October 2011

NCCD

National Council on Crime and Delinquency

Responding to the Growth of the Private Prison
Industry in the United States
Christopher Hartney
Caroline Glesmann
October 21, 2011
Submitted to
the Public Welfare Foundation
by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

In Their Own Words
An excerpt from Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), Letter to Shareholders, 2010:
We believe the outlook for CCA and the private corrections industry remains very positive. Public
prisons are overcrowded and increases in the US inmate population are expected to outpace
the addition of new prison beds. Historically, the US inmate population has also accelerated in
post-recession years, particularly at the state level. Demand for new prison beds from the federal
sector remains strong.
… As a result, we believe CCA’s inventory of available beds provides significant growth potential
for our company and will serve as a major catalyst in driving our future earnings growth. We
project that filling our existing bed inventory and beds under development could generate more
than a 30% increase in operating income and an additional $0.60 in future earnings per share.
Prison overcrowding threatens the safety of communities across America, and governments
recognize that partnering with CCA provides them a secure, cost-effective, and immediate
solution.1

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

Table of Contents
3	Introduction
3	

Private Prisons in the United States

6	

Private Prison Performance: A Discussion of the Key Claims Made by Private Prison
Proponents

6	

Economic Claims

8	

Does the Competitive Nature of the Free Market Encourage Innovation and System 	
Improvement?

9	

The Profit Motive: Conflict of Interest in Real Terms

11	

Contracting Oversight and Monitoring

12	

Other Forms of Corrections Privatization

12	

Responding to the Expansion of Private Prisons: Action Steps for Advocates

18	Conclusion

About NCCD
NCCD promotes just and equitable social systems for individuals, families, and communities through
research, public policy, and practice.
www.nccd-crc.org

2

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

October 2011

Introduction

This Report

Reported crime is at the lowest level in decades, safe
alternatives to incarceration are an accepted part of
the corrections system, and private prisons have not
provided the cost savings and improved conditions
of confinement that their proponents promise.
Nevertheless, business is booming for prison companies.

This report describes the findings of interviews with
several experts on the study of private prisons, a review
of the academic and legal literature on private prisons,
and a media review of newspaper and radio stories on
private prisons.

Since their start in the 1980s, private prisons have
come to hold eight percent of all US state and federal
prisoners, including half of federal immigration
detainees. A steady flow of inmates has meant huge
profits for these companies. Just as steady have been
the reports of abuse and neglect, poor management
of inmate needs, and poor governmental oversight.
Low pay, limited staff training, and other cost-cutting
measures—the primary ways private prisons sustain
their profits—can lead to unmet inmate needs and
security issues, heightening the inherent dangers to staff
and inmates in secure settings. Private prison companies
spend millions of dollars on lobbying, political
campaign contributions, support for legislation favorable
to their profits, shaping public opinion, and research
likely to support their practices, which leads many to
question the prison industry’s influence on criminal
justice policymaking. There are also significant issues
with the government’s ability to effectively monitor what
goes on at private prisons.
Proponents’ claims that private prisons can provide
higher-quality and more cost-effective service
provisions, improved conditions of confinement,
and economic growth in the communities where new
facilities are built are neither borne out in research
nor in the scores of private facility incident reports
across the country. The expectation that competition
for contracts among free market players would lead to
generally improved efficiency, quality, and cost savings
has not been met. Nevertheless, proponents continue
to use these claims widely as a basis for pursuing
privatization.

Secure, locked facilities designed for adults are the
major focus of this paper, although many of the same
issues and potential solutions apply to all types of
privatization, in corrections and elsewhere. Federal
immigration detention and contracted services, such as
in-custody health care and programming or post-release
supervision and services, are also discussed.

Private Prisons in the United
States
Along with the increased number of inmates
incarcerated in the United States due to tough-on-crime
laws and policies that began in the 1980s and continued
into the 2000s, came an increase in the number of
inmates held in private, for-profit facilities. Privatization
of certain corrections functions, such as health care
and service provisions, had been common in the
United States for some time, but larger scale facilities
wholly managed by for-profit companies began in the
mid-1980s.
The secure facilities focused upon in this paper are
those where all or most of the inmates remain confined
at all times, such as prisons, prison farms, penitentiaries,
correctional centers, work camps, and reformatories.
A large percentage of private facilities are communitybased facilities, such as halfway houses, residential
treatment centers, restitution centers, and prerelease
centers, where at least some inmates come and go.
•	 The most recent federal data shows that of the 1.6
million state and federal inmates, approximately 8%
(129,336) are held in private prison facilities (about
34,000 in private federal facilities and 95,000 in
private state facilities).2

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

•	 In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) had an average adult daily population of
about 32,606, and about half of these detainees
were housed in privately run detention facilities.3
•	 Most of the more than 400 private facilities are
minimum- or medium-security, with an average daily
population of fewer than 500 inmates.4
•	 Some populations, such as women, the mentally ill,
and serious offenders, are less likely to be held in
private facilities because they are more expensive
to house, making it difficult for prison companies
to make profits. A large percentage of juveniles are
held in private facilities.5

Immigration
Private prison companies have pursued
the area of immigration both in the
United States and internationally, with
huge monetary success. Accompanying
that success are numerous documented
cases of abuse and neglect and
poor conditions of confinement,6
exacerbated by long stays awaiting
immigration proceedings. On any
given day in 2009, US Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) held an
average of 32,606 adults in a total of
178 facilities. Just under half of these
detainees, 15,942, were housed in 30
private facilities.7 Although ICE has
developed standards for immigration
detention facilities, the standards may
not adequately address the conditions
and treatment experienced by many
immigrant detainees and, in any case,
they are not implemented in all facilities.8

4

Major Private Prison Companies
Today, two private companies–Corrections Corporation
of America (CCA) and the GEO Group–hold the
majority of private prison contracts in the United States.
CCA operates over 60 facilities in 19 states and the
District of Columbia and manages more than 50% of
the nation’s private prison beds. GEO Group (formerly
known as Wackenhut Securities and recently merged
with Cornell Companies) runs about 60 facilities in 17
states. These are publicly traded companies beholden
as much to their boards of directors and stakeholders
as to the needs of the prison inmates, prison staff,
and the general public. In 2010, the combined revenue
of CCA and GEO was more than $2.9 billion. Other
large private prison companies include Management
& Training Corporation, Emerald Corrections, LCS
Correctional Services, and Civigenics/Community
Education Centers, Inc.9
How Private Prisons Function
Federal, state, and local governments that seek to
privatize correctional services enter into a contractual
relationship—“a public-private partnership”—with
a private prison company. The government typically
announces a Request for Proposals (RFP), which
describes the project they wish to pursue and all of the
issues prison companies will have to address for their
proposal to be considered. Governments primarily seek
these contracts because of the ability of private prison
companies to build or acquire facility space more quickly
than government agencies, providing an easing of
overcrowding and a short-term time- and cost-savings
compared to the government building its own facilities.
The arrangement can take many forms. Some private
facilities hold inmates from one or predominantly one
jurisdiction, while others hold inmates from several
jurisdictions, including out-of-state and the federal
government. Inmates may be held in a facility owned
and operated by the company or in a facility owned
by the government and operated by the company.
Approximately 70% of the facilities CCA manages are
company-owned, 30% are government-owned.

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

The company may manage the entire facility, providing
for all of the needs of the inmates, or the government
may still manage some aspects of the prison, such as
medical services or programming. The company may
only run certain elements of correctional services such
as inmate health care or probation supervision, although
that is not a focus of this report.
Some facilities are built “on spec,” where typically a
small, rural town partners with a private prison company
to build a facility that will house inmates from other
jurisdictions. In this form, the private prison contracts
with the locality for the physical facility and related
services, and contracts with other jurisdictions to fill
beds.
The contract usually stipulates that the government will
pay the prison company a daily dollar amount, roughly
$50 to $75, for each inmate they hold. These amounts
are negotiated in the contracting process and can vary
according to many factors, including the security level
of the inmates, the size and type of facility, and the local
costs of inmate services and programming provided,
such as food service, mental and physical health care
provisions, recreation, education, vocational training, etc.
The development, implementation, and monitoring
of private prison agreements represents a complicated
and fairly unwieldy process—a fact that contributes to
difficulty regulating and monitoring these contracts. In a
facility operated in one jurisdiction but holding inmates
from several others, the laws and regulations of any
number of federal, state, and local jurisdictions may
be in play. Arizona alone has three sets of corrections
regulations and policies, one for Arizona state prisons,
one for private facilities inside and outside Arizona
borders contracted with the state to hold Arizona
inmates, and another for private prisons in Arizona not
contracted to hold Arizona inmates. The third of these
is the least restrictive and specific.
The number and variety of organizations and individuals
involved can be numerous. In the state or local context,

October 2011

the process is usually led by a chief executive (governor
or mayor) or members of the state legislature, county
commission, or city council. State or local justice
system officials such as attorneys general, judges,
heads of corrections agencies or law enforcement
are not typically spearheading the move toward
privatization—they may not even support the move—
but they and various public employees will play some
role in the process. Financiers, attorneys, construction
companies, engineers, public utilities, and others will
also be involved, especially when a new facility is being
constructed.
Prison company executives and staff play a major
role as well, not only in representing the prison
companies’ interests, but in assisting governments in the
complicated process of contracting and implementation.
Prison companies often offer to handle much of the
paperwork and hoop-jumping on behalf of government
entities; they are likely to have more experience with
the process and they, of course, have a clear interest
in the process moving as quickly and smoothly as
possible. They also take part in securing project buy-in
from other government representatives and community
stakeholders.
Development, maintenance, and oversight of ongoing
contracts also involve a variety of public employees.
Sometimes private prisons are these employees’ primary
responsibility, other times private prisons are just
one of several responsibilities. In the federal arena,
responsibilities are spread across several wings of the
Bureau of Prisons.10 In the state context, the task is
likely spread across more disparate departments. For
example, in Arizona, the Private Prisons subprogram
of the state Department of Corrections’ Prison
Operations Program develops and manages private
prison contracts; the Engineering and Facilities Bureau
oversees construction and compliance monitoring; the
Contract Beds Bureau monitors, evaluates, and supports
private prisons; and the Business Administration tracks
expenditures.11

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

Private Prison Performance:
A Discussion of the Key
Claims Made by Private Prison
Proponents
While quick solutions to crowding is the most common
reason jurisdictions contract for bed space in private
prisons, secondary rationales include cost savings and
improved services. Also, states and local jurisdictions
seek partnerships with prison companies to establish
private facilities as a way to boost their economies.
While there is a shortage of high-quality research
assessing the success of these secondary aims, what
is known does not provide a justification for these
decisions.
Do Private Prisons Provide Improved Conditions
of Confinement and Inmate Services and Meet
Basic Standards of Human Treatment?
Those concerned about private prisons not only
question if private prisons provide better care and
services than public prisons, but if they consistently
meet basic standards. Individual studies have found that,
compared to publicly managed prisons, private prisons
have a higher proportion of inmate-on-inmate assaults;12
greater likelihood of inmate misconduct, drug abuse
and higher rate of escapes;13 lower or unmet standards
of care;14 and have “systemic problems in maintaining
secure facilities.”15 A review of several previous studies
showed that the quality of confinement in public
and private prison facilities is often comparable, but
with public facilities providing slightly better skills
training for inmates and reporting slightly fewer inmate
grievances.16
Media accounts have documented numerous incidents
of abuse, neglect, violence, escapes, poor conditions,
and other alarming events in private facilities. (For a
sampling of private prison facilities around the country
and their associated media reports, please see the
appendix, Grassroots Leadership’s Resource Packet,

6

2009,17 M. Deitch, 2003,18 and the Private Corrections
Working Group resource listings.19) Whether private
prisons have more or less scandals than their public
counterparts is difficult to assess from media reports,
but it is clear: Private prisons do not provide a
consistently improved experience for inmates or staff
compared to public facilities, and, in many cases, the
experience can be worse. Immigration detention centers,
where different laws and standards often apply, are of
particular concern. (See inset, page 4.)

Economic Claims
Do Private Prisons Provide Cost Savings to
Governments?
While local and state governments still turn to prison
privatization as a cost-saving measure, the cost
effectiveness of private prisons is widely debated, and
research on the topic has produced varied results. The
verdict is, at best, a draw. Arizona is one of the few
states with a state law that requires the regular and
intensive assessment of private prison performance.
Their most recent study found that private prisons
resulted in higher costs to the state compared to public
facilities.20 Other studies have found that privatizing
facilities has resulted in minimal or no savings21 or
that privatization can yield modest savings.22 These
findings echo what studies of privatization in other
industries have shown: The promise of savings touted
by proponents of privatization is quite limited, or in fact
“elusive.”23
Researchers caution that costs of public and private
prisons cannot be easily evaluated side by side due
to numerous factors such as security level and health
conditions of inmates, physical characteristics of
facilities, indirect costs, and the large number of parties
typically involved in maintaining and paying for either
type of prison.24 Most contracts allow private facilities to
house lower risk and healthier — less costly — inmates
than similar public facilities. Prison companies fund
much research into cost and other factors; these studies
tend to find improvement with private prisons.25

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

Do Private Prisons Improve the Economic Health
of States and Localities?
For a number of years, state, county, and municipal
jurisdictions have pursued private prison opportunities
as a means to generate economic growth and job
creation in their communities. Prison companies
foreseeing increased need for bed space, but hoping
to avoid owning expensive facilities, look for local
governments who will agree to fund new facility
construction through bond sales that will be paid back
from the proceeds of the prison company’s future
contracts with other jurisdictions. These partnerships
can appeal to smaller jurisdictions, especially when their
traditional local industries have fallen off. Private prison
companies espouse their potential benefits through
campaigns to persuade key leaders and policymakers;
they then help those key leaders sell the idea to other
government representatives and the public. Much of
the early discussion on investment in private prisons
takes place behind closed doors, away from opposing
viewpoints and the public.26
Recent studies have found that growth and expansion
of prisons in general (whether public or private)
have had limited positive impact on economic
development at the local level.27 In fact, communities
in which private prisons are located can experience
unfavorable economic effects, especially in already
depressed economies. A common dynamic is that a
small town or county commits most of its limited
resources and infrastructure—labor force, emergency
response services, trade services (electricians, plumbers,
sanitation, etc.)—to supporting the prison, leaving them
dependent on the success of the prison and unable
to support other businesses that might want to locate
there.28 Further, local governments that sell bonds to
fund construction can find themselves on the hook if
the prison company fails to secure sufficient contracts to
fill beds. At the least, the bond rating for the locality is
likely to be lowered if they do have trouble repaying the
debt, leaving the local economy in worse shape.29 When
the lease is up or abandoned, the aging plant is owned
by the government.

October 2011

Even a healthy state or local government exposes
itself to risk if all or part of the public prison
structure is dismantled and reliance placed on private
structures. Significant challenges may be experienced
if the government or contractor then chooses to end
the contractual relationship at a later point and the
government is left to scramble to redevelop a public
system or seek one of the other essentially similar
private contractors.30
Texas, which experienced an immense prison building
boom in the 1990s especially related to immigration
detention, has several examples of private-public
partnerships leading to challenges for local jurisdictions.
In July 2011, a west Texas 373-bed prison was auctioned
off due to a dearth of prisoners, a 424-bed facility in
Fort Worth (managed by GEO) has been empty since
February 2011, and a new 1,100-bed facility located near
Abilene has never housed inmates.31
Ultimately, any financial savings gained from privatizing
leave the local area and, ultimately, benefit the prison
corporation’s executives, board of directors, and
shareholders as well as the innumerable lobbyists,
politicians, and government officials benefitting from
the broader private prison industry.32
Perhaps more importantly from an ethical perspective,
jurisdictions that invest in speculative private prison
projects can come to be a party to the same conflict of
interest as prison companies when they find themselves
in the contradictory situation of supporting increased
incarceration in order to pay off bonds or bolster
their local economy even if crime and arrests drop
and effective and safe alternatives to incarceration are
available.
Selling Public Assets
Some states try to shore up budget gaps by selling public
prison facilities to private companies. Some argue this
is a short-sighted remedy, as it will only reap limited
and short-term financial benefits, limit future options,
and reduce public assets.33 On the other hand, holding
on to the asset may leave the government with the
progressively higher costs of maintenance and insurance

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

and, ultimately, the burden of aging facilities that the
private prison company will eventually abandon. Prison
companies try to avoid this liability by leasing facilities
from city, county, or state governments.

Does the Competitive Nature
of the Free Market Encourage
Innovation and System
Improvement?

8

incarceration and to save taxpayer money without
threatening public safety. Thus, the prison population
continues to grow, as do corrections budgets, at least
until the newly contracted beds are themselves full.37
The speed and flexibility with which private prison
companies can acquire bed space provides, in essence,
a permanent pressure release valve that squashes what
might otherwise be an opportunity for permanent
reform.

Dominated as it is by CCA and the GEO Group,
the relative lack of competition in the private prison
industry makes it difficult for governments to assemble
a pool of qualified candidates, and contributes to the
likelihood of inadequate performance once a contract
is executed.34 If a particular industry only has a few
providers, the government’s ability to realize cost savings
is considerably lessened and it is difficult to effectively
replace one provider with another, if the need arises.35

Importantly (and ironically), the very reforms that are
not given enough consideration can serve the same
purpose as private prisons, including the quick easing of
crowding, cost-savings, and improved outcomes. These
include alternatives to detention for those awaiting
trial or immigration procedures;38 and alternatives to
incarceration such as community corrections, electronic
monitoring, day and evening reporting centers, home
custody, restorative justice, and intensive supervision,
all of which can be used to reduce the demand for
new bed space quickly, permanently, and without
jeopardizing public safety.39 These strategies are, in fact,
gaining a foothold. In 2010, legislatures in at least 23
states and the District of Columbia passed legislation
that has the potential to reduce the prison population
while remaining focused on public safety.40 In fact, some
observers suggest that the fortunes of the private prison
companies already may be starting to shift because of
these reforms and the continuing drop in crime.41 Yet
not everyone sees the advantages of these alternatives,
as privatization is still a popular choice to ease crowding
or provide short-term budget solutions, or both.

Suppressing Reform

Parallel Inadequate Systems

Early on, the rise of private prisons promised to
encourage public prison officials to make improvements
in cost efficiencies and to be more open to other
reforms.36 However, it is more likely that the opposite
has occurred as a larger dynamic has taken hold that
contributes to a suppression of innovative thinking
and reform in the public sphere. When states relieve
overcrowding in public facilities through private
contracting, stakeholders—state officials, prosecutors,
judges, and corrections agencies—lose the impetus
to seek innovative ways of reducing the reliance on

Another key issue in having two parallel approaches
to corrections—the public and the private—is that
the focus becomes a comparison of the two systems,
creating a very narrow perspective from which to
assess what works, what doesn’t work, and how the
overall system can be improved. Certainly, as some state
laws specify, private prisons should be held to at least
public prison levels of health and safety, conditions
of confinement, service delivery, cost, transparency
and accountability, and other factors, but with this
being the limit of expectations, we are simply left with

Early proponents of privatization argued that the
competition inherent in the private market would spawn
innovative processes and practices that would lower
costs while improving conditions. It was also thought
that public prison officials would themselves pursue
innovations, or at least pick up on the techniques of
their for-profit counterparts and thereby improve the
public system.
No True Competition

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

two systems in need of reform. In a sense, the two
systems begin to “play down” to each other’s level
of competence (or incompetence) rather than both
vying for a truly appropriate and effective response to
crime and solutions to the problems that plague both
approaches.42

The Profit Motive: Conflict of
Interest in Real Terms
A key concern expressed by privatization opponents
is the suitability of entrusting prisoner care to profitmotivated corporations.43 Within facilities, this issue can
play out in a number of ways, beginning with the core
issue of staffing. Beyond facilities, the profit motive
leads prison companies to use their significant resources
to influence corrections laws and policies in ways that
increase their profits through more prisoners being held
for more types of crimes and for longer sentences.
Staffing and Services
A critical part of the debate regarding cost savings,
as well as conditions and quality of care, focuses on
staffing and personnel costs. Since private prisons are
generally expected to serve the same function as public
prisons but also save public money, prison companies
need to make their profit in the small window between
their own costs and the costs of public prisons minus
some percentage of savings to taxpayers. (Some
contracts stipulate that this savings will be at least a
certain percentage, often 7%.) The most expensive part
of running a prison is staffing; therefore any savings
associated with privatization is primarily due to reduced
personnel-related costs.44 Private prisons tend to employ
frontline staff who are non-unionized and low-paid,
don’t receive fringe benefits, and lack sufficient training.
This contributes to the high rate of staff turnover
and the security issues with which privately managed
facilities are often fraught.45 This suggests that any cost
savings achieved by privatization is at the expense of
inmate and guard safety. Similarly, cost cutting with
regard to services, programming, and facility conditions
will increase inmate dissatisfaction and inmate-staff

October 2011

tension, and increase negative outcomes like grievances
and behavioral issues.
Influence on Length of Stay
The potential conflict of interest posed by private
prisons being compensated per filled bed can also
arise through the influence prison staff can have on
the length of time inmates ultimately spend behind
bars. As in public prisons, disciplinary action against
an inmate is typically initiated by guards and verified
by their supervisors. Marks on an inmate’s record may
lead to formal proceedings that can, ultimately, reduce
the inmate’s chances of early release or extend their
initial sentence. Parole decisions also are influenced by
inmates’ in-custody record, and parole boards often
ask for the opinion of prison officials. While individual
prison staff are unlikely to have a direct personal
financial incentive for pursuing disciplinary action, the
private prison company as a whole directly benefits from
longer lengths of stay. The seriousness of this risk is
illustrated by the fact that several states have enacted
laws and policies that address its likelihood.46 That longer
prison sentences have not been shown to correlate with
recidivism is indication, again, that private prisons do
not serve the best interest of the inmates or the public.
The Policy End Run
Advocates are concerned with the risk of policies and
practices being defined by costs alone, and put into place
without the normal process of debate and approval.
For instance, private prison companies reasonably argue
that contracts need to give them flexibility to respond to
unforeseen challenges or to develop creative practices.47
In practice, this open-endedness may allow them to
implement practices that go against the intentions of the
contract or the best interest of the inmates or the public.
The Political Influence of Prison Companies
Since the modern emergence of private prisons in the
mid-1980s, an intricately connected web of political
influence has developed alongside the growth of the
private prison industry. Because private prisons rely
on a steady stream of inmates to fill beds, it is perhaps

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

not surprising that the private prison industry has
been pivotal in helping to shape and promote criminal
justice policies that favor incarceration as well as put
pro-privatization lawmakers into office.48 (See “Gaming
the System.”49)
By making financial contributions to individual political
campaigns, state political parties, and specific ballot
measures, private prison companies exert influence over
policymaking that helps assure the demand for their
services as well as develop and maintain relationships
that can help them obtain prison contracts. Between
2000 and 2010, CCA, GEO, and Cornell Companies
donated over $800,000 to candidates for federal
office and more than $6 million to candidates for
statewide office. Additionally, in 2010, these three
companies donated more than $1 million to state party
committees.50 The New York Times recently quoted a
former chief prison inspector—who happens to favor
privatization—in Australia as saying “We have lost
control. …These big global companies, in relation
to specific activities, are more powerful than the
governments they’re dealing with.”51
Prison Company Lobbying
Another key area of concern is the lobbying done on
behalf of the private prison industry. Prison industry
lobbyists seek to influence sentencing policies as well
as the rules and regulations included in government
contracts. In 2010, CCA, the GEO Group, and Cornell
Companies together spent more than $1.5 million on
federal lobbying.52
Prison Company Influence on Criminal Justice
Policymaking and Law
Private prison companies have been influential in
the development and passage of state legislation that
increases incarceration, including “three strikes” and
“truth in sentencing” laws in the mid-1990s.53
More recently, as immigration detention continues
to represent a growing market for private prison
corporations, the industry has been instrumental in the
drafting and enacting of influential state legislation.

10

A key example of this influence is Arizona’s SB
1070, which drastically increased law enforcement’s
options to detain any individual who is perceived to
be an undocumented immigrant.54 This legislation
was developed under the auspices of the nonprofit
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC),
whose membership includes lawmakers and powerful
corporations such as, until recently, CCA.55 An
investigation by National Public Radio found that the
majority of the 36 co-sponsors of SB 1070 subsequently
received contributions from prison lobbyists or from
CCA, the GEO Group, and Management & Training
Corporation.56
Private prison corporations also mobilize against
legislation that would have a negative impact on its
industry. This includes the federal Private Prison
Information Act, which has been introduced by
lawmakers several times in the past decade, including
during the 2011–12 legislative session. Reports indicate
that CCA has spent millions of dollars to lobby against
this legislation, which would require private facilities that
house federal inmates to abide by the same Freedom of
Information Act guidelines that apply to public federal
prisons.57
Friends in High Places: Prison Company
Relationship Building
There are many examples of close connections between
the major prison companies and current or former
government officials that have the potential to assist
these companies.58 A prison company strategy is to add
a corrections official—in a consultant role—to a prison
company’s board of directors; the consultant advocates
for privatization from their vantage point. When the
conflict of interest is disclosed, the consultant is hired
by the private firm at a generous salary.59 A recent case
in point is CCA’s 2011 hiring of Harley Lappin, the past
director of the federal Bureau of Prisons, to serve as an
executive vice president and chief corrections officer for
the company.60
The profit incentive has also been known to spawn
serious corruption. For instance, in Luzerne,
Pennsylvania, agents of a private prison company were

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found to have paid bribes to local judges to encourage
them to commit youth to their two local facilities.61 In
Willacy County, Texas, two county commissioners were
found to have accepted bribes in exchange for favoring
certain companies involved in building a new private
facility.62
The above sections have shown how private prisons are
a pervasive but unnecessary part of the US corrections
system. It also has been shown how the presence of
private prisons makes true reform of the system less
likely, and how prison companies use their influence to
perpetuate and worsen the laws and policies that have
led to the overuse of incarceration in this country. The
next section describes how government oversight of
private prisons has been inadequate, but shows that
contracting (including strong oversight) can be used to
curtail the growth and the deficiencies in private prison.

Contracting Oversight and
Monitoring
Public-private partnerships hinge on contracts. Contracts
are more than promises of future collaboration. A
contract provides a jurisdiction with a mechanism
to clearly identify the contractor’s responsibilities
and requirements; to prescribe how this work will be
accomplished, compensated, and monitored; and to
describe penalties that will be incurred if performance
is sub-standard. A comprehensive, sound contracting
procedure is a central and crucial feature of an effective
prison privatization effort.63 Within the contract should
be detailed descriptions of how the contract and the
functioning of the private prison will be overseen and
monitored by the government. (See elements of a good
contract.64)
The experience of various jurisdictions has
demonstrated that contracts executed with private prison
companies are often poorly drafted and may minimize
or omit key provisions, which can lead to numerous
problems including inadequate contractor performance,
absence of transparency, abuse of prisoner rights, and
an overall lack of accountability.65 Oversight and

October 2011

monitoring has also proven to be difficult and tends to
be lax and ineffective.
Transparency Issues
One key issue of concern for advocates is a general
lack of tracking, reporting, and accessibility of data on
inmates. Private prison contractors, unlike government
agencies, are not typically required to report on the
inmates housed in privately run prisons, do not make
this data easily accessible to monitors, or are even aware
of the documentation and reporting requirements
intrinsic to the operation of public agencies.66 Further,
from a financial perspective, it is in the contractor’s best
interest to minimize the reporting of data that could
provide important—though potentially negative—
information about conditions of confinement, such as
the number of assaults that take place in the facility,
incident reports, and grievances filed, etc.67 Laws
requiring full transparency and access to data, stronger
contracts, and intensive oversight can help alleviate these
concerns.
Guaranteed Payments
The daily population of a prison will vary, but prison
companies have negotiated for some very favorable
terms regarding this fluctuation. Contracts often
guarantee a minimum occupancy rate, usually about
95%, and allow private prison operators to overstate
costs and maximize revenue. Fees may escalate when
the rate is exceeded, and a company may still bill at
this rate if occupancy drops.68 There are several kinds
of payment structures that may be incorporated into a
contract besides the per bed approach, including a fixed
price, “indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity” approach,
which allows that prisons beds will be provided by the
contractor on an as-needed basis.69
Monitoring
“Even carefully drafted contracts cannot prevent
many decisions by private contractors that might yield
inhumane conditions of confinement.”70 In addition
to—and part of—contracting, another critical feature of
a private prison operation is designing, implementing,

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

and maintaining a strong monitoring program.71
Oversight and monitoring provides a way for the
government to measure contract compliance, and must
concentrate on the contractor’s adherence to contract
terms as well as its success in securing the safety of the
public, inmates, and staff. Monitoring can and should
address all parts of a contract, with key areas including
security issues; legal and constitutional requirements;
conditions of confinement; medical and mental health
services; all aspects of staffing; records and reports;
and inmate programming. Monitoring also provides
a basis for contract renewals or terminations and for
charging fees and other penalties.72 It is important to
note that monitoring of conditions inside any prison,
public or private, is difficult, partly because of the
necessarily closed and isolated setting of secure facilities.
Privatization, however, adds another complicated layer
to that isolation, often one where the private prison
company has motivation to resist efforts toward
transparency and accountability.

Other Forms of Corrections
Privatization
The privatization of various correctional elements,
apart from whole facilities, also continues to grow. In
these cases, a government agency will contract with
a provider to supply a service such as health care or
programming for inmates. The reasons for pursuing
these contractual relationships are typically cost savings
and improvements in the quality and effective delivery
of service through the specialization that private groups
can develop.
Privatization of Health Care
A 2005 survey of state corrections departments found
that 32 states contracted with private companies for
some or all of their prison health care services.73
Opponents of privatized health care cite concerns that
this profit-driven approach may result in insufficient
staffing levels; a lack of appropriate treatment for
prisoners, such as delays that are longer than medically
indicated in sending inmates to the emergency room;74
and oversight issues.75

12

Privatization of Probation and Parole
Other correctional areas experiencing growth in
privatization include probation and parole. One reason
for the shift from public to private supervision is the
growing number of probation caseloads for state
probation officers and limited state budgets to address
this growth. A 2007 report found that about 10 states
contract with private agencies to provide supervision of
an estimated 300,000 clients on court-ordered probation,
typically for misdemeanor, low risk offenses.76
Concerns about privatized probation include the focus
on profit making through collection of fees and fines
from the offender, with little or no attention paid to
an individual’s underlying issues such as substance use
or unemployment,77 as well as an absence of standards
for many aspects of the industry, which, among
other things, can allow parole or probation officers’
compensation to be directly connected to the fees he
or she collects.78 Recommendations for improving the
selection, performance, and accountability of private
probation officers include developing more rigorous
statewide requirements for the private supervision
of probationers, increasing training and educational
standards for private agency staff, toughening agency
reporting obligations, and evaluating whether private
probation providers have achieved stated performance
goals. Other areas that could be included in a contract
with a private probation provider include details about
criminal background checks for individuals working
as probation officers and procedures for working with
indigent offenders.79

Responding to the Expansion of
Private Prisons: Action Steps for
Advocates
Assess, Understand, Organize, Educate
Slow Down the Process
A consistent element of efforts to establish or expand
privatization of corrections is a sense of urgency.
Proponents of privatization will stress this “time

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National Council on Crime and Delinquency

factor” as they push to move the complicated process
forward at the risk of limiting due process for public
comment; careful review of all the various factors
contributing to the perceived need, potential impact,
long-term costs of the change, and viable alternatives;
careful consideration of applicable laws, regulations,
and policies; and development of a strong and thorough
contract. When behind-the-scenes negotiations finally
come to light, stakeholders are already behind the curve
as projects already have momentum. In the recent court
ruling against GEO in Florida, the judge said, “From
the record, it appears that the rush to meet the deadlines
in the proviso has resulted in many shortcomings in the
evaluation of whether privatization is in the best public
interest as it relates to cost and effective service.”80
Support Further Studies of Corrections
Privatization
Reliable information is crucial to informing a response
to the private prison industry. Further research is
needed on rates of incidents of abuse or neglect, of
victimization, of conditions of confinement, etc.; the
ways the profit incentive impacts facility safety and
security and the humane treatment of inmates; the
influence of prison companies on legislation, regulation,
and policies regarding sentencing, parole and probation,
detention, immigration policy, and the individuals
involved; cost savings; monitoring efforts and practices
in private prisons; alternative compensation methods;
meaningful responses to contract noncompliance;
and privatized correctional services such as medical
and mental health care, probation and parole, and
programming.81 Also needed are studies of research
methodology as it applies to corrections privatization82
and of the relative bias of the various sources of
information and research on private prisons, including
that funded by prison companies.
Understand Who the Stakeholders Are
This report cannot provide a comprehensive picture
of the contracting practices, monitoring, oversight, and
problems private prisons create in each state and

October 2011

locality, nor of the numerous players and stakeholders in
the process, the variations in the level of privatization,
inmate populations, services provided, state and local
law and regulation, etc. However, efforts to impact
privatization efforts will require a strong understanding
of these and other elements as they apply to individual
jurisdictions.
Seek Partners
Not all government representatives involved favor a
move toward privatization. The decision to pursue
privatization is usually made by the chief executive
or policymakers: the governor, mayor, county
executive, city manager, legislature, city council,
county commissioners, etc. Representatives of related
county or city agencies—corrections, probation, law
enforcement, the court, district attorney, etc.—are
likely to have involvement, but are not necessarily
supportive of the move to privatization. Community
members, consultants, as well as local, county, state, and
national advocacy groups can also play a role. Legislative
representatives are often in charge of the contracting
process, so it is these individuals whom advocates
should target. After stakeholders have been identified,
build alliances or coalitions with stakeholder individuals
and organizations that have similar goals.
Educate Communities Where Private Prisons are
Trying to Locate
Provide information that will balance the prison
company’s claims about the promise of good jobs and
local prosperity. A communications strategy such as
reaching out to the media, writing op-eds, and public
presentations may be very useful.
Educate policymakers with available data about the
economic impact of prisons, ethical concerns, research
and media reports on conditions of confinement,
legislative and regulative avenues for keeping prison
companies in check, common problems with
contracting, and recommendations for strong, thorough
contracting.

October 2011

National Council on Crime and Delinquency

14

Successful Efforts in Louisiana and Ohio
In 2011, Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, and Ohio considered privatizing prison facilities,
either for the first time or as a continuing correctional approach. These proposals were
met with resistance by community members. In Louisiana, Association of Federal, State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) members protested a proposed plan by
Governor Bobby Jindal to sell three state prison facilities to private prison operators;
Jindal’s proposal was also not supported by the state legislature and did not move
forward.83 In Ohio, a proposal by Governor John Kasich to sell five prisons, opposed by
AFSCME and the Ohio Civil Services Employees Association, was revised to the sale of
one prison to CCA and the turnover of operations of two other prisons to Management &
Training Corporation.84
Advocate for Sentencing Reform and New
Legislation and Regulation
Private prison companies already enjoy a large influence
in the corrections field. New, tougher, and more specific
laws and regulations can help hold them in check. There
are a number of legislative and regulative avenues to
be pursued regarding private prisons: Limit power and
influence; limit types and scopes of facilities; create
standards regarding what laws apply, minimum levels
and quality of care, and transparency of company
policies and practices; and maximize accountability
and responsiveness to issues that arise. Most of these
apply to the private prisons, but elected officials also
need to be held to the same standard of transparency,
accountability, and legality.
Reduce the Demand for Privatization Through
Advocacy for Sentencing Reform and Other Laws
and Policies Impacting Incarceration Rates
Given that private prisons have not been shown to
provide better treatment of inmates or conditions of
confinement, better services or programming, better
post-release outcomes, improved public safety, or
consistent taxpayer dollar savings, perhaps the only
remaining argument in favor of private prisons is
the relatively quick response to bed space needs. As
described above, relying on private prisons to ease
crowding comes at the detriment to reform in the

public system. Even with the relative speed with which
prison companies work, much effort goes into the
development and implementation of a private prison—
efforts that would be better spent on reducing the use
of incarceration through the existing means described
in this report.85 Detention and sentencing reform is a
critical strategy by which the government can reduce its
reliance on incarceration and thereby reduce the need—
the demand—for private prisons. Advocates need
to demand the revision of the policies and practices
that hastened their growth: “tough on crime” statutes,
detention decisions, mandatory minimums, truth in
sentencing, sentence enhancements, reduced authority
of judges vs. increased power of prosecutors, and
mandatory time for parole and probation violations.
Some states are already pursuing these reforms; a
continued emphasis on these issues is a crucial way
to downsize the perceived need for prison beds and
reduce the profits and therefore the viability of prison
companies.
Advocate for Reform of Parole and Probation
Policies and Re-entry Strategies
The private prison industry relies on ex-inmates
reoffending and returning to prison, and on sentences
stemming from probation violations.86 Offenders can
avoid incarceration if there are more opportunities
for skills training while individuals are incarcerated,87
re-entry plans, advocacy for state-level policies that

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Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

will remove obstacles for former inmates to access
supportive services and obtain employment,88 and policy
reform.
Support Legislation That Seeks to Increase
Transparency and Improve Accountability of
Private Prison Companies
The Private Prison Information Act deserves support.89
Another opportunity for legislative advocacy is in the
area of legislation and regulations regarding lobbying,
conflicts of interest, and transparency in privatized
activities. Also needed is better access to private prisons’
financial data in order to track the true costs of running
a private prison. (See list of state laws.)

October 2011

corrections department operations in the budget
language rather than proposing and passing it as
legislation.91 This claim was upheld in state court,
with the judge concluding that private prison
proponents had attempted an end run of the
normal legislative process and that “the Legislature
has by-passed the very safeguards it built into the
process that DOC is required to follow.”92 The value
of GEO Group stock fell 5% with the news.93
•	 While they have, for the most part, not held up
in court, suits have been brought challenging the
constitutionality of governmental privatization of
functions that are “inherently governmental;” that
is, that leave the application of US laws and statues
at the discretion of a private contractor. (See Lucas
Anderson’s compilation of applicable laws in each
state.94)

Seek full disclosure of relationships and affiliations
by those involved in private prison projects, establish
watchdog groups with resources and authority for strong
•	 Lawsuits regarding abuse or neglect of inmates in
oversight and quick action, pursue laws and regulations
private facilities against the private prison companies
that define the ethics and legality of relationships and
can target the companies’ revenue, although the
conflicts of interest, and help jurisdictions develop
companies expect and are prepared for a certain
contracts that provide for real monitoring and serious
number of these suits, just as all corporations insure
repercussions when ethics issues and other types of
against such actions. The costs of lawsuits against
noncompliance arise.
private prison companies can also be returned
to the state or local government in the form of
Pursue Legal Action
higher contracting fees and overages. Nevertheless,
civil suits are an important means for individual
Recent legal actions to block prison privatization efforts
restitution, spotlighting problems, and maintaining a
have taken several forms:
check and balance on prison company practices.
•	 Lawsuits filed by the American Friends Service
Advocate for and Support Stronger Contracting
Committee in Arizona and workers groups in
Oversight and Monitoring
Florida.
•	 The Teamsters union has filed an ethics complaint
against Florida governor Rick Scott, claiming
his move to privatize prisons in south Florida is
compromised due to the fact he received campaignrelated contributions from CCA and the GEO
Group.90
•	 The Florida Police Benevolent Association,
representing unionized corrections officers, filed a
lawsuit claiming that the legislature violated the law
by inserting a directive regarding privatization of

Contracts provide an opportunity to address issues not
addressed in laws and regulations. Short of stopping a
new facility or new contract altogether, advocates can
help minimize the harm caused when private prisons
use their resources and political clout to negotiate
terms strongly in their own favor. There is a growing
understanding of what constitutes a solid contract.
Advocates need to demand strong contracts with high
levels of specificity. Contracts need to reflect policy
and values of jurisdiction, and need to foresee and
forestall as many issues as possible, such as potential

October 2011

Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

end runs around policy and increases in costs associated
with economic or justice trends. Each element of the
contract needs to be linked to a specific method for
monitoring and oversight, and to ramifications for
noncompliance.
Provide Technical Assistance to Local
Government Entities (Such as Counties) to Draft
Effective Request for Proposals (RFPs) and
Contracts
This can include training by individuals with experience
in this field as well as pro bono consultations with
attorneys who specialize in contract law. At the outset
of the contracting process, experts emphasize the
importance of developing a well-constructed RFP. An
RFP provides a way for a government agency to state
the services they wish to contract for and solicit bids
from vendors. The RFP is an important step in the
process; a well-crafted and thorough RFP can make
sure that proposals put forth by prison companies
are themselves thorough, detailed, responsive, and
verifiable. An RFP that clearly articulates a jurisdiction’s
specific needs and provides guidelines for responsive
proposals will, in turn, guide the evaluation of RFPs and
ultimately help define the content of a contract between
a jurisdiction and a private prison operator. Other
kinds of training and technical assistance could cover
key elements to include in contracts, such as specific
provisions related to data keeping, data reporting, and
monitoring, as well as a requirement that contractors
comply with federal and state law as well as any relevant
departmental policies and procedures.95 (See sources for
sample contracts.)
Performance-based Contracting
One way of requiring private prison contractors
to achieve a jurisdiction’s desired practices and
outcomes, such as data reporting or successful
prisoner rehabilitation, is through the application of
performance-based contracting. A relatively new trend in
the public sector encouraged through federal guidelines
such as the Fair Acquisition Regulations, performance-

16

based contracting allows governments to identify
specific outcomes that private prison contractors should
achieve and to hinge compensation on meeting these
goals.96 One performance-based approach gaining
popularity is guarantees on the part of the contractor
that the government will achieve set levels of cost
savings, such as a 7% improvement over the costs in
public facilities. Another links payment or incentives to a
reduction in reoffending after release.
Meaningful Penalties for Noncompliance
Contracts can include provisions for levying financial
penalties against the contractor if contract terms are
breached. In practice, however, these often fail to
discourage private prison companies from overstepping.
Fines are often set at a relatively low level, such that it
may be more cost-effective for a prison contractor to cut
corners and pay a fine than to comply with the contract
terms. Additionally, the process by which fines may be
levied is often not clearly spelled out in contracts or
consistently applied and monitored.97
Contract Should Include Detailed and Workable
Plans for Monitoring
This plan should include what will be monitored and
how, by whom, how it will be paid for, and how issues
uncovered will be responded to.
Provide Counties and Other Jurisdictions With
Research/Information on Best Practices for
Contracting
This could include examples of key contracting issues
(e.g., problems that typically crop up once a prison is
being operated by a private company) and suggested
language to address these issues.98
The Contract Should Establish Minimum
Qualifications for Key Staff
Key staff include guards and direct service personnel in
facilities, and probation and parole caseworkers. These
standards should meet or exceed all applicable federal
and state guidelines.

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Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

Approaches to Monitoring: More Than Just
Accreditation
Private prison monitors typically use several different
methods to assess contract compliance, such as reviews
of files, reports, logs, and other records (including spotchecking of records for accuracy); onsite observations;
interviews with key stakeholders (managers, staff, and
inmates); and statistical comparisons to an analogous
publicly operated prison.99 Monitoring is “a process,
requiring constant attention and vigilance. Effective
oversight of a prison is thus necessarily a labor-intensive
endeavor.”100 Some monitoring plans fail to allow
for what most would consider basic requirements,
such as unannounced site visits.101 The monitoring
process should also take into account more intangible,
unrecorded factors such as a prison’s climate, guardto-inmate communications, staff decision making, etc.,
which is described as follows by Collins: “Experienced
corrections officials know that a prison may comply
chapter and verse with the specifics of a contract and
still not be a safe and healthy facility.”102

October 2011

As part of the contract between a jurisdiction and
a private prison company, the company is typically
required to obtain and maintain accreditation from
the American Correctional Association (ACA). An
important distinction between ACA accreditation and
outcome monitoring is that ACA accreditation focuses
on processes and procedures, rather than on outcomes.
Experts caution against relying too heavily on ACA
accreditation to measure institutional effectiveness
and recommend a close linkage between what is called
“paper-based” accreditation (e.g., through ACA or
other bodies such as the National Commission on
Correctional Health Care) and regular, onsite monitoring
of contract compliance, service quality, and outcomes.103
Affiliation and Expertise of the Monitor
The monitor’s training as well as his or her relationship
to the facility is an important concern. While the
monitor may be a consultant or subcontractor, this
person may be paid by the prison operator, creating
a potential conflict of interest. In rural areas, the
monitor may be an individual who lives in or is

Successful State Example – Arizona
The recent experience of a private prison in Kingman, AZ, operated by Management &
Training Corporation (MTC), illustrates the need for various improvements and additions
to standard contracts, including planning related to occupancy and compensation, as
well as provisions concerning security and monitoring. After several inmates escaped
from Kingman in 2010 and allegedly killed two people, the state transferred more than
200 high risk inmates from the Kingman facility to another prison and determined that
additional prisoners would not be sent to Kingman until MTC complied with identified
problems, including retraining of corrections officers. This meant that MTC’s guaranteed
minimum occupancy rate of 97% was not met for nearly a year. In response to the
state’s action, MTC filed a “notice of claim” against the state, seeking approximately
$10 million in revenue that was lost when the state stopped supplying Kingman with
inmates. This series of events led the state department of corrections to revamp its
RFP process to include stipulations that private prisons will have to provide additional
security regardless of the security level of inmates; state monitors will have continuous,
unscheduled access to the facility, inmates, and records; and fines of $25,000 can be
levied for certain violations.

October 2011

Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

otherwise embedded in the community where the
prison is situated, leading to possible tension or bias in
pointing out problems that could affect many residents’
livelihoods.104 Also, monitors should have expertise in
the area(s) they are monitoring. In the case of prison
health care services, monitors should be medical
providers who work for the state or county and who
can knowledgeably evaluate the quality of services that
inmates receive.105
Improve Transparency Through Data Keeping,
Reporting, and Access to Data
A critical concern is that private prisons are generally not
required to report data to the local or state government
with which they contract, or to any oversight body.
Information is a powerful tool for advocacy; the lack of
useful data not only reduces the accountability of prison
companies, thus putting inmates and guards at risk, but
weakens opposition to their efforts to expand. Data
keeping and reporting practices that make information
readily accessible will help facilitate monitoring. It
is necessary to build specific requirements for data
collection and reporting into the contract.106 These steps
could help to correct the transparency and accountability
issues that often appear endemic to the private prison
industry.
Convene a Citizen Oversight Committee That
Augments the Functions Performed by the
Professional and Government Monitors107

Conclusion
For the most part, the way private prison companies
run their businesses—keeping costs down, pursuing
favorable contracts, influencing laws, policies and public
opinion that most support them, maximizing profits—
are not out of line with other for-profit enterprises.
What sets them apart is their responsibility for a
hugely important and difficult undertaking: assuring
the humane treatment of prisoners, carrying out the
rule of law, and preserving safety in the facilities. They
serve a crucial government function, yet they approach
the task from a strikingly different perspective than the
governments and the public they serve.

18

While it is important not to oversimplify the many
factors that contribute to crime and the corrections
populations, even the strongest supporters of “tough on
crime” policies would agree that the best case scenario
is fewer inmates in custody as long as public safety is
not diminished. The public supports efforts to reduce
the use of incarceration when those efforts are shown
to be practical and effective.109 This ultimately leaves
only those with a financial interest in private prisons
supporting filling more beds in secure facilities.

Endnotes
See Corrections Corporation of America (2010). 2010 Annual
Report. Focus on the Future. Retrieved at http://phx.corporate-ir.
net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEyfENoaWx
kSUQ9NDMyMjg3fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1. With acknowledgment
to email communication from Robert Weiss 5/12/11.

1

West, H.C., Sabol, W.J., & Greenman, S.J. (2010). Prisoners in
2009. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

2

Detention Watch Network. (2011). The influence of the
private prison industry in immigration detention. Washington,
DC: Detention Watch Network. Retrieved from http://www.
detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons

3

Stephan, J. (2008). Census of state and federal correctional
facilities, 2005. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Some
states, including Idaho, Texas, and West Virginia, forbid private
prisons from holding serious offenders, such as violent felons,
allowing only low and medium security private facilities.

4

See Bayer, P. & Pozen, D.E. (2004 November). The effectiveness
of juvenile correctional facilities: Public versus private management.
Yale University, Economic Growth Center. Retrieved at http://
www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp863.pdf.

5

ACLU. (2010). Immigration detention analysis. New York, NY:
ACLU. Retrieved at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/
detention.

6

Detention Watch Network. (2011). The influence of the
private prison industry in immigration detention. Washington,
DC: Detention Watch Network. Retrieved at http://www.
dete01ntionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons.

7

ACLU (2010). Immigration detention analysis. New York, NY:
ACLU. Retrieved at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/
detention.

8

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Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming the system: How the
political strategies of private prison companies promote ineffective
incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute; In
the Public Interest (2011). Backgrounder brief: Prison privatization.
Washington, DC: In the Public Interest.

9

October 2011

19
The Private Corrections Working Group at http://www.privateci.
org/.

10

State of Arizona, Office of the Auditor General (2010).
Department of Corrections-Prison population growth. Phoenix,
AZ: State of Arizona, Office of the Auditor General; Arizona
Department of Corrections. (2011 April 13). FY 2010 Operating
Per Capita Cost Report: Cost Identification and Comparison
of State and Private Contract Beds. Retrieved http://www.
azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/ADC_FY2010_PerCapitaRep.pdf.

Davenport, D.K. (2001 July). State of Arizona, Auditor General,
Performance Audit, Private Prisons. Report No. 01–13; program
descriptions available at http://www.azcorrections.gov/Index.aspx

21

McCain, D. L. (Spring 2001). Malesko v. Correctional Services
Corp. In the Second Circuit: Pursuing Damages for Constitutional
Violations by the Private Prison Industry, 44 How. L.J. 399.

20

11

American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio. (2011). Prisons for
profit: A look at prison privatization. Cleveland, OH: American
Civil Liberties Union of Ohio.
12

Camp, S. D. & Daggett, D. M. (2005). Quality of Operations at
Private and Public Prisons: Using Trends in Inmate Misconduct
to Compare Prisons. Justice Research and Policy, 7: 1: 27–51;
McDonald, D.C. & Carlsen, K. (2005). Contracting for
imprisonment in the federal prison system: Cost and performance
of the privately operated Taft Correctional Institution. Cambridge,
MA: Abt Associates Inc.
13

14
Davenport, D.K. (2001 July). State of Arizona, Auditor General,
Performance Audit, Private Prisons. Report No. 01–13; program
descriptions available at http://www.azcorrections.gov/Index.aspx;
Oppel, R.A., Jr. (2011 May 18). Private prisons found to offer little
in savings. New York Times. Retrieved at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html?pagewanted=all.

Camp, S.D. & Gaes, G.G. (2001). Growth and quality
of U.S. private prisons: Evidence from a national survey.
Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of
Research and Evaluation. This quote is from page 16 of the
report; Hiaasen, S. (2011 April 24). Effort to privatize Florida
prisons raises questions of cos. Miami Herald. Retrieved at
http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/
effort-to-privatize-florida-prisons-raises-questions-of-cost/1165807.
15

Lundahl, B.W., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet,
R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost and quality
of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice,
19(4):383–394.
16

Grassroots Leadership. (2009). Considering a private jail, prison,
or detention center? A resource packet for community members
and public officials (2nd ed). Austin, TX: Grassroots Leadership.
17

Deitch, M. (2003). Highlights of private prison scandals in Texas
2/28/03. Retrieved at http://www.aclutx.org/files/Highlights%20
of%20Private%20Prison%20Scandals%20in%20Texas.pdf.

18

This includes the following: Austin, J. & Coventry, G. (2001).
Emerging issues on privatized prisons. Washington, DC: Bureau of
Justice Assistance; Lundahl, B.W., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris,
N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis
of cost and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social
Work Practice, 19(4):383–394; Nelson, J. (2005). Competition
in corrections: Comparing public and private sector operations.
Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation; Pratt, T.C. & Maahs, J.
(1999 July). Are private prisons more cost-effective than public
prisons? A meta-analysis of evaluation research studies. Crime and
Delinquency; New York.

This includes the following: Blumstein, J.F., Cohen, M.A., & Seth,
S. (2007). Do government agencies respond to market pressures?
Evidence from private prisons. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University
(Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03–16;
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 03–05); Segal, G.F. &
Moore, J.T. (2002). Watching the watchmen: Evaluating the costs
and benefits of outsourcing correctional services (part 1). Los
Angeles, CA: Reason Public Policy Institute.
22

In the Public Interest (2011). Backgrounder brief: The high costs
of privatization. Washington, DC: In the Public Interest.

23

Hall, J. & Walsh, K. (2010). Are Florida’s private prisons keeping
their promise? Tallahassee, FL: The Florida Center for Fiscal and
Economic Policy; Gaes, G. (2008). Cost, performance studies look
at prison privatization. National Institute of Justice Journal. Vol.
259; U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007). Costs of
prisons: Bureau of Prisons needs better data to assess alternatives
for acquiring low and minimum security facilities. Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Accountability Office.

24

See http://www.cca.com/cca-research-institute/
research-findings/.
25

26

Telephone communication with Gail Tyree (9/21/11).

Glasmeier, A.K. & Farrigan, T.L. (2007). The economic impacts
of the prison development boom on persistently poor rural places.
International Regional Science Review, 30(3), 274–299; Hooks, G.,
Mosher, C., Rotolo, T., & Lobao, L. (2004). The prison industry:
27

October 2011

Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

20

Carceral expansion and employment in U.S. counties, 1969–1994.
Social Science Quarterly. 85(1), 37–57.

39
Mendell, R. (2011). No place for kids: The case for reducing
juvenile detention. Baltimore, MD: Annie E. Casey Foundation.

Hooks, G., Mosher, C., Rotolo, T., & Lobao, L. (2004). The prison
industry: Carceral expansion and employment in U.S. counties,
1969–1994. Social Science Quarterly. 85(1), 37–57.

Porter, N. (2011). The state of sentencing 2010: Developments in
policy and practice. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.

28

40

Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming the system: How the
political strategies of private prison companies promote ineffective
incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute;
Mitchell, M. (2011, September 3). Texas prison boom going bust.
Star-Telegram. Retrieved from http://www.star-telegram.com.  

41

Chadwell, S. (2009). Public Financing of Private Jails. In
Grassroots Leadership. (2009). Considering a private jail, prison, or
detention center? A resource packet for community members and
public officials (2nd ed). Austin, TX: Grassroots Leadership.
29

Telephone/email communications with Michelle Deitch (5/6/11)
and Robert Weiss (5/12/11); Office of Program Policy Analysis &
Government Accountability (2009). Steps to control prison inmate
health care costs have begun to show savings. Tallahassee, FL:
Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability.
30

Mitchell, M. (2011, September 3). Texas prison boom going bust.
Star-Telegram. Retrieved from http://www.star-telegram.com;
Pinkerton, J. (2005, February 27) Scandal dims hopes in Willacy
County. Houston Chronicle Rio Grande Valley Bureau. Retrieved at
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas.

Email communication with Robert Weiss (5/12/11); Dolovich,
S. (2009). How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons. In
Government by contract: Outsourcing and American democracy,
Jody Freeman and Martha Minow, eds., Harvard University Press;
UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 07–07. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=970629
42

31

32

Email communication with Robert Weiss (5/12/11).

Austin, J. & Coventry, G. (2001). Emerging issues on privatized
prisons. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.
43

44
Austin, J. & Coventry, G. (2001). Emerging issues on privatized
prisons. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Telephone/email communication with Sharon Dolovich
(5/17/11) and Robert Weiss (5/12/11); American Civil Liberties
Union of Ohio. (2011). Prisons for profit: A look at prison
privatization. Cleveland, OH: American Civil Liberties Union of
Ohio; Grassroots Leadership. (2009). Considering a private jail,
prison, or detention center? A resource packet for community
members and public officials (2nd ed). Austin, TX: Grassroots
Leadership.
45

American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio. (2011). Prisons for
profit: A look at prison privatization. Cleveland, OH: American
Civil Liberties Union of Ohio. This quote is from page 8 of the
report.
33

Mendelson, N.A. (2009). Six simple steps to increase contractor
accountability. In J. Freeman & M. Minow (Eds.), Government by
Contract: Outsourcing and American democracy. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
34

McDonald, D. & Patten, C. (2003). Governments’ management
of private prisons. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.

Dolovich, S. (2005). State punishment and private prisons. Duke
Law Journal, 55(3), 439–548. See pages 518–523 of   the article.
46

35

Austin, J. & Coventry, G. (2001). Emerging issues on privatized
prisons. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.
36

Anderson, L. (Fall, 2009). Kicking the National Habit: The Legal
And Policy Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39
Pub. Cont. L.J. 113.

37

ACLU of Georgia & Georgia Detention Watch. (2011).
Securely insecure: The real costs, consequences and human face
of immigration detention. Washington, DC: Detention Watch
Network. Retrieved at http://www.georgiadetentionwatch.com/
documents/.
38

Segal, G.F. & Moore, J.T. (2002). Watching the watchmen:
Evaluating the costs and benefits of outsourcing correctional
services (part 1). Los Angeles, CA: Reason Public Policy Institute;
Email communication with Robert Weiss (5/12/11).

47

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.
(2011). Making a killing: How prison corporations are profiting
from campaign contributions and putting taxpayers at risk.
Washington, DC: American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees; Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming
the system: How the political strategies of private prison companies
promote ineffective incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice
Policy Institute.

48

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Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

49
Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming the system: How the
political strategies of private prison companies promote ineffective
incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute; In
the Public Interest (2011). Backgrounder brief: Prison privatization.
Washington, DC: In the Public Interest.

Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming the system: How the
political strategies of private prison companies promote ineffective
incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute.

50

Bernstein, N. (2011 September 28.) Companies Use Immigration
Crackdown to Turn a Profit. New York Times. Retrieved at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/asia/getting-tough-onimmigrants-to-turn-a-profit.html?pagewanted=all.
51

Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming the system: How the
political strategies of private prison companies promote ineffective
incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute.
52

Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming the system: How the
political strategies of private prison companies promote ineffective
incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute;
Hodai, B. (2010, July 21). Corporate con game: How the private
prison industry helped shape Arizona’s anti-immigrant law. In These
Times. Retrieved from http://www.inthesetimes.com.

53

October 2011

61
Associated Press (2011). Former Pennsylvania Judge Sentenced in
Kickbacks Case. Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111903791504576589010561506234.html

Pinkerton, J. (2005, February 27) Scandal dims hopes in Willacy
County. Houston Chronicle Rio Grande Valley Bureau. Retrieved at
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas.
62

Collins, W. (2000). Contracting for correctional services
provided by private firms. Middletown, CT:  Association of State
Correctional Administrators.
63

Mendelson, N.A. (2009). Six simple steps to increase contractor
accountability. In J. Freeman & M. Minow (Eds.), Government by
Contract: Outsourcing and American democracy. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

64

Collins, W. (2000). Contracting for correctional services
provided by private firms. Middletown, CT:  Association of State
Correctional Administrators; Ortega, B. (2011, August 7). Arizona
prison oversight lacking for private facilities: State weighs expansion
even as costs run high. Arizona Republic. Retrieved from www.
azcentral.com/arizonarepublic; telephone communication with
Sharon Dolovich (5/17/11).
65

Archibold, R.C. (2010, April 23). Arizona enacts stringent law
on immigration. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.
nytimes.com; Hodai, B. (2010, July 21). Corporate con game: How
the private prison industry helped shape Arizona’s anti-immigrant
law. In These Times. Retrieved from http://www.inthesetimes.com.  

66
Camp, C.G. & Camp, G.M. (1987). Guidelines for correctional
contracting: A manual for correctional administrators. South
Salem, NY: Criminal Justice Institute; Mendelson, N.A. (2009). Six
simple steps to increase contractor accountability. In J. Freeman
& M. Minow (Eds.), Government by Contract: Outsourcing and
American democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

55

Ortega, B. (2011, September 4) Arizona prison businesses are big
political contributors. Arizona Republic. Retrieved from http://
www.azcentral.com.

Dolovich, S. (2005). State punishment and private prisons. Duke
Law Journal, 55(3), 439–548. This quote is from pages 480–481 of
the article.

Sullivan, L. (2010, October 28). Prison economies help drive
Arizona immigration law. National Public Radio. Retrieved from
http://www.npr.org.

68

54

56

Hodai, B. (2010). Freedom Forum CEO Tied to For-Profit
Prisons. Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR). Retrieved from
http://www.fair.org.
57

Ashton, P. & Petteruti, A. (2011). Gaming the system: How the
political strategies of private prison companies promote ineffective
incarceration policies. Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute.
58

59

Telephone communication with Paul Leighton, 5/17/11.

Texas Prison Bid’ness. (2011, June 7). Former BOP director hired
by Corrections Corporation of America. Texas Prison Bid’ness.
Retrieved from http://www.texasprisonbidness.org.
60

67

Telephone communication with Paul Leighton, 5/17/11.

McDonald, D. & Patten, C. (2003). Governments’ management
of private prisons. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
69

Dolovich, S. (2005). State punishment and private prisons. Duke
Law Journal, 55(3), 439–548. This quote is from pages 480–481 of
the article.

70

71
Collins, W. (2000). Contracting for correctional services provided
by private firms. Middletown, CT: Association of State Correctional
Administrators; Crane, R. (2000). Monitoring correctional services
provided by private firms. Middletown, CT: Association of State
Correctional Administrators; Deitch, M. (2006, February 8).
Effective prison oversight. Prepared testimony for the Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons, 4th Hearing, Los
Angeles, California; Pace Law Review. (2010 Fall). Opening Up a

October 2011

Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

22

Closed World: A Sourcebook on Prison Oversight. New York, New
York: Pace University School of Law. Volume 30, Issue 5.

is killed by House committee. The Times-Picayune. Retrieved from
http://www.nola.com.

72

Crane, R. (2000). Monitoring correctional services provided by
private firms. Middletown, CT: Association of State Correctional
Administrators.

Fields, R. (2011, September 2). Ohio corrections system sells
one prison to private operator, reorganizes four others. The Plain
Dealer. Retrieved from http://www.cleveland.com.

LaFaive, M.D. (2005). Privatization for the health of it. Michigan
Privatization Report. Midland, MI: Mackinac Center for Public
Policy.

Mendell, R. (2011). No place for kids: The case for reducing
juvenile detention. Baltimore, MD: Annie E. Casey Foundation.

73

84

85

Kirchhoff, S.M. (2010). CRS Report for Congress: Economic
impacts of prison growth. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service.

86

Bedard, K. & Freech, T.E. (2007). Prison health care: Is
contracting out healthy? Departmental Working Papers,
Department of Economics. Santa Barbara, CA: UC Santa Barbara;
telephone communication with Joe Goldenson (5/5/11).
74

Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability.
(2009). Steps to control prison inmate health care costs have begun
to show savings. Tallahassee, FL: Office of Program Policy Analysis
& Government Accountability.
75

76
Schloss, C.S. & Alarid, L.F. (2007). Standards in the privatization
of probation services: A statutory analysis. Criminal Justice Review,
32(3), 233–245.

Southern Center for Human Rights. (2008). Profiting from the
poor: A report on predatory probation companies in Georgia.
Atlanta, GA: Southern Center for Human Rights.
77

Southern Center for Human Rights. (2008). Profiting from the
poor: A report on predatory probation companies in Georgia.
Atlanta, GA: Southern Center for Human Rights.
78

Schloss, C.S. & Alarid, L.F. (2007). Standards in the privatization
of probation services: A statutory analysis. Criminal Justice Review,
32(3), 233–245.
79

Alvarez, L. (2011 October 1.) Judge Stops Florida’s Plan to
Privatize 29 State Prisons. New York Times. Retrieved at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/us/florida-prison-privatizationplan-hits-roadblock.html.
80

81
See recommended research at Detention Watch, http://www.
detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons#Research

Camp, S. D. and Daggett, D. M. (2005). Quality of Operations at
Private and Public Prisons: Using Trends in Inmate Misconduct to
Compare Prisons. Justice Research and Policy, 7: 1: 27–51.
82

Moller, J. (2011, March 24). Workers protest plan to sell state
prisons. The Times-Picayune. Retrieved from http://www.nola.
com; Moller, J. (2011, June 6). Gov. Jindal’s plan to sell state prisons

83

Solomon, A.L., Johnson, K.D., Travis, J., & McBride, E.C. (2004).
From prison to work: The employment dimensions of prisoner
reentry. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
87

88
Porter, N. (2011). The state of sentencing 2010: Developments in
policy and practice. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.

Mendelson, N.A. (2009). Six simple steps to increase contractor
accountability. In J. Freeman & M. Minow (Eds.), Government by
Contract: Outsourcing and American democracy. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

89

DeSlatte, A. (2011, September 14). Teamsters file ethics complaint
over prison privatization plans. Orlando Sentinel (blog). Retrieved
from http://www.orlandosentinel.com/
90

Kam, D. (2011, July 19). Corrections union sues state over prison
privatization effort. Palm Beach Post. Retrieved from http://www.
palmbeachpost.com.

91

Kam, D. (2011 September 20). Judge rules prison privatization
plan unconstitutional. http://www.postonpolitics.com/2011/09/
judge-rules-prison-privatization-plan-unconstitutional/.
92

93
Pearson, S. (2011, October 3). Geo Group Falls as Florida Prison
Privatization Is Blocked. Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved at
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011–09–30/geo-groupfalls-as-florida-prison-privatization-is-blocked.html.

Anderson, L. (Fall, 2009). Kicking the National Habit: The Legal
And Policy Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39
Pub. Cont. L.J. 113.
94

Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability.
(2009). Steps to control prison inmate health care costs have begun
to show savings. Tallahassee, FL: Office of Program Policy Analysis
& Government Accountability.
95

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Views from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

McDonald, D. & Patten, C. (2003). Governments’ management
of private prisons. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc; Segal,
G.F. & Moore, J.T. (2002). Watching the watchmen: Evaluating the
costs and benefits of outsourcing correctional services (part 1). Los
Angeles, CA: Reason Public Policy Institute.

96

October 2011

Oakland, CA: National Council on Crime and Delinquency;
Krisberg, B. & Marchionna, S. (2006). Attitudes of US Voters
toward Prisoner Rehabilitation and Reentry Policies (FOCUS).
Oakland, CA: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

Telephone communication with Paul Leighton, 5/17/11; Ortega,
B. (2011, August 7). Arizona prison oversight lacking for private
facilities: State weighs expansion even as costs run high. Arizona
Republic. Retrieved from www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic;
Jennings, T. (2011, April 25). Private prison staffing could trigger
fines. Santa Fe New Mexican. Retrieved from http://www.
santafenewmexican.com.
97

98

Telephone communication with Paul Leighton, 5/17/11.

Crane, R. (2000). Monitoring correctional services provided by
private firms. Middletown, CT: Association of State Correctional
Administrators.
99

Dolovich, S. (2005). State punishment and private prisons. Duke
Law Journal, 55(3), 439–548. This quote is from page 494 of the
article.
100

101

Telephone communication with Sharon Dolovich (5/17/11).

Collins, W. (2000). Contracting for correctional services provided
by private firms. Middletown, CT: Association of State Correctional
Administrators. This quote is from page 36 of the manual.
102

Telephone communication with Sharon Dolovich (5/17/11) and
Joe Goldenson (5/5/11).
103

Dolovich, S. (2005). State punishment and private prisons. Duke
Law Journal, 55(3), 439–548; telephone communication with Paul
Leighton, 5/17/11.
104

Telephone communication with Joe Goldenson (5/5/11);
McDonald, D. & Patten, C. (2003). Governments’ management of
private prisons. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
105

106
Telephone communication with Sharon Dolovich (5/17/11) and
Michelle Deitch (5/6/11).
107

Telephone communication with Joe Goldenson (5/5/11).

Ortega, B. (2011, August 7). Arizona prison oversight lacking
for private facilities: State weighs expansion even as costs run
high. Arizona Republic. Retrieved from www.azcentral.com/
arizonarepublic.
108

Hartney, C., & Marchionna, S. (2009). Attitudes of US voters
toward nonserious offenders and alternatives to incarceration.
109

National Council on Crime and
Delinquency
1970 Broadway, Suite 500
Oakland, California 94612
(510) 208-3500
www.nccd-crc.org