STATE
OF
MINNESOTA
CONFERENCE OF
CHIEF JUDGES
Court Security Manual

COURTHOUSE SECURITY
COMMITTEE
MISSION STATEMENT
To develop and implement a statewide courthouse
security program, incorporating the elements of
prevention, deterrence, and response. The program shall
include the development of uniform standards and
procedures for courthouse security and shall contain a
training component for courthouse employees and those
charged with providing security in courthouses.

i

INTRODUCTION
“It’s not a question of whether there is going to be a major and serious security incident in our
courthouse; the question is when will it happen?” Those are the words of Ramsey County
Sheriff, Bob Fletcher who is responsible for security at all Ramsey County Court facilities.

Every day, headlines in newspapers shout out the violence which takes place in
courthouses around our country. Bombings, shootings, kidnapping, threats, assaults and
more. These incidents are not just the products of urban areas. They are happening in
small jurisdictions as well as in large population areas. We have been exposed to the
bombing at the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma and the recent tragedies at the
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, and the Jewish Community Center in Los
Angeles, California.
The Minnesota Conference of Chief Judges recognizes the importance of providing a safe
and secure environment to all who use our courthouses while at the same time providing
a facility which is not oppressive and intimidating.
To this task, a committee appointed by the Conference of Chief Judges has been meeting since
August 1, 1997. This committee is composed of knowledgeable persons in the areas of security,
criminal justice, historical preservation, architecture, administration and legislation.

This Manual is intended to be an important and extremely useful resource for those
persons who are responsible for making our courthouses the safehavens which they
should be for the fair, secure and effective administration of justice.

Honorable Lawrence D. Cohen, Chair
Conference of Chief Judges Courthouse Security Committee

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks must go to U.S. Marshal Charles L. Zacharias for allowing Deputy U.S.
Marshal Steve Swensen to participate and contribute so greatly to the Conference of
Chief Judges’ Courthouse Security Committee and the creation of this manual. The
following persons also deserve considerable credit for making this manual possible:
Steve Forestell, Judicial Advisory Service
Charles Nelson, Minnesota Historical
Society
Christine LaBounty, Law Clerk for Chief
Judge Lawrence Cohen, Second
Judicial District

Chuck Bergquist, St. Louis County Sheriff’s
Department & Minnesota Sheriffs’
Association
Mike Cox, President of Wold Architects
and Engineers
Judge Tom Poch, First Judicial District

We gratefully acknowledge the following people for their contributions to the
Conference of Chief Judges’ Courthouse Security Committee. Their participation
has added greatly to the Committee:
Sue Alliegro, Second Judicial District
Administrator
Marie Ballard, Ramsey County Sheriff’s
Office
Mike Campion, Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension
Judge Mary E. Carlson, Tenth Judicial
District
Patrick Chase, Capitol Security
Tracy Denisty, Capitol Security
Maureen Flaherty, Judicial Intern,
William Mitchell School of Law
Judge Mickey Greenberg, Fourth Judicial
District
Fred Grittner, Clerk of Appellate Courts
John Gundersen, Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension
Judge Elizabeth Hayden, Seventh Judicial
District
Mark Ireland, Judicial Extern, University of
Minnesota School of Law
Bob Johnson, Anoka County Attorney
Randy Kelly, Senator, Minnesota State
Senate

Steve Lydon, Department of Corrections
Pam Maccabe, Anoka County Attorney’s
Office
Janet Marshall, State Court Administration
David Metusalem, Ramsey County Sheriff’s
Office
Alesia Metry, Capitol Security
Alanna Moravetz, Minnesota Supreme
Court Continuing Education
Tim O’Malley, Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension
Judge Jeffrey Rantala, Sixth Judicial
District
Bob Parta, Asst. Anoka County Attorney
Mike Podulke, Olmsted County
Commissioner
Mike Shanley, Ramsey County Sheriff’s
Office
Loren Solberg, State Representative
John Stuart, Minnesota State Public
Defender
Kent Wagner, Minnesota Supreme Court
Continuing Education
Charles Zacharias, U.S. Marshal

iii

PREFACE
Contained within this manual is both general and specific information on a number of the
multi-disciplined areas believed essential to establishing a model Court Security
Program. It is intended to be utilized by designated officials (i.e., Court Security
Committee Members and Representatives) to enhance court security.
Simply stated, this manual is intended to be informative, and it was prepared with that
goal in mind. Throughout the manual, the comments and recommendations concerning
courthouse security intentionally cover a wide range of subjects, extending from
administratively-acted (cost-effective) to fiscally-driven schedules of implementation. It
is believed that each chapter - from Court Security Management and Development to
Threat Management to Courthouse Security Considerations - meets this pre-identified
goal.
The manual should be considered a starting, and not an ending point (i.e., a work-inprogress). In order to maintain a high level of proficiency, court security program
managers will need to continuously seek out additional program-specific experience,
source documents, training, and professional associations.
Security program responsibilities are both considerable and consequential. Assigned
program managers must not simply possess a basic familiarity, but also must possess a
high level of expertise in all associated areas. This elevated paradigm of expertise and
due diligence can only be attained when program continuity is recognized and
established. This requires a time commitment that should minimally reflect the level of
program-equated responsibility and required expertise. The premise is that assigned
managers will now be allowed to meet and exceed elevated program thresholds (in
becoming subject matter experts), rather than reach a certain, usually lesser, point and
subsequently be routinely reassigned.
The Conference of Chief Judges Courthouse Security Committee “Court Security
Manual” provides instructions and examples on executing court security operational
assignments in an exemplary manner. When reviewing the manual, please note that
individual chapters should not be interpreted nor considered exclusive of one another.
They are intended to complement one another.
For example: Chapter 12, titled “Training Outlines” is directly supported by nearly every other
manual chapter. It should be noted that with this particular example you actually need a

thorough understanding of the information contained in the other chapters as well as the
previously-mentioned experience, source documents, training, and professional
associations before you will be able to present, as an authority, the individual training
material as outlined.

iv

The material contained herein is not intended to replace or change the meaning of any
existing state manual, policy or procedure. Any disparity or change between this manual
and existing state policies and procedures will be deferred to and governed by those
same official notices and publications.
The comments and recommendations contained herein are not intended to dictate
mandated policies or procedures. Rather, they are intended to foster a positive and
responsive dialogue among those officials and persons reviewing and assessing security
needs for their respective courthouse facilities.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MISSION STATEMENT ........................................................................................ i
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................... iii
PREFACE ............................................................................................................... iv
CHAPTER 1 - LEGISLATION, POLICY NOTICES and DOCUMENTS
LAWS, RULES, AND POLICIES RELATING TO COURT SECURITY ............................................1-1-1
Responsibility for the Courthouse ......................................................................................... 1-1-1
Providing Bailiffs and Jury Attendants................................................................................. 1-1-4
Control of the Courtroom....................................................................................................... 1-1-7
Summary Punishment Procedure ............................................................................................. 1-1-10
Obstreperous Defendant .......................................................................................................... 1-1-13

Control of the Jury ................................................................................................................ 1-1-15

COURT SECURITY INCIDENT REPORTING FORM ...................................................................1-2-1
JUDICIAL PERSONNEL PROFILE ...........................................................................................1-3-1

CHAPTER 2 - COURT SECURITY MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT
COURT SECURITY COMMITTEES ...........................................................................................2-1-1
Court Order ............................................................................................................................. 2-1-2

BUILDING SECURITY COMMITTEES ......................................................................................2-2-1
COURTHOUSE PHYSICAL SECURITY CHECKLIST ...................................................................2-3-1
Courtroom and Related Areas ............................................................................................... 2-3-7
Prisoner Areas ....................................................................................................................... 2-3-10

COURTHOUSE CONTINGENCY PLANS ....................................................................................2-4-1
Situational Contingencies ....................................................................................................... 2-4-2
Courthouse Hostage Situations .............................................................................................. 2-4-4
NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Incidents ............................................................ 2-4-5
Anthrax Concerns Card ............................................................................................................. 2-4-5
Anthrax Facts Sheet ................................................................................................................... 2-4-5
Chem-Bio: Quick Response Card (CB-QRC)............................................................................ 2-4-6

Courthouse Escape Contingencies ......................................................................................... 2-4-7

OCCUPANT EMERGENCY PLANS............................................................................................2-5-1
Occupant Emergency Plan Incident Checklist ..................................................................... 2-5-2

COURTHOUSE RENOVATION AND PROSPECTUS PROJECTS ...................................................2-6-1
Renovation vs. Rebuilding ...................................................................................................... 2-6-1
Using A Phased Approach to Renovation .................................................................................. 2-6-1

Prioritizing Implementation of Security Measures .............................................................. 2-6-2
The Design Process.................................................................................................................... 2-6-2

SPACE DESIGN AND LAYOUT.................................................................................................2-7-1
REHABILITATION OF MINNESOTA’S HISTORIC COURTHOUSES ............................................2-8-1
Identification and Evaluation................................................................................................. 2-8-1

vi

History of Development .......................................................................................................... 2-8-2
Standards for Rehabilitation .................................................................................................. 2-8-3

CHAPTER 3 - COURTHOUSE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
FIVE-STAGE PROGRAM OF COURT SECURITY.......................................................................3-1-1
MAIL SCREENING .................................................................................................................3-2-1
PRISONER SECURITY.............................................................................................................3-3-1
GENERAL COURTROOM SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ...........................................................3-4-1
OPERATIONS SECURITY ........................................................................................................3-5-1
GENERAL COURTHOUSE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS .........................................................3-6-1
Courthouse Duress Alarm Operation and Response Procedures ....................................... 3-6-1

COURTHOUSE ADJACENT PARKING CONSIDERATIONS .........................................................3-7-1
Site-Specific Consideration Factors....................................................................................... 3-7-2

CREDENTIALS AND BADGES ..................................................................................................3-8-1

CHAPTER 4 - COURTHOUSE PERIMETER SECURITY
SECURED AND CONTROLLED PARKING .................................................................................4-1-1
EXTERIOR SECURITY SYSTEMS .............................................................................................4-2-1
Recommended Exterior Security System Components ....................................................... 4-2-1

COURTHOUSE INGRESS AND EGRESS POINTS .......................................................................4-3-1
CRIMINAL STATISTICAL SUMMARIES ....................................................................................4-4-1
DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROTESTS .......................................................................................4-5-1

CHAPTER 5 - SECURITY EQUIPMENT
SECURITY EQUIPMENT .........................................................................................................5-1-1
Metal Detectors (Hand-Held) .................................................................................................... 5-1
Magnetometers (Walk-Thru) .................................................................................................... 5-1
Fluoroscopes (X-Ray Machines) ............................................................................................... 5-2
Duress Alarms (Panic Devices).................................................................................................. 5-2
CCTV Cameras (Closed-Circuit Television) ........................................................................... 5-2
CCTV Housings (Enclosures).................................................................................................... 5-2
CCTV Mounts............................................................................................................................. 5-3
Security Monitors ....................................................................................................................... 5-3
Intercoms..................................................................................................................................... 5-3
Numeric Pin Pads ....................................................................................................................... 5-3
Card Key Readers (Bio-Metrics) .............................................................................................. 5-3
Electric Strikes............................................................................................................................ 5-3
Electric Strike Releases.............................................................................................................. 5-3
Magnetic Locks........................................................................................................................... 5-3
Electrified Mortise Locks........................................................................................................... 5-3
Security Lighting ........................................................................................................................ 5-4
Ballistic Glazing.......................................................................................................................... 5-4
Door Viewers............................................................................................................................... 5-4
Vehicle Barriers.......................................................................................................................... 5-4

INTERCOM SYSTEMS .............................................................................................................5-5-1

vii

GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................5-6-1

CHAPTER 6 - COURT SECURITY OFFICERS (CSO)
HIGHLIGHTS OF U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE CSO CONTRACTS .............................................6-1-1
Part I – The Schedule.............................................................................................................. 6-1-1
Part II – Contract Clauses ...................................................................................................... 6-1-3
Part III – List of Documents, Exhibits, and Other Attachments ........................................ 6-1-3
Part IV – Representations and Instructions.......................................................................... 6-1-3

CSO PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ........................................................................................6-2-1
SECURITY SCREENING GUIDELINES .....................................................................................6-3-1
General Practices..................................................................................................................... 6-3-1
Fluoroscopes (X-ray Machines).............................................................................................. 6-3-1
Suspicious Packages ................................................................................................................ 6-3-2
Response Procedures for Suspicious Packages ..................................................................... 6-3-2
Walk-Thru Metal Detectors (Magnetometers) ..................................................................... 6-3-5
Firearms ................................................................................................................................... 6-3-5
Knives and Other Dangerous Weapons ................................................................................ 6-3-6

FIXED POST ASSIGNMENTS AND GUIDELINES ......................................................................6-4-1
Courtroom Procedures ........................................................................................................... 6-4-1
Courtroom Decorum Form .................................................................................................... 6-4-2
General Listing of Fixed Post Assignments........................................................................... 6-4-3

ROVING PATROL POSTS AND ASSIGNMENTS .........................................................................6-5-1
Perimeter.................................................................................................................................. 6-5-1
Courthouse Floors ................................................................................................................... 6-5-1
Garage Area............................................................................................................................. 6-5-1
Miscellaneous ........................................................................................................................... 6-5-1

REPORTS AND RECORDS .......................................................................................................6-6-1
MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER ...........................................................................................6-7-1

CHAPTER 7 - TRIAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
TRIAL RISK IDENTIFICATION MATRIX ..................................................................................7-1-1
Inherent Risk Levels / Type of Trial...................................................................................... 7-1-1

PARTICIPATION RISK IDENTIFICATION MATRIX ...................................................................7-2-1
Inherent Risk Levels of Participants ..................................................................................... 7-2-1

RISK LEVEL IDENTIFICATION MATRIX .................................................................................7-3-1
HIGH THREAT & HIGH PROFILE TRIALS .............................................................................7-4-1
Operational Plans .................................................................................................................... 7-4-1

HIGH THREAT TRIAL OPERATIONAL PLAN - INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENTS AND ROLES..........7-5-1
Courtroom Team ........................................................................................................................ 7-5-2
Protective Services Team ........................................................................................................... 7-5-3
Sequestered Jury Team .............................................................................................................. 7-5-3
Prisoner Team............................................................................................................................ 7-5-3
Command Post and Communications ........................................................................................ 7-5-3

Individual Courtroom Duty Assignments ............................................................................. 7-5-4
Courtroom Team Leader............................................................................................................ 7-5-4
Prisoner Team............................................................................................................................ 7-5-4
Judicial Team............................................................................................................................. 7-5-4
Gallery Team.............................................................................................................................. 7-5-4

viii

Security Screening Team............................................................................................................ 7-5-4

Duty Hours............................................................................................................................... 7-5-5
Performance Guidelines.......................................................................................................... 7-5-5
Special Prisoner Transport Considerations.......................................................................... 7-5-6
Detail Personnel Data Sheet ................................................................................................... 7-5-7
Emergency Medical Information ........................................................................................... 7-5-7
Daily Activity Log.................................................................................................................... 7-5-8
Operational Plan Checklist for High Threat/Profile Trial .................................................. 7-5-9

JURORS .................................................................................................................................7-6-1
Sequestered Juries................................................................................................................... 7-6-1
Sequestered Jury Forms Package .......................................................................................... 7-6-2

WEAPONS INTRODUCED AS COURTROOM EXHIBITS .............................................................7-7-1
Ten Commandments for Handling of Firearms as Exhibits ............................................... 7-7-2
Demonstrating Non-Firearm Weapons .................................................................................... 7-7-10
Placement of Weapons as Exhibits in the Courtroom .............................................................. 7-7-11

Top-Ten List of Weapons of Opportunity........................................................................... 7-7-12
Recommendations for Safe Use of Listed Items ....................................................................... 7-7-12

CHAPTER 8 - BOMB THREAT RESPONSE PLAN
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED).............................................................................8-1-1
Main Components of a Bomb and IED ................................................................................. 8-1-1
Improvised Explosive Devices ................................................................................................ 8-1-1

LETTER AND PARCEL BOMB RECOGNITION POINTS .............................................................8-2-1
General Response to Suspicious Letters and Packages........................................................ 8-3-1
Inspecting Vehicles for Improvised Explosive Devices - IED’s........................................... 8-3-1
Conducting Room Searches for IED’s................................................................................... 8-3-1

BOMB THREAT RESPONSE CARD ..........................................................................................8-4-1
BOMB THREAT RESPONSE PLAN...........................................................................................8-5-1
Receipt of the Threat............................................................................................................... 8-5-1
Threat Evaluation.................................................................................................................... 8-5-1
Facility Search ......................................................................................................................... 8-5-1
Facility Evacuation.................................................................................................................. 8-5-2
Removal and Render Safe....................................................................................................... 8-5-2
General ..................................................................................................................................... 8-5-2

SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE RESPONSE - FLOW CHART ................................................................8-6-1
NEWS HEADLINES: TERRORIST & COURTHOUSE BOMBING INCIDENTS ..............................8-7-1

CHAPTER 9 - THREAT MANAGEMENT
THREAT INTELLIGENCE ........................................................................................................9-1-1
Intelligence Gathering Considerations .................................................................................. 9-1-2
Sources of Information and Intelligence ............................................................................... 9-1-2

THREAT SOURCE PROFILES ..................................................................................................9-2-1
American Patriot Movement Threat Source Profile ............................................................ 9-2-1
Preface ....................................................................................................................................... 9-2-1
Historical Perspectives .............................................................................................................. 9-2-1
Posse Comitatus Philosophy ...................................................................................................... 9-2-1
Charter Qualifying Factors........................................................................................................ 9-2-3
The Turner Diaries – A Summarized Report.............................................................................. 9-2-4

ix

News Headlines: Bombings..................................................................................................... 9-2-11
News Headlines: Militias ........................................................................................................ 9-2-11
Significant Domestic Terrorist Actions .................................................................................... 9-2-12
Right-Wing Demographic Profile ............................................................................................ 9-2-21
Militia Conspiracy Theories..................................................................................................... 9-2-22
Right-Wing Extremist Rallying Cries ....................................................................................... 9-2-23
Intelligence & Informational Resources .................................................................................. 9-2-24
Published Information.............................................................................................................. 9-2-25
Summary................................................................................................................................... 9-2-26
UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE THREAT SOURCE PROFILE (TSP) SAMPLE FORM ....9-3-1
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE - OPERATIONAL PLAN CHECKLIST .................................................9-4-1
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTS .................................................................9-5-1

Recommended FOIA/PA Response Guidelines .................................................................... 9-5-2
Legal Authority for USMS Investigations............................................................................. 9-5-2

CHAPTER 10 - PROTECTIVE and THREAT INVESTIGATIONS
JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY ..........................................................................................10-1-1
JUDICIAL THREAT INVESTIGATIONS ...................................................................................10-2-1
PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS ............................................................................................10-3-1
PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES ........................................................................10-4-1
THREAT ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENTS ...............................................................................10-5-1
Ten Features Associated with Attacks on Public Figures.................................................. 10-5-4
Indicators of Violence Against Protectees ........................................................................... 10-5-5
Courthouse Dimensions of Threat Space ............................................................................ 10-5-6
Analysis & Assessment Process Flow Chart ....................................................................... 10-5-7

CAUTION NOTICES ..............................................................................................................10-6-1
OPERATIONAL PLAN CHECKLIST FOR PROTECTIVE SERVICE DETAIL ................................10-7-1

CHAPTER 11 - PERSONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE ..........................................................................................11-1-1
Bureau of Labor Statistical Summary................................................................................. 11-1-2
Rates of Violence / 1992 - 1996 ............................................................................................. 11-1-2
Ten Professions Most Likely to be Victims of Murder ...................................................... 11-1-3
Characteristics of Persons Who Commit Acts of Violence................................................ 11-1-3
Potential Violent Offender Profile ....................................................................................... 11-1-4
Threat & Violence De-Escalation Techniques .................................................................... 11-1-4
Violence in the Workplace Prevention Techniques............................................................ 11-1-5
News Headlines: Violence in the Workplace Incidents...................................................... 11-1-6

PERSONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS .............................................................................11-2-1
Employee Recognized Response Actions............................................................................. 11-2-2
Proxemics ............................................................................................................................... 11-2-2
Criminal Actions - 3 Types ................................................................................................... 11-2-3
Telephone Security Considerations ..................................................................................... 11-2-3
Safe Driving Tips ................................................................................................................... 11-2-4
Neighborhood Parks - Safety Tips ....................................................................................... 11-2-4
International Travel Security Advisories............................................................................ 11-2-5
Minimizing Violence: Personal Conduct Techniques ........................................................ 11-2-7

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................11-3-1

x

Fire Prevention and Hazardous Material Information...................................................... 11-3-1
Security Lighting ................................................................................................................... 11-3-1
Residential Security Systems ................................................................................................ 11-3-2
Size, Reputation, and Location................................................................................................. 11-3-2
System Warranty and Service Contracts .................................................................................. 11-3-2
Personal Considerations .......................................................................................................... 11-3-2

Exterior Doors ....................................................................................................................... 11-3-3
Windows................................................................................................................................. 11-3-4
Miscellaneous Security Information .................................................................................... 11-3-4
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................. 11-3-5
Survey Preparation Recommendations............................................................................... 11-3-5

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY SURVEY FORM .............................................................................11-4-1
CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS .....................................................................................11-5-1

CHAPTER 12- TRAINING OUTLINES
COURT SECURITY TRAINING OUTLINE ...............................................................................12-1-1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 12-1-1
Court and Building Security Committees ........................................................................... 12-1-1
Facility Security Plan ............................................................................................................ 12-1-1
Judicial Security Plan ........................................................................................................... 12-1-2
Court Security Equipment and Related Procedures.......................................................... 12-1-2
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) ................................................................................... 12-1-3
Security in the Workplace .................................................................................................... 12-1-3
Miscellaneous Security Considerations ............................................................................... 12-1-3

PERSONAL SECURITY TRAINING OUTLINE ..........................................................................12-2-1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 12-2-1
Personal Security Considerations ........................................................................................ 12-2-1
Building Security Awareness................................................................................................ 12-2-2
Residential Security and Safety............................................................................................ 12-2-2

THREAT PROFILES TRAINING: RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST GROUPS ....................................12-3-1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 12-3-1
Historical and Ideological Perspectives ............................................................................... 12-3-1
Martyrs and symbolic Rallying Cries.................................................................................. 12-3-1
Trends and Tactics of the Right-Wing ................................................................................ 12-3-2
Intelligence and Informational Resources........................................................................... 12-3-2

CHAPTER 13 - RESOURCE DIRECTORIES
COURT SECURITY & THREAT INTELLIGENCE ASSOCIATIONS, MEMBERSHIPS & TRAINING13-1-1
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT ........................................................................13-2-1

xi

CHAPTER 1
LEGISLATION, POLICY
NOTICES and DOCUMENTS

LAWS, RULES, AND POLICIES:
RELATING TO COURTHOUSE SECURITY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COURTHOUSE
Under Minnesota law, the county is responsible for providing and keeping the courthouse
in good repair. In addition, it is required to provide suitable furniture, heating, lighting,
maintenance, and necessary office equipment and supplies necessary to the discharge of the
duties of the county officers, including the court administrator and the judges of the district
court. The court is required to provide separate waiting areas within the courthouse for victims
and defendants. The possession of dangerous weapons within a courthouse is absolutely
prohibited, except in certain limited instances. Security incidents occurring within the
courthouse are to be reported to the local sheriff and to the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.
(See Appendix for Security Incident Reporting Form.) Only in the most extreme cases may the
court invoke its inherent judicial power to provide for the security of the courthouse. If the court
does so, it must comply with specific procedural requirements. The relevant statutes are:
MINN. STAT. § 373.05. COUNTY BUILDINGS
Each county shall provide at the county seat, and keep in good repair, a suitable
courthouse, supplied with fireproof vaults, a suitable and sufficient jail, and other necessary
buildings.
MINN. STAT. § 375.14. OFFICES AND SUPPLIES FURNISHED FOR COUNTY
OFFICERS
The county board shall provide offices at the county seat for the auditor, treasurer, county
recorder, sheriff, court administrator of the district court, and an office for the county engineer at
a site determined by the county board, with suitable furniture and safes and vaults for the
security and preservation of the books and papers of the offices, and provide heating, lighting,
and maintenance of the offices. The board shall furnish all county officers with all books,
stationery, letterheads, envelopes, postage, telephone service, office equipment, and supplies
necessary to the discharge of their respective duties and make like provision for the judges of the
district court as necessary to the discharge of their duties within the county or concerning matters
arising in it. The board is not required to furnish any county officer with professional or
technical books or instruments except when the board deems them directly necessary to the
discharge of official duties as part of the permanent equipment of the office.

1-1-1

MINN. STAT. § 375.18. GENERAL POWERS
***
Subd. 3. Courthouse. Each county board may erect, furnish, and maintain a suitable
courthouse. No indebtedness shall be created for a courthouse in excess of an amount equal to a
levy of 0.04030 percent of taxable market value without the approval of a majority of the voters
of the county voting on the question of issuing the obligation at an election.
MINN. STAT. § 484.64. FAMILY COURT DIVISION; SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
***
Subd. 3. The board of county commissioners of Ramsey county shall provide suitable
chambers and courtroom space, clerks, bailiffs, and other personnel to assist said judge, together
with necessary library, supplies, stationery and other expenses necessary thereto. The state shall
provide referees, court reporters, and law clerks.
MINN. STAT. § 484.65. FAMILY COURT DIVISION; FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
***
Subd. 3. The board of county commissioners of Hennepin county shall provide suitable
chambers and courtroom space, clerks, bailiffs, and other personnel to assist said judge, together
with necessary library, supplies, stationery and other expenses necessary thereto. The state shall
provide referees, court reporters, and law clerks.
MINN. STAT. § 611A.034. SEPARATE WAITING AREAS IN COURTHOUSE
The court shall provide a waiting area for victims during court proceedings which is
separate from the waiting area used by the defendant, the defendant's relatives, and defense
witnesses, if such a waiting area is available and its use is practical. If a separate waiting area for
victims is not available or practical, the court shall provide other safeguards to minimize the
victim's contact with the defendant, the defendant's relatives, and defense witnesses during court
proceedings, such as increased bailiff surveillance and victim escorts.
MINN. STAT. § 609.66. DANGEROUS WEAPONS
***
Subd. 1g. Felony; possession in courthouse or certain state buildings. (a) A person
who commits either of the following acts is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or
both:
(1) possesses a dangerous weapon, ammunition, or explosives within any courthouse
complex; or

1-1-2

(2) possesses a dangerous weapon, ammunition, or explosives in any state building within
the capitol area described in section 15.50, other than the National Guard Armory.
(b) Unless a person is otherwise prohibited or restricted by other law to possess a
dangerous weapon, this subdivision does not apply to:
(1) licensed peace officers or military personnel who are performing official duties;
(2) persons who carry pistols according to the terms of a permit issued under section
624.714 and who so notify the sheriff or the commissioner of public safety, as appropriate;
(3) persons who possess dangerous weapons for the purpose of display as demonstrative
evidence during testimony at a trial or hearing or exhibition in compliance with advance notice
and safety guidelines set by the sheriff or the commissioner of public safety; or
(4) persons who possess dangerous weapons in a courthouse complex with the express
consent of the county sheriff or who possess dangerous weapons in a state building with the
express consent of the commissioner of public safety.
Subd. 2. Exceptions. Nothing in this section prohibits the possession of the articles
mentioned by museums or collectors of art or for other lawful purposes of public exhibition.

Comment on Inherent Judicial Power
In cases where the county or the sheriff have failed to provide adequately for the security
of the courthouse or the courtroom, the judge can exercise inherent judicial power to compel
these bodies to act. Inherent judicial power is an extraordinary remedy and is and should be
seldom invoked. Because the judge is intruding upon executive and legislative functions, the
power is to be used only under extreme circumstances and with due regard for the legal
requirements of the process, which include a hearing before an independent judge. The
requirements are contained in In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Compensation, 308 Minn. 172,
180-82, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976):
(1) Inherent judicial power grows out of express and implied constitutional provisions
mandating a separation of powers and a viable judicial branch of government. It comprehends
all authority necessary to preserve and improve the fundamental judicial function of deciding
cases.
(2) Inherent judicial power is available to courts on all levels to be used consistent with
respective jurisdictions and functions.
(3) Inherent judicial power may not be asserted unless constitutional provisions are
followed and established and reasonable legislative-administrative procedures are first
exhausted.

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(4) When established and reasonable procedures have failed, an inferior court may assert
its inherent judicial power by an independent judicial proceeding brought by the judges of such
court or other parties aggrieved. Such a proceeding must include a full hearing on the merits in
an adversary context before an impartial and disinterested district court. That court shall make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the standards set forth in this opinion
and may grant appropriate relief.
(5) The test to be applied in these cases is whether the relief requested by the court or
aggrieved party is necessary to the performance of the judicial function as contemplated in our
state constitution. The test is not relative needs or judicial wants, but practical necessity in
performing the judicial function. The test must be applied with due consideration for equally
important executive and legislative functions. (Emphasis added.)

PROVIDING BAILIFFS AND JURY ATTENDANTS
The county board and the sheriff have responsibility for providing bailiffs to the court
system. The county provides the budget and sets compensation for bailiffs. The sheriff is
responsible for the appointment of bailiffs. The term “bailiff” can refer to a full-time deputy or
to a temporary employee serving in the capacity of a jury attendant. Assignment of a person to
bailiff duty should be based upon a risk-assessment of the nature of the assignment. The ability
to respond and the necessity of possible response should be carefully considered when making an
appointment. In a case where the sheriff is of the opinion that special deputies are required
(“…riot or impending violations of the law…”) the sheriff may apply to the district court for
their appointment and fixing their compensation. The relevant statutes are:
MINN. STAT. § 387.14. DEPUTIES
The county board shall determine the number of permanent full time deputies and other
employees and fix the compensation for each position. The county board shall also budget for
special deputies, jailers, matrons, bailiffs and other temporary employees and shall fix their rates
of compensation. The sheriff shall appoint in writing the deputies and other employees, for
whose acts the sheriff shall be responsible and whom the sheriff may remove at pleasure. Before
entering upon official duties, the oath and appointment of each shall be filed with the county
recorder.
MINN. STAT. § 387.15. TEMPORARY JURY BAILIFFS
If the sex of any juror is different from the sex of all available jury bailiffs, the presiding
judge of any district court at any time before the return of a verdict by a petit jury serving upon a
case pending therein, by order issued to the sheriff and entered upon the minutes of the court,
may direct the sheriff to appoint a person of the juror's sex who is a legal voter of the county as
special deputy sheriff or bailiff to serve until the discharge of such jury from further service upon
the pending case. The appointment shall forthwith be made and entered upon the minutes of the
court and before entering upon the performance of duties, the person so appointed shall take and
subscribe the oath by law required of deputy sheriffs and file the same with the court
administrator.

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MINN. STAT. § 387.16. CHARGE OF PETIT JURIES
Upon taking the oath by law required by officers in charge of petit juries the person so
appointed may be directed by the court to have charge of such jury conjointly with a deputy
sheriff or bailiff of the other sex performing such duty. Special deputy sheriffs and bailiffs so
appointed shall in all things perform the duties and be subject to the penalties by law prescribed
for other officers having charge of petit juries.
MINN. STAT. § 487.11. ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES
Subdivision 1. Bailiffs. The sheriff of a county within a county court district shall
furnish to the county court deputies to serve as bailiffs within the county as the court may
request. The county board may, with the approval of the chief county court judge, contract with
any municipality, upon terms agreed upon, for the services of police officers of the municipality
to act as bailiffs in the county district court.
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to employ
probation officers with the powers and duties prescribed in section 244.19.
MINN. STAT. § 488A.06. BAILIFFS
Subdivision 1. Appointment; duties. The sheriff with approval of a majority of the
judges shall assign to the court a sufficient number of deputy sheriffs who shall act as bailiffs of
the court. A bailiff shall be in attendance at all sessions of the court involving traffic or criminal
matters, and serve all process and warrants and perform such other duties as may be directed by
the judges of the court. The county board may with the approval of a majority of the judges
contract with any municipality upon such terms as agreed upon for the services of police officers
of the municipality to act as bailiffs at all sessions of the court in the municipality. Provided,
however, and notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, the county board and the
governing body of any town or city within the county shall have authority to contract for the
service of such process and warrants by the police officers of such town or city within their
respective boundaries upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the parties
and approved by a majority of the judges of the court. Upon execution of such agreements, a
copy thereof shall be delivered to the sheriff who may thereafter deliver for service the process
and warrants to the local police officers for service pursuant to the terms of such agreement.
Subd. 2. Service of papers. No bailiff shall serve or receive for service any summons or
other paper in any forcible entry, unlawful detainer or civil action until the complaint has been
filed with the court administrator. The bailiff to whom a summons or other paper is delivered for
service shall make a prompt return to the court administrator showing whether or not it has been
served and if not served the reason therefor.
Subd. 3. Fees and mileage. The fees and mileage of bailiffs in civil actions and actions
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are the same as those payable to the sheriff of Hennepin
county for like services for district court actions. The fees and mileage for all other services of
bailiffs shall be fixed by rules promulgated by a majority of the judges. The fee provided for by

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chapter 349 of the Laws of 1953 is not payable. No fees or mileage are payable by the state,
county or city to bailiffs for their services, except that the county may pay bailiffs for automobile
mileage within the limits provided by law when the bailiffs furnish automobiles for use in the
performance of their duties. Bailiffs shall make returns showing their fees and mileage after
performing such services. The amount of the bailiffs' fees and mileage is payable to the sheriff
in advance.
Subd. 4. Compensation; gratuities. Except as provided in subdivision 3 above, such
bailiffs shall be paid for their services only the compensation payable to them by the county as
bailiffs. If any fee, gratuity, or reward is paid to any bailiff for services while on duty as a bailiff
of the court, the bailiff shall forthwith pay it over to the court administrator for the use of the
county. Failure to do so is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine not exceeding $100, or by
imprisonment in the county jail or city workhouse for not more than 30 days.
Subd. 5. Transportation of defendants. The sheriff of Hennepin county shall transport
defendants pursuant to rules promulgated by the court and orders of the court.
MINN. STAT. § 488A.119. BAILIFFS, DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATORS AND
LAW CLERKS; APPOINTMENT, TENURE; OATH AND BOND; SALARIES
(HENNEPIN COUNTY)
A majority of the judges may appoint an individual or individuals to perform the function
of court room bailiff, deputy court administrator and law clerk or any combination thereof. The
appointment may be terminated by a majority of the judges without hearing or notice. A
majority of the judges may establish requirements as to oath and bond. The salary or salaries of
said individual or individuals shall be set by the Hennepin county board of commissioners and
shall be paid by the Hennepin county treasurer.
MINN. STAT. § 488A.20. ADMINISTRATOR; OTHER EMPLOYEES (RAMSEY
COUNTY)
Subdivision 1. Appointment, term, removal, suspension. (a) A majority of the judges
shall appoint an administrator of the court.
(b) The court shall have employees, consisting of those persons employed in the
municipal courts of the cities of New Brighton, Roseville, Maplewood, North Saint Paul, White
Bear Lake and Saint Paul, as of December 31, 1974.
(c) Additional employees may be appointed by the administrator with the approval of the
majority of the judges when the county board consents to the creation of such new positions.
(d) The administrator and other employees of the court, exclusive of court reporters, shall
each be appointed for a term of six years from the date of appointment. At any time within six
months from the date of initial appointment, each may be removed and the appointment
terminated, with or without cause and without notice or hearing, by the appointing official or
officials. At any time, each may be suspended by the appointing official or officials without pay

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for a period not to exceed 30 days with or without cause pending a hearing for removal and
termination of appointment for cause before the appointing official or officials.
(e) The administrator and all other employees of the court shall be in the unclassified
service of the county of Ramsey.
NOTE: The 1969 amendment deleted specified number of deputy and assistant clerks,
substituting "employees and other necessary employees as are presently employed", eliminated
"bailiffs", and added clause (e) in subd. 1; eliminated "bailiffs" and substituted "other necessary
employees", added clause (d) in subd. 3; added clause (d) in subd. 4; added clause (c) in subd.
5; equated salary to that of the clerk of Ramsey district court but not to exceed $17,000,
relettered former clause (c) as (b), deleted provision that bailiffs' salaries be same as city
patrolmen, authorized clerk to set deputy and assistant clerks' salaries with council approval and
deleted provision that even though council designated assistant clerks by different title, they
continued to act as assistant clerks of court in subd. 6.

CONTROL OF THE COURTROOM
The judge and the bailiff share joint responsibility for maintaining order in the courtroom.
This responsibility extends to all aspects of courtroom behavior and all persons within the
courtroom, and the judge and bailiff should be aware of their responsibilities and trained in
exercising proper control. In particular, when exercising extraordinary means of control, such
as criminal contempt, or binding or gagging obstreperous defendants, the judge must be very
aware of the limitations on the use of such authority. The judge should review Chapter 11 of the
Criminal Benchbook for such things as restrictive orders on public presence and control of the
media prior to trial, in addition to contempt, obstreperous defendants and witnesses and
separation and sequestration of juries..
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC., TITLE I. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL COURT
PROCEEDINGS, RULE 2.01. BEHAVIOR AND CEREMONY IN GENERAL
(a) Acceptable Behavior. Dignity and solemnity shall be maintained in the courtroom.
There shall be no unnecessary conversation, loud whispering, newspaper or magazine reading or
other distracting activity in the courtroom while court is in session.
***
(c) Formalities in Opening Court. At the opening of each court day, the formalities to
be observed shall consist of the following: court personnel shall direct all present to stand, and
shall say clearly and distinctly:
Everyone please rise! The District Court of the ____________ Judicial District, County
of ____________, State of Minnesota is now open. Judge ____________ presiding. Please be
seated.
(Rap gavel or give other signal immediately prior to directing audience to be seated.)

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At any time thereafter during the day that court is reconvened court personnel shall give
warning by gavel or otherwise, and as the judge enters, cause all to stand until the Judge is
seated.
(The above rule (to) or (to not) apply to midmorning and mid-afternoon recesses of the court at
the option of the judge.)
***
(e) Court Personnel. Court personnel shall maintain order as litigants, witnesses and
the public assemble in the courtroom, during trial and during recesses. Court personnel shall
direct them to seats and refuse admittance to the courtroom in such trials where the courtroom is
occupied to its full seating capacity.
MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. TITLE II, PART H. MINN. CIV. TRIALBOOK. SECTION 10.
***
(k) Policy Against Indication as to Testimony. Persons in the courtroom shall not
indicate by facial expression, shaking of the head, gesturing, shouts or other conduct
disagreement or approval of testimony or other evidence being given, and counsel shall so
instruct parties they represent, witnesses they call, and persons accompanying them.
(l) Policy on Approaching the Bench. Except with approval of the court, persons in the
courtroom shall not traverse the area between the bench and counsel table, and counsel shall so
instruct parties they represent, witnesses they call, and persons accompanying them.
MINN. R. GEN. PRAC., TITLE VIII, RULES RELATING TO CRIMINAL MATTERS,
RULE 704. TIMELY APPEARANCES
Once the non-felony arraignment court calendar has convened, no lawyer shall approach
the courtroom clerk or the court. Any lawyer appearing late must notify the bailiff in the
courtroom of his or her presence. The bailiff will then transmit the information to the court and
the case will be called by instruction of the presiding judge.
MINN. STAT. § 588.01. CONTEMPTS
Subdivision 1. Kinds. Contempts of court are of two kinds, direct and constructive.
Subd. 2. Direct. Direct contempts are those occurring in the immediate view and
presence of the court, and arise from one or more of the following acts:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding court,
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings;
(2) A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent disturbance, tending to interrupt
the business of the court.

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MINN. STAT. § 588.20. CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS
***
Subd. 2. Misdemeanor contempt. Every person who commits a contempt of court, of
any one of the following kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed during the sitting of the
court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to
impair the respect due to its authority;
(2) behavior of like character in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a
trial or hearing, pursuant to an order of court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting
for the trial of a cause, or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law;
(3) breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the
proceedings of a court, jury, or referee;
(4) willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of a court other than the
conduct described in subdivision 1;
(5) resistance willfully offered to its lawful process or other mandate other than the
conduct described in subdivision 1;
(6) contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness, or, after being sworn, to
answer any legal and proper interrogatory;

Comment on Direct Contempt
[With thanks to Judge Bernard Boland and Judge Bruce Christopherson]
ELEMENTS OF DIRECT CONTEMPT:
?

Intentional Misbehavior - Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior directly
tending to interrupt the court’s proceedings or the respect due its authority, or unlawful
refusal to be sworn as a witness or testify. Contemnor may invoke the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. Estate of Stollmeyer, 580 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998)

?

Before the Court - The act or refusal to act must be committed in the physical presence
of the judge.

?

Witnessed by the Judge - All of the relevant facts must be witnessed by the judge.

?

Criminal Offenses - In Minnesota, all direct contempts are recognized as criminal
contempt.

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EXAMPLES:
?

Direct - Disorderly conduct in court; refusal to testify. State v. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541
(Minn. 1996).

?

Not direct - Attorney’s tardiness was not a direct contempt because the excuse was not
within the personal knowledge of the judge. Knadjek v. West, 278 Minn. 282, 153
N.W.2d 846 (1967). Nor was the act of perjury, Welfare of E.J.B. 466 N.W.2d 768
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) or lying at sentencing, State v. Garcia, 481 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).

SUMMARY PUNISHMENT PROCEDURE:
?

Where disruption or disorderly conduct occurs in the courtroom during trial or hearings
the court may summarily punish. (Note that the court may elect to proceed by summary
punishment or treat the contempt as a constructive punitive (criminal) contempt. If the
court treats the matter as constructive punitive, the judge must recuse and the matter must
be heard before another judge.) Disruption is not an essential element for summary
punishment. Refusal to testify is sufficient for a finding of direct contempt and summary
punishment. See In re Armentrout, 480 N.W.2d 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).

?

Use of summary punishment must be restrained and only those punitive measures
necessary to restore or maintain in the courtroom may be used. State v. Laarhoven, 90
Wis. 2d 67, 279 N.W.2d 488 (1979). Warnings or other sanctions should be considered
before proceeding to summary proceedings. Multiple refusals to testify at a single trial
may be a basis for only a single punishment. In re Armentrout, supra.

?

The decision should usually be made immediately, or as soon as order is restored, but no
later than immediately after the end of the trial. State v. Martin, 555 N.W.2d 899 (Minn.
1996). If the courts waits until a time after the trial, the court must recuse itself and the
defendant is entitled to a trial before another judge on the contempt issue as a
constructive contempt. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27
L.Ed.2d 532.

?

When imposing summary punishment, the judge should excuse the jury and read the
pertinent facts into the record using dispassionate and unemotional language. There is no
requirement for a fact hearing.

?

The contemnor need not be allowed to speak and the judge should not enter into an
exchange with him or her. If the contemnor is an attorney and the contempt may be
subject to future disciplinary proceedings, the contemnor should be given the opportunity
to make a record, but not until the court has imposed sentence.

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?

A contempt sentence, like any other criminal sentence, may be stayed or suspended until
the conclusion of the trial. This is an option that should be strongly considered,
especially if immediate execution of the sentence would compel a mistrial.

?

The maximum presumptive penalty is 90 day in jail and a $700.00 fine. The appellate
court will review all contempt orders to insure that they are not arbitrary, capricious, or
oppressive.

MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC., RULE 26.03. PROCEDURES DURING TRIAL
Subd. 1. Presence of Defendant.
(1) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of
the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the
verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. If the
defendant is handicapped in communication, a qualified interpreter for that defendant shall also
be present at each of these proceedings.
(2) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of a trial to and including
the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to waive the
right to be present whenever:
1. A defendant voluntarily and without justification absents himself or herself after trial
has commenced; or
2. A defendant after warning engages in conduct which is such as to justify being
excluded from the courtroom because it tends to interrupt the orderly procedure of the court and
the due course of the trial. As an alternative to exclusion, the court may use all such methods of
restraint as will ensure the orderly procedure of the court and the due course of the trial.
(3) Presence Not Required. A defendant need not be present in the following situations:
1. A corporation may appear by counsel for all purposes;
2. In the case of felonies and gross misdemeanors, on defendant's motion, the court may
excuse the defendant from attendance at any proceeding except arraignment, plea, trial, and
imposition of sentence; and
3. In prosecutions for misdemeanors, the court shall permit arraignment and plea in the
defendant's absence if the court is satisfied that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily
waived the right to be present. The court with the written consent of the defendant, or the
defendant's oral consent in open court, may permit trial, and imposition of sentence in the
defendant's absence.
4. The court in its discretion and upon agreement of the defendant may allow the
participation by telephone of one or more parties, counsel, or the judge in any proceedings in
which the defendant would otherwise be permitted to waive personal appearance under these
rules.
Subd. 2. Custody and Restraint of Defendants and Witnesses.
a. During the trial the defendant shall be seated so as to effectively consult with defense
counsel and to see and hear the proceedings.

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b. An incarcerated defendant or witness shall not appear in court in the distinctive attire
of a prisoner.
c. Defendants and witnesses shall not be subjected to physical restraint while in court
unless the trial judge has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order or security.
A trial judge who orders such restraint, shall state the reasons on the record outside the presence
of the jury. Whenever physical restraint of a defendant or witness occurs in the presence of
jurors trying the case, the judge shall on request of the defendant instruct those jurors that such
restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt.
Subd. 3. Use of Courtroom. Whenever appropriate in view of the notoriety of the case
or the number or conduct of news media representatives present at any judicial proceeding, the
court shall ensure the preservation of decorum by instructing those representatives and others as
to the permissible use of the courtroom and other facilities of the court, the assignment of seats to
news media representatives on an equitable basis, and other matters that may affect the conduct
of the proceeding.

Comment on Binding, Gagging, and Removal of Criminal Defendants
[Judge’s Criminal Benchbook]
GENERALLY: The accused has the right to be present at every stage of the trial. U.S. Const.
amend. VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The accused,
however, does not have the right to disrupt the trial. Therefore, appropriate steps may be taken to
assure that orderly process of trial. State v. Stewart, 276 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1979).
?

Every Stage of Trial - The right to be present extends to every stage of trial:
arraignment, omnibus hearing, impaneling the jury, trial, and sentencing. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.03, subd. 1(1); State v. Terrell, 283 N.W.2d 529 (Minn. 1979); State v. Grey, 256
N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1977). The right to be present at every critical stage of the trial does
not include in-chamber conferences on matters of law. State v. Holmes, 374 N.W.2d 457
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).

?

Freedom From Restraint - Encompassed in the right to a fair trial is the right to be
present free of physical restraints. State v. Stewart, supra; State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn.
384, 97 N.W.2d 472 (1959).

?

Waiver - Both the right to be present and the right to be unrestrained may be waived by
the defendant. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(2). Conduct may be the equivalent of
waiver. Illinois v. Allen, supra; State v. Coursolle, supra. A defendant can waive the
right to be present at closing argument, through absence. State v. Del Castillo, 411
N.W.2d 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).

?

Reinstating the Rights - Once these rights have been waived, the defendant may regain
them by giving assurance of willingness to behave consistently with the decorum and
respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. Illinois v. Allen, supra.

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NOTE: The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the majority view that a
defendant's disruptive conduct is not grounds for a mistrial. State v. Shiue, 326
N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1982) (no mistrial required after defendant attacked witness
in court, cutting her face with a knife).

OBSTREPEROUS DEFENDANT
?

Preferred practice - The trial court issues a warning before instituting any sanctions. If
the warning is not effective, the court should then use sanctions of increasing severity.
(Restraints and gagging are considered the most severe sanctions.) State v. Stewart,
supra; State v. Ware, 498 N.W. 2d 454 (Minn. 1993).
CONTEMPT WARNING: Recalcitrant defendants should be warned that they
may be criminally liable for contumacious behavior. Criminal contempt is a
misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. § 588.20.

?

Options - There are three constitutionally permissible ways to handle an obstreperous
defendant:
(1) Contempt (See above);
(2) Removal (See below);
(3) Physical restraints. Illinois v. Allen, supra; State v. Stewart, supra.

?

Removal - If a defendant, after warning, engages in conduct which interrupts the orderly
procedure of the court and due course of the trial, the defendant may be removed from
the courtroom. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(2) 2. State v. Jones, 247 N.W.2d 427
(Minn. 1976); State v. McRae, 371 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (continuous
interruption of prosecutor’s argument is ground for removal).
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD:
♦

Be required to be present in the court building while the trial is in
progress;

♦

Be given the opportunity of learning of the trial proceedings through
defense counsel at reasonable intervals; and

♦

Be given a continuing opportunity to return to the courtroom during the
trial upon assurance from the defendant of good behavior. The defendant
should be summoned to the courtroom at appropriate intervals and invited
to remain, with the offer to remain repeated in open court each time.
See IABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 6-38 (2nd ed. 1980).

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?

Physical Restraints - The court may use all such methods of restraint as will ensure the
orderly procedure of court and the due course of the trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd.
1(2)2.
PROCEDURE: The defendant shall be subject to physical restraint only if the
trial court has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order or
security. If the trial judge orders restraints, the judge should state the reasons on
the record outside the presence of the jury. State v. Hogetvedt, 488 N.W. 2d 487
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992). State v. Lehman, 511 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1994). Whenever
physical restraint of a defendant or witness occurs in the presence of jurors trying
the case, the judge shall on request of the defendant instruct the jurors that such
restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 2c. State v. Stewart, 276 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1979),
states the Minnesota Supreme Court's position:
(1) Restraints should not be ordered unless eminently necessary (shackling
should be virtually a matter of last resort), and
(2) Once this necessity has been shown, only those restraints which are
reasonable and least coercive under the circumstances should be imposed.
FACTORS: In State v. Stewart, supra, the Supreme Court stated the following
factors should be weighed:
(1) The seriousness of the present charge against the defendant;
(2) Defendant's character and temperament;
(3) Defendant's age and physical attributes;
(4) Past escapes or attempts and evidence of a present plan to escape;
(5) Defendant's past record;
(6) Threats to harm others or cause a disturbance;
(7) Self-destructive tendencies;
(8) The risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others;
(9) The possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large;
(10) The size and mood of the audience;
(11) The nature and physical security of the courtroom; and
(12) The adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.
APPLICATIONS:
(1) Immediate necessity for the shackling is required. State v. Coursolle, supra.
(2) Actual misconduct is unnecessary: threat of misconduct is sufficient. State v.
Jones, 311 Minn. 176, 247 N.W.2d 472 (1976).
(3) Where security measures require it, there is no impropriety in bringing a
defendant to court in manacles, provided appropriate steps are taken to minimize the
defendant's exposure to the jury's view and the handcuffs are removed before entering the
courtroom. State v. Klinkert, 271 Minn. 548, 136 N.W.2d 399 (1965); see State v. Scott,
323 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1982) (trial court justified in requiring defendant to wear leg
restraints, except when testifying, where the restraints were not visible to jury).

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DISRUPTIVE WITNESS: The right to a fair trial includes the right to have witnesses appear
unmanacled. State v. Coursolle, supra. However, this right may give way to interests of security
and an orderly presentation of trial.
?

Restraining Witnesses - The considerations listed above for restraining the defendant
have equal force with respect to restraining witnesses. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 2c;
State v. Stewart, supra.

?

Transporting Witness - Incarcerated witnesses may be brought to court in manacles.
Appropriate steps must then be taken to minimize the jury's exposure to the restraint.
The cuffs should be removed before the witness enters the jury's presence. State v.
Klinkert, supra; accord, State v. Coursolle, supra.

CAVEAT: SECURITY MEASURES: The use of special security measures such as metal
detectors and frisks of people could prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial by creating an
atmosphere indicative of guilt or inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. Thus, where
there is a possible threat to the security of the courtroom, the trial court should, after consulting
with counsel: 1) Take a particular course of action only if it is reasonably necessary; and 2)
should do everything possible to minimize the danger of prejudice. State v. Aguilar, 352 N.W.2d
395, 397 (Minn. 1984) (defendant searched in presence of jury; no prejudice where jurors also
searched, cautionary instruction given, and evidence of guilt strong). The presence of uniformed
state troopers at a criminal trial (to supplement the regular security force) in the front row of the
spectators' section is not necessarily unconstitutional. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106
S.Ct. 1340 (1986) (issue is prejudice-whether inherent or actual; not shown in this case).

CONTROL OF THE JURY
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC., RULE 2.01. BEHAVIOR AND CEREMONY IN GENERAL
***
(d) The Jury. Jurors shall take their places in the jury box before the judge enters the
courtroom. Court personnel shall assemble the jurors when court is reconvened.
When a jury has been selected and is to be sworn, the presiding judge or clerk shall
request everyone in the courtroom to stand.
***
(g) Manner of Administration of Oath. Oaths and affirmations shall be administered
to jurors and witnesses in a slow, clear, and dignified manner. Witnesses should stand near the
bench, or witness stand as sworn. The swearing of witnesses should be an impressive ceremony
and not a mere formality.

1-1-15

MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. TITLE II, PART H. MINN. CIV. TRIALBOOK. SECTION 12.
EXHIBITS
***
(f) When Exhibits to be Given to Jurors. Exhibits admitted into evidence, subject to
cursory examination, such as photographs and some other demonstrative evidence, may be
handed to jurors only after leave is obtained from the court.
Other exhibits admitted into evidence, not subject to cursory examination, such as
writings, shall not be handed to jurors until they retire to the jury room upon the cause being
submitted to them. If a party contends that an exhibit not subject to cursory examination is
critical and should be handed to jurors in the jury box during the course of the trial, counsel shall
request leave from the court. Such party shall be prepared to furnish sufficient copies of the
exhibit, if reasonably practicable, for all jurors in the event such leave is granted; and upon
concluding their examination, the jurors should return the copies to the bailiff. In lieu of copies,
and if reasonably practicable, enlargements or projections of such exhibits may be utilized. The
court may permit counsel to read short exhibits or portions of exhibits to the jury.
(g) Exhibits Admitted in Part. If an exhibit admitted into evidence contains some
inadmissible matter, e.g., a reference to insurance, excluded hearsay, opinion or other evidence
lacking foundation, the court, outside the hearing of the jury, shall specify the excluded matter
and withhold delivery of such exhibit to the jurors unless and until the inadmissible matter is
physically deleted.
Such redaction may be accomplished by photocopying or other copying which deletes the
inadmissible portions, and in such event, the proponent of such exhibit shall prepare and furnish
a copy.
If redaction by such copying is not accomplished, the parties shall seek to reach a
stipulation as to other means; and failing so to do, the admissible matter may be read into
evidence with leave of the court.
(h) Evidence Admitted for a Limited Purpose. When evidence is received for a
limited purpose or against less than all other parties, the court shall so instruct the jury at the time
of admission and, if requested by counsel, during final instructions.
MINN. STAT. § 631.09. HOW AND WHERE THE JURY MUST BE KEPT WHILE
DELIBERATING; REQUIRING SEPARATE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR JURORS
At the close of the evidence and after the court has charged the jury, the jury may decide
the case in court or retire for deliberation. If the jury cannot agree on a verdict without retiring,
the court shall swear one or more officers to take charge of the jury. The jury must be kept
together in some private and convenient place without food or drink except water unless ordered
by the court. No person may be permitted to speak or communicate with any juror, unless by
order of court, nor may a person listen to its deliberations. The jury must be returned to court
upon agreeing on a verdict or when so ordered by the court. In case of mixed juries counties

1-1-16

shall provide adequate, separate quarters for male and female jurors with proper
accommodations. If the county fails to provide proper accommodations, the court shall order the
jurors to be housed in a suitable hotel for the night.
This section applies only if the jury has failed to agree.
MINN. RULES CRIM. PROC., RULE 26.03. PROCEDURES DURING TRIAL
***
Subd. 5. Sequestration of the Jury.
(1) In the Discretion of the Court. During the period from the time the jurors are sworn
until they retire for deliberation upon their verdict, the court, in its discretion, may either permit
them and any alternate jurors to separate during recesses and adjournments or direct that they be
continuously kept together during such period under the supervision of proper officers. With the
consent of the defendant the court, in its discretion, may allow the jurors to separate over night
during deliberation. The officers shall not speak to or communicate with any juror concerning
any subject connected with the trial nor permit any other person to do so, and shall return the
jury to the courtroom at the next designated trial session.
(2) On Motion. Either party may move for sequestration of the jury at the beginning of
trial or at any time during the course of the trial. Sequestration shall be ordered if it is
determined that the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that, in the absence
of sequestration, highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the attention of the jurors.
Whenever sequestration is ordered, the court in advising the jury of the decision shall not
disclose which party requested sequestration.

Comment on Jury Separation [Judge’s Criminal Benchbook]
SEPARATION: Once the case is submitted to the jury, the jury must be kept together under the
charge of an officer of the court and separated from others until returned into court when they
have agreed upon a verdict or when ordered by the court. Minn. Stat. § 631.09. The officer
should be charged as provided in Minn. Stat. § 358.07(5).
?

Separation Upon Consent of Defendant - With the consent of the defendant, the court
in its discretion may allow the jurors to be sent home overnight during deliberations.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03(5); State v. Harris, 333 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 1983), State v.
Sanders, 355 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The jury should be sequestered if it
recesses overnight during deliberations unless the defendant consents to separation.
However, a violation of this rule does not raise a presumption of prejudice. State v.
Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1985); State v. Sanders, 376 N.W.2d 196 (Minn.
1985).
VOIR DIRE: Where jurors are allowed to separate, the trial court should conduct a
brief voir dire of the jury the next morning to determine if there was any information

1-1-17

concerning the case conveyed to jurors by any means. If any information was
transmitted, the court should weigh its effect on that juror or jurors. State v. Sanders,
supra.
CAVEAT: The presence of counsel is required at all critical stages of a criminal
proceeding; voir dire has been held to be a critical stage. See State v. McGath, 352
N.W.2d 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (exclusion of defense counsel during questioning
of juror to determine possible actual bias is reversible error).
PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE: Mere separation of the jury during deliberations
does not raise a presumption of prejudice. Prejudice will be presumed, however,
upon a showing of any private communication or contact or any other circumstances
suggestive of improper influence or jury tampering. Once this presumption arises, the
state bears the burden of overcoming the presumption even though defense counsel
consented to the separation. State v. Sanders, 376 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. 1985); State v.
Anderson, supra (no Sanders- type prejudice found).

Comment on Jury Communication [Judge’s Criminal Benchbook]
COMMUNICATIONS TO JURY: No communications to the deliberating jury may be made by
anyone other than the officer in charge of the jury and then only upon order of the court. Minn.
Stat. § 631.09.
?

Judges are included within Minn. Stat. § 631.09 - In a criminal case, any
communication relating to the case occurring during the trial judge's uninvited entry into
the jury room during deliberations and in the absence of defendant and counsel
constitutes reversible error. State v. Mims, 306 Minn. 159, 235 N.W.2d 381(1975).
Substantive communication by a court officer to jury without the trial court's consent is
presumptively prejudicial and reversible error. State v. Jurek, 376 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (bailiff answered deliberating jury's question regarding re-reading of
testimony; found to be improper).

?

Inquiry Regarding Deliberations - If practical considerations make it necessary for the
court to determine how much longer the jury will deliberate (i.e., overnight, through a
meal, etc.), the court should recall the jury to the courtroom and direct the jury foreperson
to poll the jury in private in the jury room, and return and inform the judge whether a
majority does or does not believe a verdict can be reached by a certain time. State v.
Mims, supra; State v. Olson, 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. 1977). Coercion of jury to reach a
verdict is a ground for reversal of conviction. State v. Holly, 350 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984); State v. Vann, 372 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (no coercion;
solicitous concern for jury demonstrated). It is improper for a judge upon inquiring into
deliberations, to comment negatively on the failure of a juror to vote. See Holmes v.
State, 394 N.W.2d 818 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (jury not coerced to reach a verdict).

1-1-18

CAVEAT: The above inquiry could result in reversible error if the answer
discloses the numerical division of the jury. One court's solution is to explain to
the jury foreperson that the court is asking questions the answer to which might
reasonably be expected to disclose the numerical division of the jury and direct
the foreperson to advise the court only that a majority of the jury believes a
verdict can be reached or a majority does not. See People v. Luther, 53 Mich.
App. 648, 219 N.W.2d 812 (1974) cited with approval in State v. Mims, supra.
But see Holmes v. State, supra, in which judge was told numerical count of
verdict; appeals court did not address issue.
?

Possibility of Sequestration - Comments alerting jury to the possibility of sequestration
are proper. State v. True, 378 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. Ct. App. l985) (permissible to tell jurors
that if case ends tomorrow, they will be sequestered tomorrow); State v. Vann, 372
N.W.2d 750 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

?

Presence of Parties - All communication must be done in the courtroom and in the
presence of the attorneys and the defendant. State v. Mims, supra. This right may be
waived by the defendant. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 1(2).
NOTE: All notes from the jury and all response of the court to the jury should be
made a part of the record.

?

Information After Retirement
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: After beginning deliberations, the jury may
request additional instruction by the court. If so, the jurors, after notice to the
prosecutor and defense counsel, shall be conducted to the courtroom and be given
appropriate instructions. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19(3)1. The judge should
be available for questions from the jury during deliberations. State v. Jurek,
supra. (Note that the recommended procedure for jury requests is for the
jury foreperson to submit the request in writing to the bailiff who shall pass
it on to the judge.)
DISCRETION TO BALANCE INSTRUCTIONS: The court need not give
additional instructions beyond those specifically requested by the jury, but in its
discretion the court may give or repeat other instructions to avoid giving undue
prominence to the requested instructions. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19 (3)2.
See, e.g., State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 238-239 (Minn. 1982) (court
responded to jury's specific questions regarding the defense of mental illness by
rereading the instruction it had given earlier).
AT COURT’S MOTION: The court, after notice to the prosecutor and defense
counsel, may recall the jury after it has retired and give any additional instructions
as the court deems appropriate. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19(3)3.

?

Deadlocked Jury - Partial verdicts and discharge of jury are discussed in VERDICT,
8-32, supra.

1-1-19

?

Preventative Instruction - The trial court should give the instruction approved in State
v. Martin, 297 Minn. 359, 211 N.W.2d 765 (1973), as part of its original instructions,
thereby forewarning the jury how it should proceed to forestall a deadlock.

?

After Apparent Deadlock - The Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly disapproved
the Allen "dynamite" charge, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), or instructions
designed solely to coax the undecided jury toward a verdict. State v. Martin, supra. The
court has, however, held that it was not prejudicial error to give the Martin instruction for
the first time when the jury appeared to be deadlocked where the instruction was
balanced and was neither intended to nor likely to coerce a verdict. State v. Packer, 295
N.W.2d 266 (Minn. 1980).
THE MARTIN CHARGE: Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may
give an instruction which informs the jury that:
(1) in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(2) jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual
judgment;
(3) each juror must decide the case, but only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with fellow jurors;
(4) in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine
own views and change opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(5) no juror should surrender an honest conviction as to the weight or
effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of fellow jurors, or for the
mere purpose of returning a verdict.

?

Jury Requests to Review Evidence - The court may respond to a jury's request to
review certain testimony. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19(2). Whether or not to grant a
jury's request for a reading of trial testimony is within the discretion of the trial court
[State v. Daniels, 332 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1983) (rejecting the ABA rule that requires
that any reasonable request be granted); State v. Scott, 277 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1979)],
but a categoric refusal to honor any such request is an abuse of discretion. State v.
Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1980).

?

Narrowing a Request - The court, instead of denying a request, may attempt to narrow
the request to an acceptable level of testimony. See State v. Scott, supra; State v.
Spaulding, supra.

?

Balancing Testimony - The court need not submit evidence to the jury for review
beyond that specifically requested by the jury, but in its discretion the court may also
have the jury review other evidence relating to the same factual issue so as not to give
undue prominence to the evidence requested. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19(2)2.
Note, however, that it has been held that it is impermissible and prejudicial to omit
portions of the selected testimony during the reading to the jury where the portions

1-1-20

omitted were those supporting defendant's case. See State v. Lubenow, 310 N.W.2d 52,
58 (Minn. 1981).
?

Procedures - The jurors shall be conducted to the courtroom. The court, after notice to
the prosecutor and defense counsel, may have the requested parts of the testimony read to
the jury and permit the jury to re-examine the requested materials admitted into evidence.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19(2)1. State v. Krauschaar, 470 N.W.2d 509 (Minn.
1991).
CAVEAT: STRICKEN TESTIMONY: The reading of testimony to the jury has
been held impermissible and prejudicial where it contained testimony which was
stricken from the record. See State v. Lubenow, supra.

1-1-21

K-CRT SEC RPT

State of Minnesota

District Court

County

Judicial District:

Court Security Incident
Reporting Form

Time and Date of Incident ________ (a.m.) (p.m.) _____________ , ______
Location: ______________________________________________________

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Was there a weapon involved?
Were any threats made?
Was anyone in fear of being harmed?
Was an assault committed?
Was anyone injured?
Was law enforcement notified?
Were any hostages involved?
Were any arrests made?

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Statement of Facts: (Please explain any "yes" answers. Attach additional sheets if necessary.)

Persons Involved in the incident:

Witnesses to the Incident:

Name of Person Preparing Report

Date of Report

Address:

Copies of this form should be sent to the local sheriff's department and to:
Special Agent in Charge
Judicial Security Incident Reporting
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
1246 University Avenue
St. Paul, Minnesota 55104

Page 1 of 1

Approved by Conference of Chief Judges

1-2-1

7/18/93

Revised: 1/1/93

JUDICIAL PERSONNEL PROFILE
Full Name:
Title:
Office Address:

Office Telephone:

Home Address:

Home Telephone:

Regular Work Hours:

Days:

Number of Persons Residing at Home:

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Height:

Weight:

Hair:

Eyes:

Scars, Glasses, Facial Hair, and Other Special Identifying Marks:

Medical Conditions/Allergic Reactions:

Medication Required/Intervals:

Blood Type:

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION - RESTRICTED ACCESS

1-3-1

Page 1 of 3

PERSONAL/FAMILY PHYSICIANS
Doctor’s Name:

Address:

Telephone:

Doctor’s Name:

Address:

Telephone:

Languages Spoken:
Regularly Scheduled Activities:
Locations:
Do You Own a Firearm?
Location(s)?

Office

YES

NO

Residence
Cabin
Other
PERSONALLY OWNED VEHICLES

VEHICLE #1

VEHICLE #2

VEHICLE #3

Primary Driver(s):

Primary Driver(s):

Primary Driver(s):

License Plate/State:

License Plate/State:

License Plate/State:

Make:

Make:

Make:

Model:

Model:

Model:

Year:

Year:

Year:

Color:

Color:

Color:

Style:

Style:

Style:

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION - RESTRICTED ACCESS

1-3-2

Page 2 of 3

RESIDENTIAL INFORMATION / FLOOR PLANS
Address:

Telephone:

Type of Residence:

Type of Neighborhood:

Single Family Residence
Townhouse/Duplex
Multi-Family Residence
Apartment

Urban
Suburban - populated
Suburban - secluded
Rural/Farm
Resort/Vacation
Other

Other

Number of Floors:

Garage Door Opener:

Number of Entrances:

Number of Windows/Skylights:

Basement Access: Yes

No

Yes

No

Roof Access to Residence: Yes No

RESIDENTIAL ALARM SYSTEM
TYPE OF ALARM SYSTEM:
Is it Operational?

YES

NO

Does it Secure All Entrances?

YES

NO

Does it Have Back-up Power?

YES

NO

Does it Detect Smoke?

YES

NO

Does it Detect Heat?

YES

NO

Does it Alert the Police?

YES

NO

Does it Alert the Fire Department

YES

NO

Type(s) of Doors:

Solid Wood

Type(s) of Door Locks:

Dead-Bolt

Hollow Wood/Metal
Dead-Latch

Screen

Cylinder

Chain

Glass
Bar

Miscellaneous Residential-Related Information:

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION - RESTRICTED ACCESS

1-3-3

Page 3 of 3

CHAPTER 2
COURT SECURITY
MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT

COURT SECURITY COMMITTEES
The Conference of Chief Judges has established a standing Court Security Committee for each
district or county within the State of Minnesota.
Court Security Committees should consist of the following persons or their designees:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Sheriff (principal coordinator and co-chair)
Judicial Representative (co-chair)
Court Administration Representative
County Administration Representative
Building Services Representative
County/City Attorney
Public Defender
Probation Office Representative

The Responsibilities of the Committee Include but Are Not Limited to:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Develop a Strategic Security Plan
Assist in Developing Security Recommendations for Courthouse Renovation
Ensure the Proper Dissemination of Court Security Information
Develop Security Policies and Procedures (see below samples re: Photographic,
Telephonic and Recording Equipment and Court Order)
Recommend Site Appropriate Security Awareness Training
Review and Assess Court Security Incidents
Ensure the Uniform Reporting of Court Security Incidents
Assist in the Determination and Allocation of Security Personnel
Ensure that Facility, Staff and Equipment Surveys/Audits Are Conducted on a Regular
Basis
Ensure that Safety and Evacuation Plans are Properly Disseminated
Photographic, Telephonic and Recording Equipment. A judge of this court may authorize still or video
photography of a ceremonial procedure in the courthouse. Cameras intended for personal use, that remain
inoperative and unobtrusive at all times, may be brought into the courthouse. No other cameras, whether film,
video, or any other photographic means, shall be permitted in the courthouse.

Sound recording devices, including telephonic devices, such as pagers and other sound
receiving, transmitting or enhancement devices, may be brought into a courthouse, but must
be inoperative and unobtrusive at all times they are in a courtroom or in any adjacent area
where their operation could be disruptive to any judicial proceeding. The Sheriff or designee
Court Security Officers are authorized to exclude from any courtroom, prohibit from any
courthouse, or confiscate any devices the Sheriff has reason to believe violates this rule.
All electronic devices shall be subject to visual and/or electronic inspection by the Sheriff or designee Court
Security Officers at any time, and such inspection may include a required demonstration by the person in
possession that the item is functional.

2-1-1

COURT ORDER
For the purpose of assisting in providing security in courthouses, offices situated
therein, and courtrooms.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff’s, Police Officers, Court
Security Officers, and contract security guards are hereby authorized to conduct searches of
all bags, parcels, packages, sacks, valises, briefcases, or any other container attempted to be
transported within any courthouse in this Judicial District, or within the areas of any other
building where court or grand proceedings are conducted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that anyone refusing to submit to such search shall be
refused admission to the premises.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no packages, bags, sacks, or other containers of any
kind shall be allowed in any courtroom or other room where court or grand jury proceedings
are being conducted at any time by anyone not in attendance on official business.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that except when to be used as an exhibit in an official
proceeding, or when law enforcement officers are producing prisoners for appearances or
providing court security services that no firearm or weapon (i.e. impact or edged weapons,
chemical spray, etc.) shall be taken into a courtroom, except by the Sheriff and/or Police
Officials and their Court Security Officers.
Firearms and other weapons to be used as exhibits shall be rendered safe by the case
agent and checked for safety by the Sheriff or Police Officials before they are taken in a
courtroom. Where the Sheriff or Police Officials are not available, the presiding judge may
designate a suitable person to confirm that the exhibit has been rendered safe.

Dated:

BY THE COURT:

Chief Judge

2-1-2

BUILDING SECURITY COMMITTEES
Other than all courthouse agencies being represented, the responsibilities and goals of a
Building Security Committee are considered identical to those of the Court Security Committee.
On June 28, 1995, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released the report Vulnerability Assessment
of Federal Facilities which provided recommended minimum security standards and application
to security levels of federal facilities (i.e. federal buildings that house court operations are rated
as Level IV facilities), survey profiles of existing security conditions at federal facilities, and
conclusions and recommendations. Recommendations center on the establishment of Building
Security Committees to evaluate existing security at federal facilities and recommend and make
improvements to meet the minimum standards identified in the reports.
Building Security Committee Meetings should be coordinated by the Courthouse Property
Manager using the existing Designated Official and Occupant Emergency Plan (see page 2.5)
organizational structures. These committees include but are not limited to those representative of
non-court-related agencies. They should be considered critical to the security evaluation process
and the implementation of long term enhancements designed to meet the minimum standards as
identified and outlined in the report Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities.
Where the courts and court support agencies are the sole occupants of a building, the district’s
Court Security Committee can serve the dual role/purpose of a Building Security Committee.
It is recommended that the federal policy and procedures concerning Building Security
Committees be adopted by county officials.
It is extremely important that Building and Court Security Committees are aware of the others’
planning and implementation schedules and how their interaction significantly affects courthouse
security. A representative of the Sheriff and/or Police Department should be a regular attendee
at all Building Security Committee meetings to ensure that the interests of security and the
judiciary are being represented.

2-2-1

COURTHOUSE PHYSICAL SECURITY
CHECKLIST
LIGHTING

PARKING AREAS

Is the entire perimeter lighted?

YES

NO

Are lights on all night?

YES

NO

Lights are controlled:
n Automatically
n Manually

YES
YES

NO
NO

Are control switches secured?

YES

NO

Do exterior/perimeter lights have an auxiliary
power source?

YES

NO

Excluding parking areas describe the lighting
conditions of building grounds areas?
n Fully illuminated
n Partially illuminated
n Not illuminated

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO

Is the building exterior sufficiently lighted to
discourage and observe unlawful entry and
placement of explosive devices?

YES

NO

Are public areas sufficiently lighted to discourage
and detect assaults on persons?

YES

NO

Are parking area entrances and exits controlled by:
n Guard
n Controlled Access System
n Other

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO

Is a courthouse parking area provided?

YES

NO

Do reserved parking spaces block courthouse
access to emergency vehicles?

YES

NO

Is there reserved parking for judges?
Is there reserved parking for jurors and witnesses?

YES
YES

NO
NO

Does anyone else have reserved parking?
Specify:

YES

NO

Are parking spaces reserved by name?
Are parking spaces reserved by number?

YES
YES

NO
NO

Is there direct judicial access from parking areas to
restricted or security elevators and corridors?

YES

NO

2-3-1

LANDSCAPING

Do landscaping features provide places for
intruders to conceal themselves?

YES

NO

Are there items such as bricks, stones, and wooden
fence posts which could be used by intruders to
gain courthouse access and/or commit assaults?

YES

NO

Are all exterior doors and windows equipped with
cylinder locks, dead bolts, dead latches, or quality
padlocks and latches?

YES

NO

Are all hinge pins internally located, welded, or
otherwise secured from easy removal?

YES

NO

Are all unused doors permanently locked?

YES

NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

Are roof/penthouse openings secured?

YES

NO

Is internal access to the roof/penthouse secured?

YES

NO

Is the roof accessible by means of:
n Fire Escape
n Adjacent Building
n Utility Pole or Tree
n Other:

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO

Do roof/penthouse openings have intrusion alarms?

YES

NO

Are other openings to the courthouse (tunnels,
service ports, culverts, utility/sewer manholes)
secured?

YES

NO

Has a quality control key system been
implemented?

YES

NO

Are building master keys secured and issued solely
on a controlled basis?

YES

NO

Is the number of public entrances reduced to the
minimum number necessary?

YES

NO

If so, describe items:

DOORS, WINDOWS
AND OTHER
OPENINGS

Are windows that could be entered secured with:
n
n
n
n
n

Locking Devices
Metal Bars
Mesh
Intrusion Alarms
Other:

2-3-2

CEILINGS AND
WALLS

Do judicial and court officers have a private
entrance to the courthouse?

YES

NO

Do interior walls extend to the decking?

YES

NO

Are drop or removable ceiling tiles used?

YES

NO

Are private elevators provided for judges?

YES

NO

Are certain elevators exclusively used to move
prisoners?

YES

NO

Are prisoner elevators controlled and marked for
non-public use?

YES

NO

Are prisoner elevators key controlled?

YES

NO

Are prisoner elevators programmed to bypass
floors?

YES

NO

Are prisoners placed in the elevator in a separate
holding area secured by metal bars or grilles?

YES

NO

Are judicial and prisoner elevators equipped with:
n Panic Alarms
n Telephones
n CCTV
n Intercoms
n Other:

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

Is the main power source dependable?

YES

NO

Is there a dependable auxiliary power source for
emergencies?

YES

NO

List Locations:

ELEVATORS

STORAGE AREAS Which of the following materials are stored in the
courthouse?
FOR WEAPONS AND n Firearms
n Intermediate Weapons (stun guns, mace, riot
AMMUNITION
n
n
n
n
n

batons, pepper spray, etc.)
Ammunition
Chemical Munitions (tear gas)
Hazardous Materials
Flammable Materials
Explosive Materials

How are said materials secured:

EMERGENCY
POWER SYSTEM

2-3-3

When was the last documented record of the
system being tested?

PERIMETER
ALARM SYSTEMS

Does the courthouse have an intrusion alarm
system?

YES

NO

Is the system tested on a monthly basis?

YES

NO

Where does the system report:
n Sheriff’s Department
n Police Department
n Central Station Monitoring
n Local Annunciation
n Other:

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

Is there an emergency power source for courthouse
alarm systems?

YES

NO

Does the courthouse comply with local fire codes?

YES

NO

Does the courthouse have fire alarms?

YES

NO

Does the courthouse have smoke detectors?

YES

NO

Does the courthouse have a fire sprinkler system?

YES

NO

Does the courthouse have fire extinguishers?

YES

NO

Are courthouse fire evacuation drills conducted
and actively participated with?

YES

NO

Are emergency exits and fire escapes prominently
identified and marked?

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

YES

NO

Who conducts and documents testing procedures?

FIRE PROTECTION

Are communications considered adequate?
COURTHOUSE
COMMUNICATIONS What courthouse communications are available?
n
n
n
n
n
n

Telephone
Interoffice Mail
Radio
Teletype
E-mail
Public Address System

Is there more than one communications system
used exclusively by security personnel?

2-3-4

Who operates the Public Address System?

PUBLIC AREAS

COURTHOUSE
POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES

Communications in the courthouse consist of:
n Sheriff’s or Security Base Station
n Hand-Held Portable Radios
n Cellular and/or Hard-Wired Telephones

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO

Can communications network with:
n Local Police
n State Police
n Other Sheriff’s Departments
n Other:

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO

Do base stations have auxiliary emergency power?

YES

NO

Does the courthouse have a main switchboard?

YES

NO

Are public waiting areas routinely searched?

YES

NO

Are waiting rooms next to courtrooms?

YES

NO

Are drop ceiling tiles used in waiting areas?

YES

NO

Are public restrooms routinely searched?

YES

NO

Are restrooms next to courtrooms?

YES

NO

Are drop ceiling tiles used in restrooms?

YES

NO

Do trash receptacles allow easy access and
concealment to contraband and illegal items?

YES

NO

Are directions (as appropriate - floor plans and
directories) clearly posted?

YES

NO

Are there security procedures manuals (OEP and
Contingency Plans) for the courthouse?

YES

NO

Are all plans updated and current?

YES

NO

Are all plans subject to periodic review?

YES

NO

Is responsibility for declaring an emergency clearly
and appropriately designated?

YES

NO

Is the authority and chain of command in
emergency plans clearly delineated?

YES

NO

Are there procedures for responding to medical
emergencies?

YES

NO

2-3-5

Are there procedures for responding to natural
disaster and weather emergencies?

YES

NO

Is there a specific person in the Sheriff’s
Department designated as the Court Security
Coordinator?

YES

NO

Is there a security presence after-hours?

YES

NO

YES

NO

If so, when:
and what hours:
Are there procedures for daily inspections or
security sweeps of the courthouse?

2-3-6

.

COURTROOM AND RELATE AREAS
DOORS, WINDOWS
and OTHER
OPENINGS

Are secondary courtroom doors secured?

YES

NO

Are the keys to courtroom doors strictly
controlled?

YES

NO

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO

Do the judge and prisoner courtroom entrances
permit visual observation (door viewers) prior
to entering?

YES

NO

Are all windows tinted or draped to prevent
viewing courtroom proceedings from the
outside?

YES

NO

Are metal detectors available for use?

YES

NO

Are fluoroscopes (x-ray machines) available
for use?

YES

NO

Is there emergency lighting?

YES

NO

Are emergency lights positioned so they do not
silhouette the judge?
YES

NO

Are emergency lights positioned so they
silhouette exits and the gallery?

YES

NO

Are courtroom lights key controlled or
activated from multiple switches (i.e. no one
or two switches will turn off all courtroom
lights)?

YES

NO

Are routine checks conducted of/for:
n Duress/Panic Alarms
n Emergency Lighting
n Metal Detectors
n Controlled Access Systems
n Door Hardware

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

Are there separate courtroom entrances/exits
for:
n Judges
n Jurors
n In-custody Defendants
n General Public

LIGHTING

COURTROOMS

2-3-7

n
n
n
n

CHAMBERS and
RELATED OFFICE
SPACE

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO

Is the judge’s bench reinforced with ballistic
resistant material?

YES

NO

Are there policies and procedures for firearms
carried in the courtroom by:
n Court Security Officers
n Case Agents
n Law Enforcement Witnesses
n Law Enforcement Spectators

YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO

Are Court Security Officers armed in the
courtroom?

YES

NO

Are Court Security Officers uniformed?

YES

NO

Are prisoners kept in restraints except in the
presence of jurors or while in the courtroom?

YES

NO

Are there emergency evacuation procedures
for:
n Judicial Officers
n Jurors
n Prisoner Defendants

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO

Are courtrooms secured and locked when not
in use?

YES

NO

Are judicial chambers routinely searched for
contraband?

YES

NO

Are controlled access systems utilized?

YES

NO

Are judicial chambers locked and secured
when not occupied?

YES

NO

When judicial chambers are occupied are the
doors usually:
n Open
n Closed and Unlocked
n Closed and Locked

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO

Communication Systems
Tampering/Vandalism
Contraband
Weapons

2-3-8

VICTIM/WITNESS
WAITING AREAS

JURY
DELIBERATION
ROOMS

Are victim/witness rooms provided?

YES

NO

Is it possible to separate prosecution and
defense witnesses?

YES

NO

Is public access to victim/witness areas
restricted?

YES

NO

Are victim/witness areas secured when not in
use?

YES

NO

Is the jury deliberation room adjacent to the
courtroom or accessible through a secured
corridor?

YES

NO

Is the deliberation room routinely searched
prior to use and secured/locked when not in
use?

YES

NO

2-3-9

PRISONER AREAS
PRISONER
PRODUCTION

TEMPORARY
HOLDING AREAS

GENERAL
PROCEDURES

Are prisoners brought to the courthouse and
courtroom by:
n Vehicles
n On Foot
n Elevator
n Stairwell
n Tunnel
n Bridge/Skyway

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

Are these area secured or restricted?

YES

NO

Do prisoners enter the courthouse through:
n Public Entrances
n Private Entrances
n Secured Sallyport

YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO

Are prisoners’ entrances restricted from public
contact and view?

YES

NO

YES

NO

Do holding cell areas directly access the
courtroom? Or, are restricted corridors used?

YES

NO

Is at least one holding cell area equipped with
audio video coverage of the courtroom?

YES

NO

Are holding cells areas regularly searched for
weapons and contraband?

YES

NO

Are additional prisoner restraining devices
available?

YES

NO

Are there written policies and procedures for
evacuating prisoners from holding cell areas?

YES

NO

Are there written policies and procedures for
responding to prisoner medical emergencies?

YES

NO

Are prisoner arrival/departure times made
known to other agencies and available to the
general public?

YES

NO

Are temporary prisoner holding facilities
located in the courthouse?
If not, where are prisoners secured:

2-3-10

COURTHOUSE CONTINGENCY PLANS
In the event of a critical incident and/or crisis situation occurring within a courthouse the Sheriff
and/or Police Department should implement the Courthouse Contingency Plan which consists of
the following:
?

The immediate response (inclusion of those areas of specifically required coverage) to an
incident by law enforcement and security personnel. Assignment of an on-site supervisor
to coordinate and ensure implementation of the plan.

?

Direct critical incident review and assessment.

?

Emergency notification telephone numbers of pre-designated officials. Notification itself
will be conducted by senior management or personnel previously authorized. In absence
of senior management officials, responding personnel must initiate notification
procedures.

?

Additional emergency notification telephone numbers of State of Minnesota and Federal
Law Enforcement Agencies. Information stating response times and the provision of
specialized emergency services (i.e. SWAT, Medical Support, Urban Recovery Teams,
Tactical Teams, etc.) is included.

?

State of Minnesota Hostage Negotiators Directory listing the respective agency, address,
city, 24 hour contact number, and name/title of the negotiator.

?

Activation procedures and operational requirements for security Command Posts.

?

Maps, diagrams, blueprints, and floor plans of all ingress/egress locations for the
courthouse.

?

Names, addresses, and 24 hour contact numbers of respective facility management,
utility, and maintenance personnel. Exact locations of Utility, Telecommunications,
Electrical, HVAC, Boiler, and Maintenance rooms are to be noted on facility blueprints
and floor plans.

?

Roster containing names, addresses, telephone and pager numbers of all Sheriff and/or
Police Officials. Individual Emergency Locator Forms are secured at respective facilities.

?

Facility parking assignments of the judiciary, support staff, and other agency personnel.

?

Evacuation procedures, to include designated areas of refuge, for judicial officers, staff,
employees, and the general public. Security personnel assignments are contained within
this section.

2-4-1

?

Photographs (aerial, exterior, and interior) of the courthouse facility and adjacent
grounds.

?

Copies of the Courthouse Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP).

SITUATIONAL CONTINGENCIES
SITUATION - This plan outlines the procedures, policies, and responsibilities for the safety of
all members of the judiciary as well as securing those areas used for conducting judicial
proceedings. The effectiveness of normal security operations could be disrupted and hampered
by incidents requiring emergency or security operational response.
?

Un-Friendly Forces - Composition of persons involved in civil disturbances, terrorist
activities, bomb threats, demonstrations, prisoner escapes, threatening behavior, hostage
situations, assaults, etc. In many cases they cannot be identified prior to their actions.

?

Friendly Forces - Composition of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and
support groups. These agencies may be requested and required to provide assistance
based on situational aspects.

?

Assumption - It is assumed that civil disturbances, bomb threats, demonstrations,
hostage situations, terrorist acts, etc. could be directed against courthouses and
government facilities due to the types of cases generated and agencies located there. It
must also be assumed that some incidents could be undertaken in opposition to
government policies and practices. This assumption is commonly referred to as the
Inherent Risk Factor for courthouse and government facilities.

EXECUTION - The Sheriff and/or Police Officials are primarily responsible for the protection
of personnel and property assigned to the judiciary and support staff. They are responsible for
all security functions involving the courts and will be in direct control of all forces committed to
supporting this plan to the extent of determining specific assignments for operational personnel.
?

Main Forces - (1) County Sheriff’s Department, (2) City Police Department, (3) Other
State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, (4) Federal Law Enforcement Agencies,
(5) Emergency Response Personnel, and (6) Military Assistance Personnel

?

Support Forces - (1) County/City Attorney, (2) Courthouse Property Manager, (3) Other
State and Local Agencies, (4) Federal Agencies, (5) Telecommunications Providers
(6) Utility Companies, and (7) Courthouse Elevator Service Contractors.

2-4-2

TASKS OF MAIN FORCES - Responsible for incident operations as outlined in the Building
Contingency Plan.
?

Sheriff and/or Police Officials - Direct control of all forces committed to proper
execution of this plan to include delegating assignments appropriate to the situation and
the apprehension of suspects.

?

FBI and other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies - Furnish investigative support,
incident response teams, apprehend suspects, and provide intelligence information on
situational aspects effecting (assessed and actual) the operation.

?

State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies - Support assignments as determined by
the Sheriff and/or Police Officials.. Provide personnel to secure and control areas
adjacent to the operation site. Apprehend suspects under their jurisdictional authority.

?

Emergency Response Personnel - First responders in providing medical care and
treatment. Sheriff and/or Police Officials to determine levels of security and safety prior
to organized response. Serve as technical advisors to Sheriff and/or Police Officials on
Biological and Chemical Agents.

?

Military Assistance - As determined by Sheriff and/or Police Officials and governed by
situational conditions, provide support services in the areas of tactical considerations,
special equipment considerations, and personnel reinforcements.

TASKS OF SUPPORT FORCES - Provide support services outlined as follows:
?

County and City Attorney - Legal Assistance, guidance, and specific information.

?

Courthouse Property Management - Knowledge of building electrical, mechanical,
plumbing, construction, and site specific space design features.

?

Other Federal Agencies - Support services as required by main forces.

?

State and Local Agencies - Support services as required by main forces.

?

Telecommunication and Utility Companies - Support services as required.

?

Elevator Contractors - Support services as required.

2-4-3

COURTHOUSE HOSTAGE SITUATIONS
Certain specific policies and procedures will be implemented in event of a hostage situation
occurring in courthouses, judicial facilities and leased space.
Upon activation of any duress/panic alarm, an appropriate number of law enforcement and
security personnel will be immediately dispatched to investigate and conduct a preliminary
assessment.
If it is determined that the alarm is real and a hostage situation exists, the following will be
carried out by responding security personnel:
?

Immediately establish a security perimeter for the affected area. The perimeter should
extend in scope to provide for all ingress/egress points (i.e. stairwells, doors, elevators,
windows, etc.) that the hostage taker(s) have access to.

?

If not equipped initially, perimeter personnel should be outfitted with communications
and other essential equipment as soon as practical.

?

Request the assistance of those agencies and officials responsible for tactical responses
and hostage negotiations. Prior contact with these agencies and officials should have
been initiated to confirm their assistance during hostage and emergency situations.
Security personnel can expect to be utilized as technical advisors for the duration of
incident. Consequently, it is incumbent upon and the responsibility of all personnel to
continually familiarize themselves with their areas of responsibility and layouts of all
courthouse space.
These areas of responsibility include, but are not limited to (1) familiarization of
prisoner court appearances, (2) ability to access prisoner background information from
computer databases, (3) acquired proficiency on the general design layout of courthouses
and facilities housing court components, and (4) knowledgeable on the type, location, and
operation of courthouse security systems.

?

If necessary, provide for and organize the systematic evacuation of courtrooms,
chambers, and other areas within the courthouse. Employees other than those of court
agencies may also be affected by decisions to evacuate the building.

?

The Sheriff and/or Police Officials may designate call signs or codes to responding
personnel. This will provide personnel with a means to confirm identity upon being
challenged and/or replaced by responding tactical units. The designated Command Post
is responsible for notifying other agency personnel of these assigned call signs.

?

Security personnel assigned to security perimeters are to remain on post until replaced by
responding tactical units. When replaced, security personnel will either (1) establish and

2-4-4

maintain an outer security perimeter while providing support, as directed, to tactical
units, or (2) report to the Command Post for a tactical debriefing.
n

All materials contained within the Courthouse Contingency Plan will be made readily
available to responding authorities.

NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) INCIDENTS
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has prepared incident contingency plans for each of these
situations. Designated as the lead federal law enforcement agency to respond to threats or acts of
domestic and international terrorism, the FBI has assumed primary responsibility for preparing
these plans.
Private companies such as Tempest Publishing (#703-370-2962) in Alexandria, Virginia,
specialize in NBC Incident Response Plans. Information available from them include “First
Responder Chem-Bio Handbook (FR-CBH)” a practical manual for first responders and
“Chem-Bio Frequently Asked Questions (CB-FAQ)” a guide to better understanding of
Biological and Chemical weapons.

ANTHRAX CONCERNS CARD
Copyright © 1999 Tempest Publishing

It is unlikely that you have been exposed to Anthrax, however, it is important to be alert to
possible signs of infection. The following signs are symptoms of Anthrax exposure:
Fever / Malaise / Fatigue / Cough / Mild Chest Discomfort followed by Severe Respiratory
Distress

While these are not absolute signs of infection, you should call the below number immediately
(insert ph# of Sheriff and/or Police Department)

ANTHRAX FACTS SHEET
Copyright © 1999 Tempest Publishing

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Clothing and other items worn at the time should be placed in plastic bags.
Upon arriving home, shower with soap and water.
If medication is prescribed it should be taken until you are instructed otherwise.
Symptoms usually occur within 1-6 days.
Initial symptoms are often followed by a short period of improvement (ranging in hours to
2-3 days).
If severe symptoms are present, seek immediate medical attention.
Anthrax can be successfully treated.
There has not been any documented cases of human-to-human transmission.

2-4-5

CHEM-BIO: QUICK RESPONSE CARD (CB-QRC)
Copyright © 1998 Tempest Publishing

Chemical Weapon (CW) Indicators
Biological Weapons (BW) Indicators
Suspicious Devices/Packages - unusual metal Unusual Liquid, Spray or Vapor - spraying
dispensers - suspicious devices or packages
debris - abandoned spray devices - leaking
packages - unexplained munitions
Unusual Conditions or Casualties - unusual
Unusual Liquid, Spray or Vapor - droplets - illness for region/area – definite pattern
oily film - unexplained odor - low lying clouds inconsistent with natural diseases - human
casualties
or fog unrelated to weather
Dying or Dead Animals – sick/dying animals
or fish

Dying or Dead Animals - lack of insects
Unexplained Conditions or Casualties serious illnesses - nausea - disorientation difficulty breathing - convulsions - definite
casualty patterns - multiple victims

Unusual swarms of insects

INCIDENT RESPONSE KEY CONTACT NUMBERS
U.S. Public Heath Service #1-800-872-6367

U.S. Army Ops Center #1-800-851-8061

Domestic Preparedness #1-800-368-6498

National Response Center #1-800-424-8802

INITIAL
ACTIONS
NOTIFICATION
ESSENTIALS

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Remain Calm
Don Protective Equipment
Maintain Safe Position - Reassure Victims
Await Properly Equipped Response
Wind Direction and Weather Conditions
Direction of Cloud or Vapor
Number/Location of Victims - Types of Injuries – Symptoms
Recommended Safe Access Route and Staging Area
Witness Statements and Observations

2-4-6

COURTHOUSE ESCAPE CONTINGENCIES
In the event of a prisoner escape(s) or attempted escape(s) emergency security procedures as
outlined in the Courthouse Escape Contingency Plan should be immediately implemented.
A general listing of Courthouse Escape Contingency Plan considerations include:
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?

Sheriff and/or Police response instructions
Securing Ingress and Egress Points
Systematic utilization of courthouse security systems
Search and Arrest procedures
Investigation and Evidence procedures
Witness Interview and Prisoner Interrogation procedures
Notification procedures for other State and Federal Law Enforcement Agencies
Judicial and Courthouse Employee notification procedures
Available assistance from resource agencies
Public announcements and Media news releases
Security and Threat Advisories
Determination and Procedures for Courthouse Evacuation

JUDICIAL PERSONNEL PROFILES
Extensively completed Judicial Personnel Profiles should be maintained for each member of the
Judiciary. The information contained within each profile is an integral part of courthouse
contingency plans. Consequently profile copies are secured in the same manner and locations as
contingency plans. A Judicial Personnel Profile Form is provided on page 1.4 of this manual.

GENERAL INFORMATION
Each identified court facility should have an individual building contingency plan that covers all
established considerations and features unique to that facility. The completed plan should be
secured in a location that is readily accessible to security personnel during emergency and crisis
situations. Communication/Dispatch Centers are recommended for this location as they are
centrally located, secured, and monitored.
It is strongly advocated that copies of the plan be secured off-site in the event of a terrorist
act/tragedy similar to the ones experienced at the World Trade Center in New York and the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In the event of such an incident, a copy of the
contingency plan and the essential information contained within would only be available to
responding personnel if it were previously secured at an off-site location.

2-4-7

Building Contingency Plans should explicitly cover and provide for the planned and organized
responses of law enforcement and emergency personnel to duress alarms, threats, hostage
situations, assaults, vandalism, dangerous individuals, prisoner escapes, etc. Areas of
contingency responsibilities (individual and shared) for the Sheriff, Police Department, and
Building Management should be clearly defined and outlined.
In addition to the policy and procedural guidelines previously stated in this section, the
following are also recommended for plan inclusion:

Videos of Courthouse
State, City, and County
Interior and Exterior
Maps
Concurrent
Interagency
Jurisdiction
Agreements

Availability of Military
Assistance/Specializati
on

Description and
Location of Security
Systems

Key Control Registers

Annual Crime
Courthouse Threat and Operations Security
Statistical Summaries
Risk Assessments
(OPSEC) Assessments

Local Infrastructure
and Transportation
Support

Courthouse Security
Surveys

Emergency Medical
Center Locations.

Example: Courthouse photographs and videos can be effectively used by law enforcement
personnel and emergency responders who have never been inside the courthouse or are
unfamiliar with the courthouse design and layout.

2-4-8

OCCUPANT EMERGENCY PLANS
Facility Occupant Emergency Plans (OEP) are developed in order to minimize the danger to life
and property arising from the effects of attack, fire, flood, explosion, serious weather conditions,
demonstrations, and other disasters affecting courthouse facilities.
The prescribed policies, procedures, and methods for the establishment of an OEP by agencies in
court controlled space should be implemented in accordance with recognized state and local
property management regulations.
Generally, the Prime Tenant of a building, the agency with the largest number of employees in
the building, is responsible for developing the OEP with assistance and involvement from other
tenant agencies. The Designated Official, usually a management employee of the prime tenant,
is responsible for approving the development of the OEP, to include conducting test drills for
natural disasters, fires, and weather emergencies.
The Sheriff and/or Police Department responsible for courthouse security should be listed as a
Technical Advisor for courthouse OEP’s. Sheriff and/or Police officials should make
themselves available to assist with the coordination and design of a site comprehension OEP.
The OEP itself is considered to be primarily a Life Safety Plan that supplements Sheriff
and/or Police prepared Contingency, Operational, Threat Specific, Evacuation, and
Prisoner Escape Plans.

2-5-1

OCCUPANT EMERGENCY PLAN
n

COURTHOUSE EMERGENCY INFORMATION

n

AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

n

OEP ORGANIZATION

n

DUTIES and RESPONSIBILITIES

n

SUCCESSION OF COMMAND

n

WARNING, SIGNAL, and EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

n

EVACUATION PROCEDURES

n

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

n

FLOOR TEAM DESIGNATIONS and ASSIGNMENTS

n

EMPLOYEE BOMB THREAT ACTION PLAN

n

EMPLOYEE FIRE ACTION PLAN

n

EMPLOYEE MEDICAL ACTION PLAN

n

EMERGENCY EVACUATION ROUTES

n

COURTHOUSE UTILITIES DIAGRAM

n

OPERATIONAL FORMS

n

LISTING OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

2-5-2

OCCUPANT EMERGENCY PLAN INCIDENT CHECKLIST
1. What is the nature of the emergency?
Bomb Threat
Airborne Toxin

Explosion
Biological/Chemical Agent
Dangerous Individual
Weather

Medical
Hostage Situation
Weapons Fire
Flood
Other:
YES
NO
2. Is there immediate danger to
other building areas?
Personnel:
3. What other facility areas are
in danger?
Infrastructure:
4. Are there any reported (or any
risks of) injuries?
5. Is medical assistance required
or present?
6. Has building evacuation been
ordered?
7. Have the Sheriff and Police
Department been notified?
8. Are OEP officials on-site?
9. Who reported the emergency?

Chemical Spill
Natural Disaster

Fire

Power Outage

Where?

YES

NO

Where?

YES

NO

Where?

YES

NO

State Area of Refuge:

YES

NO

Contact Info:

YES

NO

Who?

Name:
Title:
Telephone:

EVACUATION and SECURITY SWEEPS INFORMATION
10. Floor Evacuations and
Security Sweeps

Time Evacuation/Sweep Ordered:
Time Evacuation/Sweep Completed:

2-5-3

COURTHOUSE RENOVATION AND
PROSPECTUS PROJECTS
RENOVATION vs. REBUILDING
The fundamental question which needs to be addressed during an analysis of existing court
facilities is: “Should the facility be replaced or renovated?” In deciding whether to renovate an
existing structure or replace it, you should consider the following:
♦ Desired outcome;
♦ Costs; and
♦ Occupancy during renovation.
A study of comparisons between building new or renovating needs to be made. Once the
decision to renovate has been made, the specific design process should leverage existing,
positive features of the courthouse. In renovating a court facility, you should use a
comprehensive approach to resolve as many issues as possible as they relate to the overall
strategies of improving the court facility. The following are eight basic design issues which need
to be addressed:
♦
♦
♦
♦

Functionality
Security
Test of Time
Technology

♦
♦
♦
♦

Flexibility
Judicial Image/Preservation
Environmental
Accessibility

The process for design and renovation should consider master-planning for an ideal outcome
when embarking on the design and renovation of court facilities. When funds are not available
for total renovation, then a phased approach to accomplishing the total master plan is effective.
Phased implementation occurs as funds are available.

USING A PHASED APPROACH TO RENOVATION
These factors should be considered in using a phased approach to renovation of a court facility:
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Existing structural or physical features that will not allow significant change;
Historical features;
Area and size of the court floors;
Multiple entries due to the facilities urban location;
Accessibility; and
Feasible changes and alterations.

2-6-1

PRIORITIZING IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY
MEASURES
The design process will need to prioritize what can be accomplished given the challenges of
existing facilities and the ability to fund comprehensive renovation. From a security standpoint,
the following priorities are often effective:
♦
♦
♦
♦

Providing a singular building entry;
Providing separate and controlled access to judges and staff;
Providing duress buttons;
Separate waiting areas for the public, including attorney/client conference
rooms;
♦ Bullet-resistant materials in judge, reporter, witness and clerk benches; and
♦ Providing controlled detainee movement.

THE DESIGN PROCESS
The design process for renovation should involve judiciary, court personnel, county property
management, and architectural, engineering and security consultants familiar with the issues.
The design process will generally accomplish the following tasks:
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Setting goals and objectives
Survey of existing facilities
Development of space, function and security needs
Design options
Implementation of desired option
Construction and renovation

The renovation of a court facility is best accomplished when the court’s operation can move out
during construction. If this is not feasible, a Renovation Occupancy Plan needs to be developed
for the construction phase(s). Specifications need to address all aspects of this Security Manual
for the construction process in a manner that outlines the desired court operation and security
needs during construction. Periodic meetings with the Contractor(s) are necessary to review the
upcoming construction process, and to ensure safe and secure court operation during
construction of the court facility.

2-6-2

SPACE DESIGN AND LAYOUT
The past has provided many excellent examples of elements of good court facility design.
Changes in basic operations and evolving functional requirements for these facilities are the
focus of the changing environment for new court facilities. Changes in the legal process,
litigation procedures, technology, security consciousness, protocol and changes in the perceived
nature of the courts’ work have created the need for a re-definition of this significant building
type.
JUDICIAL DESIGN FACTORS - These factors, outlined on the following list of eight design
objectives, should be considered in the design of the modern courthouse.
n

Functionality:
User orientation through lobbies and organization;
Design for efficient court operations;
Allow for flexibility; and
Ample waiting/conference areas.

n

Security:
Single securable entry;
No blind spots;
Zoning to separate judicial, public, jury and detainee circulation;
Direct, secure detainee delivery to the courtrooms;
Special victim/witness waiting areas; and
Multiple waiting areas for separation of conflicting parties.

n

Test of Time:
Durable materials;
Generalized litigation spaces rather than over-specialization; and
Provide appropriate symbolism in the facility image.

n

Technology:
Provisions for the “virtual” courtroom;
Computerization of record-keeping and access to all courtroom and court
functions;
Provide for the future, even if it cannot be afforded now;
Video court reporting provisions; and
Video arraignment provisions.

n

Flexibility:
Equal access to all courtrooms by the judges;
Multiple use of courtrooms and court-related spaces;
Modular workstation approach for furniture and office layout;
Standardization of judicial quarters; and
Generalized litigation spaces rather than over-specialization.

2-7-1

n

Judicial Image:
Appropriate ceiling height and room volumes and spaces;
Provide traditional dignity in courtrooms while reducing excessive informality;
and
Appropriate courtroom sight lines and heights of judicial positions,
encouraging judicial process and protocol.

n

Environmental:
Acoustical control;
Lighting appropriate to tasks; and
Ventilation appropriate to the assembly occupancy.

n

Accessibility:
Design for equal access to all positions in courtrooms/courthouse.

SPACES & DESIGN FROM A SECURITY POINT OF VIEW - Space design and layout of
new court facilities from a security point of view is the emphasis of this security manual. A
more detailed list of spaces and their design from a security point of view is as follows:
n

Courtroom security - Security may be provided with architectural barriers,
technology, and operational methods. Architecturally, security is provided through
the clear separation of circulation routes for participants in the proceedings and the
elimination of spaces where a weapon or bomb might be placed. The public should
enter the courtroom from the public zone, prisoners should enter through a secure
zone, and judges and court staff should enter through a restricted or private zone.
Technologically, the courtroom an be made more secure through the use of
magnetometers at the entrance, bullet-absorptive materials along the judge’s bench,
and duress alarms connected to security stations to transmit an audio or visual
depiction of the action occurring in the courtroom. Operationally, bailiffs or court
deputies should be stationed in the courtroom during proceedings, and an emergency
response plan should be developed by facility users in the event that a situation arises.

n

Judge’s Bench Security - The front panel of the judge’s desk should be made of
bullet-absorptive materials. Care should be taken not to use steel-plated, bulletresistant materials, as this may cause bullets to ricochet through the courtroom.
The judge’s bench should have a concealed, silent, positive-action duress alarm that
will directly alert the courthouse security station or an employee trained in emergency
notification procedures. While care should be taken to avoid placement of the alarm
where it could be accidentally activated, the alarm should be within easy reach of the
judge, and its activation should be as inconspicuous as possible.

2-7-2

The button should also activate an audio or, preferably, video system within the
courtroom, which transmits to the security station. This will enable security
personnel to determine what is occurring in the courtroom and plan an appropriate
response.
n

Clerk’s Station Security - The court clerk’s station may have the same duress
alarm/intercom system as the judge, providing direct linkage with central security
through a foot- or knee-activated button under the work surface.

n

Court Reporter’s Station Security - As a court reporter could be sitting near a
potentially hostile and violent witness, the court reporter’s station should allow for an
easy escape.

n

The Witness Stand Security - The witness chair should be affixed to the floor to
ensure control of prisoners who must testify.

n

The Jury Box Security - The jury box should incorporate a modesty panel and shelf
area to provide some distance from trial participants. A bailiff or court deputy may
be stationed between the jury box and the spectators to prevent any communication or
intimidation.

n

Attorney Tables Security - The tables should not have drawers or concealed
recesses where a weapon or bomb may be placed.

n

The Bailiff’s Station Security - The bailiff must have access to a duress button,
which is connected to the main security office.

n

Spectator Seating Security - Security may be provided by placing magnetometers at
the public entrance to the courtroom, or, better, at the building entrance. It is also
desirable to separate opposing parties seated in the courtroom.

SECURITY SCREENING - Although incorporating all aspects of a recommended five
stage court security program (Deterrence, Prevention, Detection, Response, and Training),
security screening systems are primarily considered deterrence systems. It is conservatively
estimated that a minimum of ten times the number of weapons and/or contraband actually
detected at a screening system would have entered that facility if it had not established security
screening.
Architectural space design and system integration proposals for security screening must evolve
around the required association between security personnel/equipment and operational policies
and procedures relating to judicial security. A proper design layout also recognizes and
acknowledges the absolute necessity of providing security screening personnel with unobstructed
sight lines of persons entering the screening area. This Visual Assessment and Reaction Zone
affords personnel an opportunity to observe, assess, and appropriately respond to suspicious
persons exhibiting threatening behavioral characteristics.

2-7-3

As screening equipment and conditions vary, it is not possible to depict exactly where personnel
will be positioned. It is far more beneficial to generally state screening objectives and position
responsibilities which should provide sufficient information as well as desired flexibility in
finalizing a system design. Magnetometers (Walk-Thru Metal Detectors) are designed to detect
all metal objects, subject to programmed sensitivity levels, that persons attempt to pass through
the detector frame. A majority of the magnetometers in use today do not indicate where the
metal object is located other than on the person and/or article being screened. It is noted that
recently- designed magnetometers will provide general, and in some models, exact locations of
the detected metal object. On a contemporary basis, a hand-held metal detector must be used in
combination with the magnetometer in order to determine the exact location of the metal object
in question. Consequently, a discreet area of sufficient size (increases security and limits public
obtrusiveness) must be conveniently located in which to screen persons for such items.
To facilitate the screening process by eliminating alarms on commonly-carried items, persons are
directed to place all metal objects on an adjacent counter-top area. For each magnetometer, the
counter-top area should be a minimum of 36 inches wide in order to adequately provide for this
routine and continuous procedure.
Placement of the magnetometer(s) may be dictated by surrounding areas, or the location of a
second magnetometer, that interfere with its sensitivity readings. It may be necessary to slightly
reposition or even relocate the magnetometer(s) altogether if this is the case. In attempts to
eliminate this problem, it is recommended that preliminary site tests be conducted on all
proposed magnetometer locations.
Fluoroscopes (X-Ray Machines) are used primarily to enhance the abilities of security personnel
in detecting firearms, weapons, explosives, and contraband. Their use also facilitates the
screening of packages, boxes, personal items, etc., so as not to cause any unnecessary public
inconvenience or delay. Fluoroscope conveyor belts (to place and retrieve screened items)
require specific attention during architectural design to address the need for aesthetic attachments
or tables to prevent multiple screened items from amassing at the end of the belt and falling to
the floor.
The main responsibility for security screening personnel is to ensure all visitors, employees (as
determined by security committee), and belongings are screened prior to entering the building.
Personnel must be able to verbally and visually instruct persons on screening procedures. For
each screening system, a total of two officers will be routinely assigned. However, any system
design should also incorporate features to accommodate operation by an individual officer.
Simultaneously, this officer should be able to issue instructions, operate the fluoroscope, and
read the magnetometer display panel.

2-7-4

Additional Questions to be Considered by Deciding Officials
Include But Are Not Limited To:
n

What type and level of ballistic-resistant material (kevlar, armotex, etc.) and/or glazing
(mylar, steel mesh, etc.) will be installed in adjacent walls and the side and front panels?

n

To what extent (height, width, borders, etc) will this material be installed?

n

Will mail screening also be conducted at a separate remote location?

n

Is there an adequately-sized area (egress route) for persons to exit the building without
interfering with screening operations?

n

If it is determined that employees will be exempt from screening, what type of policies
and procedures (agency or building identification, separate entrance, familiarity, etc.)
will be implemented for security to identify employees?

n

What sensitivity levels will be programmed for the magnetometers?

n

What type and number of courthouse signs are required to advise persons of screening
policies and procedures?
n Where should these and other courthouse signs or directories be located?
n

Will weapons and/or contraband be seized and confiscated? Will weapons and/or
contraband be held and secured (gunlockers and lock boxes) at the screening point?

n

It is universally understood that if you screen for weapons - - you may actually detect
them! Consequently, will armed personnel be assigned to security screening? or will they
be available on a response basis?

2-7-5

REHABILITATION OF MINNESOTA’S
HISTORIC COURTHOUSES
IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
Minnesota’s courthouses are among its most recognizable and prominent testaments of civic
pride. These proud buildings have historically been regarded as the heart of government,
providing a spectrum of services in addition to their role as a seat of justice. In some cases, the
range of services range from county to municipal to public agencies as well as shelter for nonprofit organizations and programs. As such, the courthouse has an important place in the state’s
history. A significant number of Minnesota’s courthouses have been designated as historic
resources included in the National Register of Historic Places, a federal program enabled by the
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.
The National Register of Historic Places is the nation’s official list of properties deemed worthy
of preservation. The Register is maintained by the National Park Service in the U.S. Department
of the Interior and is administered by a State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] in each state.
The National Register recognizes properties that have local, state, or national significance.
Properties may be listed on the Register because of their association with significant persons and
events, because of their architectural or engineering significance, or because they contain
important information about our history or prehistory. In addition, the Register also lists
important groupings of properties as historic districts. (A number of Minnesota’s courthouses
are located within districts.)
The National Register process begins with research to establish the basis for a property’s
significance. This information is recorded on a nomination form which is presented to the
Minnesota Historical Society’s State Review Board, a volunteer group of citizens and
professionals with expertise in history, architecture, and archaeology. If the nominated property
is found to meet Register criteria, it is sent to the State Historic Preservation Officer for signature
and then to the Keeper of the National Register in Washington, D.C., for final review. If the
nomination is approved, the property is placed on the National Register of Historic Places.
Listing on the National Register constitutes an official recognition that certain properties are
significant places in Minnesota and are worth preservation. Their preservation may be
encouraged through certain federal tax benefits and state and federal grant funds. An
environmental review process also protects properties that may be affected by state projects or
federally funded or licensed undertakings. National Register listing often changes the way
communities perceive their historic properties and gives credibility to efforts to preserve them.
Listing, however, does not interfere with a private property owner’s right to alter, manage, or
dispose of the property.
In the more than thirty years since passage of the National Historic Preservation Act, the State
Historic Preservation Office of Minnesota has been engaged in an ongoing effort to identify
significant properties throughout the state. During that time, more than 45,000 properties in all

2-8-1

87 counties have been inventoried. Currently there are 1497 listings in Minnesota, representing
more than 6830 individual properties. Courthouses listed on the National Register and those
considered of special interest are listed on the Inventory of Currently Functioning Courthouses,
included in the Appendix.

HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT
Minnesota’s earliest courthouses represented the Greek Revival and Italianate styles of
architecture. These “first generation” buildings date from the late 1860's through the 1870's.
Although several of these buildings are extant, only one continues in its original function, the
Dodge County Courthouse [1871] in Mantorville. Three other early courthouses, no longer used
by the courts, the Washington County Courthouse [1869] in Stillwater, the Dakota County
Courthouse [1869] in Hastings, and the old Sibley County Courthouse [1879] in Henderson, now
serve as a community center and city halls, respectively. The only remaining wooden courthouse
from this early period, the Chisago County Courthouse [1876] formerly located in Center City,
has been moved from its original location and is no longer eligible as an historic property. The
above factors make the Dodge County Courthouse extremely significant, and although the
building has been expanded by a modern addition to the east, the historic courthouse remains
intact.
The years from 1880 through the turn of the century saw a major building boom in Minnesota’s
communities. County seats were particularly impacted. Courthouses erected during this period
represented the popular Richardsonian or Romanesque Revival style. Prominent features
included towers, distinctive round arches, and massive stone or brick masonry walls. This was
also a period in which landscape design played an important part in the setting of the courthouse,
many such buildings being prominently sited on a public square, which could also include a jail,
formal walkways and plantings, and monuments. Prime examples of courthouse from this period
include the Hennepin County Courthouse/Minneapolis City Hall [1889-1905] in Minneapolis,
the Winona County Courthouse [1889] in Winona, and the Douglas County Courthouse [1895]
in Alexandria.
Following the Columbian Exposition of 1893, stylistic preference in civic architecture changed
from the Richardsonian to the Neo-classic, a style based upon the architecture of ancient Greece
and Rome. These classically inspired buildings often incorporated colonnades or porticoes, and
were placed on high foundations approached by monumental staircases. The interiors often were
arranged around a central light court of atrium, crowned by either a skylight or dome. Most of
these “classic” courthouses are considered “second generation” courthouses as they replaced a
number of older, functionally obsolete, buildings in early county seats and were the first choice
for counties which were experiencing development in the years prior to World War I.
Noteworthy examples of this style are the Cottonwood County Courthouse [1904] in Windom,
the Sibley County Courthouse [1916] in Gaylord, the Stearns County Courthouse [1921] in Saint
Cloud, and the Lake County Courthouse [1906] in Two Harbors.
The final stylistic phase of courthouse design considered in this report includes the Modern or
Art Deco of the WPA era of the 1930's. These buildings incorporate fine building materials both

2-8-2

on exteriors and interiors in a manner which is distinctive to their particular style. They are
often rectilinear in massing, reminiscent of stacked cubes comprising floors and wings. They
represent the beginning of the modern era of courthouse design, in which many of the standard
elements of planning found today are introduced. As in previous phases, the Modern
courthouses continue to occupy prominent positions within their communities and remain as
symbols of civic pride. Significant examples of this period include the Ramsey County
Courthouse/Saint Paul City Hall [1932] in Saint Paul, the Rice County Courthouse [1932-34] in
Faribault, and the Goodhue County Courthouse [1931-32] in Red Wing.

STANDARDS FOR REHABILITATION
A guide to sensitive treatment of historic buildings is the Secretary of the Interior's Standards
for Rehabilitation, a chapter of a larger technical reference publication issued by the National
Park Service of the U.S. Department of the Interior entitled The Secretary of the Interior's
Standards for the Treatment Historic Properties. These standards are used by every State
Historic Preservation Office in reviewing the impact of work on historic buildings, and as
guidance in the recognition of significant features and the determination of sensitive treatment
to respect and retain such features.
The Standards define “rehabilitation” as “the process of returning a property to a state of utility,
through repair or alteration, which makes possible an efficient contemporary use while
preserving those portions and features of the property which are significant to its historic,
architectural, and cultural values.” The Standards focus on ten major areas ranging from use and
historic character, to retention and replication of features, to impacts of additions and new
construction. When considering the intent of the definition, it is important to recognize the broad
interpretation of such words as “utility,” “alteration,” “contemporary,” and “preserving.”
Together they promote treatments which will continue the usefulness of the property, with
sympathetic changes, to provide for a use which will satisfy the demands of today while
retaining those qualities which are important to its past.
Guidance in the Standards is provided by a fairly extensive outline of recommended and notrecommended approaches. The following comments have been paraphrased from the
“guidelines.”
Basic to the treatment of all historic buildings is the identifying, retaining and preserving of the
form and detailing of the architectural materials and features that are important in defining the
historic character of the property. The Standards list recommendations as well as types of
activities which would result in the diminution or even loss of this historic character. Loss of
character is often caused by the cumulative effect of a series of actions which would be
considered minor at the time of their individual undertaking. As such, all activities must be
considered in a larger context as they apply to the total impact on the property.

2-8-3

After identifying those materials and features that are important and must be retained in the
process of rehabilitation work, protecting and maintaining them must be addressed. Protection
generally involves the least degree of intervention and is preparatory to other work. It may
include maintenance of historic material through treatments such as caulking, selective paint
removal, and re-application of protective coatings, the cyclical cleaning of gutters, or
installation of temporary protective systems. An overall evaluation of the physical condition of
the property should begin at this level.
When the physical condition of character defining materials and features requires additional
work, repairing rather than replacing is recommended. Such repairs may include work on
masonry, wood or metal elements, and requires the least amount of intervention such as
patching, consolidating, or upgrading to recognized preservation methods. Repairing also
includes the limited replacement in kind or which a compatible substitute material of extensively
deteriorated or missing parts of features. Although using the same kind of material is the
preferred option, substitute material is acceptable if the form and design as well as the material
itself convey the visual appearance of the original treatment.
In this hierarchy, replacement is the next level of treatment if repair is determined infeasible. If
the essential form and detailing are still evident so that the physical evidence can be used to
reestablish the feature as a part of the rehabilitation project, replacement is appropriate. As in
repair, the preferred option is replacement of the feature with the same material. However, this
approach may not always be technically or economically feasible; a compatible substitute
material may then be acceptable.
Finally, if an entire feature is missing, it no longer plays a role in physically defining the
historic character of the building unless it can be accurately recovered in form and detailing. If
this feature can be accurately documented, its reconstruction is recommended as the preferred
course of action. If adequate historical, pictorial, and physical documentation exists so that the
feature may be accurately reproduced and if it is determined desirable to recreate the feature,
then designing and constructing a new feature is appropriate.
A second option for replacement is a new design which is compatible with the remaining
character-defining features of the building. The new design should always take into account the
size, scale, and material of the historic building and should be clearly differentiated so that a
false historical appearance is not created.
Some exterior and interior alterations are generally needed to assure continued use of an
historic building. It is imperative that such alterations do not radically change, obscure, or
destroy character-defining spaces, materials, features, or finishes. Alterations may include
providing additional parking space on the site, creating new windows or entries of secondary
elevations, insertion of new mechanical systems, or rearrangement of interior spaces and
functions. Alteration may also include the selective removal of buildings features or portions of

2-8-4

the environment of building site that are intrusive and therefore detract from the overall historic
character.
The construction of an addition to an historic building may be essential for new or expanded
use, but it should be emphasized that such additions should be considered only after it is
determined that those needs cannot be met by altering secondary or non-character-defining
spaces. If it is determined that an addition is the only viable solution, it should be designed such
that the character-defining features of the historic building are not radically changed, obscured,
damaged, or destroyed.
CONCERNS: The Secretary of the Interior's Standards for Rehabilitation may apply in the
following work areas:
Building Exterior
Masonry: Brick, Stone, Terra Cotta, Concrete, Stucco, Mortar
Wood: Clapboard, Shingles, Wooden Siding, Decorative Elements
Architectural Metals: Cast Iron, Steel, Pressed Metal, Copper, Aluminum, Zinc
Roofs: Slate, Tile, Cement Asbestos, Metal, Asphalt Composition
Windows: Double Hung, Casement, Fixed Plate Glass, Stained Glass
Entries: Porches and Porticoes, Vestibules, Surrounds and Entablatures
Building Interior
Structural Systems: Wood-Timber, Iron, Steel, Hollow Tile, Concrete
Spaces: Lobbies and Vestibules, Atriums, Public Hallways, Courtrooms, Reception Areas,
Libraries
Features: Woodwork, Light Fixtures, Flooring, Glass, Built-in Furniture, Ornamental
Metalwork Finishes: Wood, Metal, Plaster, Terrazzo, Marble, Paint
Mechanical Systems: Heating, Air Conditioning, Electrical, Plumbing, Elevators
Building Site
Landscape: Site Plan, Plantings Walkways, Monuments, Lighting, Parking, Ancillary
Structures
Additions
Physical Connection, Location, Design
Accessibility
A.D.A. Compliance, Ramps, Signage, Doors and Passageways
Health and Safety Considerations
Code Compliance, Fire, Egress, Hazardous Materials
Determination of eligibility for historic designation in accordance with National Register
Criteria is the responsibility of the State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] of the Minnesota
Historical Society. The SHPO also reviews proposed work on historic properties to determine
compliance with the Secretary of the Interior's Standards. In either case, early notification is the
key to cooperation and a successful project.

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The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for
establishing standards for all national
preservation programs under Departmental
authority and for advising federal agencies on the
preservation of historic properties listed in or
eligible for listing in the National Register of
Historic Places.

Physical record of its time, place, and use. Changes
that create a false sense of historical development,
such as adding conjectural features or architectural
elements from other buildings, shall not be
undertaken.

The Standards for Rehabilitation address the most
prevalent historic preservation treatment today:
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is defined as the
process of returning a property to a state of utility,
through repair or alteration, which makes possible
an efficient contemporary use while preserving
those portions and features of the property which
are significant to its historic, architectural, and
cultural values.
The Secretary of the Interior’s
Standards for Rehabilitation
The Standards that follow were originally
published in 1977 and revised in 1990 as part of
Department of the Interior regulations (36 CFR
Part 67, Historic Preservation Certifications). They
pertain to historic buildings of all materials,
construction types, sizes, and occupancy and
encompass the exterior and the interior of historic
buildings. The Standards also encompass related
landscape features and the building’s site and
environment as well as attached, adjacent or
related new construction.
The Standards are to be applied to specific
rehabilitation projects in a reasonable manner,
taking into consideration economic and technical
feasibility.
1. A property shall be used for its historic purpose
or be placed in a new use that requires minimal
change to the defining characteristics of the
building and its site and environment.
2. The historic character of a property shall be
retained and preserved. The removal of historic
materials or alteration of features and spaces that
characterize a property shall be recognized as a

4. Most properties change over time; those
changes that have acquired historic significance in
their own right shall be retained and preserved.
5. Distinctive features, finishes, and construction
techniques or examples of craftsmanship that
characterize a property shall be preserved.
6. Deteriorated historic features shall be repaired
rather than replaced. Where the severity of
deterioration requires replacement of a distinctive
feature, the new feature shall match the old in
design, color, texture, and other visual qualities
and, where possible, materials. Replacement of
missing features shall be substantiated by
documentary, physical, or pictorial evidence.
7. Chemical or physical treatments, such as
sandblasting, that cause damage to historic
materials shall not be used. The surface cleaning of
structures, if appropriate, shall be undertaken using
the gentlest means possible.
8. Significant archeological resources affected by
a project shall be protected and preserved. If such
resources must be disturbed, mitigation measures
shall be undertaken.
9. New additions, exterior alterations, or related
new construction shall not destroy historic
materials that characterize the property. The new
work shall be differentiated from the old and shall
be compatible with the massing, size, scale, and
architectural features to protect the historic
integrity of the property and its environment.
10. New additions and adjacent or related new
construction shall be undertaken in such a manner
that if removed in the future, the essential form and
integrity of the historic property and its
environment would be unimpaired.

2-8-6

CHAPTER 3
COURTHOUSE SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS

FIVE-STAGE PROGRAM of COURT SECURITY
A fundamental consideration in the development of any court security program is the principle
that all action taken be designed with a stated objective of (1) Deterrence - includes limiting
opportunities for acts to occur, (2) Prevention, and (3) Detection. These program areas should
be supplemented with two additional areas of consideration - (4) Response, and (5) Training.
Supporting one another, each of these significant elements represents an integral part of the
recommended five-stage program of courthouse and judicial security.
Unlike traditional law enforcement, which can be classified as Re-active, court security should
be considered a Pro-Active measure. This means the stated five-stage security program is driven
by the elements of Deterring and Preventing criminal and/or prohibited incidents. A court
security program that effectively utilizes Pro-Active measures will undoubtedly realize a
substantial increase in both security and safety levels.
However, these same measures lead to artificially-deflated numbers when compiling statistics on
actual security incidents - What incidents were in fact averted by pre-established Pro-Active
measures? Consequently, officials should not solely rely on this type of statistical data as a basis
for rendering decisions on funding, policies, procedures, personnel and systems acquisition.
Doing so embodies a perspective of not fully understanding the stated objective of security, as
well as supporting or declaring a particular position without being completely informed.
Concentrated within this five-stage security program are the “to be determined” categories of
reasonableness and practicality. Since courthouses and most government facilities cannot and
should not be secured like Fort Knox, the significant test of what is reasonable and practical must
be enacted with reference to all proposed security measures. The scope of these site-specific
determinations (What is practical? and What is reasonable?) differs from facility to facility, is
quite extensive, and therefore is dependant upon a number of factors upon which a greater degree
of validity should be placed:

Judicial Acceptance

Employee Safety

Public Safety

Threat Assessments

Operations Security

Site Surveys

Risk Assessments

Facility Operations

Space Design/Layout

The issue of whether increased levels of security have become acceptable in today’s society can
be responded to by stating that security enhancements at certain facilities (i.e. courthouses,
airports, government buildings, schools, etc.) have not only become an expectation, but also a
coveted sense of reassurance.
When facility surveys and assessments dictate that enhanced levels of security are necessary,
appropriate security measures need to be implemented to ensure the safety and security of all
persons who have cause (For courthouses: judges, staff, employees, defendants, visitors and the
general public) to enter that facility. Reasons justifying this position are self-evident, with the
consequences of not doing so being potentially tragic.

3-1-1

There is an inherent risk factor associated with government facilities (federal, state and local)
that is certainly apparent where courthouses are concerned. Whether this is based on the
multiple types of high-threat, profile, and emotional proceedings conducted in these buildings, or
the fact that courthouses represent both the American Judicial and Governmental Systems, threat
and risk levels are substantially increased.
Acceptance of this principle does not mean officials should resign themselves to the too often
stated premise that “persons intent on carrying out criminal or terrorist acts cannot be stopped.”
On the contrary, do we not lock our homes and cars because experienced burglars and thieves
can break in if they want to? Do we not educate our children on personal safety because they
could be abused or abducted at any time? Of Course Not! Even the thought of such non-action
is considered ridiculous and irresponsible. Unfortunately, present society trends tell us the days
where we can actually rely on others to live up to the favored slogan “Minnesota Nice” have all
but disappeared. Consequently, elected officials and leaders responsible for courthouse security
must recognize, acknowledge and provide the appropriate predetermined response.
Being Responsible for Courthouse Security Requires a Thorough Understanding of the
Inner-Relationships and Resulting Effects Between the Following:
n

Implementing a Five-Stage Courthouse Security Program

n

Reviewing Site-Specific Factors - Emphasizing The Elements of Reasonableness and Practicality

n

Considering Security and Safety Vulnerabilities Addressed in Facility Surveys and Threat and Risk
Assessments

n

Addressing Issues Brought Forward by Court and Building Security Committees

n

Initiating Program Review and Established Quality Control Measures

3-1-2

MAIL SCREENING
Depending upon the available resources, a mail screening program should be implemented for
courthouses. It is a current assumption that in a majority of Minnesota courthouses fluoroscopes
(x-ray machines) are not readily available to screen courthouse mail and deliveries. That being
the case, it is recommended that courthouse personnel be trained in Letter and Parcel Bomb
Recognition Points and General Responses to Suspicious Letter and Packages. These areas are
covered in detail under Chapter 8: Bomb Threat Response Plan. Employees would then be
empowered to conduct the initial or preliminary assessment of mail and deliveries.
Due consideration should also be given to having a central receiving mail station where agencies
would pick up their mail. The main advantage to this is the person assigned to mail station
duties would be thoroughly trained in all aspects in reference to suspicious packages and letters;
the result being you now would have established a pre-screening program which directly
supports the assessments as conducted by individual agencies and employees.
The specific section of the Courthouse Bomb Threat Response Plan that addresses
those agencies and persons to be contacted to further investigate a suspicious package
or letter needs to be disseminated to all courthouse employees
Assessing the contents of a suspicious package with a fluoroscope requires that each x-ray
image be evaluated and classified in one of four categories:
n

NO THREAT - Defined as no identifying monitor image (shape, density, and/or color) that
could be part of a weapon or improvised explosive device.

n

CONTRABAND ITEM - Defined as a suspicious or confirmed monitor image (shape,
density, and/or color) indicating an item as been pre-identified as contraband.

n

POSSIBLE THREAT - Defined as a suspicious monitor image (shape, density, and/or
color) that indicates a likelihood of weapons or an improvised explosive device.

n

OBVIOUS THREAT - Defined as a confirmed monitor image (shape, density, and/or color)
that indicates the presence of weapons or an improvised explosive device.

Shipped items that cannot be screened through a fluoroscope should require an agency contact to
verify the shipping contents before the item will be allowed into the courthouse. Items that
either meet threat profiles or are still deemed suspicious (per mail bomb indicators) may require
the Sheriff and/or Police Department to implement the courthouse bomb-threat response plan.

3-2-1

PRISONER SECURITY
Prisoner Security is Court Security - It is recognized that any time a prisoner enters a courthouse
it becomes a judicial and courthouse security matter. Prisoners should never be allowed access
to judicial chambers. This includes visitations, conferences, consultations, plea bargains, etc. If
a judge orders the appearance of a prisoner to her chambers, the Sheriff and/or department
designated Court Security Coordinator should be immediately notified so they can address the
situation. Judicial contact with prisoners should only occur within a secure environment such as
the assigned courtroom.
Policies regarding handcuffed prisoners in courtrooms should be proposed. It is recommended
that when the courts have ruled that a defendant(s) is a risk for flight and/or a danger to the
community, consequently being detained, a minimum application of restraints be applied to all
prisoners appearing in non-juror proceedings. A variation of this proposed policy would be that
“A minimum application of restraints can be applied on a case-by-case basis as approved by
the presiding judge.”
Deputy Sheriff’s assigned to “Control” prisoners should not be armed with a firearm whenever
they are in a courtroom or holding cell area. This is dictated by the fact that deputies in direct
control of prisoners will be the first to physically come in contact with the prisoner during any
type of disturbance or escape attempt. By not carrying firearms, deputy concerns of weapon
retention and real threats of the firearm being used against them and others are effectively
negated. Now efforts can be concentrated on regaining control of the prisoner, preventing the
escape, curtailing the disturbance, etc. Armed deputies maintain a position of support to prisoner
control deputies rather than close contact with a prisoner(s).
Department determination will need to be made as to the “Intermediate Weapon” (i.e. stun gun,
mace, baton, etc.) that may be issued to sheriff’s deputies. Policies, guidelines, and training
governing the usage of the selected intermediate weapon will need to be implemented
The proper placement and positioning of Sheriff’s personnel in courtrooms is essential when
securing prisoners. Considerable attention should be given to this integral component of prisoner
security. Deputies assigned to secure prisoners should not only be positioned within direct
proximity but also between the prisoner and any potential target (i.e. escape routes and judges).
This will allow personnel to intercept instead of reacting and pursuing a prisoners actions.

3-3-1

GENERAL COURTROOM SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS
To eliminate the possibility of an accidental or intentional blackout condition, standard light
switches should be changed to a key-activated variety. Another option is to have separate banks
of lights controlled by multiple light switches in varied locations.
Well/Gallery and Courtroom Participant/Observer circulation areas should be clearly defined.
Ideally, this is done during the design stage of courthouse construction or renovation projects. It
can still be incorporated into existing facilities, as even unobtrusive separation allows judicial
officers and security personnel to instantly self-assess a person’s intentions, manifested or
otherwise, while subsequently allowing them to respond with the appropriate challenge.
Courtroom exits leading to judge-controlled access areas should be secured to prevent any
unauthorized entry. Those exits designated for emergency use can be equipped with delayed
exiting panic hardware. This type of door hardware satisfies fire codes and will prevent anyone
from entering a designated security area for a pre-programmed period of time.
Only fixed seating (benches or individual chairs clamped together) should be allowed in
courtrooms. As documented and reported by the news media, a number of times during the past
few years, chairs not secured are potential weapons and have been used in such a manner to
create courtroom disturbances.
As witnesses are occasionally admonished, hostile, and in-custody prisoners, an aesthetic barrier
or partition should be installed between the judges immediate bench area and the witness stand.
The result is you have effectively increased security by limiting or removing the opportunity for
an incident to happen.

3-4-1

OPERATIONS SECURITY
It is extremely important that the Sheriff’s Department be immediately advised of any new
arrest, preliminary hearing, and/or trial involving threat groups. This information is essential in
due preparation of security operational plans, judicial protection, and ensuring building security
integrity.
Immediate notification allows the Sheriff time to plan, gather intelligence, conduct threat and
risk assessments, and consult with the judiciary. Consequently, the County/City Attorney, Task
Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies should be contacted and their cooperation requested in
providing the Sheriff with timely notification and information on any arrest involving High
Profile Criminal and Civil Cases and the following identified threat groups:

Street Gangs

Prison Gangs

White Extremists

Tax Protesters

Militias

Drug Cartels

Biker Gangs

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Skinheads

3-5-1

GENERAL COURTHOUSE SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS
It is recommended that Pre-Employment Background Investigations be conducted on courthouse
custodial and maintenance staff personnel. They usually have unrestricted facility access and,
appropriately, should undergo investigations similar to law enforcement officers. All courthouse
contractors should be issued and identified by courthouse-specific identification cards. These
“temporary credentials” are to be prominently displayed for easy recognition by the judiciary,
courthouse employees, and security.
Employees responsible for the collecting and depositing of monies received during daily
business transactions should be trained to practice sound fiscal security procedures. Routes and
times of deposits should be varied, with departure and arrival times documented. Funds held
overnight and on weekends should, at a minimum, be secured in a Class III level, fire-rated file
safe.

COURTHOUSE DURESS ALARM OPERATION and
RESPONSE PROCEDURES
n

Agency personnel will be provided training on the duress alarm use, and are encouraged to
become familiar with the location of office and courthouse duress alarms.

n

Agency personnel are encouraged to become familiar with office and courthouse public,
employee, and emergency entrances, exits, elevators, and stairwells.

n

Duress alarms should be used whenever a situation has escalated beyond control. Minor
incidents are to be reported to pre-designated personnel. However, if courthouse personnel
are unable to call they should not hesitate to activate the nearest duress alarm.

Courthouse employees need to be aware that until an “enhanced 911 system” (locks onto exact
origin of call) is installed in the courthouse, the caller must state the exact location of the
emergency (i.e. room #). It is assumed that most courthouse 911 systems currently identify
emergency calls originating only by the courthouse address.
Quality control standards should be implemented concerning courthouse security and master
keys. All persons issued courthouse keys are to be listed in documentation registers and noted in
building contingency plans. Concentrated efforts must be made to confirm the return of these
keys immediately upon the transfer, retirement, or termination of any courthouse employee.
All courthouse utility/maintenance closets and circuit-breaker housings are locked and secured
from the general public. All courthouse HVAC or plumbing valves, levers and switches are
secured with tamper-resistant locking devices.

3-6-1

The June 28, 1995, Department of Justice “Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities”
examined the security of day care centers by stating: (1) A thorough review of security and
safety policies in evaluating whether to locate day care facilities in buildings with high-threat
activities should be conducted, and (2) If a facility is being considered for a day care center, an
evaluation should be made based on the risk factors associated with that facility’s occupants,
operations, type and locale. The study did not address any implementation of these standards or
specific recommendations resulting from their determination.
While arguments have been made for day care programs in buildings where security is enhanced,
the more appropriate consideration or question is - Why has building security been increased?
Based on inherent, self-evident and assessed courthouse threat and risk levels, the housing of day
care centers in courthouses, while in some cases is convenient, is not recommended.
It is recommended that Hostage Situation Exercises be conducted in all courthouses to
familiarize police and emergency responders with procedures/requirements and the respective
facilities design/layout. Realizing that Sheriff and/or Police Department personnel may be called
upon to take command (temporarily or permanently), said personnel should be directed to
familiarize themselves with the courthouse’s (1) design/layout, (2) contingency plan, (3) security
systems, and (4) security-related policies and procedures.
The June 28, 1995, Department of Justice “Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities” also
recommended that an employee identification or badging system be implemented for courthouse
employees. However, badges that are required to be worn or prominently displayed are more
suitable for a headquarters or corporate environment (where access is controlled and all persons
and visitors are required to wear identification), not a courthouse-type environment (where in
the badging scenario the only persons not wearing identification would be the public).
The position against this type of display is supported by the same reasons that judicial parking
spaces should be numbered instead of individually identified, not to mention the increased
probability of court employees becoming personally known targets of threatening behavior.
Courthouse Identification Badges do Provide a Uniform Way to Identify Court Employees and
Judicial Officers, and are Encouraged to be Taken for that Reason, but they Should be Kept
Secured until Required for Identification
Note: This is a perfect example where all security policies and procedures need to be reviewed
to determine those best suited for a courthouse - not all security-recommended policies and
procedures are right for every situation.

3-6-2

COURTHOUSE ADJACENT PARKING
CONSIDERATIONS
Assessing the threat probability of an improvised explosive device (IED) or vehicle bomb and
whether to restrict or eliminate street-side parking adjacent to the courthouse can be addressed by
answering three questions:
n

If the courthouse is located in a downtown urban or rural environment does the same
threat exist across the street with on-street parking, ramps, or lots?

n

Do the realized security and safety benefits justify a ban on contiguous street-side
parking?

n

What is ultimately gained and lost by the elimination or continuance of street-side
parking?

Attempting to justify a restriction or ban on street-side parking solely on the basis of a vehicle
bomb or IED will likely be opposed for convenience and fiscal reasons. However, incorporating
additional site-specific aspects to the courthouse will ensure that final assessments and proposals
are comprehensive. (See related table on page 3.7.1)

3-7-1

SITE-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION FACTORS
n Where do prisoners enter/exit the courthouse?
Prisoner Custody,
Control, and Detention
n Does the close proximity to parked vehicles increase the real
potential of prisoner escapes?
n

Perimeter Security
Patrols

If a prisoner escape occurs, is there an increased public risk
because of street-side parking?
n Are challenges issued by security personnel rebutted by the
simple placement of a coin in a parking meter - thereby giving
persons a legitimate reason to be in the area, security sensitive
or otherwise?
n

Does contiguous street-side parking conceal criminal activity
or the placement of small and large IED’s?
Judicial and Executive n What are the courthouse-specific operational requirements that
dictated enhanced levels of security?
Operations
n

Where are the secured parking areas of the facility?

n

Assessments and
Survey Audits

Does the proximity of street-side parking increase the likelihood
(provides an opportunity) of planned attacks?
n How far is the courthouse offset from adjacent streets?
n

Are there skyway and/or tunnel connections?

n

Do completed threat and risk assessments support enhanced
security measures?

n

Do site surveys support added security measures?

n

Do after-hours security concerns (assaults, stalking, vandalism,
threats, etc.) for employees and the public increase with streetside parking?

3-7-2

CREDENTIALS AND BADGES
As with any branch of government, whether it be civilian or military, executive or judicial, there
is a need for identification. For judges, the need for this security measure is made apparent as
judges become more and more prone to attack by disgruntled participants. All judges of the
United States District Court, Circuit Court of Appeals, and justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States are issued double-window credentials for identification. (These credentials also
facilitate taking advantage of travel discounts when traveling on government business.)
Identification for trial and appellate judges must be official and authentic in appearance and must
clearly identify the holder and the authority. It should command instant recognition by security
officers and get the attention of those who would question the holder. It must identify the
authority of the individual seeking restricted access to the courthouse, courthouse complexes and
in areas of needed sensitive information.

IDENTIFICATION CARDS - Identification cards, at a minimum, should be
convenient, the size of a credit card or driver’s license, without disclosing personal information.
They should include a colored seal of the court in which the holder serves, together with an
embossing seal for authentication. The holder’s name and title, photograph, signature and
judge’s number, along with the signature and title of the authenticating official, should appear
thereon.
CREDENTIALS - Credentials should be in a suitable leather case with double windows
clearly identifying the court, name and title of the holder, with signatures of the holder and
authenticating officer, the judge’s registration number or trial court information system number;
the judge’s photograph, and should have the authority and colored court seal imprinted thereon.
The seal of the court should be in color so that it is less susceptible of forgery, duplication or
copying on contemporary copiers or scanners.

BADGES - Badges are an optional form of identification.

They should bear the seal of the
State of Minnesota, the court in which the judge serves, and the title of the holder. They should
never be used or recognized alone, but only as an adjunct to credentials. It is preferable not to
look like a police or sheriff’s badge, but one that will draw instant attention if the judge is in
trouble and in need of assistance.
Occasionally judges may find a need to carry firearms for their own personal protection or
defense. In such cases, it is absolutely essential that judges have the proper permits to carry
concealed weapons so that they may be properly identified instantly. The badge serves as instant
identification, and the credentials, which must have a photograph of the holder, quickly
confirms authenticated identify. Badges should be carried in the same leather case, recessed on
the inside of the case, and should only be displayed when necessary.

3-8-1

CHAPTER 4
COURTHOUSE PERIMETER
SECURITY

SECURED and CONTROLLED PARKING
Ideally, courthouse-assigned parking spaces should be located in both a Secured and Controlled
(see below stated definitions) underground parking ramp. If this is not possible, the farther the
spaces are located from ground level the better. In designating assigned parking spaces, numeric
plates should be used instead of titles and name - reduce and eliminate opportunities.

SECURED PARKING - Security coverage based on an integrated system of CCTV
Cameras, Panic or Call Stations, Monitors, Security Personnel, Intrusion Detection Devices,
Emergency and Standard Lighting, Loop Detectors, etc.

CONTROLLED PARKING - Controlling

access into the parking facility through
Space Design and Layout, Door and Stairwell Locking Hardware and Contacts, Passive and
Active Vehicle and Pedestrian Ground Barriers, Card Key Access, etc. Contract Parking can be
considered an initial step in documenting and controlling access into a parking facility.
In Order to Reach the Highest Level of Parking Ramp Security both Secured and Controlled
Parking Considerations Need to be Implemented

Open Courthouse Parking Lot Recommendations and Considerations:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Control Access into the Parking Lot
Designate Separate Parking Areas for the Public
Clearly Define Employee, Visitor, and Public Circulation Areas in and Adjacent to the
Parking Lot Area
Install Passive and/or Active Barriers - for Public Sight and Physical Restrictions
Add Site-Appropriate Outside Security and Safety Lighting
Provide an Enhanced Security Presence
Install Site-Appropriate Security Systems
Establish Policies and Procedures for the Immediate Removal of Unauthorized Vehicles
Promote Employee Security Awareness
Consider Security-Oriented Landscaping Designs and Grounds Maintenance
Review Neighboring Crime Statistics
Actively Investigate Crimes Committed in Parking Lot Areas

4-1-1

EXTERIOR SECURITY SYSTEMS
In most cases, Active Barriers are hydraulically-operated devices that are designed to stop a
vehicle from penetrating an entrance. They can be of a bollard-type construction, surface
mounted, or wedge-type. Courthouse barrier specification levels must be able to stop a 4,000
pound vehicle traveling at 30 MPH.
Passive Barriers are fixed-in-place and designed to restrict vehicles or pedestrian access in close
proximity to the courthouse. Typical structures include concrete planters, bollards, and fences.
When possible, a minimum setback of fifty (50) feet should be maintained. For new courthouse
design and construction, a setback of one hundred (100) feet is recommended as a standard.
Passive barriers can be counted or measured in linear feet for fences or quantities for bollards or
planters.

RECOMMENDED EXTERIOR SECURITY SYSTEM
COMPONENTS:
TYPE
Barrier Gates
Bollard Systems
Crash Gates
Rising Barricades

DESCRIPTION
Series/Manufacturer: BB10M, TT212, TT212E/Delta or Sheriff
Approved Equal
Series/Manufacturer: TT203, TT210/Delta or Sheriff Approved
Equal - Height: 24" Diameter: 8.63"
Series/Manufacturer: SGC1000, SC3000S, TT280, MTC31/Delta
or Sheriff Approved Equal - Height: 108" Opening: 144"-396"
Series/Manufacturer: TT224, TW107, TW108, TT205, TT205S,
TT207, TT207S, TT107S/FM/Delta or Sheriff Approved Equal
Height: 24" Opening: 20"-157"

4-2-1

COURTHOUSE INGRESS and EGRESS
POINTS
The Number of Public Entrances to Courthouses Should be Kept to the Minimum Number
Practical to Provide for Court Operations

Areas of Ingress and Egress consideration include, but are not limited to:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Security Screening Systems
Mail and Delivery Screening Programs
Door Locking Hardware
Intrusion-Detection Systems
Controlled-Access Systems
ADA Requirements
Fire Code Regulations
Courthouse Historical Design Features - see manual, Chapter 2: Court Security
Management and Development, section 2.8: Historical Preservation Status
Courthouse and Agency Operations
Judicial and Employee Entrances and Exits
Courthouse Security Personnel
Threat and Risk Assessments
High-Threat/Profile Trials
Criminal Statistics
Civil Disturbances, Protests and Demonstrations
Building Management
Building Signs and Directories

4-3-1

CRIMINAL STATISTICAL SUMMARIES
Criminal Statistical Summaries, considered a Pro-Active Measure, should be
Conducted on a Quarterly Basis, within a Four-Block-Square Radius of the
Courthouse. Documented Criminal Acts can then be Reviewed, Assessed, and
Responded to regarding their Direct Effect on Court Security Operations.

Depending upon the Numbers, Locations and Types of criminal activity, the following are a
number of available response actions:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Threat and Risk Assessments
Threat Advisories
Security Alerts
Facility and Area Surveys
Increased Security Presence and Patrols
Increased Police Presence and Patrols
Installation of Additional Security Systems
Enhanced Security Lighting
Employee Security Awareness Training
Promoted and Coordinated Neighboring Efforts and Networking

NOTE: Statistics are Only as Reliable as the Raw Data Reported and Collected. Security
review and assessments need to consider not only the statistics themselves, but questions such as:
Why was their an increase in crimes of this type? and Why was this specific or larger area
effected?

4-4-1

DEMONSTRATIONS and PROTESTS
Public Demonstrations and Protests are a Constitutionally-Protected Right.
Court Security Efforts must be Balanced and Concentrated to both Respect this Right and
Simultaneously Provide for Courthouse Security.

In the event of a planned demonstration or protest, personnel responsible for court security must
assess, determine, and respond to a number of different situations - prior planning is essential
when doing so. Efforts should be made to identify the protest organizer or leader in an attempt
to determine the protest objective, and thereafter reach a mutually beneficial accord on dealing
with agitators and disturbances.
The following are a number of areas and concerns that will likely require action on the part
of court security personnel:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Multiple Arrests
Medical Emergencies
Disorderly Conduct
Acts of Vandalism and Arson
Criminal Assaults
Interfering with Courthouse Operations
Attempts to Barricade Courthouse Entrances and Exits
Civil Disobedience

SECURITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Intelligence Information
Demonstration Size and Cause
Staffing Requirements
Inter-Agency Jurisdictional Agreements
Officer Conduct
Assembly Locations
Court Orders and Resulting Enforcement
Arrest Procedures, Locations, and Holding Facilities
Medical Facilities
Chemical Munitions Deployment and Protocol
Contingency and Occupant Emergency Plans

4-5-1

CHAPTER 5
SECURITY EQUIPMENT

SECURITY EQUIPMENT
METAL DETECTORS - Hand-Held Metal Detectors are highly mobile and relatively inexpensive.
They are designed to determine the exact location of a metal substance,
Hand-Held
usually on a person. They can be used as single detection devices, with a
disadvantage being the reduction in the volume of persons being
screened, or preferably, in conjunction with a Walk-Thru Metal Detector.
It is recommended that, at minimum, the number of detectors of this type
be purchased on a ratio comparable to the number of courtrooms and/or
screening systems located within your facility. Policies will need to be
outlined and implemented which reference procedures to follow when
using this metal detector. For example: the proper technique to use is not
a jabbing motion but one with a steady motion that outlines the body
from a distance of 2-3 inches (subject to programmed sensitivity levels).
If your stated objective is the detection of firearms and explosive
devices, it may not be necessary to subject persons to complete
screening. The professional and recurrent training of security staff
personnel will allow them to initially, visually assess persons, then
concentrate the detector on those areas where firearms and explosives
can be concealed. If, however, you desire detection of smaller edged
weapons, completed all-encompassing screening of a person is required.

MAGNETOMETERS - Magnetometers are designed to detect all metal objects (subject to
programmed sensitivity levels) persons attempt to carry through the
Walk-Thru
detectors frame. Metal objects that are carried past the immediate
outside of the magnetometer frame will also be detected.
A majority of the magnetometers in use today DO NOT indicate where
the metal object is located other than on the person and/or article being
screened. The use of a Hand-Held Metal Detector in combination with
these magnetometers will assist in confirming the exact location of the
metal object in question. Of note, recent technology has brought about
the design of detectors that will provide general and, in some models, the
exact location(s) of metal objects. This is accomplished through a
Lighted Electronic Display (LED) located on the entire length of the side
panel or through a monitor designed with computer graphics.
Placement of magnetometers may be dictated by surrounding areas that
potentially interfere with magnetometer readings. It may be necessary to
reposition or even relocate the magnetometer altogether if this is the
case. Preliminary site testing of the magnetometer at various intervals of
your screening operations point will identify a suitable location. Even
though the magnetometer is typically considered a detection device, its
initial and believed continuous value, whether incorporated with a
fluoroscope (x-ray machine) or not, is one of deterrence. A primary
advantage of magnetometers is their desired ability to efficiently handle
high traffic volume areas.

5-1-1

FLUOROSCOPES –
X-ray Machines

A fluoroscope provides “x-ray” imaging or viewing of weapons,
explosives, contraband, etc. Depending on the system operator, this
equipment is considered as effective a screening and detection device as
is currently available.
Fluoroscopes range in cost from a few thousand dollars (smaller portable
designs with individual inspection) upward towards $30,000 (fixed
designs with conveyor belts for mass volume inspection and color
scanning for dense, organic and in-organic materials).

DURESS ALARMS –
Panic Devices
CCTV CAMERAS Closed-Circuit
Television

CCTV HOUSINGS
Enclosures

It should be expected that registration of ionizing radiation sources (i.e.
x-ray machines) will be required by the State of Minnesota Health
Department. Information required will consist of (1) Manufacturer, (2)
Serial Number,
(3) Unit Location, (4) Tube Type, (5) Tube Status, and (6) Systems
Radiation Leakage Report as required by 14 CFR 108, 17, and 14 CFR
129, 26.
Duress Alarms register (via simultaneous relay) a silent, non-visual
signal from the point-of-origin to a central monitoring station where an
audio/visual alarm is sounded.
CCTV’s provide security with an operationally inherent ability to
visually monitor pre-identified areas of coverage. CCTV’s have a
number of different available features that include:
♦ Fixed (Set Field of Coverage) Video Imaging
♦ PTZ (Pan, Tilt, and Zoom) Capabilities
♦ Fixed Lenses (Non-Adjustable Focal Points)
♦ Variable Lenses (Adjustable Focal Points)
♦ Fixed (Indoor Use) Iris Lenses
♦ Auto (Exterior or Extreme Lighting Conditions) Iris Lenses
♦ Black and White or Color (Higher Clarity) Imaging
CCTV’s can provide video to a central location or multiple monitors and
locations. They can also be set up for “point-to-point” coverage (One
CCTV Interfaced to a Single Location) as intentionally designed for a
Judicial Chambers Controlled Access System. CCTV Video Signals are
relayed via coaxial cable connection or wireless technology. Power to a
CCTV is supplied through a separate power source or coaxial cable
connection.
Housings/Enclosures are designed to secure CCTV’s and provide a
certain degree of equipment protection from adverse environmental
conditions, vandalism, or tampering. They are also designed and often
intended to provide CCTV’s with operationally enhanced and/or
aesthetically unobtrusive concealment. There are numerous types of
housings and enclosures available from which to meet your specific
application and operational requirements. They include:
Corner / Quarter and Half Domes / Ceiling Wedge / Environmental
Ceiling Recessed Pressurized / Surface Mounted Mini-Dome
Suspended Pendant Domes / Tamper Proof / Institutional / Scanner
Impact Resistant / Pan-Tilt / Liquid Cooled / Infrared Illuminator

5-1-2

CCTV MOUNTS

SECURITY
MONITORS

In lieu of housing or enclosure, secures a CCTV to a fixed location.
Different types include:
Wall / Ceiling / Column / Universal / Pedestal
Depending on the type of CCTV and Monitor, provides black and white
or color video image from a CCTV camera. Security monitors can
accommodate Dedicated (fixed image), Sequencing (multiple CCTV
video images shown at pre-programmed intervals), Single (one video
image at a time), Dual (two video images), or Quad (four images) Video
Imaging.
Standard Sizing includes: 9 - 12 - 13 - 14 – 15 - 17 - 19 - 20 Inch Models

INTERCOMS

NUMERIC PIN PADS

Provides point-to-point audio communication and identification. An
Intercom Remote can only send and receive audio from a single point
connection or location. An Intercom Master is able to send and receive
audio from multiple point locations and connections.
Electronic or Mechanical device that allows authorized individuals to
enter a numeric code to gain access into a secured area. Pin Pads are
designed for ease of operation in facilitating employee access.
Numeric displays that are either vertically or horizontally designed
(numbers up and down or side to side) are usually mechanical devices
(open doors with a door latch) while those similar to touch tone phones
are usually electronic devices (open doors with an electronic strike).

High security areas may require a Scrambling Pin Pad which
automatically “scrambles” (code is less likely to be compromised) the
location of each number after each use.
CARD KEY READERS Readers allow security doors to be accessed via use of an authorized
Card Key. Either Pass Through or Proximity type readers are currently
- Bio-Metrics
available.
Bio-Metric (retina, thumb, hand, etc.) Scanners are recent technical
advances.
ELECTRIC STRIKES Enables security doors in Controlled Access Systems to be electronically
released. The release action can be controlled remotely by a strike
release, use of a reader, or entering a numeric code into the electronic pin
pad. Electric Strikes are designed to be installed in door frames - In
Reference to New Construction: final decisions to use electric strikes
should be made early in the design phase so door frames can be
“prepped” prior to their being installed.
Individual
Remote and/or Local release buttons or readers that activate
ELECTRIC STRIKE
the release of an electric strike allowing access through a specific door
RELEASES
that has been equipped with controlled access.
MAGNETIC LOCKS Used for Controlled Access Systems that do not accommodate electric
strikes or lock sets. Ideally suited for double door applications. Access
is controlled by electronic pin pads, readers, and release buttons.
The door hardware itself (lever, internal mechanisms and latch) is wired
ELECTRIFIED
electronically for access control. Access is controlled by electronic pin
MORTISE LOCKS
pads, readers, and release buttons.

5-1-3

SECURITY LIGHTING Seven Primary Types of Protective Lighting:
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Continuous - series of continuous fixed lighting
Controlled - lighting adjusted to meet protective requirements
Area - illumination of all open areas
Surface - illuminates priority structures and building surfaces
Standby - supplemental lighting system that automatically or
manually activates on alarms or suspicious activities
♦ Moveable - manually operated floodlights or searchlights
♦ Emergency lighting - limited to times of power failure or other
emergencies. Battery Powered or Hard Wired
Five Types of Lamps:
♦ Incandescent - common type of glass light bulb
♦ Mercury Vapor - emits a blue/green light (interior/exterior lighting)
♦ Sodium Vapor - emits a golden/yellow light (i.e. streets and garages)
♦ Metal Halide - emits a harsh yellow light
♦ Fluorescent - supply high light output
BALLISTIC GLAZING Ballistic glazing is designed to stop, dependant on rated levels, ballistic
rounds from completely penetrating its layered shell. A glazings rating
level will indicate which ballistic rounds it is designed for. Rating levels
and ballistic test requirements are set forth by Underwriters Laboratories
(UL) and the National Institute of Justice.
Bullet Resistant Glazing and Detention Type Glazing is available in
several different configurations. Laminated glass glazing can weigh
between 2.5 lbs. and 26.0 lbs. per square foot. Tinting, wire, and oneway mirrors may be incorporated into glazing materials.
Fiberglass ballistic resistant glazing (a fiberglass woven reinforced
plastic) materials are used to fortify judges benches, witness stands, jury
boxes, walls, doors, counters, or virtually any surface area requiring a
relatively lightweight ballistic resistant material.

DOOR VIEWERS

VEHICLE BARRIERS

Common brand names associated with these glazing materials are Kevlar
and Armotex.
Door Viewers, or peepholes, allow observation of pre-identified areas
prior to entering. The brand name door viewer “Big Eye” is an optical
instrument that provides a 180 degree viewing angle that has exceptional
visual clarity - in essence modern door viewers make traditional
peepholes obsolete.
Door Scopes allow persons to stand up to seven feet away and see a wide
angle visual image with little distortion. Door scopes are larger than
door viewers and their use should be examined when aesthetics are a
consideration.
Vehicle barriers operate exactly as their name indicates - a barrier to
vehicles. Different types include: Bollards (high impact solid
construction), Drop Arms (impact resistant crash beams), and ElectroHydraulic Powered Barriers (high impact - standard for controlled
access - rapid deployment models available).

5-1-4

INTERCOM SYSTEMS
Intercom systems should enable the judge to communicate with the court security staff,
coordinator, or dispatcher in an emergency. Telephones on the bench enable the judge to call for
help for a medical emergency, for court security officer backup, or for assistance during any
exigency or emergency. To do so subtly and without jeopardizing the safety of anyone, the
judge may use a telephone that is capable of connecting to a dispatcher on the push of a button.

THE NORTEL SYSTEM - Certain telephones or intercoms are capable of
transmitting voice while the handset is still in the phone cradle. One such system is Nortel. The
advantage of the Nortel system is that the sheriff’s dispatcher can hear and record conversations
without alarming the perpetrator or others at the calling end — either in chambers or in the
courtroom. It also enables the judge to continue, hands-free, to control the situation or to leave
the courtroom if a hostile environment is developing.
NOTE: At the present time, there is only one such system in operation. That is in
Dakota County in Hastings, Minnesota, in the Government Center. It is presently
employed on a Nortel telephone system. It is not known whether it would work on a
different telephone network.
HOW IT WORKS:
•

It is absolutely essential that the telephone system be connected directly to the
sheriff’s dispatcher or police dispatcher. With that connection in place, a phone
card is inserted into the system that can accommodate up to 16 telephones on the
Nortel telephone system.

•

Since the wiring and connections are already in place, all that remains to be done
is to install a button which is connected to the telephone, but not necessarily
located on the phone. It may be connected to the telephone by wires from a
location on or beneath the bench in the courtroom. It also may be located in the
court reporter’s area, in the court security officer’s area or station (or bailiff’s
box), and at or beneath the court clerk or court attendant or law clerk’s desk.

•

Once the button is pushed and the system is activated, a red light, LED, or pilot
jewel is illuminated to indicate the button has been pushed. This does not,
however, indicate whether the dispatcher has picked up the receiver.

•

Once the dispatcher picks up the phone in the dispatch center, a number of things
can happen: The audio can be recorded, the dispatcher can hear the conversation
and audible circumstances in the courtroom or chambers, and assistance can be
dispatched.

The Nortel system functions as a silent alarm with a listening device. That listening device is the
very mouthpiece or microphone in the telephone handset that is on the bench, on the clerk’s

5-2-1

desk, in chambers, or in an anteroom just outside a judge’s chambers. This technology is not a
Nortel accessory; it was developed by information technicians in Dakota County, Minnesota, at
Hastings, when the need became apparent for a way to monitor the Treasurer’s office in the
Government Center. There is no reason why it would not work in a courtroom or courthouse
complex setting. With one phone card controlling or connecting 16 telephones at a cost of
approximately $100.00 per telephone, it is a very inexpensive adaptation of a telephone system
already in place, and it has distinct advantages over and above that of merely having a button
with a silent alarm in place.
ADVANTAGES OF THE SYSTEM:
•

It allows the dispatcher or court security officer monitoring the telephones to have
the same direct contact with the courtroom to alert to trouble.

•

It has the greater advantage of allowing the monitor to hear what is going on and
direct assistance to the courtroom or chambers immediately.

•

It affords the monitor to select the kind of assistance that is necessary — medical,
security, fire, or whatever may be needed.

•

It allows the dispatcher or court security officer to continue the audible
proceedings while being undetected so as to communicate with emergency
responders while en route, without alerting an assailant that help is on the way.

•

It also allows the dispatcher or court security officer monitoring to hear what may
be displayed on a video monitor in a dispatching center or court security control
room.

OTHER INTERCOM SYSTEMS
If such a system is not workable or available, it is still possible (with some telephone
systems) to use the telephone on the bench as an intercom. It can be done very simply. With a
push-button telephone console and a RELEASE button, some systems allow the handset to be
removed from the telephone and the RELEASE button to be pressed, thus causing the line to go
dead. This should be tried to make sure that after some period of time a dial tone does not
automatically become activated. The purpose is to assure that once the handset is removed from
the phone cradle and the release button is pushed, the phone is deactivated until an outgoing line
button is pushed and an outgoing line is activated.
PROCEDURE:
•
•
•

Remove the phone from the cradle;
Press the RELEASE button;
Make certain there is no dial tone;

5-2-2

•
•

Punch in the number “911" or the extension for the sheriff’s dispatcher or court
security officer’s dispatcher;
With the handset off the phone cradle, the call is placed, and the line is activated
much like an intercom.

The advantage of having the telephone handset off of the console is that it enables you to use the
telephone that is already in place at the bench of the clerk’s desk to summon emergency
assistance without picking up the telephone handset and alerting an assailant. If there is no
physical threat, the judge or clerk can have the number already inserted to the emergency
extension, and all that needs to be done is to press the OUTDIAL button or any phone line
extension that appears on the telephone console. If, at the end of a court session, no 911 or
emergency call is necessary, the judge merely pushes the RELEASE button and the telephone is
available for calls. With the number pre-dialed but not activated, the telephone can still receive
any incoming calls to the chambers or courtroom.
The disadvantage of a telephone without buttons, but with a direct line to the sheriff’s dispatcher
or court security officer monitoring calls, is that the handset needs to be removed from the
telephone console in order to be activated. This movement may alert an assailant or unstable
individual who could pose an immediate threat to the judge, jurors, parties, court staff, or others.

5-2-3

GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS
n

CENTRAL STATION MONITORING
A contract or proprietary system (i.e. Communication Center) that monitors a facility’s security
systems (CCTV, Duress, Intercom, Contacts, etc.)
n

CONTACTS
Surface mounted or concealed magnetic switches that activate a remote and/or local alarm when
moved apart. Typical application for alarming doors and windows.
n

DEADLATCH
Detention type lockset designed for use on frequently used security doors. They automatically
lock whenever the door is closed. A paracentric or mogul key unlocks the deadlatch by
retracting a beveled bolt. Can be keyed on one or both sides. Electric lock versions will allow
access to be controlled from central station monitoring.
n

DEADLOCKS
Detention type lockset designed for use on security doors, access panels, plumbing closets, or
electrical panels. They are locked or unlocked with a paracentric key retracting or extracting a
single squared bolt. Can be keyed on one or both sides. They are not intended for use on prison
or holding cells. Electric lock versions will allow access to be controlled from central station
monitoring.
n

DEDICATED RECORDING
Continuous video recording of a single CCTV. Note: Time lapse programmed VCR’s do not
have the capability of taping on a dedicated basis. If your system is entirely time lapse you will
have to integrate a separate VCR for dedicated taping. Recommended for recording
demonstrations, security screening, high threat/profile proceedings, prisoner and other high
threat activities.
n

DELAYED EXITING
The programmed time interval from when a door lever or panic (crash bar) hardware is turned or
pushed until it opens. Ideal application for security doors that must also be designated, per fire
code, as an emergency exit.
n

DIALER
A device that telephones an alarm to single or multiple preselected telephone numbers.

n
DOOR POSITION SWITCHES
Monitoring devices for hollow metal, plated, or grilled security doors. Designed for use in
Minimum or Maximum security applications.
n

ELECTROMAGNETIC LOCKS

Provides instant door release point for controlled access systems. Does not require or
incorporate dead latches or dead-bolt while conforming to building and fire codes. Securing
double doors is an example where this lock type would be typically used.
n

ENTRY CONTROL PACKAGE (ECP)
Integrated security systems to control access to designated area. Standard equipment includes:
CCTV and Housing, Numeric Pin Pad (Electronic or Mechanical), Intercom Remote, Electric
Strike or Magnetic Lock, Manual Over-Ride (Key), and Local and/or Remote Annunciators.
n

FAIL SAFE CONDITION
Instantly unlocks ECP or other Controlled Access System when electricity is cut off, during a
power failure, fire panel deactivation, or emergency sprinkler systems are activated. Enhanced
courthouse security measures may require a single or combination of these events to occur before
certain systems go Fail Safe.
n

FAIL SECURE CONDITION
Controlled Access Systems will stay locked during power failures, fire panel deactivation,
electricity cut off, and/or emergency sprinkler systems activation.
n

FIRE SAFE RATING
Underwriters Laboratories (UL) certification of an identified item’s fire resistance
n

INFRARED MOTION SENSORS
Senses heat sources that move into protected areas, simultaneously triggering an alarm.
n INSTITUTIONAL TYPE DEVICE
Accessory equipment (i.e. sprinkler heads, fastening devices, vents, toilets, sinks, enclosures,
etc.) rated and approved (secured and tamper proof) for use in detention facilities and prisoner
circulation areas.
n LASER SENSORS
Similar to photoelectric sensors - exception being laser beams replace light beams.
n

LOCAL ALARM
Annunciates at point of alarm.
n

MICROWAVE MOTION SENSORS
Activate an alarm mode when motion is detected in designated protected areas.
n

MOGUL KEY
Detention type key generally used for prisoner circulation area security doors (i.e. sallyports,
interview rooms, prisoner property rooms, etc.)
n

PARACENTRIC KEY
Detention type key generally used for prison or holding cells and/or interfaced cuff ports (also
known as food-pass ports).

n

PHOTOELECTRIC SENSORS
These sensors project a light or infrared beam that triggers an alarm or action (i.e. door opening)
when an object or person passes through it.
n

PROPRIETARY SYSTEM
Owned and/or operated by a specific company or agency
n

REMOTE ALARM
Annunciates at pre-designated location such as a central monitoring station.
n

SYSTEM INTEGRATION
The final step in incorporating a facility design that connects and integrates security equipment
through a central station monitoring point (communication center) with computers, radionics,
monitors, intercom masters, time lapse and dedicated VCR’s, video printers, multiplexers, matrix
switchers, etc. to create an operationally efficient and complete security system.
n

TIME LAPSE RECORDING
Simultaneous video recording of multiple CCTV’s. Note: The number of cameras integrated
into a time lapse-ready VCR will affect the frequency and interval of the video images you see.
For example: Sixteen cameras are programmed for time lapse recording, each camera is
allotted a 16th of a second, which results in one second passing before you view that same video
image again - similar to a strobe effect

CHAPTER 6
COURT SECURITY
OFFICERS (CSO S)

Highlights of U.S. Marshals Services CSO
Contracts
There are a number of issues to consider and address if it is determined that CSO guard services
will be contracted out to a private vendor. The United States Marshals Service (USMS)
currently uses private vendors to provide contract guard services for CSO’s. The following
highlights those areas (Parts and Sections) included in USMS CSO contracts and will assist
persons in developing similar-type contracts as determined by each agency.

PART I - THE SCHEDULE
1.

Section A - Solicitation / Contract Form

2.

Section B - Supplies or Services and Prices / Costs
B-1. Description of Services
B-2. Estimated Quantities

3.

Section C - Description / Specifications / Statement of Work
C-1. Background
C-2. General Scope
C-3. Contractors Purchasing System
C-4. Government Reimbursements
C-5. Contractor Personnel
C-6. CSO Qualification Standards
C-7. Training Standards
C-8. Minimum Medical Standards
C-9. Physical Standards
C-10. Weapons Proficiency Standards
C-11. Other General Standards
C-12. CSO Dress Standards
C-13. CSO Performance Standards
C-14. Alternate Locations and Special Assignments / Temporary Duty
C-15. Work Restrictions
C-16. Unforeseen Government Closures
C-17. Additional Security Coverage
C-18. Emergencies
C-19. Overtime and Holidays
C-20. Changing the Number of Authorized CSOs
C-21. Contractor Continuing Responsibility to Provide Suitable CSOs
C-22. Authority and Jurisdiction
C-23. Orientation
C-24. Contractor Personnel Applications
C-25. Background Investigations

6-1-1

C-26. Contractor Responsibility to Provide Full-Protective Coverage with Qualified
CSOs
C-27. Government-Furnished Equipment
C-28. Contractor-Furnished Personnel Identification Cards
C-29. Mandatory CSO Reports
C-30. Turnover
4.

Section D - Packaging and Marking
D-1. Preservation, Packing and Marking
D-2. Marking

5.

Section E - Inspection and Acceptance
E-1. Inspection and Acceptance of Contractors Services and Reports and Other
Required Data
E-2. Clauses Incorporated by Reference

6.

Section F - Deliveries or Performance
F-1. Liquidated Damages - Supplies, Services, or Research and Development
F-2. Deliverables
F-3. Period of Performance
F-4. Option to Extend the Term of the Contract
F-5. Extension of Services
F-6. Work Week
F-7. Clauses Incorporated by Reference

7.

Section G - Contract Administration Data
G-1. Roles and Responsibilities of Government Personnel
G-2. Contract Administration
G-3. Task Orders
G-4. Overtime Services (Category 5)
G-5. Invoice Payments
G-6. Invoice Requirements
G-7. Price Adjustment Procedures Resulting from Wage Determination Increases

8.

Section H - Special Contract Requirements
H-1. Subcontracting Restriction
H-2. Indemnification
H-3. Removal of CSOs and Other Contractor Personnel
H-4. Insurance Coverage
H-5. Licenses
H-6. Facility Survey Prior to Assuming and Commencing Contract Performance
H-7. Recording Presence
H-8. Wage Determination
H-9. Liability for Start-Up Costs
H-10. Quantities for Minimum and Maximums
H-11. Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy

6-1-2

H-12. Notice Regarding Firearm Possession and Domestic Violence
H-13. Notice Regarding Blood-Borne and Air-Borne Pathogens Exposure

PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES
1.

Section I - Contract Clauses
I-1.
Ordering
I-2.
Order Limitations
I-3.
Statement of Equivalent Rates for Federal Hires
I-4.
Availability of Funds for the Next Fiscal Year
I-5.
Subcontracts for Commercial Items and Commercial Components
I-6.
Indefinite Quantity
I-7.
Clauses Incorporated by Reference

PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS, and OTHER
ATTACHMENTS
1.

Section J - List of Attachments

PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS and INSTRUCTIONS
1.

Section K - Representations, Certifications, and Other Statements of Offerors
K-1. Certificate of Independent Price Determination
K-2. Taxpayer Identification
K-3. Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Proposed Debarment, and Other
Matters
K-4. Type of Business Organization
K-5. Small Business Program Representations
K-6. Previous Contracts and Compliance Reports
K-7. Affirmative Action Compliance
K-8. Clean Air and Water Certification
K-9. Certification of Toxic Chemical Release Reporting
K-10. Contractor Establishment Code
K-11. Clauses Incorporated by Reference

2.

Section L - Instructions, Conditions, and Notices to Offeror’s or Respondents
L-1. Submission of Proposals
L-2. Content of Technical Proposal
L-3. Content of Past Performance Proposal
L-4. Content of Business Proposal
L-5. Information Statement of Wages and Fringe Benefits
L-6. Type of Contract

6-1-3

L-7.
L-8.
L-9.
L-10.
L-11.
L-12.
L-13.
L-14.
L-15.
L-16.
L-17.
L-18.
3.

Service of Protest
Freedom of Information Act
Notice of Award
Disposition of Proposals
Site Visit
Requests for Site Visits
Acceptance of Offers
Receipt of Proposals
Solicitation Copies
Written Inquiries
Solicitation Provisions Incorporated by Reference
Listing of Solicitation Provisions Incorporated by Reference

Section M - Evaluation Factors by Award
M-1. Award Basis
M-2. Award Selection
M-3. Evaluation Options
M-4. Technical Evaluations
M-5. Technical Evaluation Criteria
M-6. Evaluation of Past Performance
M-7. Evaluation of Prices
M-8. Special Standards of Responsibility
M-9. Progress Payments Not Included

6-1-4

CSO PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
n

Be courteous and demonstrate good manners toward the judiciary, court employees,
government employees and the general public.

n

Maintain a respectful and helpful attitude in all endeavors.

n

Maintain a neat, clean, and businesslike appearance and comply with CSO dress standards
while on duty.

n

Report to work physically fit and mentally alert. Personnel feeling otherwise will make
appropriate notification to the appropriate supervisor and request necessary relief or
instructions.

n

Report any circumstance which may adversely affect performance on a particular assignment
to their immediate supervisor, prior to that assignment.

n

If the CSO should be detained or become aware that they are under investigation by any
federal, state, or local agency, for any legal or ethical violation, they must report this to the
appropriate supervisor, no later than the next working day.

n

Ensure that issued weapons are concealed from view when not in use. Weapons shall not be
inspected, cleaned, handled, or exchanged in public areas or in the presence of jury members,
prisoners, witnesses, protected persons, family members or members of the general public.
Ensure that weapons are secured in a safe place to prevent theft, tampering, or misuse when
not being carried.

n

Do not engage in any discussion concerning government matters, policies, grievances, or
personalities and financial, personal or family matters with jury members, prisoners,
witnesses, protected persons, family members, the public, or any known associate of the
above. Not entertain, socialize, or enter into business arrangements with, give legal advice or
grant special favors to, or accept gifts or payments from jury members, prisoners, witnesses,
protected persons, or family members and friends of the above.

n

Do not accept or solicit gifts, favors, or bribes in connection with official duties.

n

Do not allow jury members, prisoners, witnesses, protected persons, or their family members
and friends into the CSOs home or living quarters (temporary or permanent).

n

Unless authorized, do not visit the duty site during non-duty hours or allow family members
and friends to visit the duty site or other operational areas.

n

Do not gamble or enter into games of chance with prisoners, witnesses, jurors, or protected
persons. Do not gamble or unlawfully bet or promote gambling on government owned or
leased premises.

6-2-1

n

Do not disclose any official information, except to the Sheriff or other officials having a need
to know (as directed by the Sheriff), or make any news or press releases without the express
permission of the Sheriff.

n

Refrain from discussions concerning duty assignments, particularly manpower, weapons,
security precautions, or procedures, except with those persons having a need to know (as
directed by the Sheriff).

n

Comply with all applicable laws while enforcing official duties.

n

Do not knowingly give false or misleading statements or conceal material facts in connection
with employment, promotion, travel voucher, any record, investigation, or other proper
proceeding.

n

Do not discriminate against nor sexually harass an employee or applicant for employment or
engage in any prohibited personnel practices.

n

Ensure that just financial obligations are met.

n

Abide by all ethical standards of the State of Minnesota and residing county regarding
conflicts of interest, outside activities, gifts, and use of state and county property.

n

Do not bid on or purchase in any manner, directly or through an agent, any property being
offered for sale by the Sheriff or by others on behalf of the Sheriff.

n

Refrain from any activity which would adversely affect the reputation of the State of
Minnesota Courts and Sheriff’s Department.

n

Avoid personal and business associations with persons known to be convicted felons or
persons known to be connected with criminal activities. This does not apply to immediate
family members so long as you have notified the Sheriff of their status.

n

Avoid any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct.
Neither possess nor use illegal drugs. Abstain from the consumption or possession of
alcoholic beverages while on duty. Do not report for duty or work under any condition
which impairs the ability to perform as expected.

n

Always demonstrate the highest standards of personal and moral conduct normally expected
of law enforcement officers and government employees.

n

Do not operate a government vehicle, or any other vehicle while on government business, in
an improper manner or while under the influence of intoxicants or drugs.

n

Do not misuse official authority, credentials, communications equipment, security systems,
and weapons.

6-2-2

n

Do not make statements about fellow employees or officials, with knowledge of the falseness
of the statement or with reckless disregard of the truth.

n

Report violations of prescribed rules, regulations and any violations of statute or law to
appropriate supervisor and/or management officials.

n

Do not violate security procedures and regulations.

n

Do not close or desert any post prior to scheduled closure unless directed to do so or
permission is received from the supervisor. Remain at assigned post until properly relieved
or until the post is to be secured.

n

Always perform assignments in accordance with prescribed regulations to the best of one’s
ability and in accordance with safe and secure working procedures and practices.

n

Do not fail, unnecessarily delay, or refuse to carry out a proper order of a supervisor or other
official having responsibility for your work.

n

Do not possess, use, lose, damage, or otherwise take government property or the property of
others without direct authorization of the Sheriff.

n

If assigned to conduct investigations or interviews, do so in an impartial, objective, and
businesslike manner to ensure fairness, both to the individual being investigated and to the
Sheriff. When conducting investigations or interviews, employ no technique that violates the
law, such as unauthorized intrusion onto private property, unnecessary destruction of
property, unauthorized listening and/or recording devices, or any other activities prohibited
by law or regulation.

n

Refrain from surreptitiously recording conversations between government, law enforcement
or contractor employees.

n

Conduct only official business on government property.

n

Refrain from neglecting duties. This includes sleeping on duty, unreasonable delays or
failures to carry out assigned tasks, conducting personal affairs during duty hours, and
refusing to render assistance or cooperate in upholding the integrity of the work site security.

n

Refrain from use of abusive or offensive language, quarreling, intimidation by words,
actions, fighting and participation in disruptive activities which interfere with normal and
efficient government operations.

n

Respect the offices of judges and other court officers. CSOs must not disturb papers on
desks, open desk drawers or cabinets, or use government telephones and equipment, except
as authorized.

6-2-3

n

Except when in performance of official duties, or upon direct authorization by the Sheriff or
his designee, will not use any other agencies equipment, storage space, telephones, furniture,
facilities, etc.

n

CSOs will adhere to and follow the State of Minnesota Deadly Force Policy concerning the
use of firearms.

n

Adherence to all Sheriff-specified duties and responsibilities to include official policy and
procedural memorandums from the Sheriff or his designee.

Violation of CSO Performance Standards May Result in Disciplinary Action Being Taken
Against any Court Security Officer(s) Found Culpable. Sanctioned Forms of Discipline
Range from Letters of Reprimand, to Suspensions, to Imminent (resulting from an accrual
of letters and/or suspensions) or Immediate Dismissal.

6-2-4

SECURITY SCREENING GUIDELINES
GENERAL PRACTICES
Security Screening, or Entrance Control, involves the operation of security systems/equipment
and enforcement of policies and procedures primarily designed to (1) deter, and (2) detect and
prevent weapons and contraband from entering a pre-identified building or area. Security
personnel assigned to a security screening system and all CSOs will be trained and certified on
specific screening aspects.
To counter the significant factors and limits of fatigue, complacency, and patience, CSOs will
not be scheduled for longer periods than required to any security screening location.
CSO demeanor at all screening locations is to be highly professional at all times:
n

Drinking, eating, smoking and/or reading is not authorized at screening locations.

n

System equipment will not be used as foot rests, to lean/sit on, shelves, etc.

n

Devoting complete attention to all persons/items being screened - personnel assigned to
screening operations will be professional, diligent, and vigilant. CSOs will not engage in
any conversation that interferes with or ignores persons being screened. Chairs and stools
are only provided to temporarily relieve personnel during operational lulls. They are not
intended, nor are they to be used on a full-time basis. As a general rule, at least one CSO
will always be standing while screening persons.

n

Being aware of activities occurring adjacent to the screening location - each screening
location has been designed, to the extent possible, to provide personnel with unobstructed
sight lines (assessment and reactionary zones) of persons entering the building/area. This
gives personnel an opportunity to observe, assess and appropriately respond to a suspicious
person(s) exhibiting threatening behavioral characteristics prior to their actually being
screened.

Screening operations and general explanations of policies and procedures required to facilitate
screening are to be done courteously but firmly. Any requests for further detailed information
should be directed to the attention of the Sheriff or his designee. CSOs are not to state their
professional or personal opinions on the courts or Sheriff’s policies and procedures to any
member of the public, media or government.

FLUOROSCOPES (x-ray machines)
All fluoroscopes will be tested and calibrated each morning with the ASTM Security Stepwedge
to ensure a 30-gauge wire can be seen at the fifth step of the wedge. Brightness and contrast
controls will also be adjusted on daily basis.

6-3-1

n

There is a false impression that the fluoroscope (x-ray machine) can damage or corrupt
film, video tape, electronic devices, and computer disks. The only film that may be
damaged is high speed film exceeding ASA 1000, and x-ray or scientific film. If
necessary, these items may be inspected by hand.

Court Security Officers are not to comment or joke about dangerous radiation levels being
emitted from fluoroscopes (x-ray machines). Such comments only serve to mislead the public
and employees. Radiation safety levels on screening systems are tested to ensure they exceed all
federal and state requirements.
All packages brought in by the public, couriers, and special delivery personnel (i.e. DHL,
Federal Express, etc.) will be thoroughly screened (x-ray, metal detector, and/or visual
inspection) by CSO personnel. This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
n

Purses, Backpacks, Brief Cases, Bags, Boxes, Lap-Top Computers, CD/Cassette Players,
Cellular Telephones, Pagers, and Radios.

Even if a delivery person is known to a CSO and has been arriving at the courthouse the same
time with the exact same delivery for years - he and his packages will be screened.

SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES
Proper x-ray interpretation requires that each x-ray image be evaluated and classified in one of
four categories (see manual chapter 3: Courthouse Security Considerations, section 3.1.2 Mail
Screening):
n
n
n
n

NO THREAT
CONTRABAND ITEM
POSSIBLE THREAT
OBVIOUS THREAT

RESPONSE PROCEDURES TO SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES
n

Dependant upon the threat classification (possible or obvious), the CSO will either
immediately notify the Sheriff or secure the area and immediately notify the Sheriff.

n

The CSO(s) discovering the suspicious item will directly communicate all known
information to responding Sheriff’s personnel.

6-3-2

n

CSOs will ensure any suspicious item is not moved from the location in which it was
found. This is especially true for those items found inside and outside the courthouse
environs, as detonation may correlate to motion.

n

CSOs will not discuss any aspect surrounding the discovery of a suspicious package or
response actions with any member of the public, government employee, or other CSOs
except as authorized in performance of official duties or as directed by the Sheriff or his
designee.

n

Once a suspicious package is discovered, all radio traffic/communications will cease.

n

Responding Sheriff’s personnel will determine the number and extent to which other
courthouse personnel will be notified of the suspicious package.

n

In attempts to confirm a suspicious package’s contents, the recipient and sender should be
identified, if possible, and contacted by the Sheriff. If (1) the suspicious item has not
been tampered with, and (2) the recipient and sender are aware the package is being
delivered and can verify package contents - you have eliminated the likelihood of an
explosive device.

n

Sheriff’s personnel should utilize the expertise of resident officers and agents (i.e. Police
Department Officials, ATF, Postal Inspectors, etc.) when and where available.

n

The Sheriff or his designee will determine whether and when it is necessary to call in the
local bomb squad.

n

Unless directed to do so by the Sheriff or his designee (i.e. during attempts to verify a
packages contents), CSO personnel will not contact any agency official or employee
regarding a suspicious package and the Sheriff’s response.

n

When assigned a post (corridor, stairwell, elevator, etc.) to assist in securing a suspicious
package, CSOs will make no specific statements to the public, media, or government
employees concerning the assignment. When questioned, CSOs are only authorized to
provide general information such as, “this area has been temporarily closed by the
Sheriff.”

At No Time Whatsoever Will Any CSO Make Reference to Any Type of Bomb
(i.e. Mail, Letter, Pipe, Briefcase, Package etc.)

n

Any judicial officer or government official insisting on more information will be directed
to see the Sheriff or his designee.

6-3-3

n

The Sheriff or his designee will determine whether to request assistance from Building
Management. If requested, their personnel will provide support to the Sheriff in
technical, mechanical, custodial, and advisory capacities. Building management officials
will be responsible for ensuring that their personnel, including contract employees, keep
all communications regarding Sheriff activities secure. This means they will refer all
questions regarding any incident involving a suspicious package to the attention of the
Building Manger, and at no time whatsoever will they refer to any type of bomb.

n

In the event no assistance is requested of Building Management, the Sheriff or his
designee will keep building officials informed of incident events as they transpire.

n

If a decision is made to evacuate the courthouse, the respective Occupant Emergency
Plan (OEP) and Sheriff’s Courthouse Contingency Plan (CCP) will be utilized. As the
CCP contains information specific to Sheriff operations, it is considered a departmental
exclusive document and is not to be disseminated outside the agency.
NOTE: Sheriff’s personnel responsible for court and judicial security should be
prepared to initiate evacuation procedures for court personnel if the Sheriff or his
designee determines it is in the best interests (Safety and Security) for same. CSOs
will not discuss with any member of the public, media, or government the decision
to or not to evacuate.

n

CSOs will conduct a comprehensive security sweep of court floors to ensure all persons
have safely been evacuated from the building. Other than pre-identified judicial officers,
all court officials/employees are directed to exit the building via emergency exits. Those
judicial officers requiring assistance in exiting the courthouse will be assisted by CSO
personnel. During evacuations, CSOs are also responsible for maintaining security,
providing assistance, and giving direction.

When a decision has been made to contact the Bomb Squad, the Sheriff and CSO (as
directed by the Sheriff), will be responsible for the following:
n

Providing all known information (Who, What, Why, When, Where, and How) to the bomb
squad upon their arrival.

n

Confirmation from responding emergency and bomb squad personnel on: What They
Expect and Require for Support.

n

Maintaining a constant presence (appropriate/safe distances from the suspicious
package) while responding authorities are on-site.

n

Being involved (as Sheriff’s representative) and consulted prior to any decision being
made on taking action (i.e. detonation of the package with a water cannon) on-site.

n

Sheriff’s personnel should strongly discourage any attempt to open a suspicious package
on-site. If There is No Other Choice - Measures Must be Undertaken to:

6-3-4

1
2
3
4
5
n

Advise and Prepare Courthouse Occupants for the Resulting Noise and/or Shock
Determine Need for Partial (i.e. Offices and Floors Above, Below, or Adjacent to the
Suspicious Package) or Entire Courthouse Evacuation
Consider Advantages (Would Potential Damage Levels be Lowered?) and Disadvantages
(Would Moving the Package Cause it to Detonate?) in Moving the Package to a More
Suitable, Preferably Off-Site Location
If the Package Cannot be Moved - Whether or Not to Reinforce Areas (Potential
Detonation and Resulting Blast Effect Must be Taken into Account) and Cover Equipment
(Screening Systems are Very Expensive and all Efforts Should be Made to Prevent them
from Being Damaged / Building Electrical and Power Systems) Adjacent to the Package
Preserving Evidence for Subsequent Crime Scene Investigation
The Sheriff’s Department will be responsible for obtaining copies of all other agency
reports generated as a result of their involvement in responding to a suspicious package.
After-action reports and case files (including other agency reports) should be reviewed
by the Sheriff or his designee.

WALK-THRU METAL DETECTORS (MAGNETOMETERS)
Magnetometers are designed to detect those objects consisting entirely or partially of metal
which persons may be carrying.
As a general practice, persons will be asked to empty their pockets prior to passing through the
magnetometer. If the magnetometer alarm is triggered, the person will be required to pass
through for a second time. If the alarm continues after a person has passed through for a second
time, the hand-held metal detector will be used to determine the source of the alarm.
If Anyone Refuses to Allow the Search of their Belongings and/or Pass Through Security
Screening, they Should be Denied Entrance into the Courthouse

FIREARMS
When a firearm is detected and the person carrying the firearms DOES NOT have a recognized
permit to carry, the weapon will be immediately seized and the suspect detained. CSOs will
then (1) contact their Supervisor, and (2) promptly and securely bring the suspect and firearm to
the Sheriff’s office.

6-3-5

KNIVES and OTHER DANGEROUS WEAPONS:
Knives and other dangerous instruments should not be allowed into courthouses. State law
defines a knife as having a blade in excess of four (4) inches in length. Federal Law considers
any knife or edged weapon with a blade exceeding 2 ½ inches in length as a dangerous weapon.
Any stun gun, pen knife, disguised edged weapon, martial arts weapon, etc. will not be allowed
in any district courthouse.
Switch Blades and Spring Loaded Knives Should be Seized Immediately (possession
prohibited by state law) Regardless of Blade Length

NOTE: If any of these weapons are discovered and/or removed from individuals currently under
supervised release, CSO screening personnel will immediately notify the Sheriff or his designee.
The Sheriff or designee should subsequently notify county probation.

6-3-6

FIXED-POST ASSIGNMENTS and
GUIDELINES
COURTROOM PROCEDURES
It is recommended that CSOs be charged with the responsibility of securing each courtroom prior
to that day’s proceedings and after court has adjourned for the day. A thorough check under
benches, tables and chairs is essential to securing each courtroom. Once any court proceeding
begins, it is the CSOs responsibility to ensure courtroom decorum is being maintained. Any
disturbance from the gallery will be quickly addressed by the attending CSO.
Appropriate CSO responses range from a simple warning to “Be Quiet” to requesting the
offending person to please come with the CSO into the hallway. This is done for two specific
reasons:
n

To allow the CSO to fully explain why the person was removed from court. At this
point, the person may either be allowed back into court or instructed they will not be
allowed back in, without further disturbing the court.

n

If the person is being evicted from the proceeding, to avoid any potential confrontation
from occurring in the courtroom.
CSOs will Use Discretion and Professional Familiarity with the Presiding Judicial Officer
Prior to Evicting any Person Permanently from a Courtroom. The Sheriff or his Designee
will be Immediately Notified of Any Incident Resulting in a Person Being Removed or
Banned from a Courtroom.

Each CSO is individually responsible for being thoroughly familiarized with each judicial
officer’s courtroom decorum checklist (see sample form on page 6.4.1). The CSO supervisor
will maintain updated copies of these checklists for review by CSO personnel.
Unless otherwise directed by the presiding judicial officer, CSOs will unlock and open
courtrooms at least one-half (½) hour prior to the start of a scheduled court proceeding.
Assigned CSOs will be in court a minimum of ten (10) minutes prior to the start of a scheduled
courtroom proceeding.

6-4-1

COURTROOM DECORUM FORM
JUDGE:

DATE:
COURT SECURITY OFFICER REQUESTED (Check Response)

Civil Hearings

YES

NO

Criminal Hearings

YES

NO

Pro Se Hearings

YES

NO

Jury Selections

YES

NO

COURTROOM DECORUM

COMMENTS

Food?
YES
NO
Beverages?
YES
NO
Gum Chewing?
YES
NO
Reading?
YES
NO
Reading Material?
YES
NO
Writing?
YES
NO
Note Passing?
YES
NO
Talking?
YES
NO
Whispering?
YES
NO
Headgear?
YES
NO
Standing?
YES
NO
Gesturing?
YES
NO
Dramatics?
YES
NO
Sleeping?
YES
NO
Child Disturbances?
YES
NO
Number of Times Court Security Officers are to Warn Violators Prior to their Removal from
the Courtroom (Check Response): o 1
o2
o3
o4
Where Should Court Security Officers Position Themselves in your Courtroom? (Check
Response) o Gallery - Courtroom Entrance o Well o Jury Area o Bench Area
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

6-4-2

GENERAL LISTING OF FIXED-POST ASSIGNMENTS
n

Security Screening Systems

n

Courtroom Trials and Proceedings

n

Jury Deliberations

n

Security Equipment and Systems Monitoring

n

Courthouse Communication Center

n

Parking Garage/Ramp/Lot Security Booth

n

Authorized Protective Service Assignments

n

Courthouse Perimeter Areas

n

Courthouse Areas of Access Control

n

Judicial Entry Control Points

n

High Threat/Profile Trial Security Assignments

n

Authorized Security Escorts

n

Special Assignments and Details

Certain Fixed-Post Assignments may result from a Regular Roving Patrol Post(s) being
Temporarily Re-Designated as a Fixed-Post

Implementation of Fixed-Posts will likely Deter and Prevent Unauthorized Access

6-4-3

ROVING PATROL POSTS and
ASSIGNMENTS
Roving Patrol Assignment Responsibilities Consist of, but are Not Limited to, the
Following:

PERIMETER
A thorough search of the courthouse exterior, to include all common areas, parking lots,
landscaping, dumpsters, etc. Emergency exit and employee entrance doors should always be
secured. All variances from standard security practices (i.e. doors left ajar, equipment
malfunctioning, suspicious containers/packages, protests, etc.) will be directly reported to the
CSO supervisor for documentation and immediate (determined from situational aspects)
notification to the Sheriff.

COURTHOUSE FLOORS
A thorough search of each court floor, to include those floors housing the County Attorney and
main public entrance(s). Floors housing non-court tenants are not required to be searched unless
otherwise directed by the Sheriff. Judicial Entry Control Packages (i.e. CCTVs, housings,
intercoms, pin pads, electric strikes, door hardware, etc.), Stairwells, Corridors, Windows, and
Bathrooms are to be searched and secured per policy and procedures. All variances from
standard security practices will be directly reported to the CSO supervisor for documentation and
immediate (determined from situational aspects) notification to the Sheriff.

GARAGE AREA
A thorough search of the courthouse garage area, to include all common areas, doors, stairwells,
elevator bays, etc. Employee entrance and judicial elevator doors should always be secured.
CSOs will maintain a visible position near the garage entrance when not actually engaged in
garage roving duties. All variances from standard security practices will be directly reported to
the CSO supervisor for documentation and immediate (determined from situational aspects)
notification to the Sheriff.

MISCELLANEOUS
Items discovered during roving patrols that can be easily corrected by the reporting CSO will be
done. CSO supervisors will report all mechanical problems, unlocked utility closets, penthouse
and roof access doors, system malfunctions, etc. to the attention of the Sheriff. Suspicious
persons detected in secure or sensitive areas will be challenged by CSOs. Contractors not
displaying recognized temporary building identification will also be challenged. All variances
from standard security practices will be directly reported to the CSO supervisor for
documentation and immediate (determined from situational aspects) notification to the Sheriff.

6-5-1

REPORTS and RECORDS
Documentation via Standardized Official Reports is Recommended for all Incidents that Occur
During Court Security Officer Tours of Duty

Daily log books should be maintained as a matter of agency policy. These log books should
include descriptive entries such as (1) Shift Assignments, (2) Special Assignments, (3) Incidents,
(4) Detail Instructions, and (5) Shift Hours.
Incidents are occasionally brought forth that result in a need to recall specific information and
details months or even years later. The developed ability to refer to report documentation will
refresh both agency, officer, and witness memories, accurately reaffirm original actions and
positions, and assist in agency response preparation.

Examples of Incidents that Require Documentation Include, but are Not Limited to:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Detection of Firearms, Dangerous Weapons, and/or Contraband
Courthouse and/or Courtroom Disturbances
Removing Persons from the Courthouse and/or Courtrooms
Disorderly Conduct and Assaults
Excessive Force Accusations
Discrimination Allegations
Suspicious Items and/or Activities
Courthouse Bomb Threats
Perimeter Check Clearances and Confirmation
Identified Areas of Vulnerability
Security Equipment Malfunctions
Courthouse Systems Requiring Repair
Security Breaches
Acts of Courthouse Vandalism and/or Sabotage
Acts of Intimidation, Stalking, and Threats
Violations of Established Courthouse Policies and Procedures
Courthouse Systems and Alarm Testing
Courthouse Systems and Alarm Servicing and Repair

6-6-1

MAINTAINING LAW and ORDER
Court Security Personnel are Required to Enforce not only those Policies and Procedures as
Outlined Regarding their Assigned Duties, but are also Responsible for Enforcing and Following
those Rules, Regulations, and Laws Commonly and Statutorily Associated with their Positions.
Those Officials involved in Determining and/or Responding to the issue of Court Security,
including Maintaining Law and Order are:
n
n
n
n
n
n

County Sheriff - Primary Provider of Court Security Services
County Board Members - Responsibilities Defined Under Law
State and County Judiciary - Inherent Judicial Review and Authority
State of Minnesota Legislature - Developing and Enacting Applicable Laws
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension - Incident Reporting and Investigative Assistance
Local Police Department - Concurrent Jurisdictional Law Enforcement Response

See Manual Chapter 1: Legislation, Policy Notices and Documents and ensuing
subsections for those specific laws, rules, and policies regarding Courthouse Security
Duties and Responsibilities in the State of Minnesota.

6-7-1

CHAPTER 7

TRIAL SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS

TRIAL RISK IDENTIFICATION MATRIX
♦
♦

L
O
W

M
O
D
E
R
A
T
E
H
I
G
H

INHERENT RISK LEVELS / TYPE OF TRIAL
CIVIL TRIAL

CRIMINAL TRIAL

Admiralty
Anti-Trust
Bankruptcy
Contracts
Economic Stabilization
Energy Allocation
Environmental Matters
Freedom of Information
Labor Suits
Land Condemnation
Personal Injury
Product Liability
Real Property
Protected Property
Social Security
Tort Claims
Civil Rights Violations
Deportation
Foreclosures
Seizures, Forfeiture and Penalties
Tax Violations
High Profile / Media Intensified
Related Threat Analysis and Assessment

Associated Violent Criminal History
Related Threat Analysis and Assessment

7-1-1

Auto Theft
Burglary
Embezzlement
Forgery
Counterfeiting
Fraud
Larceny
Theft
Perjury
Public Corruption

Assaults
Extortion
Terroristic Threats
Stalking
Firearms Violations
Obstruction of Justice
Organized Crime - RICO Violations
Armed Robberies
Sex offenses
High Profile / Media Intensified
Anti-Government / Treason Offenses
Related Threat Analysis and Assessment
Mass/Serial Violent or Sex Offenses
Escape
Homicide
Kidnappings
Bombing Attacks
Narcotics Trafficking
Related Threat Analysis and Assessment

PARTICIPATION RISK
IDENTIFICATION MATRIX
♦
♦

L
O
W
M
O
D
E
R
A
T
E

INHERENT RISK LEVELS of PARTICIPANTS
CIVIL TRIAL

CRIMINAL TRIAL

Class Actions

Defendant Not Present

Jury Trials
Prisoner Petitions
Pro Se Actions
High-Profile / Media Intensified
Threat Assessment - Moderate Rating
Strong Identification and Ideological
Views with Known Threat Groups:

Defendant Not In Custody - On Bond
Threat Assessment - Moderate Rating
High-Profile / Media Intensified
Probation or Parole Violators
Highly Emotional / Inner-Relationships
Multiple Defendants
Repeat Offender(s)
Anti-Society Behavioral Characteristics

Organized Crime
Neo-Nazi / Militia / Skinhead
Ku Klux Klan / Skinhead / Patriot
Street or Prison Gangs
Outlaw Biker Gangs
Domestic/International Terrorists

Highly Emotional / Inner-Relationships
Associated Violent History or Actions
Threat Assessment - High Rating

H
I
G
H

Strong Identification and Ideological
Views with Known Threat Groups:
Organized Crime
Neo-Nazi / Militia / Skinhead
Ku Klux Klan / Skinhead / Patriot
Street or Prison Gangs
Outlaw Biker Gangs
Domestic/International Terrorists

Threat Assessment - High Rating
Escapee From Custody or Commitment
Violent Actions/Outbursts While In
Custody
Defense or Plea Based on Insanity
Mass or Serial Sexual Predator
Murderer / Contract Killer
Protected Witness
Multiple Defendants
Defendant(s) with Violent Criminal
History

7-2-1

RISK LEVEL IDENTIFICATION MATRIX
DOCKET

C
I
V
I
L

C
R
I
M
I
N
A
L

STAGE

TRIAL RISK

PARTICIPANT RISK

RISK LEVEL

Pre-Trial

-------------

-------------------

- - - Level 1

Low

------------------Moderate
-------------------

- - - Level 1
- - - Level 2
- - - Level 2

------------------Moderate - - - - -

- - - Level 1
- - - Level 2

Low
Moderate
High

- - - Level 1
- - - Level 2
- - - Level 3

Trial
Moderate

Post-Trial

Low

Pre-Trial

Low
Trial
Moderate
High

Post-Trial

-------------

------------------Moderate
High
-------------------------------------

-----------

------------------High

- - - Level 3
- - - Level 4

Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 3
Level 4

Source: 1982 Task Force Guidelines

n

By using this Table to Identify the Level of Risk by Type of Trial and Participants,
Anticipated Risk Environments can be Established.

LEVEL 1:
n
n
n
n

Low-Risk Civil Proceeding
Criminal Pre-Trial Proceeding with No Defendant Present
No Indication or Likelihood of Courtroom Disruption or Violence
Deputy Sheriff or Court Security Officer is Not Required

7-3-1

LEVEL 2:
n
n
n
n

Moderate-Risk Civil Proceeding
Criminal Proceeding with Defendant Present
Potential Courtroom Disruption or Violence
Court Security Officer May Be Required / Deputy Sheriff May Be Requested

LEVEL 3:
n
n
n
n

Moderate-Risk Criminal Trial or Criminal Post-Trial with In-Custody Defendant
High-Profile Trial
Substantial Risk or Opportunity for Courtroom Disruption or Violence
Deputy Sheriff and Court Security Officer Required

LEVEL 4:
n
n
n

High-Risk Criminal Trial or Post-Trial with In-Custody Defendant
High-Profile/Threat Trial
Minimum of Two Deputy Sheriffs and One Court Security Officer Required

For Level 3 and Level 4 Trials - Standard Utilization of a ‘One-on-One-Plus-One” Method is
Recommended in Determining the Number of Personnel to Assign to Secure Prisoners
EXAMPLE: Two (2) In-Custody Defendants

Three (3) In-Custody Defendants
Four (4) In-Custody Defendants

= Three (3) Deputies
= Four (4) Deputies
= Five (5) Deputies

It is noted that when the situation dictates (via threat assessments, intelligence, prisoner actions,
etc.), the utilization of two (2) deputies per prisoner may be necessary

7-3-2

HIGH THREAT & HIGH PROFILE
TRIALS
OPERATIONAL PLANS:
High-Profile/Threat Trial Operational Plans should provide detailed information on (1) Policies
and Procedures, (2) Individual and Team Assignments, (3) Judicial Directives, (4) Trial
Operations, (5) Prisoner Operations, and (6) Emergency Response Procedures.
The following sections are recommended for Trial Operational Plans and should encompass all
aspects necessary to supervise trial operations with adherence to recognized standards:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Copies of Official Correspondence
Job Description Leader Roles - see sample format
Threat Source Profile - see manual, Chapter 9: Threat Management, Section 9.2
Threat Analysis and Assessment - see manual, Chapter 10: Threat Investigations, Section 10.5
Intelligence and Informational Reports
Personnel Data Sheet - see enclosed sample form
Judicial Preference Form - see manual, Chapter 6: CSO’s, Section 6.4.1
Judicial Personnel Profile - see manual, Chapter 1: Legislation and Documents, Section 1.7
Modification of Standards
Daily Activity Log - see enclosed sample form
Weapons Policy - Deadly Force
Intermediate Weapons Policies and Registers - Stun Guns and Belts, Mace, Batons, etc.
Code of Conduct
Daily Hours Time Sheet - see enclosed sample form
Key Assignment Log
Media Reports and News Articles
Copies of Indictments, Arrest and Search Warrants
Criminal Dockets
Prisoner Processing Forms and Criminal Histories
Defendant Photographs
Area Maps and Courthouse Floor Plans
Aerial Photographs of Courthouse and Adjacent Areas
Primary and Alternate Prisoner Transport Routes
Courtroom Space Design Layout
Courtroom Video and Audio Recording Capabilities and Assignments
Prisoner, Media, and Visitor Courtroom Seating Assignments
Key Agency Emergency Contact List
Local, City, County, State, and Federal Law Enforcement Support and Coordination
Sheriff and Court Security Officer Post Assignments
Special and Temporary Assignment Statements

7-4-1

HIGH-THREAT TRIAL OPERATIONAL
PLAN – INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENTS
and ROLES
COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT
The Sheriff will provide liaison with:
n
n
n
n
n

Trial Judges
Federal and State Agencies
Police Departments
Other Law Enforcement Departments
Media

Chief Deputy Sheriff:
n

Maintain overall responsibility for the trial.

Supervisory Deputy Sheriff:
n
n
n

Responsible for briefing the Sheriff and Chief Deputy.
Assumes Courtroom Team Leader duties as necessary.
Overall Trial Supervisor responsibilities.

Assigned Deputy Courtroom Team Leader:
n
n
n
n
n

Responsible for daily trial operations.
Will coordinate and make decisions regarding courtroom trial matters.
In lieu of Sheriff, Chief Deputy, and Supervisor, will assume their responsibilities.
Responsible for ensuring that all policies and procedures as specified in Sheriff Manuals and Trial
Operational Plans are adhered to.
Responsible for coordinating all aspects of the trial with assigned Trial Supervisor.

Assigned Courthouse Team Leader is:
n
n
n

Responsible for outer and inner security perimeters.
Responsible for security screening procedures.
Responsible for trial operations as assigned.

7-5-1

Assigned Courtroom Team Leader will also:
n
n
n
n
n
n

Ensure all team members are on post.
Ensure all team members adhere to post instructions.
Enforce judicial orders.
Ensure courtroom is searched prior to and following trial.
Secure courtroom prior to and following trial.
Ensure proper conduct of trial participants.

Assigned Prisoner Team Leader will:
n
n
n

Ensure defendants are properly restrained per department policies and procedures.
Ensure defendants are transported in a safe and secure manner.
Ensure defendants’ proper conduct and safety during trial.

Assigned Sequestered Jury Team Leader will:
n
n
n
n
n

Secure the needs of the jury.
Coordinate safe and secure lodging for the jury.
Coordinate jury transportation.
Coordinate jury arrivals and departures.
Provide for medical needs of jury.

Assigned Prisoner Motorcade Team Leader will:
n
n

Coordinate prisoner transports with Trial Supervisor and Courtroom Team Leader.
Assume responsibilities as outlined in the prisoner transport section of the trial plan.

Assigned Protective Service’s Team Leader will:
n
n
n

Coordinate and Provide 24-hour (or variation of) Protective Service Details.

n
n
n

Will report for scheduled shifts at the USMS Command Post or designated area.
Responsible for searching and securing the courtroom.
Will maintain order/decorum within the courtroom and respond to all disturbances and incidents
(see post assignments).
Will assist other team as necessary and/or assigned.

Coordinate and Provide security for Protectees identified as being under threat.
Adhere to department policies and procedures as outlined for Protective Services.

COURTROOM TEAM

n

7-5-2

PROTECTIVE SERVICES TEAM
n
n

Will be formed when a protectee comes under threat and a detail has been authorized by the
Sheriff or Chief Deputy.
Will establish additional and separate details when multiple protectees come under threat.

SEQUESTERED JURY TEAM
n
n

Responsible for the security of the jury during sequestration.
Each Sequestered Jury Team member is responsible for standards as outlined in department
policies and procedures.

PRISONER TEAM
Responsible for controlling prisoners at all times - Specific duties are as follows:
n
n
n
n
n

Controlling, Searching, Restraining and Securing Prisoners.
Transporting prisoners to and from detention facilities and the courthouse.
Moving prisoners to and from transport vehicles and Courthouse Holding Cells.
Moving prisoners to and from Courthouse Holding Cells and the trial courtroom.
Adherence to department Prisoner Policy and Procedures Manuals.

COMMAND POST and COMMUNICATIONS
The Command Post (CP) will be located in a department or courthouse office as designated by
the Sheriff. Upon arriving at the CP, the assigned Courtroom Team Leader will ensure the
following is conducted:
n
n
n
n
n

Radios are checked
Operational Plan is readily available
Activity Logs and Trial Registers are updated
Communications have been established and are being monitored
Confirmation and Coordination of daily trial activities

COMMUNICATIONS WILL CONSIST OF:
n
n
n
n

CP Base Station
Portable radios equipped with approved privacy kits - The Trial Supervisor will determine if,
when, and for whom radio privacy kits will be utilized.
Radio Chargers and Batteries
Reserve Radios

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS WILL SERVE AS THE CENTRAL POINT OF
CONTACT FOR DURATION OF THE TRIAL

7-5-3

Assigned personnel shall report each morning to the CP prior to their scheduled shift. The Trial
Supervisor and/or respective Team Leaders will confirm duty assignments and brief personnel on
a daily basis. All assigned personnel will be immediately briefed by the Trial Supervisor on any
changes made to the trial operational plan.
Personnel will remain on duty until (1) properly relieved or (2) instructed to secure their post
assignment. At the conclusion of each day, all personnel will report to the CP for the daily
debriefing. Specialized equipment will be signed out when scheduled shifts commence and
signed back in when said shift is completed.
Trial personnel will either be on post, in the immediate area of the CP, or in designated areas of
the courthouse - All other locations are to be authorized by the CP prior to any departure.

INDIVIDUAL COURTROOM DUTY ASSIGNMENTS
COURTROOM TEAM LEADER
Responsible for all actions of the Courtroom Team. This includes, but is not limited to, directly
responding to all judicial, attorney, media, and defendant inquiries. During each recess, will
report trial status to the attention of the Trial Supervisor.

PRISONER TEAM
Responsible for all prisoner actions. As directed by the Trial Supervisor, team members may be
armed with either a department approved firearm or intermediate weapon. The Prisoner Team is
under the direction of the Courtroom Team Leader.

JUDICIAL TEAM
Responsible for the security of the trial judge. The Judicial Team is under the direction of the
Courtroom Team Leader.

GALLERY TEAM
Responsible for handling disturbances from the general public, defendant family members and
associates. Reports and directs inquiries to the attention of the Courtroom Team Leader.
Enforces all predetermined courtroom seating assignments (i.e. reserved, media, public, and
security). The Gallery Team is under the direction of the Courtroom Team Leader.

SECURITY SCREENING TEAM
As determined by the Trial Supervisor, may supplement courthouse screening and/or be
responsible for screening all persons entering the courtroom. Security equipment utilized may
include magnetometers, hand-held metal detectors, and fluoroscopes. The Security Screening
Team is under the direction of the Courtroom Team Leader.

7-5-4

DUTY HOURS
Duty hours will be documented according to:
n
n
n
n
n
n

Arrival of Trial Supervisor and Courtroom Team Leader
Commencement and Suspension of CP operations
Arrival of Assigned Posts
Arrivals and Departures of Prisoner Transports
Courthouse and Courtroom Security Sweeps
Trial Schedule

PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES
Deputies will reports to the CP at least 15 minutes prior to the start of their scheduled shift
assignment. Deputies will report for duty physically fit and mentally alert. If a deputy is unable
to perform assigned duties due to illness, or unspecified reason, they will immediately notify the
Trial Supervisor.

Personnel will not discuss department internal matters, procedures, policies, grievances,
personalities, finances, personal or family problems with or in the presence of judicial
officers, the general public, attorneys, media, defendants and prisoners. Personnel will refer
to the department Code of Conduct for all department-authorized standards of behavior.

There will be no unnecessary display of firearms and/or intermediate weapons.
Personnel, including while off duty, will remain vigilant for persons (1) Exhibiting any Unusual
Curiosity for Trial Proceedings and Sheriff Department Activities, and (2) Conducting Counter
Surveillance Operations - A heightened sense of awareness should be maintained by all
assignment personnel for the real possibility of hostile or said counter-surveillance actions.
The Daily Activity Log will be maintained in the CP for the review and recording of trial shift
assignments, revisions, modifications, and operational incidents.

7-5-5

SPECIAL PRISONER TRANSPORT CONSIDERATIONS
The Prisoner Transport Team may require utilization of FOLLOW-CAR VEHICLES

If the follow-car option is determined, city, county, and state law enforcement agencies will be
notified of the time and routes of prisoner transports.
At the direction of the Trial Supervisor, these agencies may be requested to provide information
on (1) Traffic Accidents, Congestion and Delays, (2) Known and Suspected Hazards, and (3)
Threat Intelligence.
The Trial Supervisor will also determine the level and type of agency assistance required with
reference to (4) Marked Squad Escorts, (5) Roadblocks, and (6) Notice and Concurrence to
Exceed Posted Speed Limits.
Transportation to and from the courthouse will be scheduled to avoid contact with judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and the general public. Primary and Alternate routes/times of travel
will vary as determined by the Trial Supervisor.
Scheduled prisoner transports will not be released to the media, attorneys, or public. All
inquiries will be directed towards the Trial Supervisor.

7-5-6

DETAIL PERSONNEL DATA SHEET
Name:

DOB:

Drivers License Number:

State:

Immediate Supervisor:

Telephone:
1:

2:

1:

2:

Emergency Contact Names:

Emergency Contact
Telephone Numbers:

EMERGENCY MEDICAL INFORMATION
Current Prescribed Medications, Allergies, and Conditions ( i.e. Diabetic, etc.):

Doctor’s Name:

Telephone:

Hospital:

Telephone:

Date Form Completed:

/

/

Signature:

7-5-7

DAILY ACTIVITY LOG
Date:
TIME

Page
INFORMATION

PREPARER

of ____________
REVIEWING SIGNATURE

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

_______________________
_______________________

Name:
Title:
Signature:

7-5-8

OPERATIONAL PLAN CHECKLIST for
HIGH THREAT/PROFILE TRIAL
TRIAL SUPERVISOR:

TRIAL DATE:

V.

JUDGE:

INDIVIDUAL TRIAL ASSIGNMENTS

ASSIGNMENT STATUS
COMPLETED

As Directed - Brief Sheriff and Chief Deputy on Trial Status
Operational Considerations
Secure and Review all Trial Requests and Information

and

Identify/State Trial Objectives - Providing Security Services
Assess/State Scope of Trial - Significant Influencing Factors
Identify Trial and Pretrial Prisoner Detention Facilities
Specify Department and Other Agency Commitments
List Trial Contacts (Judicial, Attorney, and Law Enforcement)
Secure and Review Judicial Personnel Profile, Courthouse
Contingency and Occupant Emergency Plans
Review Previous High Threat/Profile Trial Plans
Assign Personnel - Schedule Shift Assignments
Conduct Threat and Risk Assessment(s)
List Primary and Alternate Routes to Jails and Courthouse
Confirm Separatee Status for Defendants and Witnesses
Determine Special Handling Requirements for Prisoners
Assess, Propose and Establish Courtroom Seating
Assignments and Requirements - Gallery / Well / Defendants
Identify and List Special Trial Considerations
Identify and List Trial Specific Emergency/Medical Contacts
Secure and Review Trial Site Plans, Maps and Photographs
Identify and List Trial Equipment Requirements
Prepare High Threat/Profile Trial Operational Plan and
Individual Trial Deputy Briefing Packets
Submit to Sheriff and Chief Deputy for Review, Briefing,
Plan Authorization

and

7-5-9

PENDING

N/A

JURORS
The type of trial and the amount of publicity will dictate security considerations for jurors. Jurors
should be kept out of public hallways and gathering areas to keep them separate from parties,
witnesses, and the media. Ideally, separate parking facilities and building entrances should be
provided. Absent that, jurors should be kept together and should take breaks in secure areas not
accessible to the general public.
Jurors should use secure hallways from the courtroom to the deliberation room. Jurors should
never use a hallway which is in the process of being used for transporting prisoners or custodial
witnesses. If secure hallways are not available, court security personnel should keep jurors
separate from parties, witnesses, and the general public. More and more incidents are occurring
in hallways and assembly areas outside courtrooms where violence has a great tendency to erupt.
The intelligence information available to the judge and the court security officer will also dictate
whether jurors are referred to by name or merely by number during the jury selection process and
throughout the trial. For trials where the threat level is greatest, personal escorts should be
employed to accompany jurors to and from their cars, or they should be escorted by van from a
remote assembly site where they may park away from the courthouse and the media.
For sequestered juries, suitable arrangements need to be made for hotel accommodations with
sign-in and sign-out logs for phone calls, visitors, and other requests of jurors. Security personnel
should keep a general log of activity during a tour of duty (i.e., log any videos requested by and
provided to jurors). A sufficient number of security personnel of each gender should be assigned
to assist the jurors. Additional arrangements will need to be considered for the jurors’ meals and
for other forms of diversion, especially during a lengthy trial.
CAUTIONARY NOTE: Court security personnel, court attendants, and jury clerks must take
special care to compare jury panel lists against those for whom alert notices have been posted.
Recently, an individual in the state of Minnesota who had repeatedly threatened a number of
judges and other court personnel, responded to a jury summons, was a member of a jury panel,
was selected to serve, and was seated on a misdemeanor criminal jury. He accompanied the other
jurors through the secure hallways in the company of the jury attendant. While nothing
happened, he had access to the judicial chambers as he walked along, and he became familiar
with the security measures in place. It was not until a detective witness alerted the prosecutor
that the judge was notified. The judge then informed him that he was the alternate juror and
would not be needed. The individual was then excused with the judge’s thanks.

SEQUESTERED JURIES
The United States Marshals Service has prepared a Sequestered Jury Blank Forms Package
(USM-523) that contains the necessary forms (see below) to document all jury sequestration
activities and incidents. This package is considered LIMITED OFFICIAL USE information and
is secured per USMS Information Security Policy mandates.

7-6-1

County Sheriff Departments requesting copies of this forms package can contact the United
States Marshals Service.

SEQUESTERED JURY FORMS PACKAGE:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Sequestered Jury Record Checklist of Required Forms - USM-523-A
Jury Instructions at Sequestration Commencement - USM-523-B-1
Sample Judicial Order for Sequestration - USM-523-B-3
Individual Jurors Information Form - USM-523-C
Room Assignments Register - USM-523-D
Medication Register - USM-523-E
Telephone Calls Register - USM-523-F
Visitation Register - USM-523-G
Newspapers and Periodicals Register - USM-523-H
Television Log - USM-523-I
Video-Taped Programs Register - USM-523-J
Incident Report Form - USM-523-K
Authorized Visitors Record and Absent Jurors Location Form - USM-523-L
Mail Consent Form - USM-523-M
Incoming Mail Register - USM-523-N
Outgoing Mail Register - USM-523-O
Jury Transportation Register - USM-523-P
USMS Command Post Site Log - USM-523-Q-1
USMS Command Post Site Log Continuation - USM-523-Q-2

Personnel assigned Sequestered Jury Team Leader duties are responsible for ensuring all jury
forms are completed in a thorough and expeditious manner.

7-6-2

HANDLING WEAPONS AS EXHIBITS IN
THE COURTROOM
“If we cannot ensure the safety of all participants in the judicial process, we cannot
maintain the integrity of the system, we cannot - in sum - ‘establish justice’ as
mandated in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States.”
— Chief Justice of the United States & the U.S. Attorney General Judicial Conference, March
11, 1982

Attacks on the courts have ranged from minor disturbances and physical assaults to senseless
acts of murder. Regardless of your past experience, there is no assurance that violence will not
happen in your court!

THINK PROACTIVELY. AVOID A TRAGEDY. TAKE NOTHING FOR GRANTED.

“THE POTENTIAL IS THERE.”
How would you like to find yourself answering a jury question, “Why did you send a loaded gun
into the jury room?” It has happened! What would you do if a county attorney in a receiving
stolen gun case checked a shotgun as an exhibit, and in so clearing the weapon, a live round
ejected? How would you like to have a semi-automatic handgun on counsel table right next to a
loaded magazine (Fig. 1)?
In St. Paul, the police department has instituted a policy that no firearm may be removed from
the property room or the crime laboratory for use in court or any other purpose without having
one of the firearms instructors or rangemasters inspect the weapon to assure that it is unloaded.
But that is only one department in the whole state of Minnesota. What are you doing in your
district or in your court to assure that firearms are unloaded and safe? What are you doing in
your court to assure that knives cannot be used as weapons?
As presiding judge in your court, you have an obligation to see that order is preserved, to prevent
injury to court personnel - the parties, counsel, jurors, yourself, and spectators - and to prevent
escape, as well as to ensure an atmosphere free of apprehension or fear of violence.
Weapons can be used intentionally, either to injure, maim or kill. They may be secreted and
carried into the courtroom by a defendant, a witness, a spectator, or a friend or relative of a
victim or a defendant. We can recall with horror how Ming Sen Shue raced from counsel table
in Anoka County several years ago and, with a hidden razor, sliced the face of his kidnap
victim/witness on the witness stand before sheriff’s deputies could get to him.

7-7-1

There is an area 18-21 feet in radius known as the kill zone. That is an area in which a person
could run with a knife and kill you before you could act to stop that person or draw a gun and
fire in self-defense. It is possible, therefore, for someone to make a run for an exhibit, such as a
knife or firearm, grab the weapon, even load the firearm, and use it to facilitate an escape, injure
or wound security personnel, court staff, counsel, a juror, or you. Weapons, as exhibits, also can
be handled such that they injure or kill accidentally.
Weapons can be used safely as exhibits in both civil and criminal cases. This can be done if a
few simple rules are followed:

TEN COMMANDMENTS
FOR HANDLING OF FIREARMS AS EXHIBITS
1.

EVERY FIREARM IS ALWAYS LOADED!
A firearm must be checked every time it is handled - whether it has been offered as an
exhibit or is merely being identified during foundation prior to its being offered, and
regardless of who is handling it - unless it has a mechanical block in place to prevent
firing.
This is especially so in cases where there are multiple firearms as exhibits or potential
exhibits. As it is generally considered unprofessional conduct for counsel to have
unadmitted real evidence visible to the jury or witnesses prior to the time admission of
the exhibit is sought, see United States v. McDowell, 13 C.M.A. 129, 32 C.M.R. 129
(1962), counsel will usually keep a firearm in a briefcase until admitted into evidence.
Since you cannot assure that the weapon retrieved from a briefcase is the same weapon
earlier retrieved, checked, used for whatever purpose and returned to the briefcase, you
must ensure an unblocked weapon is checked each and every time it is retrieved. Do not
assume that it is unloaded. This is how accidents happen.
Check the firearm each time it is touched unless a mechanical block is in place!
Even a firearm that is checked each time is susceptible to being grabbed and loaded
quickly and suddenly. Thus, a mechanical block is recommended.

2.

ALWAYS POINT THE FIREARM - THE MUZZLE - DOWNRANGE!
In the courtroom there really is no such thing as downrange; thus extra care must be taken
that a weapon is not pointed at jurors, spectators, parties, and court personnel.
Make sure when a firearm is held or being demonstrated or passed, it is pointed at
the ceiling, the floor, or at a wall with no one between the weapon and the wall! A
firearm may be demonstrated safely, but only if the handler knows how to operate or hold
it safely. This applies to both counsel and witnesses. Only when a firearm is pointed at
the ceiling, the floor, or a blank wall during demonstrations, with no one between the

7-7-2

firearm and the wall, may everyone concentrate on the testimony, rather than on whether
the weapon is likely to go off.

3.

ALWAYS KNOW WHAT DIRECTION THE FIREARM IS POINTED!
Be sure that all counsel who handle the firearm or any weapon of any kind are aware
what direction the firearm is pointed and that they caution witnesses - especially lay
witnesses, but sworn personnel as well - to be aware of what direction the firearm is
pointed. Often sworn officers are so used to working with firearms that in the somewhat
stressed setting of the courtroom they may not be as attentive to the handling of a firearm
as you would like. Do not assume that one counsel is as experienced with firearms as
another, or that one counsel is as safety-conscious as the other.

4.

KNOW HOW TO HANDLE AND HOLD FIREARMS!
Firearms should always be held with fingers OUTSIDE the trigger and trigger guard!
The natural tendency is to grip a firearm with the index finger inside the trigger guard and
on the trigger. This natural inclination must be unlearned!
Firearms should never be held with the finger inside the trigger guard or on the
trigger unless counsel is demonstrating or directing a witness to do so!

5.

n

Handguns - Hold by the barrel pointed at the floor, with the handgrip pointing
away from you.

n

Revolvers - Cylinder swung open or weapon broken open if hinged.

n

Pistols - Slide locked open if slide can be locked open in place.

n

Long guns - Hold by the neck of the stock pointing at ceiling with action open,
hinged shotguns may be pointed at floor with action open.

KNOW HOW TO TRANSFER FIREARMS SAFELY!
Generally speaking, the safest way to transfer a firearm is to place it, action open, on a
table and let the other person pick it up making sure the other person does so directly - by
the barrel, never with a finger inside the trigger guard. Semi-automatic handguns should
be placed down on a table or the witness stand with the slide back, ejection port up, while
revolvers should be placed down with cylinder swung open and up. It is perfectly
acceptable to hand the firearm to the witness and for the witness to hold the handgun by
the handle while examining the exhibit, as long as the witness is directed to keep the
weapon pointed at the ceiling or the floor and the witness’s fingers do not go inside the
trigger guard or on the trigger. A witness should not put a finger inside the trigger guard

7-7-3

or on the trigger unless it is necessary as part of a demonstration, and then only if the
firearm has been just checked, cleared, or a mechanical block is in place. In fact, by
counsel handing the firearm to the witness with the muzzle pointed toward the ceiling or
toward the floor, the witness can be directed to safely receive, handle, and return the
firearm in the same way counsel is handling the exhibit.

6.

KNOW WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE FIREARM!
Have a written policy, or at least an oral order, that is clearly understood by counsel, the
court clerk, the court reporter, and the bailiffs or sheriffs how the firearm or weapon is
to be secured, and who is responsible for its security during trial, morning and
afternoon breaks, as well as noon and overnight recesses.
Having a written policy, or at the very least a written order for that trial, focuses
responsibility. (Some judges, some sheriffs, and most counsel have no idea whose duty
or responsibility court security and weapons or exhibit security is!) Written policy,
procedure, or a written order also encourages and promotes cooperation. A written order
or policy also increases the likelihood of preventing injury or loss of life. This also
should be the case for other kinds of weapons, as well as for drugs or any contraband
material. There is nothing worse than having an exhibit disappear during a break or over
a noon recess.
Take advantage of the provisions of Minn. Stat.§ 609.66 that require counsel to notify the
sheriff of intent to transport a weapon into a courthouse complex for use as a
demonstrative exhibit. Ask counsel if they have given notice and what arrangements they
have made for its safe condition, safekeeping, and transfer prior to its being offered.
Counsel, the clerk, the reporter, and the sheriff should know the procedures you require
for keeping the firearm safe. Do not just allow the firearm to be placed on the reporter’s
table, on counsel table, with the clerk, or on the bench or anywhere it can be reached
easily by a defendant, spectator, or witness.
Watch out for counsel who want to place a firearm or other weapon on counsel table or in
front of a defendant on the witness stand in an attempt to see just what the reaction of that
defendant is. It may be perfectly permissible, but you must consider requiring counsel to
clear it with you in chambers so that there are no surprises for the judge or for either
counsel. Placement of a firearm or other weapon is as important as any
consideration when handling firearms as exhibits in the courtroom. Even with a
mechanical block in place, remember that a firearm still can be picked up and thrown or
used as a club, so haphazard placement of the weapon must be avoided.

7.

USE A MECHANICAL BLOCK WHENEVER POSSIBLE!
Contrary to the belief or arguments of some, checking a firearm each time it is handled is
not prejudicial to the rights of a defendant, but is an absolute necessary and essential

7-7-4

safety practice unless a mechanical block is in place. There are a number of different
types of mechanical blocks that may be used with varying degrees of effectiveness to
keep firearms safe and secure in court (Figs. 2, 21, 22).
Types of mechanical blocks:
n

Trigger lock - This is usually a keyed device, (Fig. 2), but if it is an un-keyed
type, it is applied and removed with only a large amount of pressure. It is placed
either side of the trigger guard of a handgun or long gun. It is held in place by a
cylinder that connects one side with the other, with the gun’s trigger and trigger
guard sandwiched in between each side of the trigger lock (Figs. 3, 4, and 5).
Care must be taken in relying on this device because if it is placed too loosely on
a single-action semi-automatic weapon, it could slide back and fire a bullet. This
is especially true with the type of triggers on the Colt .45 and similar handguns
that have a solid trigger that slides straight back when pulled (Fig. 6).
If possible, the cylinder on the trigger lock should be placed behind the trigger to
block the trigger from being able to be pulled back (Fig. 7). Of course it is not
always possible to place the trigger lock over the trigger guard so that the cylinder
is behind the trigger. In that event, where the trigger lock cylinder is in front of
the trigger (Fig. 8), as in all cases, it is extremely important to make sure that the
trigger lock is on tightly and that it will not slide back and allow the firearm to
discharge a round.

n

Electrician’s strap or cable tie - This device, once in place, cannot be removed
without cutting it off. It is fairly inexpensive, but is not reusable once it is
applied. As can be seen from the photos (Figs. 9, 10, 11 and 22), it may be used
on any size pistol, but particularly on smaller semi-automatic pistols, such as .22,
.25, .32, .380 caliber and other smaller handguns where a bicycle padlock will not
fit.
However, extreme care must be taken when used on revolvers to assure that the
hammer will not come back, and to ensure that the gun cannot fire. When the
strap was applied behind the hammer spur of the Colt .38 that is shown (Fig. 12),
it was still possible to pull the trigger and fire the gun in double action, that is,
without pulling the hammer back first. When the electrician’s strap was applied
over the top of the hammer spur of the Smith & Wesson .38 as shown (Fig. 9), it
was not possible to fire the handgun. The preferred method to secure a revolver
with electrician’s strap is to run the strap down the barrel.
On revolvers that hinge or break open, where the cylinder does not swing to the
side, place the tape through the barrel and insert it through the cylinder and secure
it.

7-7-5

On rifles and shotguns where the long gun has a magazine or is pump action or
semi-automatic, it is possible to run the strap up through the action and out the
ejection port and secure it (Fig. 4).
n

Flex cuffs - These have the same advantage as the electrician’s strap above, but
are more durable and more difficult to cut through; they are heavier and thicker.
Because they are wider and thicker, they are less pliable, and, thus, may be more
difficult or impossible to maneuver or fit through smaller openings or spaces (Fig.
22).

n

Padlock - This is the preferred method for securing a handgun because of its ease
of application and because it is possible to have ammunition in the courtroom at
the same time, which may be essential to the presentation of some element a party
has to prove. Semi-automatic pistols, such as 9mm, and .40 and .45 caliber, may
be secured by opening the action, placing the bicycle padlock down through the
ejection port into the magazine well, and locking it in place at the butt of the
handgun, as shown (Fig. 13). This mechanical block prevents anyone from
grabbing a magazine, whether loaded or unloaded, and inserting it into the
magazine well by the handle. It also prevents a single bullet from being
chambered or placed into the gun through the ejection port into the chamber and
fired. With the bicycle padlock in place, the slide cannot move forward and the
firing pin cannot strike the bullet. A bicycle padlock in place prevents the ability
to load a bullet into the gun in the first place.
In revolvers, the bicycle padlock has the advantage of being able to secure the
weapon in a number of ways: First, a revolver with a swing cylinder may be
secured by merely placing the padlock through the top strap, as shown (Fig. 14).
This prevents the cylinder from closing and allowing the hammer and firing pin to
come near the cylinder or bullet. Firing a round through a revolver with a padlock
placed in this manner is impossible. Second, a revolver may be secured by
inserting a bicycle padlock through the barrel at the muzzle and locking it in place
by the open cylinder, as shown (Fig. 14). Third, depending on the caliber of he
revolver, the lock may be inserted through the cylinder itself and locked (Fig. 15),
which will prevent the cylinder from being aligned and prevent it from being
fired. Where the revolver is too small to allow the lock to be inserted through the
barrel or through the cylinder, the first method - the preferred method - is the only
method that will work. By securing a revolver by placing a padlock through the
top strap of the handgun, counsel are still afforded the ability, as indeed they
should be, to demonstrate loading of the weapon with the cylinder swung out and
locked open, to show trigger pull in either double action or single action, and to
demonstrate the effect of pulling back on the hammer.
The state or government can utilize this, both as it relates to intent, cognition, and
thought processes, and to premeditation, planning, and preparation. The defense
can use it to show accident, mistake, the lack of intent, the lack of premeditation,
or the presence of self-defense.

7-7-6

n

SAFEGUN SafeTclaw Universal Gun Lock - This is very similar to the padlock
and can be used on virtually any firearm - long guns and handguns (Figs. 18, 19,
20 and 21). It is a truly all-purpose, universal gun lock. It is adjustable and will
secure most long guns, from sporting-type rifles or shotguns to military-pattern
firearms, such as AR-15 and Uzi. It fits all handguns from .22 semi-automatics or
revolvers to the .50 cal. Desert Eagle. As shown in the right side of Fig. 18, the
top hook of the SafeTclaw hooks over the ejection port, while the bottom end fits
into the bottom of the magazine well. The SafeTclaw is then snugged up in place
against the butt of the pistol until it is secure. It can work equally well to insert
the hook end into the ejection port and snug the other end up in place against the
muzzle and secure it there as well.
On revolvers, the SafeTclaw works in much the same way. It can be hooked into
the chamber and the key end inserted into the end of the muzzle, as shown on the
top of Fig. 19. It also can be applied by placing the SafeTclaw into one end of the
cylinder and securing the key end into the other end of the cylinder, thus
preventing the cylinder from closing and thus prohibiting a bullet from being fired
(Fig. 20).

n

Safegun gun lock - This is a plug that fits semi-automatic pistols but will not
work on revolvers (Fig. 18). The T-type plug is inserted through the ejection port
of the pistol with the top part of the tubular “T” inverted so that the front end is
inserted into the chamber and the rear end protrudes towards the hammer and
firing pin. It is locked in place with a key, which extends an interior cylinder,
locking the “T” plug in place. A number of different sizes fit different firearms,
and no one “T” plug is a universal fit, although some will fit more than one brand
of pistol. There are specific directions on each particular model to insert it with
the long end on the expanding cylinder pointing either toward or away from the
chamber of the pistol.

n

Bicycle cable - This may be used as an effective method to keep a number of
revolvers and semi-automatic handguns together (Fig. 22). This device is also
especially suited to use in long guns, where an electrician’s strap is not long
enough or where steel cable is desired. The advantage of bicycle cable over
electrician’s strap is that a defendant cannot race forward with a box cutter, razor
or knife and grab the firearm and cut the cable. Electrician’s strap or flex cuffs
can be cut before anyone wakes up and realizes what is being done!

n

Mossberg cable lock - This is very similar to the bicycle cable (Fig. 22), but is
generally shorter and secured by a keyed padlock (Figs. 18, 19, 20 and 21).

7-7-7

8.

KEEP AMMUNITION SEPARATE FROM FIREARMS!
It is generally recommended that ammunition and firearms be kept separate in the jury
room and in the courtroom as well. This is absolutely essential if there is n o mechanical
block on the firearms or if electrician’s strap, which can be cut easily, is used.
Where you have a number of firearms or a lot of ammunition, or both, such as in a case
involving the robbery or burglary of a gun shop, it is essential to keep the firearms and
ammunition separate. Plans must be made to coordinate with the sheriff and secure the
ammunition in a separate room outside the courtroom and away from the firearms.
You will have to determine whether to use more or less restrictive measures in restricting
the accessibility, or in the handling or use of ammunition and firearms as exhibits
depending upon certain factors. These include security considerations and intelligence
regarding possible violence from spectators, victim’s friends or relatives, or defendant’s
friends or relatives.

9.

ALLOW DEMONSTRATIONS USING FIREARMS - BUT BE CAREFUL!
n

Demonstrating Revolvers - When necessary or essential to counsel’s case to
have ammunition near a firearm to show how a revolver is loaded, or for some
other legitimate purpose, a mechanical block in the revolver, such as a bicycle
padlock through the top strap or through the barrel, would still allow
demonstration, without any possibility that it will fire. As an additional safety
measure, have a police rangemaster remove the powder and primer from some of
the seized ammunition, or from comparable ammunition, confirm with your Court
Security Officer that it is inert, and then use it when demonstrating.

n

Demonstrating semi-automatic pistols. The Prosecutor or Defense Counsel
may need to show how a semi-automatic pistol is used in order to show intent or
to corroborate a witness. For example, a witness describes how the defendant or
the victim grabbed a gun from a shelf, put a “clip” or “something” into the handle
of the gun (a magazine into the magazine well), and then pulled the top of the gun
back (the slide - to chamber a round or load the gun by putting it into battery).
The Prosecutor or Defense Counsel may need to have a jury understand the effect
of having the slide stop back, indicating that the magazine is empty, or of having
the slide slam forward, indicating that the magazine was loaded with one or more
rounds. Some pistols will lock the slide back after firing the last round or when
the magazine is empty. Some pistols will lock the slide back without the
magazine locked in the magazine well, but only if done manually. Still others
have a magazine disconnect, or magazine safety, which prevents firing with the
magazine removed, a safety feature which prevents deliberate firing during a
magazine change or if the magazine is lost. These different operations may be
shown during the testimony of a rangemaster or a firearms instructor or other

7-7-8

qualified individual. In order for this to be demonstrated by inserting a magazine
into the pistol, there can be no mechanical block, such as a bicycle padlock,
through the ejection port down into the magazine well, and a trigger lock will not
assure that the hammer on a semi-automatic pistol will not strike the firing pin.
The presence of a decocker or decocking lever is an insufficient safeguard to
allow a safe demonstration of this with live ammunition. Therefore, any
demonstration of the loading or chambering of ammunition into a semi-automatic
pistol must be done with inert ammunition; that is, with bullets that have the
primer and powder removed. All such inert ammunition should be test-fired
outside of court before the demonstration is allowed. Counsel should be required
to have officers or agents clear weapons outside of court in the presence of the
Court Security Officer in charge of weapons or in charge of security in your
courtroom before a hearing or trial begins. Cases have been reported where it was
virtually impossible to clear a weapon, only to have a round go off when the slide
finally was pulled back. As an added safety feature, you should consider
requiring the firing pin to be removed.
n

Demonstrating center-fire weapons - With center-fire weapons, but particularly
semi-automatic pistols, it is possible to demonstrate safely that they are operable
and functional. This can be done by inserting a regular unsharpened lead pencil
into the barrel with the eraser either closest to the hammer or grip, or closest to
the muzzle, and then cocking the pistol, aiming it at the ceiling, and pulling the
trigger. It should not be a surprise to see the pencil fly out like a section-cup dart.
Of course, it would bee ideal to have a pencil with an eraser on both ends, but
they may be hard to find. Slipping a cap-type eraser over the unsharpened end
will achieve this result. Whether you allow this practice is, of course, your
decision. It can be done safely if counsel, the firearms instructor, the criminalist
or range officer witness, and all concerned know what to expect. For this
demonstration, the firing pin must not be removed or the pencil will not be
propelled out of the gun.

n

Demonstrating silencers - This can be done safely if some things are understood
from the outset. To demonstrate the powerful effect of a silencer on a firearm, the
proponent may request or desire to fire the weapon into a cotton baffle, both with
a silencer in place and with it removed. Opposing counsel may object, claiming
that it is too prejudicial to their case or to their client. You may consider ordering
that sound recordings be made outside the courthouse and outside the jury’s
presence and that the recordings be made and played back for the jurors. The
difficulty with this approach is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to replicate the
exact decibel level of the reports with and without a silencer in place, especially if
it is made in a different environment, either outdoors or indoors where the sound
reverberations may be entirely different.
This, again, is a discretionary call, but one which I would not hesitate to allow, as
long as you set the ground rules and they are clearly understood. A number of

7-7-9

years ago, a visiting federal judge from Texas granted such a request in United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota. If you allow it, the
demonstration should be conducted by a rangemaster, a firearms instructor, a
qualified criminalist, or other qualified individual, and the entire procedure should
be spelled out for you, so that you can lay it out for the jury with full explanation,
as appropriate. If you allow this demonstration, you must notify the sheriff and
any other building tenants so that upon hearing a report of a gunshot from your
courtroom, sheriffs, security personnel, waiting officers or agent-witnesses or
others do not race into the courtroom with weapons drawn.
n

10.

Displaying firearms. In addition to keeping a number of firearms secured
together by means of a bicycle cable, firearms may be displayed on a pegboard
(Figs. 16, 17 and 22). The firearms, whether handguns or long guns, may be
secured to the pegboard by electricians straps or cable ties, or by flex cuffs.
Pegboard is available in 1/8" and 1/4" thickness with holes of corresponding size.
Neither size will allow Flex cuffs to be used to secure them without enlarging the
holes for them to fit through. The advantage to the pegboard is that all of the
weapons admitted into evidence may be displayed safely, so that none may be
removed and fired or otherwise thrown or used as a blunt object. The
disadvantage is that if someone is quick enough, they may cut through the plastic
material and remove one or more of the weapon-exhibits, so the length and
thickness of the plastic ties should be considered carefully. This disadvantage of
easy removal may be overcome by using wire instead of cable ties.

CLEARING LONG GUNS REQUIRES EXTRA CAUTION!
It is not enough to work the action several times with lever-action, pump-action or semiautomatic rifles and shotguns. Cases have been reported where a round became lodged,
crimped or stuck at the far end of the magazine tube and was not jarred loose until
working the action over a dozen times. With long guns of this nature, it is absolutely
necessary to remove the tube and follower and check for any plug or other obstruction
visually. Continually racking the slide or working the lever action will not assure that the
long gun is loaded.
By following these Ten Commandments for Handling Firearms as Exhibits, you will
provide a safer environment for trial and reduce the anxiety level of all participants, and
you will go a long way in exercising that kind of no-nonsense courtroom control that is
absolutely essential to conducting a fair trial, while allowing counsel the ability to prove
or challenge those matters which are essential to their case.

DEMONSTRATING NON-FIREARM WEAPONS
n

Knives - All knives should be kept in their sheath. If there is no sheath, consider having
counsel or your Court Security Officer fabricate a multi-layer cardboard sheath using 3M

7-7-10

strapping tape or duct tape. Butterfly or gravity knives may be secured in the closed
position with electrical tape, or, if the handle has holes, by electrician’s straps, flex cuffs,
or cable ties or wire.
n

Razors, box cutters, and other sharp instruments - These should be kept in heatsealed pouches that are used in evidence collection by criminalists, double-layered, to
guard against puncture of the pouch by the item itself. An ideal way to secure any
weapon would be to place it in a see-through box constructed of Lexan, or some bulletproof glass, and secured with a padlock. This would prevent access while allowing the
item to be viewed.

n

Bombs, bomb components, blasting caps, and fuses - Be governed by
recommendations of the United States Marshals Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
& Firearms of the United States Treasury Department, and your local bomb squad or
explosive ordinance disposal team. Consider photographs in lieu of actual devices,
unless they can be made inert and can be secured and stored safely. No live bombs
should ever be allowed in the courtroom.

PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS AS EXHIBITS IN THE
COURTROOM
More important than anything else is the placement of the weapon as an exhibit. Easy
access to someone who would deliberately or accidentally use or misuse it in your court
must be avoided!
Special note: Special precautions are necessary for pro se defendants! Where you have a
pro se defendant, either at the beginning of the trial or who discharges counsel mid-trial,
it is necessary to caution a pro se defendant that in addition to being required to comply
with all the rules of decorum and rules of evidence, defendant will not be allowed to
approach the bench, to participate in chambers conferences, to approach the witness
stand, or to handle any kind of weapons. Arrange for the court security officer, bailiff or
court clerk to carry exhibits between the counsel table and the witness stand. Defendants
should not be permitted to examine weapons as exhibits. That must be left to standby
counsel. Decide whether the court security officer, bailiff or court clerk will carry
exhibits, particularly weapons, for both the state and the defendant, or just for the pro se
defendant.
Non-exhibit weapons of opportunity - Weapons of opportunity can be found in any
courtroom in any courthouse in America. Even the simplest of everyday objects can be
turned into lethal weapons. A United States Marshal found this out the hard way when
he went to pull back the chair of a woman defendant in federal court following recess for
the day. As the chair was pulled back, she took a regular yellow lead pencil in both
hands, and with the point held up by her thumb and index finger, raised it straight up and
over her head to the back, jabbing it into the marshal’s face between the top of his eye

7-7-11

and the orbit. This could have been prevented if a gold pencil or 100% flexible, nonmetallic pen had been provided in place of an ordinary pen or pencil.

TOP-TEN LIST OF WEAPONS OF OPPORTUNITY
1. Judge’s name plate;
2. Pencil or pen at counsel table;
3. Judge’s gavel;
4. Stapler;
5. Sign & holder on counsel table - “Do Not Place Briefcases on Table;”
6. Scissors;
7. Letter openers;
8. Microphones;
9. Microphone cord and electrical cord; and
10. Large pointed objects such as clothes trees, flag pole eagles and points.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFE USE OF LISTED ITEMS
1. Make the judge’s nameplate out of cardboard in a tent-fashion, as with
seminar nameplates, or affix the nameplate in front of the bench so that it
cannot be grabbed and used as a weapon.
2. Replace the pen or pencil at counsel table for a criminal defendant with a golf
pencil or a York roller ball pen. The York rolling ball 117EF is a highsecurity pen, 100% plastic, flexible construction, which uses water-based ink
and contains no metal. It is readily available tat a reasonable price.
3. Move the gavel so that it is out of reach of someone standing by the bench or
near the clerk or by whoever has the gavel in your court.
4. Keep staplers, scissors and letter openers in a drawer at all times while not in
use by the clerk or court reporter!
5. Remove any signs on counsel table. Once the suppression hearing or trial
begins, everyone should know the rules about what is and is not permitted on
counsel table.
6. Use paper or Styrofoam cups for water, and keep the pitcher with the clerk so
that it is no easily accessible to a criminal defendant.
7. Install microphones so that they are a permanent fixture and cannot be moved
and used as a club.

7-7-12

8. Keep electrical cords concealed. If they must be exposed, consider taping
them down with duct tape so that they cannot readily be grabbed to tie or
strangle someone.
9. Keep clothes trees out of the well, away from the bar, and place flags behind
the bench, as shown, rather than between the witness stand and jury, as
shown, so that the flagpoles cannot be used as lances.
10. The most important thing to do is to become aware of those items which may
become weapons of opportunity and which may be used by someone who
wishes to disrupt the proceedings, attempt retribution, effect an escape, or
cause injury or death.
The proper placement of objects in the courtroom can do more than anything else to
minimize or eliminate the threat of their use as weapons of opportunity!
Institute training in awareness of weapons of opportunity for all court staff! By recognizing
the hazards in the courtroom and how to minimize them, you and your staff can create a safer
environment for all participants.

7-7-13

CHAPTER 8
BOMB THREAT
RESPONSE PLAN

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
(IED)
MAIN COMPONENTS OF A BOMB and IED
IGNITION SYSTEM
Initiation and Firing Devices

Battery / Power Source
Electrical Sequencing
Non-Electrical Sequencing
Prima Cord
PETN

MAIN CHARGE
Secondary Explosives

DETONATOR
Primary Explosives

Blasting Cap
Flame
Spark
Military Fuses

Plastic (C-3 / C-4)
Powder
Chemical / Liquid
Dynamite
Ammonium Nitrate
TNT
Sheet Explosives

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
TYPES

CLASSIFICATION

MECHANICAL Determined according to
♦
♦
♦

Pipe Bombs
Mail Bombs
Booby Traps

the speed, expressed in
feet per second, at which ♦
the change of state takes
place.
♦
♦

HIGH

CHEMICAL
♦
♦
♦

Kerosene
Ammonia Nitrate
Gasoline

♦
♦
♦

NUCLEAR/ATO
MIC
♦
♦
♦

Military
Terrorist

♦

TNT
Nitro
Plastic

LOW

EFFECT

DETONATION

BLAST

SPARK

Positive &
Negative
Pressure Exerted
Primary Effect

METHOD

PRESSURE

♦

the application or
release of:

♦

the release or
increase of:

FLAME

TENSION

FRAGMENTATI
ON
♦
♦

IED Itself
Shrapnel From a
Variety of Materials

SECONDARY

MOTION

DEVICE

REMOTE
Black Powder

CONTROL

INCENDIARY

Smokeless Powder
♦
♦

Burning Effect
Damage is Environs
Dictated

MILITARY
FUSES

TIME

♦

the expiration of:

♦

4 Types of Time

Clock / Chemical
Burning / Electrical

8-1-1

CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUDGES

♦ WARNING ♦
LETTER AND PARCEL BOMB
RECOGNITION POINTS
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Foreign Mail, Air Mail and Special Delivery
Restrictive Markings such as Confidential, Personal, etc.
Excessive or No Postage
Handwritten or Poorly Typed Address
Incorrect Titles with Name
Title with No Name
Misspellings of Common Words
Oily Stains or Discolorations
No Return Address
Excessive Weight
Rigid or Bulky Envelope
Lopsided or Uneven Package/Envelope
Protruding Wires or Tinfoil
Excessive Securing Material such as Masking Tape, String, etc.
Visual Distractions
Strange Odor

8-2-1

GENERAL RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS LETTERS and PACKAGES
n
n
n
n
n
n

Notify Security Personnel - First Step in Implementing Courthouse Contingency Plan
Do Not Open - Detonation may be Triggered
Do Not Confine Package - Magnifies Blast Effect thereby Increasing Damage Potential
Do Not Submerge Package in Water - Water is a Conductor of Electricity
Open Windows and Doors - Creates an Open Vacuum for Blast Dispersion
Isolate and Evacuate - Per Established Security Policies and Procedures

INSPECTING VEHICLES FOR IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES - IED’s
1. Conducting an external search
n
Check the area around the vehicle. Look for tape, wire, string or fuses
n
Look for marks on the ground indicating unusual activity
n
Look for signs of forced entry
n
Look inside the vehicle (through the window) for devices, packages, or other suspicious items
2. Locked Vehicles - Check Below
n
Look for loose wires similar to blasting caps
n
Inspect Top/Sides of tires
n
Inspect exhaust pipe for inserted objects
n
Look for pieces of dirt, rust, etc, that may have been dislodged
3. Unlocked Vehicles - Check Inside
n
Look inside the vehicle (through the windows) and open a door other than the driver’s
n
Inspect vehicle interior in a logical sequence - Start at floor and work up
n
Check under the floormats
n
Check under front and back seats
n
Check door panels for signs of tampering

CONDUCTING ROOM SEARCHES FOR IED’s
n
n
n
n
n
n

Stop, Look, and Listen
Divide room by height for search - floor/waist waist/chin chin/ceiling ceiling/decking
Search room by height and assigned area - overlap for thorough coverage
Search internal public areas - mens/ladies rooms, elevators, lobby, stairwells, office reception
areas, etc.
Search internal areas - utilize employee familiarity in locating/clearing out-of-place items
Search outside areas - landscaping, trash receptacles, vehicles, abandoned items, signs,
windows, doorways, building facade, etc.

8-3-1

BOMB THREAT RESPONSE CARD
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUDGES

CALLER’S VOICE
BACKGROUND SOUNDS
__________________ ____________________________
o CALM
o STREET NOISES
o ANGRY
o CROCKERY
o EXCITED
o VOICES
PLACE THIS CARD UNDER YOUR
o SLOW
o PA SYSTEM
TELEPHONE
o RAPID
o MUSIC
_____________________________________ o SOFT
o HOUSE NOISES
QUESTIONS TO ASK:
o LOUD
o MOTOR
o LAUGHTER
o OFFICE MACHINERY
1. WHEN IS THE BOMB GOING TO EXPLODE? o CRYING
o FACTORY MACHINERY
o NORMAL
o ANIMAL NOISES
2. WHERE IS IT RIGHT NOW?
o DISTINCT
o CLEAR
o SLURRED
o STATIC
3. WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?
o NASAL
o LOCAL
o
STUTTER
o LONG DISTANCE
4. WHAT KIND OF BOMB IS IT?
o LISP
o TELEPHONE BOOTH
o
RASPY
o OTHER _______________
5. WHAT WILL CAUSE IT TO EXPLODE?
___________________________
o DEEP
___________________________
o RAGGED
6. DID YOU PLACE THE BOMB?
___________________________
o CLEARING THROAT
7. WHY?
o DEEP BREATHING
o CRACKING VOICE
8. WHAT IS YOUR ADDRESS?
o DISGUISED
o ACCENT
9. WHAT IS YOUR NAME
o WHISPERED
o FAMILIAR - HOW?
EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT:
THREAT LANGUAGE:

♦

_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
SEX OF CALLER:
RACE: ______________
AGE:
LENGTH OF CALL: _________________
TELEPHONE NUMBER AT WHICH CALL IS RECEIVED:

o
o
o
o
o
o

WELL SPOKEN (EDUCATED)
FOUL
IRRATIONAL
INCOHERENT
TAPED
MESSAGE READ FROM LETTER

REMARKS___________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________

#______________________________________________________
TIME:
DATE:
/
/ _______

REPORT THREAT IMMEDIATELY TO:
at
PHONE NUMBER_____________________________________
YOUR NAME: _____________________________________
TITLE: _____________________________________
PHONE NUMBER: _____________________________________

8-4-1

BOMB THREAT RESPONSE PLAN
RECEIPT OF
THE THREAT

Obtaining accurate information is vital to selecting the appropriate response.
The most frequent receipt of bomb threats is via telephone. Persons likely to
receive such calls should be briefed and trained in the following procedures:

♦ Try to keep the caller on the line long enough to trace the call and obtain
further information
♦ Record, in writing or by recorder, the exact words the caller used.
Attempt to determine the exact location of the IED, device type,
appearance, and time of detonation
Persons likely to receive ♦ Attempt to determine the sex, age, and caller mental attitude - to include
bomb threats should be
reasons for placing the IED
provided with a
♦ Note any accent or peculiarity of speech which may help identify the
response form similar to
caller, as well as any background noise that may provide a clue to the
the one depicted on
caller’s identity
page 8.4

THREAT
EVALUATION

This stage involves assessing the credibility of the message and selecting the
appropriate response. The following are general points of consideration that
should be taken into account when conducting the evaluation:
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

FACILITY
SEARCH

Information Ascertained From Caller
Threat Scope
Facility Operations
Threat and Risk Assessments
Pre-Identified Vulnerabilities
Prior Incident Activity and Response
Environmental Conditions and Factors
Area(s) of Refuge
Preliminary Search Results
Use of Subject Matter Experts (public & private)

To search a building before or after it is evacuated is a matter that should be
governed by situational aspects. The value of intelligence gathered during
Stage One, receipt of the actual bomb threat, becomes critically evident
during this stage. If the information received indicates a definitive location, a
search could be conducted without evacuation, provided that time is not a
factor. Cursory searches that have been delineated in Contingency Plans can
also be conducted prior to any decision to evacuate the building.
Building employees can be of great assistance in conducting a search, since
emergency responders are likely to be unfamiliar with the facility and
surrounding environs. Employees should be directed to report all out-ofplace items to the immediate attention of pre-designated personnel. For
those facilities with inherent or elevated threat/risk levels, efforts should be
made to schedule on-site familiarization training for emergency responders

8-5-1

RESPONSE PLAN CONTINUED
FACILITY
EVACUATION

Essentially, there are three alternatives available to officials when deciding
building evacuation - (1) Ignore The Threat, (2) Evacuate Immediately, and
(3) Search and Evacuate If Warranted - considered by professionals to be
the most desired approach.
A general rule to follow if you do not have an established bomb threat
response plan is - EVACUATE. Unfortunately, this action is usually the
exact effect a hoax bomber desires.

The Threat Evaluation
Process Plays An
Integral Part In
Considering and
Determining Facility
Evacuation

REMOVAL and
RENDER SAFE

As stated, an evacuation may occur before or after a search has been
conducted. However, an outlined search of some type (i.e. cursory, general,
inclusive, etc.) is strongly recommended prior to allowing building
occupants to continue on with their current activities.
Although total evacuations offer the highest degree of safety, situational
aspects may allow less absolute, more incident-specific measures.
During this stage, only properly trained Explosives Ordinance Disposal
(EOD) personnel should be involved. IED’s are limited only by the
imagination of their designers and should never be touched or moved by
untrained persons.
Knowing (1) Who to contact, (2) How to contact, (3) What information they
will need concerning the Bomb Threat/IED, and (4) Response Times is vital
to any bomb threat response plan.

GENERAL

♦ Telephone contact/notification information for management and
command elements to ensure some officials are readily available to
make critical decisions throughout the incident
♦ What situational aspects dictate either immediate evacuation, ignoring
the threat, or initiating a search and evacuating the facility if/when the
threat is confirmed.
♦ Identifying Search Personnel and/or Teams
♦ Established Search Techniques

A bomb threat response
plan should specifically
address and incorporate
several areas:

♦ Secondary or Diversionary Devices
♦ Policies and Procedures If/When a Device Has Been Located
♦ Handling Employee, Public, and News Media Inquiries
♦ Interfacing with Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Threat
Response Plans

8-5-2

SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE RESPONSE FLOW CHART
Security personnel classify suspicious package as Radio communications and traffic will immediately
a Possible or Obvious Threat
cease - the suspicious item should be secured and
the Sheriff/Police notified
è
ê
Security initiates pre-designated policy and procedural response actions
ê

ê

ê

Utilize expertise of
Confirm and Assess the
IED Resident Experts suspicious package or
(ATF, USMS, FBI,
item
local Law Enforcement
Officers, etc.)
ê

ê

Determine the extent to
which other personnel
must be notified of the
situation and assigned

Ensure the suspicious
package or item is not
moved from the location
where it was found

ê

ê

ê
ê

PRIMARY METHOD RECOMMENDED IN RULING PACKAGE SAFE
In determining the contents of a suspicious package, attempt to Identify and Contact both the Sender and
Receiver - If (1) the package has not been tampered with, and (2) the Sender and Receiver are aware of
the delivery and can verify package contents, you have eliminated the likelihood of an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) or mail bomb
ê
HAS THE SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE BEEN CLEARED?
ê
Determine necessity of requesting
assistance from EOD
(local bomb squad).
ê

NO

YES

ç

è

No further response or action required.

-----------------------------------------------------------

Follow specific procedures for EOD Assistance as
outlined in Courthouse Contingency Plans

ê

Determine authorities to notify of any suspicious
package that results in EOD being called on-site

8-6-1

TERRORIST &
COURTHOUSE BOMBING INCIDENTS
NEWS HEADLINES:

Truck bomb fails to go off in Indiana Courthouse
But ‘terror attack’ leaves building damaged by fire8/98

8/98

Letter bomb sent to prison official intercepted
Eight explosive devices are believed to be the work of Islamic militants

12/97

Search is on for person who placed fake pipe bomb in Perham Hospital

12/97

N.Y Police foil terrorist bomb plot
- 5 bombs seized, 3 men arrested

8/97

Man admits making Wisconsin bomb threat /
Charged with three armed robberies, shooting at police, and making hundreds of bomb threats

7/97

Man throws firebomb at judge in courtroom in Urbana, Illinois

4/97

Mail bomber gets death for killing federal judge –
Suspect already serving seven life sentences for killing city alderman and bombing NAACP
office in Jacksonville

2/97

Pipe bomb fails to explode
Police evacuate neighborhood surrounding home of federal employee

2/97

Bomb damages courthouse
Powerful bomb explodes outside Courthouse in Solano, California

1/97

Suspect in bomb threat familiar with explosives –
Man’s history led DNR officials to take no chances

1/97

Pipe bomb lay unnoticed at Waconia newspaper for five dangerous days

10/96

St. Paul postal inspectors find fake bomb
Letter addressed to New York Supreme Court judge contained homemade bomb

9/96

Bombs explode in 2 mail-collection boxes in downtown St. Paul –
Incendiary device injures worker

7/95

Improvised explosive device mailed to federal judge in Chicago
U.S. Marshals investigating

3/95

Austin man convicted of threatening federal officials
Previously acquitted of bombing two state judges homes in Austin and Blooming Prairie

3/94

Letter bomb traced to prison –
Parcel addressed to ATF attorney

12/93

8-7-1

CHAPTER 9
THREAT MANAGEMENT

THREAT INTELLIGENCE
Threat Intelligence is an Integral Component of any Model Court Security Program. The Ability
to Accurately Determine Site Appropriate Levels of Protection and Security is Severely Limited
without a Solid Foundation of Intelligence Gathered Information

The June 28, 1995, Department of Justice “Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities”,
under section B-4, specifically addresses and endorses “Intelligence Sharing” as a recommended
Security Standard (see below related table).

STANDARD
ESTABLISHING LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
and SECURITY LIAISONS

REVIEW and ESTABLISH
PROCEDURES FOR
INTELLIGENCE RECEIPT
and DISSEMINATION

ESTABLISH UNIFORM
SECURITY and THREAT
NOMENCLATURE

DEFINITION/DESCRIPTION
Intelligence-sharing between law enforcement agencies and
security organizations should be established in order to facilitate
the accurate flow of timely and relevant information between
appropriate government agencies. Agencies involved in
providing security must be part of the complete intelligence
process.
Determine what procedures exist to ensure timely delivery of
critical intelligence. Review and improve procedures to alert
agencies and specific targets of criminal/terrorist threats.
Establish standard administrative procedures for responding to
incoming alerts. Review flow of information for effectiveness
and time critical dissemination.
To facilitate communication, standardized terminology for Alert
Levels should be implemented. Normal, Low, Moderate, and
High - as recommended by the Security Standards Committee.

9-1-1

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING CONSIDERATIONS
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Department or Agency Commitment - Personnel and Resources
Program Continuity - Necessary Requirement in Developing a Model Program
Extended Personnel Assignments - Elevated Expertise and Proficiency Levels
Department Policies and Procedures - Quality Control Measures
Intelligence Agency Networking - Common Objectives
Site Specific Threat Groups and Dangerous Individuals - Trends and Tactics
Active Involvement - Threat Intelligence Association Memberships
Operations Security - Threat and Risk Assessments
Facility Operations - Threat and Risk Assessments
Administrative Support - Reports, Profiles, and Documentation
Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts - Regulations and Restrictions

SOURCES OF INFORMATION and INTELLIGENCE
Law Enforcement Agencies

Task Forces

Electronic Databases

News Media

Intelligence Associations

Security Associations

Informants

Directories

Internet

Public Sources

Government Sources

Private Sources

9-1-2

THREAT SOURCE PROFILES
Threat Source Profiles (TSP’s) significantly assist law enforcement management, court security
coordinators and investigators in determining Protective Measures and Operational
Requirements and Assignments. They also supplement and support Threat and Risk
Assessments.

Consequently, TSP’s should be prepared on all site-specific identified threat groups. Profiles
should be prepared, with a focus on supporting the Sheriff’s protective and enforcement statutory
responsibilities. It is noted that while they are considered to be pro-active they only contain
general information (in compliance with the Federal Privacy Act) that must suffice until a
specific TSP can be prepared in response to an identified threat(s).
Threat Source Profiles prepared in direct support (i.e. an identified threat) of protective service,
enforcement and investigative assignments are considered reactive in nature and, consequently,
are usually prepared after the fact. These profiles, however, are likely to (1) be more detailed,
and (2) contain specific information on individuals and/or threat groups directly involved in the
investigation or assignment.
As such, this type of TSP will (1) supplement prepared threat assessments, and (2) be governed
by the privacy act law enforcement exception of whether the specific information or record is
connected to a past, present, or anticipated threat.
The American Patriot Movement TSP (See 9.2.1) was prepared as a response to the proliferation
of Anti-Government and Right-Wing groups in the State of Minnesota. Law enforcement
operational assignments that have resulted and been effected by these extremist activities
include, but are not limited to: protective and threat investigations, high-threat proceedings and
trials, service of process, prisoner transports, facility security, judicial conference security
details, etc.
This paraphrased Threat Source Profile on the American Patriot Movement is an example
provided to law enforcement agencies for recognized protective and criminal investigative
purposes.
An italicized statement such as “While this document is unclassified it should be considered (1)
Law Enforcement Sensitive, and (2) For Official Use Only. Profile information contains neither
the recommendations or conclusions of the
(insert name of appropriate law enforcement agency) . The
profile itself is considered the property of the
(insert name of appropriate law enforcement agency)
and dissemination outside of your agency is not authorized without prior (insert name of appropriate
law enforcement agency)
approval” should be prominently noted.

9-2-1

AMERICAN PATRIOT MOVEMENT - THREAT SOURCE
PROFILE
PREFACE
It should be understood that it is not against the law to protest taxes, espouse atypical political
views, join militia organizations, harbor anti-government convictions, possess firearms, etc. It is
illegal, however, to engage in activities that jeopardize the lives and liberties of others. All
material comprised in this profile is intended to depict these actions as they may be revered
and/or conveyed by extremists. It is noted that the action itself may not be entirely indicative of
an illegal activity and, consequently, no other comparisons or references should be made.
Emphasis is placed on increasing law enforcement awareness levels through profile discussion of
(1) Historical Perspectives, (2) Martyrs and Symbolic Rallying Cries, (3) Trends and Tactics,
(4) Illegal Activities, (5) Conspiracy Theories, (6) Case Studies, and (7) Sources of Information.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
In 1969 co-founders Henry Lamont Beach and William Potter Gale formed the Posse Comitatus
in Glendale, California. The name Posse Comitatus is a Latin term meaning Power of the
County. A number of reports have been written concerning the philosophical foundation of the
Posse Comitatus. While these reports tend to vary to some degree, all contain in one form or
another a similar listing of incorporated ideological principles. Of significant importance is the
fact that the general philosophy of the Posse Comitatus not only preceded the present-day
American Patriot Movement, but can be found imbedded in organizational philosophies
throughout the right-wing.

POSSE COMITATUS PHILOSOPHY
n

Legal rights are derived from the United States Constitution, Magna Carta, Bible,
Common Law, and the Articles of Confederation. The strict interpretation of these rights
provides a basis for their convictions.

n

Recognize the Sheriff as the only authorized law enforcement officer or agency in the
United States. If the Sheriff has been notified of an “unlawful act” and refuses to take
action, the Posse Comitatus then has the “lawful right” under natural law to act in the
name of the Sheriff to protect local jurisdiction.

n

Do not acknowledge the courts and legal system in their entirety. Reject the courts’
authority to empanel juries, as juries should be formed by rightful citizens of the land (i.e.
the Posse Comitatus). When appearing in court, members will usually, if not always,
demand to represent themselves pro se.

9-2-2

n

Graduated Income Tax is illegal. The Internal Revenue Service does nothing more than
levy a series of abuses (taxes) requiring a rejection and thus a violation of their god-given
and constitutional rights.

n

The United States Treasury (Federal Reserve System) operates illegally, as dispensed
currency is not insured by gold or silver.

n

Survivalist instruction, paramilitary training, and an advanced communications network
consisting of citizen band radios, telecommunications, and two-way radios are openly
advocated in advance preparation and response to the inevitable Armageddon.

Encompassing these philosophies is the Posse Comitatus’s universal non-recognition of the
federal or state government’s right to enact and enforce laws. This is especially so in those
legislative areas involving taxation, firearms, explosives, education, and the Federal Reserve
System. Rhetoric expounded by groups in the American Patriot Movement will be primarily
centered on and around these specific issues.
The Posse Comitatus does not rely on a strong central structure other than rendering a charter,
disbursing identification, and disseminating printed tax protest material. The non-existence of a
national hierarchy enables each chapter to be autonomous in organizing and implementing its
priorities concerning political involvement, “defense” preparations, militancy levels, and
publicity generated activities. Only a few basic qualifying factors have been formally accepted
as a prelude to establishing membership. They must be met in order for a group to file and be
granted national charter designation.

CHARTER QUALIFYING FACTORS
n

Each charter must contain SEVEN MALE INDIVIDUALS

n

Each individual must be of the PURE WHITE RACE

n

Each individual must be PATRIOTIC

n

Each individual must be of GOOD CHARACTER

n

Each individual must PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER

n

Each individual must be a CHRISTIAN

Christian Identity Churches, founded by some Posse Comitatus members, can be considered the
common ground in which right-wing groups join with one another. The assumption is that this
has been predicated by similar philosophies and paralleled long-term goals openly proclaimed by
group leaders. This forum of extremism creates a “strength-in-numbers” attitude, and has at

9-2-3

times resulted in outbreaks of aggravated violence. This may be explained in part by the rightwing justifying their actions by so-called “divine authority.”
In 1978 a significant event for the American Patriot Movement occurred when a fictional account
of the Great Revolution entitled, The Turner Diaries, was authored by Andrew MacDonald, a
pseudonym for William Pierce. Long considered required reading for loyal followers of the
American Patriot Movement its circulation substantially increased following the Oklahoma City
Bombing.

THE TURNER DIARIES - A SUMMARIZED REPORT
The book itself chronicles a two-year period in the life of Earl Turner, a rank-and-file member of
the Organization, which consists of persons who (1) believe minorities are subservient to the
white race, and (2) are opposed to the government or System. This is predicated on the System’s
tyrannical rule, corruption within, and view of minorities as equals.
The Organization was “forced into action” when the System enacted the Cohen Act, a law which
prohibited anyone in the United States from owning a firearm. Raids were then conducted to
confiscate any weapons that had not been turned in, and to arrest anyone in possession of a
firearm. The Cohen Act and subsequent arrests were the starting point for the Organization’s
war on the System.
Radical and militant Organization members favored plans to carry out executions of federal
judges, newspaper editors, legislators, law enforcement personnel, and all other supporters of the
System. Before these plans were to be set in motion, it was determined that further development
and discipline were required within the Organization.
Recruitment intensified after the arrests of fellow Organization members. New members were
divided into two categories: (1) Underground Units - whose members were known to authorities
and were directly involved in attacking the System, and (2) Legal Units - whose members were
unknown to the System and were involved with intelligence, funding, defense, and other strategic
forms of support.
Initially, the Organization robbed small businesses to fund their activities. As they became more
sophisticated, the organization started to commit bank robberies and print counterfeit monies in
order to finance operations and disrupt the economy. Causing havoc within the System was a
significant part of the overall mission of the Organization. They hoped this would lead to
increased membership and additional support from both civilian and military sectors.
The Organization bombed the FBI Headquarters Building in Washington D.C. by using a
mixture of heating oil and ammonium nitrate fertilizer (note: same ingredients used in the
Oklahoma City Bombing). Although many innocent persons were killed, members believed that
was the price to pay in order to ultimately destroy the System. Future targets concentrated on the
System’s infrastructure to include railroads, interstate highways, bridges, airports, shipping ports,
utility companies, fuel depots, media centers, and telecommunication sites. Military installations

9-2-4

were identified as a source of weapons, ammunition, personnel, and, when necessary, for
complete eradication.
The Organization was intent on building Improvised Explosive and Incendiary Devices to be
used in attacks on the System. They were also attempting to develop explosive materials that
would pass undetected through metal detectors and x-ray machines. They developed a
communication network linking their organizational units through a combination of human
couriers and highly- sophisticated radio transmissions. This “network” was an effective means
of keeping an eye on the System, as well as coordinating attacks with multiple units. This made
for a more mobile and efficient fighting force.
The Organization believed that strict adherence to their cause and regulations was an absolute
necessity. Summary executions (via hangings) were commonplace for members who violated
this code, as well as for outsiders. Basically, Organization philosophy was centered around the
belief that “you could either be trusted and live, or not, and die”. The Turner Diaries concludes
with an epilogue describing in general accounts how complete control of the United States and
world domination would be accomplished.
On February 13, 1983 Posse Comitatus member Gordon Kahl was the central figure involved in
a shootout with United States Marshals. A federal probation warrant had been issued for Kahl.
Marshals, along with local law enforcement officers, were in Medina, North Dakota, that day
attempting to arrest Kahl, when shots were fired. When the shooting was over, two Marshals
were dead and Kahl was a fugitive wanted for the murder of a federal officer.
With the assistance of fellow “patriots”, Kahl avoided an extensive manhunt for several months.
Kahl was hiding out with survivalists in the Ozark Mountains near Smithville, Arkansas, when
federal officers located him. On June 3, 1983, agents and local officers surrounded Kahl’s
hideout. When Sheriff Gene Matthews entered the bunker, he was shot and killed by Kahl.
Impeded by automatic gunfire, officers then used teargas in an attempt to force Kahl’s surrender.
Shortly thereafter, the fortified bunker was ablaze and the charred remains of Gordon Kahl were
later discovered among the bunker’s ashes.
Aryan Nations, headquartered in Hayden Lake, Idaho, is the leading Christian Identity
organization in the United States. In September of 1983, ardent follower Robert Matthews
separated from the Aryan Nations and formed a violent underground group known as The Order
or Bruder Schweigen (German for: Silent Brotherhood). Matthews believed Aryan Nations could
continue to preach the movement’s message while he and The Order took action against the
government, minorities, and Jews. They subsequently initiated a campaign of armed robberies,
sabotage, murder, and domestic terrorism in their efforts to bring about “total victory” for the
Aryan race. These acts and the name The Order itself were patterned by Matthews after events
depicted in The Turner Diaries.
Fifteen months later Matthews’ reign as founder and leader of The Order was over, as the FBI
investigation led agents to Whidbey Island, Washington, where, on December 8, 1994, with
Matthews refusing to negotiate his surrender, the FBI sent in two tactical teams.

9-2-5

Even with the house saturated with CS, gas both entry teams were forced back as Matthews
responded with extended bursts of automatic fire from his machine gun. A decision was then
made to use starburst flares in order to pinpoint Matthews’ location by illuminating the house
interior. Shortly after being used, the flares ignited, not only setting the house on fire, but
exploding caches of ammunition. Matthews, still refusing to surrender, apparently barricaded
himself on the second floor. Not able to fight the fire due to the intense heat and explosions,
available emergency personnel had to wait until the following morning when Matthews’ body
was recovered from the house remains.
Within a year, over seventy-five Order members were arrested for various criminal offenses. In
total, eight trials, including those tried in federal courts in Seattle, Spokane, Salt Lake City, and
Denver, were held involving Order members. The largest trial in Seattle resulted in ten members
being convicted and twelve members pleading guilty to federal crimes, including conspiracy,
armored car robberies, racketeering, murder, and counterfeiting violations.
Zarephath-Horeb or as better known, The Covenant, The Sword, The Arm of The Lord (CSA)
was an Identity-based compound located in the Ozark Mountains near the Arkansas/Missouri
border. Jim Ellison founded the CSA in 1976 and as the man who “God told to come to that part
of the country and establish a place of refuge for his people,” was the proclaimed leader. The
CSA ultimately evolved into a paramilitary organization that specialized in automatic weapons
conversion, survivalist skills, explosive devices, marksmanship, and special tactics. They even
constructed a training facility called Silhouette City where live explosives and ammunition were
used to emphasize real conditions.
On November 11, 1983, during a robbery attempt, CSA member Richard Wayne Snell shot and
killed a pawn shop owner he mistakenly thought was Jewish. On June 30, 1984, Snell murdered
an Arkansas State Trooper who had stopped him for a traffic violation. Snell was arrested later
that day. On April 19, 1995, Snell was executed by the State of Arkansas for committing these
murders. Prior to his execution and just after he learned of the Oklahoma City Bombing, Snell
forewarned then-Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker to, “Look over your shoulder. Justice is on
the way. I wouldn’t trade places right now with you or any of your cronies.”
On April 19, 1985, over 100 agents of the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and
Arkansas State Police descended on the CSA Compound to arrest Ellison and seven other
members (including four members of The Order who had sought refuge at the CSA). Federal
warrants for manufacturing and possessing illegal weapons, making and transferring silencers,
attempting to dynamite a natural gas pipeline, and firebombing a Jewish Community Center
accompanied them. After a three-day standoff, Ellison and the others finally surrendered to
authorities on April 22, 1985.
A subsequent search of the CSA Compound uncovered hundreds of firearms, a LAW’s (militarystyle, light anti-tank weapon) rocket, anti-aircraft guns, improvised explosive devices, grenades,
land mines, dynamite, C-4 plastic explosives, blasting caps, a truck converted into an armored
car, and mass quantities of liquid cyanide. It is alleged that the cyanide was to be used to
contaminate the water supply of a major metropolitan area.

9-2-6

In April 1987, a federal grand jury in Fort Smith, Arkansas returned an indictment charging
fourteen White Supremacists with seditious conspiracy to overthrow the United States (ten
members) and conspiring to assassinate (four members) a Federal Judge, FBI Agent, and United
States Attorney. Right-wing organizations connected to the defendants included Aryan Nations,
The Order, CSA, and the Ku Klux Klan. Six of the defendants were already serving federal or
state sentences for crimes committed as members of The Order and CSA.
Prior to trial, it was theorized that one or two events would arise as a result of the Fort Smith
Sedition Trial verdicts. Either (1) guilty verdicts would serve notice to those individuals and
groups contemplating illegal and violent acts in furtherance of their ideology, or (2) an acquittal
would give the right-wing a forum, previously only envisioned, to resurrect and advance their
cause.
On April 7, 1988, after a two-month trial and three days of deliberation, a federal jury acquitted
all thirteen defendants (when the government rested it’s case, one defendant petitioned for, and
was granted, an acquittal) of all charges. A former Klansman and self-described White
Separatist immediately announced “I think ZOG (Zionist Occupational Government) has
suffered a terrible defeat by what happened here today.” A chaplain of the Ku Klux Klan
declared “ZOG has been harassing our movement for the past several years and I think it’s time
they release us.” In response, the United States Attorney publicly denied the defendants were
prosecuted for their beliefs stating “They were prosecuted for what they did not what they said”.
The next several years are generally considered as a period of inactivity for the American Patriot
Movement. A few months after the Fort Smith verdicts, recruitment and membership began to
fluctuate and continued to do so for several more years. Even so, there were still occasions when
devoted members engaged in armed bank robberies, assassination plots, fraud enterprises, etc.
However, it appeared the movement would require a significant incident in order to further the
cause, encourage anti-government extremism, attract followers and sympathizers, and, most
importantly, reclaim the fervor as previously attained in the 1980's.
On August 21, 1992, an encounter between Deputy United States Marshals and a self-proclaimed
White Separatist, later known as the Incident at Ruby Ridge, would surface as this long-awaited
Right-Wing rallying cry. When the confrontation occurred, Marshals were on a routine
surveillance assignment as a prelude to an undercover operation that had been planned after
numerous unsuccessful attempts to arrest a suspect for failing to appear on federal firearms
violations.
The eleven-day siege outside of Naples, Idaho, drew interested spectators, supporters, white
supremacists, anti-government protesters, and assorted others. On August 25, 1992, five
Skinheads were arrested for attempting to evade the police line that had been established around
Ruby Ridge. Fortified with arms and provisions, they apparently intended to offer themselves as
a relief force to their fellow patriots.
When the last inhabitants finally surrendered to federal authorities on August 31, 1992, thus
ending the siege, the main suspects wife and fourteen-year-old son were dead, and a Deputy
United States Marshal had been killed. In May of 1993 a federal jury acquitted the two named

9-2-7

defendants of all charges, except for the original charge of failing to appear. A congressional
inquiry was held during September 1995 which examined the circumstances surrounding the
events which lead up to and occurred during the Incident at Ruby Ridge.
Approximately six months later on February 28, 1993, while in possession of a search warrant
for illegal weapons and an arrest warrant for Branch Davidian Leader David Koresh, the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) launched a raid of the Mount Carmel Branch Davidian
compound near Waco, Texas. Attempting a tactical forced entry, ATF agents were driven back
when the Davidians opened fire on them from within the compound. When the shooting was
over, four ATF agents had been killed and several others were wounded.
The FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) responded, and the siege universally known as the
Waco Incident had begun.
After 51 days of intense negotiations and the failure of psychological tactics to bring an end to
the standoff, the HRT obtained approval to force the surrender of Koresh and the Davidians. On
April 19, 1993, armored vehicles approached the compound, and the Davidians once again
opened fire. This time, however, they also dispersed some type of fuel accelerate throughout the
compound. Shortly thereafter the fuel was ignited (listening devices later conclusively proved)
by the Davidians. Within moments, the entire compound was on fire. More than eighty
Davidians died in the aftermath. Upon inspecting the compound, federal authorities ultimately
discovered several hundred firearms, including over forty illegal machine guns.
In the span of half a year, the Patriot Movement had gained not one, but two, rallying cries in
furtherance of their cause. Unlike Ruby Ridge, the incident at Waco was not one of individual or
group ideology, as continuously exploited by White Extremists, but one that primarily focused on
the right to own and possess firearms. Like Ruby Ridge, a congressional inquiry was later held
to examine the circumstances surrounding events leading up to and through the incident.
Two acts of federal legislation followed Ruby Ridge and Waco and provided Right-Wing
Extremists with further evidence that the Turner Diaries was now becoming a reality - the
federal government was now on a course to ban all private ownership of firearms. In November
1993, congress passed the Brady Bill which imposed a mandatory five-day waiting period for the
sale of handguns and included a required background check on buyers of firearms. Anger over
the Brady Bill and against the federal government intensified when in July of 1994 the Federal
Crime Bill became law. This Bill banned the sale of certain types of assault weapons and limited
the capacity of magazines to a maximum of ten rounds.
In addition to advocating a familiar position of anti-government extremism, the Patriot
Movement began to openly converge on a newly-perceived threat identified as the New World
Order.
The title New World Order was originally introduced by then-President George Bush in
describing the international alliance that had been brought together by the United States during
the Persian Gulf War. It was said with the intent to emphasize the extent of cooperation

9-2-8

exhibited between those international communities involved, not to be manipulated into a
massive conspiracy theory.
The message, however, was changed, and extremist organizations began claiming a one-world
government controlled by the United Nations and code-named the New World Order would soon
engulf the United States. Existing militias swelled in ranks and new militias were formed to
counteract this newfound threat. Reports asserting foreign troops being deployed on American
soil to enforce the Brady Bill became widespread. Rumors were rampant, with ordinary citizens
becoming mesmerized by the thought of any of the many known conspiracy theories.
In October of 1994, approximately 1,500 people attended a gathering called Operation Freedom
in Lakeland, Florida, to collect informational packets on how to form a militia. In February of
1995, over 2,000 people assembled en masse in Meadville, Pennsylvania, to hear militia leaders
address specific steps Americans should take to defend themselves against the New World Order.
Right-Wing Leaders immediately recognized another avenue in which to spread their message of
hate. They became actively involved with exploiting militias for training and recruiting
purposes.
On April 19, 1995 the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was
completely destroyed by an Improvised Explosive Device. The Oklahoma City Bombing was the
single most deadly domestic terrorist action in the history of the United States. By the time the
Murrah Federal Building was imploded, 168 men, women, and children were confirmed killed,
and more than 500 people were injured. In comparison, the bombing itself could be considered
almost a blueprint from the fictional account of the bombing in the Turner Diaries.

TURNER DIARIES BOMBING

OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING

Target was a federal law enforcement building.

Target was a federal building that housed offices of federal
law enforcement agencies.

A truck bomb weighing just under 5000 pounds was used.

A truck bomb weighing 4400 pounds was used.

The bomb was a mixture of fuel oil and ammonium nitrate
fertilizer.

The bomb was a mixture of fuel oil and ammonium nitrate
fertilizer.

The bomb was detonated at 9:15 AM

The bomb was detonated at 9:04 AM

The bomb was designed to blow off the front of the building
and cause the upper floors to collapse.
The bombing was sparked by passage of a federal gun control
act.

The bomb blew off the front of the building and caused the
upper floors to collapse.
The suspects convicted for the bombing are violently opposed
to federal gun control.
The suspects convicted for the bombing consider themselves
Patriots and despite having no apparent means of support had
thousands of dollars, ski masks and pipes similar to those use
in 13 bank robberies.

The main character “Turner” considered himself a Patriot and
was a member of an anti-government underground cell that
subsidized it’s activities by robbing banks.

A renowned White Extremist reacted to the Oklahoma City Bombing by stating, “I have told
people for years that the government of this country, what we call the criminals, had better start
listening to the dispossessed white people, the dispossessed majority,” and “There was a hot war
in the 1980's and now things are heating up again.” Another White Supremacist stated, “The
bombing was a fine thing.” “I hate the federal government with a perfect hatred,” and “I’m
surprised that this hasn’t happened all over the country.”

9-2-9

Less than one year after the Oklahoma City Bombing, extremist factions with allegiances to the
anti-government insurgency met on April 5, 1996, at Lake Tahoe, Nevada for Jubilation 1996.
Those participating included White Supremacists, Freemen, Militia’s, Ruby Ridge and Waco
Advocates, Sovereign Citizens, Tax Protesters, Outlaw Bikers, and Klansmen. Some of the
material distributed at the conference included manuals on converting semi-automatic machine
guns, improvised explosive devices, and chemical warfare agents. Quoting those in attendance,
an Aryan Nations member delivered a scathing attack on the government, its agents, and all who
support them. This commentary was punctuated by statements demanding, “The federal tyrants
either get off the land or go under it” (in apparent reference to the Freemen siege). “We can take
them out by practicing what we know must be done,” and “No death is too cruel for them.”
On April 12, 1996, the third annual Super Conference was held in Branson, Missouri. In some
contrast to Jubilation 1996, this meeting was mostly made up of Christian Identity followers.
“Spiritual Warfare” was denoted as the theme for the conference. Audience members were
urged to study and implement Common Law as the primary organizational tactic against ZOG.
On June 13, 1996, after eighty-one days, a standoff in Jordan, Montana, between the FBI and a
group of anti-government protesters supporters known as the Freemen ended. As events ensued
at Justus Township, it became evident that the Freemen had similar convictions to those of the
Posse Comitatus and other tax protest groups. Specifically, they believe they are entitled to
separate sovereignty from ZOG and, thus, rightfully go by the name of Freemen.

9-2-10

NEWS HEADLINES: BOMBINGS
FBI: Bomb Plot Targeted Spokane Courthouse
Federal Agents Arrest Two in Bomb Plot - Militia members planned war on U.N. officials say
Two charged in Reno bomb scare
Man accused in IRS bombing plot
NATION BRIEFING - Reno Bomb resembles Oklahoma City Device
Georgia militia members arrested; bombs seized
Early reports said summer Olympics games were a target, but federal agents deny connection
Plastic drum left near IRS office in Reno was bomb, officials say

NEWS HEADLINES: MILITIAS
Midwest bank loot may finance racist groups
Federal officials think robbers gave cash to extremists
Small Detroit militia shatters some movement stereotypes
Moving with caution in Montana
‘Weaver Fever’ prompts law officers to avoid confrontations
Testimony of Intimidation
Militia attacks related
U.S. agents become targets for anniversary of Waco
MILITARY/Pentagon says makeup of forces reflect society
Critics fear extremists’ links to military; probe studies extent
Right-wing militia, neo-Nazis gather intelligence on their foes
Militia of Montana defends tax protester jailed for firing on police
Visions, songs, white superiority
‘Grandpa’ and his right-wing followers wait for apocalypse, their salvation

9-2-11

SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC TERRORIST ACTIONS
CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY - From January 1996 to July 1998
n

Wise Use Movement Bombing of U.S. Forest Service Headquarters, Espanola, New
Mexico, January 6, 1996

n

Aryan Republican Army members commit Bank Robberies & Bombings in Missouri,
Kansas, Iowa, Ohio, Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Kentucky, January 1994 through January
1996

n

Militia murder plot of Superior Court Judge, Atlanta, Georgia, January 1996

n

Armed Bank Robberies, Spokane, Washington, April 1, 1996

n

Oklahoma Constitutional members arrested for Bombing Plot, Muskogee, Oklahoma,
April 26, 1996

n

Georgia Militia members arrested for Bombing Plot, Roberta, Georgia, April 26, 1996

n

Murder plot by radioactive contamination, New York, New York, June 14, 1996

n

Viper Militia members arrested for murder and bombing conspiracies, Phoenix, Arizona,
July 1, 1996

n

Washington State Militia members conspire to manufacture and possess explosives,
Bellingham, Washington, July 1996

n

Mountaineer Militia members conspire to bomb the FBI Fingerprint Classification
Facility, Clarksburg, West Virginia, October 12, 1996

n

Phineas Priesthood members commit bank robberies and bombings, Boise, Idaho,
October 27, 1996

n

Christian Identity followers with established ties to the Aryan Nations engage in shootout
with local police during “routine” traffic stop, Wilmington, Ohio, February 15, 1997.

n

Ku Klux Klan members plot bombing in Wise County, Texas, March 22, 1997

n

Ku Klux Klan members conspire to bomb gas refinery and commit bank robberies, Fort
Worth, Texas, April 23, 1997

n

Republic of Texas members hold two people hostage in protesting for the independence
of Texas, Fort Davis, Texas, April 28, 1997

n

IRS offices destroyed by arson, Aryan Republican Army suspected, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, May 3, 1997

n

Suspected members of the Neo-Nazi National Alliance and the League of the Silent
Soldier arrested for conspiring to use explosive devices in furtherance of bank robberies,
Orlando, Florida, April 23, 1997

9-2-12

n

Militia members arrested for conspiring to raid U.S. military bases, kill foreign soldiers,
and seize weapons and ammunition, Fort Hood, Texas, July 23, 1997

n

Members of the White Separatist group Republic of Texas planned to kill the President
and government officials with deadly toxin Ricin, Brownsville, Texas, July 16, 1998

Tactics such as the filing of liens and legal actions against the personal property of judicial
officers, prosecuting attorneys, government representatives and law enforcement officers has
become a favored practice within the American Patriot Movement. This manipulation of the
legal system (i.e. paper terrorism) is designed to impede, intimidate, and embarrass those
involved in the administration of justice.
Using Common Law Grand Juries to indict public officials is openly done by a majority of tax
protest groups. Upon return of an “indictment,” arrest warrants have been issued naming persons
involved in judicial and government proceedings against these individuals and groups.
Law enforcement agencies will usually be contacted and confronted on the execution of these
semi-quasi warrants. In Arkansas, White Extremists impersonating United States Marshals have
attempted to arrest municipal court judges and bring them before Common Law Courts in
Kansas. Marshals’ and other law enforcement agencies’ credentials, badges, uniforms, and raid
jackets have been stolen and counterfeited for use in commission of these types of activities.
Notices warning of actions that will be taken in response to “trespassers” have been posted in
conspicuous locations on properties owned and/or claimed by Freemen, Constitutional Rangers,
Sovereign Citizens, and Posse Comitatus members. These notices may be the first indication to
public officials and law enforcement officers of the potential for confrontation when they enter
onto these properties.

LEGAL NOTICE
TO FEDERAL OFFICERS OF THE IRS, HEW, HUD, ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH,
AND OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL AGENCIES: AND TO ALL MEMBERS OF
LOCAL PLANNING & ZONING BOARDS, SCHOOL BOARDS, COMMISSIONS,
SPECIAL DISTRICTS, ELECTED OR APPOINTED OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS:

WARNING!
YOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING CRIMINAL LAW
“If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, or
because of having so exercised same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with the intent to prevent
or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more that ten years, or both; and if death
results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years for life
UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 18, Sec. 241

9-2-13

NOTICE
NO TRESPASSING
To all Public Officials and Citizen: whether Federal, State, County or City, this is to put
you on notice that the members of this household, or business building, require that all
Public Officials abide by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of
America, which is the Supreme Law of this Land.

BILL OF RIGHTS
ARTICLE II: “... the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”
ARTICLE IV: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated....”
The undersigned will, therefore, refuse to permit any search, or inspection whatever of this
dwelling, or buildings which are a part of this property, without the presentation of a proper
warrant, duly signed, as described by the Constitution Amendment, Article IV:
...AND NO WARRANT SHALL ISSUE, BUT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE,
SUPPORTED BY OATH OR AFFIRMATION, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED, AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
ANY OFFICER, OR PERSON WHO ATTEMPTS TO ENTER THESE PREMISES
WITHOUT A PROPER WARRANT, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, WILL BE TREATED
AS ANY OTHER INTRUDER WOULD WHEN ATTEMPTING TO BREAK AND
ENTER AN INHABITED BUILDING OR DWELLING.
(Signature) _____________________________________________________________

“POSSE COMITATUS”
Citizens Rule Books are being disseminated throughout the American Patriot Movement. These
books contend jury members are not required to obediently listen to judges regarding questions
of law. Instead, jurors are instructed to challenge the injustices committed by government agents
and acquit those being wrongfully prosecuted. Followed to their cars after court, jurors for the
Ruby Ridge trial had their license plates recorded, and Citizen Rule Books were sent to their
listed addresses.

FULLY
INFORMED JURY

ASSOCIATION

9-2-14

♦CITIZENS RULE BOOK♦
A Palladium of Liberty
BILL OF RIGHTS - JURY HANDBOOK - The Fireworks are in the Document itself: READ THE CONSTITUTION

STARTING TODAY
n

BE AWARE! Thousands of harmless citizens are in prison only because their trial
juries were not fully informed, and the U.S. now leads the world in percent of population
behind bars! More prisons are being built than ever before - - for those whose “crime” is
to upset the government “master”, and not to victimize anyone.

n

BE ALERT! Consider every day to be Jury Rights Day. Be wary and/or critical of
any proposals to “streamline” the jury system, or to create jurisdictions or regulations
which “do not require” trial by jury (two of the means by which your power as a juror is
stolen!)

n

BE ACTIVE! Let other people know what you now know about jury veto power!
Advise them all that before a jury deliberates, each member should consider:
ü
ü
ü
ü

Is this a good law?
If so, is the law being used justly?
Was the Bill of Rights honored in the arrest?
Will the punishment fit the crime?

As a juror, if you answer “no” to any of these questions, your vote should be “not guilty”

Publications and newsletters are written, edited, and sold by persons from within and without the
Patriot Movement. Contained in these materials are subscription and order forms for books,
audio tapes, video tapes, posters, etc. Information featured covers the spectrum from Gordon
Kahl to Ruby Ridge, Waco, The New World Order, and conspiracy theories. In addition, the
abundance of Right-Wing information available on the Internet can be assessed by the
movement loyalists and sympathizers, as well as all on-line users.

NEW
WORLD
ORDER
THE

Exposes A Plan To Control The Future of
Nations --- And Your Life
______________________________________
These next several years are absolutely crucial — we must see an
awakened citizenry in America.
Perhaps the following information will give you some insight to
the questions and maybe “incite” you to do a little research on
your own. Maybe you will start developing some concern about
the welfare and future of your own family and that of your
country.

9-2-15

Forgive them * NOT,

Place
Stamp
Here

for they KNOW

what They DO!
For High PAY and
PENSIONS TOO!
(Jeremiah 18:23)
* Judges, Gov’t Lawyers, Legislators, Tax Collectors
Knowingly & Willfully OPPRESS and HURT innocent
constitutionally minded & oft-times NAIVE People for
Personal gain. It’s their job - to practice Extortion Kidnapping - Theft by Swindle & Murder by paid
armed gunmen (police) risking life and limb for a
pittance to help destroy Americans.
* They have declared WAR on America.

Can Your Gov’t
DO NO WRONG

A U.S. Police Action

WORLD GOVERNMENT PLAN

ALIEN TROOPS TO
POLICE U.S.A.

OPERATION

VAMPIRE

Officers who think they will be at home watching their own
children and spouses are wrong. Once the NWO is set up in the year
2000 (just a couple years away) you, officer, guardsman, and
soldiers will be in other countries (see enclosed maps). Foreign
police troops will be guarding and enslaving your spouses and
children in the U.S.A. Here is the plan --

KILLER
2000

American Police Action Plan for Stopping
World Government Rule
Published by:
POLICE AGAINST THE NEW WORLD
ORDER

Order Complete text by sending $1.00 to:
####### ####### ###### Phone: ###-###-####
Operation Vampire Killer 2000

9-2-16

P.O. Box ####, Phoenix, Ariz ######

During court appearances, property seizure and sales, it is not atypical for armed and/or unarmed
tax protesters to congregate about in large numbers. Primarily done as an intimidation tactic it
cannot be discounted that a total cessation of the related activity is the real objective.
Operational plans should include and provide for the predetermined resolution of this and all
other contingencies that may result.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comptroller Warrant

Certified Bankers Check

PAY TO:

_____________________________
$
DOLLARS

_________________________________
without recourse U.C.C. sec. 3-415
___________________________________
authorized acceptance signature
#####################
remitter, special receiver

ACCOMMODATION POST OFFICE
BY SPECIAL AGENT RECEIVER

Certified Bankers Check

Comptroller Warrant
No. 1382
7 December 1995

Pay To
Treasurer United States of America
Redeemable at office of Postmaster
Payable on Sight
Remitter
Drawer / Maker
Special acct. 002 017721 40

$ _____________________
DOLLARS
________________________________
without recourse U.C.C. 3-415
_________________________________
authorized acceptance signature
accommodation / surety / guarantor
Lien no. 9342013801716025

Certified Banker Checks and Money Orders are fraudulent certificates designed by American
Patriots in attempts to pay off outstanding debts. Artificial financial backing of these “checks”
is supported by their declared belief that a substantial amount of funding is owed to them by
persons that they have served common law liens upon.
Loyalists and sympathizers of the American Patriot Movement have even been targets and
victims of fraudulent schemes. Federal indictments have charged individuals with illegally

9-2-17

soliciting funds through promotion of an alleged class action lawsuit which they falsely claim
was won in Federal District Court in Colorado. Literature and videos were disseminated and
public seminars were held in as many as 40 states; declaring the court had ruled the IRS, Federal
Reserve, and entire U.S. banking system unconstitutional. Persons who completed a provided
claim form enclosed a $300 (U.S. Currency) fee, and had paid income taxes for a ten-year period
were entitled to “damages,” but only if the claim was filed by using the provided form. Over
6,800 claims from people in 49 states and 2 Canadian Provinces were received.
The Wise Use Movement is based on the rejection of federal/state environmental management
legislation as irrational, biased, and treasonous to true Americans. Throughout the western
United States, violent incidents associated with this movement have repeatedly occurred. The
real threat, armed supporters and bombing attacks, have targeted officials from the Bureau of
Land Management and U.S. Forest Service.

News Headlines: MINNESOTA CASE STUDY
DEADLY TOXIN - Ricin Poison Symptoms: Ricin inhibits protein synthesis in the intestinal wall
and breaks down red blood cells. Characteristic symptoms from Ricin poisoning, which may not occur
for several days, include burning of the mouth/throat, nausea, vomiting, severe stomach pains, diarrhea
(sometimes containing blood and mucus), thirst, exhaustion, shock from massive fluid/electrolyte loss,
headaches, dizziness, lethargy, impaired vision, rapid heart beat, convulsions, retinal/internal
hemorrhaging, fluid buildup in the digestive tract and lungs, and deterioration of the liver and kidneys.
Similar symptoms are believed to be experienced whether exposure is from ingestion, injection or
absorption through the skin. There are no case studies available on effects by inhalation.

2 convicted of possessing deadly poison
0.7 grams of the substance is enough to kill 129 people
2 Minnesotans convicted of producing deadly toxin
Minnesota men charged with possession of deadly poison to use as a weapon.....

2 Minnesota men first to be convicted under Biological Weapons Act.
Federal Jury convicts 2 more Minnesota men of producing and possessing the deadly toxin
Ricin as a weapon, making it the second conviction in Minnesota and in the nation under the
Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.

In 1995 four Minnesota men were convicted in Federal District Court in St. Paul, Minnesota, for
producing and possessing the deadly toxin Ricin as a weapon, in violation of the 1989 United
States Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act. Federal affidavits alleged the men were
affiliated with a tax protest group known as the Patriots Council and had discussed plans to blow
up a federal building and kill a Deputy United States Marshal.
Later that year an Arkansas man was arrested for attempting to smuggle 139 grams of Ricin from
Alaska into Canada. Canadian Customs Agents also found $89,000 in cash, four guns, and more
that 20,000 rounds of ammunition. After being ordered held without bail for trial, he was
transported to the county jail where he committed suicide the next day.
Counter-Intelligence tactics are openly being encouraged and conducted by Right-Wing
organizations and prominent Militia networks in attempts to gather as much information as

9-2-18

possible on who they perceive to be their enemies. The Military acronym SALUTE, which
stands for Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, and Equipment, is being used to coordinate and
centralize this intelligence-gathering effort.
Leaderless Resistance strategies have been devised by Right-Wing leaders in reaction to law
enforcement investigations. More times than not these investigations were aided by informants,
and ensuing prosecutions were in turn aided by those arrested becoming government witnesses.
By adhering to Leaderless Resistance tactics and dividing into Underground Cells’ members
could operate independently of each other. By design, this strategy would serve to defeat
government undercover operations, investigations and prosecutions.

NETWORKING
THE NUTS & BOLTS
Leader stays Commander
4 stay and build up to 7 again
1 3 ------------------------------------------------- 3 1

Leader stays Commander
4 stay and build
up to 7 again
1 3 ---------------- 1 3

1 3 -------------- 1 3
13

-- 1 3 -- 1 3 -- 1 3

1 3 --1 3 -- 1 3 -- 1 3

---

---

We The People (Tax Protesters) believe that law enforcement officers have no legal authorization
to stop and search them. Members also believe that they have the right to carry firearms for
self-protection. Not recognizing the authority of government to regulate “freedom of travels,”
Freemen will often refuse to produce a driver’s license or vehicle registration. Instead, fake
identification cards claiming individual citizen and traveler status may be produced. Removed or
homemade license plates are distinct indicators of individuals subscribing to anti-government
philosophies.

9-2-19

FEDERAL
WITNESS
HEIGHT:

WEIGHT:

HAIR:

EYES:

C

R

T

F

CIVIL

RIGHTS

TASK

FORCE

ISSUE DATE:
It is the manner of enforcement which give Statue 1983 its
unique
importance, for enforcement is placed in the hands of the people. Each
citizen “acts as a private attorney general who
takes on the mantel of the
sovereign” guarding for all of us the
individual liberties enunciated in the
Constitution. Section 1983
represents a balancing feature in our
government structure,
whereby individual citizens are encouraged to
police those who
are charged with policing us all.
Frankenhauser v. Riczon 59 F.R.D. 339 (1973)
The individual identified on this card, when and where
applicable, has the right to make arrest(s) if he sees a crime(s)
committed, under the laws of the United States of America

being

UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA

NO. 0488
NAME:

Kingdom of Heaven

174247
Depart from Iniquity

Several anti-government groups have formed their own Common Law or Supreme Courts. Not
acknowledging any existing judiciary, these pseudo-courts have indiscriminately issued decrees
of one sort or another against “opposing” government officials. Some have gone as far as
registering documents confirming their intent to replace existing courts in stature and authority.

9-2-20

RIGHT-WING DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE
LEADER CHARACTERISTICS:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Male
White Protestant
College Educated
Age 30-45
Middle Class Living Environment
Urban Sophisticated
English Literate
High Verbal Skills
Articulate
Trained Perfectionist
Strong Paranoid Type Personality
Politically Motivated

FOLLOWER CHARACTERISTICS:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Male
White
Limited Formal Education
Age 20-25
Lower to Low Middle Class Living Environment
Rural Sophisticated
English Literate
Poor Verbal Skills
Lacks Articulation
Poor Labor Skills
Weak Paranoid Type Personality
Politically Naive

9-2-21

MILITIA CONSPIRACY THEORIES
n

The United Nations plans to take over the United States (code-named: New World
Order)

n

United Nation “Black Helicopters” are conducting surveillance missions in the western
United States as a prelude to invasion

n

Bar Codes are being placed on highway signs to direct invading enemy armies

n

Chemical spills are practice exercises for planned larger disasters. Americans will be
forced to vacate their homes and United Nation forces will enter and seize their weapons

n

The Los Angeles Riots were a government-orchestrated rehearsal for ensuing martial law

n

Amtrak Repair Yards in Indianapolis, Indiana, are to be used as crematoriums for the
eradication of political dissidents

n

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will maintain control over an
interim government

n

The Federal Government (ZOG- Zionist Occupational Government) is controlling the
weather to adversely affect the economy

n

The Oklahoma City Bombing was instrumented by ZOG to divert attention from the
Ruby Ridge and Waco Senate Hearings. The bombing was planned as justification to
further suspend American citizens’ constitutional rights

9-2-22

RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST RALLYING CRIES
Anniversary dates of significant events, as proclaimed by movement leaders, are used to create
and advance an almost fever-like pitch in anticipation of someone responding in an implied or
ordained manner. Tragically, this apparently escalated to the point where the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City was bombed on April 19, 1995.

n

GORDON KAHL - MEDINA, NORTH DAKOTA
February 14, 1983 - Two United States Marshals murdered in Medina, North Dakota
June 3, 1983 - Kahl killed during arrest attempt in Smithville, Arkansas

n

THE COVENANT, THE SWORD, THE ARM OF THE LORD (CSA)
April 19, 1985 - FBI raid of Christian Identity compound in Bull Shoals Lake,
Arkansas

n

RUBY RIDGE - NAPLES, IDAHO
August 21, 1992 - Confrontation resulting in the death of a United States Marshal

n

DAVID KORESH - WACO, TEXAS
April 19, 1993 - FBI led assault on the Branch Davidian Compound

n

OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING
April 19, 1995 - Murrah Federal Building bombed

n

RICHARD WAYNE SNELL - LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS
April 19, 1995 - CSA member Snell executed for the murder of an Arkansas State
Trooper

n

FREEMEN - JORDAN, MONTANA
June 13, 1996 - FBI Siege of fugitive Freemen at “Justus Township” ends peacefully

n

OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBER CONVICTED
June 2, 1997 - Timothy McVeigh convicted for bombing the Murrah Federal Building

9-2-23

INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATIONAL RESOURCES
Information available from these associations is extremely valuable when considering content,
accuracy, accessibility, and quality. Said material is distributed through professional
memberships, newsletters, bulletins, periodicals, studies, reports, and videos. Of added
importance is the establishment of networking alliances between public and private law
enforcement professionals. The listing provided should be used for resource and review
purposes. It is not intended to promote one association over another (listed or not) and should not
be considered so.

NAME:

TELEPHONE:

Southern Poverty Law Center - Klanwatch
Montgomery, Alabama
International Association of Counter Terrorism and Security
Professionals
Arlington, Virginia
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS)
Arlington, Virginia
Jewish Anti-Defamation League (ADL)
New York, New York
Tactical Response and Security - Varro Press
Shawnee Mission, Kansas
Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center
Springfield, Missouri
Mid-West Gang Investigators Association
Cleveland, Ohio
Center for New Community - Midwest Action
Oak Park, Illinois
Coalition for Human Dignity
Seattle, Washington

9-2-24

#334-264-0286
#703-243-0993

#703-522-5800
#212-885-7951
#913-432-5856
#417-883-4383
#216-623-5543
#708-848-0319
#206-233-9775

PUBLISHED INFORMATION
PUBLICATION:

DESCRIPTION:

A Force Upon the Plain- by Kenneth S.
Stern, Published by Simon & Schuster
The Silent Brotherhood - by Kevin
Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, Published by
Signet
Armed and Dangerous - by James
Coates, Published by Hill & Wang
Extremism in America - edited by
Lyman Tower Sargent, Published by
New York University Press

The American Militia Movement and their Politics of
Hate
The inside story of one of America’s most violent antigovernment domestic terrorist groups

The Northwest Imperative - by
Crawford, Gardner, Mozzochi, and
Taylor, Published by the Coalition for
Human Dignity
Bitter Harvest - by James Corcoran,
Published by Penguin Books
The Limits of Dissent - by Halpern and
Leven, Published by Aletheia Press
Gathering Storm - by Morris Dees with
James Corcoran, Published by Harper
Collins
The Right to Bear Arms - by Jonathan
Karl, Published by Harper Paperbacks
American Extremists - By George and
Wilcox, Published by Prometheus
Books

An examination of violent Right-Wing paramilitary
groups in the 1980's
A collection of extremist ideologies and writings that
highlight the one threat that unites various brands of
extremism; namely, that there is always an enemy. The
enemy can take the form of government, race, religion,
creed, etc.
A concise look at White Supremacists and Right-Wing
extremist organizations in the Pacific Northwest

An account of the 1983 Gordon Kahl Shootout in
Medina, North Dakota
The constitutional status of armed militias
America’s Militia Threat

America’s constitutional right and fight to bear arms
Background, characteristics, motivations, and other
considerations of the Far Left and Right

9-2-25

SUMMARY
It should be noted and reiterated that currently only a small number of militias can be considered
openly extremist. Most are concerned only with exercising their constitutional rights. However,
militias have been found to be operating in nearly 40 states, with memberships estimated to
exceed 40,000. Numbers like these only serve to underscore what the American Patriot
Movement already knows - they only have to deliver the message there are bound to be some
who will listen, believe and act.
The Minnesota Patriots Council Ricin case is a prime example of Right-Wing groups escalating
terrorist actions to include the threat of biological weapons. Since then, others with known ties
or sympathies to the Right-Wing have ordered bubonic plague cultures through the mail,
published Internet reports titled “Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North America”,
and conspired to kill persons by radioactive contamination. The threat of Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical (NBC) terrorist acts is real. While law enforcement responds accordingly,
officials responsible for public/private disaster management should incorporate NBC response
procedures into their facility’s contingency plan.
In closing, Trends and Tactics employed by the American Patriot Movement should not be
considered site-specific. What occurs in one area of the country/state can be expected to shortly
spread to others. This is especially true when the tactic(s) itself is considered a successful one.

9-2-26

UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE
THREAT SOURCE PROFILE (TSP) SAMPLE FORM
Date:

District:

Threat Coordinator:

Telephone:

Reason for Report
Submission:
#1
What is the name of the Subject or
Group? (if a group, proceed to question #17)
#2
Place of Birth:

#3

Date of Birth:

#4

Height:

#5

Weight:

#6

Sex:

#7

Race/Ethnicity:

#8

Hair:

#9

Eyes:

#10

Scars/Marks/Tattoos:

#11
#12

Drivers License
Number/State:
Subjects FBI Number:

#13

SSN #

#14

USMS/BOB Number:

#15

Other #

#16

Subject Photograph Available/Attached/Dated:

#17

Describe any Acts of Violence or Previous Threats Involving the Subject/Group:

#18

Aliases:

#19

Subject
Phone #

#20

Aliases:

Subject
Phone
#
What Addresses are Associated with the Subject/Group:

Address
#1
#21

Subject/Group Associates Name(s):

#21

Subject/Group
Associations:
Duration and Type?

Address
#2

9-3-1

Subject
Phone #

#22

Is the Subject/Group connected with any other Criminal
YES
Groups?
Name(s)
Location(s
Subject
:
):
Position:
#23 Vehicle
Model
State
Type(s):
Year:
Licens
e
Plate:
#24 Were Weapons Seized When Subject was
YES
Arrested?
Were Weapons Seized Pursuant to a Search
YES
Warrant?
Description of
Weapons(s):
#25 Subject/Group
Criminal
History:
#26 Subject/Group
Involvement in
Drug
Operations:
#27 Additional
Information on
Subject/Group:
#28 Is the TSP
Source of
Information
Reliable?
#29 Has the TSP
Information
been
Corroborated?
#30 List Other Agencies Involved with the Case Investigation and/or TSP:
Agency:

NO

NO
NO

Contact
PH #
:
Agency:
Contact
PH #
:
Agency:
Contact
PH #
:
#31 Additional Addresses, Associates, Aliases, Identifying Numbers, and Information:

9-3-2

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OPERATIONAL PLAN CHECKLIST
SUPERVISOR:
Supreme Court

CONFERENCE DATES:
Appeals

District

Other

INDIVIDUAL CONFERENCE ASSIGNMENTS

LOCATION:
ASSIGNMENT STATUS
COMPLETED

As Directed - Brief Sheriff and Chief Deputy on
Conference Status and Operational Considerations
Secure and Review Conference Correspondence,
Requests and Information
Identify/State Objectives - providing protective services
Assess/State Scope - significant influencing factors
Identify Primary and Secondary Conference
Locations
Specify Department and Other Agency Commitments
List Conference Contacts (Judicial and Law Enforcement)
Secure and Review Judicial Personnel Profiles
Review Previous Conference Operational Plans
List Conference Advance Sites and Contacts
Conduct Threat and Risk Assessment(s)
Assign Personnel - Schedule Shift Assignments
Identify and List Special Conference Considerations
Identify and List Site Specific Emergency and
Medical Contacts - Federal / State / County / City /
Private
Identify and List Conference Equipment
Requirements
Secure and Review Site Plans, Maps, and
Photographs
Prepare Judicial Conference Operational and Briefing
Packets
Submit to Sheriff and Chief Deputy for Review,
Briefing, and Plan Authorization

9-4-1

PENDING

N/A

PRIVACY and FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACTS
The Privacy Act (PA) and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) require all Federal agencies to
disclose all agency records upon request, unless there is a statutory reason for exempting the
information from disclosure.

THE PRIVACY ACT
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a - Records maintained on individuals
SUBSECTIONS:

n
n
n
n
n

(b) Conditions of disclosure
(c) Accounting of certain disclosures
(d) Access to records
(e) Agency requirements
(f) Agency rules

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 - Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders,
records, and proceedings

EXCEPTIONS:
(paraphrased)

n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

In the interest of the national defense or foreign policy and classified as such.
Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.
Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
Trade secrets and commercial or financial information.
Inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters not available by law.
Personnel and medical files.
Records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes as provided
under (a)(6)(C)(b)(7) of this section.
Reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.
Geological and geophysical information and data

The Privacy Act access provisions only apply to Systems of Records and records contained
therein. A Privacy Act System of Records is defined as a group of records where information is
retrieved by name or identifying symbol. Only these Systems of Records must be searched under
the Privacy Act.

It is recommended that a department form (Privacy Act Disclosure Recording Log) be developed
and maintained in each file, cataloged by an individual’s name, and every disclosure of any
information of the file to someone outside the Sheriff’s Department be recorded on it.

9-5-1

RECOMMENDED FOIA/PA RESPONSE GUIDELINES
n

When someone, including law enforcement agencies for law enforcement activities,
requests a document or information from a System of Records, they will be required to
submit a written request with the appropriate entry documented.

n

If an attorney or immediate family member (i.e., spouse or parent) requests information,
only the jail location of the individual will be released. Any request for additional
information will be directed to the attention of the County or City Attorney.

n

The Privacy Act is a non-disclosure statute meaning: in the absence of any exceptions,
the information may not be disclosed.

n

The Freedom of Information Act is a disclosure statute meaning: in the absence of any
exceptions, the information must be released.

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR USMS INVESTIGATIONS
The USMS may compile and maintain a database of judicial threats and incidents as long as there is a
past, present or anticipated violation of a statute which the USMS is empowered to enforce. It is the
law enforcement exception which governs how the USMS can maintain a system of records. The
applicable standard is whether the record is connected to a past, present or anticipated violation.
The USMS may investigate extremist groups in the course of providing security for the Federal
judiciary, but only after the occurrence of a triggering event. In all cases, there must be a nexus to an
actual or anticipated criminal violation for any investigation to commence.
n
Inappropriate Communication
TRIGGERING
n
Actual Threat
EVENTS
n
Trial Security
n
Execution of a Court Order
n
Making an Arrest
n
Fugitive Investigation
n
Transportation of a Witness or Prisoner

NOTE: the above is provided as a guide to sheriff departments in executing same duties and
responsibilities

9-5-2

CHAPTER 10
PROTECTIVE AND THREAT
INVESTIGATIONS

JURISDICTION and AUTHORITY

♦

The County Sheriff’s Department is the Primary Law Enforcement
Agency in the State of Minnesota for Investigating Threats against
Members of the Judiciary residing within their Jurisdiction

♦

See Manual, Chapter 1: Legislation, Policy Notices and Documents, and ensuing Subsections
for specific laws and regulations which reference Jurisdiction and Authority

The Sheriff may collaborate with Police Departments and other local, county, state and federal
law enforcement agencies in department-determined investigations.
Protocols for investigations should be discussed with these agencies prior to incidents, and
mutual aid or joint-power agreements should be pre-enacted as necessary.

10-1-1

JUDICIAL THREAT INVESTIGATIONS
Upon a threat (implied or direct) being made against a member of the judiciary, a threat
investigation must be immediately initiated. This criminal investigation may be undertaken with
the intent to prosecute, or as a means of gathering additional information in the event of
prosecution.

A Significant Consideration of Threat Investigations is the Assessment or Determination of
Threat Probability Levels and the Simultaneous Conducting of a Protective Investigation (see
manual, Chapter 10: Protective and Threat Investigations, Page 10.3)

Case tracking persons who issue threats is another important aspect of a threat investigation.
Threats are usually not a one-time or isolated occurrence. By case tracking, you will have
begun compiling subject information necessary for future investigations and prosecutions (see
manual, Chapter 9: Threat Management, page 9.5 Privacy/Freedom of Information Acts).
Threat Investigators must investigate the value of the threat itself to determine the actual level of
risk. To measure value, threat investigators must assess the suspect’s intent, motive, opportunity,
and ability. Intent is a purposeful course of action. Motive is the emotion, desire, psychological
need, or similar impulse acting as an incitement to take action. Opportunity is required for the
threat to being acted upon. Ability is having the resources and freedom to take action.
Each element should be assessed independently, then in combination of one another. For
example, some suspects may be highly motivated but incapable of instigating an attack because
they are imprisoned. Other suspects can lack coherent motivation, but truly intend harm. Of
most concern are those suspects with strong intent, powerful motive, ample or created
opportunities, and considerable ability.
The following table beginning on Page 10.2.1 describes a number of clues embedded in every
inappropriate communication that can assist in determining the value of the inappropriate
communication or threat.

10-2-1

INDICATORS

GENERAL RISK LEVEL

INSIGHT INTO THREAT VALUE
Method of delivery is solely the choice of
the suspect (exception being informants).
Consequently, that choice gives insight into
the suspect’s intent.

1. How was the IC
delivered?

WRITTEN

Generally Low Risk

TELEPHONE

Generally Low Risk

VERBAL

High Risk Potential

SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITY

High Risk Potential

Generally Low Risk
INFORMANTS
Informant Credibility
Elevates the Risk
2. Was the Suspect
Known or
Unknown?

ANONYMOUS

High Risk Potential

KNOWN

Generally Low Risk

10-2-2

With the rare exception of mail bombs,
suspects who write keep themselves a safe
distance from protectees, thereby
suggesting a lack of intent to carry out the
threat at this time.
Suspects who telephone threats also keep
themselves a safe distance from the
protectee.
Suspects who deliver IC’s in person, either
to the target or some known court or law
enforcement official, place themselves at
some risk of arrest, thus suggesting they
intend to carry out the threat at this time.
Suspects who engage in suspicious activity,
such as stalking, vandalism, unscheduled
appearance, or approaching the protectee,
place themselves at some risk of arrest, thus
suggesting an intent to carry out the threat
at this time.
Informant threats are out of the control of
the suspect. In every informant threat, the
credibility and motive of the informant
should be assessed first.
Suspects also choose whether or not to
reveal their identity. Judicial threateners
are not seeking notoriety or infamy.
Instead, they are contemplating a crime and
thinking like a criminal, want to escape.
Those who preserve their anonymity pose a
higher risk than those who reveal
themselves.
Suspects who reveal their identity generally
are expressing anger or outrage and usually
intend no more.

3. Who is the focus of
the Communication?

DIRECT

Intermediate

VEILED-TARGET

High Risk Potential

VEILED-SUSPECT

Generally Low Risk

4. What is the
Immediacy of the
Risk?
IMMEDIATE

Intermediate

DEFERRED BY
CONDITION

Generally Low Risk

DEFERRED BY
TIME

Generally Low Risk

10-2-3

The focus asks if it is clearly stated that the
suspect (not necessarily by name) intends to
do the harm and if the suspect clearly
identifies the target to be harmed (again,
not necessarily by name).
The statement, “I am going to kill you” is a
direct threat, even though there is no name
associated with either the “I” or “You.”
Direct threats are so common they have no
strong association with either high or low
risk situations.
The statement, “I’m going to make
somebody pay for this,” is a veiled-target
threat, since it is clear the suspect intends to
cause the harm, but not clear who will be
harmed. These statements suggest intense
frustration with the system of justice and
are frequently expressed while the suspect
is in the courthouse and, hence, better able
to pose a risk.
The statement, “Somebody’s going to make
that judge pay” is a veiled-suspect threat
because the suspect is saying someone else
will cause the harm to a specific target. In
over 600 previous cases of veiled-suspect
threats, not a single one has ever escalated
to enhanced or violent outcomes.
Placing conditions on when or if the harm
will occur strongly suggests that the suspect
does not intend to cause any harm unless
certain conditions are met.
An immediate threat of harm has no
conditions or demands placed upon it.
A deferred-by-condition threat of harm puts
a condition on the action, such as, “If you
find me guilty, I’ll kill you.” This strongly
suggests the suspect is putting the
responsibility on the protectee for the next
step, thus showing he intends no harm until
the condition may be met.
A deferred-by-time threat of harm injects a
time element delaying action, such as,
“When I get out of jail in ten years, I’m
going to kill you.” In effect, the suspect is

saying she cannot do anything now, but will
at some future date.

5. What is the
Suspect’s Purpose?
CASE RELATED

Knowing what prompted the IC helps
determine how motivated the suspect is.
Indeterminate

Most IC’s are related to a particular case.

HIDDEN MOTIVE

High Risk Potential

HABITUAL

Generally Low Risk

IRRATIONAL

High Risk Potential

IDEOLOGICAL

High Risk Potential

When the suspect chooses not to reveal
what his motivation is, it suggests an effort
to hide the suspect’s identity and cover the
suspect’s tracks, both indications of
preparing to commit a crime.
A significant but small percentage of IC’s
come from habitual threateners who have
neither the intent nor motive to cause harm.
They like to threaten.
Irrational suspects are often highly
motivated and less inhibited in carrying out
attacks.
Suspects motivated by some ideology,
particularly those whose ideology brought
them into court, pose a slightly higher risk
than others.
Knowing if the suspect is incarcerated or
not gives insight into the suspect’s ability to
cause harm.

6. Is the Suspect
Incarcerated?
INCARCERATED

Generally Low Risk

Although incarcerated suspects have been
known to pose a risk, the majority cannot.
Even those that do can be controlled.

NOT
INCARCERATED

Indeterminate

Knowing that a suspect is not incarcerated
suggests that he has the ability, but says
nothing of motive or intent.
Group affiliation suggests that the risk of
harm may come from more than one
source. It also suggests stronger
ideological or criminal motivation.

7. Is the Suspect
Affiliated with a
Group?
GROUP MEMBER

High Risk Potential

NO GROUP
AFFILIATION

Indeterminate

Suspects who belong to a group can be
more strongly motivated because of the
group’s support. They also have others to
assist them.
Most IC’s come from lone individuals.

10-2-4

Knowing where the IC was received can
give insight into how much information the
suspect has on the protectee.

8. Where was the IC
received?

Because judicial officials are public
officials, it is easy to find business
addresses.

COURTHOUSE

Indeterminate

RESIDENCE or
OTHER LOCATION

High Risk Potential

10-2-5

Although many judicial officials make no
effort to protect their privacy, delivering an
IC to the official’s residence or some other
location strongly suggests stalking or
research on the target.

PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS
A Protective Investigation Identifies, Assesses, and Attempts to
Defuse any Risk or Threat of Harm to a Judicial Protectee

The United States Marshals Service has developed a set of criteria or thresholds to use when
deciding whether to open a protective investigation. An investigation of every inappropriate
communication relating to judicial protectees is not required under every circumstance. Rather,
these definite set of pre-identified thresholds are used to decide when to open an investigation.
Inappropriate communications are the standards for which the United States Marshals Service
will initiate a protective investigation and subsequent threat assessment. (See manual Chapter
10: Threat Investigations, Page 10.5.2 for agency definition of these types of communications.)
Frequently, while relying on the inappropriate communication and case circumstances, threat
investigators immediately assess the risk or threat to the protectee as low. When this assessment
is corroborated through agency internal control mechanisms, it is no longer necessary to pursue
an open protective investigation.
As certain computer databases may not be available to assist State of Minnesota officials in
evaluating inappropriate communications and threat probability factors, it is recommended that
the following criteria be used in determining whether or not to open a protective investigation:
n

A Protective Service Detail has been Established on the Protectee - the inappropriate
communication itself is one considered so immediate or threatening that the protectee
requires immediate protection until the threat source has been negated.

n

A Direct and Explicit Threat has been Received and the County Attorney indicates
a Willingness to Prosecute the Offender - at this point the protective investigation will
develop into a criminal threat investigation.
NOTE: As long as there remains the potential of criminal prosecution for the threat
source (actual or suspect perceived), the suspect should be considered a potential risk to
the protectee.

n

The Threat Analysis and Assessment of the Inappropriate Communication indicates
a Moderate or High-Threat Rating - the assessment supports the operational necessity
to open a protective investigation.

The purpose of a protective investigation is to take all lawful and necessary steps to negate the
potential risk to a protectee. A Threat Management Case should incorporate the entire range of
operational responses available to the Sheriff’s Department, to include protective investigations
and threat assessments. The following terms may be used to describe or label the situations
which may arise when conducting protective investigations:

10-3-1

n

Open Case - An inappropriate communication has been received and the threat
investigator is conducting an active investigation into threat probability factors and
protective investigative techniques.

n

Closed Case - An inappropriate communication has been received and the investigation
determines that the suspect does not pose a threat to the protectee at that time. This may
be determined by the suspect lacking intent, ability, opportunity, or resolve.

n

Ongoing Case - An inappropriate communication has been received and it is determined
by the threat investigator that long-term management or monitoring of the suspect is
required.

Successful protective investigation efforts require that threat investigators and their
supervisors be allowed to devote themselves to program-recognized duties and
responsibilities. They include, but are not limited to the following:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

A Complete Understanding of the New Concept of Threat Management
Equipping Threat Investigators with the Necessary Resources and Equipment
Ensuring the Proper Steps are Taken When an Inappropriate Communication is Reported
Educating Protectees and their Staff on Reporting Inappropriate Communications
Applying the Conceptual Tools of Threat Analysis and Assessments
Focus Protective Investigations to Determine the Suspect’s Intent, Motive, and Ability
Immediately Develop the Appropriate Case-Specific Protective Response Technique
Modify, Amend, or Revise the Protective Response Based on Investigative Information
Following Privacy Act Considerations and Restrictions when Conducting Investigations
Opening a Protective Investigation when the Threshold has been Crossed
Consider all Available Options and Strategies for Case Management
Determine and Label Cases as Open, Closed, or Ongoing Protective Investigations
Ensure Proper Coordination is initiated with City, County, State, and/or Federal
Investigative Agencies
Ensure Proper Coordination is initiated with the City and/or County Attorney
Ensure that all Reporting Requirements are Accomplished in a Professional Manner

10-3-2

PROTECTIVE INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNIQUES
n

Watch and Wait

Instead of the Threat Investigator confronting the suspect (potential risks being suspect agitation
or satisfying attention-seeking needs), the investigator instead closely monitors the situation for
any additional threatening action(s). Threat Investigators should consider and assess the reasons
behind desired and unwanted outcomes which result from confrontations with the suspect.

n

Security Briefings

Provided to protectees to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to criminal and threatening actions.
Refer to manual Chapter 8: Bomb Threat Response Plan, Chapter 10: Protective and Threat
Investigations, and Chapter 11: Personal Security Considerations.

n

Psychiatric or Psychological Professionals - Cooperating Assistance

If the suspect is known to be under psychiatric care (custodial or non-custodial) the attending
psychiatrist or psychologist can be contacted to (1) ascertain the suspect’s case-relevant mental
condition, and (2) determine suspect’s treatment and/or prognosis. Patient/Client privilege and
privacy laws may limit the amount of information you can obtain without a subpoena. However,
by law, mental health professionals must disclose threat information discerned from the suspect.
NOTE: Suspect treatment should be given due consideration by Threat Investigators. A
number of prior threat investigations have disclosed that the onset of the inappropriate
communications were preceded by a change or reduction in the suspect’s use of medications.
Once the suspect’s medications were appropriately readjusted, the inappropriate
communications stopped, and the threat was negated.

n

Suspect Interview

Determine case/suspect interview strategies and protocol. The John E. Reid and Associates, Inc.,
Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation course and the Laboratory for Scientific
Interrogation course on Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN) are recognized as two of the leading
training agencies/programs in the field of suspect interviewing.

10-4-1

n

Interpersonal Communication

The process of Interpersonal Communication should be recognized and effectively used by the
Threat Investigator during all suspect interviews. This encompasses not only what can be
detected from the suspect, but also what messages you as the investigator might be conveying.
There are several disciplines associated with interpersonal communications. A number of
suspect interview or case-relevant categories are defined in the following tables:

LANGUAGE - A Conventional System of Arbitrary Vocal Signs
CONVENTIONAL
SYSTEM
ARBITRARY
VOCAL
SIGNS

Recognized and Practiced Standard that Develops Over Time
Set Language Pattern or Code - Several Influencing Factors
Random and Unpredictable, with No Logical Connection Between the
Words We Use and What They Represent
Verbally Expressed, with Sign Language the Recognized Exception
Symbolic Meaning that Usually Stands for Something Else

NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION
♦ Occurs Within a Context - Gives Recognized Meaning to
Communication
♦ Packaged for Meaning - i.e. Body Language or Proxemics
♦ Rule-Governed (Cultural or Gender) - What’s Acceptable or Not
Acceptable
♦ Highly Believable - 7% Verbal / 38% Tone / 55% Body Language
♦ Reinforces or Contradicts What is Said - Lasting Impact
♦ Body Language - Gestures, Touch, Facial (cross-cultural) and Eye
MAJOR TYPES
(contact and avoidance) Communications
and CATEGORIES
♦ Space Communication - Personal or Professional and Territorial or
Physical
♦ Speech - Rate, Volume, Inflection, Tone, and Pause
♦ Other - Personal Objects Having Meaning, Environment, Smells, Time
Schedules or Deadlines, Actual or Perceived Social Status, Attire,
Appearance, Hygiene, etc.
GENERAL DEFINITION
Messages Intentionally or Unintentionally Expressed and Understood
through Non-Linguistic Means

5 PRINCIPLES

SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES
Occurs when a person’s expectations of an event influence the outcome. Specific types include
Predictions by Others and Self-Imposed Prophecies. A person’s response is significantly
influenced by both these prophecies. Self-fulfilling prophecies can be both positive or negative.

10-4-2

SELF-PERCEPTION
TENDENCIES

FACTORS

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Influenced by Obvious
Cling to First Impression
Assume Similarity
Favor Negative Impressions
See Ourselves in Best Light
Personal Needs - perceived and actual
Wants and Desires
Cultural Similarities and Differences
Past Experiences - positive and negative
Stereotypes
Environment or Social Status
Physiological
Psychological
Emotional
Frame of Reference - family, peers, idols, etc.
Education and Training
DIMENSIONS OF LISTENING

EFFECTIVE LISTENING

NON-EFFECTIVE LISTENING

Active - Complete Attention and Focus
Empathic - Relate to Speaker
Non-Judgmental - Objectively Listen with
Open Mind

Passive - Distracted, Not Comprehending, and
Likely to Misinterpret
Subjective - Evaluate Speaker Based on
Personal Criteria (Often Facilitates Conflict)
Judgmental - Critical Listening or Analysis
Effective listening skills will assist Investigators in evaluating messages and understanding
and retaining information. The final dimension of listening requires a self-determination
of whether a suspect’s words should be interpreted at Surface Face Value or a Deeper
Meaning and Intent
SUSPECT EMPATHY
Is the ability to experience the world from the suspect’s perspective. Suspect empathy has three
dimensions: (1) Perspective-Taking, (2) Emotional or Sympathetic Involvement, and (3)
Concern, Feigned or Real, for the Person. When properly used, this technique builds trust (a
primary step for self-disclosure) that will likely influence the suspect to go along with a Threat
Investigator’s desires and/or directives (i.e. stop sending inappropriate communications to
protectees).

10-4-3

GENDER PERCEPTIONS and INFLUENCES
Two Primary Factors –
MALES:
Biological and Sociological
♦ Differ from males in Thinking,
♦ Differ from females in Thinking,
Communicating, and Problem Solving
Communicating, and Problem Solving
♦ Speak in Paragraphs, Details, Narrative,
♦ Speak in Words, Generalizations, Phrases,
with the Bottom Line coming Last
with Bottom Line coming First
♦ Are Creative, Intuitive, Artistic, Verbally
♦ Reasoning, Logically, Mathematically and
Expressive
Mechanically Inclined
FEMALES:

CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS and INFLUENCING FACTORS
Language

Customs

Environment

Appearance

Employment

Past Experiences

Discrimination

World Affairs

Attire

Stereotypes

Media Portrayals

Context

REASONS FOR SELF-DISCLOSURE or CONFESSION
Catharsis

Self-Clarification

Self-Validation

Reciprocity

Impression Formation

Physical Health

Social Control

Manipulation

Elevated Trust

Relationship Support

Understanding

Conflict Resolution

ALTERNATIVES TO SELF-DISCLOSURE or CONFESSION

n

Lying

Evasive Behavior

Equivocal Language

Remaining Silent

Deception

Blaming Others

Suspicious Behavior

Refusal to Answer

Mental Health Commitment

Under Minnesota State Law, persons under Mental Health Commitments or Holds can be
committed or held for up to 72 hours. A preliminary psychiatric evaluation will be conducted,
and the person may either be released or held, via court order, for further evaluation and/or
commitment.

n

Arrest(s)

Decisions must be made concerning the point at which Threat Investigators are to effect suspect
arrests. During any investigation, there may be times when the decision to arrest or not to arrest
will be solely made at the discretion of the Threat Investigator(s). All arrests should be made in
adherence to agency policy and procedures.

10-4-4

n

Restraining Orders

Threat Investigators need to determine the case-specific information required to draft a languageappropriate restraining order. A few examples of these type of considerations include, but are
not limited to: Duration / Locations / Provisions / Limitations / Prohibitions / Enforcement

n

Target Transfer

This technique has been successfully used on a number of protective investigations conducted by
the United States Marshals Service in the District of Minnesota. The Target Transfer, or
Diversionary Technique, transfers suspect focus from the protectee to the Threat Investigator.

n

Refocus to Support Groups

Request active support from the suspect’s spouse, family, church, peers, counselors, etc., in an
attempt to effectively transfer suspect focus away from the protectee.
NOTE: Threat Investigators need to assess any probability of the suspect becoming agitated or
embarrassed, to the point of violent action, before this technique is used.

n

Caution Notice

As determined by the Threat Investigator, prepared and disseminated to Sheriff’s personnel,
Court Security Officers, Police Departments, Protectee, her Family and/or Staff. Recognized
benefits are immediate, self-evident, tangible, and numerous. See example on page 10.6.

n

Long-Term Monitoring

Suspect anonymity and means of opportunity are effectively diminished through continual threat
investigator-initiated official contacts. Long-Term Monitoring allows the threat investigator to
gather additional intelligence and information, observe patterns of behavior and influences, and
as the situation requires, update and re-assess suspect’s threat potential.

n

Residential Surveys

Provided to protectees to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to criminal actions. See Manual,
Chapter 11 - Personal Security Considerations, sections 11.3 Residential Survey Considerations
and 11.4 Residential Security Survey Form.

10-4-5

n

Officially advise Law Enforcement and/or Emergency Contacts

Specific (primary place of residence) law enforcement contact information should be listed for
each judicial officer in the Sheriff’s Judicial Personnel Profile Manual. Each of the respective
law enforcement agencies should be pre-contacted and requested to provide the following upon
being advised of a threat: Increased Marked Squad Presence, 911 Emergency Dispatch
Notification and Response, Officer Briefings, Mutual Aid and Assistance.

n

Criminal Statistical Summary

Conducted within a 3 block radius of courthouses and judicial residences. Provides crime rates
and activity information to assist the threat investigator in assessing any connection of criminal
acts to inappropriate communications. Further, criminal statistics also assist security personnel
in determining whether crime is increasing to the extent (i.e., atypical to urban, suburban, or
rural site locations) where efforts require enhanced law enforcement and security intervention.
The following is an illustration of how this can work in support of threat and risk assessments:
A request was made for a protective services detail. Several months after being sent an
inappropriate communication the protectees vehicle had been vandalized on three separate
occasions while parked outside in the driveway. Subsequent analysis of criminal statistics
determined that within a 3 block radius of the protectees residence and over a period of 4
weeks a total of 68 vehicles had been vandalized. The protectee was briefed on the statistical
information, vehicle/garage security, and law enforcement findings that these acts of vandalism
were not connected to the previously reported inappropriate communication. The request for a
protective services detail was rescinded and to date their has not been any further acts of
vandalism.

n

Threat Source Profiles

See manual Chapter 9 Threat Management, section 9.2 Threat Source Profiles.

10-4-6

THREAT ANALYSIS and ASSESSMENTS
Risk Assessments are primarily based on site-specific threats (i.e. Crime Statistics, Space
Design and Layout, Environment - Urban, Suburban or Rural, Opportunity, Operations, etc.).
Threat Assessments differ in that they are based on the assessed totality of the (1) Corroborated
Information and Intelligence, (2) Investigative Actions, and (3) Individual and Group Threat
Source Profiles. Threat Propensity Levels are subsequently determined through comprehensive
analysis of these factors.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CORROBORATION CANNOT BE OVER
STATED
IT IS NECESSARY TO, AT MINIMUM, REDUCE AND, FOREMOST, ELIMINATE (the
Desired Objective of the Analyst) THE PROBABILITY OF ERRONEOUS INFORMATION
AND INTELLIGENCE ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE FINAL ASSESSMENT

Threat Source Profiles and Outlines (see manual Chapter 9: Threat Management, section 9.2
Threat Source Profiles) can significantly assist investigators in conducting a threat analysis and
subsequent assessment. The diversity of background information included in these profiles
should provide support for assessed correlations between past, present, and anticipated
threat incidents. For example, albeit a rather simplistic one, anniversary dates are used by Right
Wing Extremist Groups to create and foster an almost fever like pitch in anticipation of some
loyalist or sympathizer responding in an implied or ordained criminal manner. Tragically, this
apparently escalated to the point where the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was
bombed on April 19, 1995.
A Threat Source Profile on the American Patriot Movement (delineating historical perspectives,
ideology, trends, tactics, demographics, conspiracy theories, rallying cries, and informational
resources) shows that on April 19, 1985 the Covenant, The Sword, The Arm of the Lord (CSA)
compound in Bull Shoals Lake, Arkansas was raided by a contingent of federal and local law
enforcement officers; on April 19, 1993 the assault on the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco,
Texas began; and on April 19, 1995 White Supremacist and CSA member Richard Wayne Snell
was executed for murder in Arkansas. Consequently, a threat assessment indicating a higher
threat classification for the date of April 19th would be supported and further justified by the
stated profile.

10-5-1

To completely assess a threat, Specific Agency Identified Procedures should be thoroughly
evaluated in order to ensure that a definitive assessment as operationally-possible is generated.
A basic approach to consider when conducting threat assessments includes:
n
n
n

n
n
n
n
n
n

Identify and Define the Threat - Who? What? Why?
Research the Threat - Where? When? How?
Accumulate, Collate, and Corroborate All Available Information and Intelligence
Obtained From Principals, Witnesses, Informants, and Sources (Private, Public,
Business, Legal, and Law Enforcement)
Prepare or Review and Update an Existing Threat Source Profile
Review Findings and Form a Preliminary Synopsis
Utilize Databases and Recognized Violence Indicators (MOSAIC, U.S. Secret Service,
Dietz, etc.)
Consult with Colleagues
Use Positive and Negative Responses in Revising the Preliminary Synopsis
Prepare and Present the Final Threat Assessment Report

Threat Assessments are Generated in Final Report Form by Analyzing the Entire Scope of
Material Accumulated During the Investigative, Intelligence, and Analysis Processes.

Assessment can be Operationally Defined as a Formal Investigative Document that has been
Prepared in an Analytical Attempt to Identify the Threat Source and Level or Probability of
Danger to a Specific or Universal Object(s).

A Highly Recommended Assessment Practice is for Final Reports to List Established Policies
and Procedures for Agencies and/or Personnel to use in Responding to and Counteracting the
Identified Threat.

The Final Threat Assessment Report Should be Formatted to Include at a Minimum:
Assigned Case Number

Assessment Preparer

Assessment Requestor

Subject(s) of Threat

Distribution Register

Completion Date

Threat Rating

Basis of Preparation

Case Overview

Situational Summary

Historical Perspective

Threat Source Profile

Protective Services

Stated Assessment

Summary

10-5-2

Additional Techniques for Narrative Report Presentation:
n
n
n
n
n
n

Develop a conclusion based on your analysis and state your opinions as such.
Use headings, spacing, indenting and capitalization to categorize information and to draw
attention to important assessment conclusions.
Insert a table of contents and introduction.
Utilize a bibliography and footnotes if different opinions/comments than yours are incorporated
within the final assessment report.
List sources contacted during the analysis process.
Support your narrative with tables, charts and graphs.

The United States Marshals Services uses the following Three Rating Levels for Threat
Assessments:

LOW THREAT RATING - Indicating a slight probability of risk. It is unlikely that an
adverse action will occur.

MODERATE THREAT RATING - An identified and specific threat source has been
determined - - It is likely that an adverse action will occur without the implementation of
recommended agency counter-measures.

HIGH THREAT RATING - An identified and specific threat source has been determined.
Adverse action is expected and appropriate agency counter-measures and response plans are
being implemented.
Inappropriate Communications are the standards for which the United States Marshals Service
will initiate a protective investigation and subsequent threat assessment.
Agency Definition Includes Any Communication Making Reference to:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

A particular complaint or sense of outrage over the handling of a court case
Pseudo-legal court filings
A special history shared with the subject
A special destiny shared with the subject
Religious and historical themes involving the subject
Death, suicide, weapons, etc
Extreme or obsessive admiration or affection
Obsessive desire to initiate personal contact with the subject
A debt (not necessarily monetary) is owed to the threat source
The subject is someone other than himself/herself (deity, historical figure, spouse, etc.)
Public assassinations (assailant and victim)
Notorious acts (World Trade Center Bombing, Oklahoma City Bombing, etc.)
Mental illness (psychiatric care, medication, committed, etc.)
Protective services, security measures, security systems, etc

10-5-3

PARK ELLIOT DIETZ
Threat Assessment Group, Inc.
Newport Beach, California

TEN FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH
ATTACKS ON PUBLIC FIGURES
MENTAL DISORDER
EXAGGERATED SENSE OF
SELF-IMPORTANCE
INAPPROPRIATE
COMMUNICATIONS
RANDOM TRAVEL
EXCURSIONS
PRIOR IDENTIFICATION

CREATION OF JOURNAL

RESEARCHING TARGET
VICTIM
ABILITY TO CIRCUMVENT
ORDINARY SECURITY
PROCEDURES
PHYSICAL ADVANCES

The most common characteristic of those who stalk and attack
public figures
Especially those exhibiting a destiny (real or imagined) of doing
something of historical importance, or of the desire to be famous
Threatening (directly or indirectly), intimidating, or harassing
communications that can be expressed verbally or in writing
Centered around the public figure - Unexplained and unnoticed
unless you are aware of subject’s fixation on the public figure
Identifies with others who have stalked and/or attacked public
figures - Extremely interested in their past actions and deeds as
they have been publicized in books, magazines, newspapers, and
television
Recording of activities and observations made during periods of
stalking behavior - includes personal observations of public figure
via multi-media sources
Copious efforts made to extract detailed information on a selected
person
Primary consideration or probability factor in determining subjects
“ease of capability” to harm the public figure(s)

Repeated attempts (publicly and/or privately) to approach the target
victim(s)
OBTAINING A WEAPON FOR A Acquiring a firearm, dangerous weapon, or explosive materials
SPECIFIC OCCASION RELATED prior to a scheduled, publicized, or well attended event
TO THE PUBLIC FIGURE

10-5-4

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST PROTECTEES
History of Emergency Psychiatric Admission(s) and/or Extremely Bizarre Behavior
Claims of Personal Relationship with the Protectee
Lack of Concern for Self-Protection
Concern on the Part of Significant Others for Subject’s Behavior
Fixed ideas, Obsessions, or Compulsions
Extreme, or Seemingly Senseless but Focused Hostility
Repeated Threats of Violence and/or Past Offenses of Violent Behavior
Episodic or Binge Drinking and/or Alcoholic Blackouts
Involvement with Violent Groups
History of Unemployment and/or Situational Stress
Lack of Permanent Residence - Nomadic Lifestyle
Absence of Social Supports, Family, Church or Friends
Paranoid Feelings on Being Cheated, Abused, and Concerned with World Issues
Collection and Preoccupation with Weapons

From: “Behavioral Science and the Secret Service; Toward the Prevention of
Assassination” Report of the Committee of the Institute of Medicine,
National Academy of Sciences

10-5-5

COURTHOUSE DIMENSIONS OF THREAT SPACE
AGENT
Insider:

♦ Employee
♦ Contractor
♦ Visitor
Protester/Demonstrator
Anarchist
Vandal(s)
Criminal(s)
Prisoner(s)
Organized Crime
Dangerous/Deranged
Individuals
Pre-Identified Threat Source
Domestic Terrorists
International Terrorists
Unknown Individual(s)
Gangs:
♦ Street
♦ Prison
♦ Motorcycle
♦ Skinhead
♦ Militant

MEANS

MOTIVE

Conventional Arms:
♦ Firearms
♦ Edged Weapons
♦ Improvised Explosive
Devices
♦ Incendiary Devices

Act of Opportunity

Unconventional Arms:
♦ Nuclear Device
♦ Biological Agent
♦ Chemical Agent
♦ Military Weapons
♦ LAWs Rockets
♦ RF Weapons
♦ Cyber Intrusion

Monetary Gain

Threat of Attack:
♦ Bomb Scare
♦ NBC Hoax
♦ Symbolic Dates and
Anniversaries
♦ Inappropriate
Communications
♦ Prior Terrorist Acts

To Bring About System
Change

Threat Type:
♦ Hostage Situation
♦ Shooting
♦ Bombing
♦ Knifing
♦ Physical/Assaults
♦ Vandalism

Terrorism

Act of Recognition
Employee/Public Threat
Conception Escalated

Diversionary Tactic
Aid and Abet Prisoner
Escape(s)
Undermine Confidence in the
Government/Courts System

Revenge / Malice
Domestic/Sexual Abuse
Political Manipulation

Ideology
Occupational Related
Personal Adversity
Self-Importance

10-5-6

ANALYSIS & ASSESSMENT PROCESS FLOW CHART
Define the Threat and How It
Affects Agency Operations

Sheriff Receives Threat
Information/Intelligence
è

ê
COLLECT DATA
ê

INDUCTION
(Investigate)

é

COLLATE DATA

é

ê

é

ANALYSIS PROCESS

é

ê

é

Prepare Your Preliminary Assessment

é

ê

é

è

DEDUCTION
(Corroborate)
è

Confirm if the Assessment is
Supported
è
ê

YES
ê
COMPLETED ASSESSMENT REPORT

10-5-7

NO

_______________________________COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

CAUTION NOTICE
NAME:
ALIAS:
DESCRIPTION:
Sex:
Race:
Place of Birth:
Date of Birth:
Height:
Weight:
Eyes:
Hair:

(paste photo)

ADDRESS and LOCALE:

REASON FOR CAUTION:

INSTRUCTIONS: Courthouse security personnel will challenge subject upon any and all
contact occurring during the furtherance of official duties. DO NOT ARREST or DETAIN
subject based solely on Caution Notice information.
IF OBSERVED OR ENCOUNTERED, IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE SHERIFF at:
TELEPHONE #: _____________________________________

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

10-6-1

DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
PROTECTIVE SERVICE DETAIL - OPERATIONAL PLAN
CHECKLIST
Detail Supervisor:

Date:

Assignment:

Location:

INDIVIDUAL DETAIL ASSIGNMENTS

ASSIGNMENT STATUS
COMPLETED

As Directed - Brief Sheriff and Chief Deputy on
Detail Status and Operational Considerations
Secure and Review all Detail Requests and
Information
Identify/State Detail Objectives - providing protective services
Assess/State Scope of Detail - significant influencing factors
Identify Primary and Alternate Detail Locations
Specify Department and Other Agency Commitments
List Detail Contacts (Private and Public)
Prepare and List Detail Advance Sites
Assign Personnel - Schedule Shift Assignments
Conduct Threat and Risk Assessment(s)
Identify and List Special Considerations
Conduct and Document Detail Advances
Secure and Review Official Itinerary of Protectee
Identify and List Detail Equipment Requirements
Identify and List Site Specific Emergency Contacts
Secure and Review Site Plans, and Maps
Identify and List Emergency and Evacuation Routes
Review Previous PSD Plans
Prepare Protective Service Detail Operational Plan
Submit to Sheriff and Chief Deputy for Final
Review, Briefing, and Plan Authorization

10-7-1

PENDING

N/A

A recommended listing of sections to incorporate within Protective Service Detail
Operational Plans and Summaries include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n

Operational Code Name
Table of Contents or Index
Mission Statement
Department and Detail Chain of Commands
Detail Personnel Information
Detail Assignments, Duties and Responsibilities
Contact Names and Numbers
Sheriff’s and Police Department Contact Names and Numbers
Emergency Contact Names and Numbers
Protectee Biographical and Personal History Information
Department Communications - Standard Issue
Other Agency or Specialized Communications
Required Equipment for Detail Personnel
Detail Operations Requirement for Specialized Equipment
Site Command Posts
Site Locations
Threat Intelligence
Media and General Public Issues
Specialized Training
Housing as Required - Official Protectees
Housing as Required - Prisoner Protectees
Housing as Required - Detail Personnel
Motorcade and Travel Considerations
Administrative Support
Medical Considerations - Protectee
Medical Considerations - Detail Personnel
Emergency Evacuation Sites and Procedures
Arrest Considerations
Other Support - Traffic, Weather Reports, Site Management, etc.
Hostage Situations - Available Tactical Response
Detail Specific Instructions
Individual Briefing Packages and Detail Policy Notices
Closing and After-Action Reports

10-7-2

CHAPTER 11
PERSONAL SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS

VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE
In July 1993, Northwestern National Life Insurance Company conducted a survey and study on
workplace fear and violence among 600 representative civilian workers. Their study was the
first comprehensive assessment of the incidence of fear and violence and its effect in the
workplace.
The following statistical information, which is believed to be the most current data available, was
obtained from this study:

Approximately 2 million full-time workers were physically attacked
on the job between July 1992 and July 1993

TABLE 1
ON-THE-JOB INCIDENT
EXPERIENCED

Harassment
Threat of physical
harm
Physical Attack

PERCENTAGE OF
WORKERS

RATE PER 100,000
WORKERS

NUMBER OF WORKERS
(MILLIONS)

19%

18,667

16.1

7%

7,333

6.3

3%

2,500

2.2

Based on 1991 Census Bureau estimates of 96.575 million full-time workers, less 10.341 million
self-employed workers, or a total of 86.234 million workers

TABLE 2

Violence and harassment in the workplace are pervasive
VIOLENCE, THREAT, HARASSMENT OR FEAR

Worker was harassed, threatened, or attacked on the job in the past 12 months

PERCENTAGE OF
WORKERS
25%

Someone was threatened with physical harm in workplace during the past 12 months

22%

Worker was threatened with physical harm on the job during lifetime

21%

Worker was harassed on the job in the past 12 months

19%

Worker was physically attacked on the job during lifetime

15%

Someone was physically attacked in employee’s workplace in the past 12 months

14%

Worker considered carrying teargas or mace for protection on the job

11%

Worker is often worried about being a victim of violence on the job

10%

Worker considered bringing a gun or other deadly weapon to work for protection

4%

11-1-1

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICAL SUMMARY
♦ According to Bureau of Labor Statistics, an average of 1000 people die every year as a
result of occupational homicides
♦ Of the 769 Bureau of Labor-reported 1991 violent workplace fatalities, 553 were shootings,
58 were stabbings, 29 were by hitting, kicking or other assaults, 85 were suicides, 18 were
death by animals and 26 by other causes
♦ Statistical research has found that 40% of occupational deaths for women are homicides
♦

Homicide has become the second leading cause of death in the workplace - for women it is the
leading cause

♦

Guns account for 75% of workplace deaths; edged or piercing weapons account for 14%

♦

30% of workplace violence victims are public sector employees

♦

Nationally, workplace homicides occur on a regional percentage basis of:
North Central - 19%

West - 24%

North East - 8%

RATES OF VIOLENCE / 1992 - 1996

South - 49%

per 1000 workers

Law Enforcement Officers

306

Private Security Officers

218

Taxi Drivers

184

Correctional Officers

117

Bartenders

91

Mental Health Professionals

80

Gas Station Attendants

79

Convenience / Liquor Store Clerks

68

Mental Health Custodial Workers

63

Junior High / Middle School Teachers

57

Bus Drivers

45

Special Education Teachers

41

High School Teachers

29

Elementary School Teachers

16

College / University Teachers

3

11-1-2

TEN PROFESSIONS MOST LIKELY TO BE VICTIMS OF MURDER
Data researched by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health indicate the
below listed occupations (listed in order) as those most likely to result in being murdered
♦ TAXI CAB DRIVER
♦ SHERIFF / BAILIFF
♦ POLICE OFFICER / INVESTIGATOR
♦ HOTEL CLERK
♦ SERVICE STATION ATTENDANT
♦ PRIVATE SECURITY GUARD
♦ RETAIL STOCK HANDLER
♦ STORE MANAGER
♦ POLICE SUPERVISOR
♦ BARBER

CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT
ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE
History of Violence
Psychosis

Romantic Obsession
Chemical Dependence
Depression
Pathological Blamer

Criminal Acts / Domestic Violence / Verbally Abusive
Anti-Social Behavior
Individual will demonstrate: Impaired reality; inability to
evaluate society objectively and distinguish it from inner
experiences; senseless violence, inattentiveness, grossly
disorganized
Schizophrenia / Major Affective Disorders / State of
Paranoia
♦ Object of fixation may not be aware of the degree
♦ Subject of attraction usually holds higher social status/title
Use of Alcohol and/or Drugs can cause irrational response
1 of 7 depressed persons will commit an act of violence
Accepts no responsibility for individual actions

11-1-3

POTENTIAL VIOLENT OFFENDER PROFILE
White Male

25-40 YOA

Exhibits Delusions of Grandeur Experienced Prior Successes
Has Violent Fantasies
Religious / Political
Expounding
Unstable Work History

Loner
Experienced Recent Setbacks

Angry / Paranoid

History of Violence

Blames Others For Failures

Abuses Drugs / Alcohol

Inappropriate Physical Actions
Seeks to Control by
Low Self-Esteem
Occupation-Based Self-Esteem
Intimidation
Perceived / Actual Job Stress
Misperception of Others
Resists Change / New ideas
Prolongs Grievances
Marital / Financial Problems

Overt Obsessions

Empathy for Violent Persons

Exhibits Suicidal Tendencies

Misinterprets Acts of Kindness Overly-Sensitive to Criticism

THREAT and VIOLENCE DE-ESCALATION TECHNIQUES
ANGRY / HOSTILE
PERSONS

THREATENING
PERSONS

ARMED PERSONS

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Stay Calm and Attentive
Maintain Eye Contact
Be Courteous and Informative
Remain Patient
When Questioned, Be Honest - Don’t Lie
Keep the Situation in Your Control
Be Aware of your Office and Security Environment
See Above Techniques
Offer Appeasement
Appear Sympathetic
Follow Through on Any Statements You Make
DO NOT CONFRONT Threatening Individuals
Signal to a Co-Worker or Supervisor that You Need Help
Use Prearranged Code or Duress Alarm System
See Above Techniques
Stall For Time
Keep Talking While Following Instructions
DON’T RISK HARMING YOURSELF or OTHERS
DON’T BE A HERO
Never Attempt to Grab a Weapon(s)
Watch and Take Advantage of Any Safe Opportunity to
Escape - Know Your Avenues of Escape

11-1-4

VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE PREVENTION TECHNIQUES
SECURITY AWARENESS
Conduct Facility/Environmental
Threat and Risk Assessments
Conduct Courthouse
Security Surveys
Adhere to Security Recognized
Agency Space Design & Layout
Foster Consciousness of
Heightened Building Security
Use Court Remedies Restraining Orders and
Commitments
Adherence and Consistency in
Enforcing Personnel Decisions
Employee Acceptance of
Individual Responsibility for
Personal Security

Establish Site-Specific
Employee Reporting Policies
Develop Case
Management Strategies
Establish Clearly Defined Public
and Private Traffic Areas
Determine Building’s Physical
Security Equipment
Requirements
Adherence to Recognized
Facility Quality Control
Measures
Use of Existing Laws: Terrorist
Threats, Harassment Stalking,
etc.
Job Commensurate
Pre-Employment Screening

Organize Incident-Management
Response and Review Teams
Develop Detailed
Courthouse Contingency Plans
Determine Access Control
Systems, Policies & Procedures
Regularly Convene Courthouse
Security Committees
Recognize Early Warning Signs
of Violent Persons
Train Employees to Use
Conflict-Resolution Techniques

Establish Off-Site
Security Programs
Establish and Use Alternative
Disseminate Caution Notices on
Dispute Resolution (ADP)
Known Dangerous Individuals
Panels
Close Secondary Public
Establish Policies and
Encourage Use of Employee
Entrances; Use One Main
Procedures for After- Hours
Assistance Programs
Entrance
Visitors
Establish Multi-Cultural Diversity Training Program for Courthouse Employees and Security Staff Avoid the Potential of Situational Conflicts Resulting From Unintentional Misunderstandings
Issue a Single Form of Photographic Identification (ID) for Courthouse Employees - Instead of Several
ID Badges from a Number of Agencies, these ID’s can be Used to Readily Identify Courthouse
Employees to Security Staff. It Should be Noted that in a Courthouse Type Environment the Prominent
Displaying of ID Badges is Discouraged. The Reasoning behind this Recommendation is Made on the
Same Basis as Marking Vehicle Parking Spaces by Name and/or Title is Discouraged.
SECURE YOUR ID UNTIL IT IS NEEDED / DON’T CREATE OPPORTUNITIES WHERE
NONE NEED EXIST
Establish Set Policies and Procedures (General Public, Employees, and Law Enforcement) on the
Prohibition of Firearms and Other Dangerous Weapons from the Courthouse - See Title 18 USC,
Section 930
Classifying Courthouse Operations and Employee Assignments by Security Levels - Thereby Resulting
in a Direct and Desired Correlation between Higher Classification Levels and Elevated Court Security
Measures
Continue Your Research into the Specific Factors Associated with Violence in the Workplace and
Occupational Homicides - While Evaluation is Critical to Violence in the Workplace Prevention,
Efforts Few In-Depth Studies Have Been Conducted to Evaluate Preventive Measures

11-1-5

News Headlines: VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE INCIDENTS
Ex-chess coach opens fire at city hall in Riverside, California
Mayor among 6 people wounded
10/98

METRO: Man fatally shoots
friend, then himself at Eden Ex-worker kills 4 at S.C. plant
9/97
Prairie firm

Former employee kills four,
shoots himself at Ottawa bus
garage
4/99

9/97

USA TODAY Gunman kills two, himself in
San Antonio

Sheriff’s deputy kills wife inside Buffalo, NY
elementary school
5/98

10/97

NATION Fatal shooting spree at Milwaukee post

Shots shock nations Capitol / Man charges past
security fatally shoots two officers

office Clerk’s rage explodes

7/98

Associated Press 3/98

New Hampshire gunman apparently held grudge against judge - kills her and 3 others during

shooting spree
8/97

Fired employee
threatens suicide in
Cascade, Iowa / later
surrenders to police

County official shot
over stadium tax in
Phoenix

METRO 3 teens
charged in fatal
shooting on I-94
3/97

8/97

Salt Lake City 71
year old gunman
kills two wounds five
others
4/99

4/98

California killer blamed
former supervisor for having
him fired / kills four with
AK-47

NATION: Connecticut Lottery
accountant guns down 4
supervisors, kills self
Associated Press

Man fatally shot at work
Co-worker at Eden Prairie
firm is arrested

3/98

3/97

3/98

Three die, two wounded in small-town shooting spree / Fired employee in Wykoff kills 2, self
8/96

Plant cleared as man kills woman, self ‘
hundreds of employees evacuated in
Plymouth Township, Michigan’
Associated Press

Man convicted in shooting shot former
girlfriend at Apple Valley Health Care Center
4/97
9/97

Veteran surrenders to
Fired city worker
police after 14 hour
standoff at VA Center in kill 5, self in Florida
2/96
Waco
3/98

San Diego State
student kills 3
professors / gun
stowed in first aid kit
8/96

11-1-6

Guilty plea in U of
MN Hasselmo office
shooting / Woman
says she meant no
harm
2/97

PERSONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
A major component of any personal security program is the realization that persons must
assume a certain degree of Individual Responsibility to ensure their own safety and security

The fact is, security cannot be everywhere - to protect everyone - all the time - for every
situation.
The key to establishing a model court security program is to take into account all of those aspects
relative to reasonably ensuring and enhancing safety and security levels. Each aspect must be
thoroughly reviewed and addressed in order to successfully incorporate the necessary security
standards, policies and procedures. This is done under a basis of understanding that the relative
situational aspects for judicial officers include courthouse operations, building security systems
and personnel, high threat/profile proceedings, conferences, inherent risks, threats, protective
services, and off-site programs such as residential, travel, and personal security.
For court security programs to be successful, it is essential that they be supplemented with what
can be labeled as Employee Recognized Response Actions. Simply meaning, for every likely
security situational aspect, employees should be overly-familiarized with what is required of
them. The Method and Extent (see below for non-exclusive listings) of how to manage and
implement Employee Recognized Response Actions should be security driven and determined.

METHOD
Security Awareness Training

Occupant Emergency Plans

Fire/Evacuation Drills

Informational Bulletins

Security Pamphlets

Training Videos

EXTENT
No Action Required

Policy/Procedure Compliance

Duress Alarm Activation

De-Escalation Techniques

Security Consciousness

Report Suspicious Activities

Contact Security or Police

Active Training Participation

Building Evacuation

This is never more apparent or necessary than for Personal Security. Consequently,
limitations should never be put on the methods or extent of Employee Recognized Response
Actions for Personal Security.

11-2-1

EMPLOYEE RECOGNIZED RESPONSE ACTIONS PERSONAL SECURITY
n

Be Aware of your Environment - A city street may be perfectly safe to walk on at noon,
but the same street at midnight may be inundated with criminal activity.

n

Eliminate Opportunities for Crime to Occur - Practice sound security habits.

n

Establish a Personal Comfort Zone (Proxemics) - Subconsciously determined zones at
which we are comfortable or uncomfortable with other persons. See table on Proxemics.

n

Learn to Use your Skills of Observation and Intuition - Before entering a convenience
store, you should look through the store’s glass windows to observe, assess, and respond to
any suspicious activity. Learn to assess non-verbal “Body Language” gestures.

n

Have a Game Plan - Know What You Are Going To Do and How You Are Going To React.
Where are the emergency exits?

n

Where are the duress alarms?

What are your options?

Develop Personal Security Assurance - your familiarization and knowledge of personal
security is evident by your confident attitude and actions.

n

Expand Field of Studies - Examples of recommended reading include “The Gift of Fear”
and “Protecting the Gift” both by Gavin DeBecker.

PROXEMICS
Intimate Zone: 6"-18"

Personal Zone: 18"-4'

Close Social Zone: 4'-7'

Used for emotionally based
relationships and close
friendships
Far Social Zone: 7'-12'

Where we normally converse
with others on a one-to-one
basis
Close Public Zone: 12'-25'

Where we conduct impersonal
business, converse with
strangers
Far Public Zone: Beyond 25'

Used for formal social affairs Marks the limits of
Used by persons addressing
or business - i.e. police desk
interpersonal concerns large or formal groups
sergeant
conferences & training
Court employees should evaluate their Personal Comfort Zone, self-determine which zones
create personally-heightened concerns, and make a conscious decision as to their response when
someone “violates” these zones. For example:
An agitated person violates your comfort zone - your immediate response is to step back - you
tell the person to stay where he is, and once again he violates your comfort zone - you now know
that this person has repeated non-verbal actions that you consider threatening - now you should
respond to the extent you have been trained (i.e. de-escalation techniques, signaling another
employee to call for security, activating a duress alarm, etc.)

11-2-2

CRIMINAL ACTIONS - 3 TYPES
Crimes of Opportunity
The criminal action occurs
only because the opportunity
presents itself

Crimes of Intent
The criminal action is based
on a desire or intent against
the target victim

Opportunity-Imposed
Crimes of Intent
The criminal action against
the target victim is desired and
intended, but will occur only
when the opportunity presents
itself

TELEPHONE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
Threatening Calls
Calls in this category may
require intervention by law
enforcement agencies

Harassing or Obscene Calls
These calls may include silent
calls

Nuisance Calls
These calls are intended to
irritate you, such as constant
and frequent hang-up calls

What to do:
What to do:
♦
♦

♦

Hang up immediately
Use available telephone security
features
Record all threat information and
contact the police department

♦
♦
♦

♦

Hang up immediately
If the calls persist, unplug your
phone or do not answer
Use available telephone security
features
Contact telephone security to
discuss alternative options

Prank Calls - generally calls made at
random, and if the caller does not get the
response they want, will usually stop
after one or two attempts.
Anonymous Calls - typically are
attempts to get information.

TELEPHONE SECURITY FEATURES
CALLER
IDENTIFICATION
CALLER
IDENTIFICATION
BLOCK
CALL REJECTION

CUSTOMER
ORIGINATED TRACE
LAST CALL RETURN

Electronic attachment that displays the caller’s name, telephone
number, and possibly the date and time of the call.
Permits the caller to block the name, number, etc. from the line
being used to place the call. To use, press *67 or 1167 on a rotary
phone
Allows customers to program into their line the telephone numbers
of calls they don’t want. To use, press *60 or 1160 on a rotary
phone
Allows customers to trace the last incoming call to that line. To
use, press *57 or 1157 on a rotary phone
Automatically dials the last person who called you, whether the call
was answered or not. Will not return blocked calls. To use, press
*69 or 1169 on a rotary phone

The listed Telephone Security Features are those available from U.S. West Telephone. They may or may not be available in
your communications area, dependant upon whether automated services have been programmed and who your telephone
provider is.

11-2-3

SAFE DRIVING TIPS
BEHAVIORS OF
♦ Running Stop Signs and Red Lights
AGGRESSIVE DRIVERS ♦ Speeding, Tailgating, and Weaving between Lanes
♦ Passing on the Right of a Vehicle
♦ Making Inappropriate Hand and Facial Gestures
♦ Screaming, Honking the Horn, and Flashing Headlights
WHAT TO DO WHEN ♦ Make every attempt to Safely Move Out Of The Way
CONFRONTED BY AN ♦ Do Not Challenge by Speeding Up
AGGRESSIVE DRIVER ♦ Do Not Challenge by Holding Your Own Lane Position
♦ Always Wear your Seatbelt
♦ Avoid Eye Contact
♦ Ignore Gestures and Do Not return them
♦ Report Aggressive Drivers to the Authorities
♦ Safely Use a Cellular Telephone to Call the Police
♦ If you Believe an Aggressive Driver is Following you - Do Not
Go Home - Go Directly to the Nearest Police Station
♦ If an Aggressive Driver is Involved in a Crash, Stop a Safe
Distance from the Crash Scene, Wait for the Police to Arrive,
and Report what you Witnessed

NEIGHBORHOOD PARKS - SAFETY TIPS
Be Aware of your
Surroundings and
Circumstances

When Possible, Run or Walk
with a Friend

Keep the Volume on your
Headsets Down

Let Someone Know Where you
are Going and How Long
you’ll be gone
Know where you can go for
Wear Reflective or LightPark your Locked Car in a
Help or a Telephone
Colored Clothing
Lighted Parking Area
Carry Identification and your
Put Valuables in the Trunk
Don’t Take Chances or Be over
Car Keys (if driving) at all
Before you arrive at the
Confident
times
Parking Area
Be Aware of the Possibility of
Carry (self-determined) Mace
Be Aware of and Avoid
Danger - Learn/Rely on
and Be Ready to Use it.
Suspicious Persons or Groups
Intuition
Carry a Personal Panic Alarm

Be Alert when Running or
Walking near Wooded Areas

11-2-4

INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL SECURITY ADVISORIES
APPEARANCE

LUGGAGE

DESTINATION

SECURITY/SAFETY
ADVISORIES
MEDICATIONS

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

PERSONAL and
FINANCIAL

♦
♦
♦
♦

AIRPLANE

HIJACKING

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

ACCOMMODATIONS

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Whenever possible maintain a low-profile appearance.
Downplay your official status as a judge, government employee, etc.
Dress casually when possible and leave obviously expensive clothing and jewelry home.
Use hard-sided luggage that can be locked.
Don’t use luggage tags that state your name and home address. Use your business
address.
Don’t carry a briefcase everywhere you go.
Plan and know your itinerary in advance.
Share your itinerary with family members and trusted associates only.
Plan direct flights.
If you must make a connection, avoid airports with a history of incidents.
Don’t rely on taxicab drivers for directions and advice.
Contact the U.S. State Department Citizen Emergency Hotline at
#202-647-5225 for
information on overseas travel advisories, obtaining security pamphlets, and emergency
information on U.S. citizens traveling abroad.
Pack copies of your birth certificate, visa, and passport in your checked baggage.
Take twice your anticipated need and place them, in their original bottles, in two
different bags.
Have your doctor write a prescription to include the generic brand name for any essential
medications you need to take along.
Contact your doctor or local health clinic for specific country questions.
Schedule a doctor’s appointment for required or precautionary immunizations well in
advance of your travel plans.
Confirm departure time at least one hour before you leave for the airport.
Arrive early.
Move to the secured area as soon as practical. Most problems occur in ticketing and
baggage claim areas.
Wait at your departure area unless you are traveling to a country listed in State
Department security advisories. In that case, wait for boarding at an adjacent gate’s
departure area.
Avoid sitting near luggage lockers or large windows/glass.
Be cognizant of unattended luggage and discreetly advise the authorities.
Don’t leave your luggage unattended.
Upon arriving at your destination and reclaiming your baggage, directly exit the airport.
Avoid aisle and first-class seating.
Request window seats toward the rear of the aircraft.
Place carry-on items in overheard compartments.
Pay attention to the flight attendants’ explanation of emergency evacuation procedures.
Avoid personal and/or business conversations that strangers can hear.
Don’t protest, question, challenge, or stand up from your assigned seat.
Don’t distinguish yourself from others. Don’t volunteer for anything.
Avoid abrupt movements. Do exactly what you are told.
Don’t do anything without requesting permission.
Don’t talk with other passengers. Remember, their may be accomplices intermixed
among the flights crew and passengers.
Avoid eye contact with any of the hijackers.
The most critical time in a hijacking is the first thirty minutes. Hijackers are tense and
ready to react. Prepare yourself mentally for questioning. Use your time to think about
possible situational contingencies.
Stay at busy, recognized, major hotels.
Ask for a room on the second through fourth floors. These floors are high enough to
discourage most burglars and low enough to allow escape during fires or other
emergencies.
When registering, inquire into hotel emergency procedures.
Locate emergency exits and fire extinguishers near your room.
Count the number of doors from your room to the emergency exit.

11-2-5

♦
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STREET

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♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
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♦

Determine how your windows open and lock shut. What is located outside your window?
Use the hotel safe to secure your valuables.
Leave a radio or television on normal volume when you leave your room.
Don’t leave your room key at the front desk.
Be careful about leaving sensitive information around your room.
Reconsider what you throw away in the garbage. Your itinerary, address, credit card
receipts, etc. can be used by experienced criminals.
Use the peephole and privacy locks/chain in your room.
Call the front desk before admitting anyone who claims to be hotel staff.
If a fire alarm sounds, check the door before exiting.
Is the hallway full of smoke? If not, grab your room key and flashlight and head
for the nearest exit. Stay low if you encounter smoke/noxious fumes.
Do not use the elevators even if other persons are.
Head in the direction of downstairs - only go the roof as a last resort.
If you elect to stay in your room - fill the bathtub with water - block the bottom
of doors and vents with wet sheets or towels - keep all windows closed to avoid
creating a draft for fire and smoke.
Stay alert and aware of your surroundings.
Be wary of persons “accidentally” bumping into or distracting you.
If you feel you are being followed, contact the police and/or head for a busy
establishment.
Don’t accept packages from strangers.
Know how to use the pay phones and carry the correct change.
Carry on your person all numbers you will need in an emergency.
Carry your passport with you at all times - required in some countries.
Obey local laws and customs.
Exchange currency only with licensed financial institutions.
Check your credit card after each use and request all carbon copies.
If you hear gunfire: Don’t Run - Get Down - Stay Down Until It Is Safe.

11-2-6

MINIMIZING VIOLENCE - PERSONAL CONDUCT
TECHNIQUES

DO

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♦

♦

DO
NOT

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♦

♦

Situate yourself so visitors cannot block your path to an exit.
Project calmness, move and speak clearly, quietly and confidently.
Be an empathetic listener; encourage the person to talk and listen patiently.
Focus your attention on the person - Appear interested.
Maintain a relaxed, attentive posture.
Position yourself at a right angle (a non-threatening defensive stance)
instead of right in front of the person.
Acknowledge the person’s feelings - Indicate that you can see they are upset.
Ask the person to move to a quieter area to discuss their situation.
Use delaying tactics to give a person time to calm down - offer a drink of
water.
Be reassuring and point out other options.
Avoid any physical contact or finger-pointing.
Avoid extended periods of eye contact.
Watch your non-verbal “body language” gestures. Use positive gestures.
Use styles of communication which generate hostility or apathy.
Stand in a challenging stance - directly opposite someone, hands on hip or
arms crossed.
Make accusing or demanding comments.
Make sudden movements which can be seen as threatening.
Issue challenges or threats.
Attempt to belittle or embarrass the person.
Criticize, act impatiently, or attempt to bargain
Try to make the situation appear less serious than it is.
Make false statements or promises you cannot keep.
Try to impress the person with your personal or business credentials.
Take sides or agree with obviously distorted versions of the truth.
Use a lot of complicated or technical language when explaining information.
Invade a persons personal space “proxemics” - stay within the Close Social
Zone of 4'-7'.

11-2-7

RESIDENTIAL SURVEY
CONSIDERATIONS
It is recommended that Residential Security Surveys be extended to all judicial officers and those
courthouse support staff personnel who have been threatened.
The completed survey will generally consist of a (1) Title Page, (2) Introduction - to include
survey preparer, date, location, description, and existing security systems, (3) Table of Contents,
(4) Body - to include sections on site specific recommendations, hazardous materials found
within the home, fire prevention, security lighting, security systems, miscellaneous security
information, etc., and (5) the survey Conclusion.

Fire Prevention and Hazardous Material Information
General and specific information on Fire Prevention and Hazardous Materials in the home can
be obtained from the National Fire Protection Association in Batterymarch Park, Quincy,
Massachusetts. Additional informational brochures are also available reference the topics of:
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Emergency Exit Drills
Fire Safety Points
HVAC Systems
Smoke Detectors

Security Lighting
A primary concern and deterrent to any intruder is the threat of observation, which is greatly
enhanced with the installation and utilization of outdoor security lighting. Criminal intruders
profit from opportunity, if one exists they will eventually attempt to take advantage of it. If you
eliminate or minimize these “opportunities”, criminals will likely move on to an easier target.
There are a variety of types and models of security lighting commercially available to select
from. They extend in range from the following:
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Fluorescent, Halogen, Quartz, or Infrared Lighting.
Manually operated, Timer Programmed, or Light and Motion Sensitive.
Low Voltage, Battery, Solar, or Photo Cell powered.
Traditional Security or Decorative Security Lighting.

All of these can be purchased directly from building supply or outlet stores. Although security
companies do install security lighting systems it is far more cost effective to commercially

11-3-1

purchase a homeowners self-installed security lighting package (only minimal electrical
experience required).
Motion sensitive controlled lighting is considered ideal for security as any movement detected
will immediately illuminate a designated area. This illumination will highlight the intruder
(prior to invading your home), invoking a concern (perceived or actual) of detection, causing a
desired response to vacate the effected area.
The number and placement of security lights should be sufficient to adequately illuminate all
points of ingress (doors, accessible windows, and crawl spaces) into a residence. Appropriate
placement will enable a single light to cover multiple areas of concern.

Residential Security Systems
When contemplating the purchasing of a home security system there are certain factors which
require consideration and response:

SIZE, REPUTATION, and LOCATION
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Is the company able to handle your security equipment requirements?
Does the companies reputation indicate quality and reliable service?
Is the company located within close and convenient proximity, or have sub-contractors
available, in the event of emergency servicing and/or warranty replacement?
If 24-hour security monitoring is determined what are the employment qualifications of
monitoring personnel and responsible supervisors?
Are background investigations (type and length) conducted on company employees?

SYSTEM WARRANTY and SERVICE CONTRACTS
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What is the length of duration for each piece of equipment?
What actually is covered in it’s entirety by the warranty and service contracts?
Are the warranty and service contracts factory or company issued?
Does the company provide annual servicing and testing of equipment and if so at what
added cost.
What is the maximum length of time as guaranteed by the company (policies, scheduling,
and availability) to service and/or replace equipment?
If the equipment needs to be replaced what is the estimated replacement time? and Does
the company install temporary equipment until your replacement part arrives and is
installed?

PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS
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Are you most concerned about security when at home or away from home?
Do you want a secure environment 24 hours a day?

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n
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Do you want the security system to be alarmed and monitored solely at your home,
company (central station monitoring), office, or all stated locations?
How vulnerable does the size and space design of your home make you?
Are you more security conscious when in certain areas of your home?
Where is your home located? and What are the neighboring surroundings?
Do you review neighborhood criminal statistics to assess and determine security needs?
Do you participate in a law enforcement organized neighborhood watch program?

A residential security survey is a viable means of addressing these questions. There are a
number of companies that specialize in security systems installation who conduct these surveys
at no cost.
The completed survey should provide you with a written evaluation delineating specific security
systems, equipment, and cost options. In addition, both basic and complex systems should be
incorporated into the survey to allow flexibility is separating options by cost and preference.
It is recommended that prior to purchasing any home security system, a minimum of two on-site
surveys be conducted by two independent companies. This will allow the accurate comparison
and evaluation of company services, systems, and equipment. Further, as technology in this area
improves and systems become standard with slight variances in performance, principal areas of
consideration such as warranties and monitoring may be negotiable with certain vendors.
It is noted that security companies are in the business of offering a service (selling a product)
which should be appropriately considered by homeowners for each and every survey they
commission.

EXTERIOR DOORS
Dead-Bolt locks are specifically designed to prevent forced entry, a majority of which occurs
through the primary entrance door of a residence. It is recommended that all exterior doors have
dead-bolt locks installed to supplement any factory/builder installed lock mechanism. A deadbolt lock fitted with an inside latch facilitates the locking and unlocking (emergency evacuation)
of doors. Consideration of this type latch should be weighed against any potential access via the
breaking of adjacent side windows. Those exterior doors constructed with a window opening(s)
should have a protective film (armorcoat or comparable type) installed. This protective covering
will secure the window and minimize glass breakage during extreme weather conditions and
accidental or intentional breaking. Augmenting the protective filming an iron wrought window
“guard” can be installed for increased security.
All exterior doors (including the frame and lock mechanism) should be routinely inspected for
attempted forced entry, decay, or vandalism. Inspections should be so thorough as to ensure that
all components function properly.

11-3-3

All necessary repairs should be completed in an expeditious manner with suspected criminal
damage brought to the attention of the Sheriff and/or local Police Department for a threat
assessment.
Main exterior doors where you are not able to visually identify a person prior to opening the door
should have a security door viewer or “peephole” installed. Peepholes with acceptable standards
will allow approximately 180 degrees of clear unobstructed visibility. In lieu of a door viewer
adjacent windows may provide the same desired effect. However, these windows should be
furnished with appropriate window coverings as recommended under windows below.

WINDOWS
While two-thirds of all burglars break into homes through main entrance doors the remaining
one-third gain access through window openings. Factory/builder issued window locks should be
inspected to insure that they meet minimum-security standards. As for doors, window areas
should be routinely inspected. If the survey dictates, windows can be further secured by pinning.
This involves (1) drilling a small diameter hole where your upper/lower or side by side windows
meet, and (2) inserting a metal pin to secure both vertical and horizontal movement.
All windows that permit persons to see into a house should have curtains and/or blinds installed.
The preferred option of having certain or all of the window coverings drawn at any given time is
a positive one. A primary advantage is the obvious limiting of visibility into a home while
realizing a desired effect of denying outsiders any glimpse or knowledge of occupants currently
within the house.
After dusk, main level windows should always be locked and secured. No main level windows
should be unlocked and unattended for any extended period of time. Only second or third story
windows should be used for ventilation or summer cooling purposes.

MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY INFORMATION
Cellular telephones are desirable and essential for emergency communications in the event of
severed telephone lines or power failures. Portable telephones while extremely convenient are
rendered inoperable when telephone lines are interrupted. With recent technological advances
the purchasing of cellular communications has been made relatively inexpensive and should be
thought of as an enhancement to any residential security program.
Local law enforcement agencies have readily available information concerning state crime watch
and operation identification programs. Police and Sheriff Departments (attn: Crime Prevention
Officer) can be contacted to obtain program instructional guides and other residential security
and safety information.
Vehicles should be parked and locked inside garages (day and night) with overhead doors closed
and locked to prevent unwanted access. If a vehicle is to be left in the driveway for any reason it

11-3-4

should be locked with the engine turned off. Automatic garage door openers are ideally suited to
increase security levels when entering and exiting your garage. Certain opener models are able
to control interior and exterior lights for added security when coming home at night to a dark
house.
House address numbers should be adequately sized and positioned to assist medical and law
enforcement personnel in locating residences during emergency situations.
The American Red Cross has printed information available on the below listed Four Steps
to Safety:
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Find out what could happen to you - contact your local emergency management or civil
defense office and American Red Cross chapter.

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Create a Home Disaster Plan - meet with your family and discuss why you need to
prepare for disaster. Explain the dangers of fire, severe weather, natural disasters, and
the inherent risks associated with your employment.

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Complete an Emergency Checklist.

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Practice and Update your Plan.

CONCLUSION
The completed survey is designed with the intent to provide a general introduction on residential
security and safety as well as focusing on specific on-site recommendations. There are certain
aspects which can and should be implemented immediately (provide notation) and others which
can be addressed as personally determined. Significant recommendations and individual
comments contained in the survey should be stated again to re-emphasize their importance.
The final paragraph should include a statement to the effect “If you have any questions
concerning this survey or would like the Sheriff’s Department to brief you on it’s findings please
do not hesitate to contact Deputy (insert name) at telephone (insert number).
.

SURVEY PREPARATION RECOMMENDATIONS
Copies of completed surveys are to be considered as LIMITED OFFICIAL USE and should be
secured as such.
“Limited Official Use” information can be defined is unclassified information of a sensitive,
proprietary or personally private nature which must be protected against release to
unauthorized individuals. Residential Security Surveys are classified as “Limited Official
Use” under the official categorization of: Reports that disclose security vulnerabilities.

11-3-5

It is strongly suggested you take interior and exterior photographs of the residence (especially for
those areas where you plan on making specific recommendations) during your on-site survey
inspection - the photographs will also refresh your memory while you are drafting the survey in
the following days. When the survey is completed these same photographs can then be included
in the final report for additional emphasis.
Depending upon your writing style and final preparation the finished survey report should be
approximately 40-50 pages in length. This includes not only your recommendations and
comments, but discussed brochures, bulletins, and if desired, a criminal statistical summary
covering a two-block radius of the survey residence.
All residential surveys completed on the judiciary should be so noted in their individual judicial
personnel profile. Any specific information of the survey that effects the stated objective of
these judicial personnel profiles should be added as a supplement to the profile. Further, the
secured location of the survey itself should be included in an appropriately marked section of the
judicial personnel profile.
A sample residential security survey form is included to assist personnel during the on-site
survey inspection. This form has been designed as a fill in the blank format simply for
convenient use. Its restrictions should not limit the extent of survey findings or the final report.

11-3-6

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY SURVEY FORM
GENERAL INFORMATION
STYLE

TYPE

DESIGN

One Story

Single Family

Ranch

Split Level

Town House

Rambler

Two Story

Condominium

Bungalow

Attic

Apartment

Cape Cod

Basement

High Rise

Colonial

Garage

Other

Other

EXTERIOR WALL COMPOSITION

OVERALL RESIDENCE DIMENSION

FENCING TYPE

Wood

Length:

Width:

Wood:

Brick

Ceiling
Heights

Wall
Thickness

Chain:

Concrete

FENCE HEIGHT

Other

Aluminum
Other

EXTERIOR DOORS
Door Type

Number

Number of
Solid Core

Number of
Number of
Opens
Screen YES
Hollow
Glass
IN
OUT
NO
Core

Single
Double
Sliding

EXTERIOR WINDOWS
TYPE

QUANTITY

LOCATION

Plate Glass
Slide Up/Down
Slide Side by Side
Storm Windows
Shuttered Windows

11-4-1

LOCKING MECHANISM

EXTERIOR EQUIPMENT

EXTERIOR WALL VENTS

Lights

None

Sprinkler System

Dryer Exhaust

Other

Other

ROOF MATERIAL

FLOOR MATERIAL

Composition Shingle

Wood

Tile

Carpeted

Gravel

Linoleum

Cedar Shake

Tile

Other

Other

ROOF STYLE

CRAWL SPACE

Pitched

Attic

Flat

Foundation

FOUNDATION TYPE
Concrete Slab:

Pier and Beam:

Other:

LIGHTING TYPES
Incandescent

Fluorescent

Combination

Number of Telephone Outlets

Number of Telephones

Telephone Types: Conventional

Portable

Locations of telephones:

11-4-2

Cellular

LOCATION OF HEATER(S)

UTILITIES:
enters residence from:

Electric Power

Telephone Service

LOCATION OF AIR
CONDITIONER(S)
Natural Gas
Service

Water Service

NORTH
SOUTH
EAST
WEST
EXPOSED
UNDERGROUN
D

HOME SECURITY SYSTEMS and LIGHTING
System Type:

Lighting Type:

Miscellaneous:

Intrusion

Motion

Security Patrol

Duress

Timer

Monitoring

CCTV

Manual Switch

Police Response

Intercom

Exterior

Local Alarm

Sensors

Interior

Remote Alarm

Other

Other

Other

Security Company Contact Information:

Listing of persons having access (possessing keys, codes, etc.) to the residence
NAME

RELATION

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CONTACT NUMBER

CRIMINAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Agency:

Completed

Copy Attached

Date:

NEIGHBORS
Direction (facing house)

NAME

Direction (facing house)

RIGHT

FRONT

LEFT

REAR

NAME

INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT
Transportation and Communication
Services within one mile of residence
Major Streets, Highways and Intersections

Specify Description, Direction, and
approximate Distance from residence

Railroad Tracks and/or Yards
Airports and/or Runways
Television and/or Radio Stations
Ground Radar Sites
Other
Describe approximate distance and location of electrical transformers that are within one
hundred yards of survey residence:

Landscaping Condition:

SURVEY PHOTOGRAPHS
Taken:
YES

Locations:

Attached:

NO

YES

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NO

CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS
Occasionally, a judge may find the need to be armed or carry a concealed weapon. As judges
become more and more prone to attack by disgruntled participants and others who may be upset
with the judicial process, it is incumbent on them to become trained in the use of firearms.
The first consideration by a judge is to choose a firearm that is comfortable, easy to fire, and easy
to handle. This can be determined by going to a commercial shooting range and renting various
revolvers or semi-automatic pistols, or by trying different models at a police or sheriff’s range.
The next step is to go through firearm familiarization training, called FAM (Firearms Automated
Training System) firing. This instruction should be under the direction of a qualified firearms
instructor, as the phrase implies, for familiarization with the firearm. Once the judge is familiar
with the firearm, the next step is to become proficient in its use, cleaning, dismantling and
reassembly.
Before applying for a permit to carry a firearm, it is recommended that a judge go through the
FATS to quicken and sharpen skills in an assault or combat setting -- shoot - don’t shoot! It is
not enough to be proficient on the range. It is necessary to be faced with the reality of when to
shoot and when not to when confronted with a hostile or life-threatening situation. This training
is available through various police and sheriff’s departments. Once a firearm is selected, a
Permit to Purchase should be obtained from the police chief in the municipality where the judge
resides or from the sheriff, if the judge lives outside of an incorporated municipality. After
obtaining the Permit to Purchase, the judge should then apply for a Permit to Carry through the
same office.
In deciding how to carry a firearm, a judge should be aware of a number of considerations. First,
a firearm may be carried in a belt holster, purse, fanny pack or belt pack, an ankle holster or a
shoulder holster. Second, a judge should consider carrying it in the same way in the same place.
The reason for this is that we all develop a muscle memory. A classic example of this is touchtyping or keyboarding. Our fingers run across the keyboard and they do so by muscle memory.
Another example of muscle memory is when we drive a rental car and the shift location is in a
different location from that of our own vehicle, and we find that we are either going to the
steering column or to the floor console, out of habit, custom or muscle memory.
If the firearm is carried in a shoulder holster during the cooler portion of the year, the warmer
summer months may not be conducive to such carry and the location may have to be changed. A
purse may not always be with women when they go somewhere, nor may a fanny pack or belt
pack. An ankle holster may be cumbersome, but it is a good position for concealment. A belt
holster or belt location is something that you always have with you. A belt holster or belt
location may be on the strong side, meaning on the right side behind the hip bone if you are
right-handed, or it may be a cross draw, which is on the opposite side or left side if you are righthanded. The advantage of the cross draw location is that it is more easily accessible while
traveling in an automobile. The disadvantage is that it is more easily grabbed by someone facing
and close to you.

11-5-1

The belt holster or belt location is preferred because it can be used under a jacket or even a golf
or tennis shirt and is easily concealed. Even the small-of-the-back location is one that is easily
reached and easily concealable and will accommodate virtually any kind of dress in any season.
The consideration for muscle memory is that if the firearm is needed quickly, even a momentary
delay caused by the firearm being in a different location may be too long. Holsters should have a
safety retention strap over the hammer unless the firearm is carried under a jacket and thus less
susceptible of exposure.
Once a judge qualifies for a permit to carry a firearm, monthly range visits are recommended for
the first year, and once a quarter at a minimum thereafter.
If a judge determines it is necessary to carry a firearm for self-defense, it should not be taken into
the courthouse complex without notifying the sheriff, in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 609.66.
The judge may be the most vulnerable between the courthouse and the judge’s personal vehicle.
Once inside the courthouse complex, the firearm should be locked in the judge’s desk in the
chambers. It is no recommended it be taken into the courtroom, and it should only be used in
self-defense, not to aid a court security officer. In no event should it be left on the bench or in a
drawer or even locked in a bench drawer, where it could be stolen or grabbed by an assailant.
At all times when carrying a firearm, it is absolutely essential that judges also carry their
credentials or credentials and badge, if they have one. The reason is simple. If, heaven forbid, it
would ever be necessary to draw your firearm and hold an assailant at bay or fire in self-defense,
the credentials should be displayed open, above the head, rotating them both behind and in front
of you. As police or law enforcement help arrives, it immediately shows that you are a
government official. Judges should never turn with a drawn firearm to face police assistance,
lest in the heat of the moment, police fire on someone facing them with a firearm. By
displaying your credentials or credentials and badge in that manner, a terrible tragedy can be
avoided.
By following these few simple steps, maintaining proficiency, and keeping in mind the Ten
Commandments for Handling Weapons in Section 7.10, supra, firearms can be carried safely and
securely.

It Is Extremely Important That Firearms Are Always Safely Secured When They Are Brought
Home. The Threat Of A Family Member Being Seriously Injured By Your Firearm Is Far
Greater Than Any Likelihood You Will Ever Use Your Firearm Against An Intruder.

11-5-2

CHAPTER 12
TRAINING OUTLINES

COURT SECURITY TRAINING OUTLINE
This outline has been designed to allow individual control in scheduling and covering the
material from a range of one to eight hours in length. As appropriate, certain sections may be
modified or omitted, depending upon the specific type of program and/or audience.

INTRODUCTION
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Sheriff’s Role and Responsibilities
Personal Biography and Experience
Presentation Material to be Covered
Active Audience/Group Participation
Administrative Matters

COURT and BUILDING SECURITY COMMITTEES
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Identifying Security Objectives
Agency Representation
Committee Structure
Court Security Policies, Procedures and Guidelines
Pro-Active vs. Re-Active Security Considerations
Scheduling and Confirming Meeting Dates
Security Awareness Training Programs
Agency, Committee, and Individual Member Responsibilities

FACILITY SECURITY PLAN
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Building Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) - Life Safety Plan
Protection of Life and Property
Emergency Contingency Plans - Fire, Natural Disaster, Weather, Bomb Threats, etc.
Courthouse Search and Evacuation Plans
Building Security Policies and Procedures
Agency Areas of Designated Control and Responsibility
Designated Courthouse and Off-Site Areas of Refuge
Employee and Agency Security Guidelines
Facility Floor Plans, Photographs and Videos
Emergency Contact Names and Numbers
Search and Rescue Procedures

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JUDICIAL SECURITY PLAN
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Identify Policies and Procedures
Standard Court Proceedings
Trial Security-Risk Levels
High-Threat Trials - Criminal and Civil
High-Profile Trials - Criminal and Civil
Threat Source Profiles and Assessments
Prisoner Restraints - Minimum and Maximum Applications
Courthouse Demonstrations and Courtroom Disturbances
Courtroom Decorum - Judicial Preference Form
Audio Visual Monitoring - Media and/or Prisoner
Courtroom Seating Assignments - Prisoner, Defendant, Media, Public, Security, etc.
Agency Space Design and Layout

COURT SECURITY EQUIPMENT and RELATED
PROCEDURES
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Duress/Panic Alarms - Hard-Wired and Wireless
Ballistic-Resistant Material, Kevlar and Glazing
Closed-Circuit Television Cameras - CCTV
Courthouse Emergency Lighting - Hard-Wired and Battery Powered
Judicial Entry Control Packages - ECP
Intercoms and Paging Systems
Electronic and Mechanical Locking Hardware
Electronic Pin Pads - Fixed, Digital and Scrambling
Controlled-Access Systems - Interior and Exterior
Magnetometers (Metal Detectors) - Walk-Thru and Hand-Held
Fluoroscopes (X-Ray Machines) - Security and Mail Screening
Judicial Parking Areas
Courthouse Secured Areas
Agency, Judicial, Employee and Public Circulation Traffic Areas
Security Screening - Location, Policies, Equipment Type, and System Integration
Ingress and Egress Points - Agency, Judicial, Employee, and Public
Remote Alarm and Security Equipment Monitoring - Internal and External
Telecommunications - Private, Public, and Secured
Enhanced 911 Systems
Security and Site Surveys
Risk Assessments - Inherent, Secondary, and Primary
Concurrent Jurisdiction Agreements - Federal, State, County, and City

12-1-2

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (IED)
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Mail, Letter, and Parcel Bombs Recognition Points
Courthouse Notification Policies and Procedures
Agency, Judicial, Employee, and Public Response Procedures
Sheriff Telephonic Response Cards - Instructions and Dissemination
IED Types and Delivery Systems - Electrical, Mechanical, and Chemical
Primary Effects of an IED - Blast Pressure, Fragmentation, and Incendiary
Observation and Searching Techniques
Actual Case Studies - Federal, State, County and Local Judiciary, Government, etc.
National Bombing and Incendiary Incidents - ATF-Compiled
Low (Black Powder), Primary (Blasting Caps), and Secondary (Det. Cord) Explosives
Main Explosives - Dynamite, ANFO, Military Sheet Explosives, etc.

SECURITY IN THE WORKPLACE
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National Statistics on Violent Acts Occurring Within the Workplace
Employee Prevention and Survival Techniques
Avoiding Violent Confrontations and Pre-Violence Indicators
Staff Awareness and Involvement - Signals, Codes, Mutual Support, Scheduling, etc.
Understanding “Proxemics” - Personal and Professional Comfort Zones
Proper Space Design/Layout and Effective Utilization of Security Equipment
Defined Employee and Public Circulation Areas
Advantages/Disadvantages of Personal Weapons - Firearms, Chemical Sprays, etc.
Advantages/Disadvantages of Personal Alarms - Annunciators, Whistles, Sirens, etc.
De-escalation Techniques and Self-Defense Strategies
Effective Communication and Response Procedures
Inappropriate and Threatening Communications - Written, Telephonic, Verbal, etc.
Inherent Risk Factors and Occupational Threat Assessment
Assessing Body Language and Interpersonal Communications
Federal, State, and Local Statutes

MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
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Residential Security Surveys and Environmental Awareness - Urban, Rural, or Suburban
Neighborhood Crime Watch and Crime Prevention Programs
Personal Awareness - Individual Responsibility
Neighborhood Criminal Statistical Summaries
Security Systems Installation
Remote and Local Monitoring - Central Station Monitoring
Security Lighting - First and Primary Consideration in Improving Residential Security

12-1-3

PERSONAL SECURITY TRAINING
OUTLINE
This outline has been designed to allow individual control in scheduling and covering the
material from a range of one to eight hours in length. As appropriate, certain sections my be
modified or omitted, depending upon the specific type of program and/or audience.

INTRODUCTION
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Sheriff’s Role and Responsibilities
Personal Biography and Experience
Material to be covered during the presentation
Active Audience/Group Participation
Administrative Matters

PERSONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
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Incident Awareness
Proxemics - Intimate, Personal, Close Social, Far Social, Close Public, and Far Public
Pre-Violence Indicators
Avoiding Violent Confrontations
Assessing Body Language and Interpersonal Communications
Advantages/Disadvantages of Personal Weapons - Firearms, Chemical Sprays, etc.
Advantages/Disadvantages of Personal Alarms - Annunciators, Whistles, Sirens, etc.
Employee Prevention and Survival Techniques
Inappropriate and Threatening Communications
Terroristic Threats - Federal, State and Local Statutes
Inherent Risk Factors - Occupation, Gender, Age, Environment, Day, Time, etc.
Limiting/Defining Criminal Opportunity, Ability, Desire and Intent
Heightened Awareness Levels
Defensive Tactics
Security Expectations
Informational Resources - Private and Public
Advance Preparation and Planning
Environmental and Location Awareness
Violent Crime Statistics
Instinctive or Intuitive Reactionary Responses
Road Rage - Influencing Response Actions

12-2-1

BUILDING SECURITY AWARENESS
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Space Design Layout - Areas of Refuge
Security Systems and Equipment - Model, Type, and Location
Remote and Local Monitoring - Central Station Monitoring
Duress/Panic Alarms and Call Stations
Emergency Response Plans/Actions - Fire, Natural Disaster, Weather, Threats, etc.
Emergency Communications - Primary, Alternate, Mobile, Cellular, etc.
Security Personnel Staffing - Quality and Quantity / Guard Force Hours 24/7?
Security and Mail Screening - Individual Employee Considerations
After-Hours Considerations
Controlled-Access Systems
Public and Private Circulation
Ingress and Egress Points - Private and Public
Emergency Exits - Stairwells, Corridors, Windows and Doors
Evacuation Plan Considerations
Bomb Threat Action and Response Plans
Interior/Exterior Parking Areas - Controlled and Secured / Public and Private
Building Security Policies and Procedures - Practicality vs. Necessity / Compliance
Security Lighting - Exterior and Interior

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY and SAFETY
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Residential Security Surveys
Security Systems - Model, Type, Location and Servicing
Local and Remote Monitoring - Central Station Monitoring
Security Lighting - Locations, Coverage Areas or Zones, Illumination, Motion and/or
Noise Active, Switches, Timers and Remote Control
Landscaping - Security Advantages
Partnerships - Neighborhood Crime Watch and Prevention Programs
Criminal Statistical Summary Review and Analysis
Evacuation Plans - Fires, Severe Weather, Home Invasions, and Areas to Meet
Emergency Exits - Windows and Doors
Emergency Contact Numbers - Security and Medical
Areas of Refuge in the Home
Hazardous Materials - Incendiary, Volatile , and Poisonous Liquids
Windows and Doors - Types, Locking Hardware and Coverings

12-2-2

THREAT PROFILES TRAINING:
RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST GROUPS
INTRODUCTION
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Sheriff’s Role and Responsibilities
Personal Biography and Experience
Material to be covered during the presentation
Administrative Matters
Privacy Act Restrictions
First Amendment and Constitutional Rights
Audience/Group Participation

HISTORICAL and IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
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The 1960's to Present - Foundation, Rise and Fall
Authoritative Belief System
Zionist Occupational Government - ZOG
Christian Identity - Pseudo Religion Justifying Actions
The Turner Diaries Influence - Right-Wing Blueprint for Violent Acts
New World Order - United Nations Code-Named Plan to Dominate United States
Common Law Courts and Grand Juries
Posse Comitatus - Forerunner to Contemporary American Patriot Groups

MARTYRS and SYMBOLIC RALLYING CRIES
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Gordon Kahl Case Study - Militant Posse Comitatus Member
The Covenant, The Sword, The Arm of The Lord (CSA) and Jim Ellison - Self-Prophet
The Order or Silent Brotherhood - Turner Diaries and Aryan Nations Influenced
Fort Smith Sedition Trial
Ruby Ridge
Waco
Oklahoma City Bombing - Turner Diaries and Militia Influences
Militia’s and Paramilitary Groups - Phineas Priesthood and Aryan Republican Army
Sovereignties and Republics
American Patriot Movement

12-3-1

TRENDS and TACTICS of the RIGHT-WING
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Paper Terrorism
Indictments
Abatements and Liens
Allegations of Civil Rights Violations - Movement Response to Legal Arrests
Public Notices and Wanted Posters
Publications and Newsletters
Protests and Demonstrations
Internet Communications
Counter-Surveillance Operations - Military Acronym S-A-L-U-T-E
Illegal Sight Drafts
Illegal Bonds and Money Orders
Criminal Activities - Counterfeiting, Armed Robberies, Murder, Drug Trafficking, etc.
Terroristic Threats - On Government, Judicial and Law Enforcement Officials
Paramilitary Training
Conspiracy Theories - Anti-Government Based
Common Law Marshals - Enforcing Common Law Judgments
Harassment and Intimidation Campaigns - IRS Forms, Judgments, Default Notices, etc.
Inappropriate Communications - Government, Judicial, and Law Enforcement Recipients
Citizen Juries - FIJA
Jury Tampering and Influences
Freemen Influence - Justus Township

INTELLIGENCE and INFORMATIONAL RESOURCES
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Southern Poverty Law Center - Klanwatch - Montgomery, Alabama
Anti-Defamation League - National and Regional Offices in Major Metropolitan Areas
International Association of Counter Terrorism/Security Professionals - Arlington, VA
Center for New Community - Chicago, Illinois
Regional Information Sharing Systems - Government Subsidized Regional Agencies
Federal, State and Local Agencies
Northwest Coalition Against Malicious Harassment -Seattle, Washington

12-3-2

CHAPTER 13
RESOURCE DIRECTORIES

COURT SECURITY and THREAT INTELLIGENCE
ASSOCIATIONS, MEMBERSHIPS and TRAINING
ASSOCIATION
American Society for
Industrial Security

CONTACT INFORMATION
1625 Prince Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
#1-703-519-6200

International Association 1450 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314-3490
of Court Officers and
#1-800-424-7827
Services, Inc.
National Fire Protection
Association

11 Tracey Drive
Avon, MA 02322-9908
#1-800-344-3555

International Association P.O. Box 10265
Arlington, VA 22210
of Counter Terrorism
#703-243-0993
and Security
Professionals

3273 Church Street, Suite 201
P.O. Box 365
Stevens Point, WI 54481-0365
#715-345-2772
Anti-Defamation League 823 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
(ADL)
#1-800-343-5540
email: www.adl.org
National Public Safety
Information Bureau

Southern Poverty Law
Center

P.O. Box 548
Montgomery, AL 36104-0548
#334-264-0286
email: www.splcenter.org

13-1-1

AVAILABLE RESOURCES
♦ Security Management Magazine
♦ Professional Development and
Certification (CPP) Program
♦ Security & Educational Seminars
♦ Networking
♦ Security/Intelligence Publications
♦ Court Security and Threat Group
Training Programs
♦ Professional Networking
♦ Security Publications
♦ Fire Safety, Prevention, and
Response Plans
♦ Fire Code Regulations
♦ Hazardous Materials Information
♦ Fire Protection Handbook
♦ Quarterly Publications
♦ Bi-monthly Reports
♦ Domestic and International
Intelligence
♦ Physical Security Information
♦ Professional Networking
♦ Conference Training Calendar
♦ Tactical Technologies
♦ “Safety Source” National Public
Safety Yellow Pages Buy Guide for
Law Enforcement Personnel
♦ Quarterly International/Domestic
Terrorism Update Report
♦ Quarterly Law Enforcement Bulletin
♦ Domestic and International
Terrorism Special Reports
♦ Threat Group Publications
♦ Hate Crimes Information Updates
♦ Quarterly Intelligence Report on
Domestic Terrorism
♦ Intelligence Databases
♦ Threat Group Statistical Summaries
and Reports
♦ Hate Crimes

Association of Threat
Assessment
Professionals

6429 W. North Avenue, Suite
101
Oak Park, IL 60302
#708-848-0319
email: burghart@newcomm.org
P.O. Box 8413
Shawnee, KS 66208
#913-432-5856
email: mvarro@aol.com
P.O. Box 11234
Chicago, IL 60611
#312-321-3932

International
Association of Personal
Protection Agents

458 West Kenwood
Brighton, TN 38011-6294
#901-837-1915

Center for New
Community

Varro Press - Tactics for
Law Enforcement and
Security

Formerly: Protective
Service Alliance
Mid-States Organized
Crime Information
Center - MOCIC

1610 East Sunshine, Suite 100
Springfield, MO 65804-1313
#1-800-846-6242

Regional Information
Sharing System - RISS
Coalition for Human
Dignity

P.O. Box 40344
Portland, OR 97240
#503-281-5823

522 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1390
Portland, OR 97204
#503-228-8866
Membership Director
Midwest Gang
Investigators Association P.O. Box 16025
Des Moines, IA 50316
Western States Center

P.O. Box 94096
Cleveland, OH 44101-6096
#216-623-5543

13-1-2

♦ Monthly Action Report on Far-Right
Activity in the Midwestern United
States
♦ Threat Conferences
♦ Quarterly Magazine on Police
Tactics, Security, Contingency
Planning, and Intelligence
♦ Training Conferences
♦ Professional Networking
♦ Contemporary Assessment and
Analysis Techniques
♦ Case Management and Intervention
Techniques
♦ Protective Specialists Networking
Forum
♦ Protective Service Plans and
Programs
♦ Quarterly Newsletter
♦ Membership Directory
♦ Bi-monthly Criminal Informational
Digest
♦ Officer Safety Bulletins
♦ Training and Conferences
♦ Technical Assistance
♦ Fugitive and Crime Alerts
♦ Regional/National Networking
♦ White Extremists and Hate Groups
♦ Domestic Terrorists
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Militia Threat Groups
Wise Use Movement
Domestic Terrorism
Professional Networking
National and Midwest Gang
Intelligence
♦ Annual Gang Training Conferences
♦ Quarterly Report on Gang Activity

FEDERAL and STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY

CONTACT INFORMATION

National Sheriff’s
Association

1450 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314-3490
#1-800-424-7827

U.S. Department of
Justice,
Office of Justice
Programs,
The National Criminal
Justice Reference
Service
United States
Marshals Service

P.O. Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000
#1-800-851-3420
email: look@ncjrs.org

600 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4210
#202-307-9500

Minnesota Dept. of Public
Safety
Office of Technical Support
444 Cedar Street, Suite 100-H
St. Paul, MN 55101-2156
#651-282-6597
FLETC
Federal Law
Enforcement Training Glynco, Georgia
#912-267-2345
Center
Minnesota Crime
Alert Network

U.S. Army War
College

National Crime
Information Center
(NCIC)

Carlisle Barracks, PA 170135050
#717-245-4080
email: pelletis@carlisleemh1.army.mil.

AVAILABLE RESOURCES
Bi-monthly Publication
Professional Liaison/Networking
Study on “Court Security and The
Transportation of Prisoners”
National Statistics and Surveys
Criminal Justice Findings
Juvenile Crime Info.
Crime Statistics
Crime Victim Information
Federal Funding and Programs
Prison and Jail Construction,
Design, and Financing
USMS National Court Security
Program Considerations/Training
Protective/Threat Investigations
and related Training.
A communications network that
allows law enforcement agencies to
promptly and simultaneously alert
other agencies, businesses, and the
community about crimes.
Court Security, Facility Security,
and Personal Security Training
Programs
Federal/State/Local Liaison
STRATEGIC STUDIES:

1. Terrorism National Security
Policy and the Home Front
2. Responding to Terrorism
Across the Technological Spectrum
3. A Theory of Fundamentalism:
An Inquiry into the Origin and
Development of the Movement
ATTN: GANG FILE
Violent Gangs and Associated
NCIC, GRBJ-3R
Subgroups and Individuals
Federal Bureau of Investigation Terrorist Organizations and
Washington, D.C. 20535
Associated Groups/Individuals

13-2-1