Mule Creek State Prison Staff Safety Eval 2005
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~~V-20-2006 I .'~ .. .. ,.' ;;' ~- .:: MULE CREEK-WARDEN 13:17 .t I" " '. . 209 274 4861 P.02 . J '" ·::·/··::::;·.~·.:.'~';0~·~f'.:~::~·;'·L ·.: . . .:...." . ... . . I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I \ I '. . , -., «,' ... :. . 0 0 ': ':.': " ,' ••••• .,..': .''' .. ... MULE CREEK STATE PRISON CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION Corrections Standards Authority 600 Bercut Drive, Suite A Sacramento, California 95814 www.csa.ca.gov , II I I . NDU-20-2006 ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 13:17 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.03 MNOI.D SC~IWARZl:N5CClER. GOVERNOR STATE OF CALIFORNIA - DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABIl.ITATION. CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY WM~ DEN'S OF FiCE HCSP 600 Bercut Drive Sacramento, CA 95814 '05 ~JUL 22 D5· 25 July 19, 2005 Secretary Roderick Q. Hickman California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 1515 S Street, Suite 205 South Sacramento, California 95814 Dear Secretary Hickman: The Staff Safety: Evaluation Team, created by the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) in response to your concern about institutional safety, conducted its evaluation of Mule Creck State Prison (MCSP) July 5-8, 2005. The enclosed report. which will be presented to the CSA at the next scheduled meeting in September, lists a number of findings for your consideration. On behalf of the eSA Staff Safety Evaluation Team (Team), I would like to express our sincere appreciation to MCSP Warden Rosanne Campbell and her staff, who provided all written materials requested and gave the Team full access to all areas of the institution. Staff members were open and candid during the evaluation, and it was clear that they understood their n,le and the mission of the institution. which was very clean and well maintained. There is a very positive working atmosphere at MCSP, and I believe this translates into a safer work environment. The Team reported observing Warden Campbell in the prison yard talking to inmates. MCSP staff indicated that this is a common occurrence and expressed an appreciation that she takes the time to do so. This first evaluation allowed the Team to pilot test the staff safety criteria developed by the panel of subject matter experts. Based 011 this experience, the Team made several modifications to tl,le origulal criteria. The following "lessons learned" fron1 the staff safety evaluation of MCSP will be incorporated into future evaluations. • Staff assault trend data alone are insufficient for conducting an adequate evaluation. The Team will collect infonnation before arriving that will be helpful in dle evaluation and increase the efficiency of the team when it is on-site. Most of the needed data can be obtained froIn the CDeR Adult Operations Data Analysis Unit. • Half ofthe fIrst day was conswned by a facility tOUf. The Team leamed that four days was too little time to conduct the evaluation. Future evaluations are scheduled for five days and will not include a tour. • • The Team added an assessment of the physical plaut: staffing, training, and inmate population (e.g., classification, housing), all of which were deemed critical to a thorough evaluation of staff safety. TIle Team also recognized that it is imperative to interview staff on safety related issues. A structured set of interview questions was developed and pilot tested. Based 011 this experience, NDV-20-2006 , f I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 13:18 MULE CREEK-WARDEN Secretary Hickman • Page 2 209 274 4861 P.04 July 19,2005 the list of questions will be reduced and perhaps modified to facilitate the sununarization of responses. The panel criteria focused exclu&ively on custody staff. However, it became apparent after the first day at MCSP that this approach was shortsighted. As a result, the Team's evaluation also included interviews with non-custody staff. In closing, I want to again extend our thanks and appreciation to Warden Campbell and her staff for their professionalism and the cooperation they extended to the Team. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me. Sincerely, Karen L. Stoll, Executive Officer (A) Corrections Standardl) Authority Enclosure cc: Warden Rosanne Campbell, Mule Creek State Prison Joe McGrath, Chief Deputy Secretary, Adult Operations NOU-20-2006 I MULE CREEK-WARDEN 13:18 209 274 4861 P.05 ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS f BACKGROUND .. 111 ,. 1 , ••••••••••• " •••••••• EVALU'ATION 1\mTHODOLOGY •.••••••••••, , 1 FACILITY PROFILE •.••.•••••.•••.••••••• .,1••••••••••,•••••,.".,•••••••,••••••,••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••,•••••••••• 3 Facility Description , Current Useage tt f .t ••••••••••••.• t ' t · ••• tt ••• t·, ••••••••• ,. ~~ Staff Assault Incident Repolts 4 , " ••••••••••••••••••••••••• It ••••••••••••• " •• " •••••••••• ~ REVIEW OF DOCUMENTAnON Trai11ing. ~~ 3 10 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 Population SUlDmary.••.•......•••..••. Staffing 3 , , ' 5 'lt f ••••••••••• , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • t~ t 4 , , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , •• Safety Equipment 5 7 8 PHYSICAL PLANT & STAFFING•••.••••••• ~ IJ• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • IJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 Findings Corrunon To Facilities A. B, & C 11 Findings Specific To Facility A 11 FindinfiS Specific To Facility B 1 " , •••••••• ••••••••• ,.1I , 12 Findings Specific To Facili.ty C 12 Findings Specific to Central Services 12 ST.APF INTERVIEWSlJt 13 IJ., •• IJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • " " • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • _ • • • • • • • • • , •• , Interviews with Managers 13 Interviews with Supervisors 14 Interviews with Line Staff ,., If ,., SUMMARY/CONCLUSION •••••.••••••••••••.••••,•.•.••••••••,••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••• ENTRANCE LETTERu•.•••• DATA MATRIX t ..t , 14 ,., IJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • , , , ••• ,.." , 15 Attachment A Attachment B DESIGN CAPACITY v. CURRENT CAPACITY Attachment C STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE•.•••••••••.•.••.•.•...., AttRchment D EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS AND ASSIGNMENT Attachment E RepOrt MCSP .d~.:7/19f200S """"",Q,,:'iiii,,,ii,(i!4wa:::::; .,j,"!!!3!i,!I!!,\i. ;;;;;;;::;;;;,.".,,~, . NDV-20-2006 \ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 13:18 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.06 BACKGROUND In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hickman requested that the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA), develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the state's adult and youth detention facilities. At the May 19,2005 meeting of the BOe) the proposal was presented and accepted. On May 24-25) 2005, a panel of state and national subject matter experts was convened to establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted. Based on those criteria, e. team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established. On July 5.8, 2005, a team comprised of staff from The California Departn1ent of Corrections and Rehabilitation ceDeR) CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice staff conducted the firS! Staff Safety Evaluation at Mule Creek State Prison. The evaluation protocol consisted of a request for advance data on staff assaults including victim and perpetrator data, a preliminary site visit of the physical plant, random interviews with various custody and non-custody staff, a review of applicable written policies and procedures goveming the operation of the institution and a review of documentation including incidents of staff assaults, staffing levels, inmate population and safety equipment. EVALUATION ~ETHODOLOGY Mule Creek State Prison was selected as the initial adult facility for review and an entrance letter was sent to Warden Roseanne Campbell infonning her of the July 5·8, 2005 site visit dates and the proposed operational plan (Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a data matrix to record information from incident reports (CDC 837) of inmate assaults on staff to determine if any trends could be identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete the matrix before the site visit. (Sec attachment B). The evaluation team asked that all incident reports and related documentation be made available during the site visit. As the evaluation progressed, the team identified other information appropriate for review and staff at the institution provided copies of existing documents or researched their records for information. The Facilities Standards and Operations Division of the CSA led the evaluation team. The team was divided into three teams, each comprised of staff from the CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice (each team had a member from each discipline - see Attachment E for a roster oHeam members and assignment). The evaluation began on Jnly 5, 2005, at the institution, with an entrance conference with Warden Campbell, appropriate it1stitutional adminisb'ativc staff and evaluation team members. The conference included an operational overview of the institution by Warden Campbell as well as an overview of the evaluation process by CSA Deputy Director Jerry Read. Following the entrance conference, the evaluation team members were provided a tour of the facilities. Using a conference room in the Administrative Building as the base of operation, the team broke into workgroups and began the review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their observations. Available documentation was reviewed relative to the physical plant configuration, policies, safety equipment, staffmg levels, staff assaults and inmate population. The group looked for any trends or related issues. RcpcJtMCSP.uO~;7/l91200S NDV-20-2006 13: 18 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.07 .. The physical plant team reviewed the institution design as it reiated to staffing, and the inmate population. The purpose was to identify any issues that would affect staff safety such as iIunate crowding, limited visibility, insufficient supervision or lack of communication. Institutional managers as well as staff and supervisors on each of the three watches were interviewed to provide an opportunity identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A questionnaire was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the interviews, and is included as an attachment to this report (see Attachment D). The responses were categorized and a summary of the responses is included in the Staff Interview section of this report (page 13-14). Conflicts between ,the documentation. the staffs' perception of the practice and staffs' concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included in this report. The review team also made their own observations and those are noted. An exit conference was conducted with Associate Director Darrel Adams t Warden Campbell and the institution management staff to provide a summary of the results the evaluation. The exit conference included a presentation of the team's perceptions and observations as well as a summary of comments made by staff. Report MCSP.doc:;7/19/200S 2 NQV-20-2006 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 13:18 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 FACILITY PROFILE Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) is located 40 miles southeast of Sacramento in lone, California. It was first opened in June 1987 as a general population institution with vocational training programs. educational programs and Prison Industries Authority programs. USillg a 270-degree design, the institution was originally constructed to house 1500 Level III inmates in three facilities and up to 200 inmate workers in the mjnimum~security support unit housing for a total institutional capacity of 1700. Facility Description There are three facilities within a secure perimeter, Facilities A, B, and C. Each facility is essentially a mirror of the others, containing five buildings, located in a semi~circulD1' fashion creating a perimeter on one side of the exercise yard of each facility. The buildings each contain 100 individually secured cells; originally designed to be single occupancy cells that were equipped with two beds. Each cell also contains a toilet/washbasin combination unit. Additionally, each facility has a gymnasium that has been converted to an inmate dormitory ~ each containing 160 beds. An administrative complex comprised of various staff office space, inmate vocational, academic and PIA programs, inmate chapels, inmate medical, dental and mental health, canteen, clothing and plant operations are located within each facility. Located outside of the secure perimeter are the two dormitories that comprise the minimum support facility (MSF). Each dormitory was designed to hold 100 beds but currently contain 200 open bunk beds. Additionally, the MSF has an exercise yard area, medical clinic. visiting room, library, irunate canteen and clothing, education and chapel area, kitchen/dining facility, and various offices that make up the facility. CUlTeot Usage MCSP is currently used as a medium to high security institution housing general population inmates up to a Level IV. It is a mental health hub institution for Enhanced Out Patient Program (EOP) and CCCMS inmates and houses inmates with sensitive needs (Sensitive Needs Yard or SNY). EOP inmates are those inmates with acute mental health needs. SNY imnates require special housing because of the high profile nature of their crimes, threats from other inmates or because they have "dropped out" from some previous gang affiliation and are now targets for assaults. The designation of being a "hub" institution means the prison bas the capability of providing the enhanced services needed for the appropriate carc of inmatcs with more acute needs within these classifications. MCSP is the only institution in the state designated to house inmates classified as being both, EOP and SNY. The institution continues to provide inmate programs including vocational training for several trades and professions (e.g., graphic arts, cabinet, grounds.keeping, meat cutting, geographic infonnation systems, etc.), educational study for high school diploma/OED, Prison Industries, and other various programs to either support the community or otherwise better prepare the inmate for reentry into the community. I I I P.08 Report MCSP.doc;7/J 912005 3 NOV-20-2006 , .,. I I I 13:19 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.09 REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION The Data/DocumentatioD Review Team reviewed available documentation, records and policy manuals to identify any trends or commOll themes among the incidents. The items reviewed included: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Incident reports for staff assaults or attempted assaults (CDC 837). Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes. State Compensation Reports (SClF) for assaults on staff. Imnate appeals (602). Inventories of authodzed safety equipment. Use afForce Executive Review Committee (ERe) findings. Facility training records. Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections. Employee safety grievances. Daily chrollologicallwatch commander's report. Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records. Staffing infonnation. Classification records. Inmate files. Department Operations Manual (DOM) - Relevant sections only. Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) - Re)evant sections only. Staff Assault Incident Reports FINDING: After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff battery. Other than imllate classification (see discussion below), no issues were identified as being significantly consistent among the various incidents. DISCUSSION: Thirty-nine incidents of battery and attempted battery on staff were reported during the time perio~ July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005 at Mule Creek State Prison. The institution reports that over 40 staff members were victims of battery or were injured during incidents: • Twenty-eight victims were from the ranks of correctional officers and two were sergeants. The remaining ten victims included five MTAs and five health care workers. • The average age of the victims w~ approximately 38 years with 9.5 years of service. • Twenty-nine ofthe victims were male and ten were female. • Twenty-six of victims were white, six were black, six were hispallic, and two were reported as '·other". The team was unable to contion whether the victim demographics were consistent with those of the institutions as those statistics were not readily available. Report MCSP.doc:7/191200S I I , I I . NOU-20-2006 , 13:19 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.10 FINDING: Additional training is needed for staff responding to emergencies. DISCUSSION: In the reports reviewed. no serious injuries I we~e initially reported by the victims and few required medical attention following the initial treatment at the institution's infhmary. In all but three incidents, no staff workdays were lost. In the most serious case, no initial serious injuries were reported; however, two staff members have been off duty for over 40 days as a result of their injuries and have not retumedto work. Three additional officers were injured, although not reported to be serious, during the process of responding to the incident. The Return to Work Coordinator provided statistics from the same time period showing a category described as "Responding to alarms" as being the third leading category of frequencies of staff injury, with 15 reported injuries during the las! fiscal year. 111ese statistics would support the need for training ways to safely respond to incidents. FINDING: Race and age do not appear to be significant assault factors. DISCUSSION: No significant variances were noted when comparing the race, age or connty of commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. Hispanic and white inmates were responsible for 29 incidents with the remaining 10 being dispersed among the other races. The inmates had been committed from twelve counties with none being unusually represented. The average age of involved inmates was 36. consistent with the prison population's average age of 38 and they had been incarcerated for an average of 1357 days including 725 days at Mule Creek. The average classification score of the involved inmates was 95 which would qualify as a Level IV. The documentation reflected only three incidents that involved inmates on a modified program. FINDING: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff. DISCUSSION: As in any facility, an inmate's housing location is largely detennined by his or her classification score. Twenty-three of the incidents involved inmates with high security Ten of the incidents occurred in the classifications or s~ious mental health issues. administrative segregation unit, which hO'L1SeS as many ali 175 iml1ates already identified as being the most disruptive or assaultive in the prison. Another 10 incidents occun·ed in areas located within Facility "A U which houses almost 1000 Level IV General Population (GP/SNY) inmates, the highest security level within the prison and an additional 160 Level III inmates housed in the gymnasium. Three incidents occurred in Facility a, Building 6, the Enhanced Out Patient (EOP) irunate housing unit. EOP imnates, While generally described as mental health patients because of their diagnosis, require a significantly higher level of clinical care. Facility B, Building 6 has I A serious injury is defined by Title I S. Section 3000 ll.'> U serious impairment uf physicll1 condition. including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted los:; or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring suturing; and disfigurement. RepOI1 MCSP.doc;7J 1912005 NOlJ-20-2006 \ I I I I I ~ 13:19 209 274 4861 MULE CREEK-WARDEN P.ll been housing approximately fifty Level VI EOP/SNY inmates. The institution has just activated an EOP unit in a Level IV building in Facility A, housing 6 inmates as of this review date. FINDING: Inmate manufactured weapons were not a factor in assaults on staff. DISCUSSION: bunate manufactured weapons were not involved in any of the incidents reviewed. Imnates threw or attempted to throw an unknown liquid substance o~ staff in 6 of the incidents. In the remainder of the cases reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to batter staff by head-butting, kicking or unlawfully touching with their hands. In the incident resulting in the most serious injury to staff, the inmate was able to head butt the officer, knock him off balance, kick him several times and finally bite him on the leg. Six incidents occurred during escorts and three during meal service when officers opened food ports. The days of the week with the least frequent incidents were Wednesday and Thursday and the remainder of the incidents was divided among the other days of the week. The number of incidents was evenly distributed between second and third watch and none occurred during first watch. l'raining FINDING: Custody staff appear to be receiving training in safety related issues. Non·custody staff; however,receive fewer hours of training and are less compliant in attending training. DISCUSSION: The training manager provided documentation of mandated training and institutional orientation training for both custody and non-custody staff. MCSP provides 40 hours of orientation training all new employees including approximately 10 hours 011 safety related issues. Mandated training topics are specified by both Califomia law and the DOM. Each institution may add training that would be considered as being site-specific. Depending on the institution's mission and construction, site-specific training topics are detemlined by the Warden. Sergeants and Lieutenants are scheduled to receive approximately 57 hours of annual training, 10 of wllich are related to staff safety. Twelve of the hours are optional and based on monthly training bulletins proyided from headquarters. MCSP tracks the supervisors' annual training based on the employee's birthday. Each employee's training year begins on their birthday, not a calendar or fiscal year, therefore, using the CUtTent 1ST tracking program, we were unable to confrrm that all of the training mandates were being met. The training files reviewed indicated that regular, ongoing training was being performed. The training manager reported that all of the supervisors, with exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the training mandates. The remaining custody personnel are scheduled to receive approximately 40 hours of annual trainiug including approximately 21 hours related to staff safety. Again, we were unable to confinn that all of the training mandates were being met. The training manager reponed that all Report MCSP.doc; 111912005 7 . ,NOV-20-2006 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 13:19 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.12 of the custody officers, with exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the training mandates. The non-custody personnel are scheduled to receive 8 hours of annual training, 6 of which are related to staff safety. The training manager reported that 80% of the non-custody personnel were compliant with the training manda.tes. The sample files reviewed supported that percentage. FINDING: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training (cell extraction, mental health intervention, etc.). In fact, the majority of staff intervIewed identified the need for more meaningful training. DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that correctional staff needed hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with EOP and CCCMS inmates. Safety Equipment TIle Department Operations Manual, Section 55050 addresses equipment involving weapons. chemiC$l agents and the annory. This section, in part identifies departmentally approved chemical agents and munitions. MCSP issues chemical agents to correctional officers during each shift. Additional chemical agents, impact munitions and less-lethal devices are maintained in the control booths and armory and at designated areas within the institution. The equipment inventory records did not make any deficiencies apparent. FINGING: Officers in some positions are not provided sufficient communications equipment. DISCUSSION: The Correctional Officer assigned to Body Cavity Surveillance cells was not equipped with a personal alann, intercom capabilities or radio (although post orders reflect a person alann is to be worn). Additionally. the camera did not monitor the hall where the staff person is stationed but was positioned to mOlutor the inmate. Only one radio is issued to the two correctional officers working inside the housing unit as floor officers. Typically the position designated as "floor one" is assigned to maintain the radio. This position is also designated as the primary respOlldent, during Code I and II emergencies. This process results in the second correctional officer remaining in the unit without radio communication. A radio was assigned to the Facility A Gym. In an effort to maximize the use of a single radio, staff had secured the radio to the podium as a point of centralized use. The evaluation team agreed that the institution should consider providing all floor officers with a radio. FINDING: There are 87 officers and many MTAs and CC that have not been issued a stabresistant vest. DISCUSSION: The soft body annor stab resistant vest inventory records were reviewed. The armory Sergeant infonned us that 651 officers have been designated to be issued a stab resistant Rcpon MCSP.doc;7/1912005 8 NQU-20-2006 13:19 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 vest. The records reflect that 54 officers within the ranks of correctional officers, sergeants and lieutenants have been fitted for vests; however, thc vests have yet to be issued. Thirty-three officers have not been fitted for or issued a vest at the time of the evaluation. Sufficient vests are available at the facility for those officers to check out for use during their shift until their personal vests are available. Officers reporttld a reluctance to wear these vests. saying that the vests were not cleaned appropriately. The records reflect that the remaining 564 officers, have been fitted and have been issued a vest. . The MTAs and Correctional Counselors (CC), who are custody staff, are not included in the above numbers. The team was informed that many of these personnel have been fitted for vests but have not received vests. The team was funher informed that the bargaining unit representing MTAs and CCs has filed a grievance (with the agency not the institution) over this matter. I I I I P.13 NDV-20-2006 I I I I I I I I I , I I I I I I I I I 13:20 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.14 PHYSICAL PLANT & STAFFING Activated in 1987, Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) was originally designed to house male adult Level I-ill inmates. The institution currently operates as a Level I, II, III, and IV general population facility. The Level III and IV housing is constructed on a 270 design. celled housing criteria. There are three facilities maintained within a secure perimeter (Facilities A, Band C each containing five buildings) and a Level I housing facility is located outside of the secure perimeter. The Institution was originally designed to house 1700 inmates. At' the time of this staff safety evaluation. the institution was housing 3517 inmates within the secure perimeter and 330 inm.ates within the Level I facility. See the Facility Profile section of this report for further information. During the second and third watches, each building was staffed with two correctional officers designated as floor one and floor two, and an armed correctional officer posted in a secure location above the dayroom designated as the control booth offic~. First watch bas one correctional officer assigned floor duties and one control booth officer. The gymnasiums were staffed with two floor officers and only the gymnasium in Facility A had an anned observation booth officer, which was assigned during all three watches. Facility A houses level IV inmates. Building 5 in Facility A is currently coming online to house the Level IV EOP inmates that were previously housed in Facility B, Building 6. An additional floor officer is assigned to this unit due to the increased supervision needs ofEOP imnates. Facility B, Building 6 houses the EOP inmates. An additional floor officer is assigned to this unit due to the increased supervision needs of EOP inmates. Buildings 7, 8, 9, 10 eaeh have 60 additional E-beds located in the dayroom area. Only 40 of the 60 beds are currently utilized. Buildings containing E-beds are provided one additional cOlTectional officer assigned as a floor officer during the first and third watch. Facility C, Building 12 contains administrative segregation housing, and Building 13 (Facility C) serves as overflow administrative segregation housing. Buildings 1l.14 and 15 contain 60 Ebeds in the dayroom area and again, only forty of these beds are used. As with other buildings containing E-beds, an extra floor officer is posted on the first and third watches. Each facility contains a large inmate exercise yard. Facility A has three correctiom~l officers assign~d to supervise the exercise yard while Facilities B and C each have two officers assigned to the exercise yard. Located outside of the secure perimeter are the two dormitories that comprise the Minimum Support Facility (M5F). Each dormitory contains 200 open bunk beds. Additionally, an exercise yard, visiting space, inmate canteen, combination education/chapel area, classrooms and various offices are included in the facility. One correctional officer is posted in each dormitory during each watch. Additional correctional officers were posted in other locations in the institution (i.e.: central services, vocational/educational areas, towers, infirmary, etc.). Repon MCSP,do/:;7119J20D5 10 209 274 4861 MULE CREEK-WARDEN I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I P.1S The evaluation team toured the institution, reviewed institutional procedures and interviewed staff at various classification levels. The evaluation team looked specifically at the overall conditions of the physical plant. the staffing levels within each areEl of the institution, and the number of inmates and their classification within each building of the institution. The evaluation revealed the following concerns within each facility: Findings Common To Facilities A. B. & C • The gymnasium was being utilized for the housing ofinmates. Imnatcs housed in the gymnasiwn were observed draping towels, blankets and clothing from their bW1ks. This practice obscured the already limited visibility within this area. Staff stated that this issue has been reported to facility management and some managers allow this practice while others do not. • Each of the buildings had a pad lock that was applied to each cell during the sleeping hours. The locks became necessary when it was discovered that inmates could lift the sliding door off of the track providing a means of exiting the cell. Teal'D members are concemed about inmate and officer safety during emergency situations requiring immediate removal of an inmate from a cell. as the padlocks arc located at the top of the cell doors. During a fue situation. lock removal could be hampered by the collection of smoke in these areas (as opposed to being able to maintaining a low position to mitigate the effects of smoke) and shorter staff having a difficult time reaching lock.... Team members recommend consulting the State Fire Marshal for an opinion on this practice of pad locking the doors during sleeping hours. • The team' recommends the institution consider placement of convex security mirrors at the end of the dayroom of each building, to enable correctional officers at the control desk to see blind spots near inmate telephone areas. Findings Specific To Facility A • The inmate exercise yard in this facility is very large; particularly considerulg it is used by Level IV inmates. Three correctional officers were assigned to the Facility A yard. These officers were not assigned specific sections of the yard for supervision responsibilities. Additionally: yard officers were observed leaving the yard without notifying their fellow officers. Sergeants were unable lo locate yard officers when asked to do so. While the team felt three correctional officers were sufficient. the practice of not having specific areas of coverage responsibility within the yard and leaving the yard without notifying other officers could possibly comprise staff safety. Due to the classification of the inmate population in this facility. the team recommends diViding the yard with fencing or masomy to aid in the supervision of inmates. • Inconsistencies were noted in the responses provided by correctional officers within several buildings regarding incident response procedures. Post orders and practice were not consistent. When interviewed. staff gave inconsistent infonnation regarding incident response responsibilities. • Building 5 has office furniture and equipment being moved into the dayroom for EOP staff. This furniture and equipment may pose a staff safety issue. as it could be used a Report MCSP.doc:;7IlSl12005 11 NDV-20-2006 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 13:20 209 274 4861 MULE CREEK-WARDEN P.16 weapon or used to make weapons. The team recommends that the office furniture be replaced with detention grade furnishings. Findings Specific To Facilitv B • Only two officers were assigned to this exercise yard. The team agreed this was an insufficient number of yard officers. The evaluation team suggests that the institution consider assigning an additional officer to this yard as well as in the exercise yard of Facility C. The issue of yard officers not having specific areas of supervision responsibility was also observed in these exercise yards. • E-beds contained in Buildings 7. 8. 9 and 10 (as well as Buildings II, 14 and 15 in Facility C) present a staff safety risk. Poor visibility due to inmates draping items between the bUl1ks and inability to secure these inmates contribute to this concern. Additional staff are provided on third watch, but not second. Logic is that inmates, during the second watch, are on the yard or attending vocational programs. Each building containing E-beds was observed with inmates in the dayroom area during the second watch. These inmates were not assigned to a vocational program and chose not to be on the yard. As a result, these inmates wcre either on their bunk. or in the dayroom area. The team recommends a third correctional officer be assigned to these units to provide supervision of these additional inmates. Findings Specific To Faciliw.c Officers in Building 14 stated that the inmates have the ability to control the TV volume and the volume becomes loud enough to hinder verbal communications between officers. • Officers in Buildings 11) 14 and 15 reported that work orders are not addressed consistently. Team members observed lights that were burned out and doors located near the showers with locks that were sticking. • Staff in Buildings 11, 14 & 15 reported concerns about 110t having adequate coverage during the AM feeding release and recall. • Endings Specific to Central Services The institutional fire identification system alarm was not working properly. Staff reported that the system ~s historically not functioned correctly and that during the rainy season, the problems with the system are exacerbated. • The Correctional Officer assigned to the Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) did not have a personal alarm. • In the CTC, Bl'l electrical room has been convened into a staff break room/inmate clerk office. The room contained cleaning supplies and a staff refrigerator. The inmate clerk was not being directly supervised md had access to officer food. • Rl:pon MCSP.doc:711 9/2005 12 NOV-20-2006 13:20 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.17 f , I t I t I I I , I l I I I I I STAFF INTERVIEWS Random interviews were conducted with custody and non-custody staff from Wednesday, July 6 through Friday, July 8, using a questionnaire (questionnaire included as Attachment D) developed by the Corrections Standards Authority. Due to limited staff resources and time constrclints, the interviewing team chose to conduct random interviews with custody staff assigned to facility A, B, C (e.g. ad seg, ad seg overflow, gymnasiums, EOP, SNY, central services, and CTC), Minimum Security, and selected support functions (lSU, and transportation). For purposes of this report, responses from custody managers, supervisors, and line staff ate grouped and perceptions concerning staff safety are detailed. Staff safety interviews were conducted on Friday with non~custody staff (managers andlor supervisors in each program area); however: their responses have not been grouped together for this report out due to a lack of time for preparation. However. the review tcam did find that the supervisors and managers (non. custody) shared many of the custody concerns. Interviews with Managers We meet with the captains on Wednesday, July 8, and we asked them to comment on their staff safety concerns. They unanimously agreed that the two major issues affecting staff safety were crowding and the increase in SNY program inmates. FINDING: Level IV inmates with mental health issues and sensitive needs are being housed in inappropriate facilities (270 versu.'l 180 design). DISCUSSION: Staff shared with us that Mule Creek State Prison is considered the uhub" for EOP/SNY inmates, designating it as the only institution that houses EOP and SNY inmates. Compounding the situation, many of the 8NY inmates have Level IV classification points requiring 180 design housing; however this institution was designed as Level III with 270 design housing. As a result, staff safety becomes a concern when SNY inmates. with assaultive histories, are housed in these facilities. The team was informed that the department has no 180 design facilities to house these Level IV SNY inmales. FINDING: Crowding leads to a potentially unsafe environment. DISCUSSION: A second concern is the overcrowding in the facilities. which result ill E beds (extra beds). or triple bunk beds placed in housing unit dayrooms, and double and triple bunking of the gymnasiums. Designated housing units have up to 40 inmates sleeping in E beds. While an additional floor officer is assigned to supervise these inmates, it is difficult for the officer to supervise these inmates due to obstructed sightJines. Gymnasium A uses triple bunks, and Gymnasiums Band C use double buw to house up to 160 inmates. Gymnasium A has two floor officers and one gunner, and Gymnasium B and C have two floor officers but no gunner, because the inmates are cla.c;sified as Level 1-2. These gymnasiums are perceived as staff safety issues, as it is difficult to supervise the inmates due to the large number of beds and diminished sightlines. !tepa" MCSP,doc;7119I2UOS 13 . NOV-20-2006 13:20 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.18 FINDING: Post and bid prevents managers from filling posts with the best-qualified staff. DISCUSSION: Additionally, the captains believe that "post and bid" (a process in which lieutenant. sergeants and COs request to work a specific post based on their seniority) restricts their ability to ensure a high level of institutional and staff safety. The best-qualified individual is not always placed in a position, based solely on seniority. Interviews with Supervisors FINDING: Supervisor concerns mirrored those of the managers in the following: • Crowding with E·beds and the using gymnasiums as dormitories. • Post and bid - supervisors were restricted from diverting an officer from one position to another based on operational needs. FINDING: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training. DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that correctional staff needed hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with EOP and CCCMS inmates. Interviews with Line Staff FINDING: Staff reported that safety equipment is adequate for performing their duties and rated the equipn1ent as "good" to "okay". DISCUSSION: Line staff said the type of safety equipment issued to them includes personal alanns, radios in designated positions, handcuffs, side-handle batons, and OC spray. They indicated that equipment could be obtained at the sergeant's office, control booths, or from the person being relieved at shift change. FINDING: Not all custody staff have been issued stab-resistant vest and are reluctant to wear vests from the '~vest pool". DISCUSSION: Of the staff interviewed, all had been fitted for stab-resistant vests, but not all had been issued a vest. The evaluation team reviewed the body armor report, and noted that 567 custody staff had been issued vests and 87 custody staff had not. Staff indicated that if they were assigned to a position which required a vest, they would not wear a vest from the "vest pool" as they believed that these vests are not maintained in a sanitary condition, and they were concerned with the integrity of the material to withstand an attack by an inmate. Staff were familiar with department policy which requires that a vest be worn by staff in specified positions, but did not always comply. Report MCSP.doc;7/191200S 14 .: , I I I I I I I I I NDV-20-2006 13:21 209 274 4861 MULE CREEK-WARDEN P.19 SUMMARY/CONCLUSION This was the first of fony-one Staff Safety Evaluations which will be conducted at California's state prisons and youth detention facilities. The initial evaluation pilot tested the criteria that was developed by a panel of subject maner experts. The evaluation team made a number of modifications to the process as a result of the pilot test; nevertheless, several observations and recommendations are contained in this report. The majority of observations were the result of crowding at the institution. classification issues (BOP, SNY, and Level IV inmates) including classification overrides, safety equipment issues (stab-resistant vests, communications, etc.), training issues, labor issues (management limitations due to post and bid), physical plant issues and staffing concerns. Institution management cannot address many of the issues identified in this report. as they require a funding source or changes in overarching policy andlor labor agreements. As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority. the fmdings from this evaluation will be presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to CSA members, CDeR administration and Warden Campbell. It is outside the scope of this project for the CSA to receive and monitor a corrective action plan; appropriate action will be the responsibility of CDCR Adult Operations. , I I I \, RCJlort MCSP.dllC;71191200S 15 I; NOlJ-20-2006 13: 21 MULE CREEK-wARDEN I I I I I I I I I I I . I I I I I I I I ATTACHMENT A ENTRANCE LETTER 209 274 4861 P.20 NOU-20-2006 - MULE CREEK-WARDEN 13: 21 Attachment A 209 274 4861 P.21 STATE OF CALIFORNIA ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR BOARD OF CORRECTIONS 600 BERCUT DRIVE, SACRAMENTO, CA 95814 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 9161445·5073 WWW.BOCORR.CA.GOV June 20, 2005 Rosanne Campbell, Warden Mule Creek State Prison P.O. Box 409099 lone, CA 95640 Dear Warden Campbell: The Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) asked the Board of Corrections (aOC) to develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at Department of Corrections (CDC) and Department of the Youth Authority (eYA) detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the Bonrd unanimously approved a proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting staff safety evaluations. The panel met on May 24-25,2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted. As a result, a team comprised of BOC, CDC and CYA staff will be conducting the evaluations over the next 28 months beginning with the MuJe Creek State Prison on July 5-8, 2005. We expect to be on site tor four days and plan to observe operations during all shifts if possible. We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and/or appropriate administrative staff on July 5, 200S at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be conducted and to get a general overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have. In order to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team's use while:: a1 Mule Creek State Prison: • A contact person with whom the team may coordinate theil' activities {plea.qe call or e-mail this infonnation when the contact is identified}. • An office or conference room equipped with a table, chairs and a telephone in which a team of nine may work. • Access to all levels of staff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their assigned work areas a~d we will avoid interrupting their schedules as much as possible. • Incident Reports for Assaults on Staff- CDC 837: o A data collection form was sent to Chief Deputy Bill Des Voignes. asking that facility staff code staff assault incident reports for the past year in the identified fonnat, addressing incident information, inmate information and vic1im(s) information (please provide an electronic copy of this data as soon as practical). . . NDV-20-2006 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 13:21 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 Attachment A Page 2 Warden Campbell P.22 June 20. 2005 • Staff Assault Committee Minutes • State Compensation Reports (SClF) for assaults on staff Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator • A copy of the Confidential and Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) The evaluation team may ask for additional resources, depending on the initial assessment. Please keep in mind that Mule Creek Stale Prison is the first facility for which staff safety evaluations will be conducted, so all needed information is still being detelmined. Supplemental Data Sources - to be accessed as needed • • • • • • • • Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes· o Grievances, Recommendations. Actions hunate Appeals (CDC) '" Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOU) at certain facilities* Authorized Equipment and Functionality Use of Force Committee Minutes and responses to recommelldations* Employee Training records for selected areas'" Corrective Action Plans for previous audits'" Men's Advisory Counsel (MAC) minutes* Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit conference with you andlor appropriate members of your staff (on or about July 8. 2005). The results of the evaluation will be reported to the BOC at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be forwarded to YACA with a courtesy copy sent to you. Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or jread@bdcolT.ca.gov. Sincerely, Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A) *= 2004 and 2005 to date co: J. S. Woodford, Director Department of Corrections NDV-20-2006 13:21 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 1 ATTACHMENT B STAFF ASSAULT DATA 209 274 4861 P.23 ---_._--_... - .. Mule Creek State- Prison Siaff AsS8Ull Data FY 2004105 Page 1 of2 Dale 1Q'-1\lI1·UIl1-Q261 I11Z1IZ1l'J~ 'neat Se<\"". Assllalt In)Jly i'J: tlln.... WOlIp;n ItMYAI IILK iii RtlCdCOC ~ c;.YA R<ll ReL'd rast DaltIPllD H"'JlIIlg IAQII Loe 5111'$ 2UlI 1Mn oIT A3-117 CCCIolS t6A UNK U liar... 2!1 2.tT Rue 4 M-13JL CCCMS tM UNK f NT'" 311 ua WIlT :IS CCCA\S NtA U'I!( F MfA 40 :u IwKT ..'" CO '2 WHJ 00 43 111.25 WHJ 00 !3 111.$' WHJ K1Sl138 Il!5P 145 SUN BLDG 4 NO PI26U WIll MCP-Aa.-o4lO6·e12! llII5IZOH 115 ruES ... ClINe StoTTEflY NO NO 1R!05<12 ',111 liICI'o.ACt..Q4IIl1~ I.e! 11612004 910 lUES EDIICA'DII IlIJ1GlY NO NO P40Z43 llISP UCP.J\DIl.U/ID-OZt1 IW2120N IlII8 SAT DN!HG s:..nelY NO AMI 111 2ol51r.l8li lICP.ADiI-44110002C lW2120D4 eelS SAT DNlHG GASSING NO D21014 1JIl 111 lICP"'DII·t4JlOo~ 1OI11naD4 1~ ClI'(lNG "nENPr flO - DUOI4 NO TlI1513 HlSP S6 DNING O",lTERY NO lID ~16&ZI H1SP II 1ZlM1XXl 4I2ilaGlU 1121202 EDUCAllOO IAmIlY NO HO K22P.33 WKT II lon:rnMil M23QOD.'I 1/11,'2OlI 1lO IuUDJlI ILK 1M' 7110119!l1 :m11211G3 Un 4Z CCCUS HlSP lU tJUlI 3.5 CI2.U1L !ttA 3112·uR ECIP SQ5Il!DI:I 41 12·I:NL MCP-AE044005·0IJ 6/24t2GD4 S\I11 1730 '''ED B5lI lHUR 18:l5 SUH A. ClINIC NO 111 tL'fI2/1996 12l1812l1ll3 5l2!l!'lDIJ "- SIlS 23 NO !J 1I1ll12lll11l 8n212OO3 UFE YrlIaf 11•• m ~ !lII9IZOa~ 010 or flO ~a lot NO mUla05 GlInller BIIRRIO lINK ~nEUPf NO 1fQ2J1D!16 &11 DI:lODl ~ NIA s"nan JAllII(JI 1 l 1 _ 211111106 81 Glr4 21 At·21tL BlJ)G3 125 ~~ Wolk '""'9'- 1915 rUES MCP..AO... HJI 1-OZ50 111101200. ~IOU $4 AHlll iliA Nt" U* tIf"..<JQlII!O L.lfI' 42 .... till. ORPr U~ %/5/tlllill 8tSOll\lllO If'E 42 .... tIIA DRPr UflK fnar:m 3Il4l1l11D D:z1lll11 48 CI3-tI2L CCXUS fLOPet UN!< 42/lG,1I!Ia iliA IlIA UIO< CCCUS IlIA 1,,11( F IlIA UNlC F MfA 2& N SIRe UN''( F MfA 37 2 ftIr IN/A lJH· CD 31 S WIlt EOP NJ. 1mX '" MrA 57 NlA U 0 31 942 WHf N 0 :IS 512 WH' 2.11 WilT 51 5fZ4n999 4IBt1OlIO UQQI2l1ZS ... AD:J~1.IL A~15L .'" .. co !ll lOll \"flit SCI :Ill ItI!llI HlSP 1BOiEF 54 9..5 MiT ,~ loICP..u:D4W11-DI41 1.'CQG04 'YCP.ASU~Ul9-DI9 9114QtO~ 1(;1]0 lUES 1:&.1 Il"TrEftY HO IlO !nuN thO-blOt i,UmIlltG4 114'5 lHORS ~ AtTENpl' NO NO 11'140 \'Hr 61 !U:P.ASUJWII·1I25 11~41ZQ(JS 17JO Ms ,\SO GIlSSING 110 NO mow II'Mr 15'.1 1ICP..,o,su.t5.Q'·DI4 II24QIlOS 1320 ~OH ASU BAUERY NO I«) P419:t6 IISP 191 8IWIllI9 121l1'20U 911121:0' 2612-23SL EOI' NzA. .~ "Ill.OI. II24QOO~ 1320 NON ASU OAnER\' NO I.IJ :NUWI IIISS> 161 II/!IIISsg 121llllIlN4 tnl2llll5 21i 12·Z3'l lOOP NIl. iliA ua>-I,SU·ISID5IlIr& 51II1:lDOS ",S V.ED ASU IU,TlERY ..0 NO BUIll I/'l'lIr 4' 1lQJ2Qll4 ~ 2·219L EOP N/I\ WA ~ CO 011 IlIA JJ co 3t 17 VI'" MIA II co 211 UB HlSP • •o, G:.SSi.'IG tlO LIFe 61llflOO3 1lII'21Q1lO1 ~19118 lI.'3llI2OJ4 12l1'nOH 11/4I'l1I1!lI ' 'omlOS . Wltr • ItI.J( 'Acp·,lSlJ.lsm-on 5fil200S 730 FlU IASU 8AnERr NO NO f45i!tS IBLK 4B :l(4J2OlIZ 41281'ZOIl5 1amaJ5 Z4 IZoZl)l EOP N/I\ "CPoASU·G5JOl!j-OU l!IJ3l.2oo5 13!Q FRt ASu IlAnEAr NO NO 1017~B WIll ~l& IntllG ZI2/1Cltl4 !1lI2012 ~ 12·129L cc~s WHY M::N\SU.e.ws-011 M:v21J115 1300 FRI I'.5U WITTER\' NO NO )(..W48 WHl 315 1/l11l'Jll7 V2t1GD4 mJ2012 ~ 1l-1ZSL CCCNS ~HT HI'" \: I.CSW 31 D nHf 316 1/l1l1991 'U2nlJ1)f 31211012 ll.Z ll-t2!lL 1ccQ.1$ \IIHr IU... M IGl D 2l1.B3 \1Hr '*1199 lGl.!JIW09 311 A4-215U IfIjl, iliA UNK IF co <4lI UII HSP 28 JlIB.I4l1U EOP HlA UNK F Ln 2lI 1."tHY 5I1312DD:5 BATTERY NO NO K3l"748 WIlt IIICP-AYlJ.I.l411o-llZl' 1G",2004 1110 RtHU5 AYMII BATTERY NO NO JJQZ&l lIUC 17 /I~IBI 1U5 MoOtI BLDG' 8AnEAV NO NO r"'l~ 0111 ~I ltUl2C02 6/19mlD2 ~1OQOO6 ,otOH NO DOailII WIlT I~ IOOglaOlI 't3IRlIlXI 11/14I1B33 M::P-IoSU·lWlI:>.QI1 ... SAl SiIIo Ir>II lccalltJ. i~ S,odd Nlw;parod I1IlI351 MCP-NI-l.cl~194 I"l Weell fiB 8 ~ Il1.OO 1 ).rzp.HJ3-D1Jl19.0tB8 !l/U1200ol .... t'\l 0"'/°' rne \lIC1lU1.FOllUA.noa .J 18l1lTl!lWARD 11IF0/INA1101C lfU:lDElI'I.FOIUtIA'PDN IMIll' Attacbment B lWa2DN iW:P-8lIl-D4I'I 1-025IJ 111l212QD4 ICI'-8II6-DUlI-02S1 1tlJOl'"dID4 MCl'-8Dll-lMIIl1.(J16' 713012G04 "CP-IDe-04/Ot..clJllI 9/23/ZGD4 1350 FRt 1BI5 ASlf 44 1&:244U EOP HlA UNK .. co 41 2.SlI HSP HlSP 15 3Q~.11l9!I 11151211(I) 1l/20W00i 311 es:z4OU ECf> "'''' lHl!( F AN sa 211.42 I"IHr "Iff 5I1112llOO eJ4nOOJ 1111!JJZllOS ~llB-ISIL NIA "''A UtI!( III co n '-'3 01H J1lea·142\J iruA "" UIII( fll 56T 3Z OM liSP aLOGa -nERY NO 1510 lUES BlDGIl ....t1ENpr No tlO ~ 1415 FRI OlOGB ~lNG lO 110 P'819l1 P.~ ~sp 143S ll1UR& B1QGO IlAnEllY ~Q flO al91ltlM 3:1 Q~211_ 5.'1Dr200l Il/MlIO!i -'~-' Attachment B Mule Creek Slale Prison Staff Assault Data FY 2004/05 Page 2of2 Q. ~~.IG! 8I1llGOOS II., IiUH 8CS SAnER'f l:O NO .HIm WHT 9' 1U1lltl9M 1N2IlCI3 311211012 ~ IIIIIlQOO5 16511 SAT 81llN1t«i AnEIIpr IlO 110 Wll14 WHr 21 1GfI2t2OO4 215QOOS S/22I10~ 21l11S-1OSU MCP-801I-1l6AJ6.104 llCStl 35 t 81K 2lI C15-l14\J "" Nu. 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WHT .4 IIl82ll03 12JZJ2003 '''112017 47 Cl4-lOU COINltlG !lAnEJlY PROJ Dnle8 \1IHT :14 7/W19117 112312004 111411.52 19511 SAT CflAGU NO ol522~~ HlSP 111 '.lQ8I2004 I leO LlC»l eTe IlATlEAY 1(0 NO CI54l1 \VHI 201 12Q0118B:1 MCI'.etC4501l5-Q1l2 ~ .r..a WEO eTC "nEUr'T 1:0 NO 1/'24120 HlSP 31 McP-CTC4UIl-lOl 5Q112Oll5 T\I£S etc IlAnERY NO 110 ~ OlK 2J !Q4I199S 8/1111915 ~12IN04 111812005 .t.z:ll2Ql1 2IlQllCl2 IFE :lIMIlCIS tll1r20llll IQll/2OSS ~ lI$ cron UcP~44.QT-OI!i! 1Q5Q~ 1625 SUN eyARO NO NO DIGH8 HlSP ~~s.oJ-Oll7 tn.aar.s 1445 SAT CYAAD 8ArrERY lID KO lc24211ll IilSP 2' 1_1998 IIJllII_ 1111maiS 34 CIJ. lO7t. NIAo &oI!CP-G\'t).G5lQ 1.(Jf11 111_ 1445 SAT CYAAD 9A.TTEm NO "0 TII8200 IIISP 26 ellCll2GOJ :11121200. 25 UlIK Nl.\ NIA. Ii Co 33 U k:o .8 FA k:o 42 118 3r19118lili :112112001 Mtl4l2010 1V11'2812 n A2·121U 511112005 18211 ruES AU AnEIIPJ NO 1:0 1/'24!>20 HlSP 50 2l11/lCD1 511712llCM 2Qlfl1Ill6 37 12-119L fOP SUflENl Nl.\ iNCP-RaR-l),505~ SlISl20tlS IlIDO WED R4A BArTERY tiO !CO 1/'24520 IIISP !D 2111ml04 5/U12OO4 21211'lD01i 3112-126L EOP StlANO NIA INCP-RIIR-45D5-OaS .-4 N M .-4 - - z.u 40 co MCP-C Is.ocnO~1 4IWt.!005 .. co MIl_ MCP.cl~12.(1211 'l2t27Q01l' lie Wltl U 2. 111I3I'I991 ~5D4-l1ll1 4!l 11IO< OTHl AnEIJPT /(0 co 11IO< lOJ~& NO M Nio\ 7n12OO3 'JIlMOlM HO 830 11J£S lU6 YJ1Ir Nu. 44 3QMillQ ~nEliPT NO I.ecP-CO,"4m.oIJl 11/2912004 44 EOP WHT BlDG. 1'1 llCP-CCl-D«64l3E &n1ll2OO4 WHrPR UNI< co lff,A TeleU 101lI FIlr 1Ot2_ EOP It lIIS-I3RL 110 NCP-C~1'()ln 712_ 3/'l3/2OU NIo\ CI5-IJ1L 1034 UOtI PflOGIIAIoI 8AnERY NO • MCP-IlPG.o.-017 lff,A IolHC8 tII!J' vntr 0..51 ASIR I~ll BLK 95 yntJ 2055 8lJ( 118UC NOV-20-2006 I I I I I I , I .. 13:22 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.26 ATTACHMENT C DESIGN VERSUS CURRENT CAPACITY .i I I ! I I~ NOV-20-2006 " , 13:22 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.27 Attachment C Design Capacity Versus Current CapacIty Designed Bed Area Desi~med Capacity Count Current Capacity Current sed Count Facllltv A. Bulldlnrl1 Buildinll 2 Building 3 Bulldln~4 Building 5 GvmnaslumA exerclse Yard FacllltvS 100 Single Occupancy Cells 100 Single Occupancy Cells 100 Single OccuDancv Cells 100 Single Occupancy Cens 100 Single OccupanCy Cells 100 100 100 100 100 0 Bulldlna6 100 SlnQle Occupancv Cells 100 Bulldlna7 100 SlnClle Occupancy Cells 100 Buildlna8 100 Sinale Occupancy Cells 100 Building 9 100 Single Occupancy Cells 100 Isulldlng 10 Gvmnasium B Execrclse Yard 100 Sinale Occupanev Cells 100 0 100 Double OccuDancv CeU5 100 Double Occupancy Cella 100 Double OccucanC'Y Cells 100 Double OCCUDanC\l Cells 100 Double OccupanC\l Cells 160 Bed Open Dorm 94 Double Occuopancy Cells + 6 single Occupancy level IV EOP Beds 98 Double Occupancy Cells"' .j. 40 E-beds 98 Double Occupancy Cells" + 40 E-beds 98 Double Occupancy Cells· + 40 E·beds 98 Double Occupancy Cells" + 40 E-beds 160 Bed Open Dorm 200 200 200 200 200 160 194 236 238 236 236 160 Facility C Building " Building 12 8ulldlna 13 100 Single Occupancy Cells 100 Smgle Occupanev Cells 100 Single Occupancy Cells 100 100 100 Building 14 100 Single Occupancy Cells 100 BuildIng 15 GvmnasiumC Minimum Security Dorm 1 Dorm 2 100 Single Occupancy Cells 100 Total 100 Bed Open Dorm 100 Bed Open Dorm 100 100 98 Double Occupancy Cells" + 40 E-beds . 100 DOUble Occupancy Cells 100 Double Occupancy Cells 98 Double Occupancy Cells" + 40 E.beds 98 Double Occupancy Cells· + 40 E·beds 1eo Bed Open Dorm 200 Bed Open Dorm 200 Bed Open Dorm 1700 • Two cells In these buildings were converted to restroom facilities for the E-bed inmates. 236 200 200 236 236 160 200 200 4126 NOlJ-2el-2006 .. 13: 22 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 ATTACHMENTD STAFF INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE P.28 i I :L . ; ~ .~ ~ r, , \' i: :: t' : NOV-20-2006 I I .I I f 13:22 MULE CREEk-WARDEN 209 274 4861 P.29 Mule Creek State Prison July 5 - 8, Z005 Line Staff: 1. What is your current job title? 2. What is your assignment? What are your primary duties (post Orders)? 3. When did you start working for the department as..• ? 4. How long have you been assigned to this facility? S. How many inmates do you supervise? What is their general classification (EOP)? 6. What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at all times, otherwise have access to, or have to check out from ~ central location? I f I J I I I ,r. ..! 7. Do you have a stab vest? Have you been titted for one? Do you wear it at all times? f I ! I; ! 8. What is the general condition of your safety equipment? 9. Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for yourjob duties? 10. If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary? 1 NDU-20-2006 • MULE CREEK-WARDEN 13:22 209 274 4861 11. On a scale ofl to la, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility? Why do you feel that way? 12. Where do you feel the least safe? Can you describe why that is? Where and when do you feel the most safe? How do other staff feel about this? 13. What staff safety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the most as you are performing your duties? P.30 i i i I ; iI ! j~ f; 14. Do you have any general suggestions or comments relating to staffsafety? r I ; • ti' o. 15. What most would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety? r ! [ 1, " " f [ !0, 16. How often do you see and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor's supervisor? The warden? r. ~ ~ [ !:. 17. Are protocols in place for emergency responses? 18. (policy?)What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or fol' emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed? 2 ,tJ.JUWW*,*,::W:;; i "",tii .#Q'w.x.a.z : Z4#".&$5M $N.%$MI4MtttQt:;::JJ:;U:;:;:40i:;;:m:t:;: h ;,:z:v;.. ~ .. 2 Supervisors: 1. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a supervisor? 2. How many years do you have as a supervisor? 3. Have you worked as a supervisor at any other CDC institution? 4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift. 5. How many officers do you directly supervise? 6. How many do you indirectly supervise? 7. What is the percentage of time (shift) do you spend personally observing your subordinates? 8. Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? i ! ! I:" 9~ -- What safety equipment is issued and carried by your-staff? -- - ~' -I;'· :i 10. I Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff s use? 4t ij ;~ 'I il II : ~ ::I ~ " smm::lII.. . 6JQ.J6iQ.QiQiWiQ.MiWiQi"',:;.M.((i::.Q.W;::;.Q •. w.«n:.C3 .•. ( . . J • .' . .. .0' .! , U :1 Q n ,. :1 ~I •1 1 " :1 :1 ~ 3 !I ,.'-. ~QQ, t (3i (6 .#.!b .-* ,0,,1( .{3,$. . ..".: .. &>.3... -_._---_. -'- ..__ ._---_.- ....... •• •• • • • _ • . 4_.•• • • _ _ ···-· ------------_.. ~-- -._-.-._.._ ~ .._._._---_ " '~ _----_ .._._- .. ... ----- .----- - - - ... !.i.'!'*"!'l)';;;(;;;;;;;;;;;::)ji#'::'l..i~"i!i««.ei"(JiM.(ii . '.M hP.e':ZZ;WZ .0PM.as ..3. .0&(3,&0:«« "".".QQ'''S ..•{3.3•.• e.&''''Z;:''; pi< .. 'i'Q'iWiiJR -.&/-':.':" NOV-20-2006 I I I I I 13:22 209 274 4861 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 11. If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued? 12. Do you have II stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times? 13. Does your staff have stab vests? Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure that they wear it at all times? 14. How often do you see your supervisors? 15. How many of your available officers are on overtime? Ordered over? Voluntary? 16. On a scale of 1 to 10. with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility? 17. What is your greatest concern about staff safety for your subordinates? P.31 !. 18. 19. What kind ofcomplaints do you get from staff? Ate there any patterns that emerge? How do you handle them? What do you do to ensure a safe working environment for your staff? 4 j" , NOV-20-2006 13:22 209 274 4861 MULE CREEK-wARDEN I~ I I I I I I I I I I 20. What would you like to do or see chl:lIlged to improve staff safety and reduce staff assaults? 21. What protocols in place for emergency responses? 22. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed? 5 P.32 I \ I I I I I I NDU-20-2006 13:22 21219 274 4861 MULE CREEK-wARDEN P.33 Managers: 1. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a manager,? 2. How many years experience do you have as a manager? 3. Have you been a manager at any other CDC institution? 4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift. 5. Have often do you walk through the facility to talk with staff and observe general staff safety practices? . 6. Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? What is available for them to use? 7: Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use? 8. lfthe answer is yes. what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued? 1 I I I 6 I I, NOV-20-2la06 I I I I 9. 13:22 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 2139 274 4861 P.34 How many of your staff have been issued stab vests? How many have been fined? What is the timeline for issuing vests? Who has been identified to receive them? 10. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility? 11. When considering staffsafety, what types of concerns do you have? 12. From your perspective, what carries the greatest potential for staff injury? 13. What might mitigate or reduce staff assaults? 14. What kinds of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge? 15. Do you have any long range plans to ensure staff safety and to reduce staff assaults? 16. Do you have anyone assigned to monitor staff assaults or track occurrences to identify trends? i ii ,I I 7 I NDU-20-2006 13:23 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 2139 274 4861 ]7. If you had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would you make to your operation to reduce staff assaults or the potential for assaults? Physical plant, service and supply, operational changes and/or staff changes? 18. Have the number of vacancies, 4850's. other leave of absences affected staff safety? Do you have mandated overtime for· staff and supervisors? 19 Do you have any staff off duty as a result of an assault? How long? Have you had contact with them whUe they were off duty? 20. What level of repair is your facility? Have you made requests for service or special projects that affect the level of staff safety? Have those requests been approved? 21. What protocols in place for emergency responses? 22. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed? 8 P.35 NOV-20-2006 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I - 13:23 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 209 274 4861 ATTACHMENTE EVALUATION TEAM ROSTER AND ASSIGMENTS P.36 NOU-2e-2006 MULE CREEK-WARDEN 13:23 209 274 4861 P.37 Attachment E Evaluation Team Members Mule Creek State Prison Team 1 Staff Interviews: Robert Takeshta, CSA Field Representative John McAuliffe, Adult Operations, Correctional Counselor II Jeff Plunkett, Juvenile Justice, Captain Team 2 Physical Plant. Staffing and Population: Gary Wion, eSA Field Representative Mark Perkins. Adult Operations, FaciliLy Captain Gerry Garcia, Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant Team 3 Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis: Don Allen, eSA Field Representative Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieutenant Bob Moore, Juvenile Justice, Major Robert Takeshta, Field Representative Corrections Stadards Authority Phone: 916-322-8346 Fax: 916-327-3317 E-Mail:.btakeshta@bdcorr.ca.gov Mark Perkins. CaptaIn Adult Operations Phone: 916·358-26.2.6 Fax: 916·356-2499 E-Mail: moerklns@corr.ga.90v Gary Wion, Field Representative Correetions·Stadards Authority Phone: 916-324·1641 Fax: 916-327-3317 e-Mail: gwion@bdcarr.ca.gov Jeff Plunkett, Captain Juvenile Justice Phone: 916-262-0802 Fax: 916-262-1767 E-Mail: jolunKett@cys.ca.oov Don Allen, Field Representative Bob Moore, Major Juvenile Justice Phone: 209-.2.74-8115 Corrections Stadards Authority Phone: 916-324-9153 ! 1-- . I I Fax: 916-327-3317 E-Mail: dallen@bdgorr.ca.gov Fax: 209· E-Mail: bmoore@cya.c~.gov John McAuliffe, Correctional Counselor II Adult Operations Phone: 916-358-2628 Fax: 916-358·2636 e-Mail: iQjJn.meaullffe@corr ca,90v Gerry Garcia, Uelltenant Juvenile Justice Phone: 209-944-6113 Fax: 209-465·2968 e-Mail: agarcia@cya.ca.gov,. Dave Stark, Lieutenant Adult Operations Phone: 916-358-.2.473 Fax: 916·358-2499 E-Mail: dave.stark@sorr.ca.gov TOTAL P.37 a,s XU). \:'M hiM" m WlM4itw Lb.,. ;, . !.ok }.4',.«,3,o, , .. .4.>...w•. o.v.3.G.v,. z. .,wS&. .. .R);:r:.t!S!,.bl':'~:;, .. lAI mw&t l . .&..z 431.;,,%:, fuM t &)ltt¢!ti}:tX?! <.f •• !#.'~~.. is i4 l Il.. .n ~3~ .:::.'.'. .