Neither Fair Nor Impartial

An Investigation into the Iowa Department of Corrections’
Sanctions Against an Inmate

Iowa Office of Ombudsman
Ruth H. Cooperrider, Ombudsman

February 16, 2015

Contributors
Investigator
Bert Dalmer, Senior Assistant Ombudsman
Advisory Assistant
Eleena Mitchell-Sadler, Assistant Ombudsman
(Corrections Specialist)
Legal Counsel
Andy Teas
Ombudsman
Ruth Cooperrider

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................... iii
OVERVIEW OF OMBUDSMAN’S INVESTIGATION .............................................................. 1
Complaint .................................................................................................................................... 1
Investigation ................................................................................................................................ 1
Challenge to Ombudsman’s Authority........................................................................................ 2
Background on Inmate Discipline ............................................................................................... 3
FINDINGS OF FACT..................................................................................................................... 6
The Incident................................................................................................................................. 6
The Investigation ....................................................................................................................... 10
The Alleged Violations ............................................................................................................. 11
The Hearing ............................................................................................................................... 12
The Appeal ................................................................................................................................ 13
Ombudsman’s Preliminary Review .......................................................................................... 14
A More Expansive Review ....................................................................................................... 15
A New Wrinkle ......................................................................................................................... 16
The Revised Decision................................................................................................................ 17
A Request for Reconsideration ................................................................................................. 18
A New Revelation ..................................................................................................................... 18
DOC Explains Its Actions ......................................................................................................... 21
The Supreme Court Weighs In .................................................................................................. 28
Policy Revisions Since the Linderman Investigation ................................................................ 28
ANALYSIS and CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 29
The Earned Time Sanction: Which Scenario to Believe? ......................................................... 29
The Disciplinary Detention Sanction: Did the Punishment Fit the Act? .................................. 31
Are DOC’s Administrative Law Judges Truly Independent? ................................................... 32
Do DOC Inmates Receive Adequate Notice of Rule Violations? ............................................. 33
What Remedies have the Courts Ordered in Mishandled Disciplinary Cases? ........................ 36
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 37
RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 38
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................... 40
i

APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................... 41
APPENDIX C ............................................................................................................................... 42
APPENDIX D ............................................................................................................................... 44
APPENDIX E ............................................................................................................................... 45
DOC DIRECTOR JOHN BALDWIN’S REPLY ......................................................................... 47
FORMER DOC ALJ DEB EDWARDS’ REPLY ........................................................................ 55
OMBUDSMAN COMMENT ....................................................................................................... 57

ii

PREFACE
The Office of Ombudsman (Ombudsman) is an independent and impartial agency in the
legislative branch of Iowa state government which investigates complaints against most Iowa
state and local government agencies. The governor, legislators, and judges and their staffs fall
outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s powers and duties are defined in
Iowa Code chapter 2C.
The Ombudsman can investigate to determine whether an agency’s action is unlawful, contrary
to policy, unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or otherwise objectionable. The Ombudsman may
make recommendations to the agency and other appropriate officials to correct a problem or to
improve government policies, practices, or procedures. If the Ombudsman determines that a
public official has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary proceedings, the
Ombudsman may refer the matter to the appropriate authorities.
If the Ombudsman decides to publish a report of the investigative findings, conclusions, and
recommendations, and the report is critical of the agency, the agency is given an opportunity to
reply to the report, and the unedited reply is attached to the report.

iii

OVERVIEW OF OMBUDSMAN’S INVESTIGATION
Complaint
On May 9, 2008, we received a letter of complaint from Randy Linderman, an inmate at Fort
Dodge Correctional Facility (FDCF). Linderman’s primary allegation was that he was
disciplined too harshly after a confrontation with an FDCF correctional officer (CO). Twentytwo days after Linderman engaged in a heated, close-quarters argument with CO David Diemer,
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Deborah Edwards held a hearing and found Linderman guilty
of breaking three prison rules, including assault. Edwards sanctioned Linderman to 180 days of
disciplinary detention and imposed a loss of 180 days of earned time. In his letter to us,
Linderman denied assaulting CO Diemer and argued that these sanctions were far in excess of
the norm in Iowa Department of Corrections’ (DOC) prisons.
After we made initial inquiries with ALJ Edwards, reviewed pertinent records, and discussed the
matter with FDCF Warden Cornell Smith and DOC General Counsel Michael Savala, we issued
a notice of investigation to DOC Director John Baldwin on August 29, 2008. Linderman alleged
that Edwards’ decision in the disciplinary case was unreasonable and unfair. We also later
considered whether Edwards and Smith, in his review of Linderman’s appeal, had acted contrary
to law or DOC policy.
Investigation
To investigate Linderman’s complaint, we reviewed all of the prison records pertaining to his
specific disciplinary case, which included a report, an investigation summary, witness
statements, video recordings, an initial hearing decision, a revised hearing decision, Linderman’s
appeal, and an appeal decision.
In order to compare the sanctions in Linderman’s case to similar cases, we requested and
received a report from DOC outlining every disciplinary case over a three-year period in three
medium security prisons where an inmate was found guilty of assaulting a staff member. We
then reviewed the particulars of each of those disciplinary cases.
For further comparison, we also reviewed select disciplinary hearing decisions where prison
ALJs decided, based on the specific facts of the cases, to impose greater sanctions against
inmates than the norm.
We reviewed DOC policies pertaining to discipline. We also reviewed state and federal case law
dealing with the proper disposition of disciplinary matters, and we interviewed a legal expert in
the corrections field.
We reviewed emails among FDCF and DOC officials dealing with the Linderman case.
Lastly, we interviewed Warden Smith, DOC General Counsel Michael Savala, and ALJ Edwards
under oath.

1

Challenge to Ombudsman’s Authority
Early in our investigation, we had two fairly short telephone interviews and an email exchange
with ALJ Edwards. Later, we received information from Warden Smith that contradicted
information we had received from Edwards. To work through the contradictions, on August 29,
2008, we requested sworn interviews of Edwards and Smith. We initially received a favorable
response from Director Baldwin. But on September 26, 2008, DOC’s legal representative,
Assistant Iowa Attorney General William Hill, informed us that DOC believed the Ombudsman
lacked the authority to conduct a sworn interview of ALJ Edwards.
We attempted to complete our investigation without ALJ Edwards’ testimony and proceeded
with a sworn interview of Warden Smith, and later, DOC General Counsel Michael Savala.
After Smith and Savala were unable to answer key questions in the case, we again requested a
sworn interview with Edwards on April 10, 2009. After more discussion, Baldwin told us on
August 19, 2009, that he would allow us to interview Edwards, but not under oath. Director
Baldwin accused our investigator of being “confrontational” and “intimidating” in his interviews
of Smith and Savala, and said he would not allow the same to occur with Edwards. We
disagreed with Baldwin’s characterizations and insisted that the interview be conducted under
oath. We were unable to agree on terms with DOC.
We responded by issuing a subpoena for Edwards’ sworn testimony on February 5, 2010, and
again on May 17, 2010. After Hill stated his intention to object to the subpoena and instruct
Edwards not to submit to the sworn interview, we filed a lawsuit against DOC on October 22,
2010, to ask a judge to enforce the subpoena.
DOC argued that Edwards and its other ALJs who preside over inmate disciplinary hearings have
a “mental-process” privilege that immunizes them from answering direct questions about the
reasoning behind their decisions.1 The Iowa Supreme Court had never before recognized the
privilege for DOC’s ALJs, who are not part of the judiciary and are not subject to the same laws
and ethical standards as most state ALJs.
We argued that ALJs were not judges in the strict sense, and that Iowa Code § 2C.9(5) gives the
Ombudsman the express authority to “compel any person to appear [and] give sworn testimony
… relevant to a matter under inquiry.” (Emphasis added.) If we could not interview Edwards
under oath, we argued, that would undermine our statutory mission as the state’s watchdog to
scrutinize and evaluate the administrative actions of Iowa’s government agencies.
On August 3, 2011, Polk County District Court Judge Joel Novak sided with our arguments and
ordered Edwards to answer our questions under oath. DOC appealed the decision to the Iowa
Supreme Court.
On December 14, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its decision. For the first time, the Court
recognized that ALJs like Edwards do enjoy a qualified mental-process privilege that generally

1

The mental-process privilege is a longstanding common-law privilege for judges to protect their thought processes
and uncommunicated motivations so they may reach decisions free from external or political pressures.

2

protects them from direct questioning. However, because our investigation showed “strong
evidence” of “improper conduct” by Edwards and Warden Smith, and because we could not
understand the basis of Edwards’ decision through other means, the Court ruled that we had
overcome the privilege and could ask Edwards questions under oath.
After more than four years of delay, we interviewed Edwards on March 25, 2013, about her
thought processes in Linderman’s disciplinary case.
Background on Inmate Discipline
Inmates of DOC’s nine prisons are governed by policies and institutional rule books that explain
prison protocols, behavioral expectations, inmates’ rights and privileges, and grievance
procedures. At the time of the writing of this report, there are 43 specific “major” rules that all
DOC inmates are instructed not to violate. All of the major rules are defined and classified as
“A,” ”B,” “C,” or “D” violations, with “A” being the most serious. Some rules can be classified
in multiple ways, depending on the particulars and the seriousness of the violation. How a
violation is classified impacts the extent of sanctions that can be imposed on an inmate.
The two most punitive ways inmates are sanctioned in the Iowa prison system are through the
imposition of disciplinary detention (DD) and the loss of earned time (ET). Disciplinary
detention, also sometimes known as solitary confinement, is a form of housing that secludes an
inmate in a cell by himself, with minimal time outside the cell and very limited privileges.2
Earned time is a credit toward an inmate’s prison sentence that most inmates can accrue for good
behavior. Iowa’s earned-time law gives these inmates 1.2 days of additional credit for every day
they serve in prison.3 When an inmate loses earned time through a disciplinary hearing, it pushes
the inmate’s discharge date further into the future and can extend their time in prison.
Lesser sanctions such as financial reimbursement, a temporary loss of privileges, or cell
restrictions can also be levied as punishment in disciplinary hearings.
DOC’s current disciplinary policies arose from a series of important federal and state court
decisions beginning in the mid-1970s. The most important of those decisions, Wolff v.
McDonnell,4 held that inmates are entitled by the 14th Amendment to some due-process rights if
officials seek to place the inmates in solitary confinement or extend their time in prison through
disciplinary actions. The Wolff decision held that such inmates are entitled to: 1) receive a
written notice of the alleged rule violations; 2) a hearing where they may present evidence; 3) an
impartial decision-maker (such as an administrative law judge); and 4) a written explanation of
the final judgment and sanction. Those core legal requirements are generally embodied in Iowa

2

Inmates in DD are allowed outside their cell one hour a day, five times a week, for exercise. They also are allowed
out three times a week to shower.
3
Earned time does not reduce the sentences of prisoners with life sentences, and has limited impact for inmates with
mandatory minimum sentences. See Iowa Code § 903A.2.
4
418 U.S. 539 (1974).

3

law5 and in more detail in DOC’s disciplinary policies, which have grown from 43 pages at the
time of Linderman’s case to 71 pages today.6
Both Iowa law and DOC policy state that prison disciplinary rules should seek to ensure that
“disciplinary procedures are fair,” that “sanctions are not capricious or retaliatory,” and that
inmate behavior should be controlled “in an impartial and consistent manner.” 7 The law also
directs DOC to define offenses and potential penalties “in order to give fair warning of
prohibited conduct.”
A prison employee who wants to hold an inmate accountable for violating a rule must write a
disciplinary notice that informs the inmate which rules he or she is accused of breaking, along
with a narrative that includes the time, place, and manner of the violation. A prison investigator
follows up to see how the inmate will plead to the charges, and whether he or she has any
statements to make about the specific accusations against them. The inmate may request
witnesses in his or her defense or assistance from staff if he or she has difficulty understanding
the nature of the charges and proceedings. Inmates are not entitled to attorneys in disciplinary
hearings.
The disciplinary notice, supporting evidence, and a written account of the inmate’s statements
and requests are forwarded to an ALJ. Unlike most state agencies that utilize ALJs from outside
their offices, DOC employs its own ALJs to oversee prison disciplinary cases. ALJs are
typically based in specific prisons throughout the state. Their supervisor is DOC’s general
counsel in Des Moines.
DOC employs five full-time ALJs and sometimes uses other staff to hold disciplinary hearings,
in person or via closed-circuit cameras. Although all of DOC’s full-time ALJs are currently
licensed attorneys, that is not required by law, nor was this the case at the time of Linderman’s
hearing in 2008. ALJ Edwards, who oversaw Linderman’s hearing, had more than 30 years of
experience in several DOC prisons as a correctional officer, supervisor, and ALJ, but was not an
attorney.
The standard of proof in disciplinary cases against Iowa’s prison inmates is very low. Unlike in
criminal proceedings, where a defendant must be found guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt,”
DOC disciplinary hearings can result in the guilt of an inmate based on “some evidence.”

5

See Iowa Code §§ 904.505 and 903A.1, 3, and 4.
See DOC Policies IO-RD-01, 02, and 03. Similar policies govern discipline in DOC’s work-release facilities,
where offenders are afforded more rights and freedom of movement than in prison. Disciplinary hearings in work
release are overseen by residential officers—not administrative law judges (ALJs). Residential officers are not
extensively trained in disciplinary matters and, in our experience, sometimes lack an appreciation for the dueprocess procedures regularly practiced by ALJs. Residential officers are not empowered to impose ET sanctions
that would require the due-process procedures set forth by the Wolff decision. However, residential officers’ written
decisions are automatically referred to ALJs who may separately impose ET sanctions. Residential officers’ written
decisions often serve as the basis for DOC administrators to transfer work-release residents back to prison without a
hearing or review by an ALJ.
7
Warden Cornell Smith made a similar pledge in FDCF’s 2007 inmate rulebook: “We hope that you will find the
treatment here to be impartial, fair, and humane.”
6

4

Theoretically speaking, this means an inmate can be found guilty of a rule violation even if the
majority of the evidence points to his innocence.8 Not all states follow this standard of proof. 9
The ALJ, in most cases, holds a hearing in the inmate’s presence, within several days or
sometimes weeks after the report is written. The ALJ may ask the inmate questions during the
hearing and must allow the inmate to present his side. If the ALJ believes the report is deficient
in some way, he or she may ask the author or investigators to correct the problems before
proceeding with the hearing.
After considering the inmate’s comments, the evidence, and any aggravating or mitigating
factors, the ALJ must issue a written decision that specifies which rules have been violated (if
any), the basis for the findings, the specific discipline to be imposed, and the basis for the
sanctions.
As part of the ALJ’s considerations, he or she must also determine the classifications of the
violations. Sanctions issued must be within the range prescribed by policy, and “in proportion to
the seriousness of the infractions involved.” DOC policy allows ALJs to “aggravate” the
classification of a rule violation by one step in “more serious” cases, so long as the reasons for
the aggravation are stated in the decision. Potential reasons for aggravating a rule violation are:
history of violence; use of a weapon; severity of injury; significant impact to institutional
operations; repeat infractions; and premeditation.
Disciplinary hearings are not electronically recorded and no verbatim records of the dialogue in
the hearings are created.
Inmates are allowed to appeal ALJs’ decisions to the prison warden or the warden’s designee.
Upon the warden’s review, “[i]f procedures have not been followed or there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s findings,” DOC policy allows the warden to reduce
or dismiss any of the ALJ’s findings or sanctions, order a new hearing, or remand a case to the
ALJ for further investigation or consideration. A warden may not increase sanctions issued by
the ALJ. Wardens are authorized to revisit disciplinary decisions at any time.
Separately from the process for major reports, prison staff is authorized to write “minor” reports,
which carry lesser sanctions that may be imposed without a disciplinary hearing or review by an
ALJ. Minor reports cannot result in a loss of earned time (ET) or disciplinary detention (DD).

8

Practical Guide to Inmate Discipline, William C. Collins, Civic Research Institute, 1997. Collins also argues that
the federal courts have not universally sanctioned the “some evidence” standard in prison disciplinary cases, as some
prison systems and state courts (including the Iowa Supreme Court) have. He points out that the standard of proof in
most administrative hearings is “a preponderance of the evidence” and argues this should also be the case in prison.
Correctional Law Reporter, “How Much Evidence Proves Guilt in an Inmate Disciplinary Hearing?” June/July
2010. The U.S. Supreme Court recently suggested the same when it said: “[W]e have utilized the ‘some evidence’
standard as a standard of review, not as a standard of proof.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
9
Minnesota’s and Vermont’s supreme courts have directly challenged the Iowa courts’ adoption of the “some
evidence” standard. See Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763 (Mn. 2005) and LaFaso v. Patrissi, 633 A.2d 695 (Vt.
1993). Said the Minnesota Supreme Court in Carrillo: “The ‘some evidence’ standard sends the message to prison
inmates as well as society at large that once an individual is convicted of a crime, he is presumed guilty of every
subsequent allegation. This message runs contrary to fundamental principles of criminal law in the United States.”

5

In 2012, more than 12,300 disciplinary hearings were held in Iowa’s nine prisons—about 34
reports per day, statewide, or one and-a-half reports per year for every DOC inmate. Assaults on
staff make up a very small percentage of the hearings. In 2012, 65 inmates were found guilty of
assaulting staff.10
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Incident
Early on the morning of April 2, 2008,11 a correctional officer (CO) named David Diemer was
making early-morning rounds in a locked housing unit of the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility
(FDCF) when he thought he smelled smoke. At the time, FDCF prohibited smoking in the unit
and was in the process of phasing out all smoking at the institution. CO Diemer tried to
investigate the source of the smoke and came to a two-man cell where inmate Randy Linderman
was housed. Linderman, who worked in the prison as a painter and plumber, had been moved to
the unit a day earlier, after he had argued with a unit manager over his pay. The move resulted in
a reduction of Linderman’s prison privileges. Linderman admitted to us and prison officials that
he was still angry about the pay issue when Diemer came to his cell.
Diemer searched Linderman’s cell and, according to a major report he later wrote on the
incident, he found tobacco and an altered battery. 12 CO Diemer said he wrote Linderman a
minor report for the contraband and slipped the report into Linderman’s cell. Linderman
reportedly refused to sign the minor report and threw it out of the slot on his cell door. CO
Diemer claimed that Linderman said Diemer “had no right” to write him up.13
Minutes later, Linderman and a handful of other inmates in the unit left their cells for breakfast.
After the inmates picked up breakfast trays from a servery adjacent to the housing unit, they
walked back to a common area outside their cells and sat down to eat at a series of four-man
tables. A video recording (see video still below) shows CO Diemer leaning on a handrail at the
far end of the common area as inmates began filing in.14

10

These totals were derived from a report we ran through DOC’s inmate records database, called the Iowa
Corrections Offender Network (ICON).
11
All dates in this section are from 2008 unless expressly noted.
12
Batteries are sometimes used in prison to make sparks to light cigarettes.
13
Diemer’s minor report was not included as an exhibit in Linderman’s major report, and could not be found by
FDCF officials when we requested it. The minor report was presumed by Warden Smith to have been thrown away
after Diemer decided to instead write a major report against Linderman. The major report did not cite any rule
violations in connection with Linderman’s alleged possession of tobacco and a battery, and neither item was kept as
evidence. A report from a prison captain suggested that CO Diemer did not actually find tobacco in Linderman’s
possession. Warden Smith expressed a similar belief to us.
14
The videos we reviewed from prison surveillance cameras were fairly grainy and did not include audio.

6

Correctional Officer David Diemer, center top, leans on a handrail while he awaits the
arrival of inmates for breakfast. The inmates on the right are walking toward an adjacent
servery to pick up their breakfast trays before returning to the tables to eat.

Linderman was the second inmate to arrive with his meal. As Linderman set his tray on a table
where another inmate was eating, Diemer moved closer and took position along a wall just a few
steps from Linderman’s table. Two more inmates took seats at Linderman’s table, and other
inmates followed to nearby tables.
A little more than two minutes passed before Linderman sprang from his stool and took five
quick steps toward CO Diemer. Although both available video angles are partially obscured, it is
evident that Linderman got face-to-face with Diemer. Diemer’s report does not explain what
caused Linderman to charge him. Witnesses said Linderman called Diemer a “m-----f----r punkass bitch.” Linderman then turned away from Diemer and began walking toward his cell.
Diemer followed immediately behind. Linderman, seeing Diemer behind him, stopped, spun,
and took two steps back toward Diemer, leaning into the officer as he shouted at him. Diemer
recoiled slightly, and the two men appeared to bump chests (see video still below). No fewer
than six inmates (five pictured) had a clear, close, unobstructed view of the incident.

7

Inmate Randy Linderman, at far right, appears to bump Correctional Officer
David Diemer while yelling at him. This was the first of two apparent contacts
Linderman made with Diemer that formed the basis of a disciplinary report for
assault.

The argument was loud enough to get the attention of two inmate workers at the opposite end of
the unit who turned their heads to watch. An officer in the adjacent servery also heard the
commotion and shut the servery door.
Linderman and Diemer separated briefly, but Linderman again stepped close to Diemer, this time
without making contact.
After a few more words were spoken, Diemer began to walk away from Linderman, toward
Linderman’s cell. Linderman followed Diemer closely for several steps, then leaned into
Diemer, appearing to make contact with the officer a second time (see video still below).

8

Inmate Randy Linderman, at center right, leans into Correctional Officer David
Diemer and appears to bump him. This was the second of two apparent contacts
Linderman made with Diemer that formed the basis of a disciplinary report for
assault.
More words were exchanged before the two walked to the far end of the unit, near Linderman’s
cell. At this point, a second correctional officer who had been present during the entire episode,
David Thoel, moved into Diemer’s position along the wall to monitor the situation. Several of
the inmates continued to watch, but none made any move to participate (see video still below).
Neither Thoel nor any other officers attempted to intervene.

9

Inmate Randy Linderman and Correctional Officer David Diemer, upper right,
exchange words outside Linderman’s cell. Correctional Officer David Thoel, lower
right, monitors the confrontation while inmates continue eating their breakfast.

Linderman broke contact with Diemer and, for most of the next two minutes, paced around the
unit with his hands in his pockets, stopping briefly at one point to sit at his table. COs Diemer
and Thoel watched him carefully from a distance until backup officers arrived. Linderman was
then handcuffed without resistance and taken away.
CO Diemer reported no injuries in the incident. He said in his report that Linderman had
bumped him twice.
The Investigation
FDCF Captain Mel Brown interviewed Linderman minutes after the incident. Linderman told
Brown that he had charged Diemer because Diemer had repeatedly called him a “liar” after
Linderman sat down to breakfast. Diemer’s purported remarks came in apparent response to
Linderman’s earlier claim that he had had no tobacco in his cell. Linderman told Brown that,
after he first confronted Diemer, he began to walk away when Diemer again called him a “liar.”
Linderman said this prompted him to return to the argument. Linderman denied making any
contact with Diemer in his interview with Captain Brown.

10

While Linderman awaited his disciplinary hearing from a more secure housing unit, written
statements from staff and inmates were taken.
CO Thoel, the second officer working in the unit during breakfast, said Linderman ignored his
order to sit down and “continued to hit Diemer in the chest with his chest.” Thoel said
Linderman had called Diemer “a f---ing punk bitch” and asked Diemer, “What are you going to
do about it?”15 Thoel, like Diemer, did not explain what caused Linderman to get up from his
breakfast and charge Diemer, although Thoel had been standing right next to Linderman’s table
when the dispute arose. One inmate witness said Linderman and Thoel were talking just before
the incident began.
CO Rickie Graves, who witnessed the end of the confrontation on camera from a control room,
said he saw Linderman pursue Diemer but noted that Linderman “did not raise his hands up at
the officer.”
Inmates who gave statements confirmed Diemer’s allegation that Linderman had called him a
“punk-ass bitch.” However, two inmates independently said that Diemer had first provoked
Linderman by repeatedly calling Linderman a “liar” and a “f----ing liar.” One of those inmates
said he heard Diemer direct the “liar” remark at Linderman before the inmates left their cells for
breakfast.
There was no indication in FDCF’s disciplinary file that prison investigators had asked COs
Diemer and Thoel whether Diemer had called Linderman a “liar.” Nor did investigators attempt
to ask the two officers what had caused Linderman to confront Diemer so angrily.
The Alleged Violations
In his disciplinary notice, CO Diemer accused Linderman of committing five rule infractions:






Assault
Threats/intimidation
Disobeying a lawful order/direction
Being out of place of assignment
Verbal abuse

Diemer’s superior reviewed the report and approved it. It was served on Linderman on April 10,
eight days after the incident.
The most serious of these alleged violations, assault, was then defined in DOC policy as follows:
An offender commits assault when the offender intentionally causes or threatens
to cause injury to another person or applies any physical force or offensive

15

Linderman also admitted these allegations in a letter to us.

11

substance (i.e. feces, urine, saliva, mucous) or any other item against any person
regardless of whether injury occurs.
…
Class “A” if weapon or potentially infectious bodily fluids, secretions, tissue, or
excrement have been used; Class “B” for all other violations.
The second charge against Linderman, threats/intimidation, is considered a Class B violation if it
involves the use of a weapon or a threat to kill; otherwise, it is considered a Class C violation.
Being out of place of assignment can be a Class C or Class B violation. The remaining
violations alleged against Linderman were defined as Class C violations.
Diemer’s report, like all Department of Corrections (DOC) disciplinary reports, did not indicate
whether Linderman’s alleged rule violations were Class A, B, or C violations. That would be
determined later by the administrative law judge (ALJ). Maximum allowable penalties under the
three classifications vary considerably. The DOC policy in place at the time of the Linderman
report set the following parameters on disciplinary sanctions:


Class C violation – maximum sanction of loss of 30 days of earned time (ET)
and 30 days of disciplinary detention (DD).



Class B violation – maximum sanction of loss of 90 days of ET and 90 days of
DD. If the violation includes “serious or dangerous violence,” DD can be raised
to a maximum of 180 days.16



Class A violation – maximum sanction of loss of 365 days of ET and 180 days of
DD. If the violation includes “serious or dangerous violence,” DD can be raised
to a maximum of 365 days.

DOC sanctions within a single report usually run concurrently with one another, not
consecutively, meaning the most serious violation usually determines the ultimate length of the
sanction.17
The Hearing
ALJ Deborah Edwards held a hearing to consider Diemer’s report and the supporting evidence
against Linderman on April 24. According to Edwards’ written decision 18, Linderman admitted
responsibility during the hearing and pleaded guilty to the rule violations.19

16

DOC policy defines “serious or dangerous violence” as follows: “includes killing, forced sexual penetration,
assault, kidnapping, rioting, arson, or the attempt to do any of those actions.”
17
Current DOC policy allows ALJs to impose consecutive DD or loss of ET sanctions for different rule violations.
However, we have rarely seen them do so in a single report.
18
See Appendix A, Hearing Decision (April 24, 2008).

12

Edwards found that Linderman had been “verbally disruptive” and had assaulted Diemer with his
body “several times.” These actions, she wrote, “placed a staff member at risk, disrupted the
normal operation [of the unit] and [Linderman] failed to follow any directives given him by that
staff member until other staff arrived on the scene.”
Edwards found Linderman guilty of three of the five charged violations: assault,
threats/intimidation, and verbal abuse. Edwards classified all three offenses as Class B
violations, and she sanctioned Linderman to 180 days of DD and loss of 180 days of ET.
Edwards wrote that the sanction “reflects the severity of the offense and is appropriate to the
nature of the offense.”20
In reaching her decision, Edwards wrote that she had reviewed staff statements, witness
statements, and video, as well as Linderman’s statements. Edwards did not elaborate on what
Linderman said during the hearing other than he admitted he had been “angry.”
Edwards’ decision made no mention of the statements of the two inmate witnesses who claimed
CO Diemer had provoked Linderman by calling him a “liar.”
The Appeal
The day after the hearing, Linderman appealed ALJ Edwards’ decision to FDCF Warden Cornell
Smith.21 In his three-page appeal, Linderman said CO Diemer had called him a liar “many
times” after Diemer failed to find any tobacco in his cell:
I got in Diemer’s face because he would not stop calling me [a] lier [sic]. This all
would not have happened if c/o Diemer was not verbal[ly] abusive to me over and
over.
Linderman argued to Warden Smith that his actions did not constitute an assault because his
arms were at his side during the confrontation and the officer was unhurt. Linderman further
argued that 180 days of DD was “way too much time,” given his past observations:
Inmates that put other inmates in the hospital don’t even get that much. I only
seen 180 for kill[ings] or stabbings or beat[ings] … and I’ve done time since
1983.
Warden Smith denied Linderman’s appeal and expressed support in his written response for ALJ
Edwards’ DD sanction.

19

Linderman denied to us and Warden Smith that he had pleaded guilty to the assault violation. He said he pleaded
guilty only to threats/intimidation and verbal abuse.
20
This was a standard phrase that Edwards used in every one of her hearing decisions we reviewed.
21
Smith left FDCF in 2010 and is now warden at the North Central Correctional Facility, a minimum-security prison
in Rockwell City.

13

“Mr. Linderman,” Smith wrote, “you do understand the way you handle[d] the situation has
resulted in the sanction imposed. … The issue is we have a ‘Zero Tolerance’ for threatening
behavior towards staff at anytime.”
Smith’s response did not address Linderman’s accusation that CO Diemer had provoked him.
Ombudsman’s Preliminary Review
We received Linderman’s letter of complaint about Edwards’ sanctions on May 9, 2008.
Linderman’s arguments were similar to those he posed in his appeal to Warden Smith. His
primary concern was the number of days he was ordered to serve in DD.
We quickly ascertained that Linderman’s DD sentence of 180 days was the maximum-allowable
DD sentence for a Class B violation, and could only be imposed if Linderman’s actions
amounted to “serious or dangerous violence.” Otherwise, Linderman’s maximum DD sentence
should have been 90 days.
We did not have immediate access to surveillance video of the incident, but we did have CO
Diemer’s report, ALJ Edwards’ decision, and Warden Smith’s appeal response.22 While
Edwards’ decision specified that Linderman had “assaulted the officer with his body several
times,” no injuries were mentioned in either Edwards’ decision or Diemer’s report. It appeared
on paper that the contact Linderman made with CO Diemer might have been incidental to the
verbal dispute. This made us question whether Linderman’s actions actually amounted to
“serious or dangerous violence.”
At the time of our review of the Linderman case, we also were reviewing a different assault case
at the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP) where an inmate had received only 90 days of DD and loss
of 90 days of ET for breaking an officer’s nose with a punch. The injuries suffered by the ISP
officer put him out of work for five weeks.23
Sensing that Linderman might have a legitimate complaint about an excessive DD sanction, we
called ALJ Edwards on May 12 to get further insights on her decision. She was cooperative and
forthright during our initial conversation.
Edwards told us it was her belief that Linderman’s assault on CO Diemer was “intentional, not
incidental.” She recalled that Linderman had bumped Diemer a total of three times in a running
argument that he had opportunities to walk away from. She did not seem to put any stock in
Linderman’s claim that Diemer had started the dispute with name-calling. Even if Diemer had
provoked the assault, she told us, Linderman’s actions were “totally inappropriate” because they
happened in the presence of other inmates who could have decided to join the fray.

22

See Appendix B, Disciplinary Appeal Response – Warden.
DOC Disciplinary Number 20041009732. We also became aware of an inmate at FDCF who assaulted staff
repeatedly in 2007. Within three months’ time, the inmate received 15 DD/60 ET for kneeing an officer in a groin
(DOC Disciplinary Number 20071009214) and 90 DD/90 ET for putting a counselor in a headlock and bringing him
to the floor during a class (DOC Disciplinary Number 20071013961).
23

14

Edwards acknowledged that she had little precedent to rely upon in deciding Linderman’s
sanctions because most assaults she had observed as an ALJ were either overt or incidental.
Linderman’s assault on CO Diemer, she agreed, was something in between.
At the beginning and at the end of our conversation, we asked Edwards to clarify how she had
intended to classify the assault. Both times, she said she considered the assault a Class B
violation. We asked her whether she felt she could have aggravated the sanction to a Class A
violation. “I could have, but I didn’t,” she replied.
A More Expansive Review
Despite Edwards’ explanation, we were not initially convinced that Linderman’s assault merited
the maximum allowable DD sanction. To get further context of sanctions issued in other inmate
assaults, we asked DOC to provide us with a list of every inmate who had been found guilty of
assaulting a prison employee in three of Iowa’s medium-security prisons between May 2005 and
May 2008. On May 30, 2008, we received a list of 35 such inmates. We reviewed the hearing
decisions in each of the assaults. With that data, we created a report.
The report revealed how many times each prison’s ALJs had issued DD sanctions in excess of 90
days for assaults on staff:




Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility:
Newton Correctional Facility:
Fort Dodge Correctional Facility:

0
1
9

Not only were Edwards’ assault sanctions typically tougher than those of her counterparts, but
she was much more likely to aggravate the classifications of the violations. Generally speaking,
we did not find that assaults at FDCF had been appreciably more violent than in other prisons.
Where inmates kicked, punched, and elbowed staff, other ALJs typically classified the assaults
as Class B violations and did not aggravate them.
In scrutinizing ALJ Edwards’ past cases, we found that Linderman’s actions seemed less serious
than those of six other inmates who received similar DD sanctions. We also found that
Linderman’s loss of ET sanction of 180 days was higher than most:






Inmate 1 – Threw feces and urine onto a passing officer, some of which struck the
guard’s chin. Class A offense. 180 days of DD, loss of 90 days of ET.
Inmate 2 – Threw urine into an officer’s chest and face. Inmate noted as habitually
disruptive. Class A offense. 180 days of DD, loss of 30 days of ET.
Inmate 3 – Spat into an officer’s face after he was ordered to remove ice from his
drinking glass. Class B offense. 180 days of DD, loss of 90 days of ET.
Inmate 4 – Threw urine onto a random officer who was delivering a book. Aggravated
from Class B to Class A offense. 180 days of DD, loss of 180 days of ET.
Inmate 5 – Jumped onto the back of an officer while trying to punch an inmate that the
officer was restraining. Class B offense. 180 days of DD, loss of 30 days of ET.

15



Inmate 6 – Spit into an officer’s face after being ordered to hang up his coat. Inmate had
an infectious disease. Aggravated from Class B to Class A offense. 140 days of DD,
loss of 365 days of ET.

In light of the sanctions she had issued in prior decisions, we called Edwards for a second time,
on June 3, and asked her: “From an ALJ’s standpoint, which type of assault do you view as
more serious: An assault where an inmate makes non-harmful but potentially inciteful contact
with a staff member, or an incident where an inmate throws urine or feces or spit into a staff
member’s face?”
Her response was immediate: In her opinion, an assault involving urine, feces, or spit was a
more serious type of assault, namely because of the risk of the spread of disease. Her response
was consistent with DOC policy, which defines an assault with bodily fluids as a Class A
violation, while other assaults where weapons are not used are considered Class B violations.
Linderman did not assault CO Diemer with bodily fluids. Nor did Linderman injure or lay his
hands on CO Diemer. For those reasons, we asked Edwards to consider whether her DD
sanction against Linderman was too harsh. We offered her a copy of our report, which she
considered. But she ultimately stood by her decision.
We decided to discuss Linderman’s DD sanction with Warden Smith.
A New Wrinkle
As we were drafting a detailed email to Warden Smith of our findings on Linderman’s DD
sanction, we realized that Edwards’ 180-day loss of ET sanction against Linderman exceeded the
amount allowed by DOC policy. At the time, DOC policy dictated that the maximum loss of ET
sanction for a Class B offense was 90 days.
On June 12, we asked Warden Smith to consider: 1) whether Linderman’s DD sanction was
excessive and should be reduced based on the particulars and our survey of sanctions in other
assault cases, and 2) reducing Linderman’s ET sanction by at least 90 days, based on the
maximum sanction allowed by policy. We also pointed out that Linderman’s secondary
violations (threats/intimidation and verbal abuse) were incorrectly classified in the decision as
Class B violations rather than Class C violations.24
Smith responded within an hour and a half. The following email exchange took place:
Smith: … I am not willing to modify the imposed sanctions related to his
disciplinary sanctions. I consider any threatening or assault behavior toward staff
has [sic] a very serious matter, therefore I am not willing to modify sanctions.

24

We also asked Warden Smith to consider paying Linderman $21 for prison work he had performed without pay.
Smith agreed. This part of Linderman’s complaint is not pertinent to the subject of this report.

16

Ombudsman: … DOC policy appears to show that the maximum allowable loss
of earned time for this violation was 90 days. Linderman was given 180 days.
Am I misreading the policy?
Twenty minutes later, we received this reply from Warden Smith:
Smith: I spoke with the ALJ and the Class B offense was in error. She will be
complete [sic] the correction to a Class A Offense related to ET loss. The hearing
will stand and the offender will be sent a modification [sic] copy of hearing
decision.
We followed up later that day with a phone call to Warden Smith to make sure we understood his
explanation. Smith explained that ALJ Edwards “admit[ted] she made an error” in her original
decision when she classified the assault violation as a Class B. He said she had intended to
aggravate the assault to a Class A violation. He did not explain her reasons for wanting to
aggravate the violation, but he gave the impression that this decision was hers—not his.
The Revised Decision
Forty minutes after we received Warden Smith’s last explanation on the Linderman disciplinary
matter, ALJ Edwards added three sentences to her original hearing decision. 25 Edwards wrote
that she was “modifying an error” and was classifying the assault as a Class A violation “to
reflect the seriousness of the violation at this time.” She wrote that a copy of the revised
decision would be shared with Linderman.
Lastly, she wrote that Linderman’s “behavior was consistent with the DOC policy IO RD01(II)(a)(P)(b).” We found that no such policy exists.
ALJ Edwards’ revision of her hearing decision concerned us for a number of reasons. First, it
contradicted her earlier statements to us that she intended for the assault to be a Class B sanction
and did not intend to aggravate the violation. Second, if she did intend now to aggravate the
assault violation, why did she not specify her reasons in the amended hearing decision, as DOC
policy requires? And why was the term “aggravate” not specifically used in the decision?
We also questioned whether it was proper or legal for Edwards to simply amend her prior
classification determinations, after the fact, in order to justify what had been an excessive
sanction under DOC policy.
The contradictions between Edwards’ and Smith’s explanations, and the quick and questionable
revision of the hearing decision, made us suspect that Warden Smith might have pressured the
ALJ to arrive at a certain result in the case. This possibility was most concerning to us because
Iowa law requires prison ALJs to be independent, and because wardens are supposed to serve as
a check on ALJs’ judgments and mistakes.

25

See Appendix C, Hearing Decision (Revised, June 12, 2008).

17

A Request for Reconsideration
We requested a meeting with Edwards’ superior, DOC General Counsel Michael Savala, to share
our growing list of concerns and to ask him to intercede. Savala oversees DOC’s disciplinary
policy and the prisons’ ALJs. We met on June 20, presented the facts in the case, and provided
Savala with a copy of our three-year survey on inmate assault sanctions. He said he would
consider our concerns and get back to us.
On July 31, Savala sent us a brief email response in which he essentially reiterated the language
of ALJ Edwards’ decision and Warden Smith’s appeal decision. It did not appear that Savala
had considered our specific policy concerns about Edwards’ revised decision. We again asked
him to do so.
In the meantime, we unsuccessfully requested the intervention of Warden Jerry Burt of the
Anamosa State Penitentiary, where Linderman had been transferred and was serving his DD
time, and Assistant Deputy Director Sheryl Lockwood, who oversaw the prisons in eastern Iowa.
Burt deferred to Smith, and Lockwood deferred to Savala.
Savala issued a lengthier response to our concerns on August 15. He began by detailing all the
crimes Linderman had committed outside prison, the most recent of which had occurred eight
years earlier. He concluded with an opinion that DOC’s disciplinary policy “was followed
properly” by ALJ Edwards and that her reasons for aggravating the assault sanction were
“properly delineated.” In response to our observation that Linderman’s sanctions for bumping an
officer were tougher than those of most inmates who threw bodily fluids on officers, Savala said
that disciplinary sanctions need not always be the same. He said the Attorney General’s office
concurred with his opinions on the matter.
Savala’s response, and those of other DOC officials, ensured that Linderman would serve out the
entirety of his DD sanction.
A New Revelation
Dissatisfied with the responses we received from upper DOC management, we decided to open a
full investigation into the Linderman case. We issued a formal notice of investigation to DOC
Director Baldwin on August 29. As part of our broader investigation, we requested copies of all
electronic communications among DOC officials involved in the Linderman case.
Among the emails we received from DOC was this one written by Warden Smith to ALJ
Edwards, eight days before Linderman’s hearing.26 Smith told us he wrote the email after he had
viewed video of Linderman’s confrontation with CO Diemer, but before he had seen all of the
investigative documentation, including the witness statements:

26

See Appendix D.

18

This email confirmed our suspicions that the Warden had weighed in with the ALJ before she
had fully considered the Linderman assault case. It also showed that Edwards’ sanctions against
Linderman fell within the range of Smith’s email suggestion. In our minds, the email raised
significant questions about the integrity of Edwards’ decision, and about FDCF’s commitment to
the independent and impartial disciplinary process mandated by DOC policies and by state and
federal law.
Smith acknowledged that the parenthetical in his email pertained to DD time, but he downplayed
its inclusion in the email. The main purpose of his email, he later told us during a sworn
interview, was to alert Edwards that it was time to proceed with Linderman’s disciplinary
hearing because the prison’s request for criminal charges had been declined.27
Ombudsman: You were doing more than a heads up. You were saying, “I
recommend this DD range,” too.
Smith: It says “situation” – “fit the situation.” Can you read that? “Warden
wants you to go 180 to 365.” Of course you can. I’m not going to dispute that.
It’s there. But did I go in there and say, “I really need it to be this?” No, I didn’t.
It’s open to interpretation.
Ombudsman: … If I’m to write a note to the ALJ saying, “Exercise sanctions to
fit situation,” I wouldn’t use 180 to 365. I’d have used zero to 180, or 90 to 180,
maybe. … Because a normal assault under this scenario gets a max of 180, not a
max of 365. Did you intend to send that message, to aggravate?
Smith: No, I sent the message just like it says.
Ombudsman: Did you mean to send an implicit message that this needed to be
aggravated beyond a regular assault?

27

Smith told us several times in our sworn interview that the Webster County Attorney’s office had declined the
prison’s request to prosecute Linderman criminally for his assault of CO Diemer. The County Attorney’s office,
however, told us that it had never been asked to consider prosecuting Linderman.

19

Smith: No. I can’t tell you how Deb took that. Deb is in my facility. “Warden,
what does this note mean? What do you want me to do?” – I didn’t get that phone
call.
During our interview, Smith could not explain how the definition of a Class A assault differed
from a Class B assault. He did know, however, that the DD range he suggested to Edwards fell
within the range of a Class A rule violation.
“One hundred eighty days in DD doesn’t take the act away,” he said, “but it sends a very swift
message to the offender that we’re not going to tolerate that kind of behavior at all no matter who
is receiving it.”
Smith went on to say that there was “nothing I’ve done here that I feel was out of the lines of the
bounds of my role or my authority. … I’m not going to be sitting in a public place and telling the
public that I failed to protect a staff member. My actions, I felt, were appropriate.”
Ombudsman: Do you think ALJ Edwards felt any obligation or pressure to
decide this case in a certain way given the email you sent her?
Smith: I would hope not.
What actual effect the Warden’s email had on Edwards could only be answered by Edwards.
But it would be more than four and a half years before we could ask Edwards this question.
That’s because DOC Director John Baldwin and Assistant Attorney General William Hill
refused to allow Edwards to explain herself to us under oath.
In the alternative to an interview with ALJ Edwards, we held separate sworn interviews with
Warden Smith and General Counsel Savala.28 When those interviews failed to provide us with
all of the answers necessary to complete our investigation, we renewed our request in 2009 for a
sworn interview with ALJ Edwards. DOC Director John Baldwin again refused.
“In short,” Baldwin wrote us on October 1, 2009, “you have had your opportunity to ask her
questions and we will not let you again try in hopes of intimidating her into providing a different
answer as was the case with Michael Savala and Warden Cornell Smith.”
In a November 24, 2009, letter, Baldwin defended the disciplinary actions against Linderman
and falsely claimed that ALJ Edwards had repeatedly assured us she was not pressured by
Warden Smith.29
Ultimately, Edwards was compelled to answer our questions by order of the Iowa Supreme
Court, after she had retired from DOC. Unfortunately, Edwards’ eventual answers to this
question, and others, only clouded the issues.

28

We interviewed Warden Smith under oath on October 24, 2008. We interviewed Savala under oath on March 13,
2009, in the presence of DOC’s attorney, Assistant Attorney General William Hill.
29
In truth, to that point, we had never asked Edwards about Smith’s email. After we first learned of the email, DOC
began blocking our efforts to interview her about it. See Baldwin’s letter in Appendix E.

20

DOC Explains Its Actions
“I never had a conversation with Cornell about Linderman’s case.”
That was the surprising statement we received from ALJ Edwards, under oath, when we started
to ask what caused her to amend Linderman’s original hearing decision.30 The statement was
surprising because we knew that Edwards replied to the Warden’s email in which he had
suggested sanctions against Linderman. Edwards even asked Smith to call her about the
Linderman case:

Edwards’ claim that she never spoke to Warden Smith about the Linderman case also
contradicted what Smith had told us in his sworn interview. According to Smith, after we
emailed him on June 12 to ask him to correct Edwards’ excessive ET sanction, he suggested to
Edwards that she consult with Savala and/or Assistant Attorney General Hill on the matter. He
did not recall whether his suggestion was made by email or in person.31
Smith and Savala each testified that Edwards separately told them she had erred in classifying
Linderman’s assault as a Class B violation and would fix her mistake by amending her decision.
Edwards, however, told us that she amended her hearing decision based solely on our feedback
and without consulting anyone from DOC.
Ombudsman: So the warden didn’t ask you to change or amend your decision?
Edwards: No.
Ombudsman: Mike Savala didn’t ask you to amend or change your decision?
Edwards: No.
Ombudsman: John Baldwin didn’t ask you?
Edwards: No.
…
Ombudsman: Did you consult with anyone before doing that?
Edwards: You. You.
…

30

We interviewed ALJ Edwards under oath on March 25, 2013, in the presence of DOC’s attorney, Assistant
Attorney General William Hill.
31
We saw no such email among a group of emails we received from Warden Smith in response our request for all
emails relevant to the Linderman case.

21

Ombudsman: So what you’re telling me is that the additional language you
added to the hearing decision, you did on your own, without input from anybody
[in DOC]?
Edwards: Right. To let you know that I made the changes.
But we never voiced any concerns to Edwards about Linderman’s ET sanction being excessive
for a Class B violation; we only discussed this with Smith and Savala. In other words, Edwards
only could have known about our concern with the ET sanction through other DOC officials.
It would not be the only time that Edwards’ explanations conflicted with those of other DOC
officials. Several of our most important questions about the Linderman case led to dubious or
contradictory answers from Edwards, Smith, and Savala:
Did ALJ Edwards intend to aggravate?
As previously stated, Edwards’ original decision classified Linderman’s assault as a Class
B violation.
However, Warden Smith and General Counsel Savala each testified that ALJ Edwards
told them after our inquiries that she had intended to aggravate Linderman’s assault to a
Class A violation. This was contrary to what Edwards originally told us, that she did not
intend to aggravate the violation.
DOC policy allows ALJs to aggravate the classification of a rule violation in “more serious”
cases—and thus increase the upper range of sanctions—provided the ALJ explains the reasons
for the aggravation.
Savala argued vigorously that Edwards’ intention to aggravate was obvious to him, even in
Edwards’ original decision, which never used any form of the term “aggravate.”
Ombudsman: Looking at the [original] hearing decision itself, how would you
know there was an aggravating factor?
Savala: Well, I can’t speak for [Edwards]. What I’m telling you as I’m reading
this, as their supervisor, you know, this is the language on the paper and this is
what I would see as aggravating conduct.
Ombudsman: Isn’t it the norm for ALJs, when they see aggravating conduct, to
specifically and explicitly say so in the decision?
We cited four examples to Savala of other recent disciplinary decisions where ALJs had used
some form of the term “aggravate” to support their decisions and sanctions. We later found that
Edwards herself had used some form of the word “aggravate” in four of the hearing decisions in
our three-year survey of assault cases. Savala conceded that many DOC ALJs use the term
“aggravate” when aggravating a sanction, but he insisted that practice was not necessary.
Ombudsman: Can you be certain, Michael, can you be certain that [Edwards], in
fact, did intend to aggravate this case?

22

Savala: Yes.
Ombudsman: From the outset? You can be certain?
Savala: I can verify it after I spoke with her and she said, “Yeah, this is what I
intended, I intended to aggravate it.” It was a clerical error on her part, and she
corrected it.
Subsequently, Edwards denied in her sworn testimony that she had ever intended to aggravate
Linderman’s assault violation. Rather, she told us that she had meant for the assault offense to
be a Class A violation all along.
Ombudsman: Let me ask you this. Let me try and be crystal clear. Was it your
belief, upon re-reviewing your initial decision, that the assault was incorrectly
classified as a “B?”
Edwards: Right.
Ombudsman: So you believed, right out of the chute, it should have been a Class
A?
Edwards: Yes.
…
Ombudsman: OK, so you did not intend to aggravate this particular
classification? What you actually wanted to do was declare it an “A” from the
get-go?
Edwards: Right. And just make sure that he got the full amount.
What made Linderman’s assault so serious?
We asked ALJ Edwards what basis she had to classify Linderman’s assault a Class A violation.
“Whether any injuries were incurred or not,” she said, “it was very intense and it was very
serious and it was very disruptive to the operation of the institution, and we [had] been dealing
with so many fights and assaults.”32
Warden Smith, believing that Edwards had aggravated Linderman’s assault violation, defended
her decision simply because the victim was a correctional officer.
Ombudsman: By that logic, though, wouldn’t every single assault on a staff
member automatically be aggravated?
Smith: … I’m not the ALJ. I’m not going to answer from an ALJ perspective.
From my perspective in this case only, in this case, what crossed the line for me is
that he chest bumped a staff member twice.
Ombudsman: OK. Both chest bumps are aggravating factors? Not [just] the
second? Both of them?
Smith: Any act of touching a staff member in an aggressive fashion.
DOC policy does not prescribe different penalties for assaults based on the identity of the victim.

32

Edwards repeatedly stated during our sworn interview that Linderman had bumped CO Diemer three times, but
we saw only two probable bumps on video. Diemer stated in his report that Linderman had bumped him twice.

23

Nor is Edwards’ rationale for classifying the assault a Class A violation supportable by DOC
policy. The policy considers an assault a Class A offense only “if [a] weapon or potentially
infectious bodily fluids, secretions, tissue, or excrement have been used.” Savala agreed that
“none of that applied” to Linderman’s assault case, and that the maximum ET sanction for
Linderman’s original Class B offense was at that time 90 days.
Ombudsman: [Edwards’] original decision says this is a Class B and it says that
the earned time sanction is 180 days.
Savala: OK.
Ombudsman: Would you agree that this is not in conformance with DOC policy?
Savala: Yeah, because the Class B does not allow the 180.
Savala told us in an email that the Attorney General believed ALJ Edwards had adequately cured
her classification error when she revised her original hearing decision to a Class A violation. But
Savala’s defense of Edwards’ revision was based on his belief that Edwards had intended to
aggravate the assault from a Class B violation—which Edwards repeatedly denied to us.
During our interview with Edwards, we pointed out to her that DOC policy considers an assault
to be a Class A offense only if weapons or bodily fluids are used. Edwards defended her Class A
classification with this explanation of Linderman’s actions:
“His body is a weapon.”
We could not find one instance in our survey of 35 assault-against-staff hearings where any ALJ,
including Edwards, had classified an assault a Class A offense without the use of a weapon or
bodily fluids. In every case where an inmate had used their body by kicking, punching, or
elbowing a staff member, or throwing something at them, the ALJ treated the assault as a Class
B violation. In addition, none of those assaults was explicitly considered “serious or dangerous
violence” by the ALJs, which would have justified DD sanctions of more than 90 days.
Edwards never said during our sworn interview that Linderman’s chest bumps were more serious
than the actions of other inmates who threw their bodily fluids onto the faces or bodies of
officers. On the contrary, when we asked her in 2008 which type of assault was more serious,
she immediately responded that an assault with bodily fluids was more serious because of the
disease risks.
When we asked the same question of Savala and Smith, neither one would choose.
Ombudsman: Is it more serious to throw urine into the face of an officer than to
bump an officer during an argument?
Savala: I don’t think there’s a distinction. An assault is an assault.
Ombudsman: Do you think a correctional officer who has urine thrown on his
face thinks that’s more serious than getting bumped?
Smith: I think you would have to get a correctional officer in here to get that
perspective.

24

What role did CO Diemer’s actions have on Edwards’ decision?
As previously stated, DOC’s disciplinary policy at the time of the Linderman hearing required
ALJs to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors in making their decisions.
When we asked Edwards, Smith, and Savala whether there were any mitigating factors in the
Linderman case, each said they couldn’t recall any. This was despite the fact that two witness
statements in the file supported Linderman’s claim that CO Diemer had provoked Linderman by
repeatedly calling him a liar in front of other inmates and an officer.
Edwards said Linderman never raised this defense during his disciplinary hearing. Her
recollection is impossible to verify since hearings are not recorded and Edwards’ written account
of Linderman’s statements was not exhaustive. However, Edwards did recall that Linderman
had requested statements from several inmate witnesses. Further, she wrote in her decision that
“the offender’s witness statements were reviewed by this ALJ.” Edwards said in her sworn
interview that she could not recall reading or considering the witness statements.
When we asked Edwards about the potential value of the witness statements in her
considerations, she responded by questioning the reliability of the witnesses. “I don’t know if
[Linderman] coerced them, you know what I’m saying?” She conceded that she had “no idea”
what prompted Linderman to spring from his breakfast and rush CO Diemer.
Edwards added that she did not think it was up to her to consider Linderman’s claims against CO
Diemer. “That would be security’s responsibility to check in and see if that officer was acting
appropriately,” she said. “That’s not my job.”
We asked Warden Smith why it appeared that no prison investigators had looked into the
inmates’ claims that CO Diemer had precipitated Linderman’s actions.
Smith: Why would I question staff on that? His statement was provided to the
administrative law judge of what happened.
Ombudsman: To your knowledge, did anyone look into the allegation that
Diemer provoked Linderman?
Smith: We did not question Mr. Diemer and say, “What did you do to cause him
to behave in that fashion?” … Has he ever had an encounter of this nature
before? No. Has he ever had any performance issues? Nothing is in his
personnel file that would lead us to believe that [he’d] done something to cross
that line.
Ombudsman: If you had any evidence that any correctional officer at Fort
Dodge repeatedly called an inmate a “liar” and a “f---ing liar,” what would you
think of that behavior?
Smith: Unacceptable.
Prior to the assault, Linderman had received four major reports over the previous three years.
Three of the reports were written after Linderman attempted to purchase or trade personal

25

property with other inmates; one was for yelling at staff after he failed to a get an orderly job he
had applied for.
Edwards told us that the assault was “out of character” for Linderman. But she was silent on
whether his relatively scant behavioral history was a mitigating factor in her decision.
What influence did the Warden’s suggested sanctions have on ALJ Edwards?
Edwards acknowledged receiving Smith’s suggested sanction of 180 to 365 days DD when we
showed her a copy of his email. She said she did not recall that the email had suggested a
specific penalty. Nor did she recall that the email had been sent before Linderman’s hearing.
Although she admitted discomfort with the email, she insisted that the decision in the Linderman
case was her own.
Edwards: [Warden Smith] can ask whatever he wants. I’m still independently
making the decisions. …
Ombudsman: Does it make you uncomfortable when you get a message from
the warden asking you to do a certain thing?
Edwards: It makes me uncomfortable when anybody questions my decisions. It
makes me uncomfortable, yes. … It’s really hard. I can’t go to the warden and
say, “Will you just leave me the heck alone?” You can’t, you know, you still
have to be [respectful of the] chain of command.
Edwards, who worked as an ALJ for 12 years, said this was the only instance where Warden
Smith had ever sent her such an email.33 Edwards said it was commonplace, though, for her to
receive input from prison staff—“officers, wardens, treatment staff, anybody”—both before and
after disciplinary hearings.
Edwards: They just tell me what they think and [they] think I should be on
board. I should think like them.
…
Ombudsman: And did I understand you earlier to [say] that, generally, their
opinion is, you weren’t hard enough on an offender?
Edwards: Yeah, that’s been the same thing.
…
Ombudsman: Now, is that something that the other ALJs also had dealt with?
Edwards: I think anybody that’s working in corrections has dealt with it in one
form or another, and not just an ALJ. I think that’s just the nature of the beast.
We asked Edwards’ supervisor, Savala, whether prison staffs’ overtures to ALJs bothered him,
since law and policy requires ALJs to be independent and impartial.

33

Smith, on the other hand, said he asked Edwards “a lot of times … to ratchet” up sanctions as a general deterrent
when inmate misbehavior was on the rise.

26

“I encourage the ALJs to keep an open-door policy if staff want to come in and talk about a
report,” he said. “Staff need to understand the process and the flow of these disciplinary systems
and why particular sanctions were given out. It just adds to a better environment if there’s a
better understanding at that institution of the discipline process.”
Savala said in his testimony that it made little difference to him whether ALJs’ conversations
with staff took place before or after disciplinary hearings.
Most ALJs in Iowa are discouraged from openly discussing a case prior to a decision, outside the
presence of the affected parties. Such “ex parte” communications are generally seen as improper
because they give an appearance that the ALJ might be biased or favored toward one party. One
common remedy for ALJs to restore fairness when they take part in ex parte communications is
to recuse (remove) themselves from the case. Iowa Code § 17A.17 requires state ALJs to
disclose any ex parte communications to all the parties involved and to memorialize the contacts
in writing to foster fairness and transparency. DOC’s ALJs are exempt from this section of the
Code. Nevertheless, other federal and state laws stemming from the Wolff court decision require
ALJs to be impartial in their consideration of inmate disciplinary cases.
Savala said he was unaware at the time of our interview that Warden Smith had emailed ALJ
Edwards with a suggested sanction prior to Linderman’s disciplinary hearing. Edwards
apparently had not informed Savala of this fact. Nonetheless, Savala said he was not troubled by
the revelation.
Ombudsman: [H]ow fair can the disciplinary process really be if the person who
is going to hear an appeal in this particular disciplinary hearing is asking the ALJ
to sentence that inmate to a certain period of time before the hearing has even
taken place?
Savala: I don’t think that influences the fairness of the hearing. Again, I mean, I
tell the ALJ I don’t care who you get input from. It could be the director. You
know, you’re there to make a decision—[an] independent decision—based on the
facts that you have in front of you.
Ombudsman: So you don’t think that the ALJ would feel pressured in this
situation given the fact that she’s just received an approach from the guy who
heads up the facility where she works?
Savala: No. And the reason for that is that’s why they report to me. … Do I have
concerns on that? No.
Edwards said in her sworn interview that when she was an ALJ, she reported not only to Savala,
but also to Warden Smith, the deputy warden, and DOC Director John Baldwin. Separately, in a
September 12, 2008, email she wrote to Savala about our inquiries, Edwards identified Warden
Smith as one of her “immediate bosses.”
In contrast, when we asked Savala in his sworn interview what working relationship DOC’s
ALJs had with the wardens where they worked, he replied: “None.”

27

Ombudsman: Can you see any way by which an ALJ might believe that they are
accountable to a warden of the institution where they work?
Savala: No.
The Supreme Court Weighs In
Although the Iowa Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the appropriateness of Linderman’s
sanctions, the justices were asked in our lawsuit against DOC to consider the propriety of prison
officials’ actions in the disciplinary case. That question was a critical element in the Court’s
decision whether to allow us to interview Edwards under oath.
In granting our request, the Court majority was not as favorable in its opinion of Edwards’
actions as Savala and Baldwin were. Specifically, the Court said that Edwards and Warden
Smith had committed “improper conduct” based on its review of undisputed evidence submitted
by our office and DOC. The Court noted several specific concerns about Edwards’ actions:
1. Her original ET sanction against Linderman was twice the amount allowed by DOC
policy, and was consistent with Smith’s suggested sanctions.
2. Linderman’s assault could not be considered a Class A offense under DOC policy
because no weapon or bodily fluids were used.
3. No aggravating factors were specifically cited in Edwards’ decision that would justify her
180 ET sanction against Linderman.
4. Edwards upgraded the classification of Linderman’s offense after our investigation
began, without clarifying why or explicitly using the word “aggravated,” as she did in
other decisions.
The Court’s decision also diverged from the claims of DOC officials who said the Warden’s
email to the ALJ was harmless. Quoting from a different court case on a similar subject, the
Court suggested that Smith’s email had “the appearance of fundamental unfairness.” The Court
further stated that:
We cannot condone such ex parte communications from a warden to the IDOC
ALJ, whose independence is statutorily mandated, particularly when the warden
himself is to hear the inmate’s appeal. … The facial impropriety of the warden’s
email to Edwards is all the more troubling because he is statutorily prohibited
from increasing sanctions on appeal.34
DOC never revisited Linderman’s ET sanction before he discharged his sentence.
Linderman was released from prison on September 12, 2014.
Policy Revisions Since the Linderman Investigation
DOC officials made several key changes to their disciplinary policy since our investigation into
the Linderman case began. Among them:
34

Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8, 21 (Iowa 2012)

28





The maximum loss-of-ET sanction for Class B offenses was increased from 90 days to
180 days.
ALJs are no longer required to specify mitigating circumstances in their hearing
decisions.
Wardens’ required review of all disciplinary decisions, regardless of whether appeals had
been filed, was eliminated.

Savala, who oversees DOC’s disciplinary policy, acknowledged that our scrutiny of the
Linderman case led to the first policy change. He said the change was needed to better reflect
proportionality between classes. Had this revised policy been in place at the time of the
Linderman hearing, his sanction of a loss of 180 of ET would not have required ALJ Edwards to
elevate or aggravate his assault violation to a Class A offense.
ANALYSIS and CONCLUSIONS
The Earned Time Sanction: Which Scenario to Believe?
There has never been any question in our minds that inmate Randy Linderman committed an
assault when he charged and bumped Correctional Officer (CO) David Diemer. Our
investigation focused on whether prison decision-makers had fully considered the circumstances
of the assault and punished Linderman fairly, within the limits of Department of Corrections
(DOC) policy.
Based on the evidence we reviewed—and accounting for the conflicting testimonies of Edwards,
Warden Smith, and General Counsel Savala—we determined that one of three possible scenarios
unfolded to explain how Edwards imposed sanctions on Linderman:
Scenario 1: Edwards initially intended to aggravate Linderman’s assault from a Class B to a
Class A violation, as allowed by DOC policy for “more serious” violations. Edwards erred in
her original decision when she failed to expressly aggravate the violation, and she later revised
her decision to reflect her actual thought process.
Edwards told us repeatedly—twice in our first conversation and years later in sworn testimony—
that she did not intend to aggravate Linderman’s assault violation. When we asked her in 2008
whether she thought she could have aggravated the assault to a Class A violation, she replied, “I
could have, but I didn’t.” Her statements on all three occasions were unequivocal. Smith and
Savala, on the other hand, both testified that Edwards told them she had intended to aggravate;
but there is no known written record to corroborate their claims. Neither Edwards’ original
decision nor her revised decision revealed any hint that she wanted to aggravate the violation.
No form of the word “aggravate” appeared in either of Edwards’ decisions, although Edwards
and other DOC administrative law judges (ALJs) routinely used the word in several other
disciplinary cases we reviewed. Nor was the basis for any purported aggravation explained in
Edwards’ decision, as DOC policy requires.
The evidence does not support a claim that Edwards had always intended to aggravate the assault
violation.

29

Scenario 2: Edwards initially intended to classify Linderman’s assault as a Class A violation,
as allowed by DOC policy when a weapon or bodily fluids are used. She erred in her original
decision when she classified the assault as a Class B violation, and she later revised her decision
to reflect her actual thought process. She had no intention to aggravate the rule violation.
Edwards asserted late in our investigation that she had meant to classify Linderman’s assault as a
Class A violation all along. She said that she had erred in her original decision when she called
the assault a Class B violation. When we asked her how she could properly call the assault a
Class A violation without the use of a weapon or bodily fluids, she replied that Linderman used
his body as a weapon. This was a novel explanation that clashed with the past practices of
DOC’s ALJs—neither Edwards nor any other ALJ at three medium-security prisons ever made a
finding that a bodily assault was a Class A violation in the three years of assault-on-staff cases
we reviewed. Edwards’ supervisor, General Counsel Savala, acknowledged that the facts in the
Linderman case made the assault a Class B violation on its face because no weapons or bodily
fluids were used.
The Iowa Supreme Court also noted, in its decision on our lawsuit against DOC, that no weapon
had been used by Linderman in his assault.
We do not believe Edwards ever truly considered Linderman’s chest a weapon in the assault.
Any such interpretation of DOC policy cannot be supported by past practices or Iowa law.
Scenario 3: Edwards initially intended to classify Linderman’s assault as a Class B violation,
and she did not intend to aggravate the classification. However, the sanctions she imposed were
incompatible with the Class B classification. After the Ombudsman reported the discrepancy to
DOC, Edwards upgraded the assault to a Class A violation rather than reducing the sanction to
correspond with a Class B violation.
Edwards was an experienced ALJ and a former prison supervisor who knew how to properly
classify rule violations and issue sanctions accordingly. It was clear from our review of
Edwards’ work that she was consistently competent. She claimed her decision in the Linderman
case was her own. Yet she also acknowledged that receiving suggestions from Warden Smith—
a person she described as one of her supervisors—put her in a difficult position. “I can’t go to
the warden and say, ‘Will you just leave me the heck alone?’” she told us.
The discrepancy between Edwards’ classification and her sanction in Linderman’s assault was
uncharacteristic. We believe she issued a sanction outside the bounds of a Class B violation
because she thought the Warden had asked her to. The fact that Edwards upgraded the assault
classification to justify her earned time (ET) sanction, then cited a policy in her amended
decision that did not exist, tells us that she felt pressured and hurried to follow the Warden’s
wishes, even if the sanction defied DOC policy and good reason. Edwards denied that she was
influenced by the Warden’s email, but the preponderance of evidence says otherwise.
We believe the more severe ET sanctions were proposed, and imposed, because Warden Smith
and ALJ Edwards were focused on giving Linderman what Smith thought he deserved. Smith’s

30

stated intention to send Linderman “a swift message” and Edwards’ explanation of her decision
brings us to this conclusion.
Edwards: I wanted him to have the maximum, so I had to make it an “A.” Do
you understand that?
…
Ombudsman: The sanction was the important part?
Edwards: Right.
Ombudsman: That was the priority?
Edwards: Yes.
Ombudsman: And you thought his action was worth 180 days’ ET regardless of
how you classified it?
Edwards: Right.
Edwards’ explanation illustrates a backward approach to a proper disciplinary process. The
elements of a rule violation should dictate the punishment; not vice versa.
All of this leads us to support the third scenario: that Edwards purposefully—and correctly—
classified Linderman’s assault in her original decision as a Class B violation, without any
intention to aggravate it.
The Disciplinary Detention Sanction: Did the Punishment Fit the Act?
The excess in Edwards’ 180-day disciplinary detention (DD) sanction was initially less obvious
than that of the ET sanction, but upon close review, equally troubling.
According to DOC’s own policies, the penalty Edwards imposed upon Linderman was the
absolute maximum allowable for the Class B classification she initially assigned to the offense.
Linderman could have fared no worse if he had broken CO Diemer’s ribs with a kick or drawn
blood with a punch to the face. Indeed, some inmates who committed injurious assaults were
penalized just the same as, or more leniently than, Linderman. So were those who, by DOC’s
own rules, committed more serious assaults by spitting on officers or hurling bodily fluids at
them.
Edwards’ DD sanction against Linderman was not merely a variance from the norm—it was
clearly disproportionate. The penalty did not comport with the promise of fairness and
consistency that DOC’s policies and the law provide. Nor did it account for the cause of
Linderman’s outburst.
Edwards’ sanction also disregarded important mitigating factors which are required to be
considered under DOC policy—namely, that three witnesses said Linderman was provoked by
the officer he assaulted. In fact, no one at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility (FDCF)
adequately investigated claims that CO Diemer directed insults at Linderman before the assault.

31

Are DOC’s Administrative Law Judges Truly Independent?
Although inmates are not legally entitled to the same protections in disciplinary hearings that
citizens receive in criminal court, Iowa’s prison officials are required by state and federal law to
follow certain due-process procedures when they take actions that could lengthen an inmate’s
time in prison. One of the core principles of due process is the promise of an impartial factfinder—someone who represents neither the government nor the individual, and who will make
decisions objectively and fairly in light of the evidence presented. Under this system, ALJs
should not act as prosecutors, or feel beholden to prison officials who seek to punish inmates.35
Nor should wardens have input on how an inmate should be sanctioned.
DOC’s general counsel, Savala, said he sees no problems with a disciplinary system where
prison officials who accuse inmates of wrongdoing are free to tell the fact finder, in private, how
they think the case should be decided. He assures us that this free flow of internal
communication poses no risk of bias against inmates because he has instructed DOC’s ALJs to
remain objective.
Edwards asserted that she was able to disregard staff overtures, but she admitted in her interview
with us that such approaches were frustratingly common.
Ombudsman: Do you think it’s improper for DOC staff to try to tell you how to
decide a case before that case has been decided?
Edwards: They know it’s improper. I don’t need to tell them that. I mean,
everybody has their opinion. As long as I don’t follow their opinion and I still
make an independent decision based on the facts and I am very consistent in my
job, it doesn’t matter what they say.
There is no reason why DOC’s ALJs should be placed in such a precarious position. ALJs
should be able to think through cases clearly and decide them freely, without concern for how
their decisions will affect staff or their own comfort and safety. If prison staff thinks there are
special factors an ALJ should consider, we believe that can be conveyed in the reports they
write—without the need for ex parte (private) communications.
We believe that Savala’s open-door policy between prison staff and ALJs is naïve and selfserving, and has great potential to undermine legal protections that ensure inmates get a fair
shake in the disciplinary process. ALJs could easily feel obligated, pressured, or threatened to
side with prison workers who approach them. There is a very good reason why ALJs in other
state agencies are legally prohibited from participating in such communications.

35

Using impartial fact-finders in prison disciplinary hearings has been required by the courts since the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Wolff v. McDonnell in 1974. This requirement has been noted by the Iowa Supreme Court numerous
times since and has been applied to other administrative settings. “[T]he primary purpose of separating
prosecutorial from adjudicative functions is to screen the decisionmaker from those who have a ‘will to win’—‘a
psychological commitment to achieving a particular result because of involvement on the agency’s team.’” Botsko
v. Davenport Civil Rights Com’n, 774 N.W.2d 841, 849 (Iowa 2009)

32

The Iowa Supreme Court expressed similar sentiments when it noted the “facial impropriety” of
Warden Smith’s email to ALJ Edwards.36 It was not the first time Iowa’s appeals courts have
admonished DOC’s wardens for discussing disciplinary cases privately with fact-finders before a
decision was reached.37
Smith’s email did not merely create an appearance of impropriety; in our view, it created a
substantive violation of Linderman’s due-process right to an independent fact finder. Smith
furthered his misconduct when, without reservation, he fielded and responded to Linderman’s
appeal of Edwards’ sanctions—sanctions that he himself had suggested.
Smith’s actions reveal a lack of respect for, and understanding of, DOC policies that are meant to
protect inmates from unfair and arbitrary decision-making. The promise Smith made in FDCF’s
inmate handbook to treat inmates impartially and fairly was, in Linderman’s case, an empty one.
So long as DOC’s administrators and employees are allowed to communicate privately with
ALJs on pending disciplinary cases, its ALJs are not truly independent, as state and federal law
require. As a result, DOC inmates’ legal right to fair disciplinary hearings has been and
continues to be compromised.
Do DOC Inmates Receive Adequate Notice of Rule Violations?
Prison officials’ varying justifications for Linderman’s sanctions raised additional questions and
concerns for us. How is it possible, we wondered, that ALJ Edwards can give one reason for her
decision while her supervisor gives another? Why is the rationale for her sanctions not obvious
in her written decision? How could Edwards’ supervisor testify that Edwards intended to
aggravate Linderman’s assault violation while the record clearly showed she did not? How
could Edwards claim that Linderman’s assault was a Class A violation all along when none of
the documentation hints at any such thing? Shouldn’t the prison’s specific allegations against
Linderman have been evident from the beginning?
DOC’s differing explanations were possible because DOC decides the classifications of inmates’
rule violations at the end of the disciplinary process. This is markedly different from the process
used in criminal court, where defendants are informed in advance of the class and degree of the
offense they are accused of violating.
This peculiarity in DOC practices even seemed to escape the notice of the person responsible for
the prisons’ disciplinary policies, General Counsel Savala.
Ombudsman: Do you know, in the typical DOC disciplinary process, when an
inmate is informed of the classification of the violation he is charged with?
Savala: Typically in the notice that they receive.

36

Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8, 23 (Iowa 2012).
The Iowa Court of Appeals ordered a new disciplinary hearing for an inmate in 1991 after a warden had privately
provided information about the inmate to a member of the disciplinary committee. Bradham v. State, 476 N.W.2d
369 (Iowa 1991).
37

33

Ombudsman: In the notice that precedes the hearing?
Savala: Uh-huh.38
At the time Linderman received notice of his disciplinary report, he was accused of “assault.”
He was not told whether he was accused of a conventional Class B assault—“applying force
against any person”—or a Class A assault, where such force involved a weapon or bodily fluids.
Without this information, Linderman was left to guess which type of assault he was accused of
committing. The difference in penalties between the two was significant: up to 90 additional
days of DD and the loss of 275 days of ET.
Of course, it would have been reasonable for Linderman to conclude he was facing a Class B
assault, since no weapon or bodily fluids were used. But ALJ Edwards ultimately determined
that Linderman had committed a Class A assault. She defended her decision by explaining to us
that Linderman’s use of his body as a weapon made it a Class A assault. But the report
Linderman received before his disciplinary hearing made no reference to a “weapon” of any sort.
Nor does DOC policy suggest that an inmate’s body qualifies as a weapon. Even Edwards’
revised hearing decision failed to explain how she concluded that Linderman’s assault was a
Class A violation.
In our opinion, DOC’s after-the-fact classification practice presents several serious systemic
problems. First, it denies inmates the opportunity to know precisely what they are accused of so
they may understand the gravity of the situation and be prepared to defend against the
allegations. Second, it vests ALJs with the power to make charging decisions when their
authority should be limited to deciding whether violations alleged by prison staff actually
occurred. Third, it leaves the process open to abuses like those we have seen in the Linderman
case.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held, since its decision in Wolff v. McDonnell in 1974, that prison
officials must provide inmates with advance written notice of any alleged rule violations that
could cause the inmates to lose earned time. A written notice provided before a disciplinary
hearing ensures that accused inmates can “marshal the facts and prepare a defense” against
prison officials’ allegations.39
We are unaware of any published court decisions that apply Wolff’s notice requirement to DOC’s
current practice of classifying rule violations at the end of the disciplinary process. However, the
Iowa Supreme Court has cited Wolff’s notice requirement as a basis to reverse disciplinary
decisions where prison officials failed to say up front how they believed an inmate’s actions
constituted a specific rule violation.
In 1996, the Court considered the case of inmate James Love, who argued that his violation of a
minor rule (possessing another inmate’s property) had been unfairly treated as a major rule
violation (disobeying a lawful order). The Court determined that prison officials were authorized

38

Savala later reversed himself on this question after we explained that disciplinary notices do not in fact indicate
the classification of rule violations: “OK, so yeah, maybe I’m corrected then.”
39
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974).

34

by DOC policy to elevate minor rule violations to majors if “adequate reasons” such as severe or
repeat infractions existed. However, the Court said those reasons must be included “both in
[DOC’s] disciplinary notice and in [the] disciplinary decision itself.” (Emphasis added.) The
Court threw out DOC’s finding against Love because prison officials failed to specify their
reasons for considering his infraction a major rule violation, either in their notice or their
decision.40
The Court also ordered the dismissal of a similar rule violation against inmate Ernest Harper in
1990. The Court concluded that the evidence presented in Harper’s disciplinary report suggested
only a minor rule violation—not the major rule violation he was eventually found guilty of. If
the prison’s decision was allowed to stand, the Court said, the prison would have
unfettered discretion to charge a more serious offense when only a minor offense
has been committed. At their whim, they could turn even the most insignificant
infraction into a serious violation. That would make a sham of the present
classification … Fairness and justice dictate against such a result. 41
Although DOC’s disciplinary procedures were somewhat different in the Harper and Love cases
than they are today, we believe the same principles outlined by the Court in those decisions
apply to DOC’s current classification practices. 42
Prison officials elevated Harper’s and Love’s “minor” rule violations to more serious “major”
rule violations; but because the officials failed to state in advance their reasons for doing so, both
cases were dismissed by the courts. Prison officials also elevated or aggravated Linderman’s
“Class B” rule violation to a “Class A” rule violation, and likewise, they failed to state in
advance their reasons for doing so.
FDCF officials certainly had the ability to elevate Linderman’s Class B violation to a Class A
violation, but that should only be done if “adequate reasons” for the upgrade were spelled out in
their disciplinary notice, and in Edwards’ decision. None of the reasons listed in DOC policy to
justify an aggravation of a rule violation—history of violence, use of a weapon, repeat
infractions, or significant impact to institutional operations, for example—were spelled out in
Linderman’s disciplinary notice. FDCF’s disciplinary notice did not say that Linderman had
used a weapon in his assault of an officer, and this omission left Linderman with no reason to
argue against it. In the parlance of the Wolff decision, Linderman was unable to “marshal the
facts” and “prepare a defense” when FDCF failed to specify how and why it believed Linderman
had committed a Class A assault.
We believe the failure of DOC to classify rule violations in inmates’ disciplinary notices gives
prison officials “unfettered discretion” to impose significant sanctions without affording inmates
the chance to argue against them.

40

Love v. State, 551 N.W.2d 66 (Iowa 1996).
Harper v. State, 463 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Iowa 1990).
42
Disciplinary rules were formerly classified only as “minor” or “major” violations; there were no differing classes
of violations within the “major” category.
41

35

What Remedies have the Courts Ordered in Mishandled Disciplinary Cases?
In deciding what recommendations should arise from our conclusions on Linderman’s sanctions,
we looked to the courts to see how they have settled similar controversies.
Courts throughout the country typically order one of two remedies when inmates prove their
hearings were faulty: 1) a remand for a new disciplinary hearing, or 2) expungement of the case.
Iowa courts have often—but not always—ordered expungement if prison officials failed to
rectify any “substantial” and “prejudicial” due-process violations before they reached the
courts.43
In a 1990 case, the Iowa Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of a major rule violation against
inmate Ernest Harper after it decided that prison officials had trumped up charges against him.
Harper had been found guilty of a major rule violation—disobeying a lawful order—even though
he committed only a minor rule violation—jiggering (exchanging items between cells). The
prison argued that Harper had disobeyed a lawful order when he jiggered, but the Court rejected
that argument as an improper application of its disciplinary policy. If the original decision was
allowed to stand, the Court said, the prison “could turn even the most insignificant infraction into
a serious violation.”44
In 1991, the Iowa Court of Appeals ordered a new disciplinary hearing for inmate Kurtis
Bradham after learning that a warden had privately provided information about Bradham to a
member of the disciplinary committee. The inmate was accused of making a false statement to
another inmate about his interactions with the warden. The information provided by the warden
was used against the inmate as evidence. The Court said prison officials’ behind-the-scenes
actions compromised “the fundamental fairness of the hearing.”45
Later in 1991, inmate John Hrbek appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court after he was found guilty
of using a prison typewriter for personal legal work. The prison did not allow Hrbek to present a
defense during his disciplinary hearing, and the Court said the misstep had a direct effect on “the
integrity of the adjudication of [Hrbek’s] guilt or innocence.” The Court refused to remand the
case for a new hearing because the prison had not corrected its actions during Hrbek’s internal
appeals process. “It is well settled that minimum requirements of procedural due process must
be observed before good-time earned by an inmate can be forfeited,” the Court said.46

43

Benadum v. Scurr, 320 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Iowa 1982) and Kelly v. Nix, 329 N.W.2d 287, 293 (Iowa 1983). Courtordered expungement of faulty disciplinary hearings may have been unique to Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP). ISP
adopted a rule requiring expungement of mishandled disciplinary cases as part of a federal consent decree issued in
1974. The decree was mandated following a spate of lawsuits against the prison for overuse of disciplinary
detention, among other things. The Iowa Supreme Court has noted that ISP’s “expungement rule” exceeded the
minimum requirements of due process required by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the rule formed the basis for the
Iowa courts’ expungement of several problematic disciplinary decisions. The federal consent decree at ISP was
terminated in 1998. The expungement rule no longer exists at ISP, although wardens throughout DOC still can—
and sometimes do—dismiss disciplinary cases when they discover procedural problems.
44
Harper v. State, 463 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Iowa 1990).
45
Bradham v. State, 476 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1991).
46
Hrbek v. State, 478 N.W.2d 617 (Iowa 1991).

36

We found several more cases after the Hrbek decision where the courts expunged flawed
disciplinary decisions from inmates’ records.
Iowa’s courts also have ordered reductions in disciplinary sanctions when they were shown to be
excessive:


A Jones County District Court judge determined in 1995 that a 1,000-day loss of good
time was too much for an inmate at Anamosa State Penitentiary who had stolen three
blank checks from a prison activities office and a coupon book from the commissary.
“Although theft is of course extremely serious,” the judge wrote, “these thefts simply do
not rise to the level of offenses serious enough to warrant such drastic sanctions.” The
inmate’s sanctions were cut by more than half.47



In 1998, the Iowa Court of Appeals considered the disciplinary case of Jeff Goodwin,
who had been given 30 days of DD and 270 days in lockup for telephoning a female
correctional officer, although it could not be proven that he had made sexual remarks to
her. The Court of Appeals, citing the ALJ’s blunt suspicions that sexual comments had
been made, noted that the sanction was far in excess of normal for misusing a telephone
and called the ALJ’s sentence “an abuse of discretion.” The Court remanded the case and
ordered a correction of the ALJ’s sentence.48

Some of Iowa’s prison administrators have followed procedures similar to the courts when they
find that an ALJ’s sanctions are inconsistent with the rule violation:


In 2009, John Fayram, warden at the Anamosa State Penitentiary, reduced an ALJ’s
sanction against an inmate for fighting from 60 DD/46 ET to 30 DD/16 ET because the
sanctions went beyond what DOC policy allowed. Fayram did not ask the ALJ to justify
the sanction. Instead, he reduced the sanction because “the decision did not indicate that
the violation was aggravated to a class B.”49



Something similar happened at Iowa State Penitentiary in 2008 when then-Deputy
Warden Bill Sperfslage noted that an ALJ had ordered an inmate to a 30-day cell
confinement, although DOC policy limited such confinement to 21 days. Sperfslage also
did not ask the ALJ to correct the decision, but simply reduced sanctions based on the
record.50

Conclusions
Although the evidence presented in Linderman’s disciplinary hearing supported a guilty finding,
we conclude that Warden Smith and ALJ Edwards violated due process and DOC policies in

47

Sanford v. Manternach, et al, nos. CL 859-1094, CL 860-1094 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1999).
Goodwin v. State, 585 N.W.2d 749 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
49
DOC Disciplinary Number 20091009400.
50
DOC Disciplinary Number 20081018077.
48

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their sanctioning of Linderman. We believe that each of the violations was substantial and
prejudicial.
First, we find that Edwards intended for Linderman’s assault to be a Class B violation at the time
she found him guilty of the offense. The facts support that it should have remained a Class B
violation. When Edwards later upgraded the offense to a Class A violation, she failed to explain
how and why the assault was worthy of such treatment, as DOC policy requires. For these
reasons, we conclude that Edwards’ sanction of a loss of 180 days of earned time was improper
and more than 90 days too excessive under DOC policy and the facts of the case.
Second, we find that Edwards’ imposition of 180 days of disciplinary detention was
disproportionate to the offense and inconsistent with sanctions in other cases involving assaults
on staff. Further, Edwards’ failure to consider as a mitigating factor three witness accounts
claiming that CO Diemer provoked the assault was contrary to DOC policy. For these reasons,
we conclude that Edwards’ sanction of 180 days of disciplinary detention was more than 90 days
too excessive and was unfair.
Third, we find that Warden Smith engaged in an improper ex parte communication when he
suggested that Edwards impose a specific penalty against Linderman. Smith’s email intruded
upon the independence of the ALJ and impinged on Edwards’ fair consideration of appropriate
sanctions. In addition, General Counsel Savala’s encouragement and acceptance of such
communications undermines the precepts of fairness long required by the courts in disciplinary
hearings.
Fourth, Warden Smith inappropriately ruled on Linderman’s appeal after he had already
prejudged the case, and without considering all of the evidence.
Finally, it is our opinion that, because inmates have a liberty interest in losing earned time,
DOC’s standard practice of deciding rule classifications at the end of the disciplinary process,
rather than the beginning, is contrary to law and unfair. As such, it should be corrected
throughout all DOC prisons. Apart from this legal position, we believe it is a best practice to
inform inmates in advance which classifications of rules they are accused of violating.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite our efforts to outline these problems and the Iowa Supreme Court’s supportive
commentary on the case, DOC officials did not acknowledge nor correct FDCF’s missteps before
Linderman had served all of his sanctions and was released from prison. Since it not feasible to
recommend that Linderman’s disciplinary action be remanded for rehearing by an ALJ, the
following action is recommended to resolve Linderman’s case:
1. DOC should retroactively dismiss and expunge Linderman’s disciplinary case.
The following systemic recommendations are made to address weaknesses we identified in DOC
practices and policies:

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2. DOC should consider a statewide reinstatement of the rule once used at Iowa State
Penitentiary that required expungement of inmate disciplinary reports when substantial
due-process violations are discovered after the exhaustion of the institutional appeals
process. This would ensure that inmates receive fair hearings, and would serve as an
incentive for staff to respect prison disciplinary policies and the law.
3. DOC should remind its wardens and ALJs that, under DOC policies, a substantive
procedural error in a disciplinary hearing can only be corrected through formal processes
such as dismissal, a new hearing, or a remand to the ALJ. DOC should not allow its
wardens and ALJs to correct substantive procedural errors only on paper, as occurred in
the Linderman case.
4. DOC should direct its ALJs to consider staff misconduct a potential mitigating factor in
inmate disciplinary hearings when the staff misconduct gives rise to an inmate’s violation
of prison rules.
5. DOC should make clear to its prison administrators that they must investigate any
potentially legitimate reports of staff misconduct, separately from any disciplinary
hearings related to the alleged misconduct.
6. DOC should adopt a written policy affirming, as General Counsel Michael Savala
testified, that its ALJs are accountable only to DOC’s general counsel, and are not
subordinate or accountable to the prison administrators where they work. This point
should also be clarified in DOC’s official job descriptions for ALJs.
7. DOC should adopt a written policy that prohibits all prison staff members and DOC
administrators (excepting the general counsel) from engaging in ex parte communications
with ALJs regarding evidence and sanctions under consideration. This policy would
ensure that disciplinary decisions are truly independent and are not improperly
influenced.
8. DOC should adopt a written policy requiring its ALJs, when they receive any pre-hearing
ex parte communications, to: 1) recuse themselves from deciding the disciplinary case, or
2) disclose the communications to the inmate at the hearing and note the communication
in the final hearing decision. This policy would ensure that DOC maintains the
independence and impartiality of its ALJs as other state agencies do, pursuant to Iowa
Code § 17A.17.
9. DOC should revise its disciplinary policy to require staff to specify, in disciplinary
notices, which classifications of rule violations are being alleged, rather than leaving that
determination to an ALJ following the disciplinary hearing. This policy revision should
also require staff, rather than ALJs, to propose aggravations of rule classifications in
disciplinary notices, subject to review by the ALJs as part of their decisions. These
changes in disciplinary procedures would prevent inmate uncertainty about potential
sanctions, remove charging decisions from the hands of ALJs, and ensure that inmates
receive full notice of alleged rule violations and their potential penalties as required by
Wolff v. McDonell and Love v. State.

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APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX C

42

43

APPENDIX D

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APPENDIX E

45

46

DOC DIRECTOR JOHN BALDWIN’S REPLY

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48

49

50

51

52

53

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FORMER DOC ALJ DEB EDWARDS’ REPLY

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OMBUDSMAN COMMENT
In their written responses to our report, DOC Director John Baldwin (who retired on January 29,
2015) and former ALJ Deborah Edwards accused us of misrepresenting the facts and engaging in
harassment or “personal attacks” against them. They did not adequately address many of the key
findings and conclusions in our report, including the following:







No one in DOC investigated multiple witness accounts that a correctional officer
provoked inmate Randy Linderman before Linderman bumped chests with the officer.
Warden Cornell Smith engaged in ex parte communication when he suggested to ALJ
Edwards how she should decide Linderman’s case before either had considered all the
evidence. Smith then fielded and rejected Linderman’s appeal. The Iowa Supreme
Court said Smith’s and ALJ Edwards’ actions amounted to “improper conduct.”
The earned-time sanction imposed against Linderman for assault was twice the
maximum allowed by DOC policy; the disciplinary detention was the absolute
maximum. The officer suffered no injuries. DOC policy requires ALJs to issue
sanctions “in proportion to the seriousness of the infractions.” After we pointed out the
disparities, ALJ Edwards revised the decision and justified the sanctions by reasoning
that Linderman used “a weapon” when he bumped chests with the officer. Her
explanation contradicted that given by her superior, General Counsel Michael Savala.
Inmates receive no advance warning of the specific class of offense they are accused of
violating, leaving it up to the ALJ to decide. Federal and state courts have said for
decades that prison officials must give inmates advance notice of alleged rule violations.

Edwards’ claim that we “misinterpreted” certain facts is not supported by the evidence provided
by DOC. Edwards says she decided not to “aggravate” the classification of Linderman’s assault
violation until after she first spoke with us and reviewed the video. But our first conversation
with Edwards happened three weeks after she wrote her hearing decision, which clearly states
that she had reviewed the video. Furthermore, although Edwards claims she told Linderman she
was aggravating the violation, she did not use the word “aggravate” as she had done in past
decisions, and she did not identify any aggravating factors as required under DOC policy.
Contrary to Baldwin’s implications, we did not tell Edwards she should submit to an interview
without an attorney. We told her that the decision to bring an attorney was hers—not Baldwin’s.
This reflects our longstanding policy to protect government employees who wish to share
information with us, free from potential pressure or threat of retaliation from their superiors.
We are concerned that Baldwin and Edwards saw our investigation as a personal attack.
Agency officials should not take offense when we diligently seek answers to our questions and
share our opinions or offer constructive feedback, in the performance of our statutory duty.
Most concerning was Baldwin’s rejection, without analysis or explanation, of our systemic
recommendations, which are aimed to improve DOC procedures and practices to avert problems
we identified in the report. Rather than being responsive to these recommendations, Baldwin
continued to defend and justify the sanctions the DOC gave to Linderman. We remain hopeful
that DOC’s current leadership will reconsider these recommendations in their handling of inmate
disciplinary cases.
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