death, willfully cause or permits any child to be injured or harmed, and that injury or harm
results in death.
Removed the requirement of intent to inflict injury from subsections relating to infliction of
injuries on any person other than an accomplice and to persons over 70 years old.
Provided that a full, separate and consecutive term (rather than just a one-third term) may
be imposed for each voluntary manslaughter offense, whether or not the offenses were
committed during a single transaction.
Required sentencing judges to consider it a circumstance in aggravation when a person is
convicted of a specified felony sex offense, that the felony was committed within a safe
school zone against a victim who was a pupil currently attending school.
Provided that the subordinate term for each subsequent kidnapping conviction shall include
the full term imposed for specific enhancements applicable to subordinate offenses (instead
of one-third of any enhancements imposed).
Deleted subsections relating to particular crimes in which the court could impose more than
one enhancement for a single offense and exceptions to the rule that the term of
imprisonment shall not exceed twice the number of years imposed by the trial court as the
base term.
Provided that when 2 or more enhancements may be imposed for being armed with or
using a deadly weapon or a firearm in the commission of a single offense, only the greatest
of those enhancements shall be imposed for that offense, with no limits on the imposition
of any other enhancements applicable to that offense, including an enhancement for the
infliction of great bodily injury.
Removed discretion of sentencing judges to strike punishments in appropriate
circumstances.
Provided list of specific enhancements. As used in § 1170.1, the term “specific
enhancement” includes, but is not limited to, the enhancements listed in § 1170.11.
Required sentencing judges to consider it a circumstance in aggravation that in specified
cases of domestic violence the defendant is or has been a member of the household of the
minor or the victim, or is a marital or blood relative of the minor or the victim, or the
defendant or the victim is the natural parent, adoptive parent, stepparent, or foster parent of
the minor, and the offense occurred in the presence of or was witnessed by the minor.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Enact.
/Amend.
Date
1/1/1998

Sess.
Law
Cit.
1997
c. 109
§1
1997
c. 503
§3

Code
Sect.
Cit.
§
12022.3

Substantive Change

§
12022.5
3

1997
c. 109
§2
1998
c. 926
§ 2.5
1998
c. 936
§ 26
1999
c. 996
§ 12

§
12022.8

Added mandatory ten year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for certain firearm
offenses.
Added mandatory twenty year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for certain firearm
offenses where the firearm is intentionally discharged.
Added mandatory enhancement of twenty-five years to life, to be served consecutively, if
great bodily injury was proximately caused to any person other than an accomplice as a
result of the firearm being discharged.
Provided that if more than one enhancement per person applies, the court shall impose the
enhancement that provides the longest term of imprisonment.
Added five year enhancement, to be served consecutively, for any person who inflicts great
bodily injury on any victim during the attempted commission of certain sex offenses.

§
1170.1

Deleted provision limiting total of consecutive subordinate terms for non-violent offenses
to five years.

§
1170.11

1/1/2001

2000
c. 689
§1

§
1170.1

1/1/2001

2000
§ 919
§1

§
12022.7

1/1/2003

2002
c. 126
§2
2004
c. 494
§3

§ 12022

Declared the intent of the Legislature that all specific enhancements shall apply to criminal
offenses from the time those enhancements are enacted, whether or not those enhancements
are listed in § 1170.11.
Provided that when a person is prosecuted for a criminal offense committed while he or she
was under the age of 18 years, and the prosecution is lawfully initiated in a court of
criminal jurisdiction without a prior finding that the person is not a fit and proper subject to
be dealt with under the juvenile court law, upon subsequent conviction for any criminal
offense, the person shall be subject to the same sentence as an adult convicted of the
identical offense.
Provided that when a person is convicted of two or more felonies (whether violent or nonviolent), the aggregate term of imprisonment includes the principle term (the greatest term
of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes, including any term imposed
for applicable specific enhancements), the subordinate term (one-third of the middle term
of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for which a consecutive term
of imprisonment is imposed), and one-third of the term imposed for any specific
enhancements applicable to those subordinate offenses. Prior to this amendment, the
subordinate term for each consecutive offense that wasn’t a violent felony excluded any
specific enhancements.
Added enhancement of four, five, or six years, to be served consecutively, for any person
who personally inflicts great bodily injury on a child under the age of 5 years in the
commission or attempted commission of a felony.
Required imposition of middle term unless aggravated or mitigated circumstances stated on
the record.
Removed presumptive imposition of middle term for § 12022 enhancements.
Made imposition of consecutive sentences for all § 12022 enhancements mandatory.

2004
c. 494
§4

§
12022.5

1/1/1998

1/1/1999

1/1/2000

1/1/2005

§
1170.17

§ 12022

Applied sentencing provisions to attempted violations of certain sex offenses.

Added three year enhancement, to be served consecutively, where the firearm used in the
commission or attempted commission of a felony is .50 BMG rifle as defined in § 12278,
whether or not the arming is an element of the offense of which the person was convicted.
Enhancement applies to all principles if at least one principle is armed, even if the
defendant was not personally armed.
Added the .50 BMG rifle to the list of exceptions under subdivision (a).

APPENDICES & NOTES

Notes
1. Andy Furillo. November 17, 2006. “Bold Vow on Inmate Health.” Sacramento Bee.
2. Andy Furillo. December 12, 2006. “Judge Balks at Prison Cap.” Sacramento Bee.
3. Roderick Q. Hickman, former Secretary, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
October 26, 2006. Testimony to the Commission.
4. Jenifer Warren. December 21, 2006. “Governor’s Aides Stymied Prison Reform, Ex Prison Chief Says.” Los Angeles Times.
5. Bureau of State Audits. November 2005. “California Department of Corrections and
Rehabi litation: The Intermediate Sanction Programs Lacked Performance Benchmarks
and Were Plagued With Implementation Problems.” Sacramento, CA.
6. Mike Jimenez, President, California Correctional Peace Officers Association. President’s
Message.
http://www.ccpoanet.org/default.php?inc=pres_msg_blog&pagemode=view&news_id=4
6. Web site accessed December 26, 2006.
7. Roderick Q. Hickman, Secretary, California Youth and Adult C orrectional Agency.
January 7, 2005. Press briefing conference call.
8. Little Hoover Commission. February 2005. “Restructuring Government: A Review of the
Governor’s Reorganization Plan. Reforming California’s Youth and Correctional
Agency.” Sacramento, CA. Page 14. Citing remarks by former Governor George
Deukmejian at a California Performance Review hearing.
9. John Hagar, Special Master, Madrid v. Tilton. June 20, 2006. “Special Master’s Draft
Report Regarding the Status of California Corrective Action Plans for Administrative
Investigations and Discipline; Recommendations.” Sacramento, CA.
10. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. January 22, 2007. “Weekly
Report of Population as of Midnight January 17, 2007.”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/PopulationReports.asp.
Web site accessed January 23, 2007.
11. Office of the Governor. December 21, 2006. “Press Release: Governor Schwarzenegger
Unveils Comprehensive Prison Reform Proposal.” Sacramento, CA.
12. Hickman. See endnote 3.
13. Richard Rimmer, former Deputy Director, Parole & Community Services Division,
Department of Corrections. October 7, 2003. Personal communi cation.
14. James E. Tilton, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
October 16, 2006. Meeting with Commission staff.
15. Thelton E. Henderson, United States District Court Judge. October 3, 2005. “Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Appointment of Receiver.” Plata v. Schwarzenegger.
Pages 7 and 27.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
16. Robert Sillen, Court Appointed Receiver. Plata v. Schwarzenegger. July 5, 2006. First
Bi-Monthly Report. Also, November 16, 2006. Testimony to the Commission.
17. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. January 6, 2005. “Strategic Plan for California.”
Submitted to the Commission with the Governor’s Reorganization Plan – Reforming
California’s Youth & Adult Correctional Agency. On file.
18. Jim L’Etoile, Deputy Director, Division of Adult Parole, CDCR. September 21, 2005.
Little Hoover Commission Roundtable Meeting on Parole Reform.
19. James E. Tilton, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabiliation.
October 26, 2006. Written testimony to the Commission.
20. Assembly Bill 76 (Lieber) 2007-2008 Regular Session.
21. Tilton. See endnote 19.
22. Letter from Parole Region III clinicians to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. August 17,
2006. Also, Committee to Continue a Centralized Parole Outpatient Clinic.
December 22, 2006. Written communication to the Commission. On file.
23. Hickman. See endnote 3.
24. Reginald Wilkinson, Ph.D., former Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, and Chair, National Institute of Corrections Advisory Board November 16,
2006. Written testimony to the Commission.
25. Sillen. “First Bi -Monthly Report.” See endnote 16.
26. California State Legislature. 2006. “Budget Act of 2006.” Pages 412-413. Also,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Budget Proposal 2007-08. “Corrections and
Rehabilitation.” Page 6. Also, Division of Juvenile Justice, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. November 2006. “Population Movement Summary.”
27. Sillen. November 16, 2006. Testimony to the Commission.
28. Wilkinson. See endnote 24.
29. Wilkinson, Ph.D., former Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction,
and Chair, National Institute of Corrections Advisory Board November 16, 2006.
Testimony to the Commission.
30. Joyce Hayhoe, Assistant Secretary, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
November 15, 2006. Written communication.
31. Hayhoe. See endnote 30.
32. Peggy B. Burke, Principal, Center for Effective Public Policy. December 22, 2006.
Written and personal communication.
33. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. January 2006. “County and
Region of Parole: Calendar Year 2005.” Sacramento, CA.

APPENDICES & NOTES
34. Joan Petersilia, Ph.D., Director, University of California, Irvine, Center for EvidencedBased Corrections. May 2006. “Understanding California Corrections.” California
Policy Research Center, University of California. Page 72.
35. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Historical Trends 19852005.” Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Historical
Trends 1980-2000.” Population in 1980 was 24,569. Also, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Weekly Report of Population as of Midnight
December 20, 2006.” Population was 172,798. (172,798-24,569=148,229;
148,229/24,569=603%)
36. California Department of Corrections and Re habilitation. Fall 2006. “Adult Population
Projections, 2007-2012.” Sacramento, CA. Page 13. Available at the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Web site:
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/OffenderInfoServices/Projections/F06pub.pd
f.
37. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. December 2006. “Monthly
Report of Population as of Midnight November 30, 2006.” Sacramento, CA. Page 1.
Available at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Web site:
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports/Research/OffenderInfoServices/Monthly/TPOP1A/TO
P1A0611.pdf.
38. Bill Sessa, Deputy Press Secretary, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. Phone conversation December 29, 2006.
39. Mike Jimenez, President, California Correctional Peace Officers Association. June 22,
2006 and October 26, 2006. Testimony to the Commission.
40. Joan Petersilia, Ph.D., May 2006. “Understanding California Corrections.” California
Policy Research Center, University of California. Pages 29-34. Also, Bureau of Justice
Statistics. August 2005. “Suicide and Homicide in State Prison.” Also, Legislative
Analyst’s Office. February 2005. “Analysis of the 2005-06 Budget Bill, Judicial and
Criminal Justice.”
41. Legislative Analyst’s Office. February 2005. “Analysis of the 2005-06 Budget Bill,
Judicial and Criminal Justice.” Sacramento, CA.
42. Petersilia. See endnotes 40.
43. Legislative Analyst’s Office. July 2006. “State of California Expenditures, 1984-85 to
2006-07.” Sacramento, CA.
44. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. January 10, 2007. “Governor’s Budget Highlights
2007-08.” Office of the Governor. Sacramento, CA.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
45. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 2005. “Historical
Perspectives 1985-2005.” Sacramento, CA.
46. Joan Petersilia, Ph.D., May 2006. “Understanding California Corrections.” Page 72.
Also, Michael P. Jacobson, Ph.D., Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New
York. January 23, 2003. Testimony to the Commission. Also, U.S. Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. October 2001. “Trends in State Parole, 19992000.” (Only Utah has a lower percentage of successful parolee discharges.)
47. Petersilia. May 2006. “Understanding California Corrections.” Page 65. (The only other
state to use determinate sentencing and place all offenders on parole is Illinois.)
48. Petersilia. See endnote 47. Page 64.
49. Petersilia. See endnote 47. Page 66. The only other state with this hybrid system is
Illinois.
50. Tilton. See endnote 19.
51. California Department of Corrections. 2001. “California Prisoners and Parolees.”
Table 42. On file.
52. California Penal Code 1170.
53. California Center for Judicial Education and Research Felony Sentencing Handbook.
2006. Judicial Council of California. (There are approximately 600 “wobblers” or
felonies that can result in a probation, jail or prison term.)
54. Roger K. Warren, Scholar-in-Residence, Judicial Council of California, Administrative
Office of the Courts, and Project Director, National Sentencing Reform Project, National
Center for State Courts. June 22, 2006. Written testimony to the Commission.
55. California State Sheriffs Association. June 2006. “Do the Crime, Do the Time? Maybe
Not in California.” Page V.
56. California State Sheriffs Association. See endnote 55. Appendix I. Local Detention
Population Overview – Adult and Juvenile. Summary of Finding from the 2005
Corrections Standards Authority Jail Profile Survey Report.
57. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. March 2006. “Time Served
on Prison Sentence – Felons First Released to Parole by Offense Calendar Year 2005.”
Sacramento, CA.
58. Marcus Nieto. California Research Bureau. May 1996. “Community Correction
Punishments: An Alternative to Incarceration for Nonviolent Offenders.” Available online

APPENDICES & NOTES
at the California State Library Web site.
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/96?08/index.html. Accessed January 16, 2007.
59. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. July 2004. “A Comparison of
the Youth Authority’s Institution and Parole Populations – June 30, 1995 through
June 30, 2004.” Also, Division of Juvenile Justice, CDCR. November 2006. “Population
Movement Summary.” Also, Senate Bill 681 (Hurtt) Statutes of 1996. Also, California
Welfare and Institutions Code 912. Also, Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2002. “Analysis
of the 2002-03 Budget Bill – 2002 Budget Analysis: Judiciary and Criminal Justice,
Department of the Youth Authority (5460).
60. Warren. See endnote 54. Also, Penal Code 8050 through 8093. Also, ABX1 99
(Rainey) 1994.
61. Tilton. See endnote 19. Page 121.
62. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. See endnote 44.
63. Warren. See endnote 54. Citing the California Administrative Office of the Courts and
California State Association of Counties, Probation Services Task Force: Final Report.
June 2003.
64. Thomas W. Ross, Executive Director, Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation; former Chair,
North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission; and, former Director,
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts. August 24, 2006. Testimony to the
Commission.
65. Richard P. Kern, Ph.D., Director, Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission. August 24,
2006. Testimony to the Commission.
66. Judicial Council of California. 2006. “Felony Sentencing Handbook.” Center for
Judicial Education and Research. San Francisco, CA.
67. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. January 10, 2007. “Governor’s Budget Proposal,
2007-08.” Item 5225 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Summary of Adult
and Juvenile Per Capita Costs and Staff Ratios 2005-06.
68. Richard J. Couzens, Judge, Placer County Superior Court. August 24, 2006.
Testimony to the Commission.
69. Sharon English, Crime Victim Rights and Services Advisor. June 22, 2006. Written
testimony to the Commission.
70. English. See endnote 69.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
71. Little Hoover Commission. November 2003. “Back to the Community: Safe & Sound
Parole Policies.” Page 43. Citing Department of Corrections Data Analysis Unit.
“Number of New Admissions and Parole Violators With a New Term Who Paroled From
SHU, During Calendar Year 2000, 2001, 2002 and through August 31, 2003.”
September 15, 2003. Renee L. Hansen, Manager, Legislative Liaison Office. Personal
communication.
72. Kevin R. Reitz, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. June 22, 2006. Testimony to
the Commission. Also, American Law Institute. April 11, 2003. Model Penal Code:
Sentencing Report.
73. Richard S. Frase. May 2005. State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus and
Unresolved Policy Issues. Columbia Law Review. Volume 105, Number 4. Pages 11901232. Also, United States Sentencing Commission and National Association of State
Sentencing Commissions Web site. Accessed July 31, 2006.
www.ussc.gov/states/nascaddr.htm.
74. Reitz. See endnote 72.
75. Bureau of State Audits. September 13, 2005. “Department of Corrections: It Needs to
Better Insure Against Conflicts of Interest and to Improve Its Inmate Population
Projections.” Sacramento, CA.
76. Ross. See endnote 64. Also,
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Default.asp. Web site accessed
December 2006. Also, North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission.
Revised 2005. A Citizen’s Guide to Structured Sentencing.
77. Richard P. Kern, Director, Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission. August 24, 2006.
Testimony to the Commission. Including the following published articles: Richard P.
Kern. September/ October 1995. Sentence Reform in Virginia. Federal Sentencing
Reporter. Volume 8, Number 2. Richard P. Kern and Meredith Farrar-Owens. February
2004. Sentencing Guidelines with Integrated Offender Risk Assessment. Federal
Sentencing Reporter. Volume 16, Number 3.
78. Reitz. See endnote 72.
79. The American Law Institute Charter Statement. Available at the ALI Web site:
http://www.ali.org.
80. The American Law Institute. April 17, 2006. Model Penal Code: Sentencing. Discussion
Draft. Philadelphia, PA. Page 4.
81. The American Law Institute. April 11, 2003. Model Penal Code: Sentencing. Report.
Philadelphia, PA. Page 49.

APPENDICES & NOTES
82. Justice Kennedy Commission, American Bar Association. June 2004. “Reports with
Recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates.”
http:www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/JusticeKenne dyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf.
Web site accessed January 17, 2007.
83. Joshua Weinstein, Senior Attorney, Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office
of the Courts, and staff to the Criminal Law Advisory Committee. June 22, 2006.
Testimony to the Commission.
84. Supreme Court of the United States. January 22, 2007. Opinion of the Court. John
Cunningham, Petitioner v. California.
85. Supreme Court of the United States. See endnote 84.
86. Office of the Governor. See endnotes 11 and 44.
87. Office of Senator Gloria Romero. January 18, 2007. “Press Release: Romero Unveils
Legislation to Set Up a California Sentencing Commission: SB 110 (Romero) 2007.”
Sacramento, CA.
88. Kara Dansky, Executive Director, Stanford Criminal Justice Center. August 4, 2006.
Written testimony to the Commission. Also,
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/fullchapter.cfm?Title=13&Chapter=169
(Vermont established a sentencing commission in 2006.)
89. Reitz. See endnote 72. Also, the American Law Institute. April 17, 2006. Model Penal
Code: Sentencing. Discussion Draft. Page 48.
90. The four bills include AB 2944, AB 1036, SB 670 and AB 14.
91. AB 14 (Lieber) would have the Governor only appoint five members and the California
Supreme Court Chief Justice would serve as Commission chair.
92. Les Kleinberg, Deputy Director, Office of the Attorney General. Sacramento, CA.
September 26, 2006. Telephone interview.
93. Governor Pete Wilson. September 28, 1992. Veto Message: AB 2944. Office of the
Governor. Sacramento, CA. On file.
94. Governor Pete Wilson. September 26, 1992. Veto Message: SB 25. Office of the
Governor. Sacramento, CA. On file.
95. Art Croney. March 29, 1995. Letter to Assemblymember John Vasconcellos on AB
1036. Committee on Moral Concerns. California State Archives.

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
96. Governor George Deukmejian. September 27, 1984. Veto Message: SB 56. Office of
the Governor. Sacramento, CA. On file.
97. Department of Finance. March 30, 1995. Analysis of SB 166. California State
Archives.
98. California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. April 10, 1997. Letter to Senator
Vasconcellos regarding SB 670. California State Archives.
99. Office of Criminal Justice Planning. 1995. Letter to Assemblymember Vasconcellos
regarding AB 1036. California State Archives.

Additional chart information from page 21:
Department / Program
Health services

Expenditures in 1984-85*
$3,076,815

Expenditures in 2006-07*
$14,488,022

Social Services
Adult Corrections
University of California

$3,259,402
$766,603
$1,457,144

$9,206703
$9,152,392
$3,083,355

California State University
Mental Health
Youth Corrections

$1,398,201
$629,907
$269,931

$2,811,384
$2,145,140
$415,000

Total State Expenditures
$25,721,660
* Dollars in thousands.

$101,260,998