U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General

Office of the Inspector General
Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2005–September 30, 2005

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General

Message From the Inspector General
This semiannual report summarizes the work of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) from April 1,
2005, through September 30, 2005. The audits, inspections, investigations, special reviews, and other activities
highlighted in this report illustrate our ongoing commitment to promote accountability, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the programs and operations of the Department of Justice (Department).
The OIG continues to focus much of its attention on matters identified by the Department and Congress as
high-priority issues, such as the Department’s counterterrorism and counterintelligence responsibilities, sharing
of intelligence and law enforcement information, critical information technology (IT) systems upgrades,
detention and incarceration issues, and the many other challenges facing the Department as it performs its
multifaceted functions.
During this reporting period, the OIG issued several significant counterterrorism-related reports, including
a review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) handling of intelligence information prior to the
September 11 terrorist attacks (September 11); the FBI’s efforts to hire, train, and retain intelligence analysts;
a follow-up review of the FBI’s Foreign Language Translation Program; a comprehensive examination of
the operations of the Department’s terrorism task forces and advisory councils; and a review of the FBI’s
reallocation of resources from criminal investigations to counterterrorism matters. The OIG also completed
important reviews related to other priorities in the Department, such as the U.S. Marshals Service’s (USMS)
effectiveness in apprehending violent fugitives, the deterrence of staff sexual abuse of Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ (BOP) inmates, and the FBI’s compliance with the Attorney General’s Investigative Guidelines.
In addition, the OIG continues its work on important criminal and administrative investigations. During
this reporting period, for example, our investigations led to the sentencing of a former FBI employee for
impersonating an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official, the guilty plea of a former BOP
maintenance foreman to embezzling approximately $90,000, and arrests of several correctional officers for
introduction of contraband into federal prisons.
We appreciate the positive response we receive regarding our work from the Attorney General, Department
leaders, and Congress. We also appreciate the continued support from Congress as we strive to assist the
Department in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.
Finally, I want to express my gratitude to the OIG staff who work diligently to fulfill the OIG’s critical
mission. They are talented and dedicated public servants who help improve the work of the Department and the
federal government.

Glenn A. Fine
Inspector General
October 31, 2005

Table of Contents
Highlights of OIG Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
OIG Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
U.S. Marshals Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Drug Enforcement Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Other Department Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Office of Justice Programs and
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Top Management Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Legislation and Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Statistical Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Audit Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Funds Recommended for Better Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Questioned Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Management Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Audit Follow-Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Unresolved Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Evaluation and Inspections Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Investigations Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendices
Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Evaluation and Inspections Division Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Audit Division Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Reporting Requirements Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Highlights of OIG Activities

Highlights of OIG Activities
The following table summarizes OIG activities
discussed in this report. As these statistics and
the following highlights illustrate, the OIG has
conducted wide-ranging oversight of Department
programs and operations.

Statistical Highlights
April 1, 2005 — September 30, 2005
Allegations Received by the
Investigations Division

4,275

Investigations Opened

218

Investigations Closed

173

Arrests

47

Indictments/Informations

42

Convictions/Pleas

30

Administrative Actions

75

Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries

$1.6 million

Audit Reports Issued
Questioned Costs
Funds Put to Better Use

109
$12 million
$2 million

Recommendations for Management
Improvements

466

Examples of OIG audits, evaluations, and special
reports completed during this semiannual reporting
period include:

 The FBI’s Handling of Intelligence

Information Prior to September 11. In
June 2005, the OIG publicly released an unclassified, redacted version of its report that exam-

ined the FBI’s handling of intelligence information in its possession prior to September 11. The
OIG review found significant deficiencies in
the FBI’s handling of this intelligence information and concluded that the FBI failed to fully
evaluate, investigate, exploit, and disseminate
information related to: 1) an electronic communication written by an FBI agent in Phoenix,
Arizona, that raised concerns about efforts by
Usama Bin Laden to send students to attend
United States civil aviation schools to conduct
terrorist activities, and 2) intelligence information available to the FBI regarding two of the
September 11 hijackers – Nawaf al Hazmi and
Khalid al Mihdhar. The OIG concluded that the
causes for these failures were widespread and
varied, ranging from poor individual performance to more substantial systemic deficiencies
that undermined the FBI’s efforts to detect and
prevent terrorism. Among other things, the OIG
review described the systemic impediments that
hindered the sharing of information between the
FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency.

 The FBI’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and

Retain Intelligence Analysts. The OIG
evaluated the FBI’s progress in hiring,
training, allocating, utilizing, and retaining its
intelligence analyst cadre. The OIG found that
the FBI has made significant progress in hiring
and training quality analysts. However, the
audit found that the FBI fell short of its fiscal
year (FY) 2004 hiring goals. In addition, the
audit found that the FBI has made slow progress
toward developing a quality training curriculum
for new analysts. We made 15 recommendations
to the FBI to help improve its intelligence
analyst program, including establishing
hiring goals for intelligence analysts based
on the forecasted need, projected attrition,
and the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

intelligence analysts; developing a threat-based
or risk-based methodology for determining the
number of intelligence analysts required; and
developing retention and succession strategies
for intelligence analysts.

 Follow-up on the FBI’s Foreign

Language Program. The OIG conducted
a follow-up review on the FBI’s Foreign
Language Program. We evaluated the FBI’s
progress in responding to findings in our
July 2004 report that the FBI’s collection of
materials requiring translation had outpaced
its translation capabilities and the FBI had
difficulty filling its critical need for additional
contract linguists. This follow-up report
concluded that the FBI had taken important
steps to address the recommendations, but key
deficiencies remain in the Foreign Language
Program. Specifically, we found that the amount
of unreviewed FBI counterterrorism material
and unreviewed counterintelligence material
had increased since our previous report. We also
found instances where high-priority material
had not been reviewed within 24 hours in accord
with FBI policy, and the FBI faced continued
challenges in meeting linguist hiring goals and
target staffing levels.

 The Department’s Terrorism Task

Forces. The OIG examined whether the
Department’s multiple terrorism task forces
and councils were achieving their goals and
whether gaps, duplication, and overlap existed
in counterterrorism coverage. Our evaluation
found that the task forces and councils generally
have achieved their intended purpose by
providing distinct, yet complementary, forums
for investigating terrorist threats and sharing
counterterrorism information. However, we
identified several management and resource
issues that the task forces should address,
including the need for more stable leadership,
better training for participants, and better
coverage of rural areas.

 The FBI’s Reprioritization Efforts. During

this reporting period, the OIG issued its third
report on the FBI’s reallocation of investigative
resources since September 11. This audit
showed that between FY 2000 and FY 2004
the FBI formally reallocated 1,143 field agent
positions away from investigating traditional
criminal matters and placed these resources
primarily in terrorism-related programs. In
addition to the formal reallocation of positions,
we found that the FBI actually utilized almost
2,200 fewer field agents to investigate traditional
criminal matters, such as bank robbery and drug
crimes, in FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000. The
FBI opened 45 percent fewer criminal cases and
reduced the number of criminal-related matters
referred to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO)
by 27 percent between FYs 2000 and 2004.
However, interviews of federal, state, and local
law enforcement officials regarding the impact
of the FBI’s changes in their jurisdictions found
that, overall, most law enforcement agencies
said they had not been significantly affected
by the FBI’s shift in investigative resources,
although their caseloads had increased.

 The USMS’s Apprehension of Violent

Fugitives. The OIG evaluated the USMS’s
efforts to apprehend violent fugitives. Our
evaluation found that the USMS had increased
its apprehension of violent fugitives by 51 percent and raised the number of apprehended individuals per staff year. The OIG attributed this
improved performance to: 1) more time allotted
for deputy marshals and other personnel to focus
on fugitive investigations and 2) the establishment of Regional Fugitive Task Forces (RTF)
that enable law enforcement personnel to work
together across jurisdictional lines. We recommended that the USMS move forward with a
plan to add more RTFs, establish measures and
goals to track performance in apprehending violent fugitives, and improve data collection and
analysis to accurately determine caseload and
necessary resources.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Highlights of OIG Activities

 Deterring Staff Sexual Abuse of Federal

Inmates. The OIG examined the problem of
sexual abuse of federal inmates by correctional
staff and highlighted the shortcomings of
current federal law in deterring staff sexual
abuse. We recommended that the Department
seek passage of legislation to increase the
penalty for unforced sexual abuse of an
inmate from a misdemeanor to a felony, which
would make the penalty consistent with most
state laws. We also recommended legislation
to extend federal criminal jurisdiction to
correctional staff who engage in a sexual act
with a federal prisoner housed in a detention
facility under contract to the Department.

 Compliance with the Attorney General’s

Investigative Guidelines. The OIG issued
a report on the FBI’s implementation of and
compliance with four sets of Attorney General
Guidelines. These guidelines govern the FBI’s
principal criminal investigative authorities with
respect to investigating individuals and groups,
using confidential informants, and managing
undercover operations and warrantless monitoring. Overall, the OIG found many areas in
which the FBI complied with the guidelines.
However, we determined that there was significant non-compliance with the guidelines governing the operation of confidential informants.
In addition, the OIG identified shortcomings in
training on the guidelines and the FBI’s planning for and implementation of the revised
guidelines. The OIG provided the FBI with
47 recommendations designed to promote
greater compliance with the guidelines.

 A former FBI employee was convicted on

charges of impersonating an INS official,
sentenced to 2 years’ incarceration and 1 year
supervised release, and ordered to pay $43,500
in restitution.

 A former BOP maintenance foreman pled guilty
to embezzling approximately $90,000.

 A former administrative assistant at the Neigh-

borhood Youth and Parent Prevention Partnership – which is partially funded by Office of
Justice Programs (OJP) grants – was sentenced
to 30 days’ incarceration, 9 months’ home
confinement, and 3 years’ supervised release,
and was ordered to pay $30,576 in restitution
for her conviction on charges of fraud and
embezzlement.

 Eight Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
special agents were cleared of allegations
raised by a defendant in a methamphetamine
investigation that they violated the defendant’s
civil rights by using excessive force during his
arrest.

Ongoing Reviews
This report also describes many ongoing OIG
reviews of important issues throughout the
Department, including:

 The FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield
Matter.

 Development of the FBI’s Sentinel Case
Management System.

 The DEA’s Control of the Diversion of
Investigations of Misconduct
As shown in the statistics in the table at the
beginning of this section, the OIG investigates
many allegations of misconduct involving
Department employees or contractors hired
with Department money. Examples of the OIG’s
investigations discussed in this report include:

Controlled Pharmaceuticals.

 The BOP’s Management of Inmate Mail.
 Follow-up Review Examining Implementation

of Recommendations Made in the OIG’s Review
of the Robert Hanssen Case.

 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives (ATF) Violent Crime Impact Teams.
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

OIG Profile
The OIG is a statutorily created, independent entity
whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud,
abuse, and misconduct involving Department
programs and personnel and promote economy
and efficiency in Department operations. The
OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal
and civil laws, regulations, and ethical standards
arising from the conduct of Department employees
in their numerous and diverse activities. The OIG
also audits and inspects Department programs
and assists management in promoting integrity,
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The
OIG has jurisdiction to review the programs and
personnel of the FBI, DEA, BOP, USMS, ATF,
USAO, and all other organizations within the
Department.
The OIG consists of the Immediate Office of the
Inspector General and the following divisions and
office:

 Audit Division is responsible for independent

audits of Department programs, computer
systems, and financial statements. The Audit
Division has field offices in Atlanta, Chicago,
Dallas, Denver, Philadelphia, San Francisco,
and Washington, D.C. Its Financial Statement
Audit Office and Computer Security and
Information Technology Audit Office are
located in Washington, D.C. Audit Headquarters
consists of the immediate office of the Assistant
Inspector General for Audit, the Office of
Operations, the Office of Policy and Planning,
and an Advanced Audit Techniques Group.

 Investigations Division is responsible for
investigating allegations of bribery, fraud,
abuse, civil rights violations, and violations
of other criminal laws and administrative

procedures governing Department employees,
contractors, and grantees. The Investigations
Division has field offices in Chicago, Dallas,
Denver, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and
Washington, D.C. The Fraud Detection Office is
located in Washington, D.C. The Investigations
Division has smaller, area offices in Atlanta,
Boston, Detroit, El Paso, Houston, Philadelphia,
San Francisco, and Tucson. Investigations
Headquarters in Washington, D.C., consists of
the immediate office of the Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations and the following
branches: Operations, Special Operations,
Investigative Support, Research and Analysis,
and Administrative Support.

 Evaluation and Inspections Division

conducts program and management reviews
that involve on-site inspection, statistical
analysis, and other techniques to review
Department programs and activities and make
recommendations for improvement.

 Oversight and Review Division blends

the skills of attorneys, investigators, program
analysts, and paralegals to review Department
programs and investigate sensitive allegations
involving Department employees and
operations.

 Management and Planning Division

provides advice to OIG senior leadership on
administrative and fiscal policy and assists OIG
components in the areas of budget formulation
and execution, security, personnel, training,
travel, procurement, property management,
information technology, computer network
communications, telecommunications, quality
assurance, internal controls, and general support.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

OIG Profile

 Office of General Counsel provides legal

advice to OIG management and staff. It also
drafts memoranda on issues of law; prepares
administrative subpoenas; represents the OIG
in personnel, contractual, and legal matters;
and responds to Freedom of Information Act
requests.

The OIG has a nationwide workforce of approximately 410 special agents, auditors, inspectors,
attorneys, and support staff. For FY 2005, the OIG’s
direct appropriation was $64.2 million, including
$1.3 million in funding provided by the Emergency
Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13). The OIG also
earned an additional $3 million in reimbursements.

As required by Section 5 of the Inspector General
Act of 1978 (IG Act), as amended, this Semiannual
Report to Congress reviewing the accomplishments
of the OIG for the 6-month period of April 1, 2005,
through September 30, 2005, is to be submitted no
later than October 31, 2005, to the Attorney General
for his review. The Attorney General is required
to forward the report to Congress no later than
November 30, 2005, along with information on
the Department’s position on audit resolution and
follow-up activity in response to matters discussed
in this report.
Additional information about the OIG and fulltext versions of many of its reports are available
at www.usdoj.gov/oig.

Detroit

Boston

Chicago

Philadelphia

Denver

New York

Washington, DC
San Francisco

Los Angeles
Dallas
Tucson

Atlanta

El Paso
Houston
Audit and Investigations Divisions Locations
Audit and Investigations Divisions Location
Investigations Division Location Only

Miami

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Multicomponent Audits,
Reviews, and Investigations
While many of the OIG’s audits, reviews, and
investigations are specific to a particular component
of the Department, other work spans more than
one component and, in some instances, extends
to Department contractors and grant recipients.
The following audits, reviews, and investigations
involve more than one Department component.

Reports Issued
The Department’s Terrorism Task
Forces
The Department’s terrorism task forces – the
Deputy Attorney General’s National Security
Coordination Council; the U.S. Attorneys’
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils (ATAC); and
the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF),
the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and
the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force – are
responsible for coordinating and integrating
intelligence and law enforcement functions to
eliminate terrorist networks, prevent terrorist
operations, and prosecute the perpetrators of
terrorist acts. Their establishment within different
components and with diverse membership
is intended to allow the Department to more
effectively use specialized expertise and create a
coordinated counterterrorism effort nationwide.
The OIG’s Evaluation and Inspections Division
examined whether these terrorism task forces
and councils were achieving their goals and

whether gaps, duplication, and overlap existed
in counterterrorism coverage. Our evaluation
found that the task forces and councils generally
were achieving their intended purpose by
providing distinct, yet complementary, forums
for investigating terrorist threats and sharing
counterterrorism information, particularly among
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
However, we also identified a series of management
and resource problems affecting the operation of the
task forces and advisory councils. Those problems
included the need for more stable leadership among
the task forces and councils, better training for
participants, greater involvement by the DEA,
additional resources, and increased coverage of
remote areas.
The OIG report provided 28 recommendations to
help the Department improve the operations of its
various counterterrorism task forces and councils.
Among the recommendations: 1) develop and
implement national training plans for task forces
and ATACs and a standard orientation program for
new task force members; 2) increase the DEA’s
membership on JTTFs; 3) develop coordinated
and consistent strategies to provide counterterrorism information and training to law enforcement
and first responders in remote areas of the country;
and 4) develop performance measures that assess
the accomplishments of the task forces and their
members in fulfilling the Department’s counterterrorism strategy. The Department, FBI, DEA, Criminal Division, and Executive Office for U. S. Attorneys (EOUSA) generally agreed with the
recommendations.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Complaints
Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act directs the
OIG to receive and review complaints of civil rights
and civil liberties abuses by Department employees,
to publicize how people can contact the OIG to file
a complaint, and to submit a semiannual report to
Congress discussing our implementation of these
responsibilities. In August 2005, the OIG issued
its seventh report summarizing our Section 1001
activities.
The report, covering the period from January 1,
2005, to June 30, 2005, described complaints
we received under this section, the cases we
opened for investigation, and the status of these
cases. During this period, the OIG identified 13
matters that we believed warranted opening a
Section 1001 investigation or conducting a closer
review to determine if Section 1001-related abuse
occurred. Of the 13 new matters, the OIG retained
7 for investigation because the allegations were
of a potentially criminal or egregious nature. For
example, one new OIG matter involved a complaint
from a former BOP correctional officer alleging
that staff members referred to certain inmates as
terrorists and displayed offensive posters depicting
Muslim prisoners throughout the facility.
The OIG referred six matters that appeared to
raise mostly administrative issues to Department
components for further investigation or review and
requested that the components report their findings
to the OIG. The other complaints to the OIG either
did not fall within the OIG’s jurisdiction, raised
management issues, or did not warrant further
investigation.
In addition, the report discussed several OIG
reviews undertaken in furtherance of our Section
1001 responsibilities, including an update on the
OIG’s December 2003 review of September 11
detainees’ allegations of abuse at the Metropolitan
Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York; an

ongoing review examining the FBI’s observations
of alleged mistreatment of detainees in military
facilities in Guantanamo Bay and Iraq; and
an ongoing review of the FBI’s erroneous
identification of a latent fingerprint found on
evidence from the March 2004 Madrid train
bombing.

The Department’s Information Security
Program Pursuant to FISMA
The Federal Information Security Management Act
(FISMA) requires the Inspector General for each
agency to perform an annual independent evaluation of the agency’s information security programs
and practices. The evaluation includes testing the
effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices of a representative subset of
agency systems.
For FY 2005, the OIG’s Audit Division reviewed
the security programs of four major components
within the Department – the FBI, BOP, DEA, and
Justice Management Division (JMD). As part of our
review, we also examined two classified systems
(the FBI’s Automated Case Support System and
the DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center Information
System) and two sensitive but unclassified systems
(the BOP’s Inmate Telephone System II and the
DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center Seizure System).
We will issue separate reports in December 2005
for each component and the four mission-critical
systems we evaluated.
On October 7, 2005, we responded to an Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) questionnaire
with the results of our review, which generally
found the Department performs oversight of
its information systems and has developed,
implemented, and is managing a Departmentwide plan of action and milestone process. We
also assessed the Department’s certification and
accreditation process, according to the OMB’s
response categories, as “good.” However, we found

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

weaknesses resulting in the implementation of the
process to ensure that all of its systems are certified
and accredited in accordance with the Department’s
guidelines.

The Department’s Process for
Identifying, Preventing, and Recovering
Improper and Erroneous Payments
Improper and erroneous payments are payments
that should not have been made or were made for
incorrect amounts because of errors, poor business
practices, or intentional fraud or abuse. Recent
estimates indicate that improper and erroneous payments exceed $45 billion annually throughout the
federal government. Recent legislation, including
Public Law 107-300, the Improper Payments
Information Act of 2002, and 107-107, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002,
require government agencies to conduct program
inventories and assess the improper payment risk in
each identified program. In addition, agencies
annually must report on progress made in identifying and recovering improper payments.
The OIG’s Audit Division assessed the
Department’s compliance with this legislation
and evaluated its efforts to identify, prevent, and
recover improper and erroneous payments. The
audit assessed improper payments in the FBI,
BOP, USMS, and OJP. The components were
selected based on the dollar amount of vendor
payments, compliance with reporting requirements,
FY 2004 financial statement audit results, and
current recovery audit activities. We found the
following weaknesses: 1) risk assessments were
not always adequate to completely measure the
risk of improper payments; 2) risk assessments
did not include analysis or consideration of any
material weaknesses, reportable conditions, or noncompliance matters resulting from the components’
annual financial statement audits; 3) improper
payment reports did not always contain a complete

description of the risk assessments performed; and
4) certain policies and procedures used to prevent
improper payments were inadequate.
The audit also found that certain components
failed to implement processes to determine the
full extent of their improper payments, and none
of the components audited had established a
fully-documented program to recover improper
payments. In addition, formalized guidance
was not provided for the implementation of a
Department-wide recovery audit program, and
no official reporting mechanism was in place
to allow oversight of component recovery audit
activities on a periodic basis. The OIG provided
22 recommendations to the audited components
and JMD. They concurred with all of the
recommendations.

The Joint Automated Booking System
The Joint Automated Booking System (JABS) helps
federal law enforcement agencies book, identify,
and share information quickly about persons in
federal custody. The Department’s law enforcement
components book offenders in their own automated
booking systems by collecting fingerprints and
photographs and recording information about the
arrest and charges, the person’s identity, address,
physical description, and other information.
However, JABS allows each participating agency
to communicate electronically with the FBI’s
fingerprint system, the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Information System (IAFIS). IAFIS
then matches JABS data against FBI information to
identify offenders and responds electronically to the
submitting offices.
The OIG’s Audit Division assessed the status of
JABS implementation throughout the Department.
At the time of our audit, the JABS program had
partially met its stated goals by: 1) automating
the booking process for Department components,

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations

including providing an automated interface
with IAFIS that ensures the rapid and positive
identification of offenders at deployed locations;
2) enabling users to share information by viewing
and printing information created by other
components; and 3) establishing an offender
tracking system. However, the JABS program
had not:

 Produced data sharing capabilities that allow

components to reduce or eliminate redundant
steps or data entry between components;

 Fully implemented data elements that would

enable users to track offenders from booking
through disposition;

 Ensured that information in JABS is updated to
reflect the most accurate information available
electronically; and

 Resolved problems with printing fingerprints
from the database.

Additionally, JABS had been deployed widely
throughout the Department, but we found that not
all Department arrests were recorded in the program
and transmitted electronically to IAFIS. Our report
contained six recommendations, including that
JMD develop, document, and implement a plan
to complete or revise the project goals to share
and exchange information in ways that reduce
redundant steps between components. Moreover,
we recommended that JMD require all federal
offenders arrested by Department components to
be booked through JABS, develop a plan for the
future expansion of JABS, and coordinate with the
USMS regarding the need to deploy JABS to all
USMS sites taking custody of federal arrestees.
JMD agreed with our recommendations and is in
the process of implementing them.

The Department’s Background
Investigations Program
The Department’s Security and Emergency
Planning Staff (SEPS) has responsibility for
managing background investigations on 27,000 of
the Department’s 103,000 employees. Primarily
for staffing reasons, SEPS delegates to seven of
the Department’s components the responsibility
for managing the background investigations of
their employees. SEPS retains the responsibility to
manage the background investigations for political
appointees and attorneys in all components, plus
all other employees in the components that do not
have delegated authority. SEPS also issues all of the
Department’s national security clearances for access
to the most sensitive classified information.
The OIG’s Evaluation and Inspections Division
examined SEPS’s management of the Department’s
background investigations. Our review found that
SEPS generally met federal regulatory requirements for adjudicating background investigations
and responded to component needs for providing
national security clearances for access to sensitive information. SEPS had achieved these results
despite the fact that, after September 11, 2001, its
workload of background investigation adjudications
and information clearances more than doubled, but
it received no additional resources.
However, the OIG reported that SEPS had not yet
provided updated guidance or conducted adequate
oversight of background investigations delegated to
components. In addition, we found that SEPS did
not have the capability to maintain electronic copies
of background investigation files.
The OIG report contained six recommendations
designed to improve SEPS’s management of background investigations. The Department agreed to
implement all of the recommendations.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

The Department’s Financial Statement
Audits
The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the
Government Management Reform Act of 1994
require annual financial statement audits of the
Department. The OIG’s Audit Division oversees
and issues the reports based on the work performed
by independent public accountants.
The Department received a disclaimer of opinion
on its FY 2004 financial statements, which was
caused by the disclaimer on the OJP FY 2004
financial statements. The ATF received a qualified
opinion on its FY 2004 financial statements, but
this had no affect on the consolidated disclaimer.
The other eight components received unqualified
opinions on their FY 2004 financial statements.
During this reporting period, we reaudited the
FYs 2003 and 2004 financial statements of OJP
and reissued these reports as unqualified opinions.
This allows the Department to potentially earn an
unqualified opinion for FY 2005, as it established
audited beginning balances for OJP.
At the consolidated level for the FY 2004 financial
statement audit, we reported two material weaknesses and one reportable condition, an increase
of one material weakness from FY 2003. The new
financial material weakness involved issues related
to data quality, monitoring, and the methodology
utilized to calculate OJP’s grant accrual and
advance. The other financial material weakness
and the IT reportable condition are both repeat

issues, although elements of the two findings
varied from last year. The financial material weakness included additional OJP issues, the accounts
payable accrual at the ATF, separation of duties
issues at the USMS, and financial reporting and
property issues at the FBI.
Our financial statement audits reported that the
Department still lacks sufficient automated systems
to readily support ongoing accounting operations
and financial statement preparation. Many tasks still
must be performed manually at interim periods and
year-end, requiring extensive efforts on the part of
financial and audit personnel. Most components’
management systems are not integrated with their
financial accounting systems, requiring manual
reconciliations between the two systems to support
amounts reported on the financial statements. These
significant, costly, and time-intensive manual efforts
will continue to be necessary for the Department
and its components to produce financial statements
until automated, integrated processes and systems
are implemented that readily produce the necessary
information throughout the year. We encourage
the Department to continue its current efforts to
implement a unified financial management system
supported by consistent, standardized business
practices across the Department.
The following table compares the FYs 2004 and
2003 audit results for the Department’s consolidated audit as well as for the 10 individual (11 in
FY 2003) components’ audits, as adjusted for reissuance of OJP’s FYs 2004 and 2003 reports.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations

Comparison of FY 2004 and FY 2003 Audit Results
Auditors’ Opinion on
Financial Statements
Reporting Entity

Number of
Material
Weaknesses

Number of
Reportable
Conditions

2004

2003

2004

2003

2004

2003

Consolidated Department
of Justice

Disclaimer

Disclaimer

2

1

1

1

Assets Forfeiture Fund and
Seized Asset Deposit Fund

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

1

1

0

Qualified

Unqualified

1

0

1

1

Drug Enforcement
Administration

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

0

1

2

Federal Bureau
of Investigation

Unqualified

Unqualified

2

2

1

0

Federal Bureau of Prisons

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

0

1

2

Federal Prison Industries, Inc.

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

0

1

1

N/A

Unqualified

N/A

3

N/A

1

Offices, Boards and Divisions

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

1

2

1

Office of Justice Programs 2

Unqualified

Unqualified

3

2

1

2

U.S. Marshals Service

Unqualified

Unqualified

2

1

2

1

Working Capital Fund

Unqualified

Unqualified

0

1

2

0

Component Totals

8

11

13

11

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives 1

Immigration and
Naturalization Service 1

1

The INS transferred to the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003, and the ATF transferred to the Department on January 24, 2003, from
the Department of the Treasury, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296.
2

The OJP FY 2003 opinion originally was issued as an unqualified opinion but was withdrawn and reissued as a disclaimer of opinion during the
FY 2004 audit. The OJP FY 2004 opinion originally was issued as a disclaimer of opinion. During this semiannual period, additional work was done to
complete both audits, and the reports were reissued as unqualified opinions. The number of material weaknesses also changed and the numbers reflected
in this table are those from the reissued reports. Thus, the number of material weaknesses and reportable conditions reported for OJP for FYs 2004 and
2003 in this semiannual report differs from prior semiannual reports.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Classified Information on Portable
Computers
Some Department portable computers can be used
to store, process, and transmit classified information. However, before any computer is authorized
to process classified information, the computer
must be certified and accredited to operate according to a specific set of standards. In response to
a November 2003 Department order, the Department’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) developed
and issued new standards for portable computers
processing classified information.
The OIG’s Audit Division examined policies and
practices in the Department related to processing
classified information on portable computers. Overall, we found that the CIO’s Classified Laptop and
Standalone Computers Security Policy contained
three areas of concern: 1) it used references to
policies that do not apply to portable or standalone
computers that process, store, or transmit classified
information; 2) it did not address the systems that
process Classified National Security Information
and Sensitive Compartmented Information separately; and 3) it included incomplete guidance and
instructions.
Our report made 12 recommendations to assist the
Department in improving its use of portable computers to process classified information. The recommendations included revising a policy to remove
any references to statute, policy, or procedures that
are not applicable to processing classified information; indicating what policy applies when classified
portable computers are allowed to be connected to
classified networks; and addressing systems that
process Classified National Security Information
independently from those that process Sensitive
Compartmented Information.
We also recommended that the Department consider using two separate, removable hard drives for
processing both classified and unclassified infor-

mation on the same portable computer. We made
additional recommendations related to the use of
encryption, tracking devices, streamlining accreditation procedures, and sending alerts to systems
administrators when classified devices are improperly connected to the Internet. The components that
were a part of this audit concurred with all of the
recommendations.

Intergovernmental Service Agreements
for Detention Facilities
The USMS houses approximately 53,000 detainees
throughout the nation and is responsible for their
detention from the time they are brought into federal custody until they either are acquitted or
incarcerated. To house the detainees, the USMS
often executes Intergovernmental Service Agreements (IGA) with state and local governments to
rent jail space. According to the USMS, 75 percent
of the detainees in USMS custody are detained in
state, local, and private facilities.
During this reporting period, we completed an
audit of an IGA that the USMS awarded to the
Blount County, Tennessee, Sheriff’s Office for the
housing and transportation of federal detainees.
The BOP also housed prisoners at the facility under
the terms of the IGA between the USMS and the
Sheriff’s Office. Our audit determined that the
Sheriff’s Office’s allowable costs did not support
the jail daily rate paid by the USMS and the BOP
for FYs 2003 and 2004 and the first 8 months of
FY 2005. During this period, the USMS could have
saved more than $1.2 million by paying the audit
calculated rate instead of the rate it agreed to, while
the BOP could have saved more than $36,000. In
addition, the USMS could have saved more than
$730,000 by paying the audit calculated rate for
the period June 1, 2005, through September 30,
2005. The BOP could have saved over $17,000 by
paying the audit determined rate for the same time
period. Both the USMS and the BOP currently are
preparing responses to the OIG.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Multicomponent Audits, Reviews, and Investigations

Ongoing Work
Management of Information Technology
in the Department

Polygraph Examinations in the
Department

The OIG is examining the Department’s management of its IT investments and Enterprise Architecture. We are assessing the Department’s progress in
meeting the criteria for establishing a mature Enterprise Architecture and IT investment management
process.

The OIG is conducting a review of polygraph
examinations in the Department. The review will
describe the administration and use of polygraph
examinations among the Department’s components
and assess whether they are conducting polygraph
examinations in compliance with federal and
professional technical standards.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Federal Bureau of
Investigation
The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the
Department. It investigates counterterrorism,
foreign counterintelligence, civil rights violations,
organized crime, violent crime, financial crime, and
other violations of federal law. FBI Headquarters
in Washington, D.C., coordinates the activities of
approximately 29,500 employees in 56 field offices,
approximately 400 satellite offices, and 59 foreign
liaison posts that work abroad on criminal matters
within the FBI’s jurisdiction.

Reports Issued
The FBI’s Handling of Intelligence
Information Prior to September 11
In June 2005, the OIG publicly released an unclassified, redacted version of its report that examined
the FBI’s handling of intelligence information in its
possession prior to September 11. The OIG completed the full 421-page version of the report classified at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented
Information level in July 2004. However, the report
could not be released until the District Court in
which the case of Zacarias Moussaoui was being
prosecuted granted the OIG’s motion to release a
redacted, unclassified version of the report.
The OIG review found significant deficiencies in
the FBI’s handling of intelligence information
related to September 11 and concluded that the FBI
failed to fully evaluate, investigate, exploit, and
disseminate information related to: 1) an electronic
communication written by an FBI agent in
Phoenix, Arizona, that raised concerns about efforts

by Usama Bin Laden to send students to attend
United States civil aviation schools to conduct
terrorist activities and 2) intelligence information
available to the FBI regarding two of the
September 11 hijackers – Nawaf al Hazmi and
Khalid al Mihdhar. The OIG concluded that the
causes for these failures were widespread and
varied, ranging from poor individual performance
to more substantial systemic deficiencies that
undermined the FBI’s efforts to detect and prevent
terrorism. Among other things, the OIG review
described the systemic impediments that hindered
the sharing of information between the FBI and the
Central Intelligence Agency.
In our final report, we made 16 recommendations
for improving the FBI’s intelligence handling and
counterterrorism efforts, including recommendations targeted towards the FBI’s analytical program.
In its October 2005 response to the recommendations, the FBI described changes it has made since
September 11, including upgrading the physical
infrastructure in FBI field offices to handle classified information, establishing centralized intelligence
components in each field office, and developing
training initiatives on subjects such as disseminating threat-related information and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. In addition, the FBI created a panel to assess whether any action should be
taken with regard to the performance of FBI
employees described in the OIG report.

The External Effects of the FBI’s
Reprioritization Efforts
Since September 11, the FBI has undergone a
broad transformation to focus on terrorism and
intelligence-related matters. In September 2005,

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Federal Bureau of Investigation

the OIG’s Audit Division released a report that
examined the FBI’s re-allocation of investigative
resources since September 11 from traditional crime
areas to counterterrorism. The report also examined
how the shift in resources has affected other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. The
OIG review does not reach judgments on the FBI’s
changed priorities. Instead, it provides details on the
precise amount of the total shifts; the shift within
particular crime areas; and what other federal, state,
and local law enforcement officials believe are the
impacts of the shifts on their respective agencies.
The OIG review determined that between FY 2000
and FY 2004, the FBI had formally reallocated
1,143 field agent positions away from investigating
traditional criminal matters and placed these
resources primarily in terrorism-related programs.
However, in addition to the formal reallocation
of positions, we found that the actual number of
agents used to investigate criminal matters was
significantly less than the FBI had allocated.
The FBI actually utilized almost 2,200 fewer
field agents to investigate these more traditional
criminal matters in FY 2004 than it had in FY 2000.
According to FBI officials, the additional agents
were diverted from criminal investigative areas to
terrorism-related matters as needs arose.
The OIG review also found that the FBI opened
28,331 fewer criminal cases in FY 2004 than it had
in FY 2000, a 45 percent reduction. Furthermore,
we found that the FBI reduced the number of
criminal-related matters referred to the USAO by
6,151, or 27 percent, between FYs 2000 and 2004.
Interviews with federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials regarding the impact of the
FBI’s changes in their jurisdictions found that,
overall, most law enforcement agencies had not
been significantly affected by the FBI’s shift in
investigative resources, although their caseloads
had increased. However, we found that the FBI’s
significant reduction in investigating financial
crime matters such as financial institution fraud and
telemarketing fraud has created an investigative

gap that no other law enforcement agency has
substantially filled.
The OIG provided seven recommendations to the
FBI, including to: 1) assess investigative needs
among its various programs to establish realistic
and practical personnel projections; 2) pursue an
interagency working group on identity theft; and
3) seek a more coordinated approach in the areas
of fugitive apprehension, child pornography, alien
smuggling, and human trafficking.

The FBI’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and
Retain Intelligence Analysts
Since September 11, the FBI has emphasized the
development of its intelligence analysis capabilities to help meet its highest priority of preventing
future terrorist attacks. During this reporting period,
the OIG completed an audit of the FBI’s efforts to
hire, train, and retain its intelligence analysts. In the
first 3 years after September 11, the FBI’s analytical
corps grew from 1,023 analysts in October 2001 to
1,403 analysts in October 2004 – a net increase of
380 intelligence analysts or 37 percent. The audit
found that the analysts hired by the FBI generally
were well qualified. Furthermore, analysts responding to the OIG survey stated that they generally
were satisfied with their work assignments, believed
they made a significant contribution to the FBI’s
mission, and were intellectually challenged.
The OIG review also identified several areas in
need of improvement. For example, the FBI fell
short of its FY 2004 hiring goal by 478 analysts
and ended the fiscal year with a vacancy rate of
32 percent. At the end of FY 2004, the FBI had
hired less than 40 percent of its goal of 787 analysts. In addition, the FBI has made slow progress
toward developing a quality training curriculum for
new analysts.
An OIG survey of intelligence analysts found
that work requiring analytical skills accounted for
about 50 percent of analysts’ time. Many analysts
reported performing administrative or other nonApril 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

15

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Semiannual Report to Congress

analytical tasks. In addition, some analysts said that
not all FBI Special Agents, who often supervise
analysts, understand the capabilities and functions
of intelligence analysts.
The OIG report made 15 recommendations to help
the FBI improve its efforts to hire, train, and retain
intelligence analysts, including to:

 Establish hiring goals for intelligence analysts

based on the forecasted need for intelligence
analysts, projected attrition in the analyst corps,
and the FBI’s ability to hire, train, and utilize
intelligence analysts;

 Develop and implement a threat-based or

risk-based methodology for determining the
number of intelligence analysts required and for
allocating the positions among FBI offices;

 Integrate testing into the intelligence analyst’s

curriculum and develop a more rigorous training
evaluation system;

 Assess the work done by intelligence analysts to
determine what is analytical in nature and what
general administrative support of investigations
can more effectively be performed by other
support or administrative personnel; and

 Develop retention and succession strategies for
intelligence analysts.

The FBI concurred with all of the recommendations.

Follow-up on the FBI’s Foreign
Language Program
In July 2004, the OIG issued a report on the FBI’s
Foreign Language Program. The OIG found that
the FBI’s collection of materials requiring translation had outpaced its translation capabilities, and
therefore, the FBI could not translate all the foreign
language counterterrorism and counterintelligence

material that it collected. The OIG also found that
the FBI had difficulty filling its critical need for
additional contract linguists. The report contained
18 recommendations to help improve the FBI’s
Foreign Language Program.
In the spring of 2005, the OIG’s Audit Division
conducted a follow-up review to evaluate the FBI’s
progress in responding to the recommendations in
our July 2004 report. The follow-up concluded that
the FBI has taken steps to address the OIG’s recommendations and has made progress in improving the
operations of its Foreign Language Program. However, the OIG found that key deficiencies remain
in the program, including a continuing backlog of
unreviewed counterterrorism and counterintelligence material, some instances where high-priority
material has not been reviewed within 24 hours in
accord with FBI policy, and continued challenges in
meeting linguist hiring goals and target staffing levels. In addition, implementation of the FBI’s quality
control program has been slow, although the FBI
made recent improvements in this area.
According to the FBI’s data, the backlog of unreviewed counterterrorism material has increased
from 4,086 to 8,354 hours, which represents
1.5 percent of total counterterrorism audio collections. The amount of unreviewed counterintelligence material, which is much larger, also has
increased.
The OIG review found that the FBI has made
progress in improving its hiring process since the
July 2004 audit. As reported in that audit report,
the number of FBI and contract linguists increased
from 883 in FY 2001 to 1,214 as of April 2004.
Since then, the number of FBI and contract linguists
has increased to 1,338 as of March 30, 2005.
However, since the July 2004 audit, according to
the FBI, the average time it takes the FBI to hire a
contract linguist has increased by at least 1 month
from 13 months to 14 months.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Review of the Terrorist Screening
Center
The OIG’s Audit Division examined the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency effort
administered by the FBI whose mission is to
consolidate terrorist watch lists and provide
24-hour, 7-day a week responses for screening
individuals against the consolidated terrorist watch
list. Prior to the establishment of the TSC, the
federal government relied on more than a dozen
separate watch lists maintained by a variety of
federal agencies to search for terrorist-related
information about individuals who, for example,
apply for a visa, attempt to enter the United States
through a port of entry, attempt to travel internationally on a commercial airline, or are stopped by a
local law enforcement officer for a traffic violation.
The OIG review found that the TSC has made
significant strides in becoming the government’s
single point of contact for law enforcement
authorities requesting assistance in identifying
individuals with possible ties to terrorism. In a
short period of time, TSC management successfully
created a new organization and consolidated vast
amounts and types of terrorist information, which
are significant accomplishments. However, the
OIG review also concluded that the TSC needs to
address weaknesses in its consolidated terrorist
watch list database and computer systems, as well
as staffing, training, and oversight of the call center.
The OIG found that the TSC had not ensured that
the information in its database is complete and
accurate. For example, the OIG found instances
where the consolidated database did not contain
names that should have been included on the
watch list. In addition, the OIG found inaccurate or
inconsistent information related to persons included
in the database.
Although the OIG found good communication
among the TSC, its partner agencies, and agencies
that submitted inquiries to the TSC, the audit
revealed some exceptions where coordination and

information sharing could have been improved. In
addition, the OIG found several instances where
the information on calls received was not entered
appropriately into the TSC system used to track
information on hits against the consolidated watch
list. We found that data was sometimes entered into
the wrong fields and at times transposed, resulting
in search errors and poor data integrity.
The OIG report provided 40 recommendations
to the TSC to address areas such as database
improvements, data accuracy and completeness,
call center management, and staffing. The TSC
generally agreed with the recommendations and
said it was in the process of taking corrective
action.

TSC’s Efforts to Support the Secure
Flight Program
In a second review of TSC operations, the OIG
examined the TSC efforts to support the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Secure Flight
program. Secure Flight is an initiative in which the
TSA will compare names of commercial airline
passengers to the TSC’s consolidated terrorist
watch list.
The OIG audit concluded that the TSC has made
significant progress in planning and preparing for
the anticipated launch of the Secure Flight program. The OIG found that the TSC has designed its
necessary electronic connections to accommodate
the transfer of terrorist watch list records, airline
passenger information, and screening results; developed new processes to facilitate law enforcement
responses to encounters with individuals who are a
match against the consolidated terrorist watch list;
and is on schedule for testing its newly established
systems and procedures relating to Secure Flight.
However, our review found that the TSA has
delayed the implementation date for Secure Flight,
first from April 2005 to August 2005, and at the
time of the audit, to September 2005. In addition,

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

17

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Semiannual Report to Congress

the TSA has changed its Secure Flight implementation plan, and as of July 31, 2005, was unsure how
many airlines will participate in the initial phase.
As a result, neither the TSC nor the TSA knows
how many passenger records will be screened and
cannot project the number of watch list hits that
will be forwarded to the TSC for action. This has
affected the TSC’s ability to plan adequately for its
role in the Secure Flight program. The OIG review
also found that the Secure Flight program has the
potential to significantly impact TSC’s space, staffing, and funding needs and has resulted in the postponement of several other TSC projects. However,
the TSC lacks the ability to adequately estimate the
incremental cost of supporting the Secure Flight
program.

field managers with greater authority to conduct
preliminary inquiries, criminal intelligence
investigations, and undercover operations.

We concluded that the TSC is attempting to plan
for a program that has several major undefined
parameters. Specifically, the TSC does not know
when Secure Flight will start, the volume of inquiries expected and the resulting number of resources
required to respond, the quality of data it will have
to analyze, and the specific details of the phased-in
approach for taking the program from “pre-operational testing” to full operational.

The OIG found violations in 87 percent of the
confidential informant files it examined. These
errors occurred in several of the most important
aspects of the FBI’s management of the Criminal
Informant Program: initial and continuing
suitability reviews designed to assess the
suitability of individuals to serve or continue as
confidential informants; instructions FBI agents
are required to give confidential informants; the
FBI’s use of its power to authorize confidential
informants to participate in “otherwise illegal
activity”; notification requirements associated
with a confidential informant’s commission of
“unauthorized illegal activity”; and documentation
and notice requirements triggered when a
confidential informant is deactivated.

The FBI’s Compliance with the Attorney
General’s Investigative Guidelines
In September 2005, the OIG’s Oversight and
Review Division issued a report on the FBI’s
implementation of and compliance with four
sets of the Attorney General’s Guidelines.
These guidelines govern the FBI’s principal
criminal investigative authorities with respect
to investigations of individuals and groups and
its use of confidential informants, undercover
operations, and warrantless monitoring of verbal
communications (also known as consensual
monitoring). Following September 11, the Attorney
General ordered a comprehensive review of the
guidelines to identify revisions that would enhance
the Department’s ability to detect and prevent such
attacks. In May 2002, the Attorney General issued
revised investigative guidelines that provided FBI

While the OIG found many areas in which the FBI
complied with the guidelines, we found significant
non-compliance with the guidelines governing
the operation of confidential informants, failure to
notify FBI Headquarters and Department officials
of the initiation of certain criminal intelligence
investigations, and failure to consistently
obtain advance approval prior to the initiation
of consensual monitoring. We also identified
shortcomings in training on the guidelines and
the FBI’s planning for and implementation of the
revised guidelines.

The OIG focused on these aspects of the Criminal
Informant Program because they include critical
judgments the FBI must make to ensure that
individuals registered as confidential informants
are suitable, that they understand the limits of
their authority from the FBI, and that supervisory
Department officials approve or are notified of
significant developments regarding the confidential
informants. The OIG review determined that
required approvals were not always obtained,
suitability assessments were not made or were
incomplete, documentation of required instructions

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Federal Bureau of Investigation

was missing, descriptions of “otherwise illegal
activity” were not sufficient, and notifications to
FBI Headquarters or USAO were not made or
documented.
In addition, the OIG found that FBI Headquarters
had not sufficiently supported the Criminal
Informant Program, which in turn has hindered
FBI agents in complying with the Confidential
Informant Guidelines. In many instances, agents
lacked access to basic administrative resources and
guidance that would have promoted compliance
with the Confidential Informant Guidelines. We
also found that compliance with the Confidential
Informant Guidelines varied significantly by
FBI field office. Finally, our review identified
weaknesses in the implementation process used
by the FBI to disseminate and communicate the
revised guidelines to its Headquarters and field
personnel.
The OIG report offered 47 recommendations
designed to promote greater accountability
for guidelines violations by field supervisors,
provide better administrative support, use existing
technology to track guidelines violations, enhance
training on guidelines requirements and the
consequences of guidelines violations to FBI
investigations and Department prosecutions,
require supervisory approval and more systematic
record keeping on the FBI’s use of new authorities
to visit public places and attend public events
for the purpose of detecting and preventing
terrorist activities, and prepare a comprehensive
implementation strategy for the next guidelines
revisions. The FBI concurred with 43 of the
47 recommendations and partially concurred with
the 4 remaining recommendations.

CODIS Audits
The FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
includes a national information repository that
permits the storing and searching of DNA specimen
information to facilitate the exchange of DNA

information by law enforcement agencies. During
this reporting period, the OIG audited six state
and local laboratories that participate in CODIS
to determine compliance with the FBI’s Quality
Assurance Standards (QAS) and National DNA
Index System (NDIS) requirements and evaluate
the accuracy and appropriateness of the data that
participating federal, state, and local laboratories
have submitted to the FBI. Below are two examples
of the findings reported in our audits:

 The State of Connecticut Forensic Science

Laboratory in Meriden, Connecticut, was not in
compliance with all of the standards governing
CODIS activities for the areas we tested. The
Laboratory did not meet NDIS participation
requirements because it did not comply with
the NDIS operational procedure that requires
laboratories to resolve all candidate matches
within 30 days of receiving the match report.
The Laboratory did not comply with the QAS
because it did not undergo an internal or
external audit during 2004. The QAS require
that laboratories have annual audits and that
every other year personnel from an independent
laboratory conduct the audit.

 The State of Michigan, Department of State

Police, Lansing Forensic Science Laboratory in
Lansing, Michigan, was not in compliance with
all of the standards governing CODIS activities
for the areas we tested. The Laboratory did not
meet NDIS participation requirements because
it did not comply with NDIS operational
procedures that require: 1) CODIS users to
complete annual reminder forms, 2) laboratories
to maintain complete training records for
personnel, and 3) laboratories to document
the steps taken when confirming or refuting
candidate matches. The Laboratory did not
comply with the QAS because it did not:
1) conduct its annual audit in accordance with
QAS requirements, 2) undergo an internal or
external audit during 2003, and 3) perform a
follow-up site visit to the contractor analyzing
its convicted offender profiles.
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Investigations
During this reporting period, the OIG received 476
complaints involving the FBI. The most common
allegations made against FBI employees included
job performance failure, misuse of a credit card,
and improper release of information. The OIG
opened 8 cases and referred 454 allegations to the
FBI’s Inspection Division.
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had
40 open cases of alleged misconduct against FBI
employees. The criminal investigations cover a
wide range of offenses, including the improper
release of law enforcement information, theft,
and misuse of position. The administrative
investigations include serious allegations of
misconduct. The following are examples of cases
involving the FBI that the OIG’s Investigations
Division investigated during this reporting period:

 A joint investigation by the OIG’s New York

Field Office, USAO, DEA, Massachusetts State
Police, Miami-Dade Police Department, and
Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office led to an
indictment in Miami, Florida, against a retired
FBI special agent on charges of murder in the
first degree and conspiracy to commit murder.
This joint investigation developed evidence that,
while employed by the FBI, retired FBI Special
Agent John J. Connolly assisted the criminal
activities of the Winter Hill Gang. Specifically,
Connolly supplied gang members with sensitive
law enforcement information and intelligence
that led directly to the murder of former World
Jai Alai President John Callahan in 1982.
Connolly currently is serving a 10-year sentence
for racketeering, obstruction of justice, and
other charges stemming from his role in
protecting members of the Winter Hill Gang
while simultaneously using them as FBI informants. Judicial proceedings continue.

 The OIG’s New York Field Office, FBI, and

USAO jointly investigated a complaint alleging

that 11 people paid a former FBI employee
a total of more than $48,000 in return for
her purported assistance in obtaining alien
registration cards, commonly known as “green
cards,” for themselves and others. The former
FBI employee accepted payments from these
individuals and told them they had appointments
with the INS to obtain green cards. She then
intentionally lost contact with the individuals
before their appointments. Consequently, none
of the individuals received a green card from the
INS. The former FBI employee was convicted
in the Eastern District of New York on charges
of impersonating an INS official, sentenced to
2 years’ incarceration and 1 year supervised
release, and ordered to pay $43,500 in
restitution, which will be returned to the victims.

 An FBI special agent who served as chief divi-

sion counsel in an FBI field office was arrested
on a charge of making a false statement. An
investigation by the OIG led to an indictment
alleging that the chief division counsel accepted
benefits worth thousands of dollars from a former subject of an FBI investigation and failed
to report his receipt of these benefits on his
financial disclosure form. Judicial proceedings
continue.

 The OIG initiated an investigation after

receiving information that an FBI language
specialist offered a bribe to a U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services supervisory district
adjudications officer (SDAO). The language
specialist allegedly offered the SDAO jewelry,
trips, and gifts in exchange for assistance with
illegally gaining admission of his foreign
relatives into the United States. During an OIG
interview, the language specialist provided a
signed sworn statement denying making any
gift offerings to the SDAO. However, when
confronted with records, the language specialist
provided another signed sworn statement
admitting he was untruthful to OIG agents in his
prior statement and that he offered the SDAO
these gifts in exchange for his assistance. The

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Federal Bureau of Investigation

case was declined for prosecution. The OIG
provided its report to the FBI for administrative
action.

Ongoing Work
The FBI’s Sentinel Case Management
System
In March 2005, the FBI announced plans to develop
the Sentinel case management system to replace
the failed Virtual Case File effort. The main goal of
Sentinel will be to enable the FBI to move from a
paper-based reporting system to an electronic
records system and maximize the FBI’s ability to
use and share the information in its possession. At
the request of the FBI Director and Congress, the
OIG has initiated a long-term audit of Sentinel to
closely monitor its development and implementation. Initially, this audit is focusing on the FBI’s
planning for the project, including its approach to
developing the system, management controls over
the project, information technology management
processes, project baselines, contracting processes,
and funding sources. Rather than issue a single
audit report, the OIG plans to issue a series of
reports examining discrete aspects of the Sentinel
project, such as the FBI’s monitoring of the contractor’s performance against established baselines
and the progress of the project.

The FBI’s Handling of the Brandon
Mayfield Matter
The OIG is completing its investigation of the FBI’s
conduct in connection with the identification of a
fingerprint found on evidence from the March 2004
Madrid train bombing. FBI fingerprint examiners
erroneously concluded that the fingerprint belonged
to Brandon Mayfield, an attorney in Portland,
Oregon. As a result of the misidentification, the
FBI initiated an investigation of Mayfield that
resulted in his arrest as a “material witness” and his

detention for approximately 2 weeks. Mayfield was
released when the Spanish National Police matched
the fingerprints on the evidence to an Algerian
national. The OIG is examining the cause of the
erroneous fingerprint identification and the FBI’s
handling of the matter, including its investigation of
Mayfield.

Follow-up Examining Implementation
of Recommendations in the Hanssen
Review
The OIG has initiated a follow-up review of the
FBI’s progress in implementing recommendations
contained in the OIG’s August 2003 report entitled,
“A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring,
Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage
Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen.” Hanssen’s
espionage began in November 1979 – 3 years
after he joined the FBI as a special agent – and
continued intermittently until his arrest in February
2001. The OIG concluded that Hanssen’s ability to
escape detection was due to long-standing systemic
problems in the FBI’s counterintelligence program
and a deeply flawed internal security program. The
OIG report made 21 recommendations to help the
FBI improve its internal security and enhance its
ability to deter and detect espionage. The Hanssen
follow-up review will assess the FBI’s response to
the recommendations in the following five areas
of the report: 1) improving the FBI’s performance
in detecting an FBI penetration; 2) improving
coordination with the Department; 3) improving
source recruitment, security, and handling;
4) security improvements; and 5) management and
administrative improvements.

The FBI’s Chinese Counterintelligence
Program
At the request of the FBI Director, the OIG is
reviewing the FBI’s performance in connection
with the handling of Katrina Leung, an asset in the
FBI’s Chinese counterintelligence program who
had a long-term intimate relationship with her FBI
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

handler, former special agent James J. Smith. The
OIG is examining a variety of performance and
management issues related to the FBI’s handling of
Leung and its counterintelligence program.

FBI and ICE Interaction on Terrorist
Financing Cases
The OIG is reviewing allegations regarding the
interaction between the FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS) Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on terrorist
financing cases. Pursuant to a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) entered into between the FBI
and the ICE in May 2003, the FBI is the nation’s
lead agency with respect to terrorist financing cases
and has the authority to decide which agency leads
these cases. Together with the DHS OIG, the OIG
is examining allegations that the FBI purposely
delayed action on a criminal wiretap application
that had been proposed by the ICE’s Houston Office
in connection with a terrorist financing case and
took other actions to exclude the ICE from the
case. The OIGs also are reviewing the effectiveness
of the MOA and the process at both agencies for
handling cases pursuant to the MOA.

Alleged Abuse of Military Detainees
The OIG is examining FBI employees’ observations
and actions relating to alleged abuse of detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The OIG
is investigating whether FBI employees participated
in any incident of detainee abuse in military facilities at these locations, whether FBI employees witnessed incidents of abuse, how FBI employees
reported observations of abuse, and how those
reports were handled by the FBI.

Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
In October 1994, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(CALEA). The purpose of CALEA is to preserve

the ability of law enforcement to conduct electronic
surveillance in the face of rapid advances in telecommunications technology. The OIG is reviewing:
1) the FBI’s strategy for implementing CALEA;
2) the progress and impediments to CALEA’s
implementation, including the effect of emerging
technologies; 3) CALEA’s implementation costs,
including projections of future costs; and 4) whether the implementation of CALEA has affected federal, state, and local law enforcement in their ability
to conduct electronic surveillance.

CODIS Operational and Laboratory
Vulnerabilities
Since 2000, the OIG has conducted a variety of
audits regarding CODIS, covering such areas as
the FBI’s overall management of CODIS; state and
local DNA laboratory compliance with existing
standards, accuracy, and allowability of DNA
profiles contained in CODIS; and vulnerabilities
of FBI practices and protocols. Our audits have
provided recommendations to improve laboratory
activities and enhance the FBI’s efforts in managing
CODIS. In continuing this effort, we currently
are evaluating CODIS’ operational and laboratory
vulnerabilities. The OIG will analyze its prior work
to identify trends and potential vulnerabilities in
the national DNA community. In addition, we will
assess the FBI’s administration of CODIS and
evaluate the implementation of corrective action
from prior, related OIG audits.

The FBI’s Seaport Security Efforts
The United States’ 361 ports comprise the world’s
most extensive and complex port system. The OIG
is assessing the FBI’s responsibilities and capabilities for preventing and responding to terrorist
attacks in the maritime domain, including seaports,
and also the extent and effectiveness of its interagency coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard,
state and local officials, and others responsible for
protecting the nation’s seaports.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Marshals Service

U.S. Marshals
Service
The USMS protects more than 2,000 federal
judges and other members of the federal judiciary,
transports federal prisoners, protects endangered
federal witnesses, manages assets seized from
criminal enterprises, and pursues and arrests federal
fugitives. The Director and Deputy Director work
with 94 U.S. Marshals, each appointed by the
President or the Attorney General, to direct the
work of approximately 4,800 employees at more
than 350 locations throughout the 50 states, Guam,
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin
Islands, Mexico, Jamaica, and the Dominican
Republic.

Reports Issued
The USMS’s Apprehension of Violent
Fugitives
The USMS is the federal government’s primary
agency for apprehending fugitives. In July 2005, the
OIG’s Evaluation and Inspections Division issued a
report on the USMS’s efforts to apprehend violent
fugitives. Our evaluation found that the USMS had
increased its apprehension of violent fugitives by
51 percent from FY 2001 through FY 2004 and
raised the number of apprehended individuals per
staff year from 18 in FY 2002 to 21 in FY 2004.
However, the increase in violent federal fugitives at
large outpaced the USMS’s progress, rising
3 percent from FY 2001 through FY 2004. At the
close of FY 2004, 14,419 violent fugitives still were
at large.

The OIG found two key reasons for the USMS’s
improved performance and efficiency. First, the
USMS increased by 21 percent the amount of time
that deputy marshals and other personnel were
devoted to fugitive investigations, from 911 staff
years in FY 2002 to 1,104 staff years in FY 2004.
Second, the USMS established Regional Fugitive
Task Forces (RTF) that enable federal, state, and
local law enforcement personnel to work together
across jurisdictional lines and share expertise
and resources to apprehend the most dangerous
fugitives. Presently, five RTFs are operating across
federal districts in nine states and the District of
Columbia.
In our report, the OIG recommended that the USMS
move forward with a plan to establish 6 more RTFs
that would operate in 19 states and 3 territories and
take steps to implement on a wider basis the practices of the most successful RTFs. We also recommended establishing measures and goals to track
performance in apprehending violent fugitives and
improving data collection and analysis to accurately
determine caseload and necessary resources. The
USMS concurred with all the recommendations, has
requested appropriations for the creation of additional RTFs, and is employing its Chiefs’ Investigative Advisory Committee to develop performance
standards and measure progress in reducing the
number of violent fugitives at large.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

The USMS’s Use of Independent
Contractors as Guards
The USMS relies on independent contractors
hired as guards to assist USMS deputy marshals in
day-to-day operations throughout its 94 districts.
The USMS hires more than 2,700 independent
contract guards annually and uses them primarily
to transport federal prisoners to and from court
facilities and guard federal prisoners in courtrooms
or cellblocks. Each guard hired as an independent
contractor requires a separate contract. Procurement
of these independent contractors is an entirely
decentralized function in which contracting officers
in USMS districts contract with individuals for the
necessary guard services. Independent contractors
constitute a core part of the USMS’s workforce in
many districts, sometimes accounting for more than
50 percent of the total hours charged to prisoner
handling activities.
The OIG’s Audit Division audited the USMS’s
internal controls over the procurement of independent contractors for guard service. Our audit also
assessed whether the USMS was adequately monitoring the performance of its independent contract
guards, examined whether independent contractors
were meeting the USMS’s experience and fitnessfor-duty requirements, evaluated the initial training
provided to contract personnel, and determined
whether independent contractors were performing
only authorized duties.
We found that the USMS districts’ procurement
practices were in violation of USMS policy and
the Federal Acquisition Regulation with regard to
procurement of independent contractors. We also
discovered a lack of controls over the procurement
process for independent contractors that have created an environment conducive to inconsistencies and
inefficiencies. We identified internal control weaknesses in the hiring and monitoring of independent
contractors that allowed for the hiring of unqualified

individuals for guard service. In addition, we found
that armed contract guards did not always receive
firearms training on a timely basis, and we could
not verify whether the majority of independent
contractors tested had been medically certified or
received background investigations because of the
lack of documentation in USMS files.
The OIG recommended that the USMS: 1) ensure
the use of formal procurement procedures in the
districts, 2) revise fitness-for-duty requirements,
3) maintain complete contract files, 4) institute a
formal evaluation process, 5) track and document
contractor training, 6) ensure firearms qualifications, and 7) consider alternative methods for
obtaining guard services. The USMS concurred
with all the recommendations and has begun instituting corrective actions.

The USMS’s Cooperative Agreement
Program
The USMS is responsible for the custody and
transportation of detainees awaiting trial in federal
courts. Most of the 49,000 USMS detainees in
custody daily are held in state, local, private,
and federal jail facilities using: 1) Cooperative
Agreement Program (CAP) agreements with state
and local jails where capital investment funding is
provided in exchange for guaranteed bed space;
2) Intergovernmental Service Agreements (IGA)
with state and local jails, where a daily rate is
paid to the jails to house detainees; 3) private
jail facilities, where a daily rate is paid to house
detainees; and 4) federal detention facilities.
In locations where detention space is scarce,
the USMS negotiates with state and local
governments to provide an agreed-upon amount
of CAP funds to improve local jail facilities or
expand jail capacities. In return, the state and local
governments guarantee the USMS an agreed-upon

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Marshals Service

number of bed spaces for a specified number of
years. Use of the bed space also requires an IGA
between the USMS and the facility. Since 1982, the
USMS has awarded about $285 million to counties
and municipalities under CAP agreements, resulting
in more than 13,600 guaranteed spaces for federal
detainees. In recent years, Congress steadily has
reduced the appropriation for the CAP program and
eliminated funding for the program altogether for
FY 2005.
Our audit focused on whether the USMS has
developed adequate plans, in the absence of CAP
funding, to secure jail space in cities where CAP
agreements will expire during the next three fiscal
years and where jail space is scarce but no CAP
agreements exist. We found that the USMS has
not determined whether jails with expiring CAP
agreements will continue to house USMS detainees
at a reasonable cost after the CAP agreements
expire. To address these issues, we recommended
that the USMS develop specific plans for securing
detention space in the event that CAP funding is not
restored in future appropriations.

Investigations
The following is an example of a case involving
the USMS that the OIG investigated during this
reporting period:

 In our March 2005 Semiannual Report to

Congress, we reported on a case in which
2 newspaper reporters followed a U.S. marshal
for 10 days during a 17-day period in September
and October 2004 and found that the
U.S. marshal rarely worked a full day and used
his assigned government-owned vehicle for
personal errands on one occasion. The reporters published an article on their findings, which
prompted the OIG to examine the U.S. marshal’s
work-related activities for a 4-week period that
included the 17 days during which the reporters
conducted surveillance. We concluded that the
U.S. marshal failed to satisfy the basic 40-hour
workweek requirement of his position and misused a government vehicle. We completed our
investigation in March 2005 and provided a
copy of our report to the USMS and the Deputy
Attorney General’s Office. In August 2005, the
U.S. marshal was terminated from his position.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Federal Bureau
of Prisons
The BOP operates a nationwide system of prisons
and detention facilities to incarcerate those
imprisoned for federal crimes and detain those
awaiting trial or sentencing in federal court. The
BOP has approximately 35,000 employees and
operates 115 institutions, 6 regional offices, 2 staff
training centers, and 28 community corrections
management offices. The BOP is responsible for
the custody and care of approximately 187,000
federal offenders, 160,000 of whom are confined
in BOP-operated correctional institutions and
detention centers. The remainder are confined in
facilities operated by state or local governments or
in privately operated facilities.

Reports Issued
Deterring Staff Sexual Abuse of Federal
Inmates
The OIG investigates many cases involving staff
sexual abuse of federal inmates. In total, these
cases annually comprise approximately 12 percent
of the OIG’s total number of investigations. The
OIG conducted this review to assess the problem of
sexual abuse of federal inmates by correctional staff
and examine the shortcomings of current federal
laws intended to deter and punish staff sexual
abuse.
Federal law criminalizes all sexual relations and
sexual contact between prison staff and inmates.
Consent is never a legal defense for corrections
staff who engage in sexual acts with inmates

because federal law mandates that all sexual
relations between staff and inmates are considered
abuse. Even if a sexual act would have been
considered consensual if it occurred outside of a
prison, by statute it is criminal sexual abuse when it
occurs inside a prison.
We concluded that current federal laws criminalizing staff sexual relations with federal prisoners
are deficient in two critical ways. First, the crime
of sexual abuse of an inmate currently is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum sentence of
1 year unless the staff member uses force or overt
threats to sexually abuse the inmate. Because prison
employees control many aspects of inmates’ lives,
in many cases prison employees obtain sex from
inmates without resorting to the use of force or
overt threats. Second, current federal sex abuse
laws do not apply to federal inmates held in facilities under contract to the federal government rather
than in BOP facilities. As a result, abuse of federal
inmates held at contractor facilities sometimes goes
unpunished because of limitations in current federal
law.
In addition, we found that many federal prosecutors
are reluctant to prosecute sexual abuse cases
because the crimes are not felonies. Between
FYs 2000 and 2004, the OIG presented 163 sexual
abuse cases for prosecution and only 73, or
45 percent, were accepted for prosecution.
Moreover, current federal laws that categorize
unforced sexual abuse as a misdemeanor are
out-of-step with state laws. We found that 43 states
make unforced sexual relations with inmates a
felony, with the average maximum sentence length
approximately 10 years’ imprisonment.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Federal Bureau of Prisons

The OIG report recommended that the Department
seek passage of legislation to make unforced sex
with inmates a felony. We also recommended
legislation to extend federal criminal jurisdiction
to individuals who engage in a sexual act with a
federal prisoner housed in a detention facility under
contract to the Department. The Department and the
BOP agreed with these recommendations and are
seeking the necessary legislative changes.

Investigations
During this reporting period, the OIG received
2,808 complaints involving the BOP. The
most common allegations made against BOP
employees included job performance failure, use
of unnecessary force, rude treatment of inmates,
official misconduct, misuse of government
property, introduction of contraband, and off-duty
misconduct. The vast majority of complaints dealt
with non-criminal issues that the OIG referred to
the BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs.
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had
233 open cases of alleged misconduct against BOP
employees. The criminal investigations cover a
wide range of allegations, including bribery of a
public official, introduction of contraband, and sexual abuse of inmates. The following are examples
of cases involving the BOP that the OIG’s Investigations Division investigated during this reporting
period:

 An investigation by the OIG’s Chicago Field

Office resulted in the arrest of two BOP correctional officers assigned to the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Pekin, Illinois. The
first correctional officer was arrested on charges
of conspiracy, introduction of contraband, and
making false statements to the OIG. The investigation led to an indictment charging that the
first correctional officer smuggled contraband,
including heroin, creatine, and cellular phones,
from inmates’ family members into the prison in

exchange for cash. When interviewed, the correctional officer provided false information in a
signed sworn statement. The second correctional
officer was arrested and pled guilty to a charge
of providing marijuana to an inmate. During an
OIG interview, the second correctional officer
confessed to having developed a sexual relationship with an inmate and smuggling marijuana
into the prison for him. One other correctional
officer, two inmates, and a civilian previously
were arrested in this case. Judicial proceedings
continue.

 An investigation by the OIG’s Miami Field

Office and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service
led to the conviction of a former BOP correctional officer, previously assigned to the FCI in
Tallahassee, Florida, on charges of introduction
of contraband. Investigators obtained evidence
that inmates’ relatives mailed contraband,
including food items and cosmetics, to a post
office box used by the correctional officer. The
correctional officer subsequently smuggled the
contraband into the FCI and provided it to
inmates in exchange for sexual favors. Sentencing is pending.

 An investigation by the OIG’s Boston Area

Office resulted in the guilty plea of a former
BOP maintenance foreman, previously
assigned to the Devens Federal Medical Center
in Devens, Massachusetts, on charges of embezzling funds belonging to the United States. The
investigation determined that the maintenance
foreman, who had been issued a federal government credit card for use in obtaining goods and
services for the medical center, made arrangements with three vendors to charge his government credit card, as well as credit cards issued
to his subordinates, for services that supposedly
had been supplied by a third-party contractor.
The maintenance foreman also arranged for the
vendors to issue checks that he endorsed and
cashed for his own use. In total, the maintenance
foreman embezzled approximately $90,000.
Sentencing is pending.
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

 An investigation by the OIG’s Washington Field
Office led to the arrest of a BOP correctional
officer, two civilians, and two inmates on
charges of introduction of contraband into the
FCI in Gilmer, West Virginia. The investigation
revealed that the inmates conspired with the
civilians and the correctional officer to obtain
and introduce marijuana inside the FCI. Judicial
proceedings continue.

printed in Arabic newspapers and used to recruit
other terrorists. As a result, the OIG is assessing
the BOP’s inmate mail screening and translation
procedures to determine whether the BOP ensures
that federal inmates are not using the mail system
or the cover of a foreign language to continue criminal behavior, encourage the furtherance of criminal
behavior, or encourage any activity that may
threaten the public or national security.

The BOP’s Pharmacy Services

Ongoing Work
The BOP’s Management of Inmate Mail
Three terrorists convicted of the 1993 bombing
of the World Trade Center allegedly wrote
approximately 90 letters while incarcerated in federal prison to Islamic extremists in other countries,
including inmates who had been part of a Spanish
terror cell tied to the 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks.
The letters, which praised Usama Bin Laden, were

The BOP currently has over 150 pharmacists who
fill 4 to 5 million prescriptions per year for federal
inmates. The pharmacists also are responsible for
managing inventories of prescription medication
and related supplies, conducting patient counseling,
and maintaining patient records. The OIG is
assessing whether the BOP ensures adequate
controls and safeguards over prescription drugs;
evaluating the BOP’s efforts to reduce the rising
costs of prescription drugs; and assessing whether
BOP pharmacies are in compliance with applicable
laws, regulations, policies, and procedures.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Drug Enforcement Administration

Drug Enforcement
Administration
The DEA enforces federal laws and regulations
related to the growth, production, or distribution
of controlled substances. In addition, the DEA
seeks to reduce the supply of and demand for illicit
drugs, both domestically and internationally. The
DEA has approximately 10,900 employees staffing
its 23 division offices in the United States and the
Caribbean and 80 offices in 58 other countries.

Reports Issued
The DEA’s Payments to Confidential
Sources
Confidential sources are an important tool used
by the DEA to help initiate investigations and
provide information or services to facilitate
arrests and seizures of drugs and cash. The OIG’s
Audit Division audited the DEA’s controls over
confidential source payments and its compliance
with regulations concerning confidential sources.
The OIG review found various areas where the
DEA can improves its management of confidential
informants and its compliance with relevant
Attorney General Guidelines.
In May 2002, the Attorney General issued revised
Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential
Informants. The guidelines outline requirements
that the DEA must fulfill before activating a
confidential source. For example, case agents
for confidential sources must complete and
sign a written Initial Suitability Report and
Recommendation (ISRR) that addresses specific

risk factors or indicate on the report that a
particular factor is not applicable. In addition,
once a confidential source has been established,
the guidelines require the case agent to review,
at least annually, the confidential source’s file
and complete and sign a written Continuing
Suitability Report and Recommendation (CSRR)
that must be forwarded to a field manager for
written approval. The purpose of the CSRR is to
determine whether the risk of using a source has
changed since the initial evaluation and whether the
confidential source should continue to be utilized.
The guidelines also require the DEA to establish
accounting and reconciliation procedures that
reflect all monies paid to confidential sources.
Our audit found that both ISRRs and CSRRs were
not adequately documented. For example, the OIG
found that most written DEA initial suitability
assessments did not address specific risk assessment
factors, and therefore did not meet guidelines
requirements that suitability statements detail the
specific benefits of utilizing a confidential source
despite the identified risk factors. The majority
of suitability statements we reviewed contained
general statements indicating, in essence, that the
benefits of using the confidential source outweighed
the risks – without specifying either the benefits or
the risks. We also found instances where multiple
DEA offices categorized the same source differently
and improperly categorized other sources. In
addition, we concluded that the DEA does not have
an effective system that accounts for and reconciles
all confidential source payments. Instead, the DEA
relies on a manual process to ascertain payment
information to confidential sources – a timeconsuming process that is prone to error.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

The OIG report provided 12 recommendations to
help the DEA improve its management of confidential sources. These recommendations include requiring comprehensive written ISRRs and CSRRs that
address all of the factors specified in the guidelines;
requiring the long-term confidential source review
committee to either review the confidential source
files for all long-term confidential sources or review
the written ISRRs and CSRRs and document their
findings; enhancing the existing DEA database system to track confidential source impeachment information; and accounting for all payments made to a
confidential source by the DEA, not just payments
using DEA-appropriated funds. The DEA concurred
with most of the recommendations.

during the arrest, and personnel who provided
the defendant’s medical treatment. Medical
personnel stated that the defendant attributed
his facial injuries to falling down when he
attempted to flee from law enforcement.
Attending medical personnel said they did not
find any evidence indicating that the defendant
was abused. The investigation concluded that no
excessive force was used during the defendant’s
arrest, and the interview statements did not
support the defendant’s allegation that he was
struck or hit. The DEA personnel involved
in the defendant’s arrest were cleared of any
wrongdoing.

 The OIG investigated allegations that a former

Investigations
During this reporting period, the OIG received 168
complaints involving the DEA. The most common
allegations made against DEA employees included
job performance failure, misuse of a credit card,
theft, misuse of government property, and false
statements. The OIG opened 9 investigations and
referred 155 allegations to the DEA’s Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR).
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had
28 open cases of alleged misconduct against DEA
employees. The most common allegation was theft.
The following are examples of cases involving
the DEA that the OIG’s Investigations Division
investigated during this reporting period:

 The OIG’s Dallas Field Office and the DEA

OPR conducted a joint investigation into
allegations by a civilian defendant in a DEA
methamphetamine investigation that DEA
special agents used excessive force during
his arrest, violating his civil rights. During
the investigation, the OIG interviewed the
defendant, all DEA special agents present

DEA resident agent in charge (RAC) was
receiving kickbacks from confidential source
payments related to a foreign-undercover
operation. Although the OIG investigation
was unable to corroborate the allegations of
criminal misconduct on the part of the RAC
or any current or former DEA employee
involved in the operation, it did find that the
RAC and the agents under his supervision did
not follow established DEA procedures for
the establishment and proper use of a DEA
confidential source. In addition, the RAC
and his supervisor did not exercise adequate
management and control over the expenditure
of $181,500 in DEA funds in the operation. The
OIG completed its report and provided it to the
DEA for appropriate action.

 An investigation by the OIG’s Dallas Field

Office led to the arrest and guilty plea of a
DEA evidence technician assigned to the
Laredo District Office in Laredo, Texas, on
charges of theft. An indictment returned in
the Southern District of Texas alleged that
the evidence technician removed jewelry and
cellular telephones from the non-drug evidence
room and sold the items in return for monetary
compensation. Following an OIG polygraph,
the evidence technician admitted to stealing

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Drug Enforcement Administration

evidence valued in excess of $2,000 from the
non-drug evidence room. The investigators also
developed evidence that he was a regular player
in high-stakes poker games in which known
Laredo crime figures participated. Judicial
proceedings continue.

 In our March 2004 Semiannual Report to

Congress, we reported on a case in which a
former DEA associate special agent in charge
(ASAC) of the DEA’s New York Division was
arrested in the Southern District of New York
on charges of embezzlement, false claims, aiding and abetting, mail and wire fraud, and theft
of honest services. A joint investigation by the
OIG’s New York Field Office and the DEA OPR
led to a 214-count indictment alleging that the
ASAC embezzled $138,000 from the DEA and
misused DEA resources to perform work for a
private investigations firm he owned and operated. During this reporting period, the ASAC
was sentenced pursuant to his guilty plea to
30 months’ incarceration followed by
36 months’ supervised release, and he was
ordered to pay full restitution in the amount of
$154,959.

Ongoing Work
The DEA’s Control of the Diversion of
Controlled Pharmaceuticals
The OIG is conducting a follow-up review of
the DEA’s enforcement of laws that prohibit
the diversion of controlled pharmaceuticals.
Our September 2002 report on this subject
included recommendations that the DEA increase
investigative resources devoted to the diversion
problem, clarify the law enforcement authorities of
diversion investigators, ensure adequate training for
special agents in diversion, and explore additional
intelligence capabilities to support diversion
control. This follow-up review will assess the
DEA’s response to the recommendations as well as
the DEA’s response to emerging diversion threats,
such as illegal Internet pharmacies.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

31

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives
The ATF enforces federal laws on firearms, arson,
and explosives, and criminal laws on alcohol
and tobacco smuggling and diversion. The ATF’s
responsibilities include regulating the firearms and
explosives industries and providing training and
support to federal, state, local, and international
law enforcement partners. The ATF’s nearly 5,000
special agents, inspectors, regulatory specialists,
forensic auditors, laboratory technicians, and other
personnel work primarily in 23 field divisions
across the 50 states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and Guam. Foreign offices are located in
Mexico, Canada, Colombia, and France.

Reports Issued
National Integrated Ballistic Information
Network Program
Through the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) program, the ATF provides
Integrated Ballistics Identification System equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies.
The agencies’ firearms examiners and technicians
use the equipment to obtain computerized images
of the unique marks made on bullets and cartridge
casings when firearms are discharged. The images
are electronically compared to other images in the
system to determine whether a firearm matches one
used in another criminal case. NIBIN enables law
enforcement agencies to quickly discover links
between crimes, some of which would not have
been identified without this technology.

At the request of the ATF, the OIG’s Audit
Division assessed the ATF’s management and
implementation of NIBIN. The OIG found that
NIBIN had been fully deployed with the capability
to compare ballistic images on a national level.
However, we concluded that ballistics equipment
had not been deployed to the sites that could best
utilize it and the nationwide search capability of
NIBIN was rarely used. We also found that the
ATF had not taken steps to maximize the entry
of evidence into NIBIN. In addition, the audit
determined that: 1) many law enforcement agencies
were not participating in the program, 2) the
ATF was not promoting the program enough to
maximize participation, 3) many law enforcement
agencies were not maximizing the amount of
firearms evidence collected and submitted for entry
into NIBIN, 4) a high-volume law enforcement
agency was not reviewing high-confidence matches
in NIBIN, and 5) many law enforcement agencies
were not adequately managing backlogged
evidence.
To improve the operation and success of NIBIN,
we made 12 recommendations to the ATF. The ATF
concurred with all of the recommendations.

Review of the ATF’s Disciplinary System
In September 2005, the OIG’s Evaluation and
Inspections Division reported on ATF investigations
of employee misconduct and discipline of
employees when misconduct is confirmed. The
report was the fourth in a series of reviews of
Department components’ disciplinary systems.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

The OIG found that the ATF did not ensure that all
misconduct was properly reported or thoroughly
investigated. In addition, the documentation and
tracking of misconduct cases was incomplete
and inconsistent, which prevented the ATF from
ensuring that consistent penalties were proposed.
Decisions to mitigate proposed discipline were not
always sufficiently justified and the implementation
of penalties for misconduct was not always
documented. The OIG also reported that the ATF
had no timeliness goals or standards to measure the
disciplinary system’s performance. The average
time the ATF took to investigate and adjudicate
misconduct cases, however, was similar in range
to the three other Department components that the
OIG previously reviewed.
At the ATF’s request, the OIG reviewed a pilot
project the ATF has been using since June 2003
for its more serious misconduct cases. In the pilot
project, a single “Bureau Deciding Official” makes
final decisions on proposed discipline, which under
the ATF’s traditional system these disciplinary
decisions were made by various local managers.
The OIG determined that the pilot project has
produced final discipline decisions that are more
consistent, reasonable, and timely than those
imposed through the ATF’s standard process, and
we concluded that making the Bureau Deciding
Official process permanent was warranted.
The OIG made nine recommendations to help the
ATF improve its disciplinary system, including to
have all investigations of alleged misconduct be
conducted or reviewed by the ATF Investigations
Division before a case is adjudicated; establish a
time period for how far back prior discipline should
be considered; eliminate the policy of allowing
the same individual to serve as the proposing and
deciding official for the same misconduct case;
and establish policies and procedures to ensure
that discipline imposed is applied consistently.
The ATF generally concurred with the report’s
recommendations and is taking steps to implement
them.

Investigations
The following is an example of a case involving
the ATF that the OIG’s Investigations Division
investigated during this reporting period:

 An investigation by the OIG’s Philadelphia

Area Office led to the arrest and guilty plea of a
former ATF contract background investigator in
the District of New Jersey on charges of theft of
government funds. OIG investigators developed
evidence that the background investigator
falsified investigation reports by not conducting
the required interviews. She subsequently
submitted fraudulent payment vouchers to the
ATF and received payment. The investigator
was sentenced to 3 years’ probation, fined
$2,000, and ordered to forfeit $5,500.

Ongoing Work
Violent Crime Impact Teams
The OIG is evaluating an ATF initiative to reduce
violent firearms crimes in selected cities across the
United States. This review will assess whether the
ATF effectively implemented the Violent Crime
Impact Teams and whether the teams are achieving
the program’s stated goal of reducing violent crime.

ATF Laboratories Follow-up
The ATF operates three forensic laboratories that
examine firearms, tool marks, fire debris, explosives
materials, fingerprints, questioned documents, and
trace evidence. During FY 2004, the laboratories
processed over 3,000 evidence submissions. The
OIG is evaluating whether the laboratories manage
workloads effectively to provide timely services to
ATF field divisions. Our audit follows up on audit
findings reported in 2001 by the Department of
Treasury OIG, which was responsible for auditing
the ATF until its transfer to the Department in 2003.
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

33

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Other Department
Components
Office of Justice Programs
Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services
OJP manages the Department’s multi-faceted grant
program. Since its inception in 1984, OJP has
awarded more than 80,000 grants totaling more
than $39 billion for a wide variety of programs to
prevent and control crime. OJP has approximately
700 employees and is composed of five bureaus:
1) the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), 2) the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 3) the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ), 4) the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, and 5) the Office for
Victims of Crime.
The Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) was created as a result of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 to advance community policing in
jurisdictions of all sizes across the country. COPS
provides grants to tribal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies to hire and train community
policing professionals, acquire and deploy cuttingedge crime-fighting technologies, and develop and
test innovative policing strategies.

Reports Issued
The OIG continued to audit grants awarded by OJP
and COPS. Examples of findings from these audits
during this reporting period included the following:

 The University of New Hampshire (UNH)

in Durham, New Hampshire, was awarded
two grants from OJP to fund research and
development efforts as part of the Consolidated
Advanced Technologies for Law Enforcement
Program, which is located at UNH. We
determined that UNH failed to fully comply
with grant requirements, did not spend all
available funds, did not exercise adequate
management and control over grant budgets, and
charged direct cost expenditures to the grants for
purchases that were not approved in the budgets.
As a result, we identified more than $1.2 million
in grant funds recommended to be put to better
use and are questioning an additional $577,605
in grant funds received. We reported total dollarrelated findings of nearly $1.8 million, which is
approximately 17 percent of the total funding
for both grants.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Other Department Components

 Prairie View Prevention Services in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota, was awarded three grants from
COPS to assist state and local law enforcement
agencies in reducing the production, distribution, and use of methamphetamine. The three
congressionally-earmarked grants totaled nearly
$2.1 million. While Prairie View was compliant with grant budget management and control
requirements, we found non-compliance issues
such as unsupported salaries and fringe benefits
as well as excessive drawdowns of grant funds
in advance of incurring grant-related expenditures. We also found that Prairie View did not
comply with OMB requirements and Financial
Status Reports and Progress Reports were not
always submitted in a timely manner. Additionally, Financial Status Reports were not always
accurate and indirect costs were incorrectly
allocated. As a result, we reported total questioned costs of $485,124.

 The Colorado Department of Corrections

(CDOC) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, was
awarded a grant from OJP to fund the Serious
and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative. The
nearly $2.2 million grant was awarded to provide funding to develop, implement, and evaluate reentry strategies to ensure the safety of the
community and the reduction of serious violent
crime. We found that CDOC transferred funds
between budget categories exceeding 10 percent
of the award amount, a violation of OJP financial guidelines. The grantee also was reimbursed
$87,710 for costs charged to the grant that
either were not supported or were not allowable.
Moreover, CDOC failed to adequately monitor its subgrantee or contractors and Progress
Reports were not always submitted timely. As a
result, we reported total dollar-related findings
of $349,084.

Investigations
The following are examples of cases involving OJP
or COPS that the OIG’s Investigations Division
investigated during this reporting period:

 A joint investigation by the OIG’s Dallas Field

Office, FBI, and Arkansas State Police led to the
arrest of a former detective with the Crittenden
County, Arkansas, Sheriff’s Department
on charges of theft. In 1997, the Sheriff’s
Department placed the detective in charge
of applying for and managing federal funds
obtained through the Local Law Enforcement
Block Grant program administered by the
BJA. Investigators developed evidence that the
detective devised a scheme to steal some of the
funds by establishing a fictitious company to
purchase law enforcement equipment for the
Sheriff’s Department. Instead of purchasing
equipment, the detective channeled funds
totaling more than $27,000 into his personal
bank account. He pled guilty in the Eastern
District of Arkansas to an information charging
him with theft from an organization receiving
federal funds. Sentencing is pending.

 An investigation by the OIG’s Fraud

Detection Office led to the arrest of a former
administrative assistant at the Neighborhood
Youth and Parent Prevention Partnership
(NYPPP) – which is partially funded by OJP
grants – on charges of fraud and embezzlement
from an organization receiving federal funds.
OIG investigators determined that, from
September 1999 to September 2003, the
administrative assistant embezzled more than
$30,000 by writing checks to herself for “salary
advances” or to reimburse herself for fraudulent
“official expenses.” The administrative assistant
pled guilty in the Western District of Michigan;
was sentenced to 30 days’ incarceration,
9 months’ home confinement, and 3 years’
supervised release; and was ordered to pay
$30,576 in restitution.
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

 In our March 2005 Semiannual Report to

Congress, we discussed a case in which a former
Texas police chief was convicted in the Southern
District of Texas on 52 counts of extortion,
conspiracy, and fraud. A joint investigation
conducted by the OIG’s Houston Area Office,
FBI, and Texas Rangers developed evidence
that the police chief, along with a former Texas
police captain, conspired to make materially
false statements to the COPS grant program
and defraud the government of grant funds.
During this reporting period, the former police
chief was sentenced to 63 months’ incarceration
followed by 3 years’ supervised release.

Ongoing Work
NIJ’s Antiterrorism Technology
Development Program
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, NIJ sponsors the
development of counterterrorism technologies
through its collaborations with various technology
partners. The OIG is reviewing NIJ’s Antiterrorism
Technology Development Program to: 1) determine
whether program funds were awarded for projects
that satisfy the intent of the program, 2) assess
the adequacy of program oversight, 3) determine
whether grantees have used program funds in
accordance with grant requirements, and 4) assess
the adequacy of the program’s progress toward
meeting its goals and objectives.

COPS’ Methamphetamine Initiative
In 1998, Congress established a methamphetamine
initiative administered by COPS to help address
the spread of methamphetamine. Since then, COPS
has invested more than $350 million nationwide
to combat the spread of methamphetamine.
The OIG is assessing COPS’ administration

of methamphetamine initiative grants and its
monitoring of grantee activities. We also are
evaluating the extent to which the grantees have
administered grants in accordance with applicable
laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and
conditions of the grant awards.

U.S. Attorneys’
Offices
U.S. Attorneys serve as the federal government’s
principal criminal and civil litigators and conduct
most of the trial work in which the United States
is a party. Under the direction of the Attorney
General, 93 U.S. Attorneys are stationed throughout
the United States, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
More than 11,700 employees work in those offices
and in the EOUSA.

Investigations
The following are examples of cases involving
the USAO that the OIG’s Investigations Division
investigated during this reporting period:

 An investigation by the OIG’s Washington

Field Office led to the arrest and guilty plea of
a USAO employee on charges of conflict of
interest. The employee, acting as coordinator
for the Law Enforcement Coordinating
Committee (LECC) Program for the USAOs’
Middle District of Louisiana from June 1994
to February 2003, had the authority to hire
government vendors to conduct training for
state and local law enforcement agencies.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Other Department Components

Investigators developed evidence that the
employee negotiated with a consulting firm to
provide training seminars and subsequently
arranged for the consulting firm to hire his wife
to plan and coordinate these seminars. He also
recommended that the LECC coordinator for
the Western District of Texas hire the consulting
firm to conduct training seminars in that District.
As a result of these business dealings, the
consulting firm paid the coordinator’s wife more
than $55,000. The coordinator, in turn, directly
received more than $20,000 from this business
arrangement. Sentencing is pending.

 The OIG opened an investigation after learning

Ongoing Work
The USAOs’ Use of Intelligence
Research Specialists
The OIG is assessing whether the USAO makes
effective use of its Intelligence Research Specialists
to analyze and share terrorism-related information.
The review will examine three areas: the purpose
and implementation of the positions, the types
of work Intelligence Research Specialists are
producing, and how the work is disseminated and
used.

that the background reinvestigation of an
assistant U.S. attorney (AUSA) revealed that he
had failed to file income tax returns for the years
2000 to 2003. The investigation confirmed that
the AUSA lied in a Department form and to OIG
agents about his failure to file. Prosecution of
the case was declined. The AUSA resigned from
his position as a result of the investigation.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

37

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Top Management
Challenges
The OIG has created a list of top management
challenges in the Department annually since 1998,
initially in response to congressional requests but
in recent years as part of the Department’s annual
Performance and Accountability Report.
The OIG’s list of top challenges for this year, issued
in October 2005, is to the right. The challenges are
not presented in order of priority – we believe that
all are critical management issues facing the
Department. However, it is clear that the top challenge facing the Department is its ongoing response
to the threat of terrorism. Several other top challenges are closely related to and impact directly on
the Department’s counterterrorism efforts.
Eight of the challenges from last year’s list remain
and are long-standing, difficult challenges that
will not be solved quickly or easily. However, two
challenges from last year’s list have been replaced
by two other challenges. We removed “Human
Capital” and “Forensic Laboratories” this year and
added two new challenges: “Department and FBI
Intelligence-Related Reorganizations” and “Judicial
Security.”

Top Management Challenges in the
Department of Justice – 2005
1.

Counterterrorism

2.

Sharing of Law Enforcement and Intelligence
Information

3.

Department and FBI Intelligence-Related
Reorganizations

4.

Information Technology Systems Planning
and Implementation

5.

Information Technology Security

6.

Financial Management and Systems

7.

Grant Management

8.

Detention and Incarceration

9.

Judicial Security

10. Supply and Demand for Drugs
Detailed information about these management
challenges can be found at www.usdoj.gov/oig/
challenges/index.htm.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Testimony and Legislation and Regulations

Testimony
During this reporting period, the Inspector General
provided the following testimony:

 Before the House Committee on Appropriations

 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee

In addition, the Inspector General submitted a
written statement for a Senate Judiciary Committee
hearing on the USMS’s judicial security process.
The Inspector General also testified before two
independent commissions during this reporting
period:

concerning the OIG’s oversight of the FBI.

 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee

concerning the OIG’s work regarding detainees
held on immigration charges as part of the
Department’s terrorism investigations after the
September 11 attacks.

 Before the House Judiciary Committee

regarding Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act.

 Before the House Committee on Government
Reform regarding the Department’s FY 2004
financial statement audits.

regarding the OIG’s oversight work in the FBI.

 The National Prison Rape Elimination

Commission regarding the OIG report on
deterring staff sexual abuse of inmates; and

 The Commission on Safety and Abuse in

America’s Prisons regarding the OIG’s work
related to use of excessive force, introduction
of contraband, verbal abuse, and civil rights
violations in federal prisons.

Legislation and Regulations
The IG Act directs the OIG to review proposed
legislation and regulations relating to the programs
and operations of the Department. Although the
Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs reviews
all proposed or enacted legislation that could affect
the Department’s activities, the OIG independently
reviews proposed legislation that affects it and
legislation that relates to waste, fraud, or abuse in
the Department’s programs or operations.

During this reporting period, the OIG reviewed a
variety of legislation, including the Department
of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2006 through 2009, which contains an OIGsponsored amendment to increase penalties for
sexual abuse of federal inmates by correctional
officers in contract detention facilities and expand
federal jurisdiction over contraband offenses
involving federal prisoners held in contract
facilities. The OIG also reviewed legislation related
to the Federal Privacy and Protection Act and the
Improving Government Accountability Act.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

39

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Statistical Information
Audit Statistics
Audit Summary
During this reporting period, the Audit Division
issued 109 audit reports containing more than
$12 million in questioned costs and more than
$2 million in funds recommended to be put to
better use and made 466 recommendations for
management improvement. Specifically, the Audit

Division issued 19 internal reports of Department
programs funded at more than $521 million;
38 external reports of contracts, grants, and other
agreements funded at more that $79 million; and
52 Single Audit Act audits. In addition, the Audit
Division issued three Notifications of Irregularities.

Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use
Audit Reports

Number of
Audit Reports

Funds Recommended
to Be Put to
Better Use

No management decision made
by beginning of period

7

$8,651,803

Issued during period

8

$2,154,437

15

$10,806,240

12

$8,657,077

0

$0

3

$2,149,163

Needing management
decision during period
Management decisions made
during period:
 Amounts management
agreed to put to better use 1
 Amounts management
disagreed to put to better use
No management decision at end of period
1

Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was taken.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Statistical Information

Audits With Questioned Costs
Audit Reports

Number of
Audit Reports

Total Questioned
Costs (including
unsupported costs)

Unsupported
Costs

No management decision
made by beginning of period

25

$39,016,272

$1,577,273

Issued during period

37

$12,639,339

$7,078,278

Needing management
decision during period

62

$51,655,611

$8,655,551

Management decisions made
during period:
 Amount of disallowed costs 1
 Amount of costs not disallowed

53
0

$45,528,636
$0

$7,061,346
$0

9

$6,126,975

$1,594,205

No management decision at
end of period
1

Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was taken.

Audits Involving Recommendations for
Management Improvements
Number of
Audit Reports

Total Number of
Management Improvements
Recommended

No management decision made
by beginning of period

43

98

Issued during period

96

466

Needing management
decision during period

139

564

Management decisions made
during period:
 Number management agreed to implement 1
 Number management disagreed with

132
0

552
0

7

12

Audit Reports

No management decision at end of period
1

Includes instances in which management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was taken.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

41

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Audit Follow-Up

 COPS Grants to the Passamaquoddy Tribe and

OMB Circular A-50

 COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants to the

OMB Circular A-50, Audit Follow-Up, requires audit
reports to be resolved within 6 months of the audit
report issuance date. Audit monitors the status of
open audit reports to track the audit resolution and
closure process. As of September 30, 2005, the OIG
had closed 134 audit reports and was monitoring the
resolution process of 385 open audit reports.

Unresolved Audits
Audits Over 6 Months Old Without
Management Decisions
As of September 30, 2005, the following audits had
no management decision or were in disagreement:

Pleasant Point Reservation Police Department,
Perry, Maine

Sioux City, Iowa, Police Department

 USMS Intergovernmental Service Agreement

for Detention Facilities with the Central Virginia
Regional Jail

Evaluation and
Inspections Statistics
The chart below summarizes the Evaluation and
Inspections Division’s (E&I) accomplishments for
the 6-month reporting period ending September 30,
2005.

Number of
Reviews

 COPS Grants to Albuquerque, New Mexico,

E&I Workload
Accomplishments

 COPS Grants to AMTRAK Police Department

Reviews active at
beginning of period

8

 COPS Grants to Dona Ana County,

Reviews initiated

4

Final reports issued

5

Reviews active at end
of reporting period

7

Police Department

New Mexico, Sheriff’s Department

 COPS Grants to Picuris Pueblo, New Mexico,
Police Department
 COPS Grants to Texas Tech University Police
Department, Lubbock, Texas

 COPS Grants to the Blackfeet Tribal Business
Council, Montana

 COPS Grants to the City of Camden,
New Jersey, Police Department

 COPS Grants to the Navajo Department of

Resource Enforcement, Window Rock, Arizona

Unresolved Reviews
DOJ Order 2900.10, Follow-up and Resolution
Policy for Inspection Recommendations by the OIG,
requires reports to be resolved within 6 months of
the report issuance date. As of September 30, 2005,
there are no unresolved recommendations that meet
this criterion.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Statistical Information

Investigations Statistics

Integrity Awareness Briefings

The following chart summarizes the workload and
accomplishments of the Investigations Division
during the 6-month period ending September 30,
2005.
Source of Allegations
Hotline (telephone and mail)
Other sources
Total allegations received

OIG investigators conducted 72 Integrity Awareness
Briefings for Department employees throughout
the country. These briefings are designed to educate
employees about the misuse of a public official’s
position for personal gain and to deter employees
from committing such offenses. The briefings
reached more than 3,000 employees.

814
3,461
4,275

Investigative Caseload
Investigations opened this period
Investigations closed this period
Investigations in progress
as of 9/30/05

218
173
409

Prosecutive Actions
Criminal indictments/informations
Arrests
Convictions/Pleas

42
47
30

Administrative Actions
Terminations
Resignations
Disciplinary action

18
39
18

Monetary Results
Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries
Seizures
Civil Penalties

$1,604,421
$1,000
$500,000

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Appendix 1
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The following are definitions of specific terms as they are used in this report.
Alien: Any person who is not a citizen or national
of the United States.
Combined DNA Index System: A distributed
database with three hierarchical levels that enables
federal, state, and local forensic laboratories to
compare DNA profiles electronically.
Disclaimer of Opinion: A disclaimer of opinion
results when auditors are unable to express an
opinion on the fairness of the agency financial
statements due to a limiting factor, such as a lack of
adequate supporting financial information.
Drawdown: The process by which a grantee
requests and receives federal funds.
Enterprise Architecture: An Enterprise
Architecture establishes an agency-wide roadmap
to achieve an agency’s mission through optimal
performance of its core business processes
within an efficient IT environment. An Enterprise
Architecture is made up of four components:
Business Architecture, Applications Architecture,
Data Architecture, and Technical Architecture.
External Audit Report: The results of audits
and related reviews of expenditures made under
Department contracts, grants, and other agreements.
External audits are conducted in accordance with
the Comptroller General’s Government Auditing
Standards and related professional auditing
standards.

Information: Formal accusation of a crime made
by a prosecuting attorney as distinguished from an
indictment handed down by a grand jury.
Internal Audit Report: The results of audits
and related reviews of Department organizations,
programs, functions, computer security and IT, and
financial statements. Internal audits are conducted
in accordance with the Comptroller General’s
Government Auditing Standards and related
professional auditing standards.
Material Weakness: A reportable condition in
which the design or operation of the internal control
does not reduce to a relatively low level the risk
that error, fraud, or noncompliance in amounts
that would be material in relation to the principal
statements or to performance measures may occur
and not be detected within a timely period by
employees in the normal course of their assigned
duties.
Qualified Opinion: The judgment by the certified
public accountant in an audit report that “except
for” something, the financial statements fairly
present the financial position and operating results
of the entity.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 1

Questioned Cost: A cost that is questioned by
the OIG because of: 1) an alleged violation of
a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant,
cooperative agreement, or other agreement or
document governing the expenditure of funds;
2) a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost
is not supported by adequate documentation; or
3) a finding that the expenditure of funds for the
intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.
Recommendation That Funds be Put to Better
Use: Recommendation by the OIG that funds could
be used more efficiently if management of an entity
took actions to implement and complete the recommendation, including: 1) reductions in outlays;
2) deobligation of funds from programs or operations; 3) withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on
loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds;
4) costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the
entity, a contractor, or grantee; 5) avoidance of
unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award
reviews of contract or grant agreements; or 6) any
other savings that specifically are identified.

Reportable Condition: Includes matters coming
to the auditor’s attention that, in the auditor’s
judgment, should be communicated because they
represent significant deficiencies in the design or
operation of internal controls that could adversely
affect the entity’s ability to properly report financial
data.
Supervised Release: Court-monitored supervision
upon release from incarceration.
Unqualified Opinion: An auditor’s report that
states the financial statements present fairly, in all
material respects, the financial position and results
of operations of the reporting entity, in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.
Unsupported Cost: A cost that is questioned by
the OIG because the OIG found that, at the time of
the audit, the cost was not supported by adequate
documentation.

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

45

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Appendix 2
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following are acronyms and abbreviations widely used in this report.

ATF

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives

INS

Immigration and Naturalization
Service

Bureau of Justice Assistance

IT

Information technology

BOP

Federal Bureau of Prisons

JMD

Justice Management Division

CODIS

Combined DNA Index System

NIJ

National Institute of Justice

COPS

Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services

OIG

Office of the Inspector General

DEA

Drug Enforcement Administration

OJP

Office of Justice Programs

Department

U.S. Department of Justice

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

September 11 September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks

EOUSA

Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

TSC

Terrorist Screening Center

FY

Fiscal year

USAO

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices

IG Act

Inspector General Act of 1978,
as amended

USMS

U.S. Marshals Service

BJA

`

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 3

Appendix 3
EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIVISION REPORTS
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005
Testimony before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary concerning the USMS’s Judicial
Security Process
The Department’s Terrorism Task Forces
Review of the USMS’s Apprehension of
Violent Fugitives
Review of the ATF’s Disciplinary System
Review of the Security and Emergency
Planning Staff’s Management of Background
Investigations

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

47

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Appendix 4
AUDIT DIVISION REPORTS
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDIT
REPORTS
ATF’s National Integrated Ballistic Information
Network Program
Compliance with Standards Governing CODIS
Activities at the Arizona Department of Public Safety
Scientific Analysis Bureau DNA Laboratory,
Phoenix, Arizona
Compliance with Standards Governing CODIS
Activities at the Colorado Bureau of Investigation
Department of Public Safety DNA Laboratory,
Denver, Colorado
Compliance with Standards Governing CODIS
Activities at the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement Tampa Bay Regional Operations Center,
Tampa, Florida
Compliance with Standards Governing CODIS
Activities at the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division Forensic Services Laboratory,
Columbia, South Carolina
Compliance with Standards Governing CODIS
Activities at the State of Michigan Department of
State Police, Lansing Forensic Science Laboratory
Compliance with Standards Governing CODIS
Activities at the State of Connecticut Forensic Science
Laboratory, Meriden, Connecticut
COPS Grants Awarded to Youth Advocate
Programs, Inc.
COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants
Administered by the Indiana State Police Department

COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants
Administered by the Prairie View Prevention Services,
Sioux Falls, South Dakota
COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants
Administered by the Virginia State Police
COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants Awarded
to the Alabama Department of Public Safety,
Montgomery, Alabama
COPS Technology Grant Awarded to the University of
New Hampshire
COPS Technology Grants Awarded to the
New Bedford, Massachusetts, Police Department
Department’s Process for Identifying, Preventing, and
Recovering Improper and Erroneous Payments
DEA’s Payments to Confidential Sources
FBI’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence
Analysts
FBI’s Foreign Language Translation Program
Follow-up
BOP’s Medical Services Contract with Salem
Community Hospital, Salem, Ohio
BOP’s Medical Services Contract with Wayne
Memorial Hospital, Jesup, Georgia
Independent Evaluation Pursuant to FISMA for
FY 2004 of the DEA’s Investigative Management
Program and Case Tracking System
Independent Evaluation Pursuant to FISMA for FY
2004 of the USMS’s Information Security Program
Independent Evaluation Pursuant to FISMA for FY
2004 of the FBI’s Tactical Operations Network
Independent Evaluation Pursuant to FISMA for FY
2004 of the DEA’s Information Security Program
Independent Evaluation Pursuant to FISMA for FY
2004 of the FBI’s Information Security Program
Internet Crimes Against Children Grant Awarded to
the City of Dallas, Texas

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 4

Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Grants
Awarded to the Utah Attorney General’s Office,
Salt Lake City, Utah
OJP’s Annual Financial Statement for FY 2003
as Restated
OJP’s Annual Financial Statement for FY 2004
as Restated
OJP’s Cooperative Agreement with Public/Private
Ventures

OJP’s Weed and Seed Grants Awarded to the Salt
Lake City Corporation, Salt Lake City, Utah
OJP BJA Project Safe Neighborhoods Grants Awarded
to the Non-Profit Resource Center of Alabama
Processing Classified Information on Portable
Computers in the Department
PSN Grant Awarded to the Baylor Health Care System
Foundation

OJP’s Grant Awarded to the Colorado Department of
Corrections, Colorado Springs, Colorado

Results of the Office for Victims of Crime
Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program
Grant Audits

OJP’s Grant Awarded to the East Los Angeles
Community Union Education Foundation

Review of the FBI’s Headquarters’ Information
System Control Environment for FY 2004

OJP’s MADD Victim Services Public Awareness
Initiative Grant Awarded to MADD National
Headquarters

Review of the Terrorist Screening Center

OJP’s National Criminal History Improvement
Program Grant Administered by the Kentucky
Justice Cabinet
OJP’s Office of Violence Against Women Grant
Awarded to Legal Aid of Nebraska, Omaha, Nebraska

Review of the Terrorist Screening Center’s Efforts to
Support Secure Flight
The Joint Automated Booking System
USMS’s Intergovernmental Service Agreement
for Detention Services with the Blount County,
Tennessee, Sheriff’s Office

OJP’s Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Grant
Awarded to the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice,
Denver, Colorado

USMS’s Cooperative Agreement Program

OJP’s State and Local Emergency Preparedness Grant
Awarded to Prince George’s County, Maryland

Use of Equitable Sharing Assets by the Police
Department of the City of Lowell, Massachusetts

OJP’s STOP Violence Against Women Formula Grant
Awarded to the State of Texas

Use of Equitable Sharing Revenues by the New
Mexico Department of Public Safety, Santa Fe,
New Mexico

OJP’s Technology Grant Awarded to Smith and
Wesson, Inc.
OJP’s Technology Grants Awarded to the University
of New Hampshire
OJP’s Weed and Seed Grant Awarded to Wichita Falls,
Texas
OJP’s Weed and Seed Grants Awarded to the City of
Compton, California

USMS’s Use of Independent Contractors as Guards

Use of Equitable Sharing Revenues by the Ohio State
Highway Patrol

SINGLE AUDIT ACT REPORTS
OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ACTIVITIES
Bon Secours Health System, Inc., and Subsidiaries
Chester County, South Carolina

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

49

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Cities in Schools, Inc.
City of Baltimore, Maryland

National Association of Police Athletic/Activities
Leagues, Inc.

City of Camden, New Jersey

National Capital Area Council of Boy Scouts of
America

City of Chattanooga, Tennessee

National Center for Victims of Crime

City of Chester, Pennsylvania

National Corrections and Law Enforcement Training
and Technology Center, Inc.

City of Cleveland, Ohio
City of Dayton, Tennessee

Office of District Attorney, 28th Judicial Circuit,
Baldwin County, Alabama

City of East Point, Georgia

Police Foundation and Affiliate

City of Jacksonville, Florida

Prince George’s County Economic Development
Corporation

City of Prichard, Alabama
City of Scranton, Pennsylvania
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Justice
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Police Department
Comprehensive Women’s Service Council, Inc.,
Beckley, West Virginia

Prince George’s County, Maryland
Report on Child Welfare League of America, Inc.
Simpson County, Mississippi
South Carolina Department of Public Safety
State of Florida

Dorchester County, Maryland

State of Maryland

Douglas County, Missouri

State of New Mexico, Valencia County

Douglas County, Nebraska

State of West Virginia

Family Independence Agency

The Bridging the Gap Project, Inc.

Florida Council Against Sexual Violence, Inc.

The National Forensic Science Technology
Center, Inc.

FN Manufacturing, Inc.
Jackson County Commission, Alabama
Kanawha County, West Virginia
Marshall Heights Community Development
Organization
Michigan Department of State Police
Municipality of Yauco, Puerto Rico
National American Indian Court Judges Association,
Colorado

Town of Davie, Florida, FY 2001
Town of Davie, Florida, FY 2002
Village of Corrales, New Mexico
Washington Village/Pigtown Village Center and
Neighborhood Planning
Wayne County, Missouri
White Buffalo Calf Woman Society, Inc.,
South Dakota
Youth Crime Watch of America, Inc., and Affiliate

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Appendix 4

AUDIT DIVISION REPORTS
April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

Quantifiable Potential Monetary Benefits
Audit Report

BOP’s Medical Contract with Salem Community
Hospital, Salem, Ohio
BOP’s Medical Services Contract with Wayne
Memorial Hospital, Jesup, Georgia
City of Jacksonville, Florida
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Police Department

Questioned
Costs

Unsupported
Costs

$744
$76,087

$70,741

$110,412
$52,702

COPS Grants Awarded to Youth Advocate Programs,
Inc.

$206,810

COPS Methamphetamine Grants Administered by the
Indiana State Police Department

$534,201

COPS Methamphetamine Grants Awarded to the
Alabama Department of Public Safety, Montgomery,
Alabama

$113,748

$72,377

COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants
Administered by the Prairie View Prevention Services,
Sioux Falls, South Dakota

$485,124

$411,106

$2,077

$656

COPS Methamphetamine Initiative Grants
Administered by the Virginia State Police
COPS Technology Grant Awarded to the University of
New Hampshire

$106,688

COPS Technology Grants Awarded to the New
Bedford, Massachusetts, Police Department

$327,471

Douglas County, Nebraska
Family Independence Agency
FN Manufacturing, Inc.
Internet Crimes Against Children Grant Awarded to
the City of Dallas, Texas

Funds Put to
Better Use

$6,400

$44,487

$18,000

$6,400

$186,207
$12,563
$318,892

$275,049

$453

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

51

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Audit Report

Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Grants
Awarded to the Utah Attorney General’s Office, Salt
Lake City, Utah
Michigan Department of State Police

Questioned
Costs

$44,698

Unsupported
Costs

$12,291

$5,367

Office of the District Attorney, 28th Judicial Circuit,
Baldwin County, Alabama

$162,116

OJP BJA Project Safe Neighborhoods Grants Awarded
to the Non-Profit Resource Center of Alabama

$209,519

$201,167

OJP Cooperative Agreement with Public/Private
Ventures, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

$465,060

$10,876

OJP Grant Awarded to the Colorado Department of
Corrections, Colorado Springs, Colorado

$214,722

$5,811

OJP Office of Violence Against Women Grant
Awarded to Legal Aid of Nebraska, Omaha, Nebraska

$1,277,909

$1,031,132

OJP Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Grant
Awarded to the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice,
Denver, Colorado

$3,701

OJP Stop Violence Against Women Formula Grant
Awarded to the State of Texas

Funds Put to
Better Use

$2,195,627

$12,088

$134,362

$2,195,627

OJP Technology Grant Awarded to Smith and Wesson,
Inc.

$36,218

OJP Technology Grants Awarded to the University of
New Hampshire

$577,605

$165,208

$1,220,304

OJP Weed and Seed Grant Awarded to Wichita Falls,
Texas

$192,769

$83,808

$12,232

OJP Youth Delinquency Grant to the East Los Angeles
Community Union

$27,881

Prince George’s County Economic Development
Corporation

$15,914

PSN Grant Awarded to the Baylor Health Care System
Foundation
Simpson County, Mississippi
State of Florida
State of Maryland

$198,527
$17,956
$2,039,460
$16,802

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

$17,956

Appendix 4

Questioned
Costs

Audit Report

Unsupported
Costs

Use of Equitable Sharing Assets by the Police
Department of the City of Lowell, Massachusetts

$46,744

$46,744

Use of Equitable Sharing Revenues by the
New Mexico Department of Public Safety,
Santa Fe, New Mexico

$71,083

$14,525

$1,267,763

$1,267,763

$990,119

$990,119

$57,871

$26,932

$12,639,339

$7,078,278

USMS’s Intergovernmental Service Agreement
for Detention Services with the Blount County,
Tennessee, Sheriff’s Office
USMS’s Cooperative Agreement Program
Wayne County, Missouri
Total

Funds Put to
Better Use

$720,780

$2,154,437

April 1, 2005 – September 30, 2005

53

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Semiannual Report to Congress

Appendix 5
Reporting Requirements Index
The IG Act specifies reporting requirements for semiannual reports. The requirements are listed
below and indexed to the applicable pages.
IG Act
References

Reporting Requirements

Section 4(a)(2)

Review of Legislation and Regulations

Section 5(a)(1)

Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies

6-38

Section 5(a)(2)

Significant Recommendations for Corrective Actions

6-37

Section 5(a)(3)

Prior Significant Recommendations Unimplemented

42-43

Section 5(a)(4)

Matters Referred to Prosecutive Authorities

Section 5(a)(5)

Refusal to Provide Information

None

Section 5(a)(6)

Listing of Audit Reports

48-53

Section 5(a)(7)

Summary of Significant Reports

6-37

Section 5(a)(8)

Audit Reports – Questioned Costs

41

Section 5(a)(9)

Audit Reports – Funds to Be Put to Better Use

40

Section 5(a)(10)

Prior Audit Reports Unresolved

42

Section 5(a)(11)

Significant Revised Management Decisions

None

Section 5(a)(12)

Significant Management Decisions
With Which the OIG Disagreed

None

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General

Page
39

20-21, 25, 27-28,
30-31, 33, 35-37

Report Waste, Fraud,
Abuse, or Misconduct
To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct in
Department of Justice programs, send complaints to:
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
Investigations Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Room 4706
Washington, DC 20530
E-mail: oig.hotline@usdoj.gov
Hotline: (800) 869-4499
Hotline fax: (202) 616-9881

Report Violations of Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties
Individuals who believe that a Department of Justice
employee has violated their civil rights or civil liberties
may send complaints to:
Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Complaints
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Room 4706
Washington, DC 20530
E-mail: inspector.general@usdoj.gov
Hotline: (800) 869-4499
Hotline fax: (202) 616-9898

On-Line Report Availability
Many audit, evaluation and inspection, and special reports
are available at www.usdoj.gov/oig.
Additional materials are available through the
Inspectors General Network at www.ignet.gov.

For additional copies of this
report or copies of previous editions, write:
DOJ/OIG/M&P
1425 New York Avenue, NW
Suite 7000
Washington, DC 20530
Or call: (202) 616-4550

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
ESTABLISHED APRIL 14, 1989