Office of Inspector General-Counterterrorism and Interrogation Activities, May 2004
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CTA LOAN COPY DO NOT COPY Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General SPECIAL REVIEW ! \ ~ ) COUNTERTERROR1Slv1 DETENTION Al\TD INTERROGATION ACTiv1TIES (SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003) (20O3-7123-IG) 7 May 2004 Copy ' • ~:•-• • I "• •."• • : • h • ~ - ~ • , . . "':::, ••-•__.•,• • • !,'; ', •, • ' "} . ' • , • ~ ' ' ' : -- • • ~• 43 . .....:t:.~ :- :~.·.:~ . TABLE OF CONTENTS Parre t> INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1 BACKGROUND;., ............... " ....................................................... 9 DISCUSSIOl''-J" Cl' . . . . . . . . 0- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ , . . . . . . , • • : . . , . . . . . . . . . ;.oo,, ....... " ....... ~ .. . ............... c. • • • 11 GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND Im'E.RROGATION A·CTIVITIES ...... .............. 1............................................ ,. ................................ 11 THE CA.PTURE OF ABU ZUBA YDAH AJ.',ffJ DEVELOPMENT OF EITS Do] ............ 12 LEGAL AJ-1ALYSIS ............ .-.................................................................. ; 16 NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION ivrrrr EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICL1LS ... ............................ : ....................................... : ........................... 23 GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE,- DETENTION,. AND INTER..TWGATION ......... :··· .... 24 ................................... 25 DCI Confinement Guidelines ......................................................... 2'7 DCI Interrogation Guidelines ........... .............. ................................ 29 Medical Guidelines .............................................................................. 31 Training for Interrogations ................ ............. .. .................... ........... 31 DETE:NI'ION A1'lJJ INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT I ♦♦ t f t 1 t •I.to ♦ 0 . •1 •4. I . J <f I • t • • C.t t O. t t t I f I I I o . • I• to • t t l • • • • • I < 1 t II It I t • t • • t t •·••• ♦ I I I f o • <, t ♦ ,.,,., • f Io• t t)i) ............................................................................................. 34 ... ,. ...................... ....................... ,........... 34 Videotapes of Interrogations ........ ... .......... ... .......... ..... ............... 36 ··••f-41,.••·"-••······ ..... ••••• • • • ••• ••••••• ,, .. . ............. .,, , •• ,,.. ....... . ''\"11 t . , . . . . . . . . . . , • . .. 317 Background and Detainees ..................................... ... ....:............ 38 .· '- · ~ -··················.. ········ .. ·.. ··· ..................... ;.................................. 39 Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines ............................. ,............ .40 Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques......... 41 Handgun and ·Pov,,rer Dri11 .................................................... .41 rrhreats ........................................................................................ 42 Stress Positions ......................................................................... 44 Stiff Brush and Shackies .............. ,..................... _. ........ :.......... 44 Waterboard Tecl1nique ............................................................ 44 ........... 46 •'I'• 1•C<t••t._• .,._,..,et It.••·••~•••••••• •ill ••••••-4 ._,. ..... t . , •• I••• rt•••~' 111', •&•<I•• ••'••I•••• I•• 47 .. , ............................. 54 .......... ,............................................. 57 C1 11 tit•••,.,_,•• I•• t 1-'t • • . , . t I•• 61 t,, ................................... ,,1,,, •. 65 &I·• C'I'•••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e ••«••I• tit.•••••••••• I I••• c • o ...................................................................... 67 . Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques ............. 69 Pressure Points ...................... .-........................................................ 69 Mock Executions .... :............................................................... ,....... 70 Use. of Smoke ........ '° ....... . ............................................................... 72 Use of· Cold ..........·........ ., .................... 'tt••·•~t••··-, . . ,-.a., ••• «" .... ".ij"·· ............ l,.,t. ... , •.••.•• 73 Water Dousing ............................................................................... 76 Hard Takedo°}vn ............................................ .'................................ 77 Abuse at Other Locations Outside of the CTC .................................... 80 ANALYIICAL SUPPORTTO TNTERROGATIONS ................ ,.... ...... , ........... , ... 82 EFFECTIVENESS ............................... ........................... ............................... ,85 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENITON AND INTERROGA TTON PROGRA.Af ................................. ............................ 91 Policy Considerations .............. ......................................................... 92 Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program ..................... 94 ENDG.AlvfE .................................................................................................. 95 CONCLUSIONS .. ~ ............ ~ ....................................................... 100 RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................... 106 APPENDICES A. Procedures and Resouxces B. Chronology of Significant Events C. J:viemorandurn for JoI-rn. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Cenlrnl Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of an A.l-Qa 1ida Operative, 1 August 2002 · D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Condilions for CIA Detainees, 28 January 2003 ~ F. Draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines on I\tledical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, 4 September 2003 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL SPECIAL REVIEW ( ~ COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEl'vfBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003) (2003-7123·I G) ·7May2004 INTRODUCTION j . 2 . . ~ In November 2002, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that the Agency had established a program in the Cmmterterrorist Center to detain a1i.d interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the CTC Program"). He also informed OIG that he had ·ust learned of and had dis a tched a team to mvestigate In January 2003, the DDO informed OIG that he had received allegations that Agency personnel had used unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee, 'Abd Al--:-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requested that 1 1 ,f: l ~ ~ OIG investigate. Separately, OIG received information that some en1ployees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities_ at an overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of hurrnui rights. In January 2003, OIG initiated a review of Agency counterterrorism detention and interro ation activities and the incident with eriod Se tember 20-01 to mid- · suMMARY th~ DCI assigned responsibility for implementir\g capture and detention authority to the DDO and to the Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D / CTC). vVhen U.S. military forces began·d~tainin individuals in__Af hanistan and at Guantanamo B_a , Cuba, 1 I I ·\ l the Agency began to detain and interrogate directly a number of suspected terrorists. The capture and initial Agency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydal1, 1 ~ Appeudix A addresses the Procedures and Resources that OIG employed in conducting this Review. The Review does not address renditions conducted by the Agency or interrogations conducted jointly w i t h ~ e U.S. military. . 2 (U) Appendix B is a chronology of significant events that occurred d~ring the period of this Review. ~ in March 2002, presented the Agency with a significant dilemma. 4 T1:"te Agen~y was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent additional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed Abu Zubaydah was withholding infonnation that could no.t be obtained t..hrough then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officials believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior _Al-Qa'ida high value detainees. 5. ( ~ The conduct of detention and interrogation activities presented new challenges for CIA. These included determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be securely located and operated, and identifying and preparing qualified persom1.el to manage and carry out detention and interrogation activities. With the knowledge that Al-Qa'ida personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques, another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that Agency personnel coul¢1 lawfully use to overcome fue resistance. In this context, CTCr with the assistance of the Office of Technical .Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to use on Abu Zubaydah. All of these considerations took place against the backdrop of pre-September 11, 2001 CIA avoida..T1ce of interrogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemning torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners and det.ainees in the internalional. community. 6. ( ~ The Office of General Counsel (OGC) took the lead in determinin.g and documenting the legal parameters and constraints for interrogations. OGC conducted independent research ·1 ~ The use of "hi.gh value" or "medium value" to describe terrorist targets and detainees in this Review is based on how they have been generally categorized by CTC. CTC distinguishes targets according to the quality of the intelligence that they are believed likely to be able to provide about current terrorist threats against the United. States. Senior Al-Qa'ida plaILrters and operators, such as Abu Zuhaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, fall into the category of "high value" and are given the highest-pribrity for capture, detention, and interrogation. CTC categorizes those individuals who are believed to have lesser direct knowledge ·of such threats, but to have information of intelligence value, as "mediu..'11. value" targets/ detainees. ~ and consulted extensively with Department of Justice (DoJ) and National Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Working with DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLCt OGC determined t.~at in most instances relevant to the counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities the criminal prohibition against torture, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340B, is the controlling legal . constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States. In August 2002, DoJ provided to the Agency a legal opinion in which it determined that 10 specific "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" (EITs) would notviolate the torture prohibition. This work provided the foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guide the CTC Program. ~ 7. By November 2002, the Agency had Abu Zubaydah and another high value detainee, 'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, in custod - - - - · i 1 and the Office of Medical Services (OMS) provided medical care to the det~inees. • • • . ~ . .' - - : ,· . . . • # . - •. • ' ' . . . ~ " .4 . ,-. - - - - . ' ~ I ' - . . . '. . .. .. - .. ·.. -- - ---- ------- - - -- ----- -- - - ·· - ·- ·· - ~ : ._· ' .·; - ' •• . - .. ' • • . - . - - < I . ' . ' .' • - . • ' ' ' ' •' . . . • . .. . .. : . - ,• . . • . ' ' ' . • • . • •• . •• • From the beginning, OGC briefed DO officers assign_e d to thes~acililies on their legal authorities, and Agency personnel staffing these facilities documented interrogations and the condition of detainees in cables . 10. ~ There were few instances of deviations from approved procedurewith one notable exception described in this Review. ·with respect to two detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one EIT, the ·waterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for purposes of DoJ's legal opinions. 5 ~ > !.. ---·----- --· · ---·----~- ' . . . . . . . ' . . . . ' . . ; :: . . . . ' . . . . ' . . . :. ._-~ . --~ ·. . ' . , 15. ~ Agency efforts to provide systematic, clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention ru.1.d Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems have been identified and addressed~ CTC implemented training programs for interrogators and debriefers.6 Moreover, building upon operational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DO ~ Before 11 September (9 /11) 2001, Agen{:y personnel sometimes used the terms interrogation/interrogator and debrie:fing/debn'efer interchangeably. The use of these terms has since evolved and, today, CTC more clearly disting11ishes their meanings. A debriefer engages a detainee solely through question and answer. An interrogator is a person who completes a two-week interrogations !raining program, which ts designed to train, qua[i.fy, and certify a person to administer ElTs. An interrogator can administer ElTs during an interrogation of a detainee only after the field, in coordination with Headquarters, assesses the detainee as wifuholding information. An interrogator transitions the detainee from a non-cooperative to a cooperative phase in order that a debriefer can elicit acttonable i.nt~[ligence through non-aggressive techniques during' debriefing sessions. An interrogator may debrief a detainee during an interrogation; however, a debriefer may not interrogate a detainee. 6 ~ /· on 28 January 2003 signed "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees" and "Guidelines on Interro ations Conducted be made aware of the guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have read them. The DCI Lr1terroga_tion Guidelines make formal the existing CTC practice of requiring the field to obtain specific Headquarters approvals prior to the application of all EITs. Although the DCT Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI Guidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room for rnisinJerpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and interrogation activities. 16. ~ The Agencys detention and interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrnrists and warned of terrorist plots pl~TJ11ed for the United States and around the world. The CTC Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports ap.d analytic products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and military commanders. 17. ~ Thecu~entCTCDetentionand Interrogation Prograw has been subject to DoJ legal review and Administration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency policy ru.i.d rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers. Officers are concerned that public revelation of the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency itself. 18. ( recognized that detainees may be held in U:S. Government custody indefinitely if appropriate law enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted. Although there has been ongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC, ~ Defense Deparhnent, and Justice Department officials, no decisions on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior Agency officials see this ·as a policy issue for the U.S. Government rather than a- CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be prosecuted 1v:ill likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely. 19. ( ~ The Agency faces potentially seriou.s long-tern-t political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC 'Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and the inability of the U.S. Goyemment fo decide what it will ultimately do with terrorists,detained by the Agency. 20. ~ This Review makes a number of recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities. Although the DCI Guidelines were an important step forward, they were only designed to address the CfC Progi:am rather than all A - enc debriefin or :interro ation activities. l I I i ~ : . 8 . ' I - ' .• • ' ..:. '-. '.• . , ~ • ,• ~ .' • ~ --·-- - - -- - - -·- --- - - - -.-.--- -··- -· - ·-- .. ~ I BACKGROUND tsl 22: The Agency has had intermittent involvement in the interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those of the United States. After the Vretnam War, Agency personnel experienced in the field of intenogations left the Agency or moved to other assignments. In the early 1980s, a resurgence of :interest in teaching interrogation techniques developed as one of several methods to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of political sensitivities the th.en-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) forbade Agency officers from using the word "interrogation."· The Agency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) . training program designed to train. foreign liaison services on jnterrogation teclmiques . . 23. ~ In 1984, OIG investigated allegations of misconduct on the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interro ations and the death 0£ one individual ..::· : · ... ,.-·, > - '~· ..~· _-::- ·-:: Following that investigation, the Agency took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its policy on < • , • 1 • • , ._ I~ I,> : ~ • ~ •,'' 9 ~ interrogations, debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarters sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance to the field. 24. ~ In 1986, the Agency ended the HRE training program because of alle ations _ofhuman ri hts abuses in Latin America. which remains in effect, explains the Agency's general interrogation policy: l \ I t ~ 10 DISCUSSION GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DITENTION /\ND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES 25.~ · · · · ogations 27. ~ · The DCT delegated responsibility for implementation to the DDO and D /CTC. Over time, ~TC a~o solicited as.s . . 1 ce from other Agency components, mcludin.g OGC, OMS and OTS. 7 CU/ /FOUO) DoJ takes the position that as Cororn.ander-in-Chief, the President independently has the Article U constitutional authority to order Lbe detention and interrogation of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information. 8 9 1 28. ( ~ T o a s s i s t A g e n ~ understandin the sea e and im l i c a t i o n s OGC researched, analyze_d, ·a nd le le al issues. These included - "draft" papers wfth Agency officers responsible . . · · THE CAPTITRE OF ABU ZUBA YDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EITs 30. ~ ) The capture of senior Al-Qa 1ida operative Abu Zubaydah on 27 March 2002 presented the Agency with the opportunity to obtain aclionable intelligence on future threats to the United States from the most senior Al-Qa'ida member in U.S. custody at that time. This accelerated CIA's develo ment of an interroo-ation program ~ . ' ·. . - . . . 12 ' . ,·. '. . ... . . ... ~ .- •• .,~ '.~ -. :· ••• ~- - .._,_,. p : · . : . . ~-~- ,':,. -~· ·:. ,- ~ • • • • ••• ~' ' ;' , ----,.-..,· .·. ·... < . . . \. ' '-·':·· -~· ·_-.i_:\ . .~:.>-=-/·\,, ,,/: . -. ., .. 31. ~ To treat the severe wounds that Abu Zubaydah suffered uport his capturer the Agency prov1.ded him intensive medical care from the outset and 1eferred bis questioning for several weeks pending his recovery. The Agency then assembled a team that interrogated Abu Zubaydah usin non-physical elicitation techniques. The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydah was withholding imminent threat information. · . 32. ~ ) Several months earlier, in late 2001, CIA had tasked an independent contractor psychologist, who had-experience hi. the U.S. Air Force's Survival, Evasion, ~ c e , and Escape (SERE) training program, to research and · write a paper on Al-Qa'ida's resistance to interrogation techniques.13 This psychologist collaborated with a Department of Defense (DoD) psychologist who had-SERE experience in the U.S. Air Force and DoD to p r o ~ p e r , "Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qa'ida Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective." Subsequently, the two psychologists developed a list of riew and more aggressive EITs that they recommended for use in interrogations. 12 l3 (U / /FOUO) The SERE training program I alls under the DoD foint Personnel Recovery . Agency (JPRA). JPRA is responsible for missions to include the training for SERE a.l"\d Prisoner of War and Missing In Action operational affairs including repatriation. SE'.RE Training is offered by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Farce to its personnel, particularly air crews and special operations forces who are of greatest risk of being captured during military operations. SERE students are taught bow to survive in va:rjous terrain,. evade and endure capiivily, resist interrogations, and COrlduct themselves to prevent harm to themselves and fellow prisoners of Vtar. ~ • ., ~9tfil./ --~. - - ' • ··- ' • .' . : ~- ' ,. ... •• 1 ( ' -: ' '-, - ' . .... :. - - ·, -~ • ; '' .- .: • 33. ~ ) CIA's OTS obtained data on the use of the proposed Errs and their potential long-term psychological effects on detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited from a number .of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area of psychopathology. 34. ~ OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joint Personne1 Recove·ry Agency (JPRA) regarding techniques used in its SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students. DoD /JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted from use of the ElTs, including the most taxing technique, the waterboard, on SERE stµdents.14 The OTS analysis was used by OGC in evaluating the legality of teclmiques. 35. ~ Eleven EITs were proposed for adoption in the CTC Inten-ogation Program. As proposed, use ofEITs would be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological state of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposed t e c b n i q u e - - - a f t e r learnmg from DoJ that frus could delay the l e ~ f o l l m - v i n g textbox identifies the 10 EITs the Agency described to DoJ. ~ According to individuals vrith authoritative knowledge of the SERE program, the waterboar<l was used for demonstration purposes on a very small number of students in a class. Excepl for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued. because of its dramatic effect on the students vv-ho were subjects. 14 ~ ~ 14 ·:••, ' ' ',: • ~~ ~ <: •• - - · . - . • I •• _·' J ,::,• • •• ::,-.::._··,.,_~ • • • \ Enhanced Interrogation Techniques ♦ The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both hands, with one hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the detainee is drawn toward the interrogator. '9 During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled fonvard and then quickly and -firmly pushed into a .flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall. His head and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash. ~ TI1e facial hold is used to ho!d the detainee's head immobile. The interrogator places an open pab:n on either side of the cletainee's face and the interrogator's fingertips are kept well away from the detainee's eyes. o With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spread apart. The j11terrogator's hand makes contact with the area ber-;•,een the tip of the detainee's chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe. ~ In cramped confinement, the detainee is placed in a confined space, typically a small or large box, which is usually dark. Confinement in the smaller space lasts no more than two hours and in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours, ~ Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a hamiless insect in the box with the detainee. · ♦ During wall standing, the. detainee may stand about 4 to 5 feet from a wall with hls feet spread approximately to his shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in front of him and his fingers rest on th.e wall to support all of his body weight The detainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or feet ♦ The application of stress positions may include having the detainee sit on the floor with his legs extended straight out in front of him with his amts raised above his head or kneeling on the .floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle. -t Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time. ~ The application of the waterboard h:chnique involves hinding the detainee to a bend, with his feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobilized and an inte.noga tor places a cloth. over the detainee's mouth and nose while pouring water onto the dolt1 in a controlled milll!1er. Airflow is restricted for 20 to 40 seconds and the technique produces the sensahon of droVv--ning and suffocation. DoJLEGAL ANALYSIS 36. ~ CIA's OGC sought guidance from DoJ arc:lin the legal bounds of EITs vis-a-vis individuals detained The ensuing legal opinions focus on the Convention Against Torture and Other _Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), 15 especially as implemented in the U.S. criminal code, 18 U.S.C. 23402340A. . 37. (U i /FOUO) The Torture Convention specifically prohibits "torture," which it defines in Article 1 as: · any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inte:ntionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person inforroation or a confession, punishing hitn for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 1..-ind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigatil?n of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanction. [Emphasis added.] Article 4 of the Torh1re Convention provides that states party to the Convention are to ensure that all acts of "torture" are offenses 1...mder their criminal l_aws. Article 16 additionally provides t..hat each state party "s.hall lw..dertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degradfog treatment or punish.ment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in Article 1." 15 (U / /FOUO) Adopted 10 December 1984, S. Trealy Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987). The Torture Convention entered into force for the United States . on 20 November 1994. ~ 38. (U / /FOUO) The Torture Convention applies to the United Stat-es only in accordance with the reservations and understandings made by the United States at the lime of ratification,16 As explained to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification: Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S. law. 111e phrase ··cruet inhwnan or degrading treatment or punishment" is a standard formula in international instruments and is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant • on Civil and Political Rights✓ and the European Convention on Human Rights. To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the context of those agreements, "cruel" and "inhuman" treatment or punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or punishment barred in the United States by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. "Degrading" treatn,ent or punishment, however, has been interpreted as potentially indudb.g treatment that would probably not be prohibited by the U .S. Constitution. [Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual's gender change might be considered ''degrading" treatment.] To make clear that the United States construes the phrase to be coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel,_ unusuaJ; and inhumane treahnent, the follmving understancting is recommended : "The United States understands the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading LTeatment or punishment,' as used in Article 16 of U1e Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment 1.1robibitecl by the Fifth, Eighth and/ or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."1 7 [Emphasis added.I 16 (U) Vienna Convenhon cm Uie Law ofTreaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.NTS. 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 11,e United States is not a party to tile Vienna Convention on treaties, but it generally regards its pro·,,risions as customary international law. · 17 (U //FOUO} S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15-16. .\ 39. (U //FOUO) In accordance with the ConventioJ.1, the United States criminalized acts of torture in 18 U.S.C, 2340A(a), whlch provides as follows: vV110ever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life. The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture" as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person with:in his custody or physical control." 18 "Severe physical pain and suffering'' is not further defined, but Congress added a definition of "severe mental pain or suffering:" I I ! I l [T}he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting frorn(A} the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pau, or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or' application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profmmdly the senses or the personality; I (C) the threat of unm.inent death; or (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected_ to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality . . . _19 These statutory definitions are consistent with the understand.in.gs and reservations of the United States to the Torhue Convention. 18 (U/ /FOUO) 18 U.S.C. 2340(1). 19 (U//FOUO) 18 U.S.C. 2340(2). 18 , ~ • . . • . < • ' • '': ! -~•: :• . : ...... : .r.: ; • ,'. <.. : ·,. ·,., ~; •'.\ \:, . • • ~; ~ . . '·'_:: - ' .::. 40. (U / /FOUO) DoJ has never prosecuted a violation of the torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §2340, and there is no case law construing its provisions. OGC presented the results of its research into relevant issues under U.S. and international law to DoJ's OLC in the summer of 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of the torture statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002 OLC legal memorandum set out OLCs conclusions regarcling the proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that "Section 2340A proscribes acts inJlicling, and that ate specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental·or physical."20 Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an "extreme nature" anµ that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 234.0A's proscription against torture." Further describing the requisite level of intended pain, OLC stated: Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily .function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2310, it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.21 OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the infliction of severe pain be fu.e defendant's "precise objective." OLC. also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justify interrogation methods that would othervvise violate Section 234.0A.22 The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other provisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatm.en t, and interrogation of detainees outside the United States.TI 20 (U/ /FOUO) Legal (\1emoi:andum, Re: Stand<"..tds of Conduct for interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340-234.0A (1 August 2002). 21 (U/ /FOUO} Ibid., p . l. Tl (U/ /POUO) Ibid., p. 39. 23 l1J I /FOUO) OLC's analysis of the torture statute ,vas guided in part by judicial decisions under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVP A) 23 U.S.C. 1350, \Vhich provides a tort remedy for victiJns of torture. OLC noted that the courts in thls context have looked at the entire course ~ 41. (U I /FOUO) A second undassified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion addressed the international law aspects of such interrogations.24 This opinion concluded that interrogation methods that do not violate 18 U.S.C. 2340 would not violate the Torture Convention and would not come within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 42. ~ 1.n·addition to the two unclassified opinions, OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at the request of CIA.25 (Appendix C:) This opinion, addressed to CIA's Acting General Counsel, discussed whether the proposed use of EITs in interrogating Abu Zubaydah woul~ violate the Title 18 prohibition on torture. The opinion concluded that use of EITs on Abu Zubaydah would not violate the tortw:e statute because, among other.things, Agency personnel: (1) would not specifically intend to inflict severe pain or suffering, and (2) would not in fact inflict severe pain or suffering. 43. ~ This OLC opinion was based upon specific representations by CIA concerning the manner in which EITs would be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. For exarnpler OLC ,.vas told that the EIT "phase" would likely last "no n-1ore than several days but could last up to thirty days.'' The EITs would be used on "ai1 as-needed basis" and all would not necessarily be used. _Further, the EITs were expected to be used "in some sort of escalating fashionr culmin~ting with the wat~rboard though not necessarily ending with this technique." Although some of the EITs of conduct, although a single incident could constitute torture . OLC also noted that courts may be willing to find a wide range of physical pain can rise to the level of "severe pain and suffering." Ultimately, however, OLC concluded that the cases show that only acts "of an extreme nature have been redressed under the TVPA's civil remedy for torture." \<Vhlte House CoW1Sel Memorandum at 22 - 27. , 2'~ (Ui /FOUO) OLC Opinion by John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC · (1 August 2002). . 5 2 ~ Memorandum for fohn Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, '1nterrogation of al Qai.da Operatiye'' (l August 2002) at 15. ~ might be used more than once, "that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions." With respect to the waterboard1 it was explained that: , .. the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench .... 11--ie individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is·then applied to the doth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. Til.i.s causes an increase in carbon dioxitj.e level in the individual's blood. This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. Th.is effort plus· the cloth produces the perception of "suffocation and incipient panic;' i.e., the perception of clrovming. The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [12 to 24] inch.es. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. The water is usually applied from a ca..r1.teen cup or small watering can with a spout. . . . [T]his procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of dtowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning. [I]t is Ukely that this procedure would not last rn.Dre than 20 minutes in any one application. Finallyr the Agency presented OLC with a psychological profile of Abu Zubaydah and ,-vith the conclusions of officials and psychologists associated with the SERE program that the use of E!Ts vvould cause no long term mental harm. OLC relied on these representations to support its conclusjon that no physical. hann or prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the EITs, including the waterboard. 26 26 {'rS.f- According to the Chief, Medical Services, OMS was neither consulted nor involved ip the initial analysis of the risk and benefits of EITs, nor provided with the OTS report dted in the OLC opinion. In reh:cspect, based on the OLC extracts of the OTS rep9rt, OMS contends that the reported soph.ishcatio11 of the preliminary EIT review was exaggerated, at least as it related to the waterboard, and that the power of this EIT was appreci<.1bly overstated in the report. Furl-hermore, OMS contends that the expertise of th.e SERE psychologist/interrogators on ~ TOP"3E 44. ~ OGC continued to consult with DoJ as the CTC Interrogation Program and the use of EITs expanded beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the production of an undated and unsigned .document entitled, "Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel."27 According to OGC, this analysis was fully coordinated with and drafted in substantial part by OLC. In additioh to·reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torture statute, · the analysis concludes that the federal \,Var Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C. 24.41, does not apply to ·Al-Qa'ida because members of that group are not entitled to prisoner of war status. The analysis adds that "the [Torture} Convention permits the use of Icruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment] in exigent circumstances/ such as a national emergency or war." It also states that the interrogation of Al-Qa ida members does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because those provisions do not apply exh'aterritorially, nor does it viola.te the Eighth Amendment because it only applies to persons upon whom. criminal sanctions have been imposed. Finally, the analysis states that a wide range of EITs and other techniques would not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments even were t.hey to be applicable: 1 · The. use of the following techniques and of comparable, approved techniques does not violate ~my Federal statute or other law, where the CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause the detainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering (i.e., they act with the good faiU1. belief that their conduct will not cause such pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainees), deprivation of reading material, loud music or white the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experience is so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almos~ irrelevant. Consequently, according to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the frequency ~d intensity,vith which it was used by the psychologist/intenogators was either efficacious or medically safe. 27 ~ "Legal Pr,inciples Applicable to CIA Detention and lntenogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel," attached to ~ 16 June 2003). . .. . ·. .. . .' noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainees' hearing), the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, s1€ep deprivation, the use of diapers, the use of harrnless insects, and the water board. Accordin.g to OGC, this analysis embodies DoJ agreement that the reasoning of the classified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion extends beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditiorrs that were specified in that opinion . . 'f'.JOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION vVI1R EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL OFFICIALS 45. ~ ) At th~ same time that OLC was reviewing the legality of EITs in the summer of 2002, the Agency ·was consulting · with NSC policy staff and senior Adn:unistration officials. The DCI briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the proposed EITs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadership of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of both standard techniques and EITs. 46. ~ In early 2003, CIA officials, at the urging of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration officials and the leadership of the C9ngressional Oversight Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. The Agency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and the Committees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's actions . The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with v\Thite House Counsel and others at the NSC, as well as DoJ's Criminal Division and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed il1.ern on the scope and breadth of the CTC's Dete....nhon and Interrogation Progran1. 47. ~ Representatives of the DO, in the presence of the Director of Congressional Affairs and the General Counsel, continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence Oversight Committees the use of EITs and detentions in February on 23 ~eERE'.IJ and ivfarch 2003. The General Counsel says that none of the participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the Program. 4 8 . - ~ On29Jilly2003, theDCiand the General Counsel provided a detaileq. briefing to selected NSC Principals on OA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value detainees," to include the expanded use of EITs. 28 Accordin,g to a Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel following that meeti.i.7.g, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple applications of the waterboard.29 The General Counsel said he believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of the effort. According to OGC1 the senior officials were again briefed regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September 2003. Again, according to OGC, none of those involved in these briefings-expressed any reservations about the program. GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND fNTERROGATION 49. ~ Guidance and training are fundamental to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally, politically, and legally complex as the Agency's Detention and Interrogation Progr~. Soon after 9 /11, the DDO issued tti.dance on the stand~ds for the ca ture of terrorist tar ets. 50. The DCI, in January 2003 approved formal "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees" (Appendix D).and "Guidelines on fo.terrogations Conducted ( ,-'\ppc-ldix El. whi,. h c1re di:,:,,:us~ed lei,,,,: Prior to the DCI Guidelines. HecH..iquartl:rS provided gu1d·ance 1::2 i.nfcrmal briefings and elecl,nnic communication.s, to include cc1bk-:: fro:r: CIA Headquarters, to the field. 5]. ~ fn Novt~rnber 2002,. CTC i.nitiated tHining courses for individuals i11volved in interrogc1tion.s . . . ··_..· . ·, .. ·., :~_:. ,••·.. : .. , , . ' .._' :_ ., .·. : .. ·; ·. :: '·· ..: ~~n t:--r / J.Ul'::>L~ · ·. · .·· . ._· ,. . , : . ~ ·__ ·· ... , .· ·,_,,:•.. ·.·_· :.. -'··:.) . . . ·, ' .._:. . :.·.~. : '• .. ', ·, -~.-,_-.' ">.-:,,;;,:'. rovsEEPJil.! DCl Confinement Guidelines 57. ~ B e f o r e J;:i__nuary 2003, officers assigni~d to manage detention facilities develo ed and im ,lern.cn tcd confi.nemcn t condition ,rocedures. The J~i.mtarv 2003 DCI Guideiines govern the conditib1~9.oftor1Ju1ement for Cl!-\ detainee,5 _1:-\el<:l in.ct~tentionJa_dliti~.s, ; ~ review the Guide_Ll,.nes and sign done so. · an They must . ac~'w wledg:rnent th.at they l:lave · ·· · · · 59. ~ ) The UCTGui.delincsspecifylega] "minimums" and require that "due pruvisi.on rnust be tc1ken to protect the health and safety of all CIA detainees.'' The Guidelines do not require that conditions of confinement at th1c: detention facilities co~orm to U.S. prison or other standards. At a mi.nimum, hmvever, detention facilities are to provide basi.c levels of medical care: Further, the guidelines provide that: ,_. ~-':·:~·": ·._.-: _,. ·_._ ·:. '·_, ·_, , ..·.. ,_ ,·, . -.. ·.· ,_:- : .-< . - .·. . . . . . . . - . - ... - . ' ' ' . . _- . . DCI Interrogation Guidelines 60. (S71NEi_ Prior to January 2003, CTC and OGC disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail, or orally on a case-by-case b_asi.s to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques. Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been briefed on :interrogation procedures. Interrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation, and have completed the applicable acknowledgement. 62. (StfNE)__ The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define ''Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Pemlissible In.terrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced •I • • , . ' " -· .: ,: ' . • . . ·- , . . , . .. . . . . . ._ ' .. .- . . : .. i • - . , • ' .. ..' - . . . • • ' . r. • ~ 1. , ¥ ;_ . -; ~ Techniques."33 Errs require advance approval from Headquarters, as do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field must document the use of both standard techniques .and EITs. 63. ~ The DCI Interrogation GuideUr1es define "standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These techniques include/ but are not limited to, all lawful forms of questiorung employed by U.S. law enforcement and military interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,34 reduced caloric in.take (so lon.g as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading .material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the use of dia . ers for limited . eriod.s ( enerall . not to exceed 72 hours. and moderate psychological pressure. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not specifically proh1bit improvised actions. A CTC/Legal officer has said, however£ that no one may empl_oy any technique outside specifically identified standard techniques wiU1out Headquarters approval. 64. ~ ElTs include physical actions and are defined as ·"techniques th.at do -incorporate physica] or psychological pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters must approve the use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed only by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the process.35 33 ~ The 10 approved ElTs are described in the textbox on page 15 of th.is Review. 34 ~ According to the General Counsel, in late December 2003, frie period for sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours. 35 1"ffit ) Before EI · · ·· · · ~ Medical Guidelines 65. ~ OMS prepared draft guidelines for medical and psychological support to detainee interrogations. . . . Training for Interrogations In November 2002, initiated a pilot running ·of a two-week Interrogator Training Course designed to train, q1:1alify1 and certify individuals as Agency interrogators.37 Several CTC officers, 3b (U! I AIUO) A 28 March 2003 Lotus Note from C/CTC/Legal advised Chlef, Medical Services that the "Seventh Floor" "would rieed to approve the promulgation of any further formal guidelines .... For now, therefore, let's remain at the cliscussionstage ...." ' . . . , .,·,.·_' ·.·.·.·.· .. · ·. ·. · .-:.-- . '...<.- . ,· .. ,,_:· ·..-. ··.: ·.. '_._.... ,·•.. ·,: including a former SERE instructor, designed th,; curriculum, \Vhich included a week of classroom iJ1stTuction fo!io 1.ved by a week of "hands-on" tra.Lt1in in Effs. '.' ,. . ·.. . - - . . . .' . , , •' ·. .. . ' ' , ,-: ', ~ completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign an acknowledgment that they have read, understand, and yvill comply with the DCI's Interrogation Guidelines. 69. ~ In J-i:me 2003, CTC established a debriefing course for Agency substantive experts-who are involved in questioning detai11-ees after they have undergone interrogation and have been deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to train non-interrogators to collect actionable _intelligence from high value detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize non~interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation Program, to include the Program's goals and legal authorities, the DCI Interrogatio.r:t Guidelines, and the .roles and res · nsibilities of all who interact with a hi h Value detainee-. ~ ~ -~~,-~,, !\_IJ"':,r:t::-½l;...J_! 74. (T'f-psvchol.:;e:,i::.t/ir.terrog,1tors- l e d e::ch inrPrrng,l\inn or ,:i.i,u Zut:-i,·,tih i11h: A>'.\'.-1shiri where Ells were usc:d. The- ;.,,·~ \'chok)•jst / i; tt.-.cr :t".,:,~;1 h·•rs ( ,_·-n:',.·rri"·d with ka1n rnembers before each interru ·:,ation I · l , _ , .• · · .:;:it·ions wer 2002. The interrogati.on of Al-Nz.i.shiri proceeded zifter - t h e necess,uy J-ic,1<..iq1.,.:ntc1·s auth0riz,ilicn. O • • • I I , ~. ; • • .. •• • •• . . 4 •: •, L • ' , > '• . '• '. • ' ,~ . _. . • ! • ' • - I • • I • ••• : • • • ' • ~- • • • '• • • .. • • • - • • •• ' • ,:_ psychologist/interrogators began Al-Nashiri's interrogation using . EITs immediately upon his arrival. Al:-Nashi.ri provided lead information on other terrorists d u r ~ t day of interrogation. On the twelfth day of interrogation-psychologist/ inter.rogators administered two applications of the waterboard to Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced int rro • ti n f Al N hiri o ti.nu d through 4 December 2002,■ . • ' r •' ' • ' ' • ,. •• • • ' J • •• • \ • • • - :, - • I' • • • •• • ' • • • • • ' ,l • ' • -. • • -· ·,- • .• ... _ · • • • • • < ~ Videotapes of Interrogations · 77. ~ Headquartershadintenseinterestin ~ r e a s t of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation9I - i n c l u d i n g compliance with the guidance provided to the site relative to the use of EITs. Apart from this however, and before the use of EITs; the interrogation teamsdecided to videotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was to ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah's medical condition and treatm.ent should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the medical care provided to him by CIA. Li\nother purpose was to assist in the preparation of the debriefing reports, although the team advised CTC/Legal that they rarely, if ever, were used for that purpose. There are 92 videotapes✓ 12 of which include EIT applications. Ar:t OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes in November and December 2002 to ascertain compliance with the August 2002 DoJ opinion and compare what achtally happened with what v..ras reported to Headquarters. He reported that there was no deviation from the DoJ guidance or the written record. OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, and cables in May 2003. OIG identified 83 waterboard lications,most of which lasted less than 10 seconds. 41 ~ For the purpose of this Review, a waterboard application constitu.ted each discrete instance in which water was applied for any period of time during a session. 41 ~ 36 blank. Two others were blankexcept for one or two minutes of recording. Two (!thers were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG compared the videotapes t o - l o g s and cables and identified · a· 21-hour period of time, whi"ch included tvvo waterboard sessions, that was not captured on the videotapes. 79. - ~ OIG's review of the videotapes revealed that the waterboard tedutlque emplqyed a t - w a s different from the technique as described in. the DoJ opinion and used in the. SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the DoJ opinion,. the subject's airflow is disrupted by the.firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the doth in a controlled manner. By contrast; the Agency interrogator continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators a~knowledged that the Agency's use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for real" ·and is more poignant ·and c_onvincing. 80 Durir1g this time, Headquarters issued the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically 42 ~ addressing requirements for Oi\iS persomi.el. This served to Str€ngthen the comn,2ncl a.nd conh-ol exercised over the CTC Program. Background dnd Oelclin~~s 1 ~ ,--.. ~ ,-~ I !Vt'::i~. ,.::_ ;; :-_.) 1~::~~=~?i:.~:.,.. ~/ Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines . the Agenc . •was roviding legal and operational briefings and cables that contained Headquarters~ guidance and discussed the torhrre statute and the DoJ legal opiluon. CTC had l:lJ~o estf~blished a recedent of detailed cables between and Headquarters regarding the interrogation and debriefing of detainees. The written guidance did not address the four standard intenogation techniques that, according to CIC/Legal, the Agency had identified as early as November 2002.43 Agency personnel were authorized to employ standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without Headquarters' P!ior approval. The guidance did not specifically 43 lS)'iNEl_The four standard interrogation techniques were: (1) sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours, (2) continual use of light or darkness in a c~ll, (3) loud music, and (4) white noise (background hum). ~ 4D address the use of props to imply a physical threat to a detainee, nor 9,id it specifically address the issue of whether or not Agency officers could improvise with any.other techniques. No formal mechanisms were in place to ensure that personnel going to the field were briefed on the existing legal and policy guidance. Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques '1 \ \ l I I 90. ~ This Review heard allegations of the use of ~authorized techniques The most significant, the handgun and power drill incident, discussed below, is the subject of a separate OIG investigation. In addition, individuals interviewed during the Review identified.other techniques that caused concern because DoJ had not specifically approved them. These included the making of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stress positions, the use of a stiff brush on a detainee, and stepping on a detain.ee's ankle shackles. For all of the instances, the allegations \Vere disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative deterrninalion regarding the facts. Thus1 although these allegations are illustrative of the nature of the concerns held bv individuals associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance, they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action. . j Handgun and Power Drill 91. ~ interrogation team members, whose purpose·it was to. ~1-Nash.iri and debrief Abu Zubaydah, initi_ally s t a f f e d - The interrogation team continued EITs on Al-Nashlri for two weeks in December 2002they assessed him. to be "com liant." S-ubse uentl -, CTC officers at Headquarters sentenior operations officer (the debriefer) to debrief and assess Al-Nashiri. 92. ~ T h e debriefer assessed Al-Nashiri as withholding informa ti.on,. at which poin~reinstatedhooding, and handcuffing. Sometime betwe€n · 28 pecember 2002 and 1 January 2003, the debriefer used an unloaded semi~automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri into disclosing information.44 After discussing this plan - t h e debriefer entered the c.ell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled and racked the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri's head. 45 On 1-v~at was probab.l~ t h e ~ ~ debriefer used a .power drill to fnghten Al-Nashin. v V 1 ~ consent the debriefer entered the detainee's cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood naked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the power drill. withlll 93. ~ Theand debriefer did not request authorization or report the use of these unauthorized techniques to .-'It~~ .. - s. Ho1-vever1 in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officers who had leai-ned of these incidents reported them to . ·- . Headquarters. OIG investigated and.referred its findings to the Cri:rrunal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition. These incidents are f:he subject of a separate OIG Report of Investigation.46 , ' Threats 94. ~ During another incident-the sam.e Headquarters debriefer, according to a - o was present, threatened Al-Nashiri by saying ·that if he did not talk, "We could g e - o mother u rin here/' and, "We can bring your family in here." Th debriefer reportedly wanted Al-Nashiri to infer, for psychologica reasons, that the debriefer might b - i n t e l l i ence officer based on rus Arabic dialect, and that AlNashiri was in custod because it was widely believed in Middle East circ es · tenogation technique involves 44 ~ This individual was not a trained interrogator and was not authorized to use EITs. 45 (U / /FOUO) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to cha.inber a bullet or simulate a bullet being chambered. . ·· 46 CS'f,l.ME} UnauUwrized Interrogation Techniques-29 October 2003. 42 sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. The debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family. The debriefer also said he did not explain who he was or where he was fron1 when talkin with Al-Nashiri. The debriefer said he never said he wa, · telligence officer but let Al-Nashiri draw his own conclusions. 95. .An experienced Agency interrogator reported that the interrogators threatened Khalid Sha kh Muha11U:ri.ad According to this interrogator, the interrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that if anything else happens in the United States, "We're going to kill your c:tuldren." According to the interro ator, one of the_· · terrogators sai _. provided tQ him of the threaL indicate that the law had been violated. at report did not Sn1oke 96. - , i \ n A g e n c interrogat~r ~ i n December 2002, he and another smoked cigars and blew·smoke in Al-Nashiri's face during an inteirogation. The interrogator claimed they did this to "cover tile stench" in the room and to he.lp keep the :interrogators al~ late at night. This interrogator said he would not do this again based on "perceived criticism." Another Agency interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions with Al-Nashld to mask the stench in the room. He clai.med he did not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiri's face. ~ 43 Stress Positions 97. OIG received reports that :interrogation team members emp oye potentially injurious stress positions on Al-Nashiri. Al-Nash.in was required to kn.eel on the fl.oar and lean back. On at least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushed Al-Nashiri backward wrule he was-in th.is s t r e s s ~ o t h e r occasion said he had to intercede a f t e ~ xpressed concern that Al-Nashiri1s a!fllS might be dislocated from his shoulders. - e x p l ~ e d that, at the time, the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashlri in a standing stress position. Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by his arms while his arms were.bound behind his back with a belt. Stiff Brush and Shackles 98. · terrogator reported that he witnessed other techniques used on Al-Nashiri th~t the · interrogator knew were not specifically approved by DoI. These included the use of a stiff brush that was intended. to induce pain on Al-Nashiri and standing on Al-Nashiri's shackles, which resulted in cuts and bruises. When queslionedr an interrogator who was at acknowledged that they used a stiff brush to bathe Al-Nash:iri. He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses in a bath to remove stubborn dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of the incident attributed the abrasions on_Al-Nashiri's ankles to an Agency officer accidentally stepping on Al-Nashiri's shackles whlle repositioning him into a stress position. Waterboard Technique -, ,,. 99. ~ The Review determined th.at the interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboard and the description of the waterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, jn that the. technique was used an Khalid Shaykh M11J1ammad a large number of times. Accordmg to the General Counsel, the Attorney General acknowledged he is fully aware of U1e repetitive use of the waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the DoJ opinion and ~e authority given to CrA by that opinion. The Attorney General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a single individual. , 100. ( T ~ ) Cables indicate that Agency interrogato~pplied the waterboard techni ue to ·Khalid Sha kh Muhammad 18 . TOPSl:eRCT • . ' ' - .~ • - . • . . . . . ' . ' . · .- - .' • • .- ·-. .. . ' ' '- ' . . ',_.· ·.- -. I••• - ,: ~·: -· . ,- I .· \ I i I I I I I . ·_ . .. ,,. - :.. . ' . . . ... . - - ·-··- - ---- - - ·- · --- - -- ---- . :- . . . ' ' ~ ' -. ,, ~ - • ,. ·~ ... ~ •i - - - ------- --- ---- · -·· --- - - --- • • • • • •• • - • • • • : • • • • • . ' ·. - • • • • .. . . : . . .. ·. . • . . ,'. -- . . - .. • • • • ,:" • •. • • • - ·, .••.•. • • •• • . . •. : . . ' . ' • • • "' • •' • . - , ', • '- - . . . . . . . . . • • . • I • I I ••~I 53 ~ The firs t session of the ir:lt:n0g.2tion cuurs:. , beg:i11 in ~O'-'Cn!l.. ") r 2on;: . Sec paragraphs 64~63 . --' •,; ' ' . . . . ' . . . ·. .. . ,: . ' ' - ' ' ' . . ,• . ' - - - - -- ------··· roP'SE 54 - - ~ -- -- -- -- -- - - - -- -------- ~o---~~1ui'::i~ -----TO V-ScEPJil I i ~ -·I, ~ ------"----P"":-,-_IU . :--n .' . _· .· . . .. . .. ·_ : . ' ·.... . '.. .. . : ·... . . .. · ' . ·. . . . ''. ~ ~ . ' ·. · ..:•.·.· .. .~ .- : . '.:_-./ .·_ .·~ ··:·:_: :- ,.: .: :. ·. -:. ·. . ' ' ' . ' '. . '. . . . . . . , . ' ' . . . . . . ------ -·- -- --· ------ · «-.,. --.-· - ' __ · ,- . - . :· - .-· - . ' . ·. - ' - :'···. ·-: :: ' ' ' ' ' ' ' I • ~ ' ' . . ' . . ' : . . : . - . . . .. , . , . ' . .' . ' . . . . _:. ' ' .- ' • • . ' ' - .. · ..... · .··. . .• .· . ·.... · .·• ---------~- - - -- - · .. · - .. ··• ·•. \ : . ' I .\ ' I ·I .. . .. . ,. . • • w • :, • - : ' ' ' • • ' i . ' . . ', ' ~ ' ' . - ' ' .. .' .. ' ' ~ .. .. . . .. . . . ..... ··-. ·· · ·· ··· ··· -· · - ··· ···· .. · ··· · · . .. Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques was but one event in ilie ear y man Agency activity in that involved the use of interrogatio~ techniques that . DoJ and Headquarters had not approved. Agency personnel reported a range of improvised actions that int~rrogators and debriefers reportedly used at that time to assist in obtaining informati.on from detainees. The extent of these actions is illustrative of the consequences of the lack of clear guidance at that time and the Agency's insufficient attention to interrogations in ........ ·_ . . ~ : ' . ~-. . .. ! . 165. and the death of a detamee at a rnilitatv base in Northeast Afghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192). _These two cases presented £acts that warranted criminal investigations. Some of the techniques discussed below were used wi and will be further addressed in connection with a Repor In othe.r cases of undocUill-ented or unauthorized techniques, the facts are ambiguous or less serious, not warranting further investigation. Some actions discussed below \Vere taken by employees or contractors no longer associated with the Agency. Agency manage~ent has also addressed administratively some of the actions. . • . .J Pressure Points . July 2002 ns officer detainee's nee to restrict the detainee's carotid artery. . , '~ . . .: . ; - .' .e. . ' ' . ~ , . ~ ' articipated with another reportedly on the anipulated his fingers · ~ ' ~ 167.~ ho was facing the shackled deta:iriee, reportedly watched his eyes to the point that the detainee would nod and start to pass out; then, the shook the detainee to wake hhn. This process was ·eated for a total of three applications on the detainee. The acknowledged to OIG that he laid hands on the detainee and ma - have made him think he was going to lose consciousness. Th also noted that he h a years of experience debriefing and interviewing people and until recently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations. re 168. (SlfNE) CTC mana.g ement is ;now aware of this reported . incident, the se·verity of which was disputed. The use of presstffe . oints is not, and had not be~n, au'thorized, and CTC has advised the that such actions are not authorized. Mock Executions _ 169. ~ '.The debrie,!~..!~2!~.!f:i°Yed the handgun ~d ~ A l - N a s h i r ~ _ d v i s e d that those a,ctions were predicated on a technique he had artici ated in - h e debriefer s·tated that when he wa between September and October 2002, fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while e debriefer was i n t e r v i e w ~ was thought to be withholding . infonnation.68-staged the incident, which included screaming and yelling outside the cell by other 0A officers a n d . guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the-interrogation room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee, lyiJ.1.g motionless on the ground, and made to- appear as if he had been shot to death. -~·-±~~-. . ·.:--;~ 170. ~ The debriefer claimed he did not think he needed to report this incident because t h ~ a d openly discussed this p l a ~ s e v e r a ~ and after the incident. When the debriefer wa5 l a t e ~ n d believed he needed a non-traditional technique to i11duce the detainee to cooperate? he t o l d ~ e wanted to wave a handgun in front of th.e detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique, citing the earlier, unreported mock e x e c u t i o ~ . 171. ' ( ' f ~ A senior operations office recounted that around September 2002-eard that the debriefer had staged a_mock execution. llllwas not present b~lt unders~ood it went b ~ t was transparen-uj:'ruse and no ·benefit was denved from it-bserved that there is a need to be creative as long as it is not considered torture. -tated that if such a proposal were made now, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begin wi management and would include CTC/Legal, 172. ~ The-admitted staging a "mock execution" in the first d a ~ v a s open. According to the the technique was his idea but was not effective because it came across as being staged. It was based on the concept, from. SERE school, of showing something tl1at looks real, butis not. The recalled that a particular CTC interrogator later told him about employing a mock execution technique. Thelall did not know when this incident occurred or if it was successful. He viewed this technique as :ineffective because it was not believable. j ;\ ij ' . ' .. . -. ... .. -. . - ' ;- . ,·. .. . ' . . . :· ' . ' ~ .' : . '• - ' . ',- ,- . - '. ·_ . . . .. . _' .· ...... ·:i . -.. . - . . . . , . ;. - ' ,: _ ~ ~ ~- described staging a mock execution of a detainee. Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the "body" in the aftermath of the ruse ''sang like a bird.'.' 174. revealed that a roximately four days before his interview with OIG, th stated he had conducted a mock executio in October or November 2002. Report_edly, the firearm was discharged outside of the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly possessed critical threat information stated that he told the not to d ~ e stated that he has not heard of a similar act occurring-ince then. . . Use of Smoke cigarette smoke was once used as an interrogation technique in ~ e d l y , at the request of - a n interrogator, the officer, who does not smoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/ cigar in the detainee's face for about five minutes. The detainee started talking so the smoke ceased. heard that a different officer had used smoke as an interrogation t e c h n i ~ questioned numerous personnel who had w o r k e ~ b o u t the use of s·m oke as a technique. None reported any knowledge of the use of smoke as an interrogation technique. • .• ~.·. :_._ ·:·.-~-· •-: "176. .~ . ' . . . -= drnitted that he has personally used smoke inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point where they would start to "purge." After thls, in a weakened state, . ,, . . ~. . . . .' ; ; , - - ·. '. . . .- ' . •, ' • . ❖~ ' • • I • • l • •., . 'th inforrriation.70 denied ever physically abusing detainees or knowing anyone who has. Use of Cold -In 178. late Jul detainee was being interrogate Prior to proceeding with any of the~ethods, officer responsible fol the detainee-requesting Headquarters authority to employ a prescribed interrogation plan over a two-week period. The plan inclu:ded the following: Physical Comfort Level Deprivation: With use of a window air conditioner and a judicious provision/ deprivation of warm dothing/blq.rtkets, believe we can increase [the detainee's} physical discomfort level to the point where we may lower his mental/trained resistance abilities. · CTC/Legal responded and advisedr "[C]aution must be used when employing the air conditioning/blanket deprivation so that [the deta~et:'s] dis.cOmfort do.es not lead to a serious illness or worse," 70 ~This was sµbstantiated in part by the CIA officer who participated in this act with the ~ • ' ' • '• • f • •• , • . . .. • . . • ~ , \ • • • I • I . ' . . ' ' ' j • AO • > •• 0 ;. . .. . . • •~ I ::; ' . • • • 0 '• < 0 •. • • , • • • :•~· _ 183. ~ M a n y of the officers interviewed about the use of cold showers as a technique cited that t;he water heater was inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold showers. However1 xplained that if a detainee was . cooperative, he would be given a wam1 shower. He stated that when a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower with the unpleasantness of a cold shower. repor~ed that a detainee was left in a cold room 1 shackled and naked, until he demonstrated cooperation. - 185. ~ When asked ~ 0 3 , if cold was used as an interrogation tedmique,· the---responded, "not per se." He explained that physical and environn1ental discomfort was used to e:µcourage the detainees to :improve their environment. - b s e r v e d that cold 1s hard to define. He asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cold is life threatenb.1g?" He stated that cold water was still employed however, ·showers were administered in a heated room. He stated there was no specific guidance on it from H e a d ~ ~ a s leftto its own discretion in the use of cold. ~ d d e d there is a cable froni-docmnenting the use of ''manipulation of the environment." . . 186. ~ A l t h o u g h the Dci Guidelines do not mention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably cool environment" as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F.) The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe temperature ranges, including the safe temperature range when a detainee is wet or unclothed. Water Dousing 187. _ . According to and "water dousing" has been used since ·early 2003 when officer.introduced this technique to the facility. -Dousing involves ~ying a detainee dm,vn on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to 15 minutes. Anofuer officer explained that the room was maintained · at 70 degrees or more; the guards usect water that was at .room ten1perature while the interrogator questioned the detainee. 188. l'fS, A review from April aµd · sought permission from C T ~ t o employ specific techniques for a number of detainees. Included in the list of requested techniques was water dousing. 72 Subsequent cables reportE;!d the use and duration of the teclmiques by detainee per interrogation session..73 One certified interrogator, noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique, requested CTC to confirm guidelines on water dousing. A reh1m cable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towei or sheet, may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the afr temperahrre must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried iffilnediately . May 2003 _revealed tha . 189. ~ T h e DO Guidelines do not mention water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2003 draft OMS Guidelines, however, identify "water dousing" as one of 12 standard measures that OMS listed, in ascending degree of intensity, as the 11th standard measure. OMS did not further address "water dousing" in its guidelines. ~ . ·. :.-... : -.:.·-.·~ ·.. ·. ·_. :.', -... ·. -~~- .·· _·.·~··:.: ~ \ . . :_<·. ·. <.:-.':_"·•:· . . .- . .. . . in a later paragraph used !he term "cold water bath." ., . ~ - . -. , ~ . - .. ·_ ··:····::·:·:·~-;::·--.,:,>,:>._~-·~-::_')_\~ Hard Takedown 191. ~ According t o - t h e hard takedown ~ a s ~ interrogations~art of the atmospherics.'' For a time, it was .the standard procedure for moving a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. It ~as done for shock and psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of the interrogation. Th.e act of putting adetainee into a diaper can cause abrasions if ihe detainee struggles because the floor of the facility is concrete. T ~ t a t e d he did not discuss the hard takedown with~a.nagers, but he thou ht the understood what techniques were being used at tated that the hard takedown had not been used recentl After taking the interrogation class 1 he understood that i£ -~ - . : . -· ' .. . . . ·._ .... . .· _·.·_. . ' . . . . . .. ; -. . . ' . ._- - ...:· _··_ :_·:···_,\' ·. . .. . ' -. . . . . . : ,· . - -- ._··:_··:·· ~ - :'' . .. . . . ·::. . .. - . ,~ (' ···~· ".-,. -~-· he was going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to Headquarters. Although the DCI and OMS Guidelines address physical techniques and treat them as requiring advance Headquarters app1·oval, they do not otherwise specifically addsess the "hard takedown." 192. stated that he was generally familiar with the technique of hard t3:i<edowns. He asserted that they are authorized and believed they had been used one or more times at in order to intimidate a detainee. stated that he would not necessarily know if they have been used and did not consider it a serious enough handling technique to require Headquarters approval Asked about the possibility that a detainee mayhave been dragged on th~ ground during the course of a hard takedown-responded that he was unaware of that and did . not 1mderstand •the point of dragging someone _along the corridor in Abuse at Other Locations Outside of the CTC Program 193. ~ Althou h not within the scope of the CTC Programr two other incidents were reported in 2003. As noted above, one resulted in the death of a detainee at Asadabad Base76 194. (S;fN:E)_rn June 2003, the U.S. military sought an Afghan citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint U.S. Army and OA position in Asadabad located in Northeast Afghanistan. On 18 June 2003, this individual appeared at Asadabad Base at U1e urging of the local Governor. TI1e individual was held in a detention facility guarded by U.S. soldiers from the Base. During 76 ~ For more than a year, ~IA referred to Asadabad Base a s - the four days the individual was detained, an Agency independent contractor/ who was a paramilitary officer, is alleged to have severely beaten the detamee with a large metal flashlight and kicked bim during interrogation sessions. The detainee died in custody on 21 June; his body was tun1ed over to a local cleric and returned to his family on following date without an autopsy being performed. Neither the conrractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been trained or authorized to conduct ii1terrogations. The Agency did not renew the independeht contractor/s contract which was up for renewal soon after the incident. OIG is investigating this incident in . concert with DoJ?7 the 195. (3HME) In July 20Q3· officer The objective was to determine if anyone at · e school · ad information about the detonation of a remotecontrolled improvised explosive device that had killed eight border guards several days earlier. 196. Cst-f.WEl A teacher being interviewed re · ortedl smiled and lau hed inappropriately, whereupon used the butt stock of his rifle to strike or ''buttstroke" the teacher at least twice in his torso, followed by several knee kicks to his.torso. This incident was ·witnessed by 200 students. 1'.he teacher was reportedly not seriously injured. In response to his actions, Agency management returned the to Headquarters. He was counseled and given a do.mestic assignment. J --------- .· .. ' \ ' ·_ ' ; .·, . ,' . - ~.::.£-•nEI TO!::;;__,~ -· . ' . . ' ~ ', ,_' •, . : : ' ' . ' ;. . . . -, ' - , .. ' ~ ANALYn CA.L SUP PO RT TO INTER ROC.•t '['[0 :vs 204. ~ Oirectur;:ite of Tntelligence anJl y.s1·s assigned to CTC prm:ide an0lyticc1l support to iJ1.terrng.1tion k'<1rns i.n the field. Analysts are responsible for .:ievelopi.ng requirements for the questionino- of detainees as well as conducb.n ciebrieh.ngs in some cases. . Analvsts, however, do not participate in U1e application of interrogation techniques . , , , • ., , , •• , ;• ,•~/I• •.•••:\~.:•:_'--/•:-::,,•,.',. ,,,:•_.·;~•_,• , ,I• • l :,:: • . . , .. • - •:t,,: ,',:,•~•;:,:,:~.:,.';-J 205. 1FS£ According to a number of those 1 :interviewed for this Review, the Agency's intelligence on Al-Qa ida was limited prior to the initiation of the CTC Interrogation Program. · The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts an.d had very little hard kn?wledge of what particular Al-Qa1ida leaders-who later becan1e detainees-knew. This lack of knowledge led analysts to speculate about what a detainee "should know/' vice information the anal st could objectively demonstrate the detainee didknow. a detainee did not respond to a question posed· to him, the assumption at Headquarters was that the detahlee was holding back and knew more; conseq.uently, Headquarters recommended resumption of EITs_. . • - • ') . • -- . . ' . ' , : , -~· • . ' • • J ' ' evidenced in the final ,vaterbo<'lrd session of :\bu Zl1bi'l\'C18h . ~ to a senior CTC officer, the interroga.tion tea,1n ■ ~ o n s i d e r e d Abu Zub.::iyda.h to be complicmt ,md w2..nted to terminate EITs. believed Abu Zubaydah continued to generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to ·conlinue use of tl1e EITs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use of the waterboard on Abu Zuba dah was made b senior officers of the DO to assess Abu Zubaydah's compliance and witnesse1 the final waterboard session, after-which, they reported back to Headquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on Abu Zubaydah. E.fFEC11VENESS 211. ~ The detention of terrorists has prevented them from ·engaging in further terrorist ac_tivity, arid tl:)eir interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists, warned of terrorists plo_ts planned for the United States and around the world, and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence publications for senior policymakers and war fighters. In this regard, there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the effectiveness of EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not without some concern. 212. l ~ t. ts . •• .. • . • • •• When the Agency began capturing f th ff rtt b t · . .. . ' '' d. . d th . . . . ' ·, - , • • , , , r . ' , . 85 • .-, ' l • • • • • •. , • • ~ ~ ' • •' '- •, . : • • . : '•• :.~•--:,:., . : : ' ~ .-• ,· . ' •'. ,• • . . '.!,:-·--· · •'•,, ,.-. -·. '-.. . :i-,• • .:,:••, . . . • • • ••, ' •1' . . '\: . · .•. · :•,• ' . ,' : I• ' • .: •: • •. . . . :•••, ":. \ .._ . . . . -· .... ·- ...." P. significant, actionable information, the measure of success of the Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the · detainees. 213. ~ Quantitatively, the DO has significantly jncreased the nun1ber of c·o unterterrorism intelligence reports ·with the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody. Betwe~n 9 /11 and the end of April 2003, the Agency produced over 3,000 intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reports came from - e provided by the high value detainees at ,' ·. '·. . :. :· t ' ••· - • • • • : . ' 214. ere frequently uses the. information from. one detainee, as well as 0th.er sources, to vet the information of another detainee. Altho1+gh lower-level detainees provide less information than the high value detainees, :information from these detainees has, on many occasions1 supplied the • information needed to robe the hi h value detajnees fu.rt.li.er. the hiangulation•of intelligence provic:les a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities than would be possible from a single detainee. For example, lvfustafa Ahmad Adam al-Hawsawi, the Al-Qa'ida financier who was captured with Khalid Shaykh IVhtlrnmmad, rovided the Agency's first intelligence pertaining to another participant in the 9 / 11 terrorist plot. information to obtain additional details about Khalid Sha kh Muhammad 215. Detainees have provided information on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist g r o u ~ note includes: the modus operandi of A l - Q a ' i d a , . errorists who are capable of mounting attacks in the United States, 216~ ~ Detan:i-ee inform.ati.on has assisted in the identifi'Cation of terrorists. For example, infonnati.on from Abu Zubaydah helped lead to the identification of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammed-operatives who: had plans to detonate a uranium-topped ~tybomb in either Washington, D..C., or New York City. Riduan "Hambali" Isomudclin. provided infonµation·that led to the arrest of previously unknown members of an Al-Qa'ida cell in Karachi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack · inside the United States. Many other detainees, including lower~level detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan, have provided leads to other terrorists, but probably the most prolific has been Khalid · Shaykh Muhammad. He provided informati.qn that helped lead to tl---te arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paxacha and his son Uzair Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muharrnnad planned to use to smuggle explosives into the United States; Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative m New York; and I'vfajid Khan, an operative who could enter the United States easil and was tasked to research attacks Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information also led to the investigation and p r o s e c u ~ Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio. - ' ' . •. • ·. '> . ·.•·. : ' ' '.· ·. ' .·' , '. . .. ': . . . ' . ' ,· 217. Detainees, both planners and operatives, have also made the Agency aware of several plots planned for th · ~plans -attack aft to fl · into Hea . . blow up several U.S. gas stations to create panic and havoci hijack and fly an airplane into the tallest building in California in a west coast version of the World Trade Center attack; cut the lines of suspension bridges.in. New York in an effort to make them calla se; This Review did not Wl.c over any evidence that these plots were inuninent. Agency senior managers believe that lives have been saved as a result of the capture and interrogation of terrorists who . were planning attacks, in particuJ.ar Khalid Shaykh ivfuhammad, Abu Zubaydah, Hambali., and Al-Nashir1. 218. 1dge the reporting from detaiq.ees as one of the most im intelligence. viewed analysts'knowledge of the terrorist target as bav:ing much more depth as a result of information from detainees and estimated that detainee reporting is used in all counterterrorism articles roduced for the most senior olic makers. I ' . ' ' . , ~.- , ->:;•': .\ ~ ." ' : .. .'.',-- ... : ' :, . .. " : ~· .·,_.'· ~ . . .. •. l1, -~·t:~·-~-~ TOP-sf~El said he believes the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable in obtaining enormous amounts of critical threat information from · defaine_e s who had otherwise believed they were safe from any harm · in the hands of Americans. 220. ~ Inasmuch as EITs have been used only since August 2002, and they have not _all been used with every high value detainee, there is limited data on whlch to assess their individual effectiveness. 'Ihis Review identified concerns about the use of the waterboard, specifically whether the risks of its use were justified by the results, wheth.er it has been unnecessarily used in some instances, and whether the fact that it is being applied in a manner different from its use in SERE training brings into question the continued applicability of the DoJ opinion to its use. Alth,ough the waterboard is the most intrusive of the EITs, the fact that precautions have_ been taken to provide on-site medical oversight in the use of all EITs is evidence that their use poses risks. 221. ~ Determirung the effectiveness of each EIT is important in facilitating Agency management's decision as to which techniques should be used and for how long. Measuring the overall effectiveness of EITs is ch;;illenging for a number of reasons including: (1) the Agency cannot determine with-any certainty the totality of the intelligence the detainee.actually posses~es; (2) each ·d etainee has different fears of and tolerance for EITs; (3) the application of the same EITs by different interrogators may have ·····•·· · •··· " · · ·· - - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - -- 222. ~ The waterboard has been used on three detainees: Abu Zuba dah1 Al-Nashlri, and Khalid Sha kh Muhammad. possessed perishable information about immment threats against the United States. 223. _Prior to the us~ of EITs, Abu Zubaydah provided information fo intelligence reports. Interrogators applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during . August 2002. During the period between the end of the use of the waterboa:rd and 30 April 2003, he provided information £or approximately-additional reports. It is not possible to say definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah's increased production/ or if another factor, such as the length of detention, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboard however, Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative · 224. ~ With respect to Al-Nashiri,_ reported nvo waterboard sessions in November 2002, after psychologist/interrogators determined that Al-N 9shiri -was com liant. However, after bein move At-Nashiri was thought to be withholding information. Al-Naslfui subsequently received additional EITs, but not the waterboard. The Agency then . detennined Al-Nashiri to be "compliant" Because of the- litany of 90 techniques used by different interrogators over a relatively short period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why Al-Nashiri became more willing to provide information. However, following the nse -of EITs, he provided information about his most current operational planning and as opposed to the historical information he provided before the use of EITs. 225. ~ On the other hand, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, an accomplished resistor, provided only a few intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard, and analysis of that information revealedlhat much of it was outdated, inaccurate, or incomplete. As a means of less active resistance, at the beginning of th.eir interrogation, detainees routinely provide information that they know is a1ready known. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad received 183 a lications of the waterboard in March 2003 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING I'HE DETENTION AND INTERROGAITON PROGRAM 226. ~ The EITs used by tb.e Agency under the CTC Program are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the United States has taken regarding human: rights . This divergence has been a cause of concern to some Agency personnel i.J.7.volved with the Program.· · Poli~y Considerations 227. (U / /FOUO) Throughout its history, the Uni~ed States has been an international proponent of hum.art rights and has voiced opposition to to.rture and mistreatment of prisoners by foreign. countries. This position is based upon fundamental principles that are deeply embedded in the American legal strncture and jurisprudence. The Fifth and Fow:teenth Amendments to the U.S. Cons_tituti.on, for exampleF require due process of law, while tb.e Eighth Amendment bars "cruel and unusual punishments." 228. (U / /FOUO) The President advised the Senate when submitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the United States would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Convention to "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruet inhuman, or degrading treah1:1ent or punishment which do not amount to torture" as ''roughly equivalent to"- and "coextensive with the Constitutional guarantees against cruet unusual, and inhumane treatment."81 To this end, the United States submitted a reservation to fhe Torture Convention stating that the United States considers itself bound by Article 16 "only insofar as the term 'crueL in1mman or degrading treahnent or punishment' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Sth1 8th and/ or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United Stales." Although the Torture Cqnvention e.,'<pressly provides that no exceptional circumstances ·whatsoever; including war or any other public emergency, and no order from 9- superior officer, justifies torture, no similar provision was included regarding acts of "cruel; inhuman or degradin.g Lreal1nent or punishment." 81 (U / /FOUO) See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Conve!ltion Agai.ruit Tortu.re and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-20, lO()lh Cong.1 2d Sess., at 15, 1v1ay 23, 1988; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Report 101-30, August 30, 1990, at 25, 29, quoting summary and analysis submitted by President Ronald Reagan, as revised by President George H.W. Bush. 229. (U / /FOUO) Annual U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have.repeatedly condemned harsh interrogation techniques utilized by foreign governments. For example, the 2002 Report, issued m ·March 2003, stated: [The United States) have been given greater opportunity to make good on our coi;nmitrrtent to uphold standards of human digniLy and liberty .... (N)o country is exempt from scrutiny, and all countries benefit from constant striving to identify their weaknesses and improve their performance .... [T}he Reports serve as a gauge for our international human rights efforts, pointing to areas of progress and drawing our attention to new and continuing challenges, In a world.marching toward qemocracy and respect for human rights, the United States is a leader, a partner and a contributor. \Ve have taken this responsibility with a deep and abidi!lg belief that human rights are universal. They are not grounded exclusively in American or western values. But their protection worldwide serves a core U.S. national interest. The State Department Report idenlified objectionable practices in a variety of countries including, for example, patterns (?f abuse of prisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as "suspension from bars by handcuffs, and threats against family members, ... [being} forced constantly to lie on hard floors [and] deprived of sleep .... " Other reports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked. 230. (U / /FOUO) 1n June 2003, President Bush issued a statement in observance of "United Nations lntemalional Day in Support of Victims of Torture:" The statement said in part: The United States declares its strong solidarity with torture victims across the world. Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere. We are committed to building a world where human rights are respected and protected by the rule of law . • ./<· .<;.~. :,:· .:,; :. -.': ·: .\ {.' ·.\ ;\:>:·· .' ,:~~': :·: : . ~ Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right .... Yet torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush the human spirit .. . . Notorious human rights abusers ... have sought to shield their abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions and denying access to international hwuan rights monitors .... th~ The United States is committed to worldwide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all govei:nments to join with the United States an.cl the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, inv:estigating, and·prosecuting all acts o_f torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment .... Concen1s Over Participation in the ere Program · 231: ~ During the course of this Review, a number Agency officers eA-pressed -i.msolicited concern about the possibility of. recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in the CTC Progran1. A number of officers expressed concern that a hum.an ::'_..-~. . ' .- . .. ri hts . t ursue them for activities '. ' . Additionally, they feared that the Agency vvould not stand behlnd them if this occurred. of • - • ,· ' •• - ' : ,._ _< ...., ' 232. {S;tNE)_ One officer expressed concern that one day, Agency officers will wind up on some "wanted list" to apir before the vVorld Court for war cr•imes stemming from .activities -. . : ' . -~. ' . --. - -.. Another said, "Ten years from now we're going to be ·sorry we're doing this ... [but} it has to be done." He expressed concern that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and cited particular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak , ,' : . . ··.;,,~~'::".:.i · .:.r.. ~.,-;..._ ENDGAlvfE , .- • . • ' , .. ' • , • • • r' ' • . . . . : • . . . •, - ,_ . . . , •: .. . r I • • "• . . • • • • ·_ _• • • - - . The number of detai.nees in CIA custody is relatively small by comp.---irison with those in U.S. military custody. Nevertheless, the Agencv, like the militarv, has an interest in the disposition of detainees and pcirhcular interest in those who, if not kept in isolation, would likely divulge information about the J ; circumstances of their detention. 82 • • - •• . • -- . I .. ._. • ~ I - ~' ':. • . . • • : • ' ·,; . ~ 237. •.; • \ _. . '-. ~,---rD~T l\.Jl- ~~ . ., . . . - - -- - - - ' .: l .'....:::,,._.,'_. 245 _ r'K,·i;-lblt· rnss1bil I\, ,tl lc,:-:-l f· ir l'll,11; 1 ,kl ,1i ,·1 vc. date, ho\vev1:.•r. n(i de(i:-..icln h"~ bn•11 it1:-1de l<.' JHl°i( t·•-·d \·.-i\h thi" to prosecution ,1::, ,l option. - - - -----·--·- - 1. ' i c, CONCLUSIONS 2so: ~ The Agency's ~tention and interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identificati(?n an.d apprehension of other terrorists and warned of terr01ist plots planned for the United States and around the world. The CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the counterterrorisrn efforts of U.S. policymakers and military commanders. The effectiveness of particular interrogation techniques in eliciting info1mation that might not otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured, however. 251. ~ After11September2001,m.:imerous Agency components and individuals invested immense time and effort to implement the CTCProgram quickly, effectively, and within the law_" The work of the Directorate of Operations, Counterterrorist Center (CTC), Office of General Counsel (OGC),, Office of Medical Services (OMS), Office ofTeclmical Service (OTS) - h a s been especially. notable. In effect, they began with almost no foundation, as the Agency had discontinued virtually all involvement in interrogations after entountering difficult issues Vvith earlier interrogation progr~s in Central America and the Neai· East. Inevitably, there also have been some problems with current · activities. · 252. (StfWEl OGC worked closely with DoJ to determine the legality of the measures that.came to be known as enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs). OGC also consulted with White House and National Security Co~cil officials regarcling the proposed.teclmiques. Those ~fforts and the resulting DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented. That legal opinion . was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning whether long-term psychological effects would result from use of the· proposed tec...hniques. 253. (S71NE)_ The DoJ legal opinion upon which the Agency relies is based upon technical definitions of "severe" treatment and the "intent'' of the interrogators, and consists of finely detailed analysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency officers properly car:rying out EITs would not violate the Torture Convention's prohibition of torture, nor would they be subject to criminal prosecution under the U.S. torture statute. The opinion does not address the separate question of whether the application of standard or enhanced techniques by Agency officers is consistent with the undertaking,. accepted conditionally by the United States regarding Article 16 of the Torture Convention, to prevent "o:ue1, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 254. ~ Periodic efforts by the Agency to elicit reaffirmation of Administration policy and DoJ legal backing for the · Agency's use of EITs-as they have actually been employed-have been well advised and successful. However, in this processr Agency officials have neither sought nor been provided a ·written statement of policy or a formal signed update of the DoJ legal opinion, inclucUng such important determinations as the meaning and applicability of Article 16 of the Tortu.re Convention. In July 2003, the DCI and the General Counsel briefed senior Administration officials on the Agency's expanded use of EITs. At that time, the Attorney General affirmed that the Agency's conduct remained within the scope of the 1 August 2002 DoJ legal opinion. we11 255. ~ A number of Agency officers of various grade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation · activities are concerned that they may at some future date be vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that the U.S. Government will not stand behind them. Although the current detention and interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal review and Administration political approval, it diverges sharply from previous Agertcy policy and practice, rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers; statements of U.S. policy by the Departmen_t of State, and public statements by very senior U.S. officials, inducting the President, as well as the policies expressed by Members of Congress, other Western governments1 international organizations, and human rights groups. In addition, some Agency officers are aware of interrogation activities that were outside or beyond the scope of the written DoJ opinion. Officers are concerned that future public revelation of the CTC Program is inevitable and will seriously damage Agency officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency itself. · 256. ~ The Agency has generally provided good guidance and su port to its officers who have been d · · In particular, CTC did a commendable ·ob in directin the interrogations of high value detainees at At these foreign locations, Agency personnel-with one notable exception described in this Review-followed guidance and procedures and documented their activities well. 257. ~ By distinction, the Agency-especially in the -early months of the Program-failed to provide adequate staffing,. · dance, and support · · · .· · · . . . 258. ~ U n a u t h o r i z e d , improvised, inhumane, and undocumented, detention and interro ation tee used referred 102 ~ subject of a se General. unau onze tee ques were use m t e mterrogation o an individual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation by an Agency contractor in June 2003. A ·enc officers did not normally conduct interrogations at that location the Agency officers involved lacked timely and adequa e gm an~e, training, experience, supervisi.on,-or authorization, and did not exercise sound judgment. 259. ~ The Agency failed to issue in a timely manner comprehensive written guidelines for .detention and interrogation activities. ·Although ad hoc guidance was provided to many .officers through cables a~d briefings in the early months of detention and interrogation activities.,. the DCI Confinement anq Interrogation Guidelines were not issued until January 2003, several 1nonths after initiation uf interrogation activi · and after man of the unauthorized activities had taken lace. 260. ~ Such written guidance as does exist to address detentions and interrogations undertaken by Agency officers ·s inadequate. The Directorate of Operations Handbook contains a sin le ara raph that is intended to .uide officers Neither this dated guidance nor general Agency guidelines on routine intelligence collection is adequate t.o instruct and protect Agency officers involved in contemporary . in,terro ation activities •l ! 261. ~ During the interrogations of hvo detainees, thewaterboard was used in a manner inconsistent with the written DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002. DoJ had stipulated that its advice ivas base9- upon certain facts that the Agency had submitted to D03' observing, for example, that" ... you (the Agency) have also orally infor:med us that although son::i-e of these techniques may be used with more than once [sic], that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions.II One key Al- a'ida ten-orist was sub'ected to the waterpoard at least 183 times and was denied sleep for a period of 180 hours. In this and another instance, the technique of application and volume of water used cliffered from the DoJ opinion. 262. attentio OMS provided comprehensive medical where EITs were OMS did not issue formal medical guidelines · 1u1til April 2003._Per the advice of CTC/Legat the OMS Guidelines were thert issued as "draft" and remain so even after being re-issued in September 2003. · 264. ~ Agency officers report that reliance on analytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence may have resulted in the application of EITs without jwrtification. · Some participants in the Program, particularly field :interrogators, judge that CTC assessments to the effect that deta:inees are with.holding information are not always supported by an objective · TONEe?, evaluation of available information and the evaluation of the interrogators but are too heavily based, instead, on preswnptions of -..vhat the individual might or should know. 266. ~ The Agency faces potentially serious long-term political and legal c;hallenges as a result of the CTC Detention·and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and tlte inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it ·will ultimately do with terrorists detaine~ by the Agency. · ~~ ~, "'• U 1 VI' Jf:t:t<._ - RECOrv1lv1E~ DATTO NS ~ - -:::i:, -~ r: l u1·· .. ~th- rol~ERfil I 109 I Appendix A PROCEDURES .AND RESOURCES 1. ( I ~ A team, led by the Deputy Inspector Generat and comprising th.e Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, the Counsel to the Inspector General, a senior Invesligalions Staff Manager, three Investigators, two Inspectors, an Auditor, a Research Assista1i.t, and a Secretary participated in this Review. 2. ( ~ OIGtasked relevant components for all information regarding the treatment and interrogation of all individuals detained by or on behalf of CLA after 9/11. Agency components provided OIG with over 3~1 000 page~ of documents. OIG conducted over 100 interviews with individuals who possessed potentially relevant information. vVe interviewed senior Agency management officials, including the DCt the Deputy Director of Cenh·al InteHigence, the Executive Director, the General Counsel, and the Deputy Director for Operations. · As new information developed, OIG re-interviewed several individuals. L of.Ab OIG personnel made site visits to the interrogation facililies. OIG personnel also to review 92 videotapes of interrogations Appendix B ·.·.·.>.:.--.. ~ rt .. , / 1J.)MECAF.:rc Cflf10UOLOGY: COIJlffEFffEf'1Wlll$/,I O~;fErfflON Af!IJ INTEHROGAllON /tC"JlVJll£S r:i:fi~;::::,::~MOM<~=~~:L21 . ••••• . ~ -. : ;· . ... • ·:::· :! . -~ :·. . ..-, ........ ,-7 .. .. :=~·:: ::::=:=--::1 •••••w•• --•"-••.,-•--•-l-•0•1•--;•••--~ ....... ~ .......:..,..._.,:_• ,..... i i i ! 1•... ..•. ·····-······· ...•.i._·······•-•····-·····--·· . ....... ... j i,,m!Mw 1·2002 f.p, ' ?.tr-:lr~ ,Jul ! I ..~ .. ·······1 ·--+.:~~·~=.::·.:~·.·.·.·· . ·.:· .·.:.·.·.·:·.·.· ......·...·... .-:·.· _- ·..~. ._~·.::.::.~:=:~· =.·.:.··:. .:::::·:·::~:~~~. . :.::-_._.. :. ·.:·::.: :·~~::.~:-~-=-~·~· =~-i GIA t,1iob.i M~r1:t~t1 pqiit:y m~\~£,c~i <.1;1 EiT!• ~, !.:,,inlmm 2coi. CIP. tw.oht iG~?.1 (~~)/r,;,~ fi~)n! O;,J tm t..W·J ~lf !::IT!: tY.t /~lt r J S~;;~:f~~;:;!~~~·.~·;:,:,:;. ,orn,c I ;;w:1._-,,iG -·-<l~•i0'<:1iJ);idayCI/,.... , .. ~! 1'."p ,, 1. ,,''l.'-\.(1 ... '·.•'.+ ..............,..... ··,:-............................................................................. _. 1 ::CCQ. i . .... ·····•·-·····-·············-··--·· .. [· ?.QO{Nr:·/"'···:'. g:;~~~':;,::;J:<!S tettining 1r.,1g1:imi::;,·,:lllw!,1 ;J;m~1n~d ic .. _ I ! I j.'.;~:'.r~~.il.11~~:~.:.~~~ ~~~~:~:'.'.'.l.~.~.•.•:.~.~U.{'.~~ ..... .. ....... .... ._... . .... . ... ~:.~:.-.-~--~~:·~..-.-:·.:·:·~·~·.·~.. .---.-:.-.·.-:·.=~~.... I j r;V\ bri1;.u. Jznd~11i1\p ol Gn1ti;JiU!l~ilaml u,;1i!ir-0:11 Fn!I ~·.·.-.-.-:.·.·.-.·.·_-.-j J i ··········· ............... i lho lo!~mnnho1i Prt.-wum. I 1 ZW./Dcr- · , ......... _... J i ~!<.:U:~ Jcin 1 O!!;i · . 1.... ........... ............................. , .....................................,.....,, .... _,:____ .... ir,<li*l-Ns rovi(H'-' "t irr&-11cuaU;,.111 acu·1iH!~s. .............. _............................................... ____ j_omirr.b1Jw n:!!ld.!1.!!.~!\::.-......................... f [:~:;;:~•J~~~!~~'.:~~~~~:_:-J.:Ma.;,.;,.;::;;;:;;:~ :~.~~:: _~=~::~~-=:=~:: :,;!: 1 ! ,~on::i f/:f j 0MB J.t£eJ1!il!ati1:i d:·:dl tttci:lf::ll!t~,I~! fr:, ill!;'~l..1'tN1\ cl i '.............. ____ j rlolabuiUR .................... .......................- ....................- .......... 1........... . ..... ·---.. ·---..···-.. ·····-·········· i.'(l(I:! J1J11 I 01)0 (::!,::i!m!! Guklu:mi,s l<JQUL"ll l/1'-l! r,c,bj('('( p,;sr, '! ·tMI <1,,s ;':e, ~e:n, ir.lGn.:,gu1.a b.r ClA -·~f;~~~¥i~. . . ,·./ -·--·--·--··- - ··- - - - - - j I l' ·n.r.rf;:@iit"ciiiitiii,., ! 1 ·~~g:;1:~:~: ~;~1i~;.;~;~~~:~~-·: ·.:·.·..-·. . l ............. j...... ................... ....................................................... It),.;-,;, :·.~j ·~2iii!~~.~~i~±~ ; --- I ... . .....j -_; 1 i . ...... j f _.;_~:·:·:·::·:::··--··:·.-.~.·.·.=~·~·........_._. . . :·.:·.-·::~.::j ~-----·-------- - - - · - ---· -- -- Appendix C TOP0n{cRET t lJ U.S. Departmcn t of Justice Office of Legal Cou..."1.Sel lf'/;,!,i~"-"'. D.C. 1GSJ() August!, 2002 Memoran<lcun for John Rizzo Acting Genernl Couasel of the Central Iatclligeuce Agency lnierr<Jgalfon ofal Qar,aLJ Operariw You have asked for i:hl.s Office's views oq whether certE.in proposed con.duct would violat-e the p,rohibition against torfllre found at S~tion 2340A of title 18 of the Unite4 States Code. You have asked for this advrce iu the course ofcc1tducting interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. As we understand it, Zubayd.ab is one oft.1-\e h.ighe...si: ranking members of the i;!l Qaeda turorist organiwlion, with \Vbich the United States i.s cu;rentl"y engaged in an international <'-rmed conflic-t foUowing the attacks on the \1/orld Trade Center md the Penl!!.gon on September l [, 2001. This letter ine.moria!izes our previous aral advice, given 011 July 14, 2002 and July 26, 2002, that tb.e proposed conduct woufd uot violate this prohibition. l Our advice is bas.ad upoµ die folµiwiogfact., wbidt you have provided.to us. We also understand that y0u do not have WI.)' facts in your poss.cssion contrary to the f-auts oiJ.tlib,edJ1.C:re, .md. this opinion is limited to these fuels. If the'se fucts were to cM!lgo, this advice would. not necessarily apply. Zubaydah is cuae:ntly being held by the United States. The interrogation team is certain that he has additional infonnetion iliat he refuses to divulge. Spccifioal.ly, he is withholding glfurmatioo regard.iog cerrorist p_etwqrks in the United St.aies or in. Saudi Arabia and infomation regarding plans ta conduct a~cks within the United States or against our interests averS@..<;. Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of tteatmc::rit and displays .1+0 signs of,vitliugness to dfac!ose further inform.alion:.. More.:iver, your intelligence indieates that th_ere is currently a level of"chatrer" cqµa! to that which preceded t.'1.e September i l •atti.cks .. In iight of the information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of fur-eat you believe now exi:rt.s, you _wish to move the m.tcrrogatious into what you have·rlescribed as an "increased pressure phase." · As part ofdlis increased pressure phase, Zubaydah will have con.tact only with a new iiiterrogation specialist, who!{! he ho: not met previously, and the Survival, Evasion, Rc.sistancc. Escape ("SERE") training psychologist w!w has been involved with the interrogations since they began. Tius phase will likely last no more than. several days but could las! up to thirty days. In th.is phase, yon wouJd like to employ tea. tec.b.niqti.es tbat you believe will dislocate hls ~RET T~Rfil expectations rcg,"'l.fding the treatme.nt he b~lieves he will receive and eucourage him to disclose the crucial infonnation mentione<l above. These ten techniques are: (l) attention grasp, (2} walliug, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confmement; (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions. (S) sleep deprivation, (9-} insects placed in a confinement box, and (l 0) the waterboard. You have informed us t:ha.t the use of these tech.niq_ues would be 011 an a-s-neede<l ·basis and that uot all of these techniques will necessarily be used. U1e interrogation team would use th.ese techniques in some combination to convince Zubaydah. that th_e ottly way .he can influen.ce his sun:ou,.1.ding. environment is through cooperation. You have, however-, informed us that you expect these techniques to be used in som~ sort of escclatiog fashlqn, culqi.inating with the. watcttooard, UHmgh hot necessarily ent!ing with tm.s tecb.nique. Moreqve;t, you-:have-a!so orally informed us that although some_ of these techniques 01.ay be us~d vtifu more than once, that n;pe.tition will not be substmtial because the techniques generally !o~ their offectlv~uess after several repeti-tions. You hav-e als'o--informed us Uiat Zabaytiah sUstained a WoUl).d d~uing bis c,;pture, which is beiug treated.. Based on the: facts you have giveu us, we und.ersiand. eacb of tnl!Sc ~dmiques 10 be as fqllows. The atteution grasp consists of gr:asping the individual -with both hands, one hand on ea.ch side of the. col.lar opening, in a controlled and. quick motion. fa the same motion as the grasp; the ihdividual is q.rawn towaqi ~ incerrogat-0r. For walling, a flexibfo false wall will be constructed. The individual is placed with his heels i:oucrung·tue·wall: The t:H:wo-gator pulls the intlivroual for.w:ard an<l.·then -qtti:ckJy ,s:nd firmly push.es the individual iuto the wall. It is the indivrdual 's shoulder blades that hit the wall. During this ·m:otioo., the head and neck <Jre supported with a ro Ii eci hood o_r towel that provides a c-collar effect to help preve!lt whiplash. To further reduce the probability of inj_ury, the individual. is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have orally informed us that the false wa11 is in pert constructed to create a loud sound when the individua1 hlts it, which \Tiill f1.1rther shock or surprise in the indiViduaJ. _In part, the, idea is lo crea_te a· souud th.al wilL make the: tmpa.Gt seetn far i.vorse than it is and \:hat will be far wo~e than ab..y injun1-that 01ig4t result from the action. The facial hold is used to ho!,:!, the head iiiunc',b:ile. Ont: open l)4Uil isp~ed on ,either side of _rhc:: indi\ridual's fa~. The fingertips are kept wel:I av,:ay from the iudivl~Vs eyes. With the facial slap or insult slap, the interrogator' slaps i.he individual's face v-:ith fingers slightly spread. Toe band m~kes contact with the area directlybetwetn the tip of the individual's chin and the bottom of the correspondia.g earlobe. The interrogator invades tl1e individual's personal space. The goal of the fucial slap is not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting. lnstead, the purpose of the facial slap is to ioduce shock, surprise, andfor humiliafron. Ctamped G-Oufincmenl invoives the placement of the indivi.dual ma confined space, the dimensi,ms of which re-strict the h1dividua1's movement The confine<l space ts usually d.ark. . TO;rtRET 2 TO~M'f The duration of confinement varies tia:sed up~n the sue of the container. For the fatger corirw.ed space, the iruiividual can stand up or sit cawn.; the smaller space is large enollc,lrf:t for tlre~ubject to· sit down. Confiaement in the larger space can last up_ t9 e~~teeu hours; for the smaller space, confinement lasts for no more than two hours. Wal! standi.Rg is used to induce muscle fatigue. The individual stands aboui four ro .five feet from a wall, v,ith his feet spread approxirnat-ely io shoulder \ ,~dth. His arms are strdched out i.n front ofhim, with his fingers rt!stiog ou·fue wall. His fingers support all of his body weight. The individual is not peunitted to move or tepositico. his nano~ or fe::t. 0 A variety of stress positions ruay be used. You have i.Iifonned. us that these positiorrs are not designed produce the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather, somewhat like walling, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associaetd with muscle fa.ti.goo. Two particular stress positions are likely to be used on Zuba.yt!ah: (!)•sitting on the ffoor wtth legs ei--tcnded straight out in front of Jilin with his raised above hi.~ 4ead; and .(2) kneeling oa the floor while leming back at a 45 degree angle. You b.a:ve also orally in...fonneci us that through obswring Zubaydah in ce..ptivify, you have noted that he appears to be quite flexible despite bis wouo.d. to arms Sleep deprivatj.on may be used. You have.indicated that your purpose i:n using th.is technique is to reduce the indi\•iducl's ahilityfo think on bJs feet and, through the clisc¢mfurt a.ssotiate:d with fack ·of;;recp~· tcr111i:mvarei:um-w-cooperate: 1:he-efreci-of-suc:b:,ieep·dcpri,~on will generally remit after one or two aightrnfunintclTtlptedslcep. You hn.ve-infcitmed u:, diat your. resear:~h has. revealed that, in rare instan~, sottj.e inclividUEJs who areaircadyp'redisposed. io psychological prob ferns may experience abnomial reactions to sleep deprivation. Even i.ri those cases', however, rca,ction.s abate after the il1filvid11al is permitted to·sl~p. Moreover, personnel with medical trai.nin,g .are available to and wilt u1ter-1eue in the unlikely event of an abo.onlli\1 r~action. You.hav~ orally i.nfonned us tb~t yo1:1 would uot deprive Zubil-ycfah of sleep ~~ir more than eleven days at a time an.d that you have pre,iiously keot hiru a"'"ake for 72 hours, from which no mental or physical harro. resu1rec1. You ,vould like to place Zubaydah io a cramped confinement bor. witb. an in.sect. You have infom1ed us that he appea.~ to have a fear of insects. fn particuler, you would like to tell Zubaydah. tl:iat you mtend to place a stiugin.g rnsect into the. box with him. You would, however, place a hannless insect io the box. Yoo. have Gtally informed µs tl-12.t \'ClU would in fact ~ce a arm! s i sect.such. as a catt:roillar i..a tli.e box with.!iim- Finally, you would Li.kc to use a tetlmiqµe c;al.led the "watetboai:d." In fuis procedun; the individual is bound securely to .an i.ticlin.etl bench, which is approxiillilt:1ly four fret by seven feet Tue individual's feet are gene.rally elevated. A cloth ispla=i civer tl1e forehead and e)li?S. Wat.er T~ 3 T~T is thell applied io the cloth in a controlled manner. As th.is is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers·both the nose and mouth.. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air fli)W is slightiyrestricled for 20 to 40 sec-0ruls due to the pmence of the cloth. This catt5es an increase itJ carbon dioxide level in the individual's. blood. This increase in the carbon dioxide level stirtrn!ate:rincrezsed effort ro br¢athe. This·effort plus the doth pfor:hiQt$ tµe pi:rceplion 6f"suffocatiim afld incipient panic;1_i.e,,,_the percep.tion ,of dt0wrJag. TI)e-1ndivrd1a1al <loe.S UO( 'breathe any water into his lungl!. Durmg Ui.ose 20 ld 40 Se9()f\OS, water is contml)c~ly applied from a height of twelve to twenty-foot irrah~, After this-period. fby doth T$ tifteq, and the individual is all.owed to breathe unimpeded fur three or fotll'-~1 breaths. '"fhe s.e!-1sation-of drownmg is ilumedrateiy rdi-¢~ccl. by the removai of ihe cloth. The procedure may1hci:\ be·· repeat.ed. The water i.<! usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering cart with a spout. You h:avc orally infunned us that this procedure triggers an automatic pby-siological sensation of dro,vning that the individual canno't c.ontrol even though he may be aware: that he is- in fact not drowning. You have also orally infonned us that it is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application. We also understand that a medical expert with SERE ex.periencc. will be present through.out this phase and that ilie proce.di.Jre5 'vill b¢ stopped if deemed medically necessary to prevent severe mental or physical harm to Zubaydah. A.s mentioned above, Zuhayc;lah suffered an in.jury during his capture. You have informe.d It~ that steps v.-ill be taken to ~nsure tli!lt this injtJr31 is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these m~thods and thai adeqooe medical atreri.ffou. will· be gfveJl to ensure tlutl it wil! ·heaf prop~rly .. IT. In this part, we ceview tl:!e context within Which these procedures wtll be applied_ You have informed us that you have taken var.ious steps to ascertain wlrat effeit, if any, -these techniques wou[d have on Zubaydah's mental health. These same techciq1,1e~. wifh the·excepcion of the insect in the cramped confined sw.ce, have been used ma continue to oe used on some members of our military personnel during their SERE training. Because offue use ofth.ese procedures iu training cur own military persooo.el to resist interrogations, yo1} have consulted with various individuals who .have e>.'tensive 'e:-qrerience in the Ulie of these techniques. You have done so in onler lo ensure that no prolonged mental hrum would result from th.e use of these proposed procedures. TI1raugh your consultation with various individuals responsible for such. 1taining, you have learned that these techniques ha~e bee.· conduct without. any · e t of rolornred mental ha:mi. f the SERE school, as'report Ui.t, during the sevenyear period that he spent in those pos1D.ons, em were two requeslS from Congress for infoanation concerning alleged injuries resulting from the Lfaining. One of these inquiries was prompted by the temporary physic_q{ injw-y a trainee sustained as result of beiog placed in a -?~T 4 '----- ···- ..... . ········ ··-· . ........ ···· ··· ........... ········- .......... · ······ ........ ·-·· --- ------ - -- - - T~RET cmi.finemeht box. ne other inauiriinvo!Ved claims that Lhe SERE training caused two individuals to engage in criniin~ l;l;havior, nafne!y, felony shoplifting and do\VJlloaiiin~ clri\d pomoii-apl1;)1 onto a triilitecy _co~tmter_ Accm:.ding_to this official, cll_ese claims were f ~ ~ o r e o v e r , he. has indicated that dunug the three and a halfyears ·be s p e n t ~ ~ f the SERE program, he trained I 0,000 ~tudeui:s. Of those stud:eulS1 01ily Mo dropped out of-the traio.ing following tbe use oftl1ese techniques. Althougb on rnre occasions ·some students temporarily postponed ilie rem.aioder of their trafoi.ng and received psycl:iological counseling, tbose sluden_ls were able to finish the program without any inili.catio~ of subsequent menrnl health effects. You have inf.armed us that· :H.~·~tar . . '--~-. :onng ose tenyears; insofllr as b.e is a\;,are, rione ofil.i.e·1o:uivrn6'.aJ.§';;vb.q cofi_i.p1,eted ilie prngram:suffered ip.y adve.rsi: men.ta! health effects. He 1iifoIJ1ied- yu.tt:ihat there was one perso11 whQ did l'.iQt c~mpletc th.e training. That person experience.cl· an adverse mental. heiilth reaction that lasted. oul)' two hou;s. · After those two hours, the individual's symptoms spomanem.;sly: <l-issipated without requiring treatment qr coun.'leling and no other symptoms v,ere evet reported by tltls in:div.iducL According to the information you WI.Ve provide.cl to us, this assessment of the use of these procedures includes the use of the wate.rboard. l fiom the :,-iiid1·yoiisuppli&l to us. has experience with the use ot n ·o ese proc ures ma course of conduct, wit . the·except1on of the insect iJ.1 the confinement box and the waterboard. Thls memorandum ca.nfirms that tbe use of these procedures has not resu.l led. in any reported. instances of prolonged mental h.arm, and v: fuw ·nstances of immediate and temporary adverse psychologiC2l responses to the trair,jng, eported that a small miMrity of students have had temporary adverse psychol.o-giciil reactions during training. Of the 26,829 sludeu!s trained from 1992 tbro1.1-gh 2001 in d1e AtrForce. SERE training, 4.3 percent of those students h.a9 contact with ps·yc,h.ofogy services. Oftl1ose4.3 percent, only 3.2 p.erc~Tit were pulle<;i .from tl;i.e-9,ro'.gra.rrt--f.or psychological rc.aso?s-_ Thus, OU't of ~1e students trained·ov.eral~ only O.t4·~ . e;:.c. l.We¢, .u ut~edffo~- che pr.ogr-am for psycholog1cal reasons. Fl:U1hecmore, alt)1oug)1~F'licated tha~ surveys of students havin$ coi:opl~d truS:tmining are not dope, 11ei-:r.pt6se'ii ciiiifi<lence that the f,<1U1ing did not cause any long-term psychological impact He based.his corrclusioIJ: dn the debriefing of students that is done after th.e training, More importantly, he based this assessment on the fact foa( although training is required to be extremely stre:Ssfu! in order to be effective, ve.ry few complaints have been ma-de regarding the training. During hiS' tenure, in which l 0,000 students were !rained, no congr.essional complarn(s have been mad~. While them was· 0ne Inspector General complaint, il W.a$ .not due to psychological concerns, t,foreovi:r, he was av..--al'e of onlv on.e letter inquiring. about the loag.:.tenn impact of these rechniques from a□ individual tratned . TO~RET 5 TO~T over twenty ~ o u u d . th2.t it 1,.vas impossible to anribute this individual's- symp(oms to his lraining. ~ o n c l u t l e d tllat if lhere. are any long-term psychological effects. of the United States Air Force lrailiirrg using the procedures outlined abo~,e they "are certainly, minimal." Willi resp-ecr to the w2.lerboard., you. have also orally illfomtcd us chat the. Nirvy continµes that your on-site psycl1ologi,sES, who have extensive experl<mce with the use of the mterboard in Navy t;r-ainfo.g, h.av'e not elicouril;,red any significant long-term inentat health consequences from its use. Your on-site-psychologists have also indicateci"that JPRA has likewise not repocted°any sigaifieant tong:-ti!nn. merital health consequences from tl1e qse oft):ie ,1,.,.aterboard. Yo_u·ha.ve infonned us tbat.Qther-services ·ceased use of the waterboatd because it was so successful as an intc:rrogEtion technique, but oat becz.us~ of any concerns over any hann, physical or ntenta~. caused by iL It WaE a . ·.... . almos_t 100 percent efiet.tive in producing cooperatioa among the trainees. Jso indicated tl1at he had obscrved the;use of the \.\'atethoard in Navy trainfug.som~ terr t6 · ., ve times. Each time it resulted in COf:Jperati.on but it did not result in any ph.)·skal harmto th.estudent lo use it in training. You haw: informed us You have also reviewed the relevant literature and found llO empirical. data on the effect of these techniq1i.e.s, v.ith the ex.ception-of sleep deprivation. With respect· ta sleep deprivati.on, you have infoane<l us that is not uncommon for someone to be deprived of sleep for 72 hours a.rid still perform excellently on visual-spn.tial met-Or-tasks and sh.ort-te:rm.memory tests. Although some individuaJs may experience hallucinations, at.cording to the literature yon surveyed, those who ~perlence such psychotic symptoms hav¢- almost alway~·bad such episodes prior to tb.s': sleep depdvation. You have iodicat.ed the studies oflen,,oth.y sleep depri'vation showed no ps)'clrosis, loosening oftnough.ts, flatte.niug oferhQl;i.op..s, delusions, or parano'id id~~- fn oi,e c;;se, even after eleven days of d~µriv,i.tioo., no nsychosis or·pctJJ!E4eut brain c¼magta.occurred. In fact lh.c i:ndlv1.duaJ reported feeling almost back to li.omlBl after one ufg'ht's sleep. Further, based on the e;::periences ,;,,ith its use i'.n military trai.o.ing (where his indMe.d for up to 48 bours) , you foup.d that rardy, if ever, will tbe individual suffer harm after the sleep deprivation is diswb.tinu.ed . Instead, the effects remjt after a fow good nights of steep. You have tak.~n the addltional step of consulting with U.S. intcrroge.ticns experts, and other individuals with oversight over the SERE.training process. None of these individuals was aware of any pralnngcl psychological effect caused by ihe use of any of the above. technillues either separately- or as a coorse of conduct. MoreO\'eI, you ctinsuhe<l..:with ·outside psycbologisTs who reported that they '-vere unaware ofsny cases where long-term problems have occtL'Teu <i:; B result of these lcclmJques. Moreover, i□ consulting with a number of mental health ex:perts, you have learned that lhe effect of any oftbese procedures will be dopendant on the individual's personal history, cultural history md psych.ologk:Rl 1,•.nc:ltt1ci(l~. Ta that tntl, you Ii.Jive inforrne.d. us that you have . ·ro~1- 6 ~O~RET ccmpleted a psychological assessment of Zubadyah. This assessmem is l>ased 011 interviews wi(h Zubaydah., observations of him, and information collected from odier-sources such as intelligence and press reports. Our undersranding o[Zubaydah'sc psychological profile, which we set forth below, js based on that assessmenL According to this assessment., Zu6aydah1 though _onlj; 31, rose 9.uick.ly ~om very !o'l.v level mujahediu m thfrd or fourth man in al Qaec;I.a. Ht! has served as Usil.ma Bin, La,den's seiiior lieutenant. In that capacity, he bas managed a network of training camps. He has been instrumenta-f in the training of operatives· for al Qaeda, U1c Egyptian lsla.rnic Jilui:d, artd i:>ilicr terrorist ekments. inside Pakistan and Afghani-st.an. He ac·ted as the Deputy Camp Commandeifor al Qaeda training camp in .A,.fghanistau, peFSonal\y approving entr-y and graduati'on of all rrainees during I 999-2000. From 1996 until 1999, he approved all ir:.dividllals goiJlg ii1 and out of Afghanistan to the training ca,..ips. f-'ur"Jier, no one went in ar.d out of Peshawar, Pakistan withour his l<n.owledge and approva.l.. He also acted as al Qaeda's coordinator of external contacts and foreign communications. Additionally, be has acted as al Qaeda's counrerince:lligence officer aud has been tn1st:ed to find spies wiG-Jri the organization. Zul;iaydall has been involved in ev'ei.ymajortertor-ist.opetatiort carried .out by al Qaeda. He was a plmmer for the Millennium plotto attackU,S. and L'irue.-li targets during the MiHenn.ium celebrations iu Jordan. Two of me central figitres in 1hls plot who were a..rterted have ·identified Zubaytlah as the supporter of their cell and the plot. He: also served as a pl armer for the Paris Embassy plot in 200 l. Mor.eover; he was one of the planners of the September l l attacks, Pnq;r i"o his capture, be was engaged in plani..ing future terto1isi attacks against U.S. interests. Your psychological a.,,:;essr;:t~t indicates_ that it is believed Z:uoaydah wrote al Qaeda's man.ua! on resistance tecb.niqucs. You also b~lie·,•e that his experiences in al Qaeda make him well-<!-cquainted with an.d w~U-vers,etl Lr1 such' teohniqu.es. As part of'bis role in. al Qaeda, Zubayd$-visited indivrduili-m prrson med helpl.d the'ril tipo.n their rel~e. 'fp.rough trus co.ntact and a~v1tics vv'il:b. ofuet al Qaeda ~tjahedin, beli~ve that he kn.ows man,y stories bf capture, in.terrogatian, aud r~istance to such interrogation: Additionally, he has sp0kcn _ \¼ili Ayma.ri alZawahiri, and yon beli~ve it is likely tlillt the Nm c!iscussed Zawahiri' s e,:perie.uces as a pri~on.er of the Russians and the Egyptians. you Zubaydah stated duririg interviews that he thinks of any aciivi.ryoutside of jihad as "silly." He bas indicated that his hem nnd mirid are de<.·oled to serving Allah and l.slaiu 1hrough - jihad and he has stated tlJat h~ has no do\lbt.5 or rt!grets about committing himself to jihad. Zub.aydah belleves that the global victory ofislam i~ inevitable. You hive infonned us th;;.t lie continues to express his trnabuted desire to kill A..mericans anti ]t;\ ,-,. Your psychological assessment describes his personality as follows. He is ''a highly selfdirceted individual \.vho prizes his iadependence." He ha'S "narcissistic features," which are evidenced in the attention he pays to his personaf appearance: and his "obvious 'effort.f to ,, TO~RET 7 ~RET demo11!itrate that he is really a raiher_'humblil-:i.hd regular guy.'" He is "some,vnat compulsive" in how he organizes his environment and business. T·Ie is confident, self-assured, ar-td possesses an air of anthoriry. V/hile he admits to att1mes wrestling ,,_,-ith how to determine who is an "innocent," he has ackno,.,.,iedged celebrating the destruction oftbe World Trade Center. He is intelligent aud intel!eclually curi.ous. He displays "excellent self-discipline." 1l1e assessment describes him as a perfcclionisl, persistent, private, and highly capa.bl~ in his ~ocial imeracLions. He is very guarded about opening up 10 others and your assessment repeatedly emphasize!; that he cends no( to trust others easily. He is also "'quick to recognize and assess the moods a11.d motivations of other.s.'' Furthe!more, he is proud of.his l).bility to li'e and dece~ve.others successfull9. Thro ~gh. his diweptfon he ha-s! among other things. prevented th:e locat1on. or al QWa. sa-feh0uses and· evei1 acquired· a United Nati·on.s refugee identffiaa'don cai:d. . Accortl{p.g to yout rtports, Zu.ba)'dah does. not have·any·_pre-extstiJ;ig· mental GOnq.iti:qns or problemtrthat would make hlmlikeiy to stiffer prolonged nlel)!al li:m'n from yom-·-proposed ir,terrogation metllads. Through reading bis diaries and interviewing him, you have £0\iod no history of"mood disturbance or otber psychiatric pathology(,]" "thought disorder[,) _.. end.urin.g mood or mental health problems." He is in. fact "ren;iarkably resiHeo.t and confident that he can overcome. adversity." When he enco1L<1ters sfrcss or low mood., th.ls appears to last 01tlyfor a shon time. He deals with stress by assessing its source, evalu2ti.og the coping resources availahle to him, and then taking action. Your assessment notes that he is "generally s~lf-suffi.cient and relies 011bis understimding end applic-ation of religious and psycl--Ological principles, i:ntellig~r,ce and di-sciphne to avoid and. ovcroome·prnblems." Mere&Ver, you hav~-foUE.d-tha! h@ bas a "reliabl.e arid durable supporcsystem" in hi'! (aj~h; "thebles-sil;rgs of religious leaders, aad camaraderie. oflike-miuded mujahedin brothers." Duriug detemion, Zubaydah h.as 1b.anaged his mood, remaining at most points ''cirtums~. calm, c-outroJJed, arid delibenue." He has maintai..ti.ed this demeanor during aggn:ssive interrogations 2nd reductions in sleep. You desccibe that in an initial ccn.fronta(ional incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous sysrem e.rousal, which you think w·JS possibly fear. Altllouglt this incident led him to disclose intelli.gcnce infonnation, nc was able to quickly regain his composure, his air of confidence, and his "strong resolve" llOt to reveal 1l..r1y i11.fonna1ion. O~:eral.l, you suinmarize h.is primary strengths as the following: ability to focus, goal. <lircctt<l <lcsciplu16, i.inelllgeuce; emotional rcgiliew~c, street savvy, ability to orgqnize aucl rn.a.nage people, keen obse[Vation skills, fl,utd _ad.aptabilicy (can inti-c.ipate :ind adapt under all!ess ,;.nd with mi.ni.m.al tesom:ces), capacity to assess and exploit the needs of othets, antl,abilh)• to adjust goals to emerging oppor-mnities. · You anticipate that lle 1-,:ill draw upon his vast knowledge of interrogation tedmiques to • cope with the interrogation.. Your assessmeu.t indicates th;it Zubaydah may be willi.u-g to die ,o protect the most important information that he holds. Nonetl:ieless, you are of the view that his belief tbal [slam will ultimately dominate the world and thai this victory is inevitable may provide the chance th.at Zubaydab will infrmnation and ratioualizc it solely as a tiunporary / vv~ T~CRJ:,7' g TO~T setback. Additionall}'. you believe lw may be willing co 1fac\0$e. some infonnation, pa.rticularly information he dl!ems 10 not be critical, but which rna}' ultiiuru.eiy be U5eful to us when pieced togc:rlicr with other imelligence infonnation you have gained . . Sectton 2J40A makes it a crirf1Jii:al offeps~ (or aqy person "oursid~ of the Unite<l ·Srates (10] cqmmit(j or attempt(] ro comm.it torture." Section 2340(1) defines torrure as: a:n act committed by a persor. acting under the color oflaw specifioally interule<l to inflict severe pliysical or mental pain or s\Jffcr1ng (other than paip or sw:rering incidental lo lav.ful sanctions) upon another persdn within his custody of physical conu:ol. l S. U.S ,C. § 2340(1 ). A:; we outlined mour opinion on standards of conduct under $ct;t_ion, 2340A, a violation of2340A requireH shov,ilig lfuil: (1) tire torture occurred outside the United Staes; (2) the~.efcndant acted.under the col9r of law; (3) the victim was within the defundaut's custody or control; (4) the defendant spedficaliy intended tci inflict se.vere pain or saffuri'ng; and (5) that the acted inflicted siwere pain or suffering. See Memorandum for Jolm Rizzo, Acting General Counsel for the Centre! lnlelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Geo.era!, Office ofLegru Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct/or [ll;e,-rogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-234fJA at 3 (.A:ugust I, 2001) ("Section. 2340A Memorandum"). You haws asked. us to assume that Zubayadah is being held outside the United States, Zu[n.yaci.ah is within U.S. custody; and the interrogatots are acting under the color of law. A( issue is whether the la.st two elements would be rnet by the use of the proposed procedures, namely, whether those using these procedures would have the requishe mentl.l state and whcfocr these procedures v:ould inflict · severe pain or suffering Within t11e mearung oft:he statqtc.. Severe Par.n or Sufferinrr. In t:ircier for palu or suffering fo rise to the level of torture, the statute requir:es that ~t be seVere. As we have,previQusly explained, dlis recehes only extr.elne acts. See id, ai 13 . Nonetheless, drawing upon cases under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which has a defiuition of tort\lre that is similar to Sectiort234-0's dclinhi.on, we fl)u1ld · thol a s.ingle event of suffioiently im:ense pain may fall within tht.s prohibition. See id. at 26. As a result, we ltave a □ atyze<l each ofd1ese techniques separarely. ln further drawing upon U10se cases, we also bave found rhat courts tend to cake a totality-of--the-citcumsrances approach and con.sider an entire course of conduct to determine whether mrrure has occurred, See id. at 27. Therefore, in addition to considering each lccb.nique separ.;tdy, we cousider them fogether as a course of conduct. Section 2340 defines torture as the infliction of severe physical or mental p/UD or suffering. We will consider physic:!! pain and menu! pain sc.pa:rate!y. See I 8 U.S.C. § 2340(1 ). With respect to physical pain, we previously concluded that ''severe pain" v.~1h.in the meaning of TOP~RET Y· 9 -T~RET Section 234-0 is pain rhm is difficult for the individual to e~dure and is of arr i11tensity akin to the pain accompanying serious physical injury. Se.e, Section 1340A Memon;ndort1 at 6. Ora wing. upon the TVPA precedeui. we have hared that examples of acts inflicting severe-pain that typtfy torture are, amot1g othej things., severe beatings wid1 weapons such as clubs, and· the burning of prisoners. See id a{ 24. We conclude below that none of01e proposed teciuiiqoes inflicts such pain. The facial hold ai.1tl lhe attcncion gra.."]l involve tic physical p::in. In rhe absence of such pain it is obvious that they cannot he said to ;:nflict sevefe physical pain or suffering. The stress positions and ,.J.!.alJ stand!ng both may result in m1:iscle fatigue. Each involves the sustail,cd holding of a position. fa wcll ~tanding, rt will be holding a position i...1 which all oith.e individual's body weight i:s placed on his fo:!ge[ tips. Tue sttess positions will likely include ·sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in front and arms raised above !he head, and kneeling on tl1e floor and. leaning back at a l5 degree angle. Any p.rin associate.cl \Vith musele fatigue is not of the inte.usiry sufficient to amot.,mt to "severe physical pain or s~¢dug" under the st2tute, nor, d.esphe its discomfort, can it be said to be diffi<;;ult to endure. Moreover, you have orally informed us thaJ. no· str~--s :position wilt· be used that co\J.ld interfere -.viUt fac healing of Zubaydah's wound. TI,.eref-ore, we conclude that these tcchniqu.es involve disc;;omfort th:u falls far below the thresl1old of se\=ere physical pain. Similar.ly, although the confinement ~ s (both small and large} ?ft physkally uuCGmfortable ·bec-i1x1se tbe.it size r~\cts mo--vemeo.t, tl-tey are not'So srnm:l as to re.quire the individual to coiitort his body to- sit (small box) or stand (large box). You have also orally h1fom1ed us that despite hii: wound, Zubaydaf1 remains quite flexible, which would.substantially reduce any pain associated with bei11g pl-aced in the box. \Ve have no information from the medical l!Xpcris you have consultw. that tbc limited duration for which the individual is kept in ,he. boxes c&.US<;S ariy substantial physical paiu. As a result, we do not think ihe use of the.<;e boxes can be s?id to cause pain that is ofd1e intensity associal!!d with serious [)hysical injury. The use. of one of these boxes with the introduction of an insect does □ .at alter this ussessment. As we understand it, no act□ ;;lly hanufuI insect v.ill be placed in the box. Thus, t\;ough. the introduation of an insect ma:.y pr<Jduce trepidation in Zubardalt (which we discUss below), it-cert;iinly <lue~ 111.H 1.2tJ..Se pbysical ·puin. As for sleep deprivatior., it is clear that depriving some<me of sleep doc.s 001 iuvolve severe pbysfoal pain ,\iihin the rn€:a!ling of the statute. '\li1bile sleep deprivation may iuvol vc s.ome physical discomfort., such as th~ fatigue or tbe discomfort e-.xperienccd in the difficulty of keeping one's eyes open.., these effects remit after the individual is perm.irred lo sleep. Based on the facts you have provided us, we are not aware of any e,~dence·tlw.t sleep deprivation re.mils in Se.Ve:r-e physical pain or suffering. As a r~ult, its use does not vrolate Section 2340A. Even those teclwlques that involve physical coflt:).ct between the intcrrogntor and the TO~RET lO TO~RET indiv1dual do not result in severe pain. The facial slap 2.nd w,;_llir.g coa1ain precautions to ensure th<:t no pain even approaching thls level results. The slap is delivtred with fingers slightly spread, which you have explained (o u-s is designed to be less painful than a closed-hru1d slap. The slap is also delivered to the fleshy part of the. face, further reducing any risk. of physical da.,-uage or serious pain.. The facial slap does oot produce pz.in that is diffu:;uluo endure. Likewise, walling involv~ quickly pulling the person fo11va,daI14 then thrusting hlm agai°:5t a flel;'.ible false wall. You bave informe.d.us that the sound nfhirting the wall will :i:ct11-alty be far · worse tli!in any possible injmy to the. individual. 11.e use of the rolled tov.•d around the nedc also · reduces any dsk of iaju:ry. White it may hurt to be pushed against die wall:, any po.hi experience-d is not of the i11tensify 2£scciated ""i:th serious· phssical injury. A.s v..-e understand it, when the waterboaid is used, the subject's body responds as iftbe subject were drowning--even though the rubjeci may be welt awire thut he is in fact not drovming. Yoii have informed us that this procedure does not inflict 3ctu.al physical harm .. 111us, altho11gh the subject may e:>..iierieoce the fear or panic associated wrth the feeling of drovlning, L'le wr,terboard does not inflict physical pain. ru We eJCplaiaed in che Section 234OA tvfomora.ndu.m, "pain and suff<;ring" 35 used in Section 2340 is best understood as a si.r'1gle concept, not distinct CQneepts of"pain" as disliugtJished from nSl.iffering.'' Sea Section 234OA Memorandum at 6 n.3 . The waterboard, wl:iich inflicts no pain or actual harm whatsoever, docs 1,ot, in our view inflict "severe pain or sl!fferiag." Evert if one were to pw;e the staJut.e more findy to attempt to treat "suffering" as a distinct concept, the waterboard cou!d not be said to inflict severe suffering. TI1e waterboarci is simply u controll<!d wu,c episode, lacking tlte connotatioa of a protracted r..enod of time generally given to suffering. Finally, as we discussed above, you have infonned us that in determining wb.ic::11 procedures to use and how you will use them, you hn.ve selectetl kchniqucs that v.ill not hami Zubay-dah's wound. You have-also indicated that numerous step'.> will be ta.k{:fl to ensure ib.ac nooe oftb.ese procedures in any way interferes with the proper he.sling of Zu.baydah · s wourtd.. You l:ia.ve also indicated that, should it appear at any time ihat.Zubaydcl1 is ~periencing. severe pain or sufferlrtg, the medical persouncl. on hand will stop die-use ,if,an.y technique. Evett when all of the:;e methods are considered combined in an overall course of cooduct, t.!-iey still would not inflict severe physical pain or suffering. As di-scuss.ed abovt:i, a nutn0~-r of these ace; result i11 no phydcal pain, other!; pro.luee only phrsicel rliscornfo-rt. · You have ;1,diceted that these acts will r,ot be used wi(h substamial rep~tition, sa that there is no possibility tliat sc\'ere physical pain could arise from such repetition.. Ac.cordinily, w~ con.elude that thcs~ <'.cts nei thcr separately nor as part of a course of conduct would infliCT s?.were physical pain or suffering within the meaning of th.e statute. We next consider whether inc: use oftbese techniques would inflict severe nie;.ral pain suffering with.in the meaning of Section 2340. Section 2340 defmes severe mental pai11 or suffering as "ti)e prolonged mental harm caused by or resuiting from" one of seveeol predicate TOPI-RET Ci t: T~R.ET aCIS. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2). Those predicate acts are: (1) the int.emiona! infli.clion or threatened · infliction of severe physical pain or sufferin{!; (2} the administration or appHcation. or threatened adminisn:atio11 or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrur,t profouadly the senses or rlle personality; (3) the rhre.at of tmJnilienl deail1; or (4) the threat 1.h~t a11y of the preceding acrs win he-done li1 another person. Sie 18 U:S.C. § 2340(1)(AHD) . . .-'\s we:have explained, this li:sl of predicate acts ls exclusive. See Stction 2340A Mem~l;antlum at 8. No other acts can support a charge under Section 1340A based on the infliction of severe mcn~al pain or S:ufforicg. See id. Thus= if the methods that you have dts<,.ribed do Liot citlter in and of themselves constitute 011e of these acts or as a course of conduct futfill the predica.re act ,equirt':-me1tt, the prohib1~io11 ha.snot been violated. See id. Before aci.dressic.g these techn.iqu~, . _,.,e lrnte thal,it is plain that none of these procedures .involves a direat to any third party, the use of my kind of dn1.gs, or for the reasons described above, the iuflic,ion of severe physical pain. Tirns, the question is wherher any of these ~cts, separately or as a eoursc cf co..'1.duct, con.stitutes i: ,hreat of severe physical pain or ~-u.ffering-, a procedure dcsi-gned to disrupt profoundly tile senses, or a tlLre8t ofimmineut death. As we previously e:,cplauied, whether an action ·constitutes a threat must be asse.ssed from the st:aruipci.i.1t o( ~ teasona:qle person in the subject's. posltion. See i.d at 9. No argument can be made tbai the a~tention grasp or the facial hold constiillte threats of irnroinent death or are procedures designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or peTSonality. !.n general rhe grasp and the facial hold will. startle the subject, produce fe,o[, or even irisult him_ As you bav6 infoo:ned us, d1e use of these. techniques-is.not accomp;;.n.iw by a:spei;ific verb?l.i:hre\lt of severe physical pain or sufforing, Ta the extent that U1ese tecr.niques could be considered a threat of severe physical pain or suffering_., such a threat would have to be infoiTed from t:he acts thernselve.s . Because these acti.o.as thCID!5elves involve no pain, neither tould be interpreted by a reasqnable person in Zubaydah"s position to C'onstitute a threat of se-verc pain or sufferii1g. Accordittgly, these two teelmiques are 1101 predicate acts within the ·meariing of'Secti<m 2340. The facial sll!.f) like\Vise falls outside the set of predicate ac,s. !( piain:ly is not a threa.1 of imm.ihent death, under Sectio;; 2340(2)(C), or a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality, under Section 2340(2)(B). Thougb it may hurt, as discussed cbove; tl1e effect is one of smarti.c.g or stinging ,md Slb.--prise or humiliation, but not severe pain. Nor does it alone constitute a threat or sev<:re paia or suffering, under Section 2340(2)(A), Like the facici hold aud the mtention grssp, the use of this slap is not accompanied hy a specific verbal threat or furtl1cr escalating violence. Addi(iona\ly, you have infonned us that in one use this technique · will ty'pica!ly involve at mos, two slaps. Certainly, the use of th.is sh,p may dislodge any e),,-pectation that Zubayda.\.i b2.d thai he would not be touched in a physically aggreS!;ive manner. Nonetheless, this alteration in h.is expectations could hardly be. construi':d by a reasonable person in his situatiou to be tantamount to a threat ofsevete physical p.s.in or suffering. At mosl, this technique suggcSts that the circumstances ofhi.s confinement and interrogation have {;;hanged . Therefore, the facial slap is nm within the st.acute' s exclusive list of prediane acts. / TO~CRET i2 TOrlET Walling plainly is not a prc~ure calculated 10 disrup1 p(ofoundly the senses or personality. While wallhig involves what might be c.haracte;ized as rough handling, it does not involve the threat of imminenc death or, as discussed above, the irJl.iction of severe physical pain. Mo1:eover, once again we. understand that use of ihis technique v.~l'l- not_ be accompnnied by any specific verbal 1hreat tliat vio-lence will ei:isue absem cooperation. Tr.us, like tht facial slap, walling cau 01tly constitur.e i; ilu-eat 0fsevere. plry~ical pain if a reasonable p....---rson would_ i.nfor such a threat from the use of the technique. iL-;el( W-alling does nol in and of itsdfirtflict ~vcre paiu or sufferiug. Like th~ facfal slap, ;,vaUfog may alter rhe subject's ·(!)..'pectarion as to the treatment he believes he will receive. Nonetheless, ,he chmcter ofm.e a-diem falls so far short cf inflkting severe pain or suffering wi.thin._rhe meaning of the sts:mte lhat•eveu.ifhe inferred that greater aggressi Veness to follow, the type of actions that could be reasonably be anticipated would still full below art.ything sufficient to infljcl severe physi~l pain or suffering under the statute. Thus, we. conclude that. this technique falls outside the proscribed- pre<lic.CJ.le acts. ,,,a., Like walling, siress positions and wall-standing are not proecdures calculated to disrnpt r-rofoimd.ly the senses, nor arc tliey threats of imminent death. These proce.dutes, as discussed nbove, involve the use of n'il.l.!:cie fatigue to encourage cooperation aod do not ihemselves ·cousl.itute the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering. Moreover, chcre is no a.sp...--cr of ·violence to cillter teclmique. th2i _remotely suggests fumre severe pain or suffering from which sucb a threat of futur~ b2I:m could be i.nf=ed. They _simplf i._,wolvc forcing the-subject to re!T:ain tr. l!!lCOmfortable positions. 'Nh.ile these ads may ind.i<:a!e to the subject that bc may be placed i11 1hese positions again ifhe docs rrot disclose i11furrnation, the use cf these teehn.iqn_es woulc\ not sugg~st to a reasonable person in the subject's posi_tion that _he i.s being threc.teued w;th !it'.Vere pain or surfering. Accordingly, we conclude rhat these ffi'O procedures do nol constiture any of th.e predicate acts set forth in Section 2340(2). · As with ·tl1e other techniques discussed so far, crai-nped corlf,ncment is not a threat oi i.:m.n1.inent death. rt may be argued drat, fucusing in_ part on the fact that the box.es will be -..vith:mc light, placement in these boxes would. consritute a proeedurn designed to disrupt profoundly tlle senses. As we explained in our recent opinion, howiver, to "di...9:1:lpt profoundly the senses" a technique must produc~ an extreme effect iri the subject. See Section 2340A Memorandum at l0--t2. We have previously concluded that this requires that the. procedure cause substantfal inteffereuce with the indi-..idual 's cogrJ!ive abilities or [uru:l.a..'T!entally aiter llis personality. See id. ?t 11. l\forcover, !be SJ.3.tute requires that sue~ procedures must be calculated tD produce di.is effect. See id_ at 10; l8 U.S.C_ § 2340(2)(B). With respect to the small c~.flli'7ment box, yr.n1 have informed us that he would spend e.r most two hour.; in Chis box. You have informed us thE.t your purpose in using LI-Jese. boxt>.s is r1ot io interfer:e with his senses or his personality, but to cause him physics! discomfort that will encourage him lo disclose critical infonna"tion. Moreover, your i;uposition of time limitations on the use ofeh!:-e.r of the box~ 2.lso indict.tes tha1 !he use of these boxes is □ot designed or calcul:;Led f.o disrupt rrofoundly the !ienses or pe-tsona!i,y. For the larger box, in which he can T~RE1· . I )' rop&RET both stand and sit, he may be placed ir. flus 6011 fu.,_.ur- to eightten ho\.!rs at a time, while yo_u h.ave informed us thar Ile will never spend more thq.h an h(!ur at time in the smaller box. These: 11me limits f,urtl1erensure that oo profound diSTUpti!:iti ef~ senses or personality, were it even possible, would resulL As such. the use ef the co'nfiilement bo>,es does o.ot co1tstitute a rirocedure calrulated to d~ru-pt profoundly the senses or pers.onality. Nor docs the use oftl1e boxes threaten Zubuydali wirh .severe physical pai1_1 or suffui.J1g. While additional time snenc in tl-ie boxes ruay be threatened, their use is nOl accompanied by a[>.y express thrCllts of sever~ physical pain or suffering. Like the stress positions end \valling, pln.cemeul in the boxes is physkaUy uncomfortable but any such discomfort docs not rise to the level of severe physi.cal pain or suffering. A¢cordingly, a reasonable person in the _subject' s position would not infer fr.om lli.e use ofthls technique that severe physical pain _is the next step in his in.terrogator's treatment of him. Th.e.refor.e, \1/e conclude that the use; of the confinemenr boxes ·d ocs not fall :witbin. tli~ statute's required predicate acts. In additi-on to using tlie-confinement boxes alone, you also would Hketo intrqiiiice an insect into one of the box:es with Z:uba.ydah. As we ur:dersnmd it., you plan to inform Zubaydah that you are going. to pl.a~ a stinging insect into the box, but you wt!1-actus.lly place a harm.less insect in the box, such as a cateipill.at. If you do so, to ensure that you are our.side the predicate act requirement, you must inform him that the insects wrn not have a sti.ng that would -produce death or severe pain.. [f, ho\vcver, you were ta place the insect in the box without informi..ng-hi.m 1hat yeu are -eemg·so,•!.h.ei3, ~ or,:;i&,tq-not commit a predicate aci, yOll should rm.t affirmativ..el.}L lead him to believe that any iuscc ·s·nre.sentwbich has }l. : " "., · ,uh_ o on.gas you the appruaches ,vebave descri · , i ·e· insect's plncement in the box would not constitute a threat of seve re physical pain or suffeci.ng to a re:;sonable person in his position . An individual placcci in a box, even an. ir,dividual wit.ha fear of insects, would not reasonably feelthreatened with severe physical pain or suffering if a caterpillar was placed inc.he box. Further, you have. informed us that are noL aware that Zubaydah has any allergies ,o insects, and you have not inf9rmed us of any other factors that would cause a reasonable person in th<!t same.situation to beli.eve chat 3:n UJL"-IIU'.>!u instct would cause him severe ph)'Sical pain or death. Thus, we conclude tl1at the. placement of the inscc.t in th~ confinement box wi.th Zubaydah would not C-Onstitute a predicate ace you Sleep depriv•aticn -also clearly does nol involve a. Chteat of irnmiuent death. ,<\.ltlmugh it produ~ physical discomfort. i1 caonoc b;:. said to constit;1te a tlu:eal of severe physical pain or suffering from the perspective cf a reasonable person in Zubaydah ' s position. Nor could sleep depriva.ti90 constitute a proce<!Ltre calcufated -to disrupt profoundly fue senses, so long as sleep deprivation (as you have informed us is your intent) is used for limited periods, before hallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses wou.!d occ_ur. To be sure, sleep cieprivatlon may reduce the subject's ability to think on h!s foeL Indeed, you indicate that mis is· TO~T i4 TOP~T the LF1.te11ded result. His mere reduced ability to evade your questions and resJSt i!nswering does 11.ot, however, rise to the level cf cll.sri:ipt1ou r:e~\lifed by ti-ie statutt. As we exRlain.ed af;iov<!, a distuptj.on within die meanLrlg of the stature isan exlreme one, su.bsIB..r1tially interfering with an individual's cognitive abilities, for example, inducing hatlucinatrans, o, driving him Co eugage i'1 uncharacteristic self-tlestni.ctiv~ behavior. See ;nfr'1 IJ; Section 1340A Memorandum at 11. TI,erefore, the limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one of the fequired predicate .ic.s. We find tlw: the use ofth.e waterboard constitutes II tlueat of i.mcniuent death. As you have explained the watetboard procedure to us, itctelll.es in the subject the uncont;rollable physiological sensation that the subject is drowriin,g. Although the procedure will be monitored by per.sorinel wfth medical t.raining and extensive SERE scli.oo{ expe1:ience with thjs prq~durc v'110 V?i:H ei1sure the subject's mental an'd physical safety, the subject is not aware of any ofthes~ prcellutions. Prom the vanrage point of any reasonable person under~iug this procedure in su.th circ1.,.,11st:ances, h.c would feel as ifhe is drovming at very momeni of the procedure due to the uncontrollable physiological sensation he is e:qieriencing. Th~, !his- proce.dure cannot be viewe9 as too uucertain to s-atisfythe imminence requirem!!nl. A.ccordir.gly, it constitutes a threat of imminent dealli and folftlls lhe predic~ act requiremem under tl\e stal'ute. Although che waterboar<l constitu.t-es a threat.of imminent dearh; prolon.ged mental harm must nonetheless result to violate cb.e statut:ory-prohibition ou infliction of sever~ rne.nta:i p:rin or :;ufferin~-- See Seeti.on 2340A Mern.Qralldum at 7'. We-ha-v,e pr-evious.ly concluded .thR1pwlonged menu;:I harm. is mental harm of some lasting !liltation, e,g.,. mental hilli.tl 12S.ting lilontns or yeru;s. See fd. Prolongeq mental harm is not simply fue stress experieoced in, for c..xample, ao interrogation b)' state police. See id. Based on your research into the use of these met.hods at the StR.B' school md cousultirtion wi.lh others wid1 experiise in the field ofpsychl:Jlogy and interrogation, you do not anticirate that any prcilon.ged mental h:mn would result from the use of the waterboard. Indeed, you ha.ve advised us thin the relkfis almost irmnediate. Vi•hen the cloth is feruoved from th.c nose ~d mouth. ln the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental .r~in or !;11ffr-.rinG w011ld h~w. hr.~r. inflicter!, and the use of these prnc,o...du.re-s would uot coast-inn~ iortu~e within I.he meuning of the staiute. V/hen these acts are considered as a c-0urse of conduct., we arc unsure whether these acts may constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. You hav!! indicated to us that you hav:! no1 detenn.ined eilher the order or !he precise timing for Lmpleme.nting these procedures. le is conceivabJe that tl.Jese procedures could be used in a course of escab{ing, conduct, moving increm.entally and rapidly from l~t physically tf!(nisive, e.g., fuci3l hold., to the most physical con(act, e.g., waJiing or the waterbo;,rd. As we understand it, based on his treatment so far, Zubayda.h has come to expect that no physical hami wiU be done to him. By using ihese techniques in increasing iniensi.ty and in rapid successiqn, the goal wo\,!ld be to dislodge thls expectation. Based on the facts you have provi.ded to us, we cannot say definitively ~13.t the entire course of conduct. would cause a reasonable ~erson to·believe that he is being threatened TO~RET !5 T~RET with severe p3in or suffering \.\it!1in lue mcani11g of section 2340. On. lhe other hand, however, under ccrt.aih circumstances-for example, rapid escalatior. in the use of tl-tese r.echniques culminating in the waterhoard (which we acknowledt1,e consritm:es;; threat of inunin_er.t death) accompanied by verbal. or other suggestions that physical -.~olencc \l,ill follow---mrght cause a reasonable person'to believe drnt d1ey arc faced with such a thn:.at. Wilhout rnore inforrnaliou, we are u1tcertai11 whether tiJe course of conducr would constilutc a predicate act utlder Sectiou 2340(2) . Even if the course of conduct were thought to pose a threac of physicaf pain or suffering, il would nevertheless-on the f.acrs before us-not constitute a viol.ad.on. of Secti.cn 2340A. Not only ,:nUsl the course of conduct b~ a predica(e act, but also those who use the procedure must actually cause prolooged mental harm. Based on the information that you. have provided to us, in.diceting tha1 no evidence e:-dsts that.th.is course of conduct pro<iucres any pro)onged mental h.arm, we conclude that a co\4--sc·of conduct using t:hBSe procedures a.rid culminating in the waterboard would not violate Section 2340A. Snecific fotenl To ·violate the statute; an fodividU;i\ mus( have the specffic intent L'O inflict severe pain or suffering. Because specific intent is ac; element of the off'erise, the absen.ee· of specific intent negates the charge.of torture. As we pr.e·violisly opined, ru have the required specific intent, an individual mus;: expressly intend to cause sucb severe pain or suffering. See Section 234DA Memora.,-idun1 at j citing Carter v. Unired Suue.s, 530 U.S. 255, 267 (2000). We have fortltet found cha( if a defendan.r acts with the good faith be.lief that his actions will not c.1use ·such suffering, he has r,ot acted with specific· intenL See id. at 4 citing South A.Ii. Lmtd. Ptrsltp. of Tam. v. Reise, 218. F.3d 518, 531 {4th Cir. 2002). A ddeudant acts in good faith when he has an honest belief that his actions will hot resulrin severe pain ·or suffering. See id. ci(lng Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991 ). Alrhough a.'1 bnoest belief 11eed not be rc:asenablo, such a belief is easier to establish where there is a reasonable ba.sill foe it See id. ai 5. Good faith may be esl.abli.sltoo by, among other things, the. relianae on the aihice of experts. See id. at 8. Based OJl the in:fonnation you ha.-vc provided us, we believ.e th.at tnosc carrying out ,hese procedures woul.d not have the specific intent to infi.ict: severe physic.al pain or suffering. The O!:>jeetive of these l~cbniques is not to c;;.use scvtm! phys:ici:.l pain. Firsr, the con.star11 prese1lce of pc:rsonnel with medical trc.iniug who have the authority to stop Llie interrogation should it appear it is medic.ally m.-ce.ssary inr.iir..?lt~~ th;il ii is nn{ yfl\lr inlenl to cuusesevere physival pain. Th.c personnel on site have e;..tensive experie.nce with these. specific 1edmiques as they are use.d in SERE school training: Second, you have infonned us that you are taking steps to ensure that Zubaydau 's injury is not wc.:sened or his recovery impeded by rht use. of £bese techniques. Third, ~s l_OU_?~~'e described tlrem lo us, the propos.t:d tech..'lique.s involving physical cont.act between the i.nterrogaior and Zubaydah actually contain precautions t.o prevent :my serious physical harm to Zubaydah. fn "walling," a rolled hood or towel ,vi1l be used to preveut . TO~RET 16 .• TO~RET whiplash and he will be pennitted ip rebound from the fle-ldbl-e wall lo re.due~ the likelihood of injury. Similarly, in the ''facial haldt the fingertips wiU be kept well away from the bis.eyes 'to ensure that there 'is: no-injury to them. 11,e purpose of that facial hole! is not,injme him but ta lmld the head iuunobile. Additionally, while-the stress positions and. wall sranding will . un.doub~e-dly result in physical discomfort by tiring the muscles, it is obvious tbat tbes~ posi.tioos are not intendc;d ta produce th~ kind of ex.treme pain required by the stature. Funheonore. 110 soecific iment to cause severt! menial oain or s•Jffering appears to be A.s we explained in our ream opinion, an iudivic!ual ~US! Ii.we the specific intent lO c:suse prolonged mental h~rm in order to have the specific iment to inflic1 severe mental pain or snffeting. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 8. Prolonged mental harm is substantial mcoral harm of a sustained duratlou,, e.g., bann lasti!lg u1onths or even years after the acts were inllict.cd upon the_prisoner. As we indicated above, a good faith-beliefc.an. negate this clement. Accordingly, i:{ an i11dividt12.I conducting ~e interrogation bas a good"faith belief that tire proce-dur.e::; he wiU apply, separately ~rtogether, would not result inprolonged,rnentat harm, that individual lacks the req_uisite specific l.nte."\t this conclusion c.oncemin.g ~ifio mtent is fu(thet bo[m.re<l by the due diligence chat has been coll.ducted concem1.'1g the effocts of these interrogation procedures, preselll. The menral health experts thai i-ou 'have eonslilted have indicated thal the psychological impact of a course of conduct must be assessed with reference 10 the subject's psychological hi5<ory al:.d current.mental bealt.l-i stan!S. The healthier th~ .i:nilividual, !he less likely that the use of any one P.rocedure or sec of procedures as a course qf conduct will resuH in pi:olonged mental harm. A comprch.en.sive psychological profile of:z'.ubaydah has been created. In creating this profile, your personncl drew on direct interviews, Zubaydah's ·diaries, obsmia.tion of Zubaydah since his C!l- W,r. and : fi e ·nre1 i2:ence and ress reports. A:s we indicated above, you hav{} informed us that your proposed iurerrogation methods have been used and continue to be used in SERE training. ft is our l!Ilde.rscanding tl.J.ai these !cehniques are not used one by one in isolation, but as a full course of conduct to resemble a real inte.rr-ogaiion. Thus, the iuforrnatioo. derived frqm SERE trair1Jng bears both upon the impact of the use of the individual. techniques and upon their use as a course of coo duel You have found that the use of these methods togeci1er or separately, including the use. of the waterboartl, lias not resulted in any negative long-le$ mental health consequences. The continued use oftliese methods ,vi.thout m.ertmJ hcal.lh l;unsequen.ces to che trainees indicates that it is l1ighly improbable TO~RET 17 T~RET that such consequences would re.suit he-re. B.ecause you have conducted the due diligence to detemiine that these proc.edures, elther aicne ado e-0mbination, do not produce prolonged ment;I · harm, we believe that you de not mcer the specific ln1ent requirement ne~ssary to violate Secdon 2340A. You !1avt:f atso- informed. us that ym1 have reviewed tbe televanl: literatwe on the subject, and consulred with outside pss,chologi.sts, Your .r,eview of U,e liimtur-e unctivered n.0 entpirical data on the use of these procedures, \\.'tlu the exception of ~l:e<Zp deprivation for ·whlch no long~ tera.1 health. cDnseqper.c~ resulted. TileQiJtside psychblogists with wl10m yo.µ ccnsu{!ed indicated were Utia.Ware·of any cases wher.e long-term problems have occurred as a r~sutt of tb,ese tedmiques. As described above, it appears you llave conducted :!n e:dl',flsive ir,quiry to ascertain wi:nt impact. if any, these procedures individually and as a course of conduct would have an Zubaydah. You have consulce<l with interrogation experts, including those with substanJi.nl SERE school expeiience, consulted with outside psychologists, completed a psychological assessment and reviewed the relevant literature on. ti.1is topic. Based on this inquiry, you believe tbat the use of the procedures, including the walerbo3l'd, arJd as a coursi!- of conduct would not result iu ptolonged mental ha.rm_ Re.liance 011 thls information abo~Zubaydah and about the ·effeci of the use of these iedmiques mote generally d.emonst:rates th~ present~ of a good faith beiief that no prolong~d mental ha.nu will result from using tl1ese methods in the interrogation of Zubaydah. Moreover, v;e think that this represents not only an honest belief but also a rea,onable belief based 011 the informa.tionth.at you have S\l.pplied to us. Thus, w1: believe tbs.t the speeific intent to inflict prolonged memaf is not prese-nt, cori&e.quently, there is no sp·ecific in.tent to i.nilict severe menial pnin or suffering. Accocding_ly, -,ve conclude (hat ou the facts in this case the use ofthex: methods separately or a course of couduct would ll.Ot violate and Section 2340A. Based on the foregoing,. and based on the facts that you ha"e pro'i1ided, we dmclui:l.e that tl1e interrogation procedures that you propose would not violate Section 1340.A. · We vvi:sh to emphasize that this is our bes! readlug of the law; ho\vevcr, you should be a.ware tliat there are no· cases constming l:his statu.te;just as there huve been no prosecutions brou.ght tm.der it. Please let us k.now rfwe Call be of rurthe.r assistance. ~,,;.,..,..:... ~~,.~ ~ "i.;.,.::.. l3 Appendix D ......... ..... ".'. · _-;,_ :.:.-. · ~ I Guidatiµes on Con:finem.ent Conditions For CIA Detainees . These Guidelines govern the·conditions of confinement for CIA Detainees, who are person ion facilities that are under the control of acilitie"S u ; ,: i These Guidelines recognize that environmental and other conditions,.as - well. as particularized considerations affecting any given Detention Facility, will. vary from · case ~o case and location to locati~n. · l.. Minimu.ms Due nrovision ~st be safety of al· IA Detainees medical ·care 2. ,·'. .I l :tmpl~nting P:rocedm:es and -- - ---------- - ---· Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees 3. .l ReS];:)6nsih1e Cl:A Officer ·The Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center shall erisl.lre. (a)· that, at ail tim\3s, a specific Agency staff employee (the ~Responsible CIA Officer•) is designated as responsible for each specific Detention Facility, . (b) that each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached. _Ac)mowledgment, and.. _(c) that each Re~onsihie. CL'l\ O;fficer and each CIA o!ficer participating · · • inclividuals a.etained ursuant to Pursuant and has rev-1.ewed and ·signed the Ac .. ow edgment attached thereto. . Subject· to operational and security considerations, -the Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at, o~ visit, each Dete~tion Fa<;:ility at intervals appropriate to' the circumstances. APPROVED: Date ·.~•~·' .·.·~· ·-i:'?~; Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for-CIA Detainees ACXNOWLE1JGMEN'l! · I, _________ , am t.he ·.Responsible CIA Officer for the Detention Facilitt known as _ _ _ _ _ _ • By my signature . below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand.and will cornply_with the ~Guidelines on Confinement conditions for CIA Detainees• of _ _ _ _ , 2003. ACKNOWLE~ED1 Name. i iI ' r. Date Appendix E Ci• • ,: f ; .. e I , . t '. 'f • • ~ • .! ; • " ,• 1 . ' . • t • , •• • . ' • • . f •. . . . . These Guidelines addres~ .the.conduct of interrogations of ·. pe.rs.ons who are detained urs11ant to the authorities set forth -i These Guidelines complement internal Directorate of Operations guidance relating to the conduct of interrogations. In the ev.eri.t of any inconsistency between existing DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions of tbese Guidelines s _h all control_. · 1. Fermi::iaibJ.e Inta:rro~ation 'J.'ecbniques Unless other'~ise approved by Headquartexs, CIA officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Permissible Interrogation ~echniques. Pennissible Interrogation-Techniques consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b} Enhanced Techni"ques. · · . . Standard Techniques are techniques that do not . incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure. These technique.s inclu-de, but are not limitea to, all lawful forms of questioning. employed );)y US law enfo.r cement and military interrogation personnel. Among Standard .Techniques .are the :us~ of isolation, sleep deprivation. not to exceed 72 hours; reduced caloric intake (so long as . the a~ount is calculated to maintain the general · health of the detainee), de:priva'tion of. reading material, · use of loud ni.us.ic· ar white noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to . the detainee's hearing), and the use of d i a p ~ d eriods er 1 not to exceed 72 hours, . . . . . . · Enhance9, TegpniqUes are t:ech:piques tha~ do incorporate physical 9r psycho.logica.l pressure beyond Standard Techniques. The: tise of each specif~c Enhanced Tech.11..ique .must be approv~d ~Y Headquarters in advance, and may b~ employed only by approved interrogators for use with the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and psychological participation i'n the p~ocess. These techniques are, the attention grasp, ·walling, the facial hold, the _facial slap (insult slap)·, the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, Wq.J.l standing; ,stress po•s itions, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolong~d periods, the use of. harmless inseots, the·water board, and such other techniques as may . b.e specific'ally . approv:ed pursuant . to paragraph 4 b.elqw. · The 1.1s.e of each Enhanced Technique :ts subject to specific temporal, .phystcal, and rel_ated conditions, iriclud.ing a competent evaluation of t.he medical and psychological state of the ~etainee. 2. M~dica.'J. and Psycho:logicaJ. Personnel Appropriate medical and psychological per:;onnel shall be ■lll■il■l■lill■lliiilillreadily_available for consultation and travel to · tbe .int,errogation site during.all detainee .interrogations employing.Standard Techniqu.es, and appropriate medical and.psychological personnel must be on site during ~11 detainee interrogations employing.Enhanced Teclmiques. In each case, the medical and psy~hological personnel shall suspend the interrogation if they determine that significant and prolonged _physical or mental injury, pain, or suffering is likely to re:.,ult. if ·the int.errogat;i.on is not suspended. !n any .such instance, the interrogation team shall immediately report the facts to Headquarters for mar:iagement and legal review to . determine whether the interrogation may be resumed. 3 •. Interrogation Perao=el The Director, DCI.Counterterrorist Center shall ensure that all personnel d i r e c t l y . e n g a g e d ~ interro t · f saris ·detained pursuant have been appropriately spreene rom , psy ogical, and security standpoints), have reviewed )::hese Guidelines, have received appropriate training in ,. their implementation, and have completed the attached Acknowledgment. TOP Guideline on _In,J::.errogations Conducted Pursuaµt.to t:.he 4. . ~~pro¥ais Re.quired Whenever feasible, advance approval is. required for the use· of Standard ·T echniqu~s by an int.eriogation team. In · all instances, their use shall . be docunlented in cable traffic'- . Pdor approval in writing ·(e.g., by written memorandum or in cable traffic} from the Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, with the concurrence of the Chief, C-TC Legal Group, is· r_equired for. the use of any -Enhanced Technique{a); · and !Ilq.y)rn provid~d-orily where D/CTC has · detennined that- (a) the specific detainee is believed to to possess .information about risks the citizens . of the United States other nations, (b} the ·use of the Enhanced Tec.hnique·{s) ." is appro:9riate in order .to obtain that information, (c) :appropriate· 11'.e~cal, psychological or and personnel have -concluded that the use of the -Enh:;Ulced Tech.nique(s) is not expected to ~roduce ftsevere physical or mental _pain 9r suffering," and (d)·· the ·personnel authorized to .e,.-nploy the Enhanced. Technique_{s) .have completed the attached Acknowledgment. Nothing in these Guidelines alters the r~ght to act in self-defense. 5• Recordkeeping In each interrogation sess·ion in which a...., EnI1anced Technique ls employed, a contemporaneous record shall be created setting·forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, ·the _identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable . This information, which may be in the form of a cable, shall be provided to Headquarters . APP-ROVED: . .lv.:mo~ :C, ., acknowledge that I have read and understand and will . comply with the "Guidelines on :Cnt:erro ti.ans Condqctecl Pursuant to . ACKNOWLEDGED; Name ..; Date Appendix F ,;. DRAFT OMS GUIDELINES ON :tvIBDICAL Ai.'ID PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO . DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS . · S~ptember 4, :2.003 The following guidelines ·bffer general references for medical officers supporting ~.~ detention of terrorists captured and turned o~er to the Central Intclligence Agency for interrogation and debriefing. There are three .different contexts in which these guidelines m4y be applied: (1) during th~.pe.riod of irutial interrogation, 2 duriri the more sustained eriad ofdebriefin · at an interrogation sit:, and (3 I/\irERROGATION SUPPORT ., :1 ;" Captured terrorists turned over tn the CJ.A. for interrogation may be subjected to a, ~vide r~ge of legally sanctioned techniques, all of which are also used on U.S. military p~oimel in SERE training programs. These are designed to psychologically "dislocate" the detainee, ma.ximize .his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or eli,nunate his will to resist o~ efforts to obtain critical intelligence, . Sanctioned interrogation techniques must be specifically approved in advance by th~ Director, CTC in the ease of each individual case. They include, in approximately. ascending degree of in~ensity: . Standard measures (i.e., without physical or substantial psychological pressure) Shaving · Stripping Diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hours) Hooding · Isolation White noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing) Contin,uous light darkness Uncomfortably cool environment Restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain · general health) Shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position Water Dousing Sleep deprivation (up to 7?, hours) ·Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above) . A~ntion grasp Facial hold or Insnlt (facial) slap 1 AQdomiriaf slap Prolonged diapering Sle.ep deprivation (over 7_2 hours) Stress positions -on knees, body slanted forward or backward · --leaning with forehead on wall Walling . .. . . Cramped confinement (Confmenient boxes) Waterboa:rd · · In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological imp.act, and not some physical effect, with a specific _goal of ''dislocat[ing] his expectations regarding the treatwent he believes he will receive ... '.'' The more physical techniques are delivered in-a manner carefully limited to avoid seriqus physical harm. The slaps for example ·are·d~igned ''to induce shock, surprise, andior humiliation" and "not to inflict physical pain· that J:S severe or lasting." To this end they must be delivered in a specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread. Walling is-ou).y against a springfroard designed to be loud and bouncy (an..d cushion the blow). All walling and most attention grasps are delivered only with the subject's head solidly supported with a towel to avoid extens'ion-flex.ion injury. . OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency detainees St!-bject to ''enhm1ced" interrogation techniques, and·for determining that the authorized administration of these techniques would. not be expected to cause serious or pe11Uanent harrn.. 1 "DCI Guidelines" bav~ been issued formalizing these responsibilities, and these should be read directly. Whenever feasible, advance approval is-required to use any measures beyond standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for all "enhanced" measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel2 con.firming from direct detainee examination that enhanced techniq ue(s) is not expected to produce "severe physical or mental pain of suffering." As a practical matter, the detainee' s physical ·condition .must be such that these interventions will not have lasting the 1 The standard used by the Justice Department for "mental" harm is "prolonged mental harm," i.e., "ment~ harm of some·lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years." "In the abs'ence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering \.VOuld have been inflicted.11 Memorandum of August 1, 2002, p. 15. -~ . . .. ~:---:-;n., Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a physician or a PA; use ef !:he watcrboard requires the presence of a physician. . I . . ' .•· . 2 ·effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will result. · · The medica(implications of the DCI guidelines are discussed below. General intake evaluation. New ·detamees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with- a complete, docume . • · . . ' . · · · . · . . · · : . .' . Although brief, the data should reflect what \".as checked and include negative fmdings. Medical treatment It is important that adequate medical care be provided t0 detainees, even those undergoing enhanced interrogation. Those requiring chronic medications should receive Ui.em, acute medical roblems shouldbetreate and ade uate fluids nutrition and providec:l. 3 --- --- - --- - -- The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrog'<ltion need not be palatable, but should include adequate fluids and nutrition. Actual consumption should oe . monitored and reco . . ' . re · s tion. there is any question ·tored and recorded. Uncomfortably cool env:rrorrments Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfortab lengths of time, ranging from hours day~_. to Core body temperature falls after more than 1 hours at an ambient temperature of l0°C/50°F. At this. temperature increased mecabolic rate cannot compensate for heat loss. The WHO recommended minimum indoor temperature is 18°C/64°F. The "thermoneutral zone" where minimal compensatory activity is re.quired to maintain core temperature is 20°C/68PF to 30°C/36°F. Within the thermoneutral zone, 26°Cn8°F is coru;idered o timall comfortable for p.ghtly clothed individuals and 30°C/86°F for mtlced individuals. If there is any possibility that ambient temperatureS are below the thermoneutral range, they should be monitored and ~e actual t~mperatures documente: . ., -:,--.,....~- 4 . - l' • II . It II . . . . . .• ' I. I > • II t. , 11 I - I 1· , •..,; It It· I II I · ■ I II • .. . . . . . . . . . . White noise or.loud music a As practical guide, there is no pe~anent hearing risk for continuous, 24-hours.hours a day; 90 dB for a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB. or lower; at 84 dB for up to 18 up to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4 hours, ·and 100 dB for 2 hours.. If necess · be provided _to measure these ambient sound levels. instruments can Shac.kling f ' . . Shackling m. non-stressful positions requires only monitoring for the development 'th '' te tr tm . t . ci d" {th sh kl . d. A . 5 . . . ' .· . .. . . : . . . ' . . ' . Assuming no medical contraindications ar~ found, extern.led periods (up to 72 hours) in a standing position can be approved if the hands ·are no hio er than he~d level and wei hli$J:Jprne fu)J p .th.~ lowerextremiti~. ,. 0 Sleep ·deprivation The sta,ncla'rd approval for sleep deprivation, per se (without regard ta shack.Un.g posiµon) is 72_hours. Extension of slee .• de r:ivation be .ond 72 continuous hours is G.onsJg~d an NOTE: Examinatkms perfonned during periods of sleep deprivation shoultfinclude the current number of hours with.out sleep; and, if only.a brief reftpreceded this.period, the specifics of the previous deprivation also should be recorded. Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes) small box is allowable up lo 2 hours. Confinement in the large box is limited to 8 consecutive hours, · 7 TOP Waterboard \I . . 11tls is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques. The historical context here was limited knowledge of tlie use of the watetboard iri SERE trai:aing (several hundred trainees experience it' eyeiy year or two). 'In the SERE rp.odel the subject is immobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered-with a cloth. A stream, of water is cfuected at the upper lip._Resistant subjects then-have.the cloth · lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water contin~es to be .applied, fully sa~tlng the cloth, and precluding the passage of air. -R~latively little water enters the mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) lasts no more than 20 seconds. On removal of the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have water directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect. This process can continue for several minutes, and involve up to 15 canteen cups .of water. Ostensibly the primary ·~esired effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily occluding the nose and mouth, _and psychological impact of tp.e continued application of water after-the 'cloth is removed; SERE trainees usri.ally have only a single exposure to this technique, and never _more than two; ~ERE ~ers·consider it their mosf effective technique•.and deem-it virtually irresistible in th.e tr~µg settin~. . . 8 ,,- , , Toe SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique (single exposure) to trainees for years, and reportedly there have been thousands of applications without significant or lasting medical 90mplications. The procedure noneth~les$ carries some risks, partl.cularly when repeated a large .number of times or when applied to an individual less fit than a typical SERE trainee. Several medical din:iim.sions need to be monitored to eJ?,Sure the safety of the subject. In our lirmted experience, extensive sustained use of the w~terboard can introduce new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue_ or psychological resignation, the subject may simply give up, allowing ex~essive filling of the airways and loss consciousness. ·An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the interrogator should deliver a sub-Xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to restore normal breathing, aggressive medical interven.tion.is required. Any s~bject who has reached this degree of compromise is not considered ail appropriate candidate for the waterboard, and the physician on the scene can not approve further use of !he waterboard without specific C/OMS consultation and approval. of A rigid guide to medically approved use.of the waterboard in ess~ntially healthy individuals is not possible, as safety will depend on how the water is applied and· the specific response each time itis used. The following general'gnidelines are based on very limited knowledge, drawn from very few subjec!S whose experien~e and response was quite varied. These rep~sent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also are operative and may be more· restrictive. 9 I~ · TOP - A series (within a "session'') of several rel~tively rapid waterboard applications i~ medically acceptable in all health sJJb' ects, so lon as there is no indication of some ~ - Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed.without apparent medical complication .. The exact number of sessions cannot be prescribed, and will depend on the response to ea.ch. If more ·thari 3 sessions 6f 5 or more applications · are envisioned within a 24 hours period, a careful medical reassessment must be made .before each later session. · By days 3-5 of an aggressive program,.cumulative effects become a potential concern. Withou·t any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages .of this -technique, we believe that beyond this po~t continued intense.waterboard applications · may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive llile ~:>f the waterboard beyond · · this point should be reviewed b the 1IVT team in consultation with Head uq,rters rior to any further aggressive use. NOTE: In order to best infann }u.'ture medical judgments and recommendations, it is important that every application ·of the waterboard be thoroughly tUJcumented: ho.w long each application (and the entire procediire) lasted, how much ,vaterwas used .in the process (realizing that much .splashes.oft), how exactly the water was applied, if a seal was achie:ved, if the naso- or oroplw.rynx was filled, what sort of volume was expelled, how long was the break between applications, and how the subject looked between each treatment. -~ •---~'~ 10 ~ 11