Military Advantage in History Director of Net Assessment 2002

• Topics: Military

Download original document:
Brief thumbnail

This text is machine-read, and may contain errors. Check the original document to verify accuracy.

Form Approwd

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

OMB No. 074-0188
""",r, ",,,,,'i,,, omd'" "' "," ,-"lhon."" "r,,,r,,,,,,,,,r,,,, I,"""''',,' 10 "",w LhOd' '''' ""'>"". ;,,,,,,u,,, th,' ';m, 'm ",r,w"" ,,,,"',,;,,,,. ,,,,,,,,,,, "">11", ' ".' 'CO" '0', ",",,.., '''i' ,,,,,1
,,,,,r,,,,;,,,"" It" ,I,,, "eo"~' .•"" m"v""''', ."0 "'""~;"" ,hI, ,-,,11""'''0 "rIn""n,"'o" '''rl ,omm,," ","rli", ,or, t""" "',"',.'" 0' ,>oy o1h" "p,e< ", >t,l, n'""-U,,, ,f "d,,,,,,,,;,,,,.
;"'C,,,'", ,"""",eo", '0'

mm·, m.

,~L",i",

tlcr, ",,'," to

W"I,,"glo" F"",""",,, ';''''-''''''.

";"~,,,,,",'

lo, ",,,,,""',,,,, ",,,,.,,,,,,,, .>0.1 R,',,,,,,,. 1m

0"'",'f .,,'"' 'eo,,", ,m' Bud,,,. P,poe",," R,d,-,";"" 'wi"-' ro',""OI
Leave
-I
'" I J;Jiy 2002

,,," w ,,"

"l,

, 1.1:

W"h'" '''''0 nc '''"'
E AND DATES

I,,,,,,,," ,,,,;, H;,ow,,', '"'" L2D1, he];,,,,,,,,. ",

~. !lEPO~T

Study 01 Military Advantage, 9/1999

, '"

712002

NUMBERS

Military Advantage in History
AUTHOR S
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment (OSD-NA)
Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (JATAC)
David Gallina, Patrick Gorman, Mark Herman, Juli MacDonald, Robert Ryer

ERFORMIN

AM~:

OSD-NA
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net
Assessment
Room 3A930, Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

, c

S ANIJ AD

ORGANIZAT](IN
REPnRT NUMBER
lATAC
Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center
_,190 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church, VA 222042

M'. S ANU A

MONIT(lRINI~

AI;ENCY REPORT
NUMBER
Office of the Secretary of Defense for
>Jet Assessmenl
Room 3A930, Pentagon
Washington. DC 20301
11_ SlJPPLEMEJ..-'

,
,

2 :-mSTRllmTIITN rnnr

12a. D1, TRIB
. l'Y STATEMENT
Distribution F: Further dissemination only as directed b)' Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Net Assessment, or higher DoD authority, July 2002,

1.A
A 1(~a;:ml1Jm.1fJlJWo,
This paper examines the nature of military advantage by exploring the character of the major hegemonic
powers
history and seeks to gain a better understanding of what drives US military advantage; where
US vulnerabilities
may lie; and how the United States should think about maintaining its military
"
advantage in the future. Case studies of Macedonia under Alexander the Great, Imperial Rome, the
Mongols, and Napoleonic France compose the COre of the analysis, as they illustrate important themes
that remain relevant to the United States' position today. The case studies focus on two key questions:
What were the sources of military advantage in history?
What made military advantage enduring or temporary in nature?

14:"SURJ~C

PAGE

,]"~KMS

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment,
Military Advantage, Macedomans, Romans, Mongols, Napoleonic France
ClASSIFICATION
or REPORT
NSN 754

0-,_ u

CLASSIFICATION
OFTHIS PAGE

ltD
ASSIFICATI ,

OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

l~F

AIISTKACT

None
.l.n
'arm
p",,,,.I,,,1 h ANSI

"
"'_10'

,,~_

••

"'""

Military Advantage in History
July 2002
Authors:
Mark Herman
Patrick Gorman
David Gallina
Iuli MacDonald
Robert Ryer

Released from the Director of Net Assessment
Published by Booz Allen Hamilton with permission from OSD/NA.
Distribution instructions in accordance with Distribution Statement F.

About the Authors

Mark Herman

Mark Herman is a Partner with Bo02 Allen Hamilton where he leads the
Modeling, Simulation, wargaming, and Analysis Group. Mr. Herman has supported
the Director of the Office of Net Assessment and the Joint Staff for over 23 years,
conducting a variety of warfare analyses, most recently focusing on military transformation.
Mr. Herman was formerly the CEO of Victory Games Incorporated, which is
an internationally recognized design house for commercial wargames. During his
career Mr. Herman has designed over 35 commercial wargames on such diverse topics as the Peloponnesian War, Tactical Warfare in Antiquity, American Revolution,
American Civil War, World War I, World War II, Modern Warfare, and Science
Fiction. His 1983 design Gulf Strike covered the Iran-Iraq War and a U.S.-led defense
of Saudi Arabia. This simulation was used in the initial U.S. analytic efforts at the
beginning of the Gulf War in August of 1990. He designed an award-winning computer game series on Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar.
Mr. Herman has been an adjunct professor teaching Strategy and Policy for the
U.S. Naval War College, has co-authored books on military history, and is a lecturer
for the U.S. Naval War College, University of Maryland, and Georgetown University.

Military Advantage in History
_ " .• ':Uk. 4·.05

vii

•

David Gallina

Patrick Gorman

Patrick Gorman, a Senior Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, has over 15 years
of experience in large-scale, information technology (IT) systems analysis, design,
implementation, and operations. He specializes in assessing information systems
in areas of business and military operations, network security, logistics and supply
chain management, and advanced data rnlnlng. His range of experience includes IT
strategy development, business requirements analysis, modeling and simulation, mission continuity planning, architecture design, development. and operations support in
support of both commercial and government clients.

David Gallina, an Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, is parL of the Defense
Team where he leads the commercial arm of a new business area built around an
analytical methodology called TARGET. This methodology evaluates social, physical, and logical networks to determine their structure, strengths, and vulnerabilities.
Potential clients range from u.S. Government agencies to defense and intelligence
organizations to large public and private corporations. In addition, Mr. Gallina has
worked on a number of projects that evaluate the impact of information on decision

Mr. Gorman helped develop operational concept of network centric warfare in
support of OPNAVjN6 Copernicus. For JCSjJ6, Mr. Gorman was able to translate
high-level architectures into alternative detailed designs that could be evaluated and
selected in terms of operational impact. His work on JV201O-related architectures to
support Precision Engagement, Dominant Maneuver, and Full Dimensional Protection
supported early "Sensor-to-Shooter" and Joint Battle Management analysis and modeling and simulation techniques.

Prior to joining Booz Allen, Mr. Gallina was an analyst for The Analytic Sciences
Corporation ["rASC). During his 9 years at TASC, he worked on a wide variety of
analytical projects, supporting such organizations as the Strategic Defense Initiative
Office (SOlO), DARPA, various organizations within the Central Intelligence Agency,
the UK Ministry of Defense, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Northrop Grumman
Corporation, and British Aerospace. He conducted research and analysis on various
problem sets, and developed analytical models to test theories and courses of action.
Many of the projects required an in-depth analysis of historical precedence for the
actions being considered, or analyses of the political, social, economic, and military
ramifications of certain actions or projects.

Mr. Gorman developed the concept of operations, designed the architecture, and
helped establish and operate the first Theater C4ISR Coordination Center CTCCC) at
the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and has extended his work to the U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. 'jransportatton Command CUSTRANSeOM), and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the further development of these capabilities.
Mr. Gorman served 10 years in the U.s. Air Force in the areas of strategic airborne
reconnaissance and information operations with assignments to the National Security
Agency and Air Force Special Operations Command. He holds a B.A. in Government
and Economics from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in Strategic Studies and
International Affairs from the George Washington University.

viii

JATAC I Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

making.

Prior to joining TASe, Mr. Gallina served for ten years as a commissioned officer
in the United States Marine Corps.
Mr. Gallina received holds a B.A. in History and Biology from Tulane University
in New Orleans, Louisiana and a Masters in Business Administration from Loyola
University of Chicago.

Military Advantage in History

•

,
,/

Juli MacDonald

Robert Ryer

Juli MacDonald, an Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, has eight years experience conceptualizing and developing alternative futures and scenario-building exercises for national security and private sector clients; conducting research of political,
economic, energy, and military trends in Eurasia, South Asia and Asia Pacific; and
designing workshops and seminars that examine regional dynamics, military strategies, and the implications for U.S. interests. Ms. MacDonald has five years experience
supporting the Office of Net Assessment (OSDjNA) in assessing the future security
environment in Eurasia.

Robert Ryer. all Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, is a defense analyst in
the Modeling, Simulation, Wargaming, and Analysis Group. Mr. Ryer has worked
closely with Mark Herman on major projects for a variety of clients, including the
Joint Staff/r-S, Army Research Laboratory, and Office of Net Assessment (OSDjNA).
Supporting OSDjNA, Mr. Ryer was instrumental in the development and implementation of the XPATH game series, as a scenario developer, facilitator, model designer,
and analyst. Mr. Rver also helped lead the effort to develop the Entropy-Based
Warfare (EBW) model for OSDj.:--JA, designing the initial "paper" version of the model
to incorporate and demonstrate EBW's revolutionary non attrition memes, information operations components, and emphasis on unit cohesion. Currently Mr. Ryer is
designing a new model for OSD/NA that examines the nature and application of economic, military, political, and cultural influence in the geopolitical arena.

Currently, Ms. MacDonald is leading a project that will examine opportunities and
challenges associated with the emerging U.S.-tndian strategic relationship. In addition, she has supported a range of other projects for the OSD/NA, including an anti
access strategies and asymmetries project, a concept paper on Innovative operational
warfare concepts, and a study of military advantage in ancient history. Findings from
the latter study were featured in OSD (Policy)'s 2001 Summer Study that focused on
sustaining U.S. predominance.
Previously, Ms. Macuonald was a Program Analyst for SAIC, where she specialized in the development of alternative future scenarios for different strategic regions.
She organized over 25 workshops, seminars, and scenario-building exercises for
commercial and government clients and was the primary author of over 20 reports
focused on different aspects of strategic dynamics in Eurasia. She has participated
in three 050 (Policy) Summer Studies-Asian Energy: Security Implications (1997),
Asia 2025 (1999), and Strategies for Maintaining U.S. Predominance (2001).

Prior to joining Booz Allen, Mr. Ryer spent ten years as an editor and project
developer in the wargame design and publication industry, contributing to over 200
historical, contemporary, and speculative simulation products.
Mr. Ryer is a graduate of the University of Connecticut.

Ms. MacDonald holds an MSc degree in International Political Economy from the
London School of Economics and Political Science and a B.A. degree in International
Relations from the University of the Pacific.

x
., .

.;co ."

IATAC I Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center
Q ;

Military Advantage in History

r
About IATAC

The Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) provides the
Department of Defense (DoU) with emerging scientific and technical information in
support of Defensive Information Operations. IATAC's mission is to provide a 000
central point of access for information on Information Assurance (IA) and information operations (IOl emerging technologies. These technologies include system vulnerabilities, research and development, models, and analysis to support the effective
defense against Information Warfare attacks. IATAC focuses on all defensive activities
related to the use of information, information-based processes and information systems. One of thirteen DoD-sponsored Information Analysis Centers (lACs), IATAC is
managed by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTlC), Defense Information
Systems Agency (DlSA), and hosted by Booz Allen Hamilton.
IATAC basic services provide the infrastructure to support Defensive Information
Operations. Basic services include the collection, analysis, and dissemination of IA
scientific and technical information; support for user inquiries; database operations;
current awareness activities Ie.g.. IAnewsletter); and the development of critical
review and technology assessment and state-of-the-art reports.
Inquiries about IATAC capabilities, products, and services may be addressed to3190 Fairview Park Drive
Falls Church, VA 22042

xii

IATA( I Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center
• ~ ... '"m

.1...... WI

ita

wn;I.

a :a iLl mi

Phone:
Fax:

703/289-5454
703/289-5467

E-mail:
URi:

tatacgsdttc.mtl
http://iae. dt!c.milliatac

Military Advantage in History

xiii

r--'"

I'
I

Table of Contents

About the Authors
About IATAC ..........•.......................••.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Vll
Xl11

Key Questions

What Constitutes Military Advantage!

Tactical Warfare _
Operational Art _.

, .. , 2

, .. 3

. .. ,

, .. 5

Strategic Lellel
7
What Factors Determine Whether Military Advantage [s Enduring? .... , .. , ... 7

End Notes ....•..........••......•...•............ 8

Chapter 2 The Macedonians
FoundationaL Factors
Sources of Military Advantage

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12
13
.

Tactical Sources of Military Advantage.

Organization .

Leadership

Tactical Doctrine: Tile Macedonian System

Adaptability Across the Spectrum. of Conflict
Operational Sources of Military Advantage,

18
19

Mobility and Logistics

Was the Macedonian Military Advantage Enduring?
End Notes

20
21

Chapter 3 The Roman Military

Foundational Factors
Military Transformation.

26
.

Sources of Military Advantage
Tactical Sources of Military Advantage.

28
.

Military Advantage in History

a '#&1£

Organization.
Leadership
Training
Manpower.

. __

29
31

32
33

Tactical Doctrine: infantry Warfare and Siege Warfare
Siege Tactics
Operational Sources of Military Advantage.
.
Mobility
Roman Encampments
Psyclwlogiml Warfare
Adaptability and Military Transfomwlion .
Strategic Sources of Military Advantage

. 35
%

37
_

38
39

Conclusions: Military Advantage

Relevance for U.S_ strategy

Conclusions: Military Transformation

Bibliography

42
43

Economic...

Political

Sources of Military Advantage

Tactical Sources of Military Advantage _

_. _

Leadership
Organization and Discipline _
'Iccncs, Communications, and Deception.
Mobility, Firepower, and Protection .
Protection
Siege Craft.

S1
51
53
55
56

.56
57

Operational Sources of Military Advantage.

. 57

Operational Doctrine
Logistics and Mobility
Strategic Sources of Military Advantage

Was the Mongol Military Advantage Enduring?
End Notes

57
. _. 59
60

61
61

Chapter 5 Napoleon Bonaparte

Foundational Factors

The End uf Dynastic Warfare.

_ _.. 67

__ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sources of Military Advantage

Tactical Sources of Military Advantage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operational Sources of Military Advantage.

_. . .

Strategic Sources of Military Advantage

Chapter 6 Implications for the United States

Social.

I Information

. 75

_. 39

Foundational Factors

IATAC

Chapter 4 The Mongols

xvi

Was Napoleon's Military Legacy Enduring?
End Notes

Was the Roman Military Advantage Enduring?
The Coi/apse of the Roman Empire
End Notes

Strategy and Tactics

Assurance Technology Analysis Center

74
Military Advantage in History

xvii

1'1

List of Figures

Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure

'''

xviii
g; liEd

IATAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

....

...

1: Tactical Capabilities of Weapon Systems Schematic 15]
2: Roman Legion in 140 Be-lOO AD . . . . . . . . . . .
.
3: populations in Eurasia (1250 AD) . .
.
.
4: Organization of Mongol Military Structure
5: Mongol Operational Doctrine. . . . . . .
6: How the Findings Map to the United States

4
30
51
54
59
81

Military Advantage in History
._N~~'

xix

II I

Chapter 1

Introduction
The Lord is a man of war.
-Exodus 15:3

The nation state arose from the 30 Years War in 1648 as the dominant political
I organizational construct. This success was a triumph, not of ideology but of military acumen. [1) Arguably the most important core competency of the nation state
is its ability to organize, train, equip, and deploy military power. Historically, true
great power status has rested upon a bedrock of military advantage, which economic
strength alone cannot confer. [2] Moreover, the duration of great power status is
tightly coupled to the duration and robustness of military advantage. [31 If military
advantage is a key factor in great power status and its durability, then two key questions should be explored: What elements contribute to military advantage, and what
factors determine the duration of military advantage?
This study seeks to answer these questions by using several case studies of the
pivotal hegemonic powers in history. The examples of great powers evaluated in
this study were selected because of their significant military advantage over their
opponents. The Macedonians under Alexander the Great achieved military advantage through combined arms warfare and logistic acumen. The Roman success was
rooted in superior tactical doctrine, strategic mobility, and strong strategic political
and military institutions that enabled them to adapt and transform their military
forces over approximately 600 years. The Mongols under Cbenghis Khan and his
heirs overwhelmed an entire continent by coupling a tactical weapon system (horse
archer) that could not easily be duplicated with a superior organization and operational maneuver doctrine. Finally, Napoleonic France leveraged political, military,
and industrial revolutions to create the levee en masse, organizing around innovative
operational maneuver concepts to overwhelm its opponents on the battlefield and to
achieve a brief period of European hegemony. Based on conclusions drawn from the
case studies, inference will be made to suggest how the United States should think
about maintaining military advantage in the 21st century.
It should be noted that the case studies were examined and analyzed with a broad
aim to answer the two key questions of this study. Any study that tries to examine

Military Advant aq e in History

!~ 1'1 !

'I I

III

a 2,OOO-year history in a short paper format will leave a few details on the cutting
room floor. Literally thousands of books have been written on the subject of each
case study. Although the devil is in the details, our synthesis of history has focused
on the major trends and issues. Any competent historian can find anecdotal exceptions to any conclusions drawn from our analysis. We are aware of those exceptions
and differing perspectives, but we Me comfortable that our aggregate characterization
of the important trends in the establishment and maintenance of military advantage
are accurately drawn from these historical examples.

Key Questions
What Constitutes Military Advantage?
Thro~ghout history, peoples have sought to gain and maintain military advantage

over their opponents. Military advantage exists when an opponent must either directly adapt the method of warfare to reflect that of the side with military advantage
or develop an asymmetric response that is tailored to defeat the superior adversary.
Failure to adopt either of these options has always resulted in the military defeat
of the inferior force. It should be noted that military defeat is distinct from political
defe.at. Military advantage must enable both offensive and defensive advantage; otherwrse, the opponent needs only to neutralize its defense character to prevail. When
a society achieves recognizable military advantage, it cannot be defeated until the
enemy changes its approach to warfare. Some types of military advantage are hard
to copy or neutralize and, consequently, the advantage endures for a substantial
period of time, potentially over several centuries. Other forms of military advantage
are more temporary in nature, as with some aspects of military advantage iil.at have
r.est~d upon a military genius whose basic mortality confines the advantage to one
lifetime. Once seen, a new form of warfare can be copied or neutralized with an
asymmetric response or a new style of warfare.
A society arises from the environment and resources available at its formation.
~4J The env~ronment provides the basic foundation and serves as the primary shap-

mg mechan.lsm for the economic, social. and political structures of a given society.
Due to the Impact of technology, the role of the physical environment in shaping
economies and social-political institutions has diminished in the last few centuries.
However, the role of the environment on the economy prior to the industrial revolution cannot be overstated. The physical environment directly influenced a culture's
economic foundation and shaped the social structures and political processes that
formed the character of their military forces.
The basic economic systems of the pre-industrial era were harvesting, herding,
a.nd trading. Harvesting societies, based on the domestic cultivation of land, emphaSized skills in civil engineering, metallurgy, and animal husbandry. Such societies

IArAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

tended to develop centralized social and political structures. Classic examples arc
Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Rome.
Pastoral societies were tuned to the life cycle and maintenance of domesticated
animal herds, demanding skills in animal husbandry, hunting, and equestnanism.
These societies typically were built around decentralized social structures with locally
centralized leadership. Classic examples are the various Asian horse societies such as
the Scythians, Parthiana, and the Mongols.
The focus of trading societies is on the exchange of specialized products and com
modities emphasized skills in shipbuilding, finance, and engineering. These societies
tended to develop more pluralistic social and political institutions. Classic examples
are Phcnecia, Athens, and Carthage. Although there are exceptions to each of these
broad characterizations, especially in societies that evolved from hybrid economic
roots, such as the Macedonians, the basic distinctions are important insofar as military forces are somewhat predetermined expressions of the economies and strategic
institutions that create them. Because a society cannot readily copy a military paradigm requiring capabilities that are weakly developed within its economy, the character and capabilities of forces at the tactical level tend to be direct expressions of their
parent economy. The options available at the operational and strategic level of warfare are formed and constrained by the tactical level building blocks and the strategic
institutions that control them.

Tactical Warfare
At the tacticallevel of war, tactics, and material are combined at the point of contact between opposing soldiers, where battles or engagements ensue to accomplish
military objectives. The key functions at the tactical layer are command, leadership,
and organization. The command function focuses on the ability of a military commander to sense battlefield conditions, determine the most appropriate course of
action based on that understanding, and to execute a solution through his soldiers to
achieve the combat objectives.
Tactical leadership determines the efficiency, effectiveness, and robustness of the soldier in generating combat power. A force's leadership effectiveness, normally expressed
in individual morale and unit cohesion, is concerned with such characteristics as motivation, discipline, skill, trust, adaptability, cooperation, synchronization, and momentum.
The leadership function translates tactics and material inputs into capabilities.
The organization function at the tactical layer is concerned with the construction
and arming of forces to enable them to kill enemy soldiers and destroy infrastructure.
In terms of armaments, an organization must encompass four types of technologies:
mobility, engagement, control, and protection. Mohility technologies (e.g., horse
carts, trains, trucks, aircraft) bring men and material to the battle space and help to
position these resources to best advantage. Engagement technologies are the actual
Military Advantage in History

weapons that provide the strike capabilities against the opponent (e.g.. swords, composite bows, gUllS, missiles). Control technologies are the methods used by leadership to command forces (e.g., voice, flag, drums, radios, networks). Protection technologies provide the resources to protect the force against enemy engagements (e.g.,
shields, helmets, fortifications, armor, air defense systems).

Another critical feature of advantage is the interaction of tactical systems to confer
offensive capability upon a force. It is difficult to win a war decisively with a solely
defensive advantage. Consequently, during most of World War 1, the machine gun
did not produce offensive military advantage until it was integrated with infiltration
tactics or the mechanized construct of the tank.

Integration of command and organizational functions creates tactical systems. A
force is usually composed of a variety of tactical systems. Before the gunpowder era,
land forces were composed of various types of infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactical
systems. Examples of infantry tactical systems were the Phalanx (spear), the Legion
(sword), and skirmishers (missile).

Historically, combined arms forces have been broadly more successful than those constructed around one dominant tactical system. This has not always been the case, as the
Mongol success demonstrated. Their success was based on superior operational doctrine
and the paucity of Western missile capabilities. However, their case is the exception that
makes the rule. It was Alexander the Great's ability to counter eacb tactical problem with
the appropriate tactical system that enabled him to prevail, whether he was facing a large
multi-tactical system army, a fortified city, light cavalry formations, new tactical systems
(elephants), or guerrilla forces. Rome, when faced with a superior combined arms army
(Hannibal), gained allies who filled in the missing tactical pieces to ensure victory. The
ability to apply a superior tactical system repeatedly against an opposing force is a critical
foundation upon which military advantage is buill.

A particular tactical system offers advantages against certain types of tactical systems
and disadvantaged against others, as in the child's game of "rocks, scissors, paper." The
military art has yet to design the perfect tactical system, which is superior to all other
tactical systems. Each tactical system typically trades aspects of mobility, engagement,
and protection capabilities to achieve some advantageous military characteristic.

Heavy 'infantrY
{Shock Armed}

-----IIIr-----

Heavy; Cavatry

Operational Art

($hock Armed)

Operational art is focused on the maneuver and support of forces in a theater of
operations to achieve political and military objectives. The operational level binds
strategic decisions [6] and tactical engagements into a coherent, contiguous process.
The process is both an art form (maneuver) and a science (logistics).

liJilhtInfantry

(Mlssit~··Armed)

-----111--leqend:

A_ Attacker Advantage
D _ Defender Advantage

Figure 1: Tactical Capabilities of Weapon Systems Schematic [5J
An analysis of the case studies suggests that military advantage rests on a bedrock
of advantage in tactical combat. Tactical combat is defined as the sphere of direct
physical interaction between the combatants, Advantage is often a combination of
armament (technology) and tactics integrated into a coherent tactical system that
decisively defeats all opponent's comparable tactical system. It was the combination
of the composite bow, the horse, and herding tactics that spawned the horse archer
tactical system, one of the most successful military collaborations in history. This
tactical system was superior to heavy cavalry and heavy infantry, which were two
pillars of Western military culture. Consequently, when these types of forces clashed,
the horse archer system usually came out the winner.

IATAC I Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

The goal of operational maneuver is to cause tactical engagements to occur or not
occur at the behest of the superior general or admiral. Sun Tzu asserts that,

... what is most difficult about maneuver is to make the devious route the most
direct... thus, march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him
with bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before him. One able
to do this understands the strategy of the direct and the indirect. [7}

Sun Tzu also makes the point that the use of time and space factors during a
military campaign constitutes an art form that employs deception to alter or blur
the enemy's perception of the physical world. It is this integration of physical time
and space factor" with the manipulation of information that transforms operational
maneuver from a science to an art. The art of operational maneuver is the hallmark
of the great captains of history, such as Alexander, Chengfus Khan, and Napoleon.
The key to operational maneuver is the ability to control and manipulate information. Due to the relative equality of maneuver velocity prior to the 20th century, a
battle could not occur unless by mutual consent or until one side had been maneuvered up against a geographic feature that prevented disengagement. [8) In a case
Military Advantage in History

where both sides were willing to engage, one side was usually proven wrong about
its perceived advantage, so it was the ability of one side to manipulate information that deceived the opponent into thinking they had the advantage. Napoleon's
operational maneuvers before and during the Battle of Austerlitz (December 1805)
represent a textbook example, showing how superior manipulation of information
caused the out maneuvered Russian-Austrian army to believe erroneously that it had
achieved a winning position, but the final outcome was their decisive defeat.

At the operational level, military advantage has been based on the ability to gain
maneuver advantage through information superiority, organizational concepts, and
logistic expertise. Maneuver superiority allows the advantaged side to dictate when and
where tactical engagements can occur. Barring other significant factors, superiority at
the operational level of war has resulted in the ability to win wars or avoid defeat.

Strategic Level
The other key dimension of operational maneuver is organizational doctrine.
Organizing forces so that they are well balanced and able to achieve maximum
velocity for sustained periods of time has always been an important element in the
operational on. Napoleon was able to leverage the writings of contemporary military
theorists [9] to employ the combined arms corps and the division as his primary
maneuver elements. When coupled with information superiority upon the dense road
network of Central Europe, the French Corps of the La Grande Armee were able to
gain significant advantage over their opponents from 1805-1809. The efficacy of this
point is borne out by the fact that when Napoleon had to fight in Eastern Europe on
its inadequate road network, many of his operational advantages were eroded, resulting in less decisive outcomes. This situation was exacerbated during his Russian
Campaign of 1812 where through the loss of his irreplaceable cavalry he lost his
information superiority. The loss of French information superiority significantly dissipated Napoleon's former operational maneuver advantage, allowing his more numerous enemies to ultimately bring him to battle and defeat at Leipzig in 1813. Earlier in
history, the Mongols' organizational structure achieved similar maneuver advantage
with the Touman (lO,OOO-man cavalry division) that could move at a sustained rate
of 100 kilometers per day.
An old saying goes, "amateurs talk about strategy while professionals 'talk about
logistics." Logistics represents the science side of the operational level of warfare.
How much a force needs to sustain its physical integrity, the amount of transport
required to move the material of war, and how long it will take until it arrives where
it is needed can all be mathematically calculated. The art of logistics requires the
integration of the materiel part of war with the expertise to minimize the impact of
logistics on operational maneuver capabilities. Although ancient armies could forage
materiel from the enemy as they advanced, this usually handled only the sustenance
portion of logistics. Armaments, transport, and medical services still required attention, even when the army could forage. Additionally, the ability to forage depended
on local abundance, which was seasonally dependent. Forage was rapidly exhausted
if the forces ceased to move, and it required low enemy activity to allow friendly
forces to disperse for supply requisition purposes. Consequently, ancient armies still
required lines of communication if they were to operate effectively. The Athenian
destruction of the Persian fleet at Salamis caused the majority of the Persian army to
withdraw because Xerxes, the Persian king, could sustain only a small portion of his
army on local resources.

tATAC I Information Assurance Technology Analysi, (enter

At the strategic level, economic strength confers military advantage. The ability to
produce trained manpower and materiel arc the dominant variables at this level. In his
seminal work on Great Powers, Paul Kennedy demonstrates that economic strength is
the prerequisite of Great Power status. [10] This has always been true, and no less so
prior to the 20th century. Some hegemonic powers of history, such as the Mongols, were
not great economic powers before gaining ascendancy over their opponents. But an economic engine must he acquired if military dominance is to be maintained; the Mongols
achieved this through the adaptation and absorption of the Chinese bureaucracy.
The Roman political system was supported by a concept of inclusion. Over time,
many conquered people were granted Roman citizenship. Unlike conquerors before
them, who had become weaker due to the cost and burden of garrisons in newly
acquired territory, the Roman Republic and later the Roman Empire grew stronger
through the enfranchisement of conquered people under the Roman political umbrella. Hannibal recognized this feature of Roman military strength, and he tried through
his campaigns in Southern Italy to detach Rome from its conquered manpower base.
Despite some initial successes, his strategy failed because of the steadfastness of
most Roman allies, which maintained Rome's manpower reserves. Despite his failure,
Hannibal must be given credit for understanding Rome's strategic vulnerability.
The major impact of the strategic level appears not to be singularly focused on
military dominance, but on the ability of military dominance to endure. Which leads
us to the second key question of this study.

What Factors Determine Whether
Military Advantage Is Enduring?
Based on the analysis of the case studies, two dominant factors emerged as key
determinants of the durability of military advantage. The first variable is the character and strength of a society's strategic institutions. Rome lasted for roughly a thousand years because of the stability of its political, religious, financial, military, and
legal institutions. Rome's strategic institutions had the capacity to evolve over time,
allowing for adaptive and enduring strategic stability. The opposite side of the coin
is represented by Macedonia. As long as there was a Philip or an Alexander, political
succession could be managed; but over the long haul this was an inherently unstable
Military Advantage in His t ory

,
1

situation. When Alexander died without an adult heir, his field marshals, known as
the Diadochoi (successors), tore the Maccdonian Empire apart in a long series of civil
wars that sapped the strength and energy of the empire.

9. Although Napoleon was a voracious reader of the military classics, Marshall
Saxe, Frederick the Great, Comte de Guibert, and Pierre de Source! are seen as
having the most important impacts on his operational concepts.

The second key factor to the endurance of a particular military advantage is based
on a military's ability to continuously transform the source of military power. The
Roman Legion transformed its organization, armament, and doctrine many times over
the course of its history. Rome underwent approximately five major transformations
(Phalanx to Legion to Marian Legion to Cohort Legion to Foederatti to Cataphractl.
interspersed with numerous minor transformations. The adaptability of their political
and military institutions allowed the Romans to prevail over their opponents for 10
centuries. 1n the end, it was the destabilization of Roman institutions through extensive
civil wars, stagnant money supply, loss of manpower reserves, and religious upheaval
(Christianity), that made Rome vulnerable to the barbarians at its gates.

10. Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (Vintage Books Edition: New
York,1989).

End Notes
1. Porter, Bruce D., War and the Rise of the Nation State, (The Free Press: New
York, 1994) p. 1.
2. Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, (Vintage Books Edition:
New York, 1989).
3. Porter, p. 294.
4. Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societrts,
(W.w. Norton: New York, 1999).
s. Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Western World, (Barnes & Noble Books:
New York, 1987) p. 144.
6. Strategy is the determination of political and military objectives, rules of
engagement, and resource prioritization to achieve a successful outcome to a
conflict.
7. Sun Tzu (translated by Samuel B. Griffith), The Art of War, (Oxford
University Press: London, 1963) p. 102.
8. There are some examples of battles occurring due to desperation or loss of
operational maneuver velocity due to excessive baggage trains, but these are
the exceptions, not the rule. In the 20th century the increased size of forces and
their operational velocity make it possible for an offensive to force a battle upon
a reluctant enemy.

8
E

IATAC I Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

Military Advantage in History

Chapter 2

The Macedonians

.....
----_
... _._-----_10'_..._
._.s
.
.
.
.
.-_.....-_
_... _ __--......
... _-_ .
.. ""S ._

T'r ...... '

1 ••

.. _

--_
..
-..... __ . ...
..................
_. ,.....-_
... _-----................__
....
,

........ f,

................... ' _
_
,....,
...... ""''''..... 'hoi A

,.,,__ . .

..-

"VI .. 1 _ , _
Iho-..lot
on

..' 4 . -"'""; ,....

"_ _...l .. 1boI><'o "' .......... _
,... _
1m"'.. <!on.. llor

........ " ' ·JJIIII.:,

. ''' ''''' .....".' .. . ''''''

r II'

Foundational Factors
The Macedonian socio-economic system was based on a pastoral system (e.g..
sheep herding) augmented by subsistence agriculture. This combination generated
well-mounted cavalry and stout infantrymen. John Keegan, in his epic work, A
History of Warfare, identifies The seam between the steppe horse and the river-plain
agricultural societies as the domain that fostered innovation of advanced military
technology te.g., the chariot), [11
On a smaller scale, Macedonia embodied characteristics of both of these types of
societies, creating an innovative dynamic within its society. Northern Macedonian
was based on transhumant pastoralism whereby the movement of the population
was dictated by the grazing needs of flocks. They primarily used barter in economic
transactions vice currency, used few if any slaves, and served personally in the army.
In southern Macedonia, populations were largely sedentary and concentrated in cities
that relied on agriculture and trade for their livelihood. They used currency for economic transactions, and their agricultural system depended heavily on cheap slave
labor. [2] Consequently, the diversity of the Macedonian economy contributed to the
diversity of Macedonian military capability.
The political system was based on an autocracy centered on an elected king. Philip,
and later his son Alexander, were the great leaders silting astride a minor nobility who
were the backbone of the Macedonian Army. As the centraL institution in society, the
"long's army" or royal army elected the king from the available claimants in the royal
house, favoring the eldest male relative. Most Macedonian kings prior to Alexander,
including his father Philip, were assassinated or died in battle. Due to the polygamous
nature of Macedonian society, there were always numerous potential heirs tg the
throne. As a result, the succession process tended to be bloody and uncertain. [3]
Due to the role that the military played in selecting the king, leadership skills
and acceptance by the army were decisive factors in determining succession to the
throne. The king maintained the loyalty of the army with charisma and an ability
to follow a successful strategic agenda. [4) Philip [J 's rise to the throne illustrated
the importance of the military's support. In his case, it took prcscedence over blood.
Aftcr his brother died in battle, Philip was named regent over his young nephew,
Amyntas IV. Later he was ejected king over his nephew because of his success in
re-conquering lost territory and strengthening the Macedonian Army. To his credit,
Philip raised and protected his nephew, who remained a supporter of Philip until his
untimely death. Alexander, while consolidating his position within the royal succession, had Amyntas assassinated for treason.
Northern Macedonia was in great turmoil when Philip II entered the regency for
his young nephew. One of his first military acts was to reconquer the region, after
which he incorporated the pastoral segment of Macedontan society into an equal
partnership with agricultural/horse breeding southern Macedonia. To support this

lArA( I Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

integration process, he spent large sums of money on capital improvements and education in the north. As a result, the northerners were given the same privileges and
opportunities as their south Macedoruan cousins, transforming Macedonia into an
integrated society. Alexander benefited greatly from Philip's policies. I1e inherited a
relatively cohesive society from which he could draw the benefits of both the steppe
and pastoral traditions.
Macedonia was a polyglot of cultures, religions, and ethnic backgrounds.
Macedonian religion was based on a wide variety of pagan religious sects with one
officially sponsored religion. In fact, the king made daily sacrifices to a wide range
of deities. Consequently, Macedonian culture promoted tolerance for a very wide
range of religions within Macedonian society. The engraincd tolerance in the culture
and a deliberate integration policy provided a high level of cohesion, enabling the
Macedonians to undergo a long series of wars with little discernable internal dissent. It was from within this strong integrated society that Philip and later Alexander
forged the premier military institution of its day.

Sources of Military Advantage
In an examination of the Macedunian war machine, it rapidly becomes dear that its
military advantage existed at the operational and taclicallevels of warfare. Philip revolutionized warfare in his period by creating the first occidental combined arms army,
which possessed a tactical response for any combination of opposing systems. His
concept was that an army required heavy cavalry and heavy infantry for field battles,
light cavalry and light infantry for general operations, plus engineers and artillery for
sieges. [5] Central to the success of the Macedonian military was this combined arms
capability, creating asymmetric tactical advantages across the spectrum of conflict from
conventional field battles 10 counter-insurgency operations to sieges.
The forces that Alexander led into Asia were organized with a very competent staff
system, [6) based on the junior nobility, to include a research section of scientists. [7]
It was the competence of the Maccdontan technical sections that gave The army access
to the full range of technical services required by Philip's combt ned arms doctrine.
Whether Alexander was in a set piece battle, counter-insurgency operation, or a siege,
the Macedonian Army had the flexibility and expertise to adapt to the military situation. This self-contained, on-call expertise was one of the key sources of Macedonian
military advantage over its decade-long expeditionary campaign in Asia.

Tactical Sources of Military Advantage
The core of the Maccdonian military advantage lay in its tactical superiority and
its combined arms character. The army's center was composed of lightly armored
pikernen whose Is-foot sarisa [pike) outreached those of their Greek mercenary
MilitMy Advantage in History

! !
counterparts by a factor of two. A corps of professional light tfOOPS who suppressed
enemy missile fire offset the pikemen's vulnerability to missile attacks. The heavy
infantry center was supported on the flanks by mobile shock cavalry that required
a high degree of training due to the primitive nature of the livery (c.g.. no stirrups).
Following a tactical doctrine exhibited at Chaeronea. the Macedonian Army endeavored to create an interior flank through a weak decoy force or feigned withdrawal.
When the enemy advanced unevenly, the shock cavalry drove home a charge into the
enemy's exposed interior flank. The steady advance of the heavy infantry supported
the cavalry once the enemy front was pierced. This combination of tactics and full
spectrum of tactical systems allowed the Maccdonian Army to tace and defeat the
Persian Empire without losing a battle.

Organization
Philip Il created a new system of warfare after he left Thebes. He built a fully
coordinated and balanced force that combined the best features of missile, shock,
and maneuver tactics. Most perceptions of the Macedonlan Army revolve around the
Phalanx and the Companion cavalry, both of which are shock combat systems. In
fad, the Macedonians matched their opponents missile for missile, while employing all arms as complementary parts of a single lethal whole. The Macedomans were
organized along the lines of a self-contained combi ned arms expeditionary army that
included its own commissariat. medical, and engineer corps.
Philip organized his army into two components-the Royal Army, consisting of
the Companions and the agerna: and the Territorial Forces. These two forces represented the two main clements of Macedonian society. Using gold from conquered
Thracian mines, he vastly expanded the size of the Royal Army and the Territorial
Forces from 600 cavalry to 2,800 and the infantry from 10,000 to 27,000. Additionally,
he rearmed his Territorial Forces with a to-foot pike as a replacement for the traditional 8-foot spear. Lightening the armor worn by the Macedontan infantrymen and
distributing a new shield that slung over the left arm complemented this innovation.
This change in the infantrymen's panoply increased his mobility, while significantly
reducing the cost to manufacture the equipment.
The Royal Army was grouped into two categories-heavy cavalry and hypastpists.
The heavy cavalry had a strong tradition in shock combat and were armed with a
long cavalry lance as their primary weapon system. In an era that lacked the stirrup,
the Macedonian heavy cavalry developed the equestrian skills and weapons techniques to deliver a charge without unseating themselves. Most equivalent cavalry of
this era were missile-oriented medium cavalry who could fight in close combat, but
who were not trained to deliver a shock attack. The Macedonian Companion cavalry
and their Thessalian allies, who were trained in the same techniques, would be the
dominant offensive varia hie in <1]] of Alexander's victories.

IATA(

Inform<ttion Assurance Technology Analysis (enter

The Uypesrpists armament is still debated, but it appears that they were Milled in
a more traditional manner with spears and full sized shields. Their overall training
and armor enabled them to be more mobile than traditional Greek heavy infantry.
They also were trained [0 fight in a more open formation when necessary. Their role
was to maintain the linear connection between the shock cavalry and the pike-armed
Territorial Forces that were the backbone of the army. The Hypastpists also retained
their original mission of guarding the person of the king. in battle they took on the
mission of guarding the flank of the Maredonian pike Phalanx when the cavalry were
taunched on a shock attack.
The Territorial Forces composed the heart and soul of [be Macedonian Army. The
early militia levies that they replaced were unreliable, poorly trained local forces.
Under Philip these units were paid and trained on an annual basis and ultimately
evolved into a standing professional force thai Alexander used to conquer Asia. The
pike-armed Phalanx had a distinct tactical advantage against spear-armed Infantry
due to the length of the pike, which allowed the Maccdontans to present four spear
points for each one of the enemies at the point of contact. This, coupled with their
superior mobility on the battlefield, enabled the Macedonian Phalanx to anchor the
army's center during field battles. Although the Macedonian infantry were vulnerable
to missile fire due to their reduced armor, Philip's combined arms system overcame
this deficiency neatly by screening the center from enemy missile fire with light
infantry auxiliaries recruited from local tribes.
Philip unleashed his forces on the Hoplites at Chacronea and carried the day. In this
hattie, professional Macedonian soldiers, led by intelligent and capable leaders, were
able to execute complicated maneuvers, the most notable a feigned withdrawal, thai
could not he performed by poorly trained levies. This withdrawal caused the enemy
to advance at Chacronea, opening up interior flanks that were exploited by well-timed
Macedonian cavalry charges led by the young Alexander. This particular tactic, sometimes characterized by a chess metaphor as a pawn sacrifice, [8] used a feint or a sacrificial unit to draw a portion of the enemy force into an attack. This opened an interior
flank that the Macedonian heavy cavalry would quickly exploit. This tactic, which
characterized several of Alexander's later set piece battles (e.g., Granicus and Gau
GamelaJ, required exquisite timing to avoid having the army defeated in detail. Only
a very well-trained, well-led army could exploit the temporary vulnerability this tactic
created in the enemy without suffering potentially dire consequences.
cbaeronea demonstrated the Maccdonian advantage at the tacucallevel of war
fare. Pikemen armed with sansa out-reached their Hoplite-ar med opponents. Philip's
shock cavalry was able to quickly exploit the interior flank created by the premature
advance of the Greek infantry when they thought the Maccdontans were retreating.
This baltic demonstrated the core hammer (cavalry) and anvil (pikemen) tactics of
Philip's combined arms army.

Military Advantage in History

Leadership
The strength and the weakness of the Macedonian system lay in its reliance on
the genius of Alexander, The army was beholden to Alexander personally, as he was
the sole source of leadership during his reign. Within the military, Alexander was
supported by an able group of field marshals. Parmenion was the deputy commander
of the army (until Alexander had him preemptively executed for plotting against
him). Parmenion led the left wing, whose role was 10 pin the enemy and guard the
Phalanx center's left flank. The leadership of the Phalanx center rotated over time,
with several competent officers balding this post during the duration of Alexander's
campaigns. Alexander himself personally led the Companion cavalry on the offensive.

Tactical Doctrine: The Macedonian System
Macedonia's tactical superiority was achieved at the individual unit level, dominating literally the pointed end of the spear-the enemy's tactical systems at the
point of contact. The source of Macedonfan military advantage lay in its ability to
continually use a superior tactical system throughout the course of a battle, While it
is true that in most of Alexander's battles he was never as outnumbered as his official press proclaimed, the success of his army was based on its intricate interplay of
differing tactical systems,
The base and backbone of the Macedoman army during its conquest of the
Persian Empire was its 12,000 Phalangites organized into six Phalanxes upon which
the wings maneuvered, Often rmsperccivcd as superior Hoplites, the Phalanxes were
not equipped to fight a lIoplite-style battle line clash. In the Macedonian system, the
Phalanx did not close until after the wings had engaged the opponent. The power
of the Macedonian Phalanx stemmed from its defensive dominance over cavalry due
to the reluctance of horses to charge into massed men and its offensive dominance
over Hophtes due to superior reach (pike versus spear). However, the Phalanx had
its vulnerabilities. Light armor increased the Phalanx vulnerability to missile volleys,
and the large pikes made it difficult to ward off flank attacks in close combat. It is
interesting to note that the famous Swiss pikemen would overcome this latter vulneri'lbility by employing Itaiberdiers within their formation for close combat.
Although Phalanxes rarely broke in battle, they were fragile, faltering in close
combat if their integrity as a unit was broken by a flank attack or disordered by a
missile fire. [9] No Phalanx ever fought for more than 2 hours in a battle, and usually less than 1 hour, The Phalanxes were brought into play late in a battle, after
the enemy skirmishers had been run off or suppressed and the enemy wings were
engaged, allowing a Phalanx to move forward without being subjected to missile
volleys and flank attack. Alexander employed very capable skirmishers (Agrtantan
and Thracian Javelinmen, Cretan and Maccdontan Archers, and Thractan Pcltasts)
to neutralize the enemy skirmishers. However, like all skirmishers, their open formation was vulnerable to cavalry, If the skirmishers failed in their job, the Phalanx

IA1A(

Information Ass urant e Technology Analysis (enter

was exposed. For example, "-I the Battle of Issus, Alexander's Phalanxes WNe badly
disordered when they were caught under missile fire during a river crossing. AI this
moment of weakness, fresh Creek mercenary Hoplile units were able to inflict heavy
casualties 011 the Macedonians and hold them off. Fortunately for Alexander, the
timely collapse of the Persian left flank nullified any tactical advantage Darius gained
from the bravery and prowess of the Creek mercenaries.
The offensive power of the Macedonian Army was provided by their shock
cavdlry: the Companions. This arm was usually on the right flank and was led hy
Alexander personally. The heavy cavalry would spearhead a combined arms flying
column that delivered a crushing oblique attack directly supported by missile troops
for fire support and light cavalry for flank protection, Alexander's Companions were
armored and possessed lances, which outreached their opponents' javelins, The
Companions were superbly trained and could carry a charge home. Since the stirrup
had not yet been invented, the rider thrust with his lance at his enemy, as opposed
to the medieval knight who bore the brunt of the lance's impact. The history of
Alexander's battles shows that the Companion cavalry had no equals in combat.
One of Alexander's key tactics was the creation of an interior flank, using the
equivalent of a "poisoned pawn' gambit," lID) whereby a unit would he dangled in
front of the enemy in the hopes of provoking all advance. The advancing enemy unit
created an interior flank that became the target for a heavy cavalry charge that aimed
to break the enemy center. This tactic worked repeatedly against the Persians [e.g..
at Granicus, Jssus, and Gau Camels), hut failed at the Battle of Hydaspes against
the Indians, whose elephants frightened the Maeedonian horses, inspiring Alexander
to execute a reverse flank maneuver whereby his right flank moved behind his center and launched a flanking attack from the left wing, This maneuver placed the
Maccdonians in the Indian rear, causing them to break.
Throughout his career, Alexander orchestrated complex tactical operations in whieh
each component of the military performed unique and complementary functions, For
example, after the Companion cavalry moved to engage the enemy, the right flank of
his Phalanxes was protected by the presence of the Hypaspists (shieldbearers). The
Hvpasptsts maintained the linear connection between Alexander's advancing right cavalry wing and the right flank of the Phalanx center. Since this force was designed to
spread out, it was organized into smaller tactical units than a Phalanx,
While the right wing advanced off of its Phalanx base, Thessalian cavalry on the
left wing performed a defensive function. The Thessalian cavalry were highly trained,
armed with lances, and supported by missile troops. Their main function was to
ward off enemy flank attacks and to tie up the enemy's wing to prevent it from
banning the Phalanx or reinforcing the other wing.
When Alexander skillfully brought all of these elements into play, it quick,
ly became clear why the size of the respective armies was unimportant in the
battle outcomes. Alexander repeatedly defeated militaries larger in size than the
Military

Ad~antage

in History

Macedonian military. For example, Alexander defeated Darius' military on several
occasions, even though it was much larger than Alexander's. However, Darius was
a better general than his two major losses would indicate. For example. his defeat
at Issus resulted from a tactical error in failing to take advantage of the terrain that
could have neutralized much of the Macedonian maneuver capability. At Gau Carncla
(Arbela), Darius picked an open battlefield with an army whose size and composition neutralized some of the Macedonian tactical advantages. However, a timely
charge aimed at an interior flank broke the Persian center. In both cases, Alexander's
ability to adapt his army to the circumstances of the moment ensured Macedonian
victory and his place in history.

Adaptability Across the Spectrum of Conflict
-------One of the hallmarks of military advantage is the adaptability of the system that
confers advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The Macedonian system was
supreme across the entire spectrum of ancient conflict, largely due to its combined
arms character. In marry cases, it was Alexander's military genius that discovered
how to reconfigure the Macedonian force structure in unintended ways that led 10
success under different circumstances. The Macedonia» Army's flexibility and generally high level of professionalism allowed Alexander to successfully solve myriad tactical and operational challenges unforeseen by Philip, the Army's architect.
After the collapse of the Persian Army, Alexander relentlessly pursued Darius until
he was killed by his generals. Alexander then moved to subjugate the Persian motherland (i.e., Jran and Afghanistan), where the nature of conflict devolved to counter-insurgency. To prevail in guerrilla warfare, Alexander organized his conventional
army to defeat small raiding parties. These raiding parties were led by former Persian
generals who were trying to hold onto ancestral lands or were attempting to establish
kingdoms of their own.
In Bactria, Alexander attempted to hring rebels 10 battle by establishing a series of
fortified posts from which combined arms flying columns of cavalry and light infantry could intercept enemy forces. Not all Macedonian commanders were capable of
fighting this type of war without the direct supervision of Alexander, as evidenced
during the winter of 330-329 Be, when a Macedonian column was ambushed and
destroyed. [n] In the end, Alexander's tactics succeeded in bringing the last of the
rebels to ground. With these victories in the hinterlands, he declared the Persian
Empire pacified and conquered. The Macedoniao success rested on Alexander's ability to re-organize his cavalry and infantry units into combined arms mobile columns
and to utilize his engineering service to configure field fortifications.
Alexander was notorious for his siege craft and his ruthless treatment of captured cities. Traditionally, siege craft is the most difficult and technical of the ancient
military arts. Sun Tzu admonished readers in his chapter on offensive strategy that
the "worst policy is to attack cities." [12J Alexander avoided sieges when possible,

II\TAC

I Information

As~urance

Technology

Analy~is

(enter

but was forced to conduct several of them during his campaign against the Persian
Empire, most notably at Tyro, an island city off the Levant coast. Alexander cornbined his military's engineering skills, naval power, and logistic acumen to capture
the island fortress after 7 months. He then ruthlessly slaughtered the garrison, sold
the citizenry into slavery, awl looted the city. The spectacle of the Macedonian army
pillaging the city, raping women, and massacring prisoners sent waves of horror
throughout the eastern Mediterranean. It was Alexander's demonstrated ability to
successfully besiege cities and the psychological shocks caused by the sack of Tyre
that prompted many cities to open their gates to receive benevolent treatment instead
of suffering defeat and slaughter. Also, in cases where the city surrendered without
a fight, Alexander limited looting, treated the population well (although the city elite
often suffered if they exhibited the slightest hint of rebellious tendencies), and incorporated the cowed city into his empire.
Embedded within the Macedoman siege train was an extensive suite of ancient
artillery systems (e.g., rock and large bolt throwers). Alexander continued to innovate over time and adapted his capabilities to new requirements. For example, the
Macedontans deployed some of the first recorded uses of artillery in tactical engagements during river crossing operations. [13]
Finally, Alexander demonstrated his innovation and military adaptability when
faced with technical surprises on the battlefield. As Alexander moved to fight the
climactic baule against Darius at Gau Gamela, he was confronted with a new weapon-the war elephant. War elephants conferred an unexpected military advantage on
the battlefield because their unfamiliar smell caused horses to shy in the elephant's
presence. Given that the core of Alexander's offensive potential was invested in his
cavalry forces, war elephants represented a significant asymmetric tactical surprise.
In his first encounter with elephants, Alexander was fortunate that they were present in small numbers, and so their tactical impact was insufficient to force a change
ill Macedonian tactics. In a later battle against the Indians at the Hydaspes, the
Macedonlens faced an army built around this tactical system. Although pressed hard
in this battle, Alexander prevailed despite his disadvantage against war elephants.
After this near run victory, Macedonian military doctrine incorporated elephant corps
into its force structure. Elephants had a useful but very short effect on conflict. Later
it was found that horses could be trained to tolerate the smell of elephants, and
subsequent actions revealed that elephants were vulnerable to missile fire and loud
noises (e.g., horns), [legating their effectiveness.

Operational Sources of Military Advantage
Although tactical skill determines the outcome of combat engagements, operational art determines the outcome of campaigns. The Macedontan Army over the period
of a decade moved through the Middle East (Turkey, the Levant, and Egypt). and
Southwest Asia (Iraq and Iran), and into India. The most operationally mobile army
amongst its competitors, the Macedonian Army's maneuver advantage was based on
Military Advantage in History

III

its superior logistic system. Philip's troops carried their own baggage, significantly
cutting down the size of the logistic train. The reduction in numbers of pack animals
and the absence of carts enabled the Macedonians to move at twice the rate of the
Persians. This significant Macedonian maneuver advantage meant the Persians rarely
had the initiative during their confrontations with Alexander's forces.

Mobility and Logistics
Alexander was a consummate logistician. The Macedontan Army was supported
by a fleet of transports and forward dumps that were organized to support the army
while it was on the march. For most of its campaigns, the Maccdontan Army possessed an overall ratio of six to one (infantry to cavalry), This enabled Philip to institute a practice in which Macedontan troops carried their own arms, armor, and camp
gear, thereby eliminating the lise of servants or carts to carry the soldier's kit. [14]
The ability of the Maccdonian Army to carry its own implements of war enabled the
fast march rates (approxtmarclv 10 to 18 miles per day) that were characteristic of
the Macedonian offensive into Persia. [15]
The muscle power of the common foot soldier was augmented by an aggressive
commissariat that moved in advance of the army, negotiating for goods and services
prior to the arrival of the army. When enemy activity or the scarcity of human habitation precluded such arrangements, the army made use of naval transport or rapid
marches on half rations to quickly move to a more resource intensive environment.
The army could march up to 5 days [16J without logistic resupply, allowing the
Macedunians to cross significant geographic features that formerly had limited the
size and range of offensive forces.

,
The combination of minimal baggage train, superior logistic planning, and rapid
marches gave Alexander a significant maneuver advantage that he exploited throughout his ten-year campaign against the Persian Empire. There were periods of time when
the length of the campaign caused the Macedonian Army to accumulate baggage, but
when this affected operational maneuver, the excess baggage was destroyed. [17]

Was the Macedonian
Military Advantage Enduring?
The Macedoruan political system was vulnerable to issues of succession and strategic focus. When a king died, the successor usually dealt with a period of internal
and external unrest while the new regime gained control and legitimacy over the
reins of power. Alexander's ascent to the throne was accompanied by several dynastic murders to eliminate the obvious competition. [18] This central feature of the
Macedonian political system made it difficult, following Alexander's death, for the
empire that Alexander conquered to remain focused as a whole upon the concepts

IATAC

Information Assurance Technolo q y Analysis Center

that he had laid out. Consequently, Macedonia's ability to leave an enduring legacy
was subject to tile capability of Alexander's successor.
When the political system was unable to produce a leader that the nobility could
collectively accept, TUmors emerged that Alexander bequeathed his empire to the
strongest of his followers.
Civil war ensued for nearly a century as Alexander's surviving field marshals,
Diadocchi, declared themselves kings over portions of the Macedoruan empire. The civil
wars destroyed the empire's continuity and unity, enaunng that the Macedonian military
advantage and the Macedonian empire that Alexander had created would not be sustained.
Macedonia's military advantage proved to be temporary. Its military advantage
was too dependent on Alexander's leadership and military genius, and it lacked solid
strategic (political and military) institutions to preserve, maintain, and improve military advantage beyond his lifetime. The Mccedoman political system was capable of
supporting Alexander's empire largely because the army was fiercely loyal to him.
After his death, the structure of the political system, which lacked clear, institutionaltzed succession process, could not sustain his vast empire.
The Macedonian system also failed to maintain an advantage because over time it
could be easily copied. During the century-long series of civil wars, the Macedonian
style army was replicated all throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia. These
armies initially contained a core of Maccdontan veterans, hut over time these original
levies were diluted by new recruits. This military period is characterized by similarly
configured and armed combined arms forces clashing in a series of long, inconclusive, and bloody wars. These wars of attrition exhausted the eastern Mediterranean
and facilitated the rise of Rome, Carthage, and other powers in the Western
Mediterranean. New military inuovalions, such as the Roman Legion, would eventually neutralize and then eliminate the Macedontan system's tactical advantage. In the
end, the Macedonian system endured in various forms for another century, but these
successor armies never fought with the effectiveness or impact of the Maccdonian
Army led by the master, Alexander the Great.

End Notes
1. Keegan, John, A History or Warrare, (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1994) p.
155-168.
2. Hammond, N.G.L, "The Macedonian Defeat Near Samarkand," (Ancient
World, 22-2, 1991) p. II.
3. Hammond, p. 28.

Military Advantage in History

l1'lP
I'llI
i II

4. Barker, Philip, Alexander the Great's Campaigns. (Patrick Stephens:
Cambridge, 1979) p. 9.

5. Fuller, General J.F.c., The Generalship of Alexander the Grf'llt, (Rutgers
University Press: New Jersey, 1960) p. 47,
0. Burn, A.R., Alexander the Creal and the Hellenistic World, (Collier Books:
New York, 1947) p. 72.

7. Durn, p. 37.
8. Devine, A. M., "A Pawn Sacrifice at the Battle of the Cramcus: The Origins
of A favorite Stratagem of Alexander the Great," (Ancient History 18, 1988), p.
3-19.
9. Later examples of Spanish sword and buckler troops breaking into pikearmed formations demonstrate the weakness this system revealed in close combat.
10. Devine, p . .')-20.

11. Hammond, p. 41-46.
12. Sun Tzu (translated by Samuel B. Griffith), The An of War, (Oxford University
Press: London. 1963).
13. Keyser, Paul T., "The Use of Artillery by Philip
(Ancient World 25-1,1994), p. 27-53.

and Alexander the Great,"
"

14. Engels, Donald w., Atexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedoniall
Anny, (California University Press: Los Angeles, 1978) p. 12.
15. Engels, p. 153.
](i. Engels, p. 22.

17. Engels, p. IS.
18. Burn, p. 52.

IATAC

Information Assurance Technology Analy,is Center

Military Advantage in History

Chapt er 3

The Roman Military

........
-,......
..........
1':
I", I"

......._
Uon. _

,n'",_ ...... """"'" nu,Ury
"",
,
,,., " " n'''II. """'" ""&'" ,
""'.""...... 'Iw Tlt>tt
"'
IIo<\ow« u"""'" .." .
....1<01 S<lI<ly 0' • dllzm .uJII'f I"" I.. pro«<Ooo b«
,.. 1m......,,,
,<Jo" ..... "oil

"~,,,, ~n

_am.! t.... ""...I dti<fl_ ""
,10" Kuo,.. , ~ ,",.."wll, to
,_

'"~'''8'

""...'<1

,.l«,«1 00

..
'J"'"""

n' ","",.\>O"tv .. 0;_

,~ ,

... ",k

",,10'..,. l"""""

'~<'f'
.-.l ~'"t1, ,~
1' 1WI'h h'
.,,'"
,,,," Ro.",n,
100;1, ."
,I..,
'Iw""',. """,,""WI'..,, lI"'" ..-.l ,.ob>U<Jo"l "".
""" 01 Non""" r~".... IIy ,,,. md .-.l l" ..... "'Inn. """'" "," ,m1~ "" .,..
_ ...." ..Iot, ,,,.. U,,,.J>
01
UnllN ...... ~"I>.
II ,... 01 .......
'"'''''' lI~"g ...... ". ""'"
'11""
<,II , ,,,..
......... ~ 'h" .... k>r
~«...,"..... III

",,"'

_ ' '11 '" "",","'. .... .,.,
• •, .,

,• • •" ..,

The underlying sources of enduring Roman military power were its solid political and military institutions. The Romans created a society of warriors based on the
citizen-soldier, which permeated all levels of society, fully integrating politics and
military force. [3] These institutions were unique in their ability to assimilate the
innovations and practices of conquered or coopted civilizations. The Roman military
evolved over time into a formidable professional army whose strengths were footed
in its organization, structure, discipline, and engineering prowess. Rome's professional army supplied continuity over centuries, enabling the Romans to build an enduring
empire. Unlike earlier empires, Rome's inclusive political institutions and bureaucracy
provided the Romans with a code uf laws and a mechanism for incorporating subject
peoples into their empire by granting them citizenship. Consequently, the more xome
conquered. the stronger she became.

Foundational Factors
From the earliest stages of the Republic through the final sack of Rome, the army
and politics were inexorably intertwined. Over the course of six centuries, Rome went
through various political phases. which will be categorized as the Republic, Early
Imperium, and Late Imperium. in the time of the Republic, the annual election of
two consuls defined both the political and military leadership for the coming year.
The consuls, who were expected to lead armies in the field and to fight wars, knew
that military success would almost certainly lead to greater political power and prestige. The triumph, a tumultuous parade that celebrated military success, was both a
political and military event, granting the warrior politician who received this honor
significant political power and prestige. War was the straightest possible path to political dominance, and the oligarchs who ran the Republic were not shy about usipg it
as such. As the Republic transformed into Empire, the emperors continued this tradition of warrior-politicians, even if, CIS is alleged about the Emperor Caligula. they had
to invent victories to embellish their reputations.
As the Empire grew, so did the political power of the generals and their Legions.
Until the 2nd Punic War, the Roman Republic was able to use political generals to
lead its citizen army. Roman military doctrine was simple but effective against tribal
and city-state forces, but when confronted by such a military genius as Hannibal, the
system failed. Rome then turned to professional generals to win. This change created
a long-term problem for the Republic when the soldiers became more loyal to their
generals than to the Republic,
Roman tradition forbade generals from bringing their Legions into Italy proper. This
prudent measure WClS designed to forestall ambitious generals from using their combat
troops to influence politics. However, this prohibition failed many times, as in the case
of Julius Caesar, who circumvented this proscription and used the loyalty and power of
armies to seize power. This act caused a civil war that ultimately ushered in the early
imperium under Augustus and set an unfortunate precedent. For example, during the

IATAC

Information Ass ur a nce Technology Anatysis Center

Year of the Four Emperors (69 AD), successive provincial commanders "allowed" their
Legions to hail them as emperor and marched on Rome. Throughout the Imperium
period, Rome was plagued by the specter of audacious men, backed hy Legions willing
to fight for booty, marching on Rome to claim the seat of Empire.
Under Augustus, the Praetorian Guard (the Guard) was created, which held sway
in Rome proper. Originally designed to act as the emperor's bodyguard and to mainlain order in the capital, it grew in size and changed from a purely Roman force to
one manned by various peoples from the Empire, establishing its importance as an
arbiter of power during dynastic successions. No one could overthrow the sitting
emperor without the consent and help of the Guard. At times, the Guard took the
succession question into its own hands, when it felt threatened by the current OCC\!pant of the throne. The Guard, coupled with the propensity of the Legions to identify
with their commanders rather than with the central Imperial Government, ensured
that the military would he the dominant force arbitrating succession in the Empire.
Another factor in the civilian-military dynamic of Rome was the army's impact on
the economy. The Republic's reliance on a citizen army drawn from the smalllanded
working class weakened the agricultural sector. As the Empire grew, manpower
requirements rapidly increased. The Republican practice of enlisting and demobilizing militia forces to meet periodic emergencies became unworkable. I\n innovation to
allow the disenfrancbised proletariat to enlist, while minimizing the burdens placed
on the agricultural sector, created the requirement to pay and maintain a standing
army. Professional soldiers, paid for their loyalty, became the norm, and as the army
grew, the associated costs became more burdensome. Debasement of the currency,
the inability to continue to settle demobilized soldiers in colonies, and the growing
requirement for field commanders and emperors to offer the soldiers "gifts" (bribes)
for their loyalty created havoc with the economy. Various attempts to reform the
military through reorganization. reduction in forces, or redeployments failed due to
political or military necessity. At the effective end of the Western Empire, it is esrimeted that the maintenance of the Imperial Army consumed one-third to one-half of
the Imperial revenues. While the army was the instrument by which Rome expanded
its wealth and power, it also became a factor in the periodic political and economic
collapses that shook the Empire.

Military Transformation
A significant foundational advantage for Rome was its ability to transform the
nature of military power. Rome arguably underwent five significant military transformations, the dates of which are approximate because of vagueness in the ancient sources.
In the 6th century Be, Rome was under Etruscan tutelage and their army was
organized around the Hoplitc heavy infantry, although the signature Roman scutum
(rectangular body shield) was in evidence in some units. Roman military failures
against the Southern Italian and Greek states in this era created pressure for change.
Military Advantaqe in History

A strong correlation emerged between the Roman military success in the 5th and 4th
centuries Be to the new style of heavy infantryman who combined missile power
(pilum-a form of javelin) with new close combat skills built around a stabbing
sword. Sometime before the Punic Wars of the 3rd century Be. the Romans adopted

the famous Roman gtadus, or Spanish sword.
A second key transformation occurred during the Ist Punic War (264-2.41 Be)
with the rapid development of a navy as a Hew and critical source of military power.
The navy enabled Rome to gain sea control of the waters around Sicily, and its sea
control allowed Roman land forces to expel carthaginian forces from Sicily and
invade North Africa. Thus the Roman Navy won the 1st Punic War and during the
Interwar years secured tbe acquisition of Corsica and Sardinia.

the battlefield. Rome raised the world's first conscript army to be organized into
coher~nt, ~t~ndardized units. The standardized Roman formations, combined with
Rome ~ ability to raise large numbers of troops, allowed them to build new comhat
formations .as rapidly as others were destroyed ' and 10 d ep 1oy L·
eglOns from one part
of the ElIl~:re to the other without loss of military efficiency. On an operational level,
Rom~n military advantage was rooted in their engineering prowess, their extensive
road Infrastructure, and their ability to adapt to new threats.
. ~oman military dominance endured because the Roman.'> successfully combined
military ruthle.ssness wit.b pol~tical ~stuteness, enabling them to manage a complex
network of alliance relationships. Historian William Harris observes-

In many respects [the Romans'] behavior resembles that of many other nonprimitive ancient peoples, yet few others are known to have displayed an extreme
degree of ferocity in war while reaching a high level of political culture. Roman
imperialism was in large part the result of quite rational behavior, but it also had
dark a~d irrational roots. One of the most striking features of Roman warfare is its
regulanty-almost every year the Romans went out and did massive violence to
someone-and this regularity give the phenomenon a pathological character. [if}

The third transformation occurred as a consequence of the 2nd Punic War
(218-201 8C) when Hannibal revealed the vulnerability of the nne-oriented system
(Hastati-Tst, pnncipe-znd, 1hari-3rd line) to flank attacks and envelopment. Rome
improved its cavalry forces through allies and began the evolution into modular
formations built around a cohort of javelin/sword armed heavy infantry to gain
increased tactical agility. This is the Legion of the l st century BC that Julius Caesar
used to conquer Gaul and is a representation of the Roman Legion through the early
Imperium (140 BC-2oo AD).

Moreover, Roman institutions were capable of expanding and absorbing foreign
Tl.1e ~Ol1lall Empire grew and maintained its dominance because it pessess~d the msntunons to co-opt and romantze its allies, client states, and tar-flung
provinces. Rome used the incentives of Roman citizenship to recruit Legionnaires
and to gain and secure the loyaity of the local leaders. This process slowly Increased
Roman power and expanded the base from which the Roman military could operate.
lllnovatlOn~.

The fourth transformation occurred during the late Empire when Rome moved
into a defensive posture to protect its frontiers from nomadic tribe.'> beyond the
empire. During this period, the frontier garrison forces were built around heavy and
light infantry, fighting from fortification and supported by mobile forces composed
largely of cavalry forces. Over time (200 8C-450 AD), the infantry forces lost their
offensive edge and became less reliable in defense while the cavalry forces became

the arm of decision in battle.

TacticaL Sources of Military Advantage

The final significant transformation occurred after the break-Up into eastern
and western Empires ruled by separate political structures. The eastern half of the
Empire took the heavy cavalry to its ultimate evolution, called the Cataphract. The
Cataphract was a heavily armored horse and cavalryman who used a composite bow
to generate significant missile capability and lance/sword for shock combat. Local
military infantry forces supplemented these mobile heavy forces.

The Roman military demonstrated a remarkable ability to innovate and adapt
at ~lllevels of wa:'fare, transforming the way armies were raised, organized, and
rratncd, and creaung a new model for deploying heavy infantry.

Organization

Sources of Military Advantage

The Romans raised one of the world's first conscript armies in which the soldiers
were regularly recruited, uniformly armed and equipped, and organized into coherem, standardized units called Centuries. 140 BC-20o AD

Although it is difficult to generalize 600 years, it can he said that the Roman military advantage during the Republic and Early Imperium revolved around a core of
highly disciplined and very well trained infantry units called Legion.'>. The dimensions
of Rome's military advantage were multifaceted and mutually reinforcing. Roman
military organization provides enormous tactical maneuverability and flexibility on

or A~and.oning Phalanx w~rfare when heavily armored, spear-wielding Hopbtes
. gantzcd mto dense formations proved ineffective against lighter armed, faster movlllg foes, the Romans developed a completely rational plan of articulation, creating the
antecedent for the modern division. They replaced the phalangeal organization and the

IATAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

Military Advantage in History

distinctions of each line with a system of homogenous heavy infantry Legions, which
by the Early Empire could be deployed in as many or as few lines as required.
The Legion as it was configured during the height of Ruman power from the Late
Republican to the Early Empire (140 Be-200 AD) illustrates how ~oman mil~tary
advantage was rooted in organtzanon and training. Each such Legion cOI.npnsed ~ac
tical sub-units, increasing its maneuverability on the battlefield. The Legion consisted
of 10 heavy infantry cohorts of 600 men each; a cohort consisted of three maniples
of 200 men; each maniple contained two centuries (see Figure 21. The lines of
Legionnaires were positioned in a checkerboard formation to allow the uack rows to
fill any gaps left by the first two rows. The rows systematically worked together when
they attacked. As each group of engaged combatants grew tired, they were replaced
by a fresh group of Legionnaires. This maneuver was repeated until the enemy broke.

The Organization of the Roman Legion

edges of the strong blade cut effectively, making it an excellent short-range attack
weapon. For longer range, the Romans designed a throwing spear-crctcrrcd to CIS
a pilum-to replace the traditional thrusting javelin. The bulk of the infantry carried two pilums. Approximately, 6 feet lang half-wood and half iron, the pilum was
designed to break its iron point on impact with a hard object, which prevented the
enemy from using the weapon against the Romans. The swords and javelins suited
Koman tactics that consisted of throwing the javelin and then closing quickly 10 fight
with sword and shield. [6]
The Romans dispensed with the heavy Hoplite armor and adopted much lighter
body protection of hooped iron, similar to chain mail. This armor was not effective
against the pike-thrust of Phalanx fighting, but it adequately deflected sword-blows
and missile points. The armor was augmented by a light oblong shield (the scutum)
that replaced the smaller round hoplon shield of the Early Republic era because it
gave the soldier mare body protection.
Each soldier was equipped with standard equipment and weapons. All
Legionnaires wore helmets, breastplates, and leg guards; and each soldier carried
swords and thrusting or throwing javelins. Each unit was equipped with standards
that enabled the soldiers to recognize their places and units easily, enabling commanders to identify the location of their units on the battlefield.

legion
approximately 5,000
10 cohorts

Leadership

(3 manipLes in each cohort)

centuries (of 80 men)
in each maniple
6 centuries in each cohort
2

,-t,

10 mess-units in each century

The ultimate strength of the Roman Army lay in the class of professional soldiers
that made up the Centunonate. Long-service unit leaders, the Centurions provided
leadership and continuity in the Roman military. They were drawn from the best of
the enlisted ranks and formed the first body of professional fighting officers known to
history. [7J Imbuing the Legions with a backbone of solid tactical leaders, they transmitted from generation to generation the code of discipline and accumulated store of
tactical expertise.

Figure 2: Roman Legion in 140 8(-200 AD
This system combined compactness with flexibility. A commander led each of
these units, with full authority over his subordinates. [5] Subordinate units were
capable of rapidly responding to the orders of its leaders. Moreover, this organization provided the opportunity for subordinate units to take initiative in battle when
required. The organization also empowered parts of the army (c.g., a Legion or
cohort) to maneuver to protect a flank without changing the direction of the entire
force. As the Romans expanded their army, they added uniformly trained and
equipped Legions. allowing the growth of a large field army without a significant
decrease in the overall training or proficiency of the force.
I1eavy infantry dominated the Koman Army. The infantry fought primarily with
short swords and javelins. The short swords were reserved for shock combat. Both

JATA(

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

Centurions combined the functions and prestige of a modern company commander and sergeant major. rSJ Six Centurions led a cohort, each responsible for an
SO-man century. In battle, the Centurion, like Legionnaires in his cohort, fought at
close range with the enemy, accepting the hazards of life as a soldier. In addition, the
Centurion was responsible for tracking his century's arms and equipment, posting
guards, conducting inspections, and training the rank and file. The Romans did not
possess basic training camps, which made recruit training an essential function of the
Legion, led by the Centurion.
Roman Centurions dedicated their lives to soldiering. The Roman professional
soldier did not serve for the monetary rewards enlistment brought him. Ide-ally, his
military service was guided by pride in a distinctive way of life. concern to enjoy the
good opinion of comrades, satisfaction in the largely symbolic tokens of professional
Military Advantage in History

success, hope of promotion, and expectation of a comfortable and honorable retiremeru.iol Historian Livy wrote of a 50-year old Centurion who had undertaken 22
years of service, acted fOUT times as the senior Centurion of his Legion, and had won

34 decorations during his service in the Ruman military. [IOJ
Centurions harbored no ambitions to rise into the governing class, rather they
sought to succeed in their esteemed and self-sufficient military profession. They
provided the practical military expertise for the senior military otncers-c-thc consuls-who were elected by the Roman people to represent both the sovereign Roman
people and the advisory seriate. The consuls ranked as state officials, hut were
often deficient in professional military knowledge and strategy. This political feature
changed after the Punic Wars as professional generals appointed by the emperor
replaced elected officials.
The institutionalization of the Roman military freed it from dependence on one
leader for its success. The Romans benefited from a number of brilliant military leaders, many of whom left their mark on the policies of the Roman military institution.
For example, during the 2nd Punic War, Scipio Africanus reestablished Roman dominance in Iberia and defeated Hannibal in North Africa at zama. Julius Caesar greatly
expanded the empire during the Gallic Wars and used this power base to initiate the
civil war that ended the Republic. Other great leaders, such as Vespasian, contributed
to the expansion of the Empire.

Training

--=---

The Roman military operated at a significantly higher level of quality and discipline than its opponents, especially after the civil war between Julius caesar
and Pompey, which destroyed the last vestiges of competing empires in the
Mediterranean. The Roman military'S traditions, ethos, and rigorous training shaped
the Roman Legionnaire into a ruthless and efficient soldier. The Roman system
severely punished cowardice and failure and highly commended valor, courage, and
victory. This combination produced an army that would fight with an efficiency and
ferocity that was not seen again until the Mongols 1,SOO years later.
The Roman military trained extensively and demanded perfect discipline from its
soldiers. Historian Josephus in his account of the Jewish War commends the discipline and training of the Roman soldiers.
They do not sit with folded hands in peace-time only to put them in motion in
the hour of need. On the contrary, as though they had been born with weapons
in hand, they never have a truce for training, never wait for emergencies to arise.
Moreover, peacetime maneuvers are no less strenuous than veritable warfare.
Hence the ease with which they sustain the shock of battle. No confusion breaks
their customary formation, no panic paralyses, no fatigue exhausts them. {11]

IAlAe

I Information

Assurance Technology Analysis Center

The soldiers' combat training was designed to bring their natural ferocity to the
tore and to inure them against the fear of hand-to-hand combat. They practiced the
art of battlefield maneuver through seemingly endless periods of close order drill.
They were hardened to the rigors of field living through constant field exercises and
route marches. Recruits were incorporated into tbe Legion through a process of brutal psychological indoctrination, physical hardening, and constant repetition of basic
combat drills until they instantly responded to commands. Troops swore allegiance
to their Legions, not to their leaders, making the Legion the lynchpins of their lives.
This engendered a powerful esprit de corps that often translated into almost unbelievable feats of bravery on the battlefield.
The Romans also perfected the method of using cadence to keep marching troops
in step. Using drums to beat time and to send signals, Legions could be effectively
maneuvered around the battlefield without loss of cohesion, allowing them to rapidly
change direction and formation as need arose.
The Romans placed immense importance on military awards and punishments.
Whenever a soldier distinguished himself in battle, he was praised in front of his fellow soldiers and received gifts. At the same time, the Romans severely punished even
minor rules infractions. Roman soldiers feared their commanders and the punishments
they could mete out more than they feared the enemy. Actions regarded as unmanly or
dishonorable could be punished with death. ln battle, Roman soldiers were expected to
fight to their death unless ordered to retreat. The consequences of cowardice in battle
were severe. A soldier who returned from battle without his sword, shield, or any other
weapon would suffer disgrace and humiliation. Units that broke in combat were subject to decimation, the process of beating to death every tenth man.

Manpower
The Roman Army exhibited aD extraordinary ability to raise new Legions by incorporating recruits from their client states and conquered peoples. They also relied
heavily on the manpower supplied by allies and client states in the form of auxiliary
forces. The auxiliaries regularly outnumbered Roman Legionnaires on the battlefield.
The Roman commanders depended on the skill of the auxiliaries to provide specific
war fighting skills, such as cavalry, archers, and slingers. As a result, the Romans
focused their resources on developing heavy infantry forces, while the auxiliary forces provided the bulk of the Roman's missile capabilities. The Roman ability to build
a multi-ethnic military force strengthened them on the battlefield, but the consequent
dilution also became a factor in the eventual collapse of Roman power.
As the demand for manpower increased, the Roman Army began to recruit from
provinces that were securely under Roman control. As an incentive to remain loyal,
Rome would grant foreign recruits citizenship upon demobilization. Rome's relax"
ation of the recruitment requirements had severai effects on Roman military strength
and enduring military advantage. First, the expanded pool of recruits enabled Rome
Military Advantage in History

to tap the service of the great peasant masses year after year, allowing Rome to field
large and formidahle armies on an almost continuous basis and reducing the importance of casualty rates in Rome's strategic calculus. [12] Second, by granting citizenship to foreign recruits, the Roman military became a mechanism far romantztng the
provinces, As the empire grew, the military became multinational in character, and
its members were united largely by the duty they owed to Rome. [13]

Tactical Doctrine: Infantry Warfare and Siege Warfare
The Roman military excelled at shock combat defined by heavy infantry, and at
siege craft, defined by combat engineers. The Romans modified the Alexandrian tactical scheme of the combined force by depending OIl a well-articulated, sword-armed
infantry and incorporating auxiliary troops for skirmishers and cavalry. Their tactical military advantage waf: most pronounced against infantry-oriented armies with a
defined center of gravity. Most Roman generals won hy breaking their enemies' battle
lines or destroying their center of gravity. If the enemy possessed cities, the Roman's
engineering prowess prevailed in nearly all siege attacks.
In infantry warfare, Roman tactics were based on well-trained, flexible heavy
infantry units (Legions, cohorts, and mantples) to compose the main fighting power,
with light infantry, archers, stingers. and cavalry acting as a secondary force. The
skill and structure of the infantry reduced its vulnerability to cavalry because the
excellent articulation enabled the Legion or a subpart to maneuver to protect a flank,
and the efficient subdivision permitted the commander to assign units to rapidly
guard the flanks. [141

tb~m in flank, cutting them off from their forces and eliminating them. Additionally,
units m the second and third lines were prepared to move forward to any point where
a weakness appeared or to thrust forward where the enemy wavered,
These infantry-oriented tactics leveraged the army's flexible structure, training, and
ruthless fighting spirit to produce success on the battlefield (or most Roman generals.
Some generals modified traditional Roman tactics to meet unusual tactical situations.
Julius Caesar was one of Rome's most brilliant. yet unconventional, military commanders. He placed great value on highly trained, loyal soldiers who would perform
seemingly impossible tasks without question. He increased his soldiers' pay to ensure
their loyalty. Julius Caesar demonstrated brilliance for exploiting an enemy's weakness
by el~gaging i.n psychological warfare, using surprise and speed, and shifting strategies
to SUIt emerging opportunities on the battlefield. For example, Caesar tried to engage
the army of the Belgae on the River Aisne in a frontal attack. His troops were backed
up against the river, and he constructed artillery posts along tbe front of his line. His
formidable presence persuaded the Bclgae to avoid a frontal engagement with him,
Insteild, the Belgae opted to cross the river Aisne to head off the Romans and attack a
b~idge.1O the Roman's main position. Caesar used this opportunity to attack the Bclgac
With his cavalry and archers while they crossed the River. [16]
Learning from adverse experiences with Hanntbal, the Romans modified their
doctrine during and after the Punic Wars by having Roman infantry maneuver to
cover their flanks against enemy cavalry and to neutralize their attacks. Their own
cavalry was often weak, poorly trained, and indifferently led, so an infantry solution
to the threat of enemy cavalry was a military necessity, For much of the lifespan of
the Republic, cavalry played a minor role in the tactics of the field armies. Allies who
supplied the large majority of cavalry in auxiliary units did not have the same lcvd
0.( disciplined training as the Roman Legions. Against regular enemy infantry forma~lons, they played a secondary role by acting as a distraction on the wings, attack.
mg tbe enemy's rear, or fighting fleeing soldiers by waiting in the flanks, However;
their value against the more disorganized barbarian threats was considerable, As the
Empire expanded and the army shifted to a more defensive doctrine, the Romans
developed an increasingly important role for cavalry as a mobile reserve.

Roman commanders habitually arrayed their forces with a strong center b'ased
on multiple lines of troops whose goal was to penetrate and destroy the enemy's
center. For example, during the Koman defeat at the Trebbis, the only survivors were
the units that broke through the Carthaginian center and escaped. This emphasis
on the enemy center was possible because Rowan cavalry, supplied by their allies,
concentrated on defending the flanks. Although the Romans were very proficient at
these tactics, Hannibal understood Roman doctrine and exploited it repeatedly, most
notably at Cannee by creating a retreating center to draw the Romans in so he could
envelop the Romans with his mercenary cavalry.

Siege Tactics

At the subunit level (maniple), the Romans used a variety of tactical gambits, such
as the "wedge," which would thrust small groups into the enemy's formation and
expand into the enemy's center. Using their shields to push enemy troops into restricted positions, these insertions made hand-to-hand combat difficult. Such close formations were ideal for the Legionnaires 10 deploy their short, double-edged swords in low
thrusting motions, while making the use of longer swords impracticable. [15J Another
tactical ploy was the "SJW," or serrated link of battle, wbich was formed by a body
of experienced soldiers lined up behind the front rank. The enemy would be allowed
to move in a channel through the Roman formation where mobile groups would take

Roman Legionnaires were both formidable soldiers and skilled engineers. The
army's technical skills and engineering prowess, combined with its character of
patience and thoroughness, provided significant components of Rome's military
advantage. ThL" potent combination enabled them to win nearly every siege they
prosecuted. Even if the enemy could not be drawn out to fight in close combat
or outmaneuvered in the field operations, it would still be defeated by the relentless. methods of Roman "engineering warfare. ,. [17) The Romans designed siege
engmss to break walls and shatter gates; they used rams with iron points, and lOW
ers equipped with pullies and cranes to swing small parties of attackers onto the

IAfAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

Military Advantage in History

besieged walls. They excavated saps to weaken the fou.ndati~ns. of the walls and
bring them down, and they used catapults for dtschargtng missiles to damage walls

•

Engineering enabled them to build an infrastructure (e.g., roads) that nol
only contributed to their military success through strategic and operational
mobility, but also provided the foundation for controlling an empire that
stretched from England 10 the Caucasus.

•

Roman fortifications, both temporary and permanent, allowed the Roman
Army to advance slowly and methodically. and enabled the Romans to
endure minor setbacks and prevent defeats from becoming disasters.

•

Engineering prowess enabled the Romans to have an enormous psychological
impact on their opponents hy ensuring that they could secure no refuge from
a Roman siege.

and to target people or animals.
Their patience drove them to engage until they conquered the enemy. For example, during the 47 day siege of the Jewish city of J<ltap~ta, the Romans deployed a
battering ram and huilt three towers, each 15 meters high. to protect the oumer,ous
.
.
. d to bombard
siege
engmes
use
,the
.city. When the Romans finally entered the City,
they slew 40,000 people, sold 1,200 women and infants into slavery, and burned the
city to the ground. [18]
If the military could not successfully invade a city or if the,inhabitants, failed to
surrender the Romans surrounded the entire area with defensive walls, ditches, and
various other traps. This blockade tactic cut oft any supplies and reinforcements .
from entering the city and prevented any breakouts or surtie~. Caesar deployed this
blockade tactic in the epic siege of the hilltop village of Alesta. He constructed 26
miles of parallel walls-one set to keep his foe verciogetonx in and the other to keep
Vercingetorix's allies out. [191
The Roman siege of the desert fortress of Masada in 70-7~ AD provides a vivi.d
example of Roman innovation, determination, and technicalu1DovatlOll. The Jewish
War had essentially been won, but the Romans were determined to defeat the last
handful of Jewish warriors who took refuge in Masada. Although the Romans could
have stormed the fortress or waited for the Jews to exhaust their water supply, they
chose to besiege the fortress by great works of engineering. They built an assault
embankment 675 feet long and 275 feet high, surmounted by a stone .plat.form 75
feet high and equally wide to invade the fortress. They d~d this in p~all1 VI~W of .tl~e
defenders, knowing that the Jews could not stop them WIthout leaving their Inrtifications. When the Romans finally reached the fortress, they discovered that the defenders had committed mass suicide. The slow, inextricable progress of the Roman ramp
had convinced the Jews that defeat was inevitable.

Operational Sources of Military Advantage
The Roman Army was defeated numerous times, even as their military dominance
grew and the borders of the empire expanded. Losing battles was not an unusual
occurrence for the Romans; Losing wars was. The Roman military advantage was
rooted in the ability to raise and organize ,1 large, well-trained, diS~i?lin~d army, am~
in its engineering prowess in siege warfare, road building, and fortlhcatlO.o. ~rom t~IS
foundation, Roman operational doctrine enabled them to expand and Ill~mtalll t~elr
empire. Rome's extraordinary engineering capabilities contributed to their enduring
military advantage on sevcral levels->

rATA.( I l nto rmatio n Assurance Technology Analy,is Center

Mobility
The construction of roads and fortified camps across the empire was a central
component of Roman operational doctrine and integral to their ability to sustain an
enduring military advantage over centuries. As the Roman Army defeated the barbanana along their periphery, the military linked the new frontiers and provinces
to the Empire by building the communication and transportation infrastructure to
the heart of the Empire-Rome. The Roman Army built a comprehensive network
of roads that spanned three continents. The roads were systematically and resourcefully distributed, designed, constructed, and drained, with careful adaptation to local
materials and conditions. They crossed rivers on strong bridges. and they penetrated
mountains with tunnels that aroused admiration for centuries. By the end of the 2nd
century AD, the military had built more than 50,000 miles of first-class roads in the
Empire and over 200,000 miles of lesser roads. [20] In Rome's province in Africa,
which stretched from modern Morocco to the Nile Basin. archaeologists have identified some 10,000 miles of roads. [21]
The road system was known to be an instrument of peace and war, as it facilitated
communication and the movement of people, goods, and military units throughout
the Empire. For the military, the road network became an effective instrument of
imperial power. Reliable roads enabled commanders to calculate marching times and
supply needs precisely between military stations and barracks. For example, it took 67
days to travel from Rome to Cologne or 15 days to travel from Rome to Brindisi. [22]
The road network allowed the Roman Army to exploit one of its most powerful
advantages against its enemies-its internal lines of communications. Rome's empire
around the Mediterranean divided its adversaries, making it difficult for them to coordinate their actions. Moreover, none of the neighboring empires had anything equivalent
to the Roman road system. The Roman military could move Legions across the empire
rapidly and effectively, sending reinforcements and reserves to battles when necessary.

Military Advantage in History

The infrastructure built by the Roman Army also enabled Rome 10 establish political control over the new frontiers and provinces. lu addition to building a road network, the Roman military routinely built elaborate fortified camps and bases. These
fortified bases evolved into towns and centers that showcased the sophistication of
the Roman civilization and were used as a mechanism to romanize the barbarians in
the provinces. Moreover, these fortifications served strategic purposes, becoming bulwarks from which the Roman Army could launch campaigns for further expansion.

waged not just "engineering" warfare but "psychological warfare." For Luttwak, the
siege of Masada exemplified their ability to conduct psychological warfare. Their
decision to commit a Legion to besiege Masada sent a stark message to all those
tribes who might have been tempted to revolt-tbe lesson of Mcsada was that the
Romans would pursue rebellion even to mountain tops in remote deserts to destroy
the rebellion's last vestiges, regardless of the cost. [26]

Adaptability and Military Transformation

--'-------------

Roman Encampments
Roman generals were noted for their extreme caution, but it was this caution that
contributed to the relentless quality of Roman armies on the move, as well as their
resilience in adversity. [23] They built camps religiously as a means to prevent the
possibility of falling victim to a surprise attack. They preferred to retreat into a fortified position than to accept heavy losses in open warfare. The Roman military's practice of building a fortified camp before they would engage an enemy in battle clearly
Illustrates an aspect of Roman military advantage at the operational level.
The Romans constructed each camp according to one simple formula, which was
adopted at all times and in all places. Effectively, no matter where a Legionnaire was
located geographically, he was always in the same place. Josephus observed that
each camp was not erected at random but according to an engrained system.

They [the Roman soldiers] do not work at once or in disorderly parties. If the
ground is uneven, it is first leveled. A site for the camp is then measured out in
the form of a square. For this purpose, the army is accompanied by a multitude of
workmen and of tools for building. (24)

This practice reflected a belief that a secure place to prepare for battle or to which to
retreat improved the performance of the soldiers on the battlefield. The soldiers would
undergo the fatigue of digging trenches and building encampment for the sake of having
a consistent and uniform plan for a camp, which was familiar to everyone. The streets of
the encampment were marked with flags and spears. The result was increased efficiency
as each soldier knew which street and in which part of the street he was situated. Since
every soldier invariably occupied the same position in the camp, the process of pitching
camp was remarkably like the return of an army to its native city. [25J

Psychological Warfare
Rome's advanced engineering capabilities extended their reach in hattie and drove
them to overcome all physical obstacles to destroy their enemies. Historian Edward
Lutlwak argues that Roman's technical skills coupled with their ferocity and persistence bad an enormous psychological impact on their adversaries. The Romans

tATAC

I~formatjon Assurance Technology Analysis Center

The Roman Army's core strengths lay in its Legions. However, on an operational
level, the Romans extended their military dominance beyond their core competencies
through their ability to innovate and adapt lo new operational requirements and realities. For example, the Romans adapted to new requirements during the lst Punic War.
When it became clear that the only way to defeat the Carthagimans was at sea, Rome
built a powerful naval capability. The Romans developed warships whose primary mission was to carry large bodies of marines and Legionnaries. Roman naval tactics were
designed to bring the enemy 10 close quarters and to use the embarked troops to board
and capture the opponent's ships. With the help of its Greek allies- seafaring cities
such as Tarentum, Locri, Elea, Naples, and Cumae, with centuries of naval experience-Rome finally coerced Carthage to negotiate a peace after the Roman navy sank
or captured over half of Carthage's galleys in the final battles of the war. [27]
Rome's success against the greatest and most experienced navy of its day can he
attributed to its innovative concept of a warship that played to the strength of the
Romans-their prowess in infantry combat-and mitigated their general weakness
in seamanship and traditional naval combat. The Romans turned ships into fighting platforms for Roman soldiers hy inventing the grapple. The grapple, referred to
as the corvus, was a large boarding bridge that was lowered onto the opponent's
ship, enabling Roman troops to swarm aboard during the naval battle. By changing the rules of engagement during a naval battle to favor their military strengths,
the Romans inflicted several humiliating blows on the Carthaginians. However,
the corvus also made the ships top-heavy and difficult to handle in heavy seas.
Consequently, Rome's naval achievements were minimized by the inept way the
Romans handled their vessels. They suffered severe losses during stormy weather.

Strategic Sources of Military Advantage
The strength of the military and political institutions enabled the Romans to build
an enormous empire and sustain it over numerous centuries. The military was an
arm of the political leadership and was used to fulfill political objectives. The intertwining of the military and politics created a stale with a strong military culture.
Rome's institutions provided the foundation for sustained military dominance on a
number of levels.

Military Advantage in Hls t ory

First, Rome had a firmly established and sophisticated code of laws that governed
the social and cconomtc interactions in society. The Roman constitution was superior
to other systems of the day, and a code of law produced a stable and prosperous civilization that was attractive to other civilizations. Rome was able to attract allies and
manage a complex alliance system by using Roman citizenship to woo support and
loyalty. Citizenship was granted tu all people in ltaly and Cisalpine Gaul, making vast
new resources and manpower available. The continual use of this process would allow
Kame to grow stronger through captive attics rather than weaker due to garrisons.

The Roman Army played an important role ill maintaining control over conquered
territory. III the frontier provinces, the Roman Army was the main agent for Introductng romamzation to the barbarian tribes. In provinces with friendly tribes, the
military relied on the local kings and chiefs to maintain order, allowing the local government to remain in place. Most of these territories lacked native tntrastrucmro for
urban societies: therefore, the military represented the main source of technical skill
needed for large-scale engineering projects. The military forts in the provinces gave
Kame an established presence.

City-states on the Italian Peninsula were granted Roman cjnzenstnp and hospitium publicum, which entitled the citizens of these city"states equality with Roman
citizens. Rome carefully co-opted the leaders of these cities by promising to provide
defense from external threats or internal uprising and by allowing them to retain
their own city organization and self-government. In exch;mge, the city-states were
obligated to remain loyal to Rome, provide soldiers for the Roman military, and
agree not to develop political relationships with any other state. tn the end, Rome
transformed these cities into Roman cities and instilled a common worldvtew-er'ax
Romana. Hannibal tested the strength of Rome's relationships with its Latin allies
during the 2nd Punic War, and he was unable to turn many of the romanrzed city-

Fourth, Roman strategic Instnuuons enabled Rome ro build and maintain a constellation of allies and client states. The Romans combined ruthlessness with political
astuteness to manipulate allies with a variety of incentives and threats. The military
power that Rome carefully constructed through alliances gave it the power to defeat
the most tormtdabto enemies and enilb1cd its power to grow and expand until the
Romans dominated the ancient Mediterranean world. [28]

states against Rome.
Second, Rome's strength arose from its ability to embrace new cultures, enabling
it to adapt and change over time. The Romans exploited the strengths of their allies
and provincial cultures, incorporating their ideas into Roman doctrine and tactics.
During the Punic Wars, the Romans, who lacked seafaring skills, relied on their
Greek allies to help them build a navy capable of defeating the Carthaginian navy.
The Romans also relied on their allies to provide quality cavalry and missile capabilities to complement their superior heavy infantry.

Third, the Roman military was a central institution in the society that allowed
Rome to expand and sustain its large empire. The institutionalization of the military
made it both an instrument of peace and war supported by a robust bureaucracy.
The Roman Army started as a citizen-soldier army and evolved into a professional
institution, demanding a minimum of 16 years of service between the ages of 16
and 46. Most citizen-soldiers would spend several years in the field before returning
home and would likely be called several times before their term of eligibility expired.
After defeating Marc Antony in a ferocious civil war, Augustus replaced the militia
army with a smaller permanent army that was paid and received a retirement pensian from the state. In this manner, he sought to ensure that the Legionnaires were
loyal to Rome and not to their military leader. Augustus also created a highly centralized system to support and manage the professional military, which was designed to
ensure that the emperor of Roman maintained control over the legionnary garrisons.
An imperial civil service was established to raise the taxes to support the provincial
garrisons and to administer funds and supplies.

IA1AC

Information AS51HanCe lechnology Analysis Center

Rome's relationship with the non-Latin allies (socii) was Significantly different
from its close relationship with the Latin cities on the Italian Peninsula. The sucii did
not share a common language, culture, or Institutional structures with the Romans,
and usually they submitted to the Romans only after bloody battles. Rome demonstrated a unique ability to craft reasonable and generous agreements with the local
leaders to accommodate the interests of client states. Some allies enjoyed the "equal
treaty" arrangements, which guaranteed that the client state had no formal obligations to fulfill and that Rome would not interfere in their domestic affairs. Therefore,
socii could pursue their own forms of government and religion, but Rome required
them to pay tribute or accommodate Roman garrisons during wartime. However,
Rome implicitly required the client state to bend its foreign policy to suit Rome's will
an~ ~o suppl~ sold.iers for Rome's conquests, and prohibited socii from establishing
political relationships with other states. This was tbe price that Rome exacted for its
friendship and for its guarantee of "freedom," and for the favor of protection from
olltside interference in its client's affairs and threats from sedition. [29] Loyal socii
rulers were rcwardod by personal honors, Roman citizenship, or territorial rewards.
Fifth, Allied troops were indispensable to Rome's military power and SUCCess. For
example, Rome relied on its Latin allies during the znd Punic War to raise Legion
after Legion 10 fight Hannibal, even after devastating losses. As the Roman Empire
expanded, the pool of potential soldiers grew, increasing Roman military power.
Some allies, which were granted Roman citlzenshtp, were recruited to serve in the
Roman Army and were trained as Roman Legionnaires. As the Empire expanded, the
Roman Army bccarno increasingly multi-ethnic in character. Soldiers from more distant client states composed the auxiliary forces. Even early in the rise of the Roman
Empire, the pool of auxiliary troops was larger than that of Roman soldiers. In 225
Be, a demographer estimated that there were 640,000 adult male allies, but only
about 300,000 Romans available (or service.lsol In 67 AD, the three Legions in the
east deployed to subdue the Jewish revolt were augmented by 15,000 auxiliaries con-

Military Advantage in History

tributed by Anttochus IV of Commagene, Agrippa II, sohaemus of Emcsa, and the
Arah ruler Malchus. [31]
Edward Luttwak argues that socii, or client states, not only served as a source
of auxiliaries for the Roman Army, but also provided peripheral security against
border infiltration and acted as butter states. For example, Armenia was a buffer
state between Rome and parthta. If the Empire faced a high intensity threat, the client states contributed geographic depth and absorbed some of the damage until the
Roman Army arrived. Therefore, according to Luttwak, the client state system lowered the costs of maintaining security for the Roman Empire. In his analysis, Rome
successfully used its military power to manipulate its client states to achieve the
political objectives of the Empire. [32J

Was the Roman
Military Advantage Enduring?
Rome held the ancient Mediterranean world under its control for about 600 years.
Throughout that period, it fought numerous wars, suffering a number of crushing
tactical defeats, and yet continued to expand and overcome its setbacks. The Roman
military machine could he manhandled hy true military geniuses, such as Hannibal,
and defeated by armies optimized to fight in a particular environment, such as the
Parthians on the plains of modern day Iraq and Iran. The Romans also faced difficulties when fighting enemies with no defined centers of gravity (cities and major towns).
The Germanic peoples and the wild tribesmen in the Balkans and Wales proved to be
especially difficult for the Romans to bring to ground. Still, the Romans remained the
preeminent military power in the Western world for six centuries for several reasons.
First, the Romans had an ethos that equated service in the military as the highest
form of duty any man could perform for the state. As has been discussed earlier, rising
politicians also had to be successful military leaders, or their political fortunes waned.
The common man was also imbued with this ethos, as citizen soldiers serving as militia
formed the earlier Legions. Even when the Roman Army became a professional force,
the sense of service to the Senarus Populus Que Romanus (SPQR) remained among the
ranks. Koman law and tradition buttressed the notion that the soldier was the servant of
the state and that military service was the highest form of civil service possible.
Second, the Romans constantly adapted their tactics and organization to meet
changing military requirements. Roman Legions evolved as old enemies were absorbed
and new enemies arose. The Romans learned from their defeats as well as their victories, and they rapidly recovered from setbacks that would have destroyed less robust
empires. The Romans were also able to co-opt the forces of their allies and subject
nations, forming them into auxiliary forces and Legions. This enabled them to inter"
weave military technologies from the conquered peoples into their army and to use foreign technology to make up (or shortfalls in their own training and equipment.

IAlAC

I Informa t.io n

Assurance Te(hnolog~ Analysis Center

Third, the Roman military continually transformed itself as the strategic situation
evolved. Rome created new sources of military power, most notably during the l sr
Punic War, as a way to stay ahead of their opponents.
Fourth, the Romans established a military and political system that made it more
advantageous for subject peoples to cooperate with Rome than to fight it. Although
the Empire was occasionally plagued by rebellion, these instances normally occurred
when the central government was weak or disunited. For the most part, the Koman
Army offered subject peoples relative peace and domestic tranquility in exchange for
acquiescence to Roman domination Although they may have resented the presence of
Imperial troops and chafed under Roman rule, local rulers knew that, on the whole,
Roman rule was preferable to that of the despots or barbarians lurking on the frontier.
Fifth, the Romans were ruthless in suppressing their enemies. Rebellions were
stamped out without mercy. External enemies found themselves engaging an enemy
that, once mobilized, moved with single-minded determination 10 win the war. Rome
did not hesitate to use force to get its way. Potential enemies and rebels knew that failure in battle would lead to the severest form of Roman punishment and repression.
Finally, Rome possessed the most sophisticated command, control, and communtcations infrastructure of its time. The Roman roads gave them unprecedented mobility
and the ability to pass information rapidly across the Empire. The Roman ability to
rapidly shift troops from a quiet sector to a threatened one gave it a decisive advantage
over its enemies. The roads also allowed Rome to practice economy of force, as they
did not have to he strong everywhere, but could be strong where and when required.

The Collapse of the Roman Empire
--------The western part of the Roman Empire eventually succumbed to waves of
Germanic and Balkan invaders in the 5th century 1\0. The reasons for the collapse of
the Western Empire range from the deleterious effects of plague in the 2nd and Srd
centuries, the debasement of the currency, and the high costs of maintaining a standing army, to the corrosive effects of the new state religion, Christianity. Taken in toto,
these reasons, and others, interacted to collapse the Roman Empire in the west. The
Eastern Empire lingered for another 900 years, becoming more militarily impotent as
time progressed. Finally, battered by constant combat with its Christian and Muslim
neighbors, the Eastern Empire fell to Islamic forces in 1453.
The end of the Roman Empire, however, die! not mean the end of Roman influence in military thought. After the collapse of Rome, Europe experienced a period
where individual mounted soldiers were the preeminent force on the battlefield.
Massed infantry, not generally better than armed rabble, could he easily dispersed by
charging armored horsemen. When the Europeans reestablished professional standing
armies in the 15th century, they used Roman tactical treatises as the basis (or their
innovations. The development of the standardized battalions in the 16th ami 17th
Military Advantage in History

centuries can be traced to the standardized Legion of the Roman Republic. The use of
drill, formation marching, and standardized tactical formations were derived from the
Romans. Close order drill, uniforms, regimental colors used to identify various formations, personal awards, and all of the paraphernalia of modern military life in the

West can be traced to the Romans.

15. Webster, Graham, The Roman Imperial Amy, Third Edition, (Barnes & Noble
Books: New Jersey, 1985) p. 232.
16. Webster, p. 238.
17. Luttwak, Edward N., The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the I~t
Century AU to the Third , (Th e J am
I H
' University
.
, Press: Baltimore .1976)
opkms
p. 117.

End Notes

18, Webster, p. 252-54.

1. The Roman losses at caudme Fork to the Samnttes in 321 Be.

2. Bernstein, Alvin H., "The strategy of a warrior-state: Rome and the wars
against Carthage, 264-201 Be, in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and
Waf, Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1999). p. 56.
3. Hanson, Victor Davis, Carnage & Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of the
Westem Power, (New York, 2001).
4. Harris,

w.,

War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, (Oxford University

Press: Oxford, 1979) p. 54-67.

19. Brook, Richard, et al. The Times History of War, (Harper Collins Publishers'
London, 2000).
.
20. Grant, 1974, p. 264.
21. Keegan, p. 3m.
22. Keegan, p. 3m.
23. Luttwak, p. 3.
24. Crant, 1974, p. xxix.

S, Jones, Archer, p. 34.

25. Polybius, 1966, p. 324.

6. polybins, Histories, VI, 22.4-23.11 as cited in WR, Paton, 6 vols. (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1966) p. 3:319-21.

26. Luttwak, p. 4,
27. Bernstein, p. 74.

7. Keegan, p. 268

8. Grant, Michael, The Annies

of the

Caesars, (Charles ScribnC'T's Sons: New

28.

Ga~ba.

Em.ilio, .lrall::llated by PJ. Cuff: Repllblican Rome, The Anny, and the
Allies, [University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977).

York, 1974).
29. Bernstein, p. 65.
9. Keegan, 270

10. Livy XLII (translated by Aubrey De gelmcoort), The War with Hannibal, (The
Penguin Group: London, 1965) p. 34.
11. Grant, 1974, p. xxviii.

30. Bernstein, p. 67.
31. Luttwak, p. 27.
,')2. Luttwak, p. 7·49.

12. Bernstein, p. 61.

13. Keegan, p. 270.
14. Keegan, p. 35.

IAlAl

Information Assurance lechnology Analy,is Center

Military Advant aqe ill History

Chapter 4

The Mongols

•

------ - - -.. ..
0 - .. ,· - ,..--'
--_
_...- _
_..._.,. ..4_.
,
.
_
... . '. ,,--_._...
.
_
.'
'
..
-......
.
__._....._.<'
"..,...__._. ..-.. --.......... . _..
_

... _ _

n.""-"....-_('....,j __

...... _

_ ..
' _

_ ........

'0.."1."'._

,,,; ··_

"Li'......."•••,. ""•.'

Social

Foundational Factors

The Mongol Empire unified much of Eurasia under a Hew politicaL. military, and

economic world system during the 12th century AD. Much of the C[edl~ for the C?llsoltdauon of the various Turko-Mongol tribes and the expansion from Central Asia
into China, the Middle East, and Europe belongs to Chengbis Khan (11.62-1227).
Cbenghts Khan, or femu]!n. was the son of a chic.ftain of ,a tribe Iha~ lived on the
One» River ill northeastern Mongolia. [1] Chenghis exploited the fluid nature?f
social and political organization in the steppe, and utilized his strong ,leadershIp
ability 10 undertake a series of military campi1igns that united the various steppe .
tribes. After consolidating his power, he was named Supreme Khan b~ the M~~goha
il f bl . 120fJ. Between
1207 and 1221 be undertook a senes of military .
COllnCI 0 no es III
U ..
campaigns against northern China (1207-1216) and the Muslim state of Khwarezm III
Central Asia (1220-1221). Upon his death in 1227, his sons and grandsons expan~('d
into Russia and the Middle East. At its peak in the 13th century, the Mon~ol empire
stretched between poland and the China Sea, from Siberia to sout~lern China. Mongol
.
forces campaigned in Hungary, launched amphibious assaults agalllst japan, and
fought battles in Southeast Asia, and by the middle of the 13th century,. t.he M~ngob
seemed unstoppable. It was obvious that the Mongols had forg.ed a decisive military
advantage over the scattered neighboring tribes on the Mongolian steppe.

Economic
The economic foundation of the Mongol society was shaped by the immense gra.sslands of the Eurasian steppe, which stretched like a vast superhighway from the plains
of Hungary in the west to the eastern fringes of Mongolia. The grasslands were gencr~llY
unsuited for agriculture but were ideal for a pastoral economy based on herds of grazing
. Is sue11 as sh eep an d horses
Mobility was enabled by herds of horses and ,portable
aruma
,,,... ~..
dwellings called Cers. [Z] Paramount in the Mongol economy was the horse, which provided the pastoralists with food, milk, clothing, and transportation. ~s a consequence,
Mongol society was highly fluid and mobile as families and clans migrated seasonally
in search of better pastures. Competition with other tribes over grasslands and horses
resulted in frequent raids and skirmishes, thus militarizing society.
Another aspect of the Mongolian economy was the need to trade ~ith.settle~ societies in order to obtain carbohydrates to augment their high protem diet, 10 addlt.101l
to luxury goods and metals, which the pastoralists generally lac~ed. The Mongo.llan
pendent on commerce and trade than then more sedentary
econoIllY was more d e ...
, . .
neighbors. Tension in times of peace and predatorlal hehav:or. 111 times of war marked
the economic relationship between pastoral and settled SOCIeties.

Mongolian social structure was based on the individual, the family, the clan
(oboq), the tribe, and tribal federations. Families and clans were named after a common male ancestor, while tribes were often named after the strongest clan. Clans and
tribes were divided into two groups: subordinate and ruling. In times of tribal consolidation, Khans led the tribal federations. The main tribal federations during the 12th
century were the Mongols, Tatars, Merkit, Kerait, and Naiman. [3] All tribal men over
the age of 14 were required to perform military service, thus mobilizing a substantial
portion of the population and creating one of the first levee en mass.
The decentralized nature and ethnic diversity of Mongolian society during the
12th century led to innovative social institutions such as the anda and the noker,
Anda is the Mongolian term for "blood brother," a spiritual brotherhood regarded by
Mongols as more significant than kinship or ancestor-based relationships. The anda
was the key to the open nature of Mongol society where voluntary bonds were more
important than the biological bonds found in Chinese and European feudal societies.
Even within the ruling dan, the anda augmented the kinship-based organizational
model. The noker (follower, associate) was a means by which an individual could
switch clans by declaring allegiance to a new leader. The noker system encouraged
social mobility and created a society based on individual merit versus descent. The
anda and the noker helped produce the best generals whom Chenghis Khan would
later employ in his armies.
Shamanism and a worship of sky gods (Tengri), and earth and fertility deities
shaped the Mongol's belief system. The decentralized nature of shamanism [individualistic, lack of temples, etc.l. coupled with a practical belief system based on the "here
and now" fostered a low religious fervor and a high degree of religious tolerance that
allowed the Mongols to absorb neighboring tribes and religions readily into the Empire.
Cooperation-One day, at the time of his first rising to power... he drew an arrow
from his quiver and gave it to his sons. Clearly it required no great strength to
break it. He made the number two and so continued till there were fourteen, and
even athletes were unable to break them. "So it is," he said, "with my sons also.
So long as they tread the path of regard one for another they shall be secure from
the evils of events and shall be free to enjoy the fruits of their kingdom."

Political
The ad hoc nature of political power before the ascent of Chenghis Khan meant
that the political structure in Mongolia was largely decentralized and distributed
amongst the various tribes and dans. The quriltai, an assembly of nobles, was the
main political organization. During war, the quriltai afforded a chieftain great latitude
and pledged their obedience to the supreme ruler; during peacetime, however, the
Military Advantage in History

IA1A(

Information Assurance Technology Analy~is (enter

chieftain's power was curtailed. In this sense, the Mongol Empire was not an autocracy, but rather a system governed by voluntary associations with leaders selected
by the assembly in which power flowed upward from voluntary association rather
than downward through divine rule. In 1206, after consolidating the various nomadic
tribes in Mongolia, the qunltai anointed Chenghis Khan the supreme ruler of the
Turko-Mongol tribes.
Much has been made of the Vasa, a code of laws and policies that provided the
legal foundation of Mongol political authority. Rather than being the equivalent
of Roman statutes, the Vasa was more a collection of the Khan's maxims, regulations, and instructions. Although it is uncertain how strong a role the Yasa played in
Mongolia, the unifying political principal for Khans was pragmatism. The Mongols
shrewdly adopted the best practices of the lands and the people they occupied,
augmenting local bureaucracies with Mongol provincia] governors {darughachi].
Decisions were seldom arbitrary, but rather were made in consultation with other
nobles and in accordance with long-held Mongolian customs.
10 govern such a large empire effectively, the Mongols devised an ingenious communication system that played to their basic strengths-the Yam. The Yam was a system of post stations erected evcry 25-30 miles that supported express couriers with
horses and provisions. The Yam was used to transport government officials, orders
and decrees, and trading goods. [41 It also served as the strategic backbone for communicating intelligence from around the empire. While normal messages muved at
a speed of 25 miles a day, urgent messages and critical intelligence could move at a
rate of 200-300 miles per day through a network of express riders. Of all the institutions created hy the Mongolians, none were as widely copied as the Yam.

•

Sources of Military Advantage
Contemporary observers attributed Mongolian military advantage to their overWhelming numbers. The horde, originally from the Turkish word for orda or camp,
conjures images of swarming masses descending upon their enemies in a frenzied
melee. In reality, however, both Mongolian society and armies were substantially
smaller than those of their neighbors in Europe, China, and the Middle East In l250
AD, at the height of Mongolian military supremacy, the population of China was li2
million, Europe 57 million, and the Middle East 2S milliun while the total populalion of Mongolia was less than 1 million. [5) Quality, not quantity, was the source of
Mongolian military superiority.
Some have claimed that Mongolian strength arose from the application of superior
military technology, namely, the hardy steppe pony and the composite bow. However.
both mounted warfare and the composite bow had been in existence almost two millennia before the Mongols burst forth from Central Asia. It is clear that Mongolian
military success was not the result of either numerical or technical superiority.

JATA{

Information Assurance Technology Analysis {enter

•,<
t

,,,,..>d

...,;n"'..... '".. 01 ,I

Til<' """'I!"'< ""lI"" ,00
"' Ow w..d. Ib,,,,,,," • ">I"ul """
' M< ft'11«t«l It>< poilk.ll. ood.II

,,,,,"ro, In II>< "'~"'"

,"" 01''''''''. _
..",.".... ,""""

"""""

,p """

"_.od"",. , "'" "" ""'. . ",.

......,.........., ..,1<1.,. ...........,.

to."

'bn' mo..... i' ..., wt.;1< ,,",_
"'''''''''3 """"". ,lit ON'"
,., """'u'" 010'
"........,.,; ,
uf • """" ........., .... ""..
to h.ol t1
<1<>11>. "'..,
nd i~"'" 01 ,M """'"'" ".,1"
U
,lit ""'uuL
<>f """'I
>o m... ,..."'.. -hn... • OX
"'II ,,,,,,,.,. _ "
IIb • ""m.I}' fo«< """I"""" "'t"'l' of """

<,..,.,..,

'on...

.-In,""",

f." """""

......,. ,.f,n,1)'

"""" 01 "'nLonal ........ L.....

_ """K",....-wI

",,,mi< ...._ _

01 ,... __ .,.."...... ,,.""".

.....,.,. "",,&\< 100""
, 10", " look ' "'" brim..",
". 01C1... Wo"
K"', '" 'uno "n.",_ old
"""'''''''''' "
"'v """0.< ,h.
v _ ,"...... oI<wlo>r'''ll '''ll''''''''' dortn
nd h........;,. ,h. ;"1 ..,. ~"K"
""",..,Oy" th............

Tactical secrees of Mmtiry

Adv~ntage

1JI< pr<1l<\f'II !.>cIM In ,lI< MoflIlDI ,bUll. "' _

u•......, 10

do.lll> 01 ct.,
_
"
,

.on ...."". " ,,,d,n8 "om

<OIIll>,""'_ '" tho ....".n' ~'p.nd "'S-"""""""
"b;li', ..

KIWL 1M.
PK ~ "'" . _ ,........ I...... , .". ,..
""'" ............. " ,,,,,,..... ~ d;~.=

,""." ..... ,... ,. ' ;" '"

chenghis had a remarkable ability to garner friendship and loyally, and he
maintained these ties through a brilliant usc of redistribution of people and goods.
Although enabled by the social institutions of the anda and noker, Chcnghis' political genius in comutomg all of these factors cannot be overestimated. One of the most
enduring legacies associated with rhenghts's rule was his willingness to bypass traditional ties of tribal kinship and replace it with a system based on more symbolic
forms of organization--allegiances and loyalties. This more "rational" form of governance established the basis for bureaucratic discipline and rule based on precedence

Organization and Discipline
A key to the Mongol military advantage was the relative independence and selfsufficiency of each soldier and the leaders of the tactical organization. While the
Mongols possessed the best reconnaissance and command, control, and communication in existence at the time, Mongol organizational structure and leadership prinCiples. em.phasized decentralized command and control. The unique blend of a simple
o:ganIzatlOnal structure, independent leadership, and highly disciplined troops provided the Mongols the adaptability and agility necessary to overwhelm their enemies.

and procedure. instead of individual capriciollsness.
Cheoghb eradicated the horizontal dist<1Oce between clans and tribes by a wholesale replacement of tribal organi7.ations as the basis of military might. The objective
of the new military system was twofold: first, destroy the kinship-based organiza"
tional framework by diminishing the power of the tribes to create a more sound system based on demonstrated capahilities and proven loyalties; and, second, to provide
the organizational foundation for a coherent command and control system based
on a decimal system {i.e., each level of command had a maximum 1: 10 relationship
with its subordinates. greatly simplifying the command function). At the operational
level, the first objective had the greatest impact. Most tribes and clans were scattered
throughout the military system, although some tribes survived intact at the regime~t
level [i.e., 1,000). Chengms largely followed this practice by ensuring that few of his
own relatives served as the commanders of the 1,OOOs or 1O,000s. In effect, chcnglue'
reformed military became the basis of new "virtual" tribal identities, as entire families and pasturelands were allocatcd according to this system rather than through the
traditional tribal structure. This new military organization gave the heterogeneous
Mongol society an unprecedented degree of unity and discipline.
1n addition to eradicating tribal divisions, Chenghis instituted a policy that [(jf'bade any officer-many of whom were chosen by their own men through the institution of noker-from eating different food or receiving different treatment than their
men. This policy greatly strengthened command and control and overall unit cohesion, as it erased many of the communication and social barriers between the leaders
and the average soldier. Chengbis himself regularly realloc<l.ted funds and supplies to
tribes in difficulties in order to maintain loyalty.
Alrbougb supreme command lay in the hands of the Khan, the Mongol principle
of promotion to posts of leadership and authority on the basis of ability alone, introduced and enforced by chcnghis Khan, resulted in an unmatched quality of troops
from the ordinary soldiers 10 the top command. As a consequence, Mongol military
leaders could be entrusted with a great deal of authority and independence. This
decentralited decision-making was key to the Mongol tactical advantage against their
less fluid and agile enemies. The Mongolian leadership and command and control
structure presaged to a large degree the German principle of Aufstragstaktik {i.e.,
mission orders versus detailed command and control) that provided the foundation
for the successful blitzkrieg strategy.

Like t~e llsiung-Nu (Huns) over a thousands yeClrs before, the Mongol military
orgamzauon was based on a decimal system with units of 10, lOU, 1,000, 10,000.
The Khan commanded three armies and had over 123,000 troops at his disposal: the
Army ~f the Right Wing or West (Baraunghar), with 38,000 troops; the Army of the
L~ft Wmg or East (Junghar), with 62,000 troops; and the Army of the Center (Kho!),
With 23,000 troops. A Marshall or Orkhan, who was appointed directly by the Crear
Khan. commanded each army. The largest tactical unit of the Mongol army was the
'rumen with 10,000 men, although Tumens were often much smaller and categorized
according to ac.tlla.1 strengths (7,000, 5,000, and 3,000). Tumens were also categorized
~y heavy and light rumens: heavy were used as shock or bracing troops while the
fight troops eom.posed the strike force that was used to encircle the enemy. A typical army formation consisted of three 'lumens, two light and one heavy. A general or
Noyan. who was personally appointed by the Khan, commanded the Tumen.
Each 'lumen consisted of 10 Minghan (regiments) with 1,000 troops. The Minghan
was led by a Noyan who also was personally selected by the Khan. Ten companies
(Jaghun) comprised the Minghan with 100 men each and each Jaghun consisted of 10
squads (Arhan). The leadership of the Jaghun was selected by the commanders of each
of the 10 AThans. Likewise, the 10 men of the squad selected the commanders of the
Arbans. The Arban was the smallest organization formation in the Mongol Army and
normally carried two to three Oher along with additional provisions to support the squad.
In addition to the standard units, each army always had a unit of artillery and
e~lgine.ers for siege warfare along with administrators and surgeons. Allies often provlde~ infantry forces, while additional infantry was created from slaves taken during
previous engagements. The slaves were often used as shock forces or decoy troops.
The entire army, to include the normal Mongol formations as well as support and
slave forces, was referred to as a horde.
Unlike their European or Chinese counterparts, who structured their armies on
the basis of regional affiliations ami bloodlines, the Mongols removed tribal loyalties
f~om the equation by spreading the different tribes throughout the new organtzarton. The structure also allowed Chenghis to quickly assimilate defeated tribes into
the decimal-based army, thus providing an unprecedented abiLity to scale without a
corresponding loss of cohesion. Chcngtus handpicked the leaders of the armies divisions, and regiments, ensuring their loyalty along political instead of tribal lines. At
Military

1ATA(

I Information

Assurance Technotogy Analysis (enter

Adva~tage

in History

A ban where tactical cohesion mattered most,
the lower levels of the jaghun and ~ ~ subordinates ensured that the most
Chenghis' system of command selectlOl~ Y "d" g a strong [rond between the cumeO"lmander was chosen while provt III
.
compe t en t
manders and their followers,
d capable of fight.
.
s bighlv disciplined, fear \ eS5, all
The average Mongolian soldier wa
.. 1 '. ew army Chengbis struck a
t f a group, III devising us 11
'
mg independently or as a par 0
' d . \ based structure provided a de[Jcodd fluidity "lhe ccimar- ~ .
balance between structure anu nuivurhile soldiers and commanders
.
d di ct troop movements, w 1
able way to coordmate an I f e .
,oded the right amount of adaptability.
capable of highly indepf'ndent action prt» I
L

,,
mClintaining discipline and unit cohesion. One of
The Yassa WilS also critical t o ,
_\ f -etreat or refusal to follow orders,
th death pcna ty or I '
the 22 laws of the Yassa set e
.
.
\ if one or two of a group of
h
ttre Unit For examp e,
which would be applied to teen I d ;\ If a squad ran away, the company was
10 ran away, all of the 10 were put to ca 1. 11 that took flient were put to death.
t eated together, a
0
put to death. Unless t h ey re r
d h th 8 did not, those 8 were put
·f 2
t I 10 advanced an teo er
On the other hand, 1 au a
b
ti 1 force in motivating the average
be a 5\1 stan 13
'-to death. This set of rules prove d t a
Mongol solider to function as part of a group.
rc ill the formation that made the most tactiA Mongol leader would fight anywhe
riders who often fought
or Chmese army comma
,
cal sense, in contrast to European
\
euver style of warfare that
Thi
fleeted
the Mongo man
in the front of the batt Ie.
IS re
.
d d·sorder within the enemy ranks
lble casualties an 1
.
sought to inflict the greatest pOSSI
If
Thcsparse population of Mongoha
, . ..
hc :
t on Mongo orces.
.
while mmum7.1Og t c rmpac
tvle" '.ampa,·gn of attritlon.
.
"Western-s Y ..
provided no benefit to engage 10 a

Selection

Khan
Army of the
Right Wing
(Baraunghar)

Army
(25-60,000)

Orkhan (Appointed by Khan)

Tuman
(10,000)

Noyan (Appointed by Khan)

Minghan
(1,000)

Ncyan (Appointed by Khan)

38,000

Army of the
Center'(Khol)
23,000

Armft of the
te Win~
(Junghar

Jagun
(100)

Noyan (Selected by Arban leaders)

Arban
(10)

Noyan (Selected by Arban SoLdiers)

62,000

Figure 4:

Tactics, Communications, and Deception
-------------After completing an operational encirclement, the Mongols executed a maneuver
called a Tulughma or a standard sweep. The Thlughma normally involved iI formation of approximately 30 jaguns with a 7:3 mix of light and heavy cavalry. The formation was six jaguns wide and five ranks deep, with the heavy jaguns comprising
the first two ranks and the light jaguns in the three rear ranks. The purpose of the
heavy jaguns was to hold the enemy advances while the lighter iaguns in the rear
performed a sweeping maneuver from hoth sides and through the columns simultaneously. The light forces would swarm through the front two ranks end release a
shower of arrows against the enemy formation and then quickly retreat to the rear.
The sweeping process continued until the opposing formation became disorganized,
at which time the two heavily armored jaguns in the front of the formation moved
forward to deliver the final blow. The remaining light jaguns would continue to encircle the enemy from the sides to prevent an escape.
The Mongols executed these highly synchronized maneuvers through a well-evolved
process of kettle drums, pennants. and standards. To the Europeans and Chinese, who
were used to yelling battle cries and orders, the eerie silence of the Mongol movements
reinforced the perceptions of the Mongol formations as a swarming, disorganized
melee. The initial movements were initiated by the pounding of the naccara (kettledrum), after which signals for larger formations were given by banners. The real key
to battle field cormuunlcauon was the Mongol ability to sense what was happening
and respond quickly without waiting for detailed orders. This ability to operate autonomously but coherently was key to the Mongol tactical success.
The Mongols also perfected the art of tactical deception. They brilliantly employed
smoke across the battlefield to degrade the situational awareness of their opponent's
leadership. Smoke was also used to separate enemy infantry from the knights,
desvnchronlzlng the movements of these two forces and removing the benefits of
a combined arms formation. The Mongols often used their spare horses 10 create
the appearance of a much larger force by placing stuffed dummies on the horses or
by driving captive enemies towards the center of the enemy's army. The camhi ned
effect of smoke and dummies on their enemies was a degraded situational awareness
and disrupted command and control. At both the tactical and operational levels, the
Mongols almost always maintained information superiority over their opponents.
While their heavily armored adversaries relied on brute strength and force, the
MongoLs depended 0/1 mobility and speed to achieve victory. Mongolian tactics
emphasized swift flanking movements and focused on disrupting the enemy's cohesion. Their ability to synchronize firepower and shock forces in space and time was
the consequence of an obvious superiority in situational awareness, communication,
coordination, discipline, and training. Despite being outnumbered in most battles,
the Mongols were able to translate superior tactics and information superiority into a
decisive military advantage.

Organization of Mongol MiLitary Structure
Military Advantage ill History

T h oloyy Analysis ( .. nHI
JATA( Ilntormation Assurance a c n

In fact. the Yam was one of the main sources of Mongolian strategic advantage
compared with their neighbors who possessed less robust and slower methods of communication. The speed at which the Mongols were able to send messages would be
unmatched until the advent of the railways ami Pony Express riders in the 19th century.

Mobility, Firepower, and Protection

One of the key factors for the Mongols' military advantage was the horse, For the
Mongols, the horse was the backhone of their economy, not merely a means of transportation. Children were trained to ride horses and shoot arrows at a very young age.
Horses provided food, milk, and clothing. In extreme situations, a Mongol could live
off mare's milk and blood drained from his mounts. Unlike their guropean counterparts, whose horses were larger and stronger, the Mongol steppe pony was consider-

t~e chain metai WOUl by many of their enemies. The horses were often covered with
t c same lacquered leather. The heavy forces wore armored hel t
db
of mail, although they constituted a small part of the M:: s
or

shir~s

o~l~orc:ea;~PI~ates,.

:o~;::;:dU~d:~~t:~~~~;~:el;:;~~e;~~I~:~t~~:~V;" despite ,n Ofgthl, eqUIPm~n:~;~,~

d d d.
.
rom enemy swords and arrows was
spee. an rspersron..The Mongols made it difficult for enemies to hit them as the
provided no mass agamst which to fire from a distance moved too quickl f
Y
be taken, and avoided close combat until the ;nemy had alread
shots
defeated. Their opponents, however, relied on heavy chain ;nail
c
g
shields to protect them even though it severely hampered their mobility.

t~
ch~loglCallY

~e~~ a~~l1Tat('
an~·l-ar

Siege Craft
What is often missed when discussing the Mongols is their adcptnes

t .

ably smaller. The steppe pony was bred for enduT,mce and agility.

~'ft they did not develop until the Mongol wac against the Chine" Em;l:e ;:~~~c:;t ~-a

The average Mongol horseman carried two composite bows with 60 arrows. The
light cavalry was equipped with a small sword and a few javelins, while the heavy
cavalry carried a scimitar (for cutting down the enemy in close combat), a mace, and
a 12-foot lance. However, the key tactical weapon of the Mongols, like most steppe
nomads, was the composite bow. [61 A composite bow could shoot an arrow over 300
meters-albeit with reduced accuracy-while the comparable European or Chinese
bow had a range of around 230 meters. The Mongols normally fired their arrows at
a 45.degree angle to achieve the maximum distance. These shuts were intended to
strike dense formations from a protected distance in order to disrupt the organi7:aticnal cohesion of the enemy as much as possihle. Once the enemy formation began
to disperse, the Mongol horsemen would concentrate on shorter, more accurate shots.
Owing to their excellent archery, the Mongols managed high levels of accuracy at .~O
80 yards while on horseback. The Mongols' ability to move and shoot simultaneously, even while in full retreat, [7] was a key factor in the tactical military advantage.

COJ. Chenghis Khan's forces were repeatedly frustrated by Chinese fortified cities [81 .
onsequently, the. Mongols adopted Chinese siege weapons, equipment. and technolo res
Cheughis Khan to amass a formidable mobile siege train. After this new
nrty was brought to bear against cities, The Mongols conquered the Chinese. 19] (

In addition 10 the composite bows used in mobile strike operations against the
enemy, the Mongols were also accompanied by artillery troops equipped with javelinthrowers, catapults, and other siege weapons. As was the case with the light infantry,
the engineering and siege forces were largely composed of Chinese who had greater
expertise in siege warfare. However, the Mongols tried to avoid heavy artillery and
siege warfare as it deprived them of their advantage in mobility and stand-off strike.

~~l:nable

cap~--

Mong.oi siege doctrine entailed a rumen (10,000 men) invading the fortified city wid
. the field This made it diffic it f
'e
th c remainder of the- army fought enemy forces in
Army. Using the
::a
o.pponent to raise a siege without first defeating the
slege
artillery
(c.g..
ballista
and
catapults)
and
engines
Ie
g
y
d
) 1 .
. .,
'J rams, siege towers
an saps, t ie dismounted Mongol warriors would aggressively assault the wails.
'

Mongo~

batten,

Whenever possible after a battle, the Mongols would clos I
""
into. "" city. If this failed, they would rapidiy
nunate an assault on the walls. Only if these methods failed
ormal siege occur.

rig~t

lmmedl~telY

f~iI

al~f

dePlo~ ~h~u:ise~: :1~~~:;te:lJ(,l
>

WOUl~

As an adjunct m~thod for conquering a city, the Mongols deployed terror The
ali Inhabitants of a city who resisted them. [101
word ·of
pnce of failure spread to other cities, resistance often crumbled rapidly.

w~~lld sla~ghter

o~ce

th~

Operational Sources of Military Advantage
Protection

Operational Doctrine

Because of their need for mobHity and speed, the Mongol soldier dressed very lightly. Unlike their European counterparts who would be covered in armor, the Mongol
horseman was normally dressed in a silk undershirt covered by a tunic or kalat.
outside of the kalat, the Mongol wore a protective shield of lacquered leather, which
was largely impervious to arrows, swords, and knives while being much lighter than

IATA( I Information A,<;urance Technology Analysis Center

Military Advantage ill History

pie, the large-scale flanking and encirclement maneuvers designed by the Mongols
left all escape route open to encourage the enemy soldiers 10 flee. This had two purposes: first, to prevent .1 psychological hardening of the enemy by placing them in
a fight or die scenario; second, to encourage a breaking of the ranks by individuals
and unit collapse. Once the unit collapsed and the individuals were in full retreat, the
Mongols could easily cut down the disorganized and dazed survivors,

Main
Enemy
Forte

•

..........
..........

70 miLes •

Survey

Main
Enemy
Force

Another aspect of Mongol doctrine was the usc of the feigned retreat. Often a
screening force would engage the enemy and then retreat. This often caused the
enemy to break formation to purse the fleeing Mongol force. Once the enemy force
was stretched out and lost most of its organiz<1tional cohesion, the main Mongol
force would engage the pursuing force at a distance with arrows. After the pursuing
force was vanquished, the Mongols would begin their encirclement techniques while

• ••

•
•

.....

•\

---••••

Maneuver

. ..•..
~,

•-OIl~
,,#";::j.::""-.
,,,.,- "."

•

~~::::~':~

•.,:.-J..
.'

,:1'(

... ~::,....

eavy

..
".'~
""'.
H
.···l~)r;
Mongol

continuing to strike at the dense formations of the main force.

' . '. •

Calvary

Swarm
Although their opponents almost always nntnurnberetl the Mongols, the
Mongolian leaders seldom lost military engagements because they enjoyed information superiority over their enemies. This included long-range scouts to provide situational awareness, the vast Yam communications network, and the clever employment of psychological warfare. Chenghis Khan himself had stressed the importance
of intelligence gathering. Before opening a campaign, he collected from merchants,
travelers, ann spies exact information regarding conditions in the enemy's country.
Moreover, roads, bridges, and other thoroughfares were kept in constant repair 10
ensure rapidity of movement and communication. Scouts were sent forward, sometimes as much as a thousand miles away, and sent back regular reports.
In order to soften their enemies or avoid conflict altogether, the Mongols were
ruthless against those who refused 10 surrender and engaged the Mongol Army in .•
battle. If a city surrendered, the inhabitants were generally spared; if the Mongols
encountered resistance, the entire population-to include women and children-were
slaughtered. The Khans made sure to spread the news of this savagery to the next
town in order to spread fear and panic. The effect was thai the Mongols won many
campaigns against cities without having to resort to conflict.
The Mongols perfected the art of operational maneuver-the positioning of forces
to achieve a spatial advantage before the start of the battle. Typically, Mongol forces
would travel in a dispersed formation, relying on mobility and speed. Most of the
Mongols' opponents traveled in dense formations at a much lower rate of speed
because their forces were composed of a mix of heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. [11]
The Mongols would send out screening forces to probe the enemy forces. These probes
would then retreat, luring the enemy's forces towards the main Mongol force. As the
enemy approached, the Mongol forces would spread out to create a giant encircling
movement, with heavy cavalry biocking the advance in a holding formation as light
cavalry rapidly enveloped the enemy and showered the enemy with arrows.

IATAC

Information Assurance Telilnology Analysis Center

Figure 5: MongoL Operational Doctrine
The operational maneuver perfected by the Mongols was very difficult for their
opponents to copy or match. The maneuver had itt; roots in the Mongol tradition of
the grea~ hunt (battue), in which thousands of horsemen created a huge cir I 1 I
the ring until the game was trapped within the envelopment.
w~~.Wl!hll1 bow range, the Mongols attacked with their arrows slaying every ani~al
Wit lIl.the :~:elopment. These great hunts often preceded a m~jor Mongol military
camp~lgn. IhIS had the dual effect of providing supplies for the soldiers while serving
as a grant war game where the Mongols practiced highly synchronized maneuvers.

contra~ll~g

OI~C:' ~~~~:ey

The Mongols dosed with their enemies only after their opponent's horses and
men
had been weakened and organtzationally
...
.
disrupted. Their coordination between
hre~ower and maneuver provided the Mongols a significant doctrinal advanta e over
s:wer, hea.vily
less agile enemies. They avoided the close fightgwhcre
r a vantage III strtke and mobility would provide little benefit. The Mongols
targeted what they perceived to be their enemy's center of gravity-cohesion The
~o~gO[S ~eSUOyed the ene~y's c~hesioll through a skillful combination of s~ftening
t e. ~rces psycho.loglcall~, disrupting the force through long-range strike, and usinu
encirclement
Men I d tritactics to dislodge enemy formations and en courage retreat. Althoughg
go oc fine was well known by rna ny a I th err
. enemies,
. their opponents could
not successfully replicate it because of the nature of sedentary societies.

:~::r

~rrnored.

Logistics and Mobility
0d~ing to its pastoral roots, the Mongol Army had an impressive ability to plan
coor mate, ~nd manage large-scale movements of men and materials. The avera;
Mongol soldier traveled very light, with each man carrying a leather covered wicker

Military Advantage in History

shield, a leather helmet (or iron if higher rank], clothing, and cooking supplies. [12J
Each Mongol soldier was largely self-sufficient and brought five horses to carry supplies and for replenishment. During tactical engagements, these extra horses also
carried dummies in order to convince the enemy that they were being attacked by a
substantially larger force, creating confusion and panic. The net effect was that the
Mongols had a substantial advantage over their enemies in terms of mobility. speed,
and agility due to the self-sufficiency of the Mongol soldier. This mobile strike force
could move as fast as 100 miles per day with reconnaissance forces advancing at 120
miles per day, and communication riders moving up to 200 miles per day.

Organizational Strncture and Unit Cohesion-... His (commanders) own orders
have to be given to 10 persons only... no one having to give orders to more than
10. And everyone in turn is responsible only to the officer immediately over him;
and the discipline and order that come from this is marvelous. For they are Q
people very obedient to their chief.
-Marco Polo

The vurtclu. or quartermasters, were special officers responsible for providing
logistic support for the advancing Mongol Army. One of their rules was to travel in
advance of the main army to ensure tbat local officers cleared obstructions, built
bridges, and provided supplies to the Mongol Army at strategic way-points. The
Yurtchi were also responsible for allocating pasturdand for each camp (ordu) as well
as providing the forces for reconnaissance and intelligence. The Yurtchi managed to
coordinate all of this through a complex system of courier networks, signals (smoke
and arrows), and logistic trains. The Mongols excelled at this type of movement due
to their innate capabilities as nomadic pastoralists to coordinate vast quantities of
men and material through space and time.
Mongol operational mobility had a significant vulnerability. The Mongol way
of war requires large numbers of horses. Large herds of horses required prodigious
amounts of fodder to maintain a high operations tempo. The steppe terrain that
spawned the Mongol pastoral economy supplied animal fodder in abundance during
the campaigning seasons as long as the Mongol Army did not tarry for long in any
one location. When the Mongols advanced out of the steppe Into the forested terrain
of Central Europe they could no longer sustain their horse army without traditional
transport of supplies along extended lines of communication. In the end Western
Europe was saved, not by the military prowess of its armies, but by the paucity of

synthesis of military ruLe and Chinese bureaucratic tradition was implemented
system,
developed
by Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai [13J wh 0 was a formcr Chinese
.
t d
f d
official . This
ere
a e a rc- ell alization of northern China along Mongol lines.
'
tary~li~ea~~~:~eo~~e Clhinese hll:eaucratic model allowed a fundamentally illiterate rnili.'
ru e an empire that eventually ran from Eastern Europe through the

Middl E '

Mong:ll::~~~~:d ~~:=:b~i::e;~~~a~~~a::;s:fg~n.st the syste.m occurred, when local

enabled Cheoghi

](j

ran an

1-.:

IUS

cnon. the Chinese bureaucratic system
successors to rule for several ccnrurtcs.

Was the Mongol
Military Advantage Enduring?
tchl» Mongols created and sustained a strategic military advantage over their
, advantages afforded by their pastoral
nelg 1 ors
. .by Jeveraging th e re"cuvc strategic
~omadlc lifestyle. The concepts of decentralized planning decentralized
non a u t '
,.
L'
execu,
onomou.s acnon. self-sufficiency, and mobility were all deeply rooted in th
economic
Although the military technology and tactics of the e
thi go:s could be copied, the horse culture and the brutal conditions that spawned
IS cu tu~e coul.d not. When this steppe culture was married with an effective hut

~~~oral

fou~dation,

~a~s~~:~::~et~h;nese bll~eaucralic tradition, a new self-perpetuating strategic culture
,
a cornpentcrs could not master. However the Mong I
f
rooted in steppe culture was limit d b . '
0 way 0 war,
the M
I'
.'. .
c y topography. Ultimately, it was the inability of
E
on~o s to sustain their vast horse holdings logistically in Central and Western
urope t at spared the European cultures from enduring the Russian Tartar ex enp
ences that so powerfully affected the direction of that conquered culture.

End Notes
1. The trib,e name "Mongol" originates from the term Onon Ghol-M

Onon River.

lia f
ongo ta or

2. Yurt .is the name commonly used to refer to the Mongolian felt tent by
RUSSian commentators although Ger (dwelling) is the actual Mongolian word.

fodder for the horses in the forests of Central Europe.

Strategic Sources of Military Advantage
The conquest of the Chinese Empire (northern China) forced the Mongols to face
the problem of how to administer and extract value from their conquest. Assisted by
Chinese defectors, treated through the concept of noker as Mongolian companions, a

IATA(

1l1formation Assurance TechrlOlogy Analysis Center

3. The Naiman an? xeratt tribes were ethnically Turkish and had a mixed
econom.y of agnc~ltu.re and pastoralism. The Mongols and Tatars were ethnical!
.. y
Mongolian and principally pastorabsts. The Merkits were of Paleo Slberl
and were h t
df h
.
- I enan ongui
.
_
Ul.l ers an
IS ermen. These facts demonstrate the ethnic and econormc diversity of the Mongolian tribes during Chenghis' Khan's time.

Military Advantage in History

4. Official messengers on the Yam carried a tablet of authority {paiza) designating the rank and importance of the messenger. This earlier communications
protocol ensured some level of information integrity of messages transmitted
through the Yam.

5. Cavalli-Sforza, L Luca. Paolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza, The History and
Gr.x;graphy of Hllman Genes (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1994) p. 68.
6, A composite bow was made of three pieces: wood, sinew, and bone. This
combination made a much stronger material that had a tensile strength four
times that of wood. This created a stronger, shorter bow that could fire arrows
longer and faster than normal staved bows.
7. The term "parting shot" originates from the term "Parthian shut" from a
group of jndo-tranian nomads who could fire at the pursuing forces while in full
retreat. The feigned retreat and firing in full gallop arc characteristic of many
steppe nomad tribes.
8. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor Dupuy, The Encyclopedia ofMilitary History
from 3S()O BC to the Present, (Harper & Row: New York, 1998) p. 336.
9. Ibid, p. 338.
10. juvatni, Ata-Malik (translated by J. A. Boyle), Genghis Khan: Tile History uf the
World Conqueror, (University of Washington University Press: Seattle, 1958) p.
19.

ll. The average infantry formation moved at a rate of about 2 miles an hour or 20.
miles a day; the Mongols, by contrast, could move at a rate of 10 miles an hour
or tm miles a day.
12, Besides his weapons, each Mongol warrior carried a lasso; needle and thread
(sinews); leather storage hag; and a ration of dried meat. The amount that each
soldier could carry was strictly regulated, and the Yassa dictated that any item
dropped must be recovered by the other soldiers in the squad.
13, Lamb, Harold, Genghis Khan: Emperor

or All Men, (Bantam Boob; New York,

1927) p. 180.

[AlA(

I Information

Assurant e Technology An~lysi5 (enter

Military Advant~ge in History

Chapter 5

Napoleon Bonaparte

_. ... ......
-,,_
.-,

I-J

1>_-.,-, ---...... . ,. -...-.
_-"'.. . -.. . _,.
-.......- .-.....- .. _. --_ ......
.. .._-_
--, -., _
__
.....
__
- ...
_ _ _-, -..... _ .._-~

N.......,- .._ ..._-.

.,""""l ilt,
"'

d~""'''''''''''_

"'
_ " " - _ .. ,.
"'-..a_
_ _ .._ ..

~. ,..........

.... ... .., _

_..".. ............. '. hlm .. '...

..".... _ ...... .. .oo....

fullest. In addition, his rise to power was 31"ct c db Y a series of events that he had no
control over, but which he used to his own ends.

FoundationaL Factors

", .
The French Revolution was the denotng
momcn t 0 f .the late 17005. .It completely
till b fell
-.
.
d set into monon forces that can S I e
upset the political structure of Europe an
.
d h
th Y would
-ed rnbirious officers like Napoleon to rise heyon were e
today. It atlowe a
.
It h ok loose the ossified command
t1~e senior leadership, and allowed
have been allowed to ~':d.er the ~~V::~:::h
structure of the Prone
rmy, re
,
e the reins of command. The
men of talent rather than wellconnec~e~:t~:tsoo~~is:;:lvieweu themselves and their
Revolution also changed the way 111 W l1C ldi s f ugbt for payor because they were
relationship to their country. pre~l:1USly,. ~1 hler~ ~ment they were assigned to, much
t ee~eg~he king served as the symbol of
forced to fight, They barely identlfled
I
ICy under whose colors thwl1
ey serv .
.
less t ie coun
'.. .
.
II ith the king rather than the nanon.
the state, and the populace identified, If at a , W1
tatives of the state and tdennThe Revolutionary soldiers saw themselves as represcn
lied both with their leaders and with France.

The End of Dynastic Warfare
Dynastic warfare had arisen from the tumult caused by the Thirty Years War
(1618-1648). This conflict, which was simultaneously a religious and dynastic war,
had allowed some formerly fragmented countries to consolidate and had precipitated
the rise of strong centralized governments ruled by absolute monarchs. Retween the
end of the Thirty Years War and the start of the American Revolution, the idea of
nationalism did nOI exist in any meaningful context. Louis XIV of France, the Sun
King, personified the ideal ruler of that period. He was the center of the government,
making all of the meaningful decisions, bending the french to his will and doing
essentially whatever he pleased. His rivals and admirers sought to rule their territories with the same mixture of authoritarianism and divine right that he managed.

Dynastic warfare was characterized by relatively small armies maneuvering against
each other in an attempt to place the enemy in an untenable situation. The well-drilled,
ornately dressed soldiers were, in many cases, too valuable in and of themselves to risk
losing in combat. In reaction to the marauding armies of the Thirty Years War that devastated Central Europe, the dynastic armies were tethered to a series of armories and
depots scattered throughout the countryside. These depots held the food, ammLmition,
and other supplies an army needed to fight a campaign. Carefully placed to ensure
that all army was no more than a 5 days march from any one depot, these arsenals
effectively tied commanders to limited zones of action. Since most of the armies were
filled with mercenaries and other undesirable characters, the methods of tactical and
strategic movement were designed to prevent straggling and desertion along the march.
Night marches were unusual; quartering troops in large cities was almost unheard of,
and then only with extensive safeguards. Also, combat was generally limited to the
more moderate months of the year, as winter campaigning proved 100 stressful on the
armies and their rather static supply systems.

.
f h id I icel factors an of the European nations had access
With the exception a t .e 1 eOt~~a; Napole~n used so effectively. Changes to tactics
to the same tactics and eqmpmen
.'
h
I I the 1700s Improvements
ssed ad infinitum t mug lOU
. h nd
and organizations ha d been dilSCU.,.'L
d
d h all of the major powers. What set the Frenc , a
in arms were wen un e~too',r: ness to adopt the new measures, to field large mobile
Napoleon, apart was th~lr WI .1 gad rec that was not achieved by their enemies.
armies, and to trust their soldiers Lo
eg
.
Ieon crea
. teo an army where individual initiative and
The French under Nape
b [udg.
ected The French developed a system Y
ment by the field commander were and , tought their individual fights under the
which the division and corps comman ers.
iousl accepted model of .,
general direction of the army commander. Unlike the. P;l~: Freo~h operated under
combat, which emphasized strict adherence to order~llY the best judge of what he
. that the on scene commander was gener

~he:X;~~~'~o to win. T~i' t"'ti,a~flex:~~t;h:~a~:~h~~a~:~:~~~e:::~~';~,~,;g:l~l~'

campaigns, bring his enemies to ear
'
..
scheme of maneuver to meet unexpected opportumnos.

Strategy and Tactics
Napoleon was the dominant field commander of his time. AlIho gh ~et w~~lrJ
f
.
h continued to hold commao du, an 0
defeated Oll a numb~r 0 .. occaSIOns., :ssin did not diminish his influence, as the

Divisions and Corps--Tn the mid-1700s, a series of organization innovations were
initiated that would have a profound impact on the way future wars were fought.
The development of infantry formations eqntpped solely with muskets with socketed
bayonets (replacing Pikes), the slow but steady development of more mobile artillery,
and the changing role of cavalry caused by these changes brought on a flurry of new
thinking that reinvented the Legion. The Marshal de Saxe, a German mercenary in the
pay of France, experimented with a unit he called the corps d' armee during the years
preceding the War of the Austrian succession (I 740-1748). This formation was an a11arms unit, consisting primarily of infantry supported by cavalry and artillery in a pro.
portion of one gun per 1,000 soldiers, The primary concept of the corps d'arroee was to

Europe in thral~ u~,tll his de~~r~=::c~" bat~nted the reactionary regimes in Europe
specter of anot cr man on
.
d future commanders a model
for the rest of the century. Equally important, he ottere
H'. t regie vision was
by which they could engage in and win wars uf mane~ver.l "d"a
and few since 11S ea .
' time
unmatched by any other genera I 0 f h IS
I

Ii\TAC

Information Assurance Te~notog"
c " , Analysis [enter

.......

Military Advantage
in History
_

create uniform, self-contained fighting formations that could be used interchangeably
in a campaign. A further refinement of this concept came in 1760 when the Due de
Broglie developed the division, a smaller version of the corps. The division maintained
the all-arms nature of the corps, but because of its smaller size, it was more flexible
and maneuverable. The creation of the division allowed armies to advance along multiple axes and to rapidly consolidate at a single point on the battlefield. The division
proved so tactically flexible and powerful til at it became the primary tactical unit during the Napoleonic era. Consisting of regiments of infantry and batteries of artillery,
and supported by squadrons of cavalry, the division could hold its own in a smaller
fight and be rapidly combined with other divisions to form corps if the action required
it. The ability to disperse divisions along multiple axes of advance allowed armies to
rapidly march along the dense network of roads in Western Europe.
A debate that raged during this period over the best tactical formation for infantry fighting centered around the virtues of the line versus the column formati~n.
An important doctrinal development occurred in 1766 when the Comte de CUlbert
presented the French War Ministry with a memorandum introducing a compromise
ordre rmxte. This memorandum, subsequently refined and published in 1772 as the
Essai cenerai de Tactique, stressed flexibility and utility. lnfantrymen, trained for
either line or light infantry duties, deployed in line, column, or a combination of
both, depending on the tactical needs of the particular situation. Guiberl drew heavily on cnbeauval: artillery supported the infantry by firing on enemy troop formations, preferably from massed batteries. He also postulated that multiple division
columns would provide greater flexibility and speed on the battlefield rather than
divisions in line. Finally, he evaluated the current state of infantry weaponry versus
that of the cavalry and concluded that, with training, infantry could serve as the
shock force on the battlefield. He maintained that infantry could live off of the land,
drawing everything it needed from the countryside except ammunition and equip- '.,
rncnt replacements. This innovation freed armies from dependence on fixed depots,
and reduced the importance of fixed fortifications. Although the French Army did not
formally adopt cutbcrt's ideas until 1791, war games, particularly ones held in 1778
at vassleux in Normandy, tested the merits of the different systems and converted
many officers to the mixed order.
Skirmishers-The fighting in North America during the Seven Years War precipitated
a change in the way armies were organized. moved, and fought. North America in
the 1760s and 1770s was heavily wooded, had few roads, and was sparsely populated. The European armies fighting in this environment were often at the end of a
long and tenuous supply line, and they had to lise closed, winding roads to march
on. The Indians, who were allied with both sides, and the European settlers who
fought for the French or English had adopted an open form of fighting that suited
the terrain. They employed skirmishers and loose lines of battle that took advantage
of terrain to mask movement and to capitalize on the difficulties of massed infantry
maneuver. Although these open formations could not stand up to a massed charge
by trained infantry, they often inflicted heavy casualties on the traditional formations
through sniping, flank and rear attacks, and other indirect methods.

lATAC

___________.1

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

. Europ~an armies. began to use skirmishers commonly to develop the tactical situation, while preven~ll1g the enemy from doing the same, and to cause the enemy to
deploy their formations before they were ready to do so. The open skirmish forma:iOll S di.ctated that the men would have to be trained differently from the soldiers
III the hue. Initiative and independence of maneuver were required of skirmishers,
rather than the iron discipline and lock step tactics of the heavy infantry. French
Revolutionary doctrine found fertile ground with the light infantry.
Innovations in Weaponry-The second half of the 18th century saw the introduction
of t~o key technological innovations that, when matched with improved tactics and
the innovative mind of Napoleon, proved irresistible on the baUlefield.
The first innov.ation was the development of a reliable flintlock musket. This type
which the British Brown Bess was the best-known example, gave the
of weapon,
infantry a reliable, sturdy weapon that could be fired in nearly all weather. It allowed
a trained infantryman to fire three to four rounds per minute to d range of 100
meters. Beyond that range, the weapon was ineffective.

.The weapon's relative ease of loading and firing, coupled with the [act that it was

~o~Ilted rather than aimed, allowed for large numbers of infantry to be rapidly trained
III Its usc. Its inaccuracy was counterbalanced by the weight of ShOT that a trained
regiment of infantry could deliver. In addition, the weapon's rate of fire allowed
organ.i~alio~ of infantry units Into three and two rank formations, increasing mancuver~blhty WIthout sacrificing firepower. The flintlock could be fitted with a bayonet,
which enabled the infantry to close with the enemy, while at the same time neutralizing the shock power of cavalry. Trained infantry armed with flintlocks were a
fearsome presence on the battlefield. In the American Revolution, the massed formations of the British Army could withstand the fire of their less well-trained American
counterparts, deliver a single shocking volley of musket fire, and clear the field with
a well-timed bayonet charge. The flintlock turned the infantry into the primary shock
force on the battlefield. Its use foretold the decline of cavalry as the arm of decision
~n 18th century combat. In most cases, when infantry formed into squares, they were
Invulnerable to charges by horsemen.

The second primary innovation in weaponry encompassed advances in artillery. Prior
to the 1700s, cannon were generally large, ponderous field pieces that were laboriously
wheeled onto the battlefield and fired from a single position. They were unreliable and
da~gerous to their crews. French gunners so feared bursting tubes that they adopted
Saint Barbara, the patron saint of lightning, as their own. French cannon were adorned
with her image in an often-Vain attempt to forestall death by all exploding tube.
The French in particular Jed the development of new methods of cannon manufacture and empl~yment. The introduction of successively lighter cannon and lighter,
stronger gun carnages enabled the artillery to move mere easily to and across the
battlefield. In 1755, the Swiss engineer Maritz developed a barrel-boring technique
for the French thai reduced the tolerances between the bore and the shot. This

Military Adnntage in History

b "bl
bv" or gas leakage and allowed
reduced the loss of muzzle .V:lO~::al~:;l~~~p~lant°~~[~es mea'nl that cannon could
for smaller charges to he use.
. bl j th 1780s Jean Baptiste de Cribeeuval
. h
d therefore more mill e. n e
,
be made lig ter an
I"
cd
the
French
that completely revo ullOnJZ
...
. artillery by standardizing
created
a . system d q ipment Gnbeauva
.
I re d uce d the weight of each gun, improved
.
field carnages an e u
'.
.
f
. field siege, garrison, and
'zed the artillery into our groups. I ,
accuracy, and reorgam
d
t apid and important changes that
coastal. -:he field artiller~'O~~i~~i~il~~I~~ ~hne ~~~~l:n~ 19th century battlefields.
enabled 1t to become a p

This, the most famous passage of the decree, established the political, military, and
ideological framework for the mass conscription of personnel and resources that was
to follow. The edict initially called for the conscription of 300,000 soldiers; the levies
increased steadily until over 800,000 men were under the colors by 1795. The draft
was bitterly resisted by the conservative, pro-loyalist small landowners and tradesmen
in the vcnde. Their resistance sparked a bloody and vicious civil war that took several
years to suppress. Once overt opposition to the levee was Suppressed, the drafts COIIlnienced and continued throughout the Napoleonic era without serious interruption.

The development of artillery propellant had progressed to Ih€bPloinl where the
.'
Id b
edtcted with considera e accuracy.
behavior of the round "' fhght C.Oli. I" ~rG'
formed the mathematical basis
Benjamin Robins, in ~IS New pnrlctple~ 0 b~;Sn~:eloped a method of calculating
for all subsequent artillery calculations. ~o b llisti
ndulum This device allowed
(Mv) of a cannon by using a a tsttc pe
.
j .
muzzle ve ocitv.
.
f th propellant being used and
f
ted range as a f unction
0
e
for the calclllatl~n 0 expec
db'
fired. Rollins developed the first accurate
the size and weight of the roun unent into the phenomena of deflection error (the
range tables and conducted oxpenmen s 1
.'
tendency of the round to spin to the right after being fired),

The militarization of an entire nation was unprecedented. Previously, armies had
been raised from either the landed classes or from the unemployed lower claSSes. In

.
.
er's quadrants to assist them in esttmatCannoneers were equipped wlt.h gunn
I calculation of elevation. The
th s Ilowtng for more accura e
ing range to the target. .u a.
1 s indirect fire techniques were in their Intanartillery of that era was direct flfe on zl a t tho 17th and J 8th centuries to the point
.I
. h devolved t h- mug lOU
"cy. Artil cry racucs a
.
d
sidcred the primary means of
where massed artillery fires were possible an were can
employing that combat arm.
e-At the time of the Revolution, France's army consisted of
ee
The Le:v en Mass 0 soldiers all professionals, whose officers were
drawn •
approximately 82,00
.
'
..
I
s The revolutionaries initially intended
from the nobility and pcnte b~~rgeOlsles c:sse ·
'. anon. However, the loss of
to maintain the army at its original strengt an d or~alllz.
I led with
list
officers
(including
the
general
m
chief,
Lafayette).
COl
p
many 0 f t he roya .
. [ d . the case of
.
liti s i tent on crushing the revolution an ,lll
the rise of foreign coa L Ion III
I d I ge" burden on the army than was
.
titioni g France) p ace a ar ,
Austria and Prussia, par 11 In A
t 23 1793 the Committee of Public Safety
ori inally expected. Therefore, OIl ugus .,
,
nee's
. g d
edict that effectively militari7.ed the entire country and placed Pre
at the disposal of the army. The first provision of the decree stated-

generan~

~::~:UC:~
F

The levee en masse decree and the actions that stemmed from it turned 18th century warfare on its head. Henceforth. wars would be fought not by dynasties USing
relatively small armies to settle their differences, but by entire nations. In addition,
the t011e of war had shifted. Previously, the defeat of an army in a single hattie could
bring victory to one side or another. Victories were limited in scope, as were the wars
themselves. Since the countries fighting the wars had little to do with the dynasties
that were locked in battle, the defeat of the nation as a whole was not necessary, or
desired. Early l Sth century war had limited aims and limited outcomes. Kings fought
Over strips of land or over which one of their peers would sit on a particular throne.
The resources availahh- to a king were limite<l and combat was, in many cases,
avoided due to fear of sustaining heavy casualties. In fact, all entire genre of military
literature sprouted in the mid-18th century that presupposed that "modern" combat
would be one of maneuver and not fighting. The levee en masse destroyed these illusions forever. France was able to bring huge numbers of soldiers to bear against her
enemies, to fight on multiple fronts, and to suffer heavy losses and still win.

this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven fro"! the

S:~lmof the Republic. all Frenchmen are in permanent re~uisition fo rll'hfie s::';:sOf
h II ° to battle' the married men ha org
5

~:s~:n;e;h; :o~en shall m~ke tents and clothing and shall serve
~ndhtrahnspo.rtt i~ the chiidren shall tum old linen into lint; the aged shall ~etake
In t e OSPl a s;
if th wamors and
0 e
t hemseIves to me public places in order to arouse the courage
.

the armies. The

preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.

17th and l8th century Europe, every effort had been made to distance the population from the military and to prevent the militarization uf the nation as a whole.
For example, Frederick the Creal's armies consisted of mercenaries and impressed
soldiers who were feared and reviled by the Prussian people and mistrusted by the
officers who led them. Frederick himself so distrusted his own men that he forbade
night tactical marches, for fear of facilitating mass desertion; and he endeavored.
whenever possible, to billet his armies away from large cities. The English and
Austrian armies were similarly despised by their populace. The American colonists'
loathing for the "lobster backs" and their resistance to the quartering of British
troops in private homes was a manifestation of a long-standing English abhorrence
for the "scum of the Earth" that filled the ranks of the British army.

IATAC I Information Assurance lee h no logy Analysis Center

The creation of the levee en masse was a critical juncture in the development
of modern warfare, and one that was ruthlessly exploited by Napoleon. Ry 1794,
over 800,000 men were under colors. Although their training and equipment were
often indifferent, these men offered French generals a vast manpower ]1001 to draw
OIL When compared with their enemies' armies (which often numbered less than
100,000 men of questionable loyalty), the levee en masse provided the French With
large numbers of men who viewed soldiering ClS the highest form of patriotic dnty.
Military Advantage in History

...

They were indoctrinated with the ideology of the Revolution, devotion to country
rather than to king, and the knowledge that defeat would bring on the reinstallation
of the hated and discredited monarchy. They carried the "contagion" of revolution
as they arched across Europe, infecting the populations with the liberal notions of
"liberty, equality, and brotherhood." Taken as a whole, the spread of the revolutionary ideals by the levee en masse caused more damage to the dynastic governments of
central Europe than any single defeat on the battlefield.

Sources of Military Advantage
Tactical Sources of Military Advantage
La Grande Armee's sources of tactical advantage lay wholly in the realms of motivation and doctrine. All combatants during the two Napoleonic wars, without exception,
bad access to the same technological and industrial base. What set Prance's army apart
from its opponents, at least in the beginning, was the revolutionary fervor and psychological motivation of its soldiers. [1] One of the human forces set loose by the revolution was the establishment of a national meritocracy where ability and initiative were
not seen as a right of birth, but a goal that any citizen could achieve. The tactical effect
was thal French skirmishers fighting in open formation were deployed in larger numbers and with greater effectiveness than their opponents due to the French elan.
In an area of inaccurate musketry, clouds of dispersed infantry countered the
mainstay of linear volley fire. Additionally, the smoke from the skirmisher fire visually masked the approach by French infantry columns [2) rapidly closing on the enemy
position to execute a shock attack, a role traditionally executed hy the cavalry.
The French solider was supported by a tactical doctrine, synthesized by Napoleon,
that emphasized combined arms warfare. At its peak, the French Army closely coordinated artillery, infantry, and cavalry to maximize the destruction of the enemy
through the manipulation of force, space, and time factors. Napoleon was by training
a very talented artillerist, as demonstrated by his capture of Toulon from the British,
while only a captain. Whenever he could, Napoleon massed his heavy guns (12
pounds each) into a large formation called a grand battery. The grand battery massed
its fire all a narrow section of the enemy's (runt to weaken and disrupt it. Napoleon
then threatened this section of the enemy frunt with cavalry, preventing the enemy
infantry from dispersing. While this interplay of force and spatial factors unfolded,
the French infantry columns, covered by entire regiments of skirmishers, [3] closed
Oil the devastated sectors. After the effects of artillery and sklrmtshcrs fire had
reached its zenith, the infantry columns delivered a well-timed shock attack, shattering the enemy front. As the defeated enemy dispersed and retreated, the cavalry
delivered the killing blow, destroying the enemy army in pursuit.

IATAC

When delivered during the apogee of Frenct
1 power (lBOS-1809J, Napoleonic
octrme drove all ItS enemies from the fi ld
d
" .
the bane of Europe In ~ long sen
f
'
e an made the httle Corporal"
."
ertcs a contlicrs in wl . h I
destroyed and prostrated, however the enemy h ,. llC t re enemy nation is not
Th A · ·
'
as nne to learn from its defeats
e usrnans. by virtue of their numerous defeats wer bl
.
Napoleonic con
ts B'
'
e a e to cupy and adopt
tacucaj d · .

French as

demo~:~r~~ed~ a; 8~:~;:~1~.~~~i~~j~i~e~('('::~~CallY almost equa.ls of the

using terrain to neutralize French artillery and dePIOYil~e~k~l~~~:illlmetncresponse,
lent combined arms doctrine based on linear rlre
..
rers, plus <In equrvadcctnm- beet tho Frencj . r
.
power. TIllS dcfcnstve-onentared
. " 1 svs em every time thev
t t . I
at Waterloo when even the Vl1Jn, d I'r
h
,I~e, 0 InC ude their last encounter
,
e rene Jrnpenal Guard
.
I d
lesson in the dissolutton of the French advantage is t!
was repu se . The key
on technological or ('ultural distinctiveness can be co ned. syste.m That IS not based
French military system revealed its inner I "
d ~, . Con~Inual exposure to the
thereby providing tt
ogre an , u tInlately, Its vulnerabilities,
re opponent to develop asymmetric responses.

Operational Sources of Military Advantage
If one were to look for antecedents to Na 0 1 '
.
would be that practiced by the M
I.
p eo~ s operatIOnal art, a close match
.
ongo s. Napoleon s goal was to hav
'.
his corp.'>, marching on parallel axes of advance
k
e a pOI lion of
''-C., ma e contact witl th
fix him In position while l I e cneinv, and
.
t
otner elements converged 011 the battlefield from multiple
d tree-rlons
IOn.'> In envelopment or 'I
. maneuvers Thi
,a Cast fl ankmg
Icrred offensive method as exemplifie~ by his HIOS 1809'·
IS wa~ N<l~oleon's ~~re
and his 1805/1809 camoai
.
,
/
campaigns against Austria
Ign against PrussIa.
•

•

Several critical variables contributed to N
I
'
style reqUired a dense road network
.h a.poCeon s st:,le of warfare. His offensive
.euc <I.'> In entra] Europe to enClbl
I' I
of advance. When Napoleon tried thi I I . ]
,
e mu tip e axes
IS 0 ensive tee tnique in E t
E
1807/Russia 1812) the La G. I A
.
as ern .urope (Poland
,
lam e rmee was far less aile 0 I
.
series of frontal assault-style battle" with th
.g
n t re attack, forcing a
e expected mcreass in battle casualties.
Another key variable Was the information su crton N
>
•
SWarms of light cavalry leading the advance of ~ f ty apolcon achieved through
qu
fN
,.
s orccs. One unintended consc. encc 0
apolcon s disastrous winter retreat from Mosco .
'.
nificant casualty rate among French horses. These I
W.1ll 1812 was tbe s'gVlh1d:
replaceable, considerably degraded the French abmtOy','O"C'o'I
were n~ver full~'
ect lil formation.
The final key variable was Napoleon himself. He was a e m .
.
memory and coonitive skills Prior t
.
g us wtth an extraordinary
"
.,. nor 0 a campaign he w lib
networks, food production a d h .
.'.
ou (. a Sorb all statistics on road
.
' n at er Vital data (0 inform his actions M
.
Napoleon, III collaboration with his chief of staff Berth'
I.
.. ore Important,
ann
I J. I '
'
ter, ac ueved a 24-hour COmmand
con ro eve e r-somethmg not achieved again until the advent of th
dio i h
century [4J In this III
N
.
era 10 III t c 20th
.
. anner, apoleon was able to turn 'thr
Wl III an opponents' decision

Intcrmano n Assurance Technology Analysis Center
Military Advantage in Hf s t ory

cycle, creating a maneuver advantage that translated into repeated battlefield victories
even during his 1813 and 1814 campaigns, when France was outnumbered.

communication could have caused England considerable trouble. Instead, the French
Navy [ought the British on their own terms and lost.

Early and late in his career (e.g., Italy in 1799, France in 1814, and during the
Hundred Days campaign), Napoleon fought outnumbered. Under these conditions,
Napoleon favored the central position between two enemy forces. Relying on the use
of interior lines, Napoleon would screen one enemy force while defeating the other,
then quickly turn to defeat the screened enemy force. The key was to drive the two
enemy forces apart so they could not mass their forces to overwhelm the outnumbered Itreuch, which is what led to Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. The Prussiens,
after their defeat at Ltgny, eluded Marshall Grouchy's pursuit and joined forces with
Wellington. One of the intangibles of that campaign was that gcrthicr was dead; ami
his replacement apparently could not interpret and communicate Napoleon's orders
with sufficient clarity. Consequently, the French forces displayed confusion and
missed opportunities that allowed Blucher and Wellington to bring off a hard-won
victory at Waterloo after initial French successes.

Napoleon's lack of vision in this area caused him to minimize the difficulties
inherent in conducting a cross-Channel invasion of Great Britain. Like Hitler ]40
years later, Napoleon viewed the Channel as no more than a large river that could
be crossed as easily as others, His half-hearted attempts at menacing Britain wasted
France's time and resources, emboldened the British to remain in the fight, and ultimately came to naught.

Was Napoleon's
Military legacy EndUring?
Soon after Waterloo, Napoleon was deposed and replaced by a corrupt version
of the Bourbon dynasty. Exiled to St. Helena, Napoleon spent his final days under
the control of the British. Although he was pbysicaily removed from the center of
European politics, Napoleon's reputation still haunted the continent. The remaining dynasties vigorously suppressed the rising tide of liberal thought that had been
unleashed hy the French Revolution and that had been spread, like a contagion,
by the advancing French soldiery. The Bourbon King Louis Philippe, whose claim
(0 the throne was tenuous, was especially concerned about the reemergence of the
Revolutionary ethos and of another general seizing the reins of power.

In the end, Napoleon and the French displayed the effects of almost two decades
of continuous warfare. Losses among key personnel and a decline in the overall quality of soldiers, combined with a military genius past his prime, ultimately dulled the
edge required to defeat the combined forces of Europe.

Strategic Sources of Military Advantage
Although Napoleon is usually considered an icon of strategic genius, in fact he
had significant strategic blindspots. such as mtsperceiving the long-term effects of
British naval superiority, which the British gained at Trafalgar in 1805. His mispercepticns allowed the British to forge a series of coalitions fueled by English pounds
(.£J that allowed anti-French coalitions to lose most of the battles but to win the war.

Nineteenth and 20th century military tactics were permeated with Napoleonic
thought. Napoleon's enemies readily copied tile organization and tactics of the Grande
Annee, although they could not copy his tactical and strategic hriiliance. Numerous
treatises appeared that attempted to codify Napoleon's often-spontaneous tactical iunovat.ions into a series of understandable "maxims" that could be copied by competent
officers. Hardee's Tactics, which gained a wide audience among American army officers
in the 1850s, was one of many examples of this genre of literature. Ulysses S. Grant,
who acknowledged having read the book, was unable to carry out the complicated
maneuvers and procedures specified by Hardee and attributed to Napoleon. While such
works captmed the form of Napoleonic warfare, they did not capture its essence.

'.f

Napoleon did not grasp the true importance of naval warfare. He viewed the
navy as an adjunct to the army, rather than as a dominant fighting arm ill its own
right. He misjudged the power inherent to the Royal Navy and its ability to chok~
off European commerce. He also did not understand that a powerful navy gave hls
enemies the ability to land and fight where they wished. The navy also allowed the
British to marshal men and resources from places beyond his strategic reach. While
various British attempts to conduct amphibious operations often came to grief, they
caused Napoleon to view his seacoasts as potentially open flanks.

The primary impact of Napoleon was on the operational conduct of warfare,
Napoleon aimed to dislocale his enemy, to confuse him, and to bring him to battle at
the time and place most advantageous to the French. Napoleon viewed the destruction or capture of the enemy's army, and not his cities, as the true aim of warfare.
The true legacies of Napoleon were his use of extended army frontages. persistent
attempts to outflank his enemies, the development of battle plans with multiple
"courses of action," and the use of massed firepower to gain local advantage, These
tactics [arm the backbone of modern maneuver warfare, and they have been successfully applied from the American Civil War onwards.

At the same time, the poor performance of Napoleon's own navy at the Battle of
the Nile and at Trafalgar ensured that Britain would remain, among all of the other
nations of Europe, free from direct attack by the French. Napoleon did not understand the potential of such tactics as commerce raiding and striking at the British
colonial holdings. These indirect strikes at the vulnerable sea-lanes of commerce and

IAIA(

lnfermatio n Assurenc e Technology Analysis (enter
w

.• "

..........,"

.,_=~,~~"._

. .•
.

Military Advantage in History

Lf.C. Fuller postulated thai Robert E. Lee was the last Napoleonic general and
that Ulysses S. Grant was the first modern general. [5] Lee carefully and successfully
implemented Napoleonic tactics to thwart individual Union attacks; however, Grant
and Sherman employed Napoleon's strategic vision with a vengeance to break the
back of the Confederacy. Both generals learned to eschew reliance on fixed supply
oases and made living off the land part of their tactical lexicon. Hnth used wideranging flanking maneuvers to force the enemy to fight at a disadvantage. Both used
massed firepower, applied at the decisive place and time, to disrupt the enemy and
break his lines. Both understood that the capture of terrain and cities was secondary
to the elimination of the enemy's field armies. Grant's entire Wilderness campaign
was a Napoleonic war of maneuver against an enemy who had tactically reverted
to the thinking of vauban. [6] Lee proved to be more concerned with protecting
Richmond at all costs rather than trying to destroy the Union Army. Once Grant
understood this, he was able to develop a multi-pronged offensive, constantly probing (or the Confederate flank. His wheeling maneuvers down the center of Virginia
failed to destroy Lee in the field but resulted in pinning Lee to fixed fortifications cutside of Richmond and Petersburg. Once his enemy's army was trapped, Grant could
crush it in a siege. Sherman's campaign in the west applied Napoleonic strategy over
a wide front. From Chattanooga through Atlanta to Savannah, Sherman conducted a
series of wide nanking actions, designed to extract his enemies from their fixed fortifications and cause them to join battle in the open, resulting in the fall of Atlanta,
Lincoln's reelection, and ultimate Union victory.

6. Sebastien Le Prestre de v: b
.
. -.
au an was one of France's most influential military
~Ilgm('~r~. He IS renowned for his skills in both the art of attacking and defendIllg fort! fled places in the 17th and l Sth centuries H" built th
u d
f - if .
cmos a vancort
O1tllcatlOns/fortresses of his time and he also used hi
d ..
..
15 engmcenng prowess to
evrse mnovauvs SIege tactics thaI led the Frencb to victory on numero _
_
srons.
us ceca
'L

Although many of Napoleon's social reforms endured after he died, his dynasty never
really began. Napoleon, like Alexander, created no successor who could carry his vision
forward. In both cases, their military successes failed to endure beyond their lifetime.

End Notes
1. Noswcrthy, Brent, With Ml1sket, Cannon, and Sword: Battle Tactics of
Napo/eon and his Enemies, (Sarpedon: New York, 1996) p. 35-48.

2. Columns gain tactical mobility at the expense of significantly reduced firepower versus a line formation-the favorite of the British under Moore and
Wellington.
3. Chandler, David, The Campaign of Napoleon, (MacMillan Co: New York,
1966) p. 344.
4. Van Creveld, MCirlin, Command in War, (Harvard University Press: Boston,
1987).
5. Fuller, General J.F.C., The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, (Da Capo
Paperback: New York, 1929), page 372--381.

IATAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

-----------------------

MititaJY Advantage in History

Chapter 6

Implications for the
United States
Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the
road may be; for without victory; there is no survival.
-Winston Churchill

istorically, military advantage has been based on a fundamental tactical advantage, enhanced by operational art, and sustained by strategic societal institutions.
Decisive military advantage begins with asymmetric tactical advantage, which results
from superior leadership or technology. Operational advantage is based on information and control, but it must rest on a bedrock of tactical advantage. Strategic advantage is derived from superior resources; political, economic, and societal organization
and infrastructures; and the ability to engage the enemy's center of gravity. The case
studies of military advantage in ancient history explored in this study suggest that
tactical advantage without strategic advantage tends to be temporary.

In the post-Cold War world, the United States dominates on all three levels-tactical, operational, and strategic. An examination of enduring military advantage in history offers insights into what drives U.S. military advantage, where U.S. vulnerabilities may lie, and how the United States should think about maintaining its military
advantage in the future.

Conclusions: Military Advantage
The historical case studies suggest that military advantage proves most enduring
if it is based upon a strong political, economic, and social institutional structure at
the strategic level. Tactical or operational advantage must be sustained by a strong
economic foundation and a system in which stable governance is maintained.
The expansive Roman Empire offers the most telling example of enduring military
advantage. The Romans' robust tactical doctrine enabled them to win every significant siege that they attempted and ultimately every war they fought. Their military
advantage was maintained over time largely because it was supported and strengthMilitary Advantage in History

zrl

ened by the Roman ability to create and sustain strong domestic institutions, which
were based on a code of law and evoked a strong sense of civil responsibility among
the Roman populace. These institutions were designed to incorporate conquered people as the empire grew. Consequently, expansion strengthened Rome's strategic institutions until the empire reached a threshold of over-extension, at which point internal disturbances began to weaken the foundations of Rome's political and economic
institutions. When Rome's institutional infrastructure began to decline, its military
advantage began to diminish as well.
The Mongol explosion from Central Asia and its eventual domination over much
of Eurasia was accomplished with relatively small armies, commonly known military
technologies, and limited human resources. The Mongol military advantage rested on
tactical and operational superiority, which was deeply rooted in the societal and economic structures of Mongol society. In this sense, Mongolian military supremacy was
unique and could not be readily copied by competitors. The Mongols' enduring and
unique advantage was based on the strength of a nomadic herding society with innovative operational concepts, superior organization and leadership, and a skillful blend
of military technologies that reflected the political, social, and economic foundation
of Mongol society. The Mongol dynasty was sustained by incorporating Chinese strategic institutions that enabled their empire to endure. They reached their apogee due
to logistical constraints in forested regions of Central Europe that could not sustain
the horses required to wage the Mongol style of conflict. The Mongols were finally
defeated by enemies who copied their style of warfare after centuries of domination.
It can be argued that the strength of the Chinese strategic institutions ultimately was
absorbed by the Mongols, demonstrating that building strategic institutions is an
essential element to enduring military advantage.
The Maccdonians' military advantage was based on their combined arms strategy
and the exceptional leadership and military genius of Alexander the Greal. He led his
army to innumerable tactical and operational victories, but his leadership was based
more on a "cult of personality" than on a sustainable institutional structure. This lack
of strong institutions made Macedonia's military advantage ephemeral, resulting in a
long civil war that exhausted all parties after Alexander's death.
Similarly to the Macedonians, Napoleon's military advantage was temporary.
Napoleon was able to develop innovative operational concepts and maintain a
sophisticated command and control cycle, which was based on a superior doctrine
and information superiority. The political climate in the late 18th century enabled
Napoleon to create a large (one million strong), self-motivated military force. But
without the support of an inclusive strategic vision, Napoleon's tactical and operational advantages could not be sustained after his death.

IATAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

R ~ llO\/ a nc~

1IIt

Slrat~gy

"'I<.lrv .od._

1.10>"" sul",-.,

"""'" lor

U,S,

for U.S.

"';~"'"

okh-..,_

~ In

wh"" h,

"'I..

""'" """"" ..,...- ,....,.... """'"
I>r"'" "'...,.... , .. hr _

,...,~

un ,hAIl

" ......, ......I "".,........., 1<>

_ _'" .....
'h<

, ..

find _

us " ' _ ....,0600>

ou,...,.,..P<I """nwm.ol

l>b'''. 01 .od• .on«<!
'hr U.5. ""'..........

"'''''1'1 ,. _

,,"'" _ _

m;''',,,,

..,j.",_ _ on
in ..."" ,... ""..",...... II.'.

" """", . . - oM " .. 011 """'" .... ~""
~ ..... ~
10 of ..,j• • n«<I "',;", . nd

,""""'" "'' ' ' _'."ll
""", ,

, ..." ......, m"-"" d

u.s.

or _.,"'" w.h .""'..........." in '.........

'I<l ..... w" h .h< .. Id<tjn.od

trdInol_, .... 'OIU"""

""'u<'. ""

'""""

~ _,

""'P .on • ."."""

«1.",\04"

<on «Ion!or

_ " '••""" ....

_ ~ ,.""... hon

"""'''' or ......"""""

.... "" ,. ,no

f1nI. 'Ilt "I'W'

in ,

k ....... b y _

ocr,

llri<I '""" ~_ ........ "".

_-cold w

p."l.... m in

_K"
lin''''

,"ppnrt "'"
Sl.>,....

h ..,

"'.. 1<>..
'''''_''

ctul·
m"", m;"'1..0 in

""",,,,"'11<"......

iii
11
jil I,
, ,I

_
- _. - -

.....,_._..
."""'" ...

•

""--....
-.....
n;",••,

, "...

U.S. power can be challenged on a second level. Since the u.s. conventional and
technological advantage is so great, the only effective response for an opponent is to
conduct an asymmetric attack on the United States' strategic domain. For the United
States, strategic institutions (c.g., its democratic institutions, personal liberties, and
market and financial institutions) represent both the source of its military advantage
and its largest vulnerability. As U.S. military advantage in the tactical and operational
levels grows, U.S. institutions become more vulnerable to an asymmetric attack. In
this context, asymmetric attacks must be defined broadly to encompass all attacks
on political, economic, and societal infrastructure Ie.g.. financial institutions, transportation hubs, public buildings, Internet hubs), as was demonstrated by the terrorist
attacks OIl 9/11. Consequently, the U,S. Government and U.S. military are focused on
the growing vulnerability and the need to protect a broader spectrum of targets in its
efforts to focus on homeland defense.
The real U.S. vulnerability may be revealed by how the United States chooses to
react to attacks on its strategic institutions. The lessons drawn from the case studies
suggest that the United States' enduring military advantage is based on its sound strategic institutions. Therefore, this advantage could be undermined if confidence in these
institutions were shaken. Such attacks could precipitate a closing of U.S. society, which
could manifest itself in several ways. For example, the government could severely limit
the personal freedoms that Americans take for granted, or it could limit foreign access
to economic opportunities and to influence in the U.S. political system. If Americans
perceive that they arc losing freedom in their daily activities and transactions, they
could lose confidence in the government. At the same time, if the U.S. government
is perceived to he incapable of protecting the American people from external threats,
confidence will also wane. Either scenario suggests that an opponent's ability to conduct asymmetric attacks successfully against Ll.S. strategic institutions may portend the
long-term erosion of the United States' enduring military advantage.
The central question facing the U.S. military and law enforcement officers as they
think about maintaining U.S. military superiority and creating a homeland defense
strategy may he-How does the United States respond to attacks on its strategic
institutions without creating the conditions to undermine its military advantage? The
Roman model suggests that it is possible for the United States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable of transforming its forces before an
opponent can develop counter-capabilities. Transformation coupled with strong strategic institutions is a powerful combination for an adversary to overcome.

Conclusions: Military Transformation
The historical case studies highlight a second important conclusion related to the
integral role that military transformation plays in maintaining military advantage. The
Romans' ability to maintain military advantage grew out of their ability to transform

IATAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

the nature of military power over time. The Roman case study provides insights for
the issues facing the U.S. military today.
At certain times in history, a great power arises, such as the Roman Empire,
whose military power establishes the world standard that all others must exceed or
neutralize if they intend to employ military force to gain their political objectives.
Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the Unitcd States has been the dominant military power in the world. U.S. military power is multidimensional (land, air,
sea, space, and cyberspace dominant), based on advanced weapons. platforms, and
munitions; and supported by extensive networks of sensors, information systems,
and command and control clements. The U.S. global military capability is not perfect, but it sets the prevailing world standard.
No state with an unchanging paradigm of military power can dominate indefinitely, for two reasons that emerge from the case studies. First, because the dominant
power has found a method of war that is highly successful, it tends to stick with
it. There are always evolutionary improvements, but the basic source of its military
power tends toward the sacrosanct as the state's leaders follow the dictum, "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it." The second reason is that potential opponents have a vested
interest in overturning the prevailing military standard if they hope to achieve their
political objectives backed by military means. The combination of these two factors
leads adversaries to focus on the vulnerabilities of the dominant military power in
order to defeat or neutralize the key sources of its military advantage. Consequently,
the tendency of the dominant military power to codify and only modestly improve
its existing military paradigm gives an aspiring adversary a relatively static target to
undermine over time.

Since the Gulf War, the core elements of U.S. power projection capabilities have
centered on air power (land- and sea-based) supported by precision munitions, information systems, and a vast array of sensors. This capability has been combined, on
some occasions, with the timely deployment of ground forces. Although the Gulf War
and the recent war in Afghanistan demonstrate the enduring value of ground power,
the current U.S. way of war relies heavily on precision strike capabilities. Judging by
most of the systems the United States plans to buy over the next decade, the services
are largely pursuing programs to reinforce our current precision strike advantage.
This observation means that our potential opponents have already had a decade to
observe the platforms, munitions, and end-to-end networked systems that bring U.S.
military strength to bear rapidly in any part of the globe. Given that the typical acquisition cycle, from start to finish, for a major platform or command and control system
takes from 10 to 20 years, our potential opponents have already begun to procure
systems specifically designed to defeat our current military paradigm at a time when
the United States continues to procure more of these same kinds of systems. There is
strong evidence that one key dimension of adversary response is centered on an antiaccess regime designed to keep Ll.S. forces from successfully deploying into a theater
of operations. The anti-access regime is a tailored response to neutralize what are perMilitary Advantage in History

ceived as significant vulnerabilities in the U.$. way of war. This does not mean that
U.S. military power is rapidly on the decline; but barring a more innovative approach,
the process leading \0 its substantial erosion has already been set in motion.
A key strategy to arrest this trend is to migrate or transform the sources of U.S.
military power even while American military capabilities remain dominant. This will
accomplish two things. First, it will defeat our opponent's targeted asymmetric strategies. Just when an adversary's military response threatens to achieve a critical mass
against the current American precision strike paradigm, the U.S. milltary will be
transformed into something very different-something that the adversary's tailored
systems were not designed to defeat. Second, U.S. military dominance will be maintained through a continuous renewal process that periodically shifts its fundamental
sources of power. This continuous transformation process will provide the United
States with additional decades of significant military superiority.

IAIAC

Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center

Military Advantage in History