U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General

Office of the Inspector General
Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General

Message From the Inspector General
This semiannual report summarizes the audits, evaluations, investigations, and special reviews
conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) from April 1, 2004, through September 30, 2004.
These reports and activities demonstrate our continued commitment to detecting and deterring waste,
fraud, and abuse and promoting economy and efficiency in Department of Justice (Department)
operations.
Over the past 15 years, the OIG’s focus has changed to address the evolving priorities of the
Department. Our work during this reporting period reflects the priorities of the Department. Recent
OIG reviews have examined important counterterrorism-related issues, grant management and
accountability, the security of computer systems, and other Department top priorities and challenges.
For example, during this reporting period we reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)
ability to translate critical foreign language material and its success in meeting its linguist hiring goals.
We also issued a classified review that examined the FBI’s handling of certain intelligence information
prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Our findings were used by the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States in developing its final report.
In other work, we examined the selection, screening, and supervision of Muslim chaplains,
contractors, and volunteers who provide religious services to inmates in the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP). In addition, we reviewed the inspections of federally licensed firearms dealers by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). We also examined protocols and procedures in the
FBI’s DNA Laboratory and made recommendations to improve laboratory operations. At the same time,
we continued to investigate allegations of criminal and administrative misconduct and worked closely
with Department components to maintain the integrity of Department operations.
We are gratified by the response we receive from the Department and Congress for our work as
we seek to assist the Department in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.
Finally, I want to thank the dedicated OIG staff who work diligently on a daily basis to fulfill the
OIG’s critical mission.

Glenn A. Fine
Inspector General
October 31, 2004

Table of Contents
Highlights of OIG Activities ................................................................................................. 1
OIG Profile ............................................................................................................................ 3
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ................................................................................. 5
The Federal Bureau of Prisons ........................................................................................ 12
The U.S. Marshals Service ................................................................................................ 15
The Office of Justice Programs ................................................................................................. 18
Other Department Components ....................................................................................... 21
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ....................................... 21
The Drug Enforcement Administration ................................................................... 23
The U.S. Attorneys’ Offices ...................................................................................... 24
Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations ................................................... 25
Top Management Challenges ........................................................................................... 31
Congressional Testimony ................................................................................................. 32
Legislation and Regulations ............................................................................................. 32
Statistical Information ....................................................................................................... 33
Audit Statistics ...................................................................................................................... 33
Funds Recommended for Better Use ....................................................................... 33
Questioned Costs ..................................................................................................... 34
Management Improvements .................................................................................... 34
Audit Follow-Up ...................................................................................................... 35
Unresolved Audits ................................................................................................... 35
Evaluation and Inspections Statistics ......................................................................... 35
Investigations Statistics ............................................................................................. 36
Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 37
Audit Division Reports ............................................................................................ 37
Evaluation and Inspections Division Reports ........................................................... 44
Glossary of Terms ..................................................................................................... 45
Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................... 47
Reporting Requirements Index ................................................................................ 48

Highlights of OIG Activities

Highlights of OIG Activities
The following table summarizes OIG activities discussed in this report. As these statistics
and the following highlights illustrate, the
OIG has conducted wide-ranging oversight of
Department programs and operations.

Statistical Highlights
April 1, 2004 – September 30, 2004
Allegations Received by the
Investigations Division

3,871

Investigations Opened

179

Investigations Closed

232

Arrests

51

Indictments/Informations

41

Convictions/Pleas

59

Administrative Actions

63

Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries

$675,296

Audit Reports Issued

99

Questioned Costs

$21 million

Funds Put to Better Use

$1.1 million

Recommendations for Management
Improvements

424

Examples of OIG audits, evaluations, and special reports completed during this semiannual
reporting period include:
◆ 	The FBI’s Foreign Language Translation

Program. The OIG audited the FBI’s translation of counterterrorism and counterintelligence foreign language material and found
that the FBI did not translate all the material
it collected. In addition, the audit noted that
the FBI is not effectively prioritizing its
translation workload. The OIG provided
18 recommendations to help improve the
FBI’s Foreign Language Translation Program.

◆ 	Handling of Intelligence Information Prior

to 9/11. The OIG issued a classified report
describing the results of a review that examined the FBI’s handling of certain intelligence
information prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, including the FBI’s handling
of the Moussaoui case, a document known as
the Phoenix Electronic Communication, and
the Hazmi/Mihdhar case. The OIG provided
copies of the classified final report to the FBI,
congressional committees, and the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, which cited our work in its
final report.
◆ 	Effects of the FBI’s Reprioritization. The

OIG reviewed the changes in the FBI’s allocation of personnel resources and determined
that the FBI has reallocated staff positions
in accord with its changed priorities. This
detailed statistical review described how the
FBI changed its resource allocations since
September 11.

◆ 	Inspecting Licensed Firearms Dealers.

The OIG examined the ATF’s program for
inspecting Federal Firearms Licensees (FFL)
and found that the program is not fully effective in ensuring that FFLs comply with federal
firearms laws. We found that the ATF’s inspections of FFLs are infrequent and of inconsistent quality. The OIG made nine recommendations to improve the inspection program,
including developing a standard inspection
process, revising staffing requirements, improving the comprehensiveness of crime gun tracing by law enforcement agencies, and creating
a tracking system to monitor the progress and
timeliness of FFL denials and revocations.
◆ 	Enforcement of Brady Act Violations.

The OIG examined how the ATF responds
to violations of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1993 (Brady Act), which
result in prohibited persons obtaining firearms. The OIG found that firearms retrievals
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were not always timely, that few such cases
were prosecuted, and that the ATF’s Brady
Operations Branch does not have sufficient
resources to pursue Brady Act violations in
a timely manner. We made ten recommendations to the ATF to help better manage its
Brady Act caseload and improve the effectiveness of its process for referring cases to
ATF field agents and prosecutors.
◆ 	Muslim Religious Services Providers.

The OIG reviewed the BOP’s procedures for
recruiting, selecting, and supervising individuals to provide Islamic religious services to
federal inmates. The review documented a
number of deficiencies in the process, leading
to concerns that inappropriate and extremist
messages may be delivered to inmates. The
OIG’s report made 16 recommendations to
help the BOP improve its process for selecting, screening, and supervising Muslim religious services providers.
◆ 	Department Shooting Incidents. The

OIG evaluated how the ATF, FBI, Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), and
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) reported,
investigated, and reviewed shooting incidents involving their special agents or deputy
marshals. The OIG reported on the different
processes employed by the components, the
timeliness of administrative reviews of shooting incidents, their adherence to a requirement
to submit a written report to senior managers
within one day of a shooting incident, whether
the components rely on local law enforcement
agencies to conduct criminal investigations
of shooting incidents, and the composition of
their shooting review boards. The OIG recommended that the Department establish a
working group to consider developing uniform
standards for reporting and reviewing shooting
incidents.

◆ 	The FBI’s DNA Laboratory. The OIG

reviewed the FBI’s DNA Laboratory after a
former FBI biologist intentionally bypassed
an important step in the DNA testing process
and produced dozens of DNA profiles that
were scientifically invalid and unusable in

court. The OIG report examined vulnerabilities in the protocols and practices in the FBI’s
DNA Laboratory. In our report, we provided
35 recommendations to address the vulnerabilities we identified.

Investigations of Misconduct
As shown in the statistics in the table at the
beginning of this section, the OIG investigates hundreds of allegations of misconduct.
Examples of the OIG’s investigations discussed
in this report include:
◆ 	A BOP instructor pled guilty to bribery of a

public official after the teacher received more
than $65,000 in exchange for promising to
provide a federal inmate with benefits such as
early release from prison, use of a cell phone,
and food from outside the prison.

◆ 	A DEA cashier was arrested and pled guilty

to unlawfully taking $37,000 in government
money from her office imprest fund.

◆ 	An FBI special agent was alleged to have

misused his official position by engaging in a
sexual relationship with female acquaintances
of a cooperating witness and discussing FBI
investigations and sensitive procedures with
unauthorized persons. The FBI special agent
resigned his position as a result of this
investigation.

Ongoing Reviews
This report also describes many ongoing OIG
reviews of important issues throughout the
Department, including:
◆ 	The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center.
◆ 	The ATF’s implementation of the Safe

Explosives Act.

◆ 	The Department’s operation of counterter-

rorism task forces.

◆ 	Implementation of the Attorney General’s

Guidelines for Key Investigative Programs.

◆ 	The USMS’s administration of the Witness

Security Program.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

OIG Profile

OIG Profile
The OIG is a statutorily created, independent
entity whose mission is to detect and deter
waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct involving
Department programs and personnel, and to
promote economy and efficiency in Department
operations. The OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil laws, regulations,
and ethical standards arising from the conduct
of Department employees in their numerous
and diverse activities. The OIG also audits and
inspects Department programs and assists
management in promoting integrity, economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness. The OIG has
jurisdiction to review the programs and
personnel of the FBI, DEA, BOP, USMS, ATF,
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAOs), and all other
organizations within the Department.
The OIG consists of the Immediate Office of
the Inspector General and the following divisions and offices:
◆ 	Audit Division is responsible for indepen-

dent audits of Department programs, computer systems, and financial statements. The
Audit Division has field offices in Atlanta,
Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Philadelphia,
San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. Its
Financial Statement Audit Office and
Computer Security and Information
Technology Audit Office are located in
Washington, D.C. Audit Headquarters consists of the immediate office of the Assistant
Inspector General for Audit, the Office of
Operations, the Office of Policy and Planning,
and an Advanced Audit Techniques Group.

◆ 	Investigations Division is responsible for

investigating allegations of bribery, fraud,
abuse, civil rights violations, and violations of
other criminal laws and administrative procedures governing Department employees,
contractors, and grantees. The Investigations
Division has field offices in Chicago, Dallas,
Denver, Los Angeles, Miami, New York,
and Washington, D.C. The Fraud Detection

Office is located in Washington, D.C. The
Investigations Division has smaller, area
offices in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, El Paso,
Houston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and
Tucson. Investigations Headquarters in
Washington, D.C., consists of the immediate
office of the Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations and the following branches:
Operations, Special Operations, Investigative
Support, Research and Analysis, and Policy
and Administration.
◆ 	Evaluation and Inspections Division con-

ducts program and management reviews that
involve on-site inspection, statistical analysis,
and other techniques to review Department
programs and activities and make recommendations for improvement.

◆ 	Office of Oversight and Review blends the

skills of attorneys, investigators, and program
analysts to review Department programs and
investigate sensitive allegations involving
Department employees and programs.

◆ 	Management and Planning Division assists

OIG components in budget formulation and
execution, security, personnel, training, travel,
procurement, property management, information technology, computer network communications, telecommunications, strategic planning, quality assurance, and internal controls.

◆ 	Office of General Counsel provides legal

advice to OIG management and staff. It also
drafts memoranda on issues of law; prepares
administrative subpoenas; represents the OIG
in personnel, contractual, and legal matters;
and responds to Freedom of Information Act
requests.

The OIG has a nationwide workforce of approximately 420 special agents, auditors, inspectors,
attorneys, and support staff. For Fiscal Year
(FY) 2004, the OIG’s direct appropriation was
$60.8 million, and the OIG earned an

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

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additional $2.4 million in reimbursements.
The OIG also received $2.5 million from
the Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law
108-11) – funds that remained available until
September 30, 2004.
As required by Section 5 of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (IG Act), as amended, this
Semiannual Report to Congress reviewing the
accomplishments of the OIG for the 6-month
period of April 1, 2004, through September 30,

2004, is to be submitted no later than
October 31, 2004, to the Attorney General for
his review. The Attorney General is required
to forward the report to Congress no later than
November 30, 2004, along with information on
the Department’s position on audit resolution
and follow-up activity in response to matters
discussed in this report.
Additional information about the OIG and
full-text versions of many of its reports are
available at www.usdoj.gov/oig.

Audit and Investigations Divisions Locations

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Federal Bureau
of Investigation
The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the
Department. It investigates counterterrorism,
foreign counterintelligence, civil rights violations, organized crime, violent crime, financial
crime, and other violations of federal law. FBI
Headquarters in Washington, D.C., coordinates
the activities of approximately 28,600 employees
in 56 field offices, approximately 400 satellite
offices, and 45 foreign liaison posts that work
abroad on criminal matters within the FBI’s
jurisdiction.

Reports Issued
The Handling of Intelligence Information
Prior to the September 11 Attacks
On July 2, 2004, the OIG issued a 421-page
report classified at the Top Secret/Sensitive
Compartmented Information level describing
the results of a review that examined the FBI’s
handling of certain intelligence information prior
to the September 11 terrorist attacks. The OIG
initiated the review at the FBI Director’s request.
Among the issues we reviewed were the FBI’s
handling of an electronic communication written by its Phoenix Division in July 2001 regarding extremists attending civil aviation schools
in Arizona, the FBI’s handling of the Zacarias
Moussaoui investigation, and the FBI’s handling
of information related to September 11 terrorists
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar.
During the course of the investigation, the OIG
reviewed and analyzed thousands of pages of
documents and conducted over 200 interviews.
In our final report, we made 16 recommendations for improving the FBI’s intelligence handling and counterterrorism efforts, including
recommendations targeted towards the FBI’s
analytical program.

Five recommendations in the OIG’s final report
addressed information sharing between the FBI
and the intelligence community. In response
to these recommendations, the FBI provided
information about specific steps it has taken to:
1) improve the management of FBI employees
detailed to other agencies, 2) ensure that FBI
employees who interact with other intelligence
agencies better understand those agencies’
intelligence reporting processes, and 3) improve
its technological capabilities as they relate to
information sharing. The FBI also reported that
it has begun developing intelligence collection
and reporting guidance for field agents and has
developed a training course dedicated to reporting and disseminating raw intelligence.
In addition to the FBI, we provided copies
of the classified final report to congressional
committees and the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The
National Commission used the OIG report in its
final report. We are currently working with the
Department and the intelligence community to
produce an unclassified version of our report.

Audit of the FBI’s Foreign
Language Program – Translation
of Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence Foreign Language
Material
Critical to the FBI’s success in protecting
national security is its ability to prioritize, translate, and understand in a timely fashion the
information to which it has access.
Our audit found that the FBI did not translate
all the foreign language counterterrorism and
counterintelligence material that it collected.
Despite the infusion of more than 620 additional
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linguists since September 11, 2001, the FBI’s
collection of material requiring translation outpaced its translation capabilities. Using available
foreign language program data, we compiled
statistics by language and found that as of the
first quarter of FY 2004, the FBI has collected
over 123,000 hours of audio in counterterrorism
languages and over 370,000 hours of audio in
counterintelligence languages that had not been
reviewed. We attributed the FBI’s backlog of
unreviewed material to its difficulty hiring a sufficient number of linguists and limitations in the
FBI’s translation information technology (IT)
systems.
The FBI’s difficulty hiring linguists stems from
two factors – competition with other intelligence
community agencies that are responding to
similar threats, and its contract linguist security
and language proficiency vetting process that
eliminates over 90 percent of the applicants processed for hiring. Regarding IT limitations, we
found that the FBI’s digital collection systems
have limited storage capacity. Consequently,
audio sessions are sometimes deleted through
an automatic file procedure to make room for
incoming audio sessions. Although sessions are
automatically deleted in a set order, we found
that unreviewed sessions are sometimes deleted,
especially in offices with a high volume of audio
to review. It is important to note, however, that
deleted sessions are archived.
Because the FBI did not have the ability to
translate all of its foreign language material, the
manner in which the FBI prioritizes its translation workload is critically important. According
to the Language Services Section, it coordinates the threat-based priority of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) coverage
with operational division officials to ensure that
it directs foreign language program resources
toward those investigations considered to be
the highest priority. Nonetheless, we found that
the FBI was not providing sufficient operational
information to the Language Services Section
to enable it to effectively prioritize its translation workload. In addition, we found that as of
June 2004, the FBI’s Foreign Language Program
had not prioritized its workload nationwide to

ensure a zero backlog in the FBI’s highest priority cases – counterterrorism cases and, in particular, Al Qaeda cases.
Because inaccurate translations can have dire
consequences to the FBI’s intelligence gathering
and investigative efforts, the FBI instituted
a national Quality Control Program in
January 2003. Our review of the Quality Control
Program at four FBI offices found that the newhire and annual review requirements generally
were not met in FY 2003.
Our audit report contained 18 recommendations
to help improve the FBI’s Foreign Language
Program, such as: 1) ensuring that each office’s
digital collection system storage capabilities are
sufficient so that unreviewed audio material for
critical cases is not automatically deleted,
2) implementing appropriate controls to ensure
that the forwarding of audio is accomplished
reliably and timely, 3) providing adequate
information to the Foreign Language Program
regarding the relative priority of individual
counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases,
and 4) strengthening quality control procedures
to ensure the accuracy of translations and that
all pertinent material is translated.

Audit of the Internal Effects of the FBI’s
Reprioritization
In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, the FBI Director established a new set
of priorities and formally shifted a significant
number of agents from traditional criminal
investigative work to counterterrorism and
counterintelligence matters. According to the
FBI Director, each of the changes was designed
to reshape the FBI into an organization more
capable of combating the imminent threat of
terrorism and preventing another large-scale
terrorist attack against the United States.
In our almost 500-page report, we reviewed the
specific changes in the FBI’s field agent allocations for FYs 2000 through 2003. We determined
that the FBI generally shifted its allocation to
reflect its new priorities. Specifically, we found
that the FBI allocated more than 560 additional

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

field agent positions to terrorism-related matters in FY 2003. During the same period, positions allotted for matters not related to terrorism were reduced. For example, the Organized
Crime/Drug Program had 758 of its field agent
positions transferred during our review period.
Our report contains a comprehensive, datadriven analysis of the changes in the FBI’s use
of resources as a result of its shift in priorities
and reallocation of staff. We believe this type of
analysis can be useful to FBI executive management and program directors for evaluating progress in meeting goals and obtaining a data-based
view of the status of FBI operations. We recommended that the FBI conduct similar analyses
on a regular basis. In a follow-up review, we
intend to examine how the FBI’s shift in priorities and operations has affected other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies.

Allegations Raised By Contract Linguist
In June 2004, the OIG completed a review of
the FBI’s actions in connection with allegations
raised by former FBI contract linguist Sibel
Edmonds. During the investigation, the OIG
reviewed thousands of pages of documents and
conducted over 50 interviews. The review culminated in a 100-page OIG report classified by the
FBI at the Secret level.
The OIG provided copies of the classified final
report to the Department, the FBI, and the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States. We are currently working
with the Department in an attempt to produce
an unclassified version of the report that can be
publicly released.

DNA Laboratory
The OIG completed a 192-page report in
May 2004 examining the protocols and practices in the FBI’s DNA Laboratory. The FBI
Laboratory uses DNA obtained at crime scenes
to produce profiles that can be linked to a
particular individual. The DNA Laboratory’s
written protocols and procedures prescribe its
testing techniques and ensure that its results are
scientifically valid.

The OIG initiated a review of the DNA
Laboratory after the FBI discovered that a
former biologist in one of the Laboratory’s
DNA units intentionally bypassed an important
step in the DNA testing process and produced
dozens of DNA profiles that were scientifically
invalid and unusable in court. Specifically, the
biologist consistently failed to process control
samples that would have identified whether
contamination, rather than the DNA evidence,
was the source of her testing results. In addition,
the biologist falsified her laboratory documentation to indicate that she was generating contamination-free testing results. As a result of an
OIG investigation into her actions, the former
biologist pled guilty in federal court to a misdemeanor charge of providing false statements in
her laboratory reports.
The FBI’s retesting of evidence in the former
biologist’s cases to date indicates that, while she
did not properly conduct the testing process,
the DNA profiles she generated were accurate and did not result in incorrect matches.
However, the biologist’s misconduct raised
concerns about potential weaknesses in the FBI
DNA Laboratory’s protocols and practices. The
OIG’s review examined the vulnerability of the
protocols and practices in the Laboratory unit
where the biologist worked – the DNA Analysis
Unit I (DNA Unit 1). We also examined several areas of concern regarding management’s
response to the biologist’s misconduct. To facilitate our review of the Laboratory’s protocols,
we recruited three scientists from the national
DNA community to consult with the OIG’s
assessment team.
The OIG’s review concluded that certain DNA
Unit 1 protocols and practices were vulnerable to undetected, inadvertent, or willful noncompliance by staff members. Specifically, we
found that certain protocols lacked sufficient
detail, failed to ensure the precision of note
taking, were outdated, and failed to adequately
describe the decision criteria Laboratory staff
should use when required to exercise judgment during the testing process. While in most
instances the work practices of Unit staff members diminished the risks, we concluded that the

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

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Unit would remain subject to an increased risk
of employee error or inadvertent protocol noncompliance unless the protocols were revised.
In our report, we made 35 recommendations
to address the protocol vulnerabilities that
we identified and issues of concern regarding
the management response of the FBI and the
Department to the biologist’s misconduct. Those
recommendations included: 1) replacing vague
sections of the protocols with comprehensive
guidance and descriptions of the “best practices”
currently in use, 2) adding workflow and decision aides to protocols to assist staff members
in exercising proper judgment during the DNA
testing process, 3) providing staff members with
guidance sufficient to ensure that case documentation and case file reviews meet management expectations, and 4) updating protocols to
reflect current methods within DNA Unit 1. We
also recommended that the Laboratory develop
a comprehensive, written training curriculum
and complete implementation of an information
management system to improve efficiency and
evidence tracking capabilities.
In September 2004, the FBI Laboratory advised
the OIG that it is amending its protocols to
address the vulnerabilities identified in our
report. Also in response to recommendations in
the report, the Laboratory agreed to improve
its training program and enhance its communications with staff by disseminating protocolrelated information more consistently.

Audit of Controls Over Accountable
Property at the Baltimore Field Division
On July 7, 2003, a former FBI employee at the
Baltimore Field Division was sentenced to
one year in prison and ordered to pay restitution after pleading guilty to the theft and sale
of FBI photography equipment valued at over
$167,000. The former employee stated that his
thefts were easy due to the lack of checks and
balances in the office’s property control process.
In response to these events, the OIG initiated
an audit to assess the overall effectiveness of
the property controls at the Baltimore Field
Division.

We found weaknesses in the FBI’s definition
of accountable property, which omits certain property from inclusion in the Property
Management Application – the FBI’s primary
system for tracking the location and history of
specific property items. We also found that property excluded from the Property Management
Application is less likely to be located, even if
it is tracked separately by a property custodian,
and credit card purchases can be delivered
directly to the cardholder – thus bypassing
the supply technician who would identify and
record accountable property in the Property
Management Application. The audit report
made five recommendations for improvement,
which the FBI agreed to implement.

Combined DNA Index System
Laboratory Audits
During this reporting period, we audited laboratories that participate in the FBI’s Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS). CODIS includes
a national information repository maintained by
the FBI that permits the storing and searching
of DNA specimen information to facilitate the
exchange of DNA information by law enforcement agencies. Participating federal, state, and
local laboratories submit DNA information to
the FBI. Our laboratory audits were conducted
to determine compliance with the FBI’s Quality
Assurance Standards and National DNA Index
System (NDIS) requirements and to evaluate the accuracy and appropriateness of the
data that laboratories have submitted to the
FBI. Below are two examples of the findings
reported in our audits of laboratories:
◆ 	The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner

Forensic Sciences Laboratory in Wilmington,
Delaware, was not in compliance with all
of the standards governing CODIS activities for the areas we tested. The Laboratory
did not meet NDIS participation requirements because it did not comply with the
NDIS operational procedure to complete
annual reminder forms for each user. The
Laboratory did not comply with the FBI’s
Quality Assurance Standards because it did
not: 1) forward the results of its external

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

laboratory evaluation to the NDIS custodian
within 30 days of receiving the results of the
evaluation, 2) implement corrective action
for all instances of noncompliance found in
its internal evaluation report, 3) perform a
visual inspection and evaluation of all forensic profiles sent to its contractor for analysis,
and 4) include quality control samples within
the convicted offender samples sent to its
contractor for analysis. Finally, although most
of the profiles we reviewed were complete,
accurate, and properly included in the CODIS
databases, we found one forensic profile that
was inaccurately loaded into the databases.
◆ 	The Baltimore City Police Department Crime

Laboratory in Baltimore, Maryland, was
not in compliance with all of the standards
governing CODIS activities for the areas
we tested. We found that the Laboratory’s
management did not: 1) submit their 2003
external laboratory evaluation report to
the NDIS custodian as required by NDIS
participation requirements; 2) ensure that
access to Laboratory areas, evidence samples,
and isolated DNA and case information was
restricted to authorized personnel; and 3) verify the integrity of the data for its outsourced
forensic samples. Additionally, during our
review of 50 forensic DNA profiles, we found
that the Laboratory had uploaded 2 unallowable and 3 inaccurate DNA profiles to NDIS.

Investigations
During this reporting period, the OIG received
402 complaints involving the FBI. The most
common allegations made against FBI employees included job performance failure, waste and
misuse of government property, and improper
release of information. The OIG opened
16 cases and referred 11 allegations to the FBI’s
Inspections Division for investigation.
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG
had 47 open cases of alleged misconduct against
FBI employees. The criminal investigations
cover a wide range of offenses, including the
improper release of law enforcement information and theft. The administrative investigations

include serious allegations of misconduct, such
as allegations against high-level employees. The
following are examples of cases investigated
during this reporting period:
◆ 	A federal inmate alleged that an FBI case

information assistant, with whom he had a
personal relationship prior to his incarceration, committed various acts of misconduct
including: 1) accessing FBI and other computer databases to provide him with information about himself, his aliases, and his
associates, 2) providing him with information
about FBI operations and vehicles, 3) having
knowledge of his illegal drug-dealing activity
and accompanying him when he engaged in
this activity, and 4) receiving approximately
$100,000 from him for her involvement in his
illegal activity. An investigation by the OIG’s
Philadelphia Area Office determined that
the FBI employee had a relationship with the
inmate prior to his incarceration. During an
OIG interview, she admitted that she used
FBI computers to obtain information for the
inmate and provided him with that information. The investigation did not establish
whether she knew of his drug-dealing activity
for which he was later incarcerated but did
determine that she knew of his prior criminal
record. Prosecution was declined and administrative action is pending.

◆ 	An FBI special agent was alleged to have

misused his official position by engaging in a
sexual relationship with female acquaintances
of a cooperating witness, engaging in a sexual
relationship with an underage female who
was awaiting entry into the Witness Security
(WITSEC) Program, brandishing a weapon,
and discussing FBI investigations and sensitive procedures with unauthorized persons.
An investigation by the OIG’s Miami Field
Office revealed no evidence of a sexual relationship with an underage female or that the
special agent had brandished a weapon. The
FBI special agent did admit in a sworn affidavit that he had engaged in sexual relationships with females he befriended during an
undercover investigation and that he had general conversations with witnesses regarding

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

9

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Semiannual Report to Congress

his undercover roles and how the FBI records
conversations without using body wires.
However, he denied compromising any FBI
investigations or sensitive techniques used by
the FBI during undercover investigations. The
FBI special agent resigned from his position
as a result of this investigation.
◆ 	An FBI special agent was accused of accept-

ing money and gifts from an FBI confidential
informant in return for providing protection
from criminal prosecution and obtaining
an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) reentry permit for an associate of the
confidential informant who was involved
in criminal activity. An investigation by the
OIG’s Chicago Field Office did not develop
evidence that the FBI special agent had
accepted money or any other item of value
from the confidential informant for providing protection or for assisting with the
immigration problems of the confidential
informant’s associate. However, the investigation developed evidence that the FBI special
agent failed to comply with FBI policies and
improperly used his official position with the
FBI to influence the INS to grant entry into
the United States for the confidential informant’s associate. The FBI special agent was
censured for misconduct.

◆ 	An FBI special agent alleged that an FBI

supervisory special agent improperly disposed
of drug evidence. In response, the OIG’s
Miami Field Office opened an investigation
and interviewed the special agent as a complainant. During the OIG interview, the complainant recanted his statements and claimed
that he made no allegations against the supervisory special agent. The OIG then opened
a second investigation against the complainant for making false statements. During this
investigation, the OIG discovered that the
questioned drug evidence had been appropriately recovered, stored, and destroyed. The
FBI terminated the special agent as a result
of our investigation.

Ongoing Work
The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center
On September 16, 2003, the President established the Terrorist Screening Center for the
purpose of consolidating terrorist watch lists
and providing constant operational support for
thousands of federal screeners across the country and around the world. The FBI was assigned
the responsibility of administering the Terrorist
Screening Center. The OIG is examining the
operations of the Terrorist Screening Center to
determine whether it has implemented a viable
strategy for accomplishing its mission, has effectively coordinated with participating agencies,
and has appropriately managed terrorist-related
information in its attempt to ensure that a complete, accurate, and current watch list is developed and maintained.

The FBI’s Management of the Trilogy
Project
Upgrading IT to successfully perform the counterterrorism mission is among the FBI’s highest priorities. The Trilogy project is intended
to upgrade the FBI’s hardware and software,
communications network, and five most important investigative applications. We are currently
auditing Trilogy to determine the progress made
toward achieving the project’s cost, schedule,
technical, and performance baselines and the
extent to which Trilogy will meet the FBI’s overall current and longer-term IT requirements.

Implementation of the Attorney
General’s Guidelines for Key
Investigative Programs
The OIG is reviewing the FBI’s implementation of four sets of guidelines issued by
the Attorney General on May 30, 2002: the
Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the
Use of Confidential Informants; the Attorney
General’s Guidelines on FBI Undercover
Operations; the Attorney General’s Guidelines
on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise,
and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations; and

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

the Revised Department of Justice Procedures
for Lawful, Warrantless Monitoring of Verbal
Communications. The objectives of the OIG
review are to determine what steps the FBI has
taken to implement the guidelines, to examine
the effectiveness of those steps, and to assess
the FBI’s compliance with key provisions of the
guidelines.

The FBI’s Hiring of Intelligence Analysts
The OIG is auditing the FBI’s efforts to hire,
train, and retain intelligence analysts. As part
of the audit, we are reviewing: 1) analyst hiring requirements and qualifications, 2) progress
made toward meeting analyst hiring goals and
retention of analysts, 3) progress made toward
establishing a comprehensive training program
and meeting the training goals, and 4) analyst
staffing and utilization to support the FBI’s
mission.

The FBI’s Chinese Counterintelligence
Program
At the request of the FBI Director, the OIG is
reviewing the FBI’s performance in connection
with the handling of Katrina Leung, who provided information to the FBI’s Chinese counterintelligence program. Allegedly, Leung also had
a long-term intimate relationship with her FBI
handler, special agent James J. Smith. The OIG’s
review will examine a variety of performance
and management issues related to the FBI’s
handling of Leung and the FBI’s counterintelligence program.

The FBI’s Handling of the Brandon
Mayfield Matter
The OIG is reviewing the FBI’s conduct in connection with the erroneous identification of a
latent fingerprint found on evidence from the
March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombing as belonging to Brandon Mayfield, an attorney in Portland,
Oregon. As a result of the identification, the FBI
commenced an investigation of Mayfield, resulting in his arrest as a “material witness” and his
detention for approximately two weeks in
May 2004. Mayfield was released when the
Spanish National Police identified the fingerprint and other prints found on the evidence as
belonging to an Algerian national. The OIG will
examine the cause of the erroneous identification
and the FBI’s handling of this case.

The FBI’s Preparations for Integrated
IDENT/IAFIS Workstations
The OIG is reviewing the preparations the
Department and the FBI are making to support the Department of Homeland Security’s
expedited deployment of workstations that integrate the Department of Homeland Security’s
Automated Biometric Identification System and
the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS). These systems
provide automated fingerprint examination
services for the identification of suspects and
for other law enforcement purposes. The OIG
also is reviewing the FBI’s plans to develop and
deploy the next phase of IAFIS, which will be
required to complete the integration project.

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

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Semiannual Report to Congress

The Federal Bureau
of Prisons
The BOP operates a nationwide system of prisons and detention facilities to incarcerate those
imprisoned for federal crimes and detain those
awaiting trial or sentencing in federal court. The
BOP has approximately 34,800 employees and
operates 105 institutions, 6 regional offices,
2 staff training centers, and 28 community
corrections management offices. The BOP is
responsible for the custody and care of approximately 180,000 federal offenders, 153,000 of
whom are confined in BOP-operated correctional institutions and detention centers. The
remainder are confined in facilities operated by
state or local governments or in privately operated facilities.

Reports Issued
Review of the BOP’s Disciplinary System
The OIG previously reviewed the disciplinary
systems of the USMS and the DEA. As the third
major review of a component’s disciplinary system, the OIG assessed the effectiveness of the
BOP’s system for investigating employee misconduct and disciplining employees when misconduct is confirmed. Specifically, we reviewed
whether BOP employees properly reported misconduct; whether investigations were thorough;
and whether disciplinary actions were reasonable, consistent, and timely.
We found that the investigative phase of the
BOP’s disciplinary process was thorough and the
case files we reviewed were well documented.
We also found no significant differences in how
the BOP treated employees of different races,
genders, job series, or grade levels during the disciplinary process. However, we identified several
deficiencies in the BOP’s disciplinary system:

◆ 	The BOP did not require all cases with

sustained allegations to be fully adjudicated;

◆ 	The independence of the investigative and

adjudicative phases could be compromised
because the chief executive officers at each
BOP facility have a role in both phases;

◆ 	The BOP did not ensure that its employees

receive similar penalties for similar infractions BOP-wide;

◆ 	The BOP did not have written timeliness

standards for processing misconduct
allegations;

◆ 	The BOP did not monitor the reasonableness,

consistency, and timeliness of disciplinary
decisions; and

◆ 	BOP employees did not report all employee

misconduct.

We made ten recommendations to help the
BOP address these deficiencies. Among the
recommendations were that the BOP establish
a review process that ensures the investigative
and adjudicative phases function independently
and the BOP develop procedures to ensure that
discipline is imposed consistently across all of its
facilities. The BOP generally concurred with all
but one of our recommendations.

The Process for Selecting Muslim
Religious Services Providers
The OIG completed a review that examined
the BOP’s procedures for recruiting, selecting,
and supervising individuals to provide Islamic
religious services to approximately 9,000 BOP
inmates who seek Islamic religious services.
The OIG initiated this review in response to

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The Federal Bureau of Prisons

concerns from several members of Congress
that the BOP relies solely on two Islamic groups
to endorse its Muslim chaplains, and that these
two groups allegedly are connected to terrorism
and promote an exclusionary and extreme form
of Islam.
The OIG’s review found that while the BOP has
made some improvements in how it selects and
supervises Muslim religious services providers,
a number of deficiencies remain. We found that
the BOP typically does not examine the doctrinal beliefs of applicants for religious services
positions to determine whether the applicants
espouse extremist views that pose a security
threat. In addition, we concluded that the BOP
and the FBI had not adequately exchanged
information regarding the possible connections to terrorism of Muslim organizations that
endorse applicants for BOP religious services
positions. We also found that because of a shortage of Muslim chaplains, inmates often lead
Islamic religious services subject only to intermittent supervision from BOP staff members.
This situation increases the risk that inappropriate messages will be delivered to inmates.
The OIG’s report made 16 recommendations to
help the BOP improve its process for selecting,
screening, and supervising Muslim religious services providers. These recommendations include:
◆ 	More effectively using the expertise of its cur-

rent Muslim chaplains to screen, recruit, and
supervise Muslim services providers;

◆ 	Developing a strategy specifically targeted

toward recruiting additional Muslim chaplains and contractors;

◆ 	Improving and increasing the information

flow between the BOP and the FBI regarding
the radicalization and recruitment of inmates;

◆ 	Requiring that all chaplain, religious contrac-

tor, and certain volunteer applicants be interviewed by at least one individual knowledgeable of the applicant’s religion;

◆ 	Implementing additional security screening

requirements for religious services providers;
and

◆ 	Supervising inmate-led religious services

more closely.

The BOP agreed to implement corrective
action with regard to all but one of the
recommendations.

Investigations
During this reporting period, the OIG received
2,606 complaints involving the BOP. The most
common allegations made against BOP employees included job performance failure, use of
unnecessary force, official misconduct, and
off-duty misconduct. The vast majority of complaints dealt with non-criminal issues that the
OIG referred to the BOP’s Office of Internal
Affairs.
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG
had 236 open cases of alleged misconduct
against BOP employees. The criminal investigations cover a wide range of allegations, including bribery of a public official, sexual abuse of
inmates, and introduction of contraband. The
following are examples of cases investigated
during this reporting period:
◆ 	A BOP correctional officer, two inmates, and

a civilian were arrested, pled guilty, and were
sentenced in the Eastern District of Texas on
charges of bribery and conspiracy to introduce narcotics into a federal prison. An investigation by the OIG’s Houston Area Office
determined that the BOP correctional officer
conspired with the inmates and the civilian to
introduce four pounds of marijuana into the
Federal Correctional Complex in Beaumont,
Texas, in exchange for $3,000. The correctional officer was sentenced to 10 months’
incarceration and 36 months’ supervised
release and ordered to pay a $2,000 fine.

◆ 	A BOP educational teacher assigned to the

Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in
Miami, Florida, was arrested and pled guilty
to bribery of a public official. A joint investigation by the OIG’s Miami Field Office

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

13

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Semiannual Report to Congress

and the FBI found that the teacher received
approximately $66,000 from parents, relatives,
and friends of a federal inmate under her
supervision in return for a promise to provide
benefits for the federal inmate. Some of the
promised benefits included an early release
from prison, food not provided by the prison,
and the use of a cell phone. The teacher was
sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration and
36 months’ supervised release, fined $20,000,
and ordered to perform 400 hours of community service and participate in a drug and
alcohol treatment program.
◆ 	A BOP correctional officer assigned to the

Federal Medical Center-Carswell (FMC)
in Ft. Worth, Texas, was arrested and pled
guilty to an information filed in the Northern
District of Texas charging him with having sex
with inmates. An investigation by the OIG’s
Dallas Field Office determined that the correctional officer engaged in sexual relations
on several occasions with four female inmates
at the FMC. In addition, he smuggled contraband into the FMC. Sentencing is pending.

◆ 	A BOP correctional officer assigned to the

FCI in Petersburg, Virginia, was arrested and
pled guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia
to willfully and knowingly making a materially false and fictitious statement. An investigation by the OIG’s Washington Field Office
developed evidence that the correctional officer was involved in a physical altercation with
an inmate and the inmate suffered injuries
that required surgery. The correctional officer submitted a written memorandum to his
supervisor regarding the altercation, which he
later admitted to the OIG contained materially false information. The correctional officer
resigned from the BOP as a result of this
investigation, and his sentencing is pending.

◆ 	A BOP correctional officer and a federal

inmate assigned to the FCI in Victorville,
California, were arrested and pled guilty in
the Central District of California to charges
of introducing narcotics into the prison and
possessing narcotics in prison, respectively.
An investigation by the OIG’s Los Angeles

Field Office determined that the correctional
officer received a package containing one
pound of marijuana from an outside source,
smuggled it into the FCI, and delivered it to
the inmate. Sentencing is pending for both the
correctional officer and the inmate.
◆ 	A BOP correctional officer assigned to

the Atwood Prison Camp of the FMC in
Lexington, Kentucky, was arrested and
entered a plea of no contest to charges of sexual abuse of a ward. An investigation by the
OIG’s Chicago Field Office determined that
the correctional officer had engaged in sexual
relations with a female inmate under his custodial supervision. Sentencing is pending.

Procedural Reform
Recommendation
The OIG prepares a Procedural Reform
Recommendation (PRR) recommending corrective action by a Department component when
an investigation identifies a systemic weakness
in an internal policy, practice, procedure, or
program. The following is an example of a PRR
sent to the BOP during this reporting period.
An OIG PRR regarding the use of postage
stamps as currency by BOP inmates was developed from information obtained in the course
of several OIG investigations. The investigations
disclosed that inmates frequently use postage
stamps to purchase soft contraband and drugs,
pay debts, engage in illegal gambling activities,
and operate black market commissaries.
The PRR recommends that the BOP replace the
process for issuing postage stamps to inmates
with a metered postage system. This action
would prevent inmates from using postage
stamps as currency for illegal activities but still
allow them to mail letters and legal correspondence. The BOP currently is considering the
OIG’s PRR.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The U.S. Marshals Service

The U.S. Marshals
Service
The USMS protects more than 2,000 federal
judges and other members of the federal judiciary, transports federal prisoners, protects
endangered federal witnesses, manages assets
seized from criminal enterprises, and pursues
and arrests federal fugitives. The Director and
Deputy Director of the USMS work with
94 U.S. Marshals, each appointed by the
President or the Attorney General, to direct
the work of approximately 4,400 employees at
more than 350 locations throughout the
50 states, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Reports Issued
Audit of the USMS’s Prisoner Tracking
System
The USMS uses a Prisoner Tracking System
(PTS) to maintain tracking information for federal prisoners in USMS custody and as an informational and scheduling tool to assist USMS
personnel in locating prisoners for court appearances. The PTS contains information specific to
each individual prisoner, including the prisoner’s
personal data, property, medical information,
criminal information, and location.
The objectives of this OIG audit were to assess
the security of the PTS system. We examined
the effectiveness of general controls for the
PTS at the entity-wide level, reviewed the PTS’s
application controls, and performed data integrity testing. Our review identified weaknesses in
these areas. We considered our findings in these
areas to be major weaknesses and concluded
that the state of the PTS’s existing controls
posed a high risk to the protection of its data
from unauthorized use, loss, or modification.

We concluded that these weaknesses occurred
because the USMS did not fully comply with
current Department security policies and procedures, National Institute of Standards and
Technology standards, Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) guidelines, or its own procedures for prisoner processing and cellblock
operations. If not corrected, these security vulnerabilities could impair the USMS’s ability to
fully ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability of data within the PTS.
This report contains 20 recommendations for
improving select general controls, application
controls, and the integrity of data for the PTS.
The USMS concurred with many of the recommendations and agreed to implement corrective
action.

Investigations
During this reporting period, the OIG received
213 complaints involving the USMS. The
most common allegations made against
USMS employees included job performance
failure, use of unnecessary force, official
misconduct, and security failure. The OIG
opened 12 investigations and referred 6 other
allegations to the USMS Office of Internal
Affairs for investigation.
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG
had 21 open cases of alleged misconduct against
USMS employees. The following is an example
of a case involving the USMS that the OIG
investigated:
◆ 	In our March 2004 Semiannual Report to

Congress, we detailed a case in which a

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

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Semiannual Report to Congress

deputy U.S. marshal (DUSM) for the
Northern District of Texas was arrested on
charges of tax evasion and conspiracy to
transport, harbor, and encourage an alien to
enter the United States. A joint investigation by the OIG’s Dallas Field Office, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the
Department of Homeland Security’s OIG
revealed that the DUSM, with the assistance
of two Border Patrol agents, “paroled” aliens
into the United States under the guise of “law
enforcement confidential informants.” After
obtaining parole documents, the DUSM had
the aliens provide manual labor for him and
his friends. The investigation determined that
the DUSM took fraudulent tax deductions
in conjunction with these alleged business
expenses and admitted to obtaining prohibited firearms and stealing government
property worth several thousand dollars.
During this reporting period, the DUSM was
sentenced to two years’ incarceration and
three years’ supervised release. In addition,
the DUSM was fined $100,000 and ordered to
pay $22,406 in restitution to the IRS.

Procedural Reform
Recommendation
The following is an example of a PRR sent to
the USMS during this reporting period:
The OIG’s PRR concerned the USMS’s policy
on the transport of male and female inmates
in the same vehicle. The PRR was based on
an investigation conducted by the OIG’s
New York Field Office into allegations that a
male inmate sexually assaulted a female inmate
on a USMS bus during transport from the
USMS for the Southern District of New York
to the Metropolitan Detention Center in
Brooklyn, New York. Our investigation
sustained the abusive sexual contact allegation.

Our investigation also disclosed numerous
inadequacies involving record keeping, equipment, and regulations concerning prisoner transport within the USMS’s Southern District of
New York. The USMS’s policy states that male
and female inmates should not be transported
together unless the vehicle is equipped with a
separate compartment. However, this policy
allows discretion on the part of supervisors to
authorize the transport on vehicles that lack
such separation equipment.
We believe that the lack of appropriately
equipped vehicles – only 5 of the 21 USMS
transport buses operating nationwide have separate compartments and none of the transport
vans are so equipped – as well as the USMS’s
discretionary policy with respect to transport of
male and female inmates in the same vehicle,
contributed to the incident we investigated and
provides the opportunity for similar and more
egregious incidents to occur. Therefore, our
PRR recommended that the USMS revise its
policy to mandate that male and female or juvenile inmates are transported in separate vehicles
or, if together, in vehicles properly equipped
for separation. We also recommended that
sufficient vehicles should be equipped or
provided to comply with the revised policy.

Ongoing Work
Administration of the
Witness Security Program
WITSEC provides for the security, health, and
safety of government witnesses whose lives are
in danger as a result of their testimony against
drug traffickers, terrorists, organized crime
members, and other major criminals. Since the
inception of WITSEC in 1970, the USMS has
protected, relocated, and provided new identities to more than 7,500 witnesses and more than
9,600 family members or other authorized associates. The OIG is reviewing the USMS’s administration of WITSEC.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The U.S. Marshals Service

The USMS’s Fugitive
Apprehension Program

The USMS’s Personal Services
Contract Guards

The OIG is examining the effectiveness of the
USMS’s Fugitive Apprehension Program in
apprehending violent fugitives. This review will
assess the ability of the USMS, particularly of
the five Regional Fugitive Task Forces that it
operates, to carry out its mission by locating and
apprehending the most dangerous fugitives.

The USMS employs individuals on personal
contracts to guard prisoners appearing as a
witness or for a court hearing and to transport
prisoners who are in need of medical treatment.
Individual contract guards are often off-duty or
former law enforcement officers (LEOs). The
OIG is reviewing the USMS’s risk assessments
and internal controls associated with the procurement and reimbursement of personal contract guards. We also are determining whether
the performance of individual contract guards is
adequately monitored, contractors are meeting
experience and fitness-for-duty requirements,
adequate training is provided to contract personnel, and contract guards are performing only
authorized duties.

Background Investigations of USMS
Employees and Contractors
The OIG is reviewing background investigations
for USMS employees and contractors. We
are also assessing whether the background
investigations and adjudications managed by
the USMS’s Judicial Security Division for
contract court security officers and by the
Department’s Security and Emergency Planning
Staff for political appointees, attorneys, and
other designated positions are generally timely
and thorough.

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

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Semiannual Report to Congress

The Office of Justice
Programs
The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) manages
the Department’s multi-faceted grant program.
Since its inception in 1984, OJP has awarded
more than 80,000 grants totaling more than
$39 billion for a wide variety of programs to
prevent and control crime. OJP has 686 employees and is led by the Assistant Attorney General
(AAG) for Justice Programs, with a senior management team comprised of the Deputy AAG
and five bureau heads. The five bureaus are:
1) the Bureau of Justice Assistance; 2) the Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP); 3) the Bureau of Justice Statistics;
4) the National Institute of Justice; and 5) the
Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). The two
program offices include the Office of the Police
Corps and Law Enforcement Education and the
Community Capacity Development Office.

Reports Issued
Audit of OJP’s Technical Assistance
and Training Program
The technical assistance and training program
is the product of many OJP bureaus and program offices and includes a wide range of funding sources, types of services, and products. For
example, OJJDP provides training, technical
assistance, and information on trends, new
approaches, and innovative techniques to juvenile courts and court personnel; law enforcement; detention and corrections; youth service
providers; and child advocacy organizations.
Grantees include universities, non-profit organizations, states, and municipalities.
We audited 21 of the 158 technical assistance
and training grants awarded by OJP between
FYs 1995 and 2002. These 21 grants totaled

$77.7 million, or 25 percent of the $312.5 million in total technical assistance and training
grant dollars awarded. Our objectives were to
determine if OJP implemented internal control
measures to ensure accurate financial reporting
by grantees and to assess OJP’s monitoring and
evaluation of grant objectives.
Our audits disclosed several weaknesses in
OJP’s monitoring efforts. We found that grantees were reimbursed for unallowable and
unsupported costs, financial status reports and
progress reports were submitted untimely, and
closeout requirements were not observed. Our
audits also determined that key elements for
monitoring grant activity in OJP’s automated
system for managing grants were missing. OJP’s
Grants Management System (GMS) was initiated in December 1998 as a pilot program to
streamline the solicitation, application, and
awarding of grants. When functioning at full
capacity, GMS should provide “one-stop,” full
life-cycle support for all OJP grant management
efforts. While OJP has mandated that its various components implement GMS, we found that
certain GMS modules were not fully operational
during the audit period.
Another contributing factor to the weaknesses we found during this audit was the lack
of a structured method for tracking program
monitoring activities. In addition, OJP was
not collecting sufficient data to measure the
performance of technical assistance and training grants. Further, OJP does not play a role in
developing grantees’ performance or outcome
measures for program evaluation purposes, nor
does it have specific requirements that grantees must adhere to in developing performance
measures. As a result, for the 21 grants that we
audited, it was not possible to assess the impact

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

The Office of Justice Programs

of the technical assistance and training program
and determine whether the grants were achieving their intended purposes.
In total, we identified approximately $5.2 million in questioned costs and funds that could be
put to better use. Our report contained three
recommendations to improve OJP’s technical
assistance and training program. OJP agreed
with the recommendations to: 1) ensure that
grant managers receive annual training on
OJP’s requirements governing the submission
of timely and accurate reports, allowable cost,
grant monitoring, and grant closeout procedures; 2) ensure that its automated system for
managing grants is brought up to full functioning capacity as soon as possible and grant managers are trained to utilize this system; and
3) develop performance or outcome measures
to assess the effectiveness of technical assistance
and training grants.

that the grantee violated the non-supplanting requirement, charged unallowable and
unsupported costs to grant funds, had not
implemented the community policing activities outlined in the grant applications, had no
retention plans, and will not retain the
17 grant funded officers for the required
period. As a result, we identified in excess of
$1.1 million in questioned costs and recommended that $597,465 be put to better use.
◆ 	The University of Central Florida in Orlando

was awarded more than $7.8 million in OJP
grant funds to continue the operations of the
National Center for Forensic Science project established at the University. We determined that the grantee incorrectly reported
total outlays and indirect cost amounts and
charged unallowable and unsupported costs
to grant funds. As a result, we identified
$909,534 in questioned costs.

◆ 	The Midwest Regional Children’s Advocacy

Grant Audits
We continue to audit grants awarded by OJP
and the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS). Examples of findings from
these audits during this reporting period include
the following:
◆ 	The City of Waterbury, Connecticut, was

awarded more than $4.4 million in COPS
grants to hire 49 additional police officers and
redeploy 31 police officers from administrative duties to community policing. We determined that the grantee charged unallowable
costs to the grants, could not fully account for
grant expenditures, began its procurement
process before the award start date, and could
not demonstrate the required level of redeployment of officer positions into community
policing for the required periods. As a result,
we identified in excess of $2.5 million in questioned costs.

◆ 	The Blackfeet Tribal Business Council in

Montana was awarded more than $2.6 million
in COPS grants to hire 17 additional fulltime police officers and provide equipment
and training for the officers. We determined

Center Project in St. Paul, Minnesota, was
awarded more than $1.2 million in grant
funds by OJJDP. The grants were awarded
to provide technical assistance and training
to improve services available in the Midwest
Region to victims of child physical and sexual
abuse and neglect. We determined that the
grantee transferred funds between budget
cost categories in excess of authorized levels,
had not credited a portion of the program
income to the grant – resulting in excessive
draw downs and overstated expenses, and did
not document the time spent on grant activities by grant funded employees. As a result,
we identified $351,484 in questioned costs.

Investigations
The following is an example of a case involving COPS that the OIG investigated during this
reporting period:
◆ 	A former COPS grant administrator was

indicted in the Southern District of Ohio on
theft charges. An investigation by the OIG’s

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Fraud Detection Office determined that
the grant administrator stole money from
a COPS grant awarded to the Village of
Smithfield, Ohio. The grant was supposed to
be used to hire one full-time and two parttime police officers in the village. Instead, the
grant administrator used some of the grant
money to pay for trips to the racetrack, clothing, and monthly fees at a resort. Judicial proceedings continue.

Ongoing Work
No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog
Reduction Grant Program
Through the National Institute of Justice, OJP
provides funding to states for the identification,
collection, and analysis of DNA samples from
evidence collected in cases where no suspect
has been developed or in which the original
suspect has been eliminated. Our audit is focusing on funding provided in the first year of the
program (FY 2001) to evaluate the: 1) administration and oversight of the program by OJP,
2) oversight of contract laboratories by states
receiving grants, 3) allowability of costs charged
to grants, and 4) achievement of program goals.

Grants to Native American and
Alaskan Native Tribal Governments
From FYs 2000 to 2003, OJP awarded over
$200 million in tribal specific grant programs.
From FYs 1999 to 2003, COPS awarded more
than $165 million in tribal specific grant programs. The OIG is auditing the overall strategy
of COPS and OJP for awarding grants to tribal
governments; COPS’ and OJP’s monitoring of
tribal grantees; and whether costs charged by
grantees are allowable and in accordance with
applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and
terms and conditions of the grants.

OVC’s Antiterrorism and Emergency
Assistance Program
OVC was created in 1984 to assist crime victims
with recovery from physical, emotional, and
psychological injury. The OIG is reviewing OVC
to determine whether: 1) timely assistance was
provided to jurisdictions in order to address victim needs in the aftermath of an act of terrorism
or mass violence, 2) the eligibility of applicants
was properly ascertained, and 3) the purposes
for funding grants were allowable.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Other Department Components

Other Department
Components
The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and
Explosives
The ATF enforces federal laws on firearms,
explosives, and arson and administers the
U.S. Criminal Code provisions on alcohol and
tobacco smuggling and diversion. It seeks to
combat terrorism, regulate the firearms and
explosives industries, and provide training
to federal, state, local, and international law
enforcement partners. Its nearly 4,700 special
agents, inspectors, regulatory specialists, forensic auditors, laboratory technicians, and other
personnel work primarily in 23 field divisions
across the 50 states and in offices in Guam,
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Mexico,
Canada, Colombia, and France.

Reports Issued
Inspection of Federally Licensed
Firearms Dealers
This report was the OIG’s first major review of
the ATF, which transferred to the Department
in January 2003 from the Department of the
Treasury. During the review, the OIG examined
the ATF’s program for inspecting the more than
104,000 Federal Firearms Licensees (FFL). The

OIG focused on how the ATF selects firearms
dealers for inspection, the frequency and quality
of the ATF’s inspections, and the enforcement
actions taken by the ATF against dealers who
violate federal firearms laws.
The OIG’s review found that the ATF’s inspection program is not fully effective in ensuring
that FFLs comply with federal firearms laws
because inspections are infrequent and of inconsistent quality. In addition, follow-up inspections
and adverse actions taken against FFLs by the
ATF have been sporadic. We found that the
ATF does not conduct in-person inspections on
all applicants before licensing them to sell firearms and that ATF compliance inspections of
active firearms dealers are infrequent and vary
in quality. Even when the ATF found numerous
or serious violations, it did not uniformly take
adverse actions, refer FFLs for investigation, or
conduct timely follow-up inspections. The OIG’s
review also found wide variations in the ATF
inspection program’s productivity and its implementation among the ATF’s 23 field divisions.
At its current rate, the ATF would take more
than 22 years to conduct compliance inspections
on all FFLs.
The OIG made nine recommendations to help
improve the ATF’s inspection program, including developing a standard inspection process,
revising staffing requirements, improving the
comprehensiveness of crime gun tracing by law
enforcement agencies, and creating a tracking
system to monitor the progress and timeliness
of FFL denials and revocations. The review also
noted that the ATF had taken significant steps
to improve its inspection program since the
OIG began its review. The ATF fully concurred

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

21

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Semiannual Report to Congress

with seven of the recommendations, conditionally concurred with one, and did not concur with
one recommendation.

Enforcement of Brady Act Violations
The OIG examined how the ATF responds to
violations of the Brady Act by firearms purchasers. The Gun Control Act of 1968 established
nine categories of persons prohibited from possessing firearms (e.g., illegal aliens or individuals
with felony convictions). In addition, the
Brady Act established the 3-day waiting period
during which the FBI checks the prospective
firearms purchaser’s background through its
National Instant Criminal Background Check
System (NICS). If the background check takes
longer than three days, the firearms dealer is
permitted to transfer the firearm to the purchaser. If prohibiting factors are later identified
in the purchaser’s background, the ATF must
retrieve the weapon or ensure that it is turned
over to someone permitted under federal law to
possess the firearm.
The OIG found that although the ATF eventually was able to retrieve firearms transferred
to these prohibited persons in almost all cases,
the retrievals were not always timely. Of the
188 cases in the OIG’s sample, the ATF resolved
110 (59 percent) within one month. However,
in 28 cases, the ATF took from 4 months to
more than 1 year to retrieve the firearms. In
addition, the OIG found that the ATF’s Brady
Operations Branch does not have sufficient
resources to pursue Brady Act violations in a
timely manner. Furthermore, the OIG’s review
found that few NICS cases are prosecuted,
partly because the cases lack “jury appeal” and
partly because of the difficulty proving that the
prohibited person was aware of the prohibition
against possessing a firearm and intentionally
lied to the firearms dealer.
The OIG’s report made ten recommendations
to the ATF to help better manage its Brady Act
caseload and improve the effectiveness of its
process for referring cases to ATF field agents
and prosecutors. The ATF concurred with eight

of the recommendations. The OIG also made
one recommendation each to the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) and the
FBI. These recommendations will help ensure
that the ATF’s resources are focused on
Brady Act cases that are likely to be prosecuted
and cases in which the FBI has determined that
prohibited persons have obtained firearms. The
EOUSA and the FBI concurred with the recommendations and are taking corrective actions.

Ongoing Work
Implementation of the Safe Explosives
Act
The OIG is assessing the ATF’s implementation
of the Safe Explosives Act, which is intended
to prevent explosives accidents and reduce the
possibility of the theft of explosives for potential
terrorist use. The review is assessing whether the
ATF has timely and effectively implemented
appropriate management systems, oversight
mechanisms, and review and enforcement procedures designed to meet the objectives of the
legislation.

The National Integrated Ballistic
Information Network Program
The National Integrated Ballistic Information
Network (NIBIN) is a national ballistic imaging system used by forensic firearms examiners
to obtain computerized images of the unique
marks made on bullets and cartridge cases
when firearms are fired. The OIG is reviewing
whether NIBIN has been fully deployed with
the capability to compare ballistic images on a
national level; whether controls are adequate
to ensure that all bullets and cartridge casings
collected at crime scenes and from test-fires
of crime firearms are entered into NIBIN; and
whether controls are adequate to ensure that
ballistic images of bullets and cartridge casings
from newly manufactured, imported, or sold
firearms are not available in, or connected in
any way to, NIBIN.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Other Department Components

The Drug
Enforcement
Administration
The DEA enforces federal laws and regulations
related to the growth, production, or distribution of controlled substances. In addition, the
DEA seeks to reduce the supply of and demand
for illicit drugs, both domestically and internationally. The DEA has approximately 10,500
employees staffing its 21 division offices in the
United States and the Caribbean and 80 offices
in 58 other countries.

Reports Issued
Audit of the Management of Enterprise
Architecture and IT Investments
To properly manage its IT investments, the
DEA is in the process of developing an
Enterprise Architecture and Information
Technology Investment Management (ITIM)
process. Enterprise Architecture establishes an
agencywide roadmap to achieve an agency’s
mission through optimal performance of its core
business processes within an efficient IT environment. ITIM involves implementing processes
such as identifying existing IT systems and projects, identifying the business needs for the projects, tracking and overseeing projects’ costs and
schedules, and selecting new projects rationally.
Because of the importance of the DEA’s management of its 38 IT systems, as listed in its
current Enterprise Architecture, we performed
an audit to determine if the DEA is effectively
managing its Enterprise Architecture and IT
investments. We concluded that the DEA is
effectively pursuing completion of both its
Enterprise Architecture and ITIM. Although
the Enterprise Architecture is still being developed and the DEA has not established a target
date for completing its ITIM processes, the

DEA is using many sound practices from both.
The DEA will be more fully effective in managing its Enterprise Architecture and IT investments once these processes are completed and
have matured.
The OIG made seven recommendations to help
the DEA further improve its IT management:
◆ 	Apply metrics to measure Enterprise

Architecture progress, quality, compliance,
and return on investment;

◆ 	Establish an organizational policy for

Enterprise Architecture development and
maintenance;

◆ 	Ensure that the completed Enterprise

Architecture undergoes configuration
management;

◆ 	Ensure that the target architecture addresses

security;

◆ 	Complete and implement the remaining

Enterprise Architecture stages to ensure that
IT investments are not duplicative, are well
integrated, are cost effective, and support the
DEA’s mission;

◆ 	Train members of the investment boards on

the criteria for evaluating IT investments; and

◆ 	Establish a schedule for completing the

remaining stages of the ITIM process to control and evaluate the DEA’s IT investments.

The DEA accepted these recommendations.

Investigations
During this reporting period, the OIG received
279 complaints involving the DEA. The most
common allegations made against DEA employees included misuse of a credit card, job performance failure, and false statements. The
OIG opened 12 investigations and referred
19 allegations to the DEA’s Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) for investigation.
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG
had 30 open cases of alleged misconduct against
April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

23

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Semiannual Report to Congress

DEA employees. The following are examples of
cases investigated during this reporting period:

Ongoing Work

◆ 	A DEA cashier was arrested and pled guilty

Payments to Informants by the DEA

in the Southern District of Florida to theft of
public money. In an investigation by the OIG’s
Miami Field Office and the DEA, the cashier
confessed to unlawfully taking $37,000 in government money from her office imprest fund.
The cashier was sentenced to five months’
incarceration, five months’ home confinement,
and two years’ supervised release and ordered
to pay $35,682 in restitution.

◆ 	A Westchester County Police Department sec-

retary assigned to the DEA Westchester Task
Force was arrested in the Southern District of
New York and charged with theft of government property. A joint investigation by the
OIG’s New York Field Office and the DEA’s
OPR developed evidence that the secretary
stole money from a DEA evidence room
and hid the money in her residence. To date,
over $100,000 has been recovered. The DEA
has revoked her security clearance and the
Westchester County Police Department has
suspended her. Judicial proceedings continue.

◆ 	The OIG’s Washington Field Office opened

an investigation into an allegation from a
U.S. District Court judge that an unidentified individual had forged his signature on a
secondary surveillance order issued pursuant
to FISA. Due to an administrative oversight,
the judge failed to sign one of the documents.
A DEA attorney on temporary assignment to
the Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy
Review signed the document himself rather
than requesting the judge to sign the document. The DEA attorney originally denied
knowledge of the forgery and was required,
by subpoena, to provide handwriting exemplars, fingerprints, and palm prints. After he
signed a proffer agreeing that he would not
be prosecuted for his statements, he executed
a sworn affidavit implicating himself in the
forgery. He subsequently resigned his position
with the DEA.

The OIG is assessing the DEA’s compliance
with regulations and controls over payments to
confidential informants.

The U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices
U.S. Attorneys serve as the federal government’s
principal criminal and civil litigators and
conduct most of the trial work in which the
United States is a party. Under the direction
of the Attorney General, 93 U.S. Attorneys are
stationed throughout the United States,
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam,
and the Northern Mariana Islands. More than
11,600 employees work in those offices and in
the EOUSA.

Investigations
The following is an example of a case involving
the USAOs that the OIG investigated during
this reporting period:
◆ 	A USAO employee for the Northern District

of New York was arrested and pled guilty in
the Western District of New York to an information charging her with embezzlement. An
investigation by the OIG’s New York Field
Office developed evidence that the USAO
employee used her Department travel credit
card to make personal purchases in excess of
$5,000 at local businesses and while on personal travel in Florida. Sentencing is pending.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations

Multicomponent Audits,
Reviews, and Investigations
While many of the OIG’s audits, reviews, and
investigations are specific to a particular component of the Department, other work spans more
than one component and, in some instances,
extends outside the Department to contractors
and grant recipients.

Reports Issued
Review of Shooting Incidents
This review evaluated how the ATF, DEA, FBI,
and USMS reported, investigated, and reviewed
shooting incidents involving their special agents
or deputy marshals. The OIG assessed whether
the components adhered to the Department’s
Policy Statement on Reporting and Review of
Shooting Incidents (1995), which was established to ensure objective, thorough, and timely
reviews of shooting incidents involving federal
LEOs. We also assessed the components’ compliance with internal shooting incident policies
and requirements to report specific types of
shooting incidents to the OIG and the Civil
Rights Division (CRD).
The OIG found that all of the components
require a written report containing specific
information within one day of a shooting incident so that senior management can make
investigative decisions. However, on average,
only the ATF and the FBI consistently met the
requirement. Further, the FBI and the DEA are
required to report shooting incidents involving
injury or death to the CRD, and all the components are required to report shooting incidents
to the OIG, but neither the CRD nor the OIG
were informed of all reportable incidents. The
review also found that three of the compo-

nents – the ATF, DEA, and USMS – rely on
local law enforcement to conduct the criminal
investigations of shooting incidents, but the FBI
conducts its own criminal investigations.
In addition, the OIG’s review found that each
component’s Review Board prepares a memorandum for every shooting incident reviewed,
but only those prepared by the FBI and USMS
boards consistently included analysis and
recommendations specific to the incident being
reviewed. Further, each component has different
Review Board membership requirements, ranging from only senior-level managers to LEOs
from other components to nonsupervisory
personnel.
Another distinction between components was
their shooting incident review processes. We
found that the components’ Review Boards
applied the standard for the reasonable use of
deadly force differently. The ATF, DEA, and
FBI focused on the moment that LEOs discharged their firearms. In contrast, the USMS
took into account the circumstances leading up
to the shooting incident. These different applications of the standard for the reasonable use of
deadly force can lead to different conclusions
about similar shooting incidents. Finally, the
components did not systematically share the
lessons learned from shooting incident reports,
and the Department did not aggregate shooting
incident data to identify improvements to law
enforcement operations.
To address the OIG’s findings, we recommended
the Department establish a working group to
consider uniform Department standards for
shooting incident reviews. We also made recommendations specific to each components’ review
process. The Department and each component
April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

25

26

Semiannual Report to Congress

concurred with the recommendations in our
report and have agreed to take the necessary
corrective action.

Department’s Use of Polygraph
Examinations
The OIG surveyed Department components to
identify those that use polygraph examinations.
The survey was designed to identify all components that use or administer polygraph examinations and determine how polygraph examinations are used throughout the Department. This
information was obtained through responses to
a questionnaire that was sent to 43 Department
components asking them whether they administered polygraph examinations or used examinations administered by other components, the
purposes for polygraph examinations, whether
they had written policies and procedures for
governing the use of polygraphs, and to provide
an estimate of the cost of each polygraph.
Of the 43 components responding to the questionnaire, 12 reported that they used polygraph
examinations. Five of the 12 said they conducted
examinations not only for their own use, but
for the use of the other 7 components as well.
The survey also revealed that Department components conducted a total of 27,426 polygraph
examinations from FYs 2001 through 2003.
During that period, the FBI conducted the most
polygraph examinations – 79 percent (21,616 of
27,426) of all the examinations conducted in
the Department. FBI officials stated that they
expect the number of polygraph examinations
to grow by about 25 percent annually, from
8,079 in FY 2003 to about 10,000 in FY 2004.
Department components reported that they used
polygraph examinations as an aid in criminal
investigations, employment screening, administrative investigations, witness security, foreign
special investigative and vetted units overseas,
counterintelligence, personnel security, sex
offender assessments, and personnel integrity
(internal). The survey revealed several issues that
we believe warrant additional review. As a result,
we are initiating an extensive evaluation.

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Complaints
Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act directs the
OIG to receive and review complaints of civil
rights and civil liberties abuses by Department
employees, to publicize how people can contact
the OIG to file a complaint, and to submit a
semiannual report to Congress discussing our
implementation of these responsibilities. In
September 2004, the OIG issued its fifth report
summarizing our Section 1001 activities.
The report, covering the period from December
16, 2003, through June 21, 2004, described the
status of the OIG’s and Department’s investigations of alleged civil rights and civil liberties
abuses by Department employees. In addition,
the report highlighted several OIG reviews
undertaken in furtherance of our Section 1001
responsibilities. During the 6-month period covered by the report, the OIG received more than
1,600 complaints alleging civil rights and civil
liberties abuses. Only 208 of these complaints
were against Department employees. Many of
the 208 complaints did not raise issues covered
by the OIG’s duties under Section 1001.
After analyzing the 208 complaints, the OIG
identified 13 matters that we believed warranted
an investigation or a closer review. These matters included allegations of racial profiling by
FBI agents, denial of access to counsel, verbal
abuse of inmates, and placement of an inmate
in solitary confinement without cause. The OIG
is investigating several of those complaints
and has referred the remainder to the internal
affairs offices of the affected component.

Superfund Audit for FYs 2002 and 2003
The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (known
as Superfund) provides for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for
hazardous substances released into the environment and for uncontrolled and abandoned
hazardous waste sites. The Department conducts and controls all litigation arising under
Superfund and is reimbursed through

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations

interagency agreements with the Environmental
Protection Agency.
Our audit, conducted at the request of the
Department, compared reported costs on the
contractor-developed accounting schedules
and summaries for FYs 2002 and 2003 to those
recorded on the Department’s accounting
records. Based on the results of the audit, in
our judgment the Environment and Natural
Resources Division provided an equitable
distribution of total labor costs, other direct
costs, and indirect costs to Superfund cases
during FYs 2002 and 2003.

The Department’s Financial Statement
Audits
The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the
Government Management Reform Act of 1994
require annual financial statement audits of the
Department. The OIG oversees audits by independent public accountants and issues the reports
based on the work performed by the accountants.
During this reporting period, we issued
11 FY 2003 Department component financial
statement audit reports for the following:
◆ 	Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset

Deposit Fund

◆ 	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives

◆ 	Drug Enforcement Administration
◆ 	Federal Bureau of Investigation
◆ 	Federal Bureau of Prisons
◆ 	Federal Prison Industries, Inc.
◆ 	Immigration and Naturalization Service
◆ 	Offices, Boards and Divisions
◆ 	Office of Justice Programs
◆ 	U.S. Marshals Service
◆ 	Working Capital Fund

Each of these audits was in support of the FY
2003 consolidated Department audit, which was
issued in the prior semiannual reporting period.
For the third consecutive year, the Department
received an unqualified opinion on its consolidated financial statements. Additionally, the
number of material weaknesses reported at the
consolidated level declined from two to one.
The Department’s unqualified opinion also
included unqualified opinions on all 11 of the
reporting components’ financial statements that
comprise the consolidated report. Importantly,
some components were able to reduce their
material weaknesses and reportable conditions. Others had new issues identified and,
thus, overall the number of material weaknesses
and reportable conditions at the components
remained constant at nine material weaknesses
and ten reportable conditions.
While improvements in internal controls have
been made, a long-standing material weakness
remains in financial controls at the consolidated
level that was considered even more serious this
year than in prior years. Eight out of the 11 components had reportable conditions or material
weaknesses in financial accounting and reporting
that contributed to this consolidated level material weakness. These issues were only overcome
in FY 2003, as in past years, by significant yearend manual efforts. As we have pointed out in
previous reports, the Department lacks sufficient
automated systems to readily support ongoing
accounting operations. Manual efforts compromise the ability of the Department to prepare
timely financial statements in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, require
considerable monetary and human resources, and
represent an inefficient use of these resources.
These manual processes represent a significant
risk to the Department and certain components
for successful audits in FY 2004, when the OMB
will require an accelerated reporting date of
November 15 – 21⁄2 months earlier than required
in FY 2003.
The Department also had one consolidated level
reportable condition on the financial systems’
general and application controls and the general

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

27

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Semiannual Report to Congress

controls at the Department’s data centers. Because
this long-standing issue had previously been a
material weakness for the Department, improvements were made in FY 2003.
In the Report on Compliance with Laws
and Regulations, the auditors identified six
Department components that were not compliant with the Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996, which specifically

addresses the adequacy of federal financial management systems. Additionally, the audits identified five components that were not compliant
with OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation,
Submission, and Execution of the Budget.
The following table compares FYs 2003 and
2002 audit results for the Department consolidated audit as well as for the 11 individual component audits.

Comparison of FY 2003 and FY 2002 Audit Results
Auditors’ Opinion On
Financial Statements

Number of
Material
Weaknesses

Number of
Reportable
Conditions

2003

2002

2003

2002

2003

2002

Consolidated Department
of Justice

Unqualified

Unqualified

1

2

1

0

Assets Forfeiture Fund and
Seized Asset Deposit Fund

Unqualified

Unqualified

1

0

0

1

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives 1

Unqualified

N/A

0

N/A

1

N/A

Drug Enforcement
Administration

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

0

2

2

Federal Bureau
of Investigation

Unqualified

Unqualified

2

3

0

0

Federal Bureau of Prisons

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

0

2

2

Federal Prison Industries, Inc.

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

1

1

1

Immigration and
Naturalization Service 1

Unqualified

Unqualified

3

3

1

0

Offices, Boards and Divisions

Unqualified

Unqualified

1

1

1

1

Office of Justice Programs

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

0

1

1

U.S. Marshals Service

Unqualified

Unqualified

1

0

1

2

Working Capital Fund

Unqualified

Unqualified

1

1

0

0

Component Totals

9

9

10

10

Reporting Entity

Note: For definitions of terms used in this table, please see the glossary at the end of this report.
1

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, the INS transferred to the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. Additionally, the
ATF transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department on January 24, 2003.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations

Ongoing Work
The Department’s Counterterrorism
Task Forces
The OIG is evaluating the Department’s Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, National Joint Terrorism
Task Force, Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils,
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, and the
National Security Coordination Council to:
1) determine if they are achieving their purposes;
2) evaluate gaps, duplication, and overlap in terrorism coverage; and 3) identify how the performance of each task force and council is measured.

Arson and Explosives Intelligence
The two principal federal agencies responsible for compiling data related to arson and
explosives incidents in the United States are
the ATF and the FBI. To collect such data, the
ATF created the Arson and Explosives National
Repository (Repository), and the FBI created
the Bomb Data Center. Both the Repository
and the Bomb Data Center maintain databases
that collect and disseminate information for
statistical analysis and research, investigative
leads, and intelligence. Our audit objective is
to examine overlap between the systems and
evaluate whether the Department has efficiently
and effectively collected and made available
to the federal, state, and local law enforcement
community information involving arson and the
criminal misuse of explosives.

Audit of the Department’s Information
Security Program Pursuant to FISMA
The Federal Information Security Management
Act (FISMA), which replaced the Government
Information Security Reform Act, directed OIGs
to perform an annual independent evaluation
of their departments’ information security programs and practices and required the results to
be submitted to the OMB.

For FY 2004, we selected for review the
Department’s information security program
and practices performance measurement tools.
According to the Department, the performance
measurement tools were revised to correlate
directly with the Department’s information security orders and standards to determine the effectiveness of the Department’s information security policies, procedures, and practices. We also
are reviewing the Department’s reorganization
of its information security staff that is assigned
to perform oversight of the Department components’ adherence to FISMA requirements.
To examine the Department’s information
security program, we are reviewing the
security programs of three major Department
components – the USMS, FBI, and DEA.
From each of these components, we also
selected a mission-critical system to review.
We will issue one overall consolidated
Department report, three reports for each
component reviewed, and three individual
reports for each of the systems reviewed.

Office of Federal Detention Trustee
Review
Historically, the confinement of persons in
federal custody awaiting trial or immigration proceedings was the responsibility of the
USMS and the former INS. In September 2001,
Congress established the Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee (OFDT) in the Department
to oversee and coordinate the Department’s
detention activities. The objectives of this OIG
audit are to: 1) review the funding and the
accomplishments of the OFDT since its inception, 2) determine how the OFDT coordinates
and oversees detention within the Department,
and 3) examine the OFDT’s plans and goals for
managing detention needs.

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

29

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Semiannual Report to Congress

The Joint Automated Booking System
The Department’s Joint Automated Booking
System (JABS) is designed to automate information on persons booked for criminal offenses by
federal authorities so information can be shared
electronically by law enforcement agencies to
improve criminal identification. The system goals
of JABS are to streamline the booking process
through automation and eliminate duplication,
allow updates to prisoner data, standardize
data, and improve the process to identify repeat
offenders and persons with outstanding charges.
This OIG audit is examining whether the use of
JABS is meeting system goals and objectives and
the extent to which JABS has been implemented
throughout the Department.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Top Management Challenges

Top Management
Challenges
The OIG has created a list of top management challenges in the Department annually
since 1998, initially in response to congressional requests but in recent years as part of
the Department’s annual Performance and
Accountability Report.
The OIG’s list of top challenges for this year,
issued in October 2004, is below. The challenges
are not presented in order of priority – we
believe that all are critical management issues
facing the Department. However, it is clear that
the top challenge facing the Department is its
ongoing response to the threat of terrorism.
Several other top challenges are closely related
to and impact directly on the Department’s
counterterrorism efforts.
Eight of the challenges from last year’s list
remain and are long-standing, difficult challenges that will not be solved quickly or easily. However, we note that the Department is
making progress on many of these complex
issues. Two challenges from last year’s list have
been replaced by two other challenges. We
removed “Performance Based Management”
and “Protecting the Security of Department
Information and Infrastructure” this year and
added two new challenges – “Detention and
Incarceration” and “Forensic Laboratories.”

Top Management Challenges in the
Department of Justice – 2004
1.
2.

Counterterrorism
Sharing of Intelligence and Law
Enforcement Information
3. Information Technology Systems
Planning and Implementation
4. Computer Systems Security
5. Financial Management and Systems
6. Grant Management
7. Detention and Incarceration
8. Human Capital
9. Forensic Laboratories
10. Reducing the Supply of and Demand
for Illegal Drugs
Detailed information about these management
challenges can be found at www.usdoj.gov/
oig/challenges.htm.

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

31

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Congressional Testimony
During this reporting period, a director in the
OIG’s Evaluation and Inspections Division
testified before the House Committee on
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations at an August 2, 2004, field hearing that
examined the safeguarding of stored explosives.

The director discussed the results of a recently
completed review of the ATF’s Federal Firearms
Licensees inspection program as well as the
scope of a separate, ongoing OIG review that is
examining the ATF’s implementation of the Safe
Explosives Act.

Legislation and Regulations
The IG Act directs the OIG to review proposed legislation and regulations relating to the programs and operations of the
Department. Although the Department’s Office
of Legislative Affairs reviews all proposed
or enacted legislation that could affect the
Department’s activities, the OIG independently
reviews proposed legislation that affects it and
legislation that relates to waste, fraud, or abuse
in the Department’s programs or operations.

During this reporting period, the OIG reviewed
a variety of legislation, including a bill to reauthorize the Department that included a provision that would establish an Office of Audit,
Assessment, and Management within OJP. In
addition, the OIG reviewed legislation that,
among other things, would permit off-duty
and retired federal law enforcement agents to
carry weapons and a bill under which the OIG
would review compliance by states that receive
Department grants to improve their capital representation and prosecution programs.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Statistical Information

Statistical Information
Audit Statistics
Audit Summary
During this reporting period, the Audit Division
issued 99 audit reports containing more than
$21 million in questioned costs and more than
$1.1 million in funds to be put to better use and

made 424 recommendations for management
improvement. Specifically, the Audit Division
issued 21 internal reports of programs funded
at more than $78 million; 40 external reports of
contracts, grants, and other agreements funded
at more than $108 million; and 38 Single Audit
Act audits. In addition, the Audit Division
issued 9 Notifications of Irregularities,
1 Management Improvement Memorandum,
and 11 Management Letter Reports.

Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use
Number of
Audit Reports

Funds
Recommended
to Be Put to
Better Use

No management decision made
by beginning of period

1

$3,331,106

Issued during period

4

$1,196,595

Needing management
decision during period

5

$4,527,701

3

$599,130

0

$0

2

$3,928,571

Audit Reports

Management decisions made
during period:
◆ Amounts management
agreed to put to better use1
◆ Amounts management
disagreed to put to better use
No management decision at end of period
1

Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was

taken.

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

33

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Audits With Questioned Costs
Audit Reports

Total Questioned
Costs (including
unsupported
costs)

Number of
Audit Reports

Unsupported
Costs

No management decision made
by beginning of period

20

$8,997,834

$2,377,918

Issued during period

37

$21,873,820

$5,435,994

Needing management
decision during period

57

$30,871,654

$7,813,912

Management decisions made
during period:
◆ Amount of disallowed costs1
◆ Amount of costs not disallowed

472
0

$14,304,315
$0

$5,701,789
$0

No management decision at
end of period

13

$16,567,339

$2,112,123

Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was
taken.
2 Three audit reports were not resolved during this reporting period because management has agreed with some, but not all, of the questioned
costs in the audits.
1

Audits Involving Recommendations for
Management Improvements
Audit Reports

Number of
Audit Reports

Total Number of
Management
Improvements
Recommended

No management decision made
by beginning of period

31

85

Issued during period

85

339

Needing management
decision during period

116

424

Management decisions made
during period:
◆ Number management
agreed to implement1
◆ Number management disagreed with

1052
0

372
0

15

52

No management decision at end of period

Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was
taken.
2 Includes four audit reports that were not resolved during this reporting period because management has agreed to implement a number of, but
not all, recommended management improvements in these audits.
1

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Statistical Information

Audit Follow-Up
OMB Circular A-50
OMB Circular A-50, Audit Follow-Up, requires
audit reports to be resolved within six months
of the audit report issuance date. The Audit
Division monitors the status of open audit
reports to track the audit resolution and closure
process. As of September 30, 2004, the OIG had
closed 128 audit reports and was monitoring the
resolution process of 424 open audit reports.

Evaluation and
Inspections Statistics
The chart below summarizes E&I’s accomplishments for the 6-month reporting period ending
September 30, 2004.
E&I Workload
Accomplishments

Number of
Reviews

Reviews active at beginning of period

7

Unresolved Audits

Reviews initiated

7

Final reports issued

5

Audits Over Six Months
Old Without Management
Decisions

Reviews active at end of reporting period

9

As of September 30, 2004, the following
audits had no management decision or were
in disagreement:

DOJ Order 2900.10, Follow-up and Resolution
Policy for Inspection Recommendations by the
OIG, requires reports to be resolved within
six months of the report issuance date. As of
September 30, 2004, there are no unresolved
recommendations.

◆ 	COPS Grants to Albuquerque, New Mexico,

Police Department

Unresolved Reviews

◆ 	COPS Grants to AMTRAK Police

Department

◆ 	COPS Grants to Camden, New Jersey, Police

Department

◆ 	COPS Grants to Dona Ana County,

New Mexico, Sheriff’s Department

◆ 	COPS Grants to Kleberg County, Texas,

Constable Precinct 4

◆ 	COPS Grants to Picuris Pueblo, New Mexico,

Police Department

◆ 	COPS Grants to Texas Tech University Police

Department, Lubbock, Texas

◆ 	USMS Intergovernmental Service Agreement

for Detention Facilities with the Government
of Guam

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

35

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Investigations Statistics
The following chart summarizes the workload
and accomplishments of the Investigations
Division during the 6-month period ending
September 30, 2004.
Source of Allegations
Hotline (telephone and mail)
Other sources
Total allegations received

Integrity Awareness Briefings
OIG investigators conducted 59 Integrity
Awareness Briefings for Department employees throughout the country. These briefings are
designed to educate employees about the misuse of a public official’s position for personal
gain and to deter employees from committing
such offenses. The briefings reached approximately 2,300 employees.

691
3,180
3,871

Investigative Caseload
Investigations opened this period
Investigations closed this period
Investigations in progress as of 9/30/04

179
232
422

Prosecutive Actions
Criminal indictments/informations
Arrests
Convictions/Pleas

41
51
59

Administrative Actions
Terminations
Resignations
Disciplinary action

13
36
14

Monetary Results
Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries
Seizures
Civil penalties

$675,296
$108,760
$15,560

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 1

Appendix 1
AUDIT DIVISION REPORTS
April 1, 2004 – September 30, 2004
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDIT
REPORTS
Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset
Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statement
Fiscal Year 2003
BOP Contract with the Parkview Medical
Center for the Acquisition of Medical Services,
FCI, Florence, Colorado
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives Annual Financial Statement
Fiscal Year 2004
Compliance with Standards Governing
Combined DNA Index System Activities at the
Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Division of
Forensic Sciences Laboratory, Decatur, Georgia
Compliance with Standards Governing
Combined DNA Index System Activities at
the Nebraska State Police Crime Laboratory,
Lincoln, Nebraska
Compliance with Standards Governing
Combined DNA Index System Activities at the
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Forensic
Sciences Laboratory, Wilmington, Delaware
Compliance with Standards Governing
Combined DNA Index System Activities at
the San Diego, California Police Department
Forensic Science Section
Compliance with Standards Governing
Combined DNA Index System Activities at the
Baltimore City, Maryland Police Department
Crime Laboratory

Controls Over Accountable Property at the
Baltimore Field Division of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation
COPS Grants Administered by the Blackfeet
Fish and Wildlife Department, Montana
COPS Grants Administered by the City of
Waterbury, Connecticut
COPS Grants Administered by the Columbia
River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission and
Columbia Inter-Tribal Fish Enforcement
COPS Grants Administered by the Nampa,
Idaho Police Department
COPS Grants Awarded to the Blackfeet Tribal
Business Council, Montana
COPS Grants Awarded to the City of Rockville,
Maryland Police Department
COPS Grants Awarded to the Navajo
Department of Resource Enforcement, Window
Rock, Arizona
COPS Grants to the Harwood Heights, Illinois
Police Department
COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grant to
the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants to
the Arkansas State Police, Little Rock, Arkansas
COPS Technology Grant Administered by
the Concurrent Technologies Corporation,
Johnstown, Pennsylvania
Correctional Medical Services’ Compliance
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract
for Inmate Medical Services at FCI, Fort Dix,
New Jersey

Compliance with Standards Governing
Combined DNA Index System Activities at
the Montgomery County, Maryland Police
Department Crime Laboratory
April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

37

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Drug Enforcement Administration Annual
Financial Statement Fiscal Year 2003
Drug Enforcement Administration’s
Management of Enterprise Architecture and
Information Technology Investments
Equitable Sharing Activities of the Marion
County, Indiana Justice Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation Annual
Financial Statement Fiscal Year 2003
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign
Language Program – Translation of
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Foreign Language Material
Federal Bureau of Prisons Annual Financial
Statement Fiscal Year 2003
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Annual Financial
Statement Fiscal Year 2003
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Annual Financial Statement Period Ending
February 28, 2003
Justice Management Division Oversight and
Information Systems Consolidation Report
Pursuant to the Federal Information Security
Management Act for Fiscal Year 2003
No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog Reduction
Program Grant Awarded to the New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services
Office of Justice Programs Annual Financial
Statement Fiscal Year 2003
Office of Justice Programs Technical Assistance
and Training Program
Offices, Boards and Divisions Annual Financial
Statement Fiscal Year 2003
OJP Bureau of Justice Assistance Judicial
Education and Skills Training Grant Awarded to
the National Judicial College, Reno, Nevada
OJP Bureau of Justice Assistance Property
Crimes Task Force Grant Awarded to the
Spokane County, Washington Board of
Commissioners

OJP Community Mapping, Planning and
Analysis for Safety Strategies Grant
Administered by the City of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin
OJP Grant Administered by Big Brothers Big
Sisters of America, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
OJP Justice Research, Evaluation, and
Development Project Cooperative Agreement
Awarded to the University of Central Florida
OJP Midwest Regional Children’s Advocacy
Center Project Grant Awarded to Children’s
Hospital, St. Paul, Minnesota
OJP National Criminal History Improvement
Program Grant Administered by the
Indianapolis, Indiana Police Department
OJP National Institute of Justice Juvenile
Breaking the Cycle Cooperative Agreement
Awarded to Lane County Department of Youth
Services, Eugene, Oregon
OJP No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog
Reduction Program Cooperative Agreement
Awarded to the Texas Department of Public
Safety, Austin, Texas
OJP No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog
Reduction Program Cooperative Agreement
Awarded to the State of Florida, Department of
Law Enforcement, Tallahassee, Florida
OJP Office for Victims of Crime, Crime Victim
Compensation for 9/11 Attack on America
Grant Awarded to the California Victim
Compensation and Government Claims Board,
Sacramento, California, Fiscal Year 2003
OJP Office for Victims of Crime, Crime Victim
Compensation for 9/11 Attack on America
Grant Awarded to the California Victim
Compensation and Government Claims Board,
Sacramento, California, Fiscal Year 2002
OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Comprehensive Community-Wide
Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and
Suppression Program Grant Awarded to the
Riverside, California Police Department

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 1

OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Internet Crimes Against Children
Grant Awarded to the Seattle, Washington
Police Department
OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Project E.S.C.A.P.E. Awarded to the
Santa Rosa, California Memorial Hospital
OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Strengthening At-Risk Families All
Across America Grant Awarded to the Parents
Anonymous Inc., Claremont, California
OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Youth Violence and Gambling
Project Grant Awarded to Fuller Theological
Seminary, Pasadena, California
OJP Teleconferencing Equipment for
Prosecutors and Community Education Grant
Administered by the University of Kentucky,
College of Law
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Headquarters’ Information Systems Control
Environment Fiscal Year 2003
Review of the U.S. Department of Justice
Rockville and Dallas Data Centers General
Controls Fiscal Year 2003
Superfund Activities in the Environment and
Natural Resources Division for Fiscal Years
2002 and 2003
The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Reprioritization
United States Marshals Service Annual
Financial Statement Fiscal Year 2003
United States Marshals Service Prisoner
Tracking System
Use of Equitable Sharing of Revenues by the
Villa Rica, Georgia Police Department
Working Capital Fund Annual Financial
Statement Fiscal Year 2003

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

39

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Semiannual Report to Congress

SINGLE AUDIT ACT REPORTS
OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ACTIVITIES

Montgomery County, Texas

Ayuda, Inc.

National Criminal Justice Association

Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation, Montana

National Juvenile Detention Association, Inc.

National Capital Area Council Boys Scouts of
America

Champaign County, Ohio

Native American Alliance Foundation, Tulsa,
Oklahoma

City of Berkeley, Missouri

New Mexico Police Athletic Club

City of East St. Louis, Illinois

Oglala Sioux Tribal Department of Public
Safety, South Dakota

City of Flint, Michigan
City of Gardner, Kansas
City of Greenwood, Indiana

Oglala Sioux Tribe, South Dakota
Oklahoma Police Chiefs’ Training Foundation

City of Hopkins, Minnesota

Operation Weed and Seed of Southeast
Missouri, Inc.

City of Jonesboro, Arkansas

Our Hope for Youth Foundation

City of LaVergne, Tennessee

Pennyrile Narcotics Task Force
Methamphetamine Enforcement Hot Spots
Program

City of Naperville, Illinois
City of Tampa, Florida
City of Toledo, Ohio

Prince George’s County Economic
Development Corporation

Darke County, Ohio

Seminole County, Oklahoma

Hogar Crea, Inc.

State of Florida

International Education Services, Inc.

State of Ohio, FY 2002

Kane County, Illinois

State of Ohio, FY 2003

Loudoun County, Virginia

The Cal Ripken, Sr. Foundation, Inc.

Martin Luther King, Jr. Community Services of
Illinois

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 1

AUDIT DIVISION REPORTS
April 1, 2004 – September 30, 2004

Quantifiable Potential Monetary Benefits
Questioned
Costs

Unsupported
Costs

COPS Grants Administered by the Blackfeet
Fish and Wildlife Department, Montana

$18,375

$18,375

OJP Office for Victims of Crime,
Crime Victim Compensation for 9/11
Attack on America Grant Awarded to
the California Victim Compensation
and Government Claims Board, Sacramento,
California, Fiscal Year 2003

$295,730

Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian
Reservation, Montana

$180,000

$180,000

BOP Contract with the Parkview Medical
Center for the Acquisition of Medical
Services, FCI, Florence, Colorado

$519,412

$424,638

City of East St. Louis, Illinois

$24,289

$24,289

City of Greenwood, Indiana

$13,683

Audit Report

COPS Grants Administered by the City
of Waterbury, Connecticut

$2,588,658

$1,707,103

$62,657

$35,355

COPS Grants Awarded to the Blackfeet
Tribal Business Council, Montana

$1,173,045

$109,252

COPS Grants Awarded to the City of
Rockville, Maryland Police Department

$95,623

COPS Grants Awarded to the Navajo
Department of Resource Enforcement,
Window Rock, Arizona

$6,272

COPS Grants Administered by the Nampa,
Idaho Police Department

Funds Put to
Better Use

$597,465

$115,632

COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grant
to the Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

$692,414

COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants
to the Arkansas State Police,
Little Rock, Arkansas

$860,321

$15,000

$1,134,841

$468,498

COPS Technology Grant Administered by
the Concurrent Technologies Corporation,
Johnstown, Pennsylvania

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

41

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Audit Report
Correctional Medical Services’ Compliance
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract
for Inmate Medical Services at FCI, Fort Dix,
New Jersey

Questioned
Costs

$9,321,106

International Education Services, Inc.

$82,129

National Juvenile Detention Association, Inc.

$33,215

Oglala Sioux Tribal Department of
Public Safety, South Dakota
Oglala Sioux Tribe, South Dakota

Unsupported
Costs

$716,810
$1,327,112

$1,327,112

$91,214

$91,214

OJP Justice Research, Evaluation, and
Development Project Cooperative Agreement
Awarded to the University of Central Florida

$909,534

$554,983

OJP Midwest Regional Children’s Advocacy
Center Project Grant Awarded to Children’s
Hospital, St. Paul, Minnesota

$351,484

$260,986

OJP Grant Administered by Big Brothers
Big Sisters of America,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

OJP National Institute of Justice Juvenile
Breaking the Cycle Cooperative
Agreement Awarded to Lane County
Department of Youth Services, Eugene, Oregon
OJP No-Suspect Casework DNA Backlog
Reduction Program Cooperative Agreement
Awarded to the State of Florida, Department
of Law Enforcement, Tallahassee, Florida

$74,670

$4,542

OJP Office for Victims of Crime, Crime Victim
Compensation for 9/11 Attack on America
Grant Awarded to the California Victim
Compensation and Government Claims Board,
Sacramento, California, Fiscal Year 2002

$74,419

OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Internet Crimes Against Children
Grant Awarded to the Seattle, Washington
Police Department

$1,836

OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Program Youth Violence and
Gambling Project Grant Awarded to Fuller
Theological Seminary, Pasadena, California

$8,365

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

$65,695

$5,594

Funds Put to
Better Use

Appendix 1

Audit Report
OJP Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Project E.S.C.A.P.E.
Awarded to the Santa Rosa, California
Memorial Hospital
OJP Teleconferencing Equipment for
Prosecutors and Community Education
Grant Administered by the University of
Kentucky, College of Law
Operation Weed and Seed of Southeast
Missouri, Inc.
Prince George’s County Economic
Development Corporation

Questioned
Costs

$7,013

$7,013

$76,326

$76,326

$7,393
$12,500

State of Florida

$16,111

State of Ohio, FY 2002

$246,303

State of Ohio, FY 2003

$219,620

Use of Equitable Sharing of Revenues by
the Villa Rica, Georgia Police Department
Total

Funds Put to
Better Use

$309

Seminole County, Oklahoma

The Cal Ripken, Sr. Foundation, Inc.

Unsupported
Costs

$21,331
$605,158

$548,059

$21,873,820

$5,435,994

$1,196,595

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

43

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Appendix 2
EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIVISION REPORTS
April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004
Review of Inspections of Firearms Dealers by
the ATF
Review of the ATF’s Enforcement of Brady
Act Violations Identified Through the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System
Review of the BOP’s Disciplinary System
Survey of the Department’s Use of Polygraph
Examinations
Review of Shooting Incidents in the Department

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 3

Appendix 3
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The following are definitions of specific terms as they are used in this report.
Alien: Any person who is not a citizen or
national of the United States.
Controlled Personal Property: Items, other
than supplies or real property, that because of
their nature must be subjected to more stringent
controls.
External Audit Report: The results of audits
and related reviews of expenditures made
under Department contracts, grants, and other
agreements. External audits are conducted in
accordance with the Comptroller General’s
Government Auditing Standards and related
professional auditing standards.
Information: Formal accusation of a crime
made by a prosecuting attorney as distinguished
from an indictment handed down by a grand
jury.
Internal Audit Report: The results of audits
and related reviews of Department organizations, programs, functions, computer security
and information technology, and financial
statements. Internal audits are conducted in
accordance with the Comptroller General’s
Government Auditing Standards and related
professional auditing standards.
Material Weakness: A reportable condition
in which the design or operation of the internal
control does not reduce to a relatively low level
the risk that error, fraud, or noncompliance
in amounts that would be material in relation
to the principal statements or to performance
measures may occur and not be detected within
a timely period by employees in the normal
course of their assigned duties.

National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (NICS): The FBI’s system used
to determine whether a potential firearms purchaser is prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms.
Non-Supplanting Requirement: The Crime
Act states that federal funds under the COPS
Program are not to be used to supplant existing
local or state funds. Supplanting is the use of
federal funds to replace local funds.
Qualified Opinion: The judgment by the certified public accountant in an audit report that
“except for” something, the financial statements
fairly present the financial position and operating results of the entity.
Questioned Cost: A cost that is questioned by
the OIG because of: 1) an alleged violation of
a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant,
cooperative agreement, or other agreement or
document governing the expenditure of funds;
2) a finding that, at the time of the audit, such
cost is not supported by adequate documentation; or 3) a finding that the expenditure of
funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary
or unreasonable.
Recommendation That Funds Be Put to
Better Use: Recommendation by the OIG that
funds could be used more efficiently if management of an entity took actions to implement and
complete the recommendation, including
1) reductions in outlays; 2) deobligation of funds
from programs or operations; 3) withdrawal of
interest subsidy costs on loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds; 4) costs not incurred
by implementing recommended improvements

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

45

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Semiannual Report to Congress

related to the operations of the entity, a contractor, or grantee; 5) avoidance of unnecessary
expenditures noted in pre-award reviews of
contract or grant agreements; or 6) any other
savings that are specifically identified.
Reportable Condition: Includes matters
coming to the auditor’s attention that, in the
auditor’s judgment, should be communicated
because they represent significant deficiencies
in the design or operation of internal controls
that could adversely affect the entity’s ability to
properly report financial data.
Soft Contraband: Any item other than hard
contraband (e.g., drugs) that is not authorized
for possession by an inmate. Examples may
include cell phones, steroids, certain types of
sneakers, etc.
Supervised Release: Court-monitored supervision upon release from incarceration.
Unqualified Opinion: An auditor’s report that
states the financial statements present fairly, in
all material respects, the financial position and
results of operations of the reporting entity, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.
Unsupported Cost: A cost that is questioned
by the OIG because the OIG found that, at the
time of the audit, the cost was not supported by
adequate documentation.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 4

Appendix 4
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following are acronyms and abbreviations used in the report.
ATF

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives

IG Act

Inspector General Act of 1978,
as amended

BOP

Federal Bureau of Prisons

INS

Immigration and
Naturalization Service

Brady Act

Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1993

IT

Information technology

COPS

Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services

JMD

Justice Management Division

LEO

Law enforcement officers

DEA

Drug Enforcement
Administration

OIG

Office of the Inspector General

Department

U.S. Department of Justice

OJP

Office of Justice Programs

EOUSA

Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys

OMB

Office of Management and
Budget

FBI

Federal Bureau of
Investigation

OPR

Office of Professional
Responsibility

FISA

Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act

PRR

Procedural Reform
Recommendation

FFL

Federal Firearms Licensees

USAO

U.S. Attorney’s Office

FY

Fiscal year

USMS

U.S. Marshals Service

WITSEC

Witness Security Program

April 1, 2004–September 30, 2004

47

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Appendix 5
Reporting Requirements Index
The IG Act specifies reporting requirements for semiannual reports. The requirements are listed
below and indexed to the applicable pages.
IG Act
References

Reporting Requirements

Section 4(a)(2)

Review of Legislation and Regulations

Section 5(a)(1)

Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies

5-31

Section 5(a)(2)

Significant Recommendations for Corrective Actions

5-30

Section 5(a)(3)

Prior Significant Recommendations Unimplemented

35

Section 5(a)(4)

Matters Referred to Prosecutive Authorities

Section 5(a)(5)

Refusal to Provide Information

None

Section 5(a)(6)

Listing of Audit Reports

37-43

Section 5(a)(7)

Summary of Significant Reports

5-30

Section 5(a)(8)

Audit Reports – Questioned Costs

34

Section 5(a)(9)

Audit Reports – Funds to Be Put to Better Use

33

Section 5(a)(10)

Prior Audit Reports Unresolved

35

Section 5(a)(11)

Significant Revised Management Decisions

None

Section 5(a)(12)

Significant Management Decisions
With Which the OIG Disagreed

None

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Page
32

9-10, 13-16,
19-20, 23-24

Report Waste, Fraud,
Abuse, or Misconduct
To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct in
Department of Justice programs, send complaints to:

Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
Investigations Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Room 4706
Washington, DC 20530
E-mail: oig.hotline@usdoj.gov
Hotline: (800) 869–4499
Hotline fax: (202) 616–9898

Report Violations of Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties
Individuals who believe that a Department of Justice
employee has violated their civil rights or civil liberties
may send complaints to:

Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Complaints
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Room 4706
Washington, DC 20530
E-mail: inspector.general@usdoj.gov
Hotline: (800) 869–4499
Hotline fax: (202) 616–9898

On-Line Report Availability
Many audit, evaluation and inspection, and special reports
are available at www.usdoj.gov/oig.
Additional materials are available through
the Inspectors General Network at www.ignet.gov.

For additional copies of this
report or copies of previous
editions, write:
DOJ/OIG/M&P
1425 New York Avenue, NW
Suite 7000
Washington, DC 20530
Or call: (202) 616–4550