December 2008

Report No. 08-71

While DMS Has Improved Monitoring, It Needs to
Strengthen Private Prison Oversight and Contracts
at a glance
Although the Department of Management
Services (DMS) has recently improved
monitoring, it needs to further strengthen its
oversight of the state’s six private prisons and
improve its contracts with these vendors. The
department has developed stronger monitoring
tools to assess contract compliance and it has
imposed penalties for violations of contract
requirements.
However, DMS has not
adequately addressed security, contraband, and
prison infirmary problems identified by
Department of Corrections’ reviews of the private
prisons, citing its lack of expertise in corrections
issues.
DMS contracts do not ensure that the private
prisons house inmates requiring comparable
levels of health and mental health care as public
prisons. The contracts also do not establish
performance standards for the private prisons’
inmate education, vocation, and treatment
programs, and do not establish comparable
policies for inmate family visitation and telephone
costs as those provided by the state’s public
prisons. DMS also has not developed written
criteria for allowable uses of Inmate Welfare
Trust Fund monies, which hinders its ability to
ensure that the funds are used for their intended
purpose.

Scope _____________________
As requested by the Legislature, this review assesses the
Department of Management Services’ contracting and
oversight of private prisons.

Background ________________
The Florida Legislature authorized the Department of
Corrections to contract with private companies to
construct and operate private prisons in 1989. In 1993,
after the department had not successfully contracted for
any private prisons, the Legislature established the
Correctional Privatization Commission to facilitate the
process. The commission was an independent budget
entity administratively housed, but independent from,
the Department of Management Services (DMS). The
commission subsequently awarded contracts for four
private prisons; there are now a total of six. Effective
July 1, 2005, the Legislature abolished the commission
after its first executive director was fined and fired for
ethics violations and the second imprisoned for
embezzlement of state funds. Responsibility for private
prison contracting and oversight had been transferred
on July 1, 2004, to DMS, which created the Bureau of
Private Prison Monitoring under its Division of
Specialized Services. This organizational placement is
unique in the nation; as shown in Exhibit 1, of the 19
states that have private prisons, only Florida places
administrative responsibility for private prisons outside
of a correctional agency or a correctional commission
overseeing both public and private prison systems.

Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability
an office of the Florida Legislature

OPPAGA Report

Report No. 08-71

Exhibit 1
Florida Is Unique in Placing Its Private Prisons
Under a Non-Correctional Agency

and rules of the Department of Corrections, as
long as these requirements do not interfere with
the mission of cost-effective private prisons. DMS
also is responsible for ensuring that private
prisons save the state at least 7% of the cost of
operating a comparable state facility, while also
housing a representative cross-section of the
state’s inmate population, and providing inmate
programs designed to reduce recidivism.

ME

WA
MT
OR

MN

ND

ID
WY

MI
WI

SD

UT

CO

CA
AZ

IL

OK

NM

WV

VA

NJ
DE
MD

MA
RI
CT

NC

TN

AR

DMS’ Bureau of Private Prison Monitoring
employs eight central office staff and six field
contract monitors, who work full-time in each of
the state’s private prisons, to help ensure contract
compliance. Along with the agency’s general
counsel and purchasing department, the bureau
issues invitations-to-negotiate and reviews vendor
bids when new contracts are to be awarded. As of
October 1, 2008, the six private prisons housed
7,725 of the state’s 99,048 inmates at a cost of
approximately $133 million a year. 1 Exhibit 2
shows the location and size of the private prisons.

SC
MS

TX

DC

KY

MO

KS

PA

OH

IN

NH

NY

MI

IA
NB

NV

VT

AL

GA

LA
FL

AK

HI

States with no state private prison system
States with private prison system housed within the state’s correctional agency
States with both public and private prison system housed under a correctional
board or commission
State with private prison system housed outside a correctional agency

Exhibit 2
Six Private Prisons Operate In Florida

Source: OPPAGA analysis.

Florida law broadly outlines the responsibilities of
the Departments of Corrections and Management
Services regarding private prisons. Chapter 944,
Florida Statutes, assigns legal custody of all
Florida inmates in state and private prisons to the
Department of Corrections.
As such, the
department makes all decisions that affect inmate
discipline, gain time, and release. The department
also conducts routine security, infirmary, and
contraband audits in both public and private
prisons.

3

2

1

4

Private Prison Populations

Chapter 957, Florida Statutes, charges DMS
with issuing contracts, establishing operating
standards, and monitoring compliance of the
state’s private prisons.
The department is
responsible for ensuring that the private prisons
are accredited by the American Correctional
Association, which also accredits the state’s public
prisons. The DMS is responsible for ensuring that
the private prisons follow the policies, procedures,

1

Bay

2

Gadsden

1,520 adult females

3

Graceville

1,500 adult males

4

Lake City

5

Moore Haven

6

South Bay

985 adult males

5

893 male youthful offenders

985 adult males
1,861 adult males

Source: Department of Corrections website, Fall 2008.

1

2

Costs are the appropriated general revenue for operations.

6

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OPPAGA Report

Findings ________________

While DMS has recently strengthened its
oversight efforts, additional steps are needed.
After a critical inspector general report in 2007
that concluded that the Bureau of Private Prison
Monitoring was not exercising sufficient contract
oversight, DMS took steps to improve its
monitoring activities. 3 Specifically, the bureau
developed and began using a 300-item evaluation
checklist that established detailed contract
monitoring requirements. After implementing
this checklist in October 2007, DMS contract
monitors stationed at each prison were better able
to document contract violations; this improved
oversight resulted in removing three prison
wardens and assessing $3.4 million in deductions
and fines.

Although DMS has improved its oversight of
private prisons, stronger monitoring and better
contracting is needed.
The department’s
oversight is hindered by its lack of corrections
expertise, and it has not addressed problems
identified in a variety of Department of
Corrections’ audits, including the critical areas of
security, infirmary operations, and contraband
control. The current contracts do not ensure that
private prisons house inmates requiring
equivalent levels of medical and mental health
care to those housed by the state’s public prisons,
which can result in increased state costs. The
contracts also have not adequately held vendors
accountable for the effectiveness of their inmate
educational, vocational, and substance abuse
programs. The inmate family visitation and
telephone cost policies of the private prisons are
not equivalent to those of the state’s public
prisons and do not conform to legislative intent.
Finally, the department has not developed written
criteria for distributing Inmate Welfare Trust Fund
monies to help ensure that these funds are used
for their intended purpose.

However, the bureau’s oversight continues to
need strengthening. A key critical weakness is
that the bureau has not addressed problems
identified in the Department of Corrections’
reviews of security, contraband, and health
infirmary operations of the private prisons. The
Department of Corrections performs these
reviews in both public and private prisons as part
of its overall responsibility for inmate health and
safety.

Although improved, the department’s private
prison oversight is insufficient and it reports a
lack of expertise

The Department of Correction’s audits have
found repeated and substantive problems in the
private prisons. These have included

When public services are outsourced, it is
important that the state establish both detailed
contracts that establish clear service requirements
and strong oversight procedures that ensure that
these contract requirements are met and services
are delivered as intended. As noted by the DMS
inspector general, “Successfully managing
privately operated prisons involves more than
procuring and issuing contracts.
It requires
constant oversight and involvement with vendors
to ensure that vendors not only adhere to contract
terms but that the safety of the public and welfare
of inmates are ensured.” 2



violations of security requirements that could
endanger the public, correctional officers, and
inmates, including inoperable alarms,
spotlights, and escape sensors; buildings not
checked for tunneling; and missing tools that
could be crafted by inmates into weapons;



violations of prison infirmary requirements,
including lost or never executed physicianordered laboratory tests, long delays (up to five
months) in filing medical records, unsanitary
conditions, and nursing staff vacancies; and



contraband violations including positive
inmate drug tests and inmate possession of
drugs and drug residue, gang material, and
weapons as well as staff and visitors arriving at
the prisons in violation of contraband policies.

2

See Contract Monitoring at Privately Operated Prisons, Department
of Management Services’ Office of the Inspector General, Report
No. IA 2006-28, March 12, 2007.

3

3

Ibid.

OPPAGA Report

Report No. 08-71

These audits have indicated that the private
prisons need to improve their intelligence
gathering and enforcement of contraband
policies governing prison staff and visitors.

Similar issues have been highlighted by the DMS
inspector general, who recommended that
responsibility for overseeing the private prisons
be transferred to the Department of Corrections. 5
Unless the Legislature elects to make this change,
however, it is DMS’ responsibility to address
safety and security issues in the private prisons.

The state lacks an adequate mechanism to ensure
that these problems are resolved. While the
Department of Corrections issues audit reports to
the private prisons, it lacks authority to compel
the vendors to correct problems found during the
audits. DMS officials reported that the bureau has
not taken action in response to these findings
because neither its headquarters staff nor its
contract monitors stationed at the private prisons
are subject matter experts in corrections. Bureau
officials and most of the monitors stationed at the
private prisons have limited experience and
training in corrections operations. DMS has not
provided the contract monitors with corrections
training in prison safety and security techniques;
inmate manipulation resistance; defensive tactics
and hostage procedures; and contraband
detection and control.

Current contracts with private prisons do not
ensure that the private prisons house a
representative cross-section of inmates and
lack adequate provisions for inmate programs
and family visitation
The current contracts DMS has established with
private prison vendors have weaknesses that
reduce the state’s assurance that private prisons
are operated in accordance with legislative intent.
Specifically, the contracts do not

As a result, neither DMS nor the Department of
Corrections adequately addresses problems in
these areas. DMS officials assert that security,
contraband, and related problems identified in the
Department of Corrections’ audits should be
followed up by that agency, since it is the
correctional expert. However, Department of
Corrections’ officials note that the agency lacks
authority to require corrective action by private
prison wardens and has sent a letter of concern
about these repeated violations to DMS. 4 This
jurisdictional issue remains unresolved and the
state currently has no assurance that identified
security, contraband, and health infirmary
problems in private prisons are corrected.

4



assure that private prisons serve inmates with
comparable medical and mental health
conditions as those housed in public prisons;



hold vendors accountable for ensuring the
effectiveness of inmate education and
rehabilitation programs; and



ensure that inmate families are treated equitably
in regard to telephone and visitation policies.

As DMS is currently entering into negotiations
with vendors for new private prison contracts, it
will be important for the department to ensure
that its next contracts correct these deficiencies.
Current contracts do not assure that private
prisons serve inmates with comparable medical
and mental health conditions as those housed in
public prisons. Florida law requires that private

prisons operate at a cost savings of at least 7%
below the cost of comparable state prisons and
that state and private prisons house a
representative cross-section of inmates with
comparable conviction and custody levels.

Private prison wardens have disputed the significance of some of
the violations and Department of Corrections’ officials report it can
identify problems in private prisons but cannot enforce their
correction because the department is not a signatory on the
contracts with vendors. Officials within both agencies report that
the two agencies do not want to co-sign and share contractual
responsibility with the other.

5

4

See Contract Management of Private Correctional Facilities,
Department of Management Services’ Office of Inspector General,
Report No. 2005-61, June 30, 2005.

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OPPAGA Report

Historically, state policies also have required both
types of prisons to house comparable percentages
of inmates with certain medical and mental health
conditions. Comparable assignment of these
inmates, which are called “special needs” inmates,
is important because it ensures that both the
vendor and the state are shouldering an equal
burden in paying the higher costs associated with
these inmates.

special needs inmates the private prisons were to
serve over the life of the contracts (typically two to
three years).
While the percentages of special needs inmates
specified in the contracts reflected the overall state
inmate population when the contracts were
signed, the population has changed over time and
the state is now housing a disproportionate share
of inmates requiring extra medical and mental
health care (see Exhibit 3.)

When the Correctional Privatization Commission
had oversight of private prisons, the percentages
of special needs inmates assigned to state and
private prisons were negotiated in three-way
transfer agreements between the commission, the
vendor, and the Department of Corrections.
These transfer agreements allowed the state to
readjust the percentages of special needs inmates
assigned to private prisons as the overall inmate
population changed to ensure that both private
and public prisons served comparable levels of
special needs inmates.

As special needs inmates are more expensive to
serve than other inmates, the difference in the
populations of public and private prisons results
in the state shouldering a greater proportion of
the cost of housing these inmates. As a result, the
requirement that the private prisons operate a 7%
lower cost than state facilities is undermined. 6 It
will be important for DMS to address this issue as
it enters into negotiations for new contracts with
the private prison vendors.

When the Department of Management Services
became responsible for overseeing private prison
contracts in 2004, it removed these provisions
from the transfer agreements and moved them
into its new contracts with the vendors. The
result of this change was to lock in percentages of

6

We were unable to identify the fiscal impact of the difference in
inmate populations served by the public and private prisons as the
Department of Corrections has not calculated the increases in per
diem costs of inmates requiring augmented medical and mental
health care.
The Correctional Medical Authority in 2007
recommended that the department conduct such an analysis.

Exhibit 3
State Prisons House a Larger Percentage of Inmates with the Highest Health Care Costs

Private Prison
Gadsden
Graceville
South Bay
Lake City
Bay
Moore Haven

Private Prison
32%
16%
16%
16%
16%
16%

Percentages of Special Needs Inmates Assigned to Private and State Prisons
Medical Grades 2 or 3
Psychological Grade 3
Comparable
All
Comparable
State Prison 1
State Prisons2
Private Prison
State Prison
47%
48%
12%
27%
53%
37%
18%
67%
41%
37%
18%
30%
15%
14%
3%
3%
29%
37%
NA
29%
37%

All
State Prisons
38%
12%
12%
4%

1

Comparable state prisons are those that vendors bid against to demonstrate they could operate a private prison at a 7% savings, as required by
s. 957.07, Florida Statutes. For the Gadsden private prison, vendors bid against the state’s Hernando prison. For Graceville they bid against the
state’s Franklin facility for medical grade 2 and 3 inmates and against the state’s Santa Rosa facility for psychological grade 3 inmates. Vendors
bidding the South Bay prison bid against the state’s Okeechobee facility and vendors bidding Lake City bid against the Brevard state facility.
Vendors bidding the Bay and Moore Haven private prisons bid against Lawtey. By contract, Bay and Moore Haven do not accept psychological
grade 3 inmates.
2

Comparisons for all state prisons are as follows: the Gadsden private prison is compared against the state’s 5 female facilities; Graceville, Bay, South
Bay, and Moore Haven are compared against all of the state’s 47 adult male facilities, and Lake City is compared against all the state’s 3 male
youthful offender facilities.
Source: Department of Management Services’ private prison contracts and Department of Corrections’ records.

5

OPPAGA Report

Report No. 08-71
help reduce recidivism and improve outcomes for
children in their families. 9 Two key areas that
help preserve these relationships are telephone
contact and prison visitation.

Current
contracts
do
not
hold
vendors
accountable for the effectiveness of inmate
education and rehabilitation programs.
The

department’s contracts for the private prisons lack
adequate accountability provisions for inmate
programs designed to reduce recidivism. Private
prison vendors are required to provide academic,
vocational, behavioral, and substance abuse
inmate programs, while also ensuring that
between 10% and 30% of inmates enroll in these
programs. These programs have been shown to
be effective in reducing inmate recidivism and
long-term state prison costs. 7

Current private prison telephone and visitation
policies do not conform to state policies or
legislative intent in these areas. In 2007, OPPAGA
reported that families of inmates in Florida’s
private prisons were being charged substantially
more on average for inmate phone service and
were allowed only half the inmate visitation
opportunities as families of inmates in state
prisons. 10 Inmates in both public and private
prisons may place collect phone calls to their
families and others on a pre-approved list. While
the families of inmates in state prisons pay $0.50
for a 15-minute collect call, families of inmates in
private prisons, on average, pay $6.18 for the same
length call.

While the current private prison contracts include
inmate participation standards, they lack
performance standards of program quality and
success. Notably, the contracts do not currently
include commonly used performance measures
and standards such as the percentage of inmates
who



successfully complete GED education
programs;
graduate from treatment programs;



complete vocational programs; and



successfully complete transition, rehabilitation,
or other support programs without subsequent
recommitment to the state’s correctional
system within 24 months of release. 8



The private prisons have more restrictive
visitations policies than state prisons. Families of
inmates in state prisons are allowed to visit on
Saturdays and Sundays each week. In contrast,
families of inmates in private prisons are
authorized (depending on the private prison) to
visit only every other weekend or are assigned to
visit on a Saturday or a Sunday, but not both
days. DMS reports that the reason for this
difference is that private prison visitation centers
are too small to allow more frequent family
visitation. However, data provided by DMS
shows that these centers have twice the median
square feet of those in public prisons.

The Department of Corrections uses these
performance measures for inmate programs in
public prisons. Including these standards in the
private prison contracts would provide greater
assurance to the state that inmate programs in the
private prison are effectively delivered.

As DMS negotiates new contracts for private
prisons, it should adjust contract terms to provide
equivalent inmate telephone and visitation
opportunities as those available in public prisons.

Current contracts do not ensure that inmate
families are treated equitably in regard to
telephone and visitation policies. Florida law

requires prisons to promote visitation between
inmates and their families. This policy reflects
national studies that show that maintaining
contact between inmates and their families can

7

See Review of the Department of Corrections, OPPAGA Report
No. 00-23, December 2000, revised April 2001.

8

Calculation of such measures should take into account program
exits for administrative reasons such as transfers arranged by the
Department of Corrections.

9

In addition to reducing recidivism, research also shows that children
with parents who are in prison are more likely than their peers to
commit crimes and become incarcerated themselves, but these odds
are reduced when the incarcerated parent maintains a relationship
with the child. See LaVigne, Nancy G., Naser, Rebecca L, Brooks,
Lisa E, Castro, Jennifer, “Examining the Effect of Incarceration and
In-Prison Family Contact on Prisoners’ Family Relationships,”
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 21 No. 4, November
2005, 314-335.

10

6

See Some Inmate Family Visitation Practices Are Not Meeting the
Legislature’s Intent, OPPAGA Report No. 07-16, February 2007.

Report No. 08-71

OPPAGA Report

Recommendations ________

This would be consistent with legislative intent
and help reduce inmate recidivism and long term
state costs.

To improve vendor oversight and contract
management,
we
recommend
that
the
Department of Management Services

The department has not developed written
criteria for approving Inmate Welfare Trust
Fund requests from vendors
Monies in the Privately Operated Institutions
Inmate Welfare Trust Fund are collected from
revenues received from prison telephone systems
and inmate stores that operate in prisons. These
stores, called canteens, enable inmates to purchase
food, cigarettes, and toiletries with monies they
earn or receive from their families. According to
department staff, approximately $1.5 million is
collected each year in private prisons, placed in
the trust fund, and appropriated to the
Department of Management Services’ Bureau of
Private Prison Monitoring.
Vendors make
requests to the bureau to use these monies for
various projects and programs designed to benefit
inmates. These projects may include such things
as supplies for programs that enable inmates to
train guide dogs for the blind.
DMS has not developed written criteria for the
allowable uses of these funds. Instead, it has
considered vendor requests on a case-by-case
basis.
The department’s inspector general
reported in 2005 and 2007 that some vendors had
not used these funds for their stated purpose, but
instead used the monies to buy computers and
software for administrative staff. Other vendors
could not account for assets purchased with fund
monies. 11
Developing written criteria for use of the trust
fund would provide guidance to bureau and
vendors in how the funds should be used and
would help prevent such abuses.

11



ensure that private prisons resolve violations
cited by Department of Corrections security,
infirmary, and contraband operations audits;



through attrition, hire managers and contract
monitors with adult corrections expertise;



provide training to staff responsible for
overseeing the private prisons, including
training in prison safety and security
procedures, inmate manipulation resistance,
defensive tactics, and contraband detection
and control;



ensure that future contracts have the flexibility
to adjust percentages of special needs inmates
to allow for changes in the overall state
populations of those inmates; percentages
should be based on Department of Corrections
special needs population forecasts, so that
medical and mental healthcare costs are
appropriately shared by both private and state
prisons;



modify future private prison contracts to
require vendors to report the same
performance measures for inmate programs in
private prisons as reported by the Department
of Corrections for its public institutions;



develop inmate visitation policies and
telephone rates for the private prisons that are
consistent with those policies followed by the
state’s public prisons and encourage inmate
family contact, as directed by statute, and



develop written criteria for awarding Privately
Operated Institutions Inmate Welfare Trust
Fund monies so that its staff can verify that
the funds are being used appropriately.

In addition, the Legislature may wish to consider
whether these contracting functions are
appropriately housed within the Department of
Management Services or should be transferred to
the Department of Corrections.

See Contract Management of Private Correctional Facilities,
Department of Management Services’ Office of Inspector General,
Report No. 2005-61, June 30, 2005, and Contract Monitoring at
Privately Operated Prisons, Department of Management Services’
Office of Inspector General, Report No. IA 2006-28, March 12, 2007.

7

OPPAGA Report

Report No. 08-71

If the Legislature determines to retain these
functions within the Department of Management
Services, it could direct, via proviso, that the
department submit a report on how it has
corrected the problems identified in this report, as
well as those previously cited in the agency
inspector general’s 2007 report. 12
The
Department of Management Services is a logical
entity to manage private prison contracts since it
is the state’s primary agent for contract
management.
This placement also provides
independence
from
the
Department
of
Corrections; this independence was a primary
factor in the Legislature’s decision to place this
function with the Department of Management
Services. However, the department needs to
provide its staff with additional training to enable
them to better oversee correctional facilities.

would also be a logical entity to perform this
function as its core mission is providing
correctional services, and it has the organization,
staff, knowledge, and experience to oversee and
manage correctional operations.
Placing this
function in the Department of Corrections would
be consistent with the practices of other states in
the nation, but would not provide organizational
independence from the department. Department
of Corrections managers report that it could
perform the Bureau’s functions with three fewer
positions, resulting in an annual cost savings of
approximately $200,000.

Agency Response ________
In accordance with the provisions of s. 11.51(5),
Florida Statutes, a draft of our report was
submitted to the Secretary of the Department of
Management Services for review and response.
The written response from the Secretary of
the Department of Management Services is
reproduced in its entirety in Appendix A.

Alternatively, the Legislature could transfer the
Bureau of Private Prison Monitoring to the
Department of Corrections. That department
12

See Contract Management of Private Correctional Facilities,
Department of Management Services’ Office of the Inspector
General, Report No. 2005-61, June 30, 2005, and Contract
Monitoring at Privately Operated Prisons, Department of
Management Services’ Office of the Inspector General, Report
No. IA 2006-28, March 12, 2007.

8

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OPPAGA Report

Appendix A
Office of the Secretary
4050 Esplanade Way
Tallahassee. Florida 32399~0950

Tel: 850.488.2786
Fa>c 850.922.6149
WW'N.dms.MyFlorida.com

Governor Charlie Crist

Secretary Linda H. South

December 24, 2008

Mr. Gary R. Vanlandingham, Director
Office of Program Policy Analysis and
Government Accountability
Room 312, Claude Pepper Building
111 West Madison Street
Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1450
Dear Mr. Vanlandingham:
Pursuant to Section 11.51 (5), Florida Statutes, attached is the Department of
Management Services' response to your preliminary and tentative audit report,
While DMS Has Improved Monitoring, It Needs to Strengthen Private Prison
Oversight and Contracts. The attached response corresponds with the order of
your preliminary and tentative audit findings and recommendations.
If further information is needed concerning our response, please contact Steve
Rumph, Inspector General, at 488-5285.
Sincerely,

~
linda H. South
Secretary

Attachment
cc:

Ken Granger, Chief of Staff
J.D. Solie, Director, Division of Specialized Services

We serve those who serve Florida.

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OPPAGA Report

Mr. Gary R. Vanlandingham
December 24, 2008
Attachment Page 1

Florida Department of Management Services
Response to OPPAGA's
Preliminary Findings and Recommendations
Findings:

The department's oversight is hindered by its lack of corrections expertise,
and it has not addressed problems identified in a variety of Department of
Corrections' audits, including the critical areas of security, infirmary
operations, and contraband control. The current contracts do not ensure
that private prisons house inmates requiring equivalent levels of medical
and mental health care to those housed by the state's public prisons,
which can result in increased state costs. The contracts also have not
adequately held vendors accountable for the effectiveness of their inmate
educational, vocational, and substance abuse programs. The inmate family
visitation and telephone cost policies of the private prisons are not
equivalent to those of the state's public prisons and do not conform to
legislative intent. Finally, the department has not developed written criteria
for distributing Inmate Welfare Trust Fund monies to help ensure that these
funds are used for their intended purpose.
Recommendations and Responses:

To improve vendor oversight and contract management OPPAGA made the
following recommendations. Our responses follow.
•

Ensure that private prisons resolve violations cited by Department of
Corrections security, infirmary, and contraband operations audits
Concur: The department will establish written policies and procedures to
ensure that vendors resolve deficiencies cited in Department of Corrections
(DC) audits.
Upon receipt of a DC security audit, the Bureau of Private
Prison Monitoring (Bureau) will provide the vendor with written notice of any
noncompliance issues and direct the vendor to submit a plan to correct the
issue (s). Vendors will have 20 days to develop and submit a corrective action
plan and a total of 45 days from the date of notification to correct the
noncompliance issuers). We will exercise our contractual prerogative to
assess liquidated damages against the vendor if audit findings remain
unresolved beyond the 45-day timeframe or take other action provided for in
the contract. We will develop similar procedures to resolve noncompliance
issues cited in infirmary and contraband operations audits. In cases where
the vendor takes immediate action to correct a deficiency and a corrective
action plan is not required, the Bureau will provide DC with written notification

10

OPPAGA Report

Report No. 08-71

Mr. Gary R. Vanlandingham
December 24, 2008
Attachment Page 2

of the action taken. We anticipate that written policies and procedures will be
established by March 31, 2009.
•

Through attrition, hire managers and contract monitors with adult corrections
expertise

Non-concur: As noted in the report, the department is responsible for
contracting for, and administering contracts for the operation and
management of the state's privately operated prisons. The department is
responsible for assuring that vendors provide essential services to inmates,
comply with contract terms and conditions and perform to standards. The
primary responsibility of Bureau staff is, therefore, to monitor and enforce the
operations and management contracts.
As such, we employ staff with a
range of backgrounds and experience in business and contract management
and in the criminal justice arena. We will continue to seek staff with
of contract
management
as
well
as
correctional
knowledge
facilitieslinstitutions.
•

Provide training to staff responsible for overseeing the private prisons,
including training in prison safety and security procedures, inmate
manipulation resistance, defensive tactics, and contraband detection and
control

Concur: The Bureau's training initiatives focus on providing staff with the
tools needed to monitor and enforce contract terms and conditions. Monitors
are thus required to develop an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the
vendor's approved operating plan, which details the facility's safety and
security procedures; American Correctional Association (ACA) standards; and
applicable state laws and rules. Contract monitors are expected to complete
the Florida Certified Contract Manager training program and qualify for
certification. To further equip staff, the Bureau will develop an orientation
module for newly-hired staff and provide annual update training for all staff in
prison safety and security procedures, inmate manipulation resistance,
defensive tactics, and principles of contraband detection and control. We
expect to begin providing this additional training by June 30, 2009.
•

Ensure that future contracts have the flexibility to adjust percentages of
special needs inmates to allow for changes in the overall state populations of
those inmates; percentages should be based on Department of Corrections
special needs population forecasts so that medical and mental health care
costs are appropriately shared by both private and state prisons

Non-concur: Contracts currently provide flexibility to meet changes in the
inmate population mix.
The Department of Corrections specifies the
percentages of special needs inmates that each facility must serve. These

11

Report No. 08-71

OPPAGA Report

Mr. Gary R. Vanlandingham
December 24, 2008
Attachment Page 3

percentages are specified in the contract because the vendor's bid is based
on the population mix the vendor expects to serve during the contract term.
Each facility's contract further provides for a variance from the specified
percentages should the population mix change somewhat during the contract
term.
•

Modify future private prison contracts to require vendors to report the same
performance measures for inmate programs in private prisons as reported by
the Department of Corrections for its public institutions

Concur: The Bureau currently compiles completion and graduation
information from each facility. However, to help in holding vendors more
accountable for results, we will establish performance measures and
standards for academic, vocational, behavioral, and substance abuse
programs in future contracts. Vendors will be required to measure and report
results such as GED and vocational program completion rates and rates of
graduation from treatment programs. Because vendors do not have access
to recommitment data, future contracts will not require vendors to measure
recidivism rates of inmates who successfully complete support programs.
•

Develop inmate visitation policies and telephone rates for the private prisons
that are consistent with those followed by the state's public prisons and
encourage inmate family contact, as directed by statute

Non-concur (Visitation): Each facility operates under a departmentapproved plan of operations which includes the facility's visitation policies and
procedures. We believe each facility's visitation policies meet both the needs
of the inmates as well as legislative intent. Our primary concern is that
vendors maintain a secure and controlled environment during visitation.
Nonetheless, we will survey inmates and family members about their level of
satisfaction with existing policies and make a determination as to any needed
changes. We anticipate that survey results for all facilities will be available by
September 30, 2009. Decisions on whether to change visitation policies will
be made on a case by case basis.
Concur (Telephone rates): The department recognizes that telephone calls
are more expensive at private facilities than at public institutions and is
discussing this matter with vendors. In future contracts, we will require
vendors to provide telephone services at rates that are more in line with those
of the public facilities. To gain better economies of scale, the Bureau will also
explore alternatives such as providing telephone services at the public
prisons through state term contracts.

12

OPPAGA Report

Report No. 08-71

Mr. Gary R. Vanlandingham
December 24, 2008
Attachment Page 4
•

Develop written criteria for awarding Privately Operated Institutions Inmate
Welfare Trust Fund monies so that its staff can verify that the funds are being
used appropriately.

Concur:
The Bureau has completed and submitted for the Secretary's
approval Administrative Policy 08-103: Management of the Privately Operated
Institutions Inmate Welfare Trust Fund. The policy establishes procedures
and guidelines for operation and management of the trust fund. The policy
provides detailed evaluation criteria for the trust fund committee to use in
making recommendations to the Secretary for the award of trust fund monies.
The Bureau anticipates the policy will be effective by January 1, 2009.

13

The Florida Legislature

Office of Program Policy Analysis
and Government Accountability
OPPAGA provides performance and accountability information about Florida
government in several ways.


OPPAGA reviews deliver program evaluation, policy analysis, and Sunset
reviews of state programs to assist the Legislature in overseeing government
operations, developing policy choices, and making Florida government better,
faster, and cheaper.



Florida Government Accountability Report (FGAR), an Internet encyclopedia,
www.oppaga.state.fl.us/government, provides descriptive, evaluative, and
performance information on more than 200 Florida state government programs.



Florida Monitor Weekly, an electronic newsletter, delivers brief announcements of
research reports, conferences, and other resources of interest for Florida's policy
research and program evaluation community.



Visit OPPAGA’s website, the Florida Monitor, at www.oppaga.state.fl.us

OPPAGA supports the Florida Legislature by providing evaluative research and objective analyses to promote government
accountability and the efficient and effective use of public resources. This project was conducted in accordance with applicable
evaluation standards. Copies of this report in print or alternate accessible format may be obtained by telephone (850/488-0021), by
FAX (850/487-3804), in person, or by mail (OPPAGA Report Production, Claude Pepper Building, Room 312,
111 W. Madison St., Tallahassee, FL 32399-1475). Cover photo by Mark Foley.
Project supervised by Marti Harkness (850/487-9233)
Project conducted by Linda Vaughn (850/487-9216), Victor Williams (850/487-9219), and Glen Holley
Gary R. VanLandingham, Ph.D., OPPAGA Director