F I RST A M E N D . A PP L I C A T I O N

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P R ISO NS A N D I N M A T ES R E L A T E D

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SP E C I A L D I E TS

Outline by Tim Phillips, Attorney
3249 Hennepin Avenue S, Suite 216
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55408
Last updated November 28, 2012
I.

T wo F actors at Play

A.
Inmates retain protections afforded by the F irst A mendment³LQFOXGLQJLWV
directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.´(2¶/RQH v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).)
1. O nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the F ree E xercise C lause,
however. This is because ± by its terms ± it gives special protection to the exercise of
religion. (Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana E mployment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713
(1981).) ³Purely secular views do not suffice.´( F razee v. Illinois Dept. of
E mployment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989).)
a. But: ³,t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular
beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants¶ interpretations of
those creeds.´( Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989).) It is inappropriate, for example, for a prison official to argue with a prisoner
regarding the objective truth of his or her religious belief. (Nelson v. Miller , 570 F.3d
868, 881 (7th Cir. 2009).)
2. ³A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.´(Wisconsin v. Yoder , 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).)
B.
L imitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of
incarceration and from valid penological objectives ± including deterrence of crime,
rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security. (2¶/RQH v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 348 (1987).)
I I.

T he Turner Standard

³To ensure that courts afford appropriate defereQFHWRSULVRQRIILFLDOV´WKH86
Supreme Court ³determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional
rights are judged under a µreasonableness¶ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied
to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.´ (2¶/RQH v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).) If a prison regulation impinges on inmates¶
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid when it is reasonably related to legitimate
This outline is for information purposes only. It is not legal advice. Nor is it guaranteed to be correct,
complete, or up to date. Also, your review of this outline does not make me your attorney. Nor does
sending me a letter or email. To obtain legal advice or help with a legal problem, you should contact an
attorney licensed to practice in the state where you live or where ± if applicable ± the relevant incident
occurred. Finally, despite being included in this outline, information may subsequently be edited without
any notice to indicate such revision.

penological interests. (Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).) Several factors are
relevant to this µreasonableness¶ determination:
A.
W hether a rational connection exists between the regulation and a neutral,
legitimate government interest;
B.
W hether alternative means exist for inmates to exercise the constitutional right
at issue (i.e., to observe other religious obligations, VHH2¶/RQH at 352);
C.
W hat impact the accommodation of the right would have on inmates, prison
personnel, and allocation of prison resources; and
D.

W hether obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation exist.

(Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier , 417 U.S. 817,
822-VWDWLQJWKDWDVWR³considerations . . . peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials,´ ³in the absence of substantial evidence in
the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these
considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters´.)
I I I.

Religious Dietary Needs

Under the First Amendment, prisoners are entitled to ³reasonable accommodation
RIWKHLUUHOLJLRXVGLHWDU\QHHGV´ (Sisney v. Reisch, 674 F.3d 839, 846 (8th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2000)); Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d
98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992); La Fevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1119 (10th Cir. 1991);
Martinelli v. Dugger , 817 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1012 (1988).)
A SULVRQHU¶VUHOLJLRXVGLHWDU\SUDFWLFHLVVXEVWDQWLDOO\ burdened when the prison
forces him or her to choose between religious practice and adequate nutrition. ( Civil
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2003);
Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 689-90 (8th Cir. 2000); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,
198 (9th Cir. 1987).)
I V.

A First A mendment V iolation Means a R L U IP A V iolation A lso E xists

Under RLUIPA, no government may impose a ³substantial burden´ on the
religious exercise of an inmate XQOHVVWKHEXUGHQIXUWKHUV³DFompelling governmental
interest´DQGGRHVVRE\³WKHOHDVWUHVWULFWLYHPHDQV´ (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).)
RLUIPA GHILQHV³UHOLJLRXVH[HUFLVH´WRLQFOXGH³DQ\H[HUFLse of religion, whether or not
FRPSHOOHGE\RUFHQWUDOWRDV\VWHPRIUHOLJLRXVEHOLHI´ (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).)
The U.S. Supreme Court held in 2005 that the portion of RLUIPA applicable to prisoners
This outline is for information purposes only. It is not legal advice. Nor is it guaranteed to be correct,
complete, or up to date. Also, your review of this outline does not make me your attorney. Nor does
sending me a letter or email. To obtain legal advice or help with a legal problem, you should contact an
attorney licensed to practice in the state where you live or where ± if applicable ± the relevant incident
occurred. Finally, despite being included in this outline, information may subsequently be edited without
any notice to indicate such revision.

does not violate the Establishment Clause. ( Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714
(2005).)
RLUIPA applies to any inmate religious exercise case in which ³WKHVXEVWDQWLDO
burden [on the religious exercise] is imposed in a program or activity that receives
)HGHUDOILQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFH´ RU³WKHVXEVtantial burden affects, or removal of that
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several
6WDWHVRUZLWK,QGLDQWULEHV´ (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1)-(2).)
As the First Amendment standard is less demanding on prisons than RLUIPA, a
First Amendment violation in this context means a RLUIPA violation also exists. (Willis
v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 753 F.Supp.2d 768, 782 (S.D. Indiana
2010).)

This outline is for information purposes only. It is not legal advice. Nor is it guaranteed to be correct,
complete, or up to date. Also, your review of this outline does not make me your attorney. Nor does
sending me a letter or email. To obtain legal advice or help with a legal problem, you should contact an
attorney licensed to practice in the state where you live or where ± if applicable ± the relevant incident
occurred. Finally, despite being included in this outline, information may subsequently be edited without
any notice to indicate such revision.