Pace Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 5 Fall 2010
Opening Up a Closed World: A Sourcebook on
Prison Oversight

Article 1

11-18-2010

Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes
Effective Prison Oversight?
Michael B. Mushlin
Pace University School of Law, mmushlin@law.pace.edu

Michele Deitch
University of Texas

Recommended Citation
Michael B. Mushlin and Michele Deitch, Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes Effective
Prison Oversight?, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1383 (2010)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact rracelis@pace.edu.

Opening Up a Closed World:
What Constitutes Effective Prison
Oversight?
Michael B. Mushlin1 & Michele Deitch2
I. Background
In April 2006, some of the world‘s leading experts in
corrections policy and human rights gathered in Austin, Texas
for a seminal three-day conference on prison oversight. This
by-invitation event, entitled Opening Up a Closed World: What
Constitutes Effective Prison Oversight?, was sponsored by the
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of
Texas, in conjunction with Pace Law School. The Texas
conference was a follow-up to the 2003 conference at Pace Law
School entitled Prison Reform Revisited: The Unfinished
1. Michael B. Mushlin is a Professor of Law at Pace University Law
School. Before entering academia he was staff attorney and Project Director
of the Prisoners' Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society, and Associate
Director of the Children‘s Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union. He has served as Chair of the Committee on Corrections of the New
York City Bar Association and as Chair and now Vice Chair of the
Correctional Association of New York. He also was a member of the Task
Force on the Legal Status of Prisoners of the American Bar Association,
which drafted a new set of standards governing the rights of prisoners
adopted by the House of Delegates of the ABA as policy on February 8, 2010.
He is the author of RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (4th ed. 2009), a four volume text
published by West Publishing Company. B.A. Vanderbilt University; J.D
Northwestern University School of Law
2. Michele Deitch is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Texas—
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and the University of Texas
School of Law. She was the Chair of the 2006 conference on prison oversight,
as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow. She served as the original Reporter
for the American Bar Association‘s Standards on the Treatment of Prisoners,
and was a court-appointed monitor of conditions in the Texas prison system
in the landmark class action lawsuit Ruiz v. Estelle. She has also served as a
policy advisor to the Texas Legislature on corrections and sentencing issues,
was appointed to the state‘s Blue Ribbon Task Force on the juvenile justice
system, and provided lead testimony on independent prison oversight issues
before the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission and the
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons. B.A., Amherst
College; M.Sc., Oxford University; J.D. Harvard Law School.

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Agenda, the proceedings for which were published in the PACE
LAW REVIEW.3
One of the themes of the previous Pace conference was the
critical need to develop methods for ensuring greater
transparency of correctional institutions and accountability for
the protection of prisoners. Exclusive reliance on the courts to
serve this function is misplaced: judges can only remedy
problems once a constitutional violation is found; they are not
in a position to prevent problems in the first place. The far
wiser approach is to develop preventative oversight
mechanisms that reduce the necessity of court involvement in
prison operations.
The Texas conference developed and explored this theme
in-depth. It provided the first opportunity in the United States
to examine closely a range of workable non-judicial prison
oversight mechanisms—both international models and
domestic—and to explore ways that prison oversight can be
enhanced in this country. This issue goes not only to the heart
of good governance practices, but also to the protection of
human rights in a closed institutional environment. Supreme
Court Justice William Brennan sagely referred to this prison
environment as a ―shadow world‖; 4 by shining a light on these
hidden corners of our society, we can go a long way towards
eliminating abuses.
The Texas conference broke new ground in the extent to
which it brought together a broad range of high-level players
representing key stakeholder groups concerned about prisonrelated issues. They came together in a spirit of cooperation
and dialogue, and with a willingness to engage deeply about
ways to improve prison conditions and the treatment of
prisoners. Among the 115 participants were 20 percent of the
nation‘s corrections commissioners and directors, as well as
international experts and the country‘s leading prisoners‘
rights advocates, scholars, practitioners, judges, journalists,
and policy-makers.5 Many of the participants were previously
3. Symposium, Prison Reform Revisited: The Unfinished Agenda, 24
PACE
L.
REV.
395
(2004),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/.
4. O‘Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
5. A list of the distinguished conference participants and their affiliation

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used to seeing each other only on the opposite sides of a
courtroom. Attendees came from twenty-two states and five
foreign countries to discuss methods for increasing
transparency and accountability in U.S. prisons and jails.
Unlike most academic conferences, this conference was a ―byinvitation only‖ event, designed to make the conference one in
which a fruitful and respectful dialogue among experts could
take place.
By bringing together both domestic leaders and
international experts, the conference created an opportunity for
American corrections officials and prisoner rights advocates to
be exposed to international practices and requirements with
prisons. The concept of independent oversight is uncharted
territory for most U.S. corrections practitioners.
Many
European countries have highly developed mechanisms for
inspecting and reporting on prison conditions.
Such
monitoring systems are designed to prevent human rights
abuses before they occur. In contrast, the United States is one
of the only Western nations without a formal and
comprehensive system in place providing for regular, external
review of all prisons and jails.6 At the same time, these
international experts learned a great deal both about U.S.
correctional practices and the challenges faced by prison and
jail officials working in the current political environment.
The conference agenda, which is attached as Appendix B to
this Foreword, details the range of complex issues that were
explored in depth over the course of the event.
Over the course of three days, which included two days of
conference-style information-sharing and a separate day for a
work session, this diverse group achieved a remarkable level of
consensus about the need for increased levels of oversight of
prisons and jails in the United States.7 The consensus did not
at the time of the conference is attached as Appendix A to this Foreword.
6. As shown by Professor Deitch‘s 50-state inventory of correctional
oversight mechanisms in this volume, however, there are some important
examples of such routine correctional monitoring conducted at the state and
local levels. Such examples include the California Inspector General, the
Ohio Correctional Institution Inspection Committee, the Board of Correction
in New York City, and the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. Michele
Deitch, Independent Correctional Oversight Mechanisms Across the United
States: A 50-State Inventory, 30 PACE L. REV. 1754 (2010).
7. The Texas House of Representatives passed a resolution praising the

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emerge because we all share a perspective on the extent of
problems in corrections today, but because we all agree that
improvement is possible and that enhanced oversight can
assist in the effort to improve operations. Corrections officials
wisely observed many ways in which external oversight can
benefit their agencies, and advocates began to perceive that
routine oversight could be an effective and appropriate
alternative and supplement to litigation as a reform vehicle.
Moreover, all stakeholder groups that participated recognized
that they shared many common goals and objectives that could
be served meaningfully through expanded independent
oversight—most notably, the goal of achieving safe and
humane prisons.
Following the conference, numerous participants
committed to taking steps both large and small towards
ensuring that the momentum from this important event would
continue to grow and take root. Since our gathering in 2006,
we have seen a number of concrete indications that the
Opening Up a Closed World conference has had a critical
impact. In 2008, the American Bar Association passed a
resolution calling for independent correctional oversight in
every jurisdiction and detailing what such oversight bodies
should look like,8 and in 2010, the American Bar Association
adopted a vastly revised set of criminal justice standards on
the treatment of prisoners that similarly emphasized the
importance of independent oversight mechanisms.9 In 2007,
the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission held a

stimulating dialogue and debate sparked by the Conference that promises to
lead ―to significant reforms within the U.S. criminal justice system.‖ H.R.
223, 79th Leg., (Tex. 2006).
8. ABA Resolution 104b, Approved by the House of Delegates at Annual
Meeting 2008, available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/am08104b.pdf. Co-author Michele

Deitch served as an advisor to the ABA Subcommittee that drafted the
resolution.
9. ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards: Treatment of Prisoners,
Standard
23-11.3
(2010),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/treatmentprisoners.html.
Coauthor Michele Deitch served as Reporter to the ABA Standards Task Force
that developed these standards, while co-author Michael Mushlin served as a
member of that same Task Force.

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hearing featuring testimony on independent prison oversight,10
and the PREA Standards, issued in 2009, emphasized the
importance of oversight to ensure agency compliance with the
standards.11
The annual convention of the American
Correctional Association in 2007 featured a major session on
independent correctional oversight.12 Several states and local
jurisdiction have sought to establish or strengthen oversight
bodies through either legislation or negotiation. In 2007, the
Texas Legislature created the Independent Ombudsman for the
Texas Youth Commission, and incorporated many of the key
principles of independent oversight in the drafting of that
legislation.13 And countless individuals, experts, and advocacy
groups have sought guidance and information on this topic
from the organizers as a result of the conference. Though the
long-term impact of the conference has yet to be fully realized,
it is fair to say that the event has generated significant interest
and commitment to an issue that had previously received
sparse exposure in the United States.
Publication of this volume of papers is yet another step in
the process of ensuring that this topic of independent prison
oversight remains visible, and that essential information about
correctional oversight mechanisms is readily available to all
practitioners, advocates, scholars, and others who are
10. Special Topics In Preventing and Responding to Prison Rape:
Medical and Mental Health Care, Community Corrections Settings, and
Oversight, Hearing before the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission
(Dec.
6,
2007),
available
at
http://www.cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/nprec/20090820160849/http://npre
c.us/docs3/December%206%202007-New%20Orleans.txt. Many of those who
provided testimony at this hearing, including co-author Michele Deitch, were
speakers at the Opening Up a Closed World conference.
11. National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, Publications –
Standards
AU1,
http://nprec.us/files/pdfs/NPREC_PrisonsJailsStandards.PDF (last visited
Sept. 26, 2010) [hereinafter PREA Standards].
12. The speakers for this session included two corrections directors,
Harold Clarke (the then chair-elect of the ACA and incoming director of the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections) and Kathleen Dennehy (the
outgoing director of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections), and coauthor Michele Deitch.
13. 2007 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 263 (West). For more information on
the law, regularly referred to as SB 103, see Bill History, TEXAS LEGISLATURE
ONLINE,
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=
80R&Bill=SB103 (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).

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interested in the concept. The need for such information has
become increasingly apparent to us during the time since the
conference, and so we redoubled our efforts to update research
and solicit articles from our conference participants. We have
also updated the conference website, so that also remains an
excellent resource for anyone interested in prison oversight.
The website—www.utexas.edu/lbj/prisonconference—has long
contained videos of all the presentations at the conferences, so
anyone can be a ―virtual participant‖ in this exciting event.
Newly added to the website are the conference proceedings,
which include detailed written summaries of each conference
session (a godsend for anyone without time to watch the full
videos) as well as copies of handouts from the conference
(descriptions of the various oversight bodies discussed during
the sessions).14 In time, additional resources on correctional
oversight will also be added to this website.
This law review volume may be considered a sourcebook on
the issue of correctional oversight, and we predict that the
volume will be an invaluable resource in this growing field of
law, policy, and public administration. Given the explosive
growth of prisons over the last three decades and the absence,
by and large, of effective prison oversight mechanisms in this
country, these papers—the first in any American law review
devoted to this subject—take on added importance and urgency
because they provide information not previously available
before to American audiences and add important perspectives
from major leaders in the field.
II. Highlights of the Papers in this Volume
The papers published herein cover four general areas, and
the volume is organized along these lines: (1) overview of the
topic of prison oversight; (2) the international experience with
prison oversight; (3) correctional oversight in the United
States; and (4) resources for further research on correctional
oversight.

14. Michele Deitch, ed., Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes
Prison Oversight?—Conference Proceedings, LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCH. OF
PUB. AFFAIRS, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/
prisonconference/2006_conference_proceedings (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).

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A. Overview of the Topic of Prison Oversight
The first set of papers provides useful background and an
overview of this important subject. The volume begins with a
paper from Professor Michael Mushlin that traces in more
detail the connection between the 2003 Pace conference on
prison reform and this 2006 Texas conference on prison
oversight. His essay demonstrates how the Prison Reform
Revisited conference set the necessary foundation for this
conference by bringing together for the first time people who
often are at odds with one another. In his article, Mushlin
writes that ―[t]his was a dramatic break with precedent. In the
past, prison administrators rarely, if ever, voluntarily met with
advocates. By the same token, advocates, when they wished to
discuss strategies for achieving change, steered clear of prison
administrators.
Except during periods of conflict, these
individuals lived their professional lives segregated from one
another.‖15 The model for that successful conference made this
conference, which is more focused and specific, possible.
Professor Michele Deitch‘s essay, Distinguishing the
Various Functions of Effective Prison Oversight,16 will help
readers begin to understand the complex concept of oversight.
This essay was also a presentation from the opening of the
conference, and its importance lay in its effort to establish a
shared terminology on ―oversight‖ for conference participants.
―Oversight,‖ Deitch notes, is not a term of art, but an umbrella
concept that encompasses many distinct functions, including
regulation, audit, accreditation, investigation, legal, reporting,
and inspection/monitoring.
Each of these functions, she
argues, is an essential part of effective oversight and these
functions should not compete with each other in importance.
Moreover, as this essay indicates, we each have a different
function in mind when we discuss oversight, which makes
communication about this topic difficult at times. Deitch calls
15. Michael B. Mushlin, From White Plains to Austin: The Road from the
Prison Reform Revisited Conference to the Opening Up a Closed World
Conference, 30 PACE L. REV. 1430, 1432 (2010).
16. Michele Deitch, Distinguishing the Various Functions of Effective
Prison Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1438 (2010).

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for a robust system of correctional oversight that is multifaceted and multi-layered, serving each of these functions and
involving players both inside and outside the correctional
agency.
Next, the volume reprints the keynote speech delivered at
the Texas conference on prison oversight by former United
States Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach.17 His powerful
presentation drew on his personal experiences as a prisoner of
war during World War II and his belief in the importance of
oversight to ensure the humane treatment of prisoners.
Katzenbach acknowledges the lack of a natural constituency in
favor of prisoners‘ rights, and explores the possible
explanations for why there is starting to be a more welcoming
attitude towards the notion of oversight on the part of prison
administrators. He hopes that oversight bodies can engage
society in a discussion about the shortsightedness of some of
our criminal justice policies and practices. He concludes with
an eloquent exhortation to all of us to let politicians know that
important people care about reforming prisons and reversing
regressive criminal justice policies, and are willing to speak out
about these matters.
Lest there be any doubt about the need for external
oversight, Geri Lynn Green‘s article about the disarray of the
California prison system should dispel the notion that all is
right with the American correctional system.18 That article
chronicles the crises in the nation‘s largest prison system,
brought on by severe overcrowding with some California prison
facilities crowded to 300% capacity.19 Green, a civil rights
attorney, argues that these challenges have led to a situation
in which California prisons operate ―without necessary
management structures, policy standardization, training
information technology or the ability to provide essential
17. Hon. Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Reflections on 60 Years of Outside
Scrutiny of Prisons and Prison Policy in the United States, 30 PACE L. REV.
1446 (2010).
18. Geri Lynn Green, The Quixotic Dilemma, California’s Immutable
Culture of Incarceration, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1453 (2010).
19. Though California‘s prison problems are enormously high-profile, by
no means is this state the only one whose prison system is facing challenges.
For a survey of the problems in contemporary American prisons, see
generally COMM‘N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA‘S PRISONS, CONFRONTING
CONFINEMENT (2006).

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health care services and rehabilitative programming.‖20 She
concludes that without effective and appropriate external
oversight of this system, there has been a ―massive waste of
taxpayer money.‖21
This section concludes with an important article by
Professor Stan Stojkovic. His piece, entitled Prison Oversight
and Prison Leadership,22 makes a compelling argument for
prison oversight from the perspective of correctional
administrators. He ends with the premise that ―[p]rison
oversight . . . will be the norm for prison leadership and
management in the 21st century.
For correctional
professionals the only question remains how they will adjust to
this change.‖23
Professor Stojkovic demonstrates how this development
should be embraced and welcomed since prison oversight is ―in
the best interests of everyone‖ including correctional
leadership.24 This is so because without public scrutiny
administrators are ―anonymous.‖ To Stojkovic, this is not as
appealing a posture as it might sound.
His article
demonstrates the benefits that come from the transparency
that results from prison oversight. These include enhanced
effectiveness, greater resources, and new ideas. ―Without
adequate oversight, correctional problems compound. Issues
like correctional health care, prison crowding, prison violence
and the management of prisons become almost impossible to
address.‖25
Even more pointedly, Stojkovic argues that
oversight serves democratic values by engaging the public in
the ―long and difficult discussion of what we, as a society, can
reasonably expect of prisons.‖26

20. Green, supra note 18, at 1459-60. Indeed, currently the entire prison
system of California is under a court order to decrease its prison population
by tens of thousands of inmates in order to come into compliance with basic
constitutional norms. See id. at 1461-63.
21. Id.
22. Stan Stojkovic, Prison Oversight and Prison Leadership, 30 PACE L.
REV. 1476 (2010).
23. Id. at 1489.
24. Id. at 1476.
25. Id. at 1483.
26. Id. at 1486.

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B. International experience
The next section of this volume presents a variety of
international models of prison oversight.
Correctional
oversight mechanisms are far better established in other
developed countries than in the United States, and thus these
models provide an excellent source of information for us. For
example, the United Kingdom has three different oversight
bodies, each fulfilling a different function: there is a Prison
Inspectorate that conducts routine inspections of all places of
detention;27 a Prison Ombudsman who investigates prisoners‘
complaints; and a system of Independent Monitoring Boards
made up of lay citizens who are appointed to monitor a
particular facility.28 Most European countries—the forty-seven
states that are party to the Council of Europe—fall under the
auspices of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
the Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners (CPT), an
intergovernmental treaty body that has the power to inspect
and report on conditions in any of the prisons in that vast
area.29 In Canada, the Office of the Correctional Investigator is
charged with investigating conditions in that country‘s prisons
and reporting its findings to the public and to political
officials.30
These entities are discussed in several papers, and the
pieces make for fascinating reading. The authors caution that
they are not attempting to sell their particular model to the
American public and explicitly note that in order for oversight
to be effective, a model must fit within the culture in which it
operates.31 Nevertheless, there are common themes that
27. See Anne Owers, Prison Inspection and the Protection of Prisoners’
Rights, 30PACE L. REV. 1535 (2010).
28. See Vivien Stern, The Role of Citizens and Non-Profit Organizations
in Providing Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1529 (2010).
29. See Silvia Casale, The Importance of Dialogue and Co-Operation in
Prison Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1490 (2010).
30. See Howard Sapers & Ivan Zinger, The Ombudsman as a Monitor of
Human Rights in Canadian Federal Corrections, 30 PACE L. REV. 1512 (2010)
31. See e.g., Owers, supra note 27, at 1547 (―[I]t is important to stress
that the models for protecting prisoners‘ rights cannot simply be packaged up
and exported wholesale to another county. Protecting prisoners‘ rights
requires a multi-layered approach and any mechanisms for doing so need to
be effective within the political, social and legal cultures of each
jurisdiction.‖)

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emerge from this record of extensive experience with oversight
in these countries and the lessons learned are valuable to
anyone interested in the prospect of establishing oversight in
the United States.
Some of the examples of the benefits that have occurred
from oversight mechanisms used in other countries are simple,
yet powerful. In one case, Dr. Silvia Casale, the then-head of
the CPT, recalls an inspection by her group to an unnamed
European prison32 in which it was so freezing that ―fingers
grew stiff with cold.‖33 The inspection report put a spotlight on
the problem, which in turn led to an increase in government
funding for the fuel allowance given to the prison. The end
result was that the prison was no longer as cold and forbidding
a place.34 In another equally powerful story, Casale tells how
the Russian Federation was persuaded by the oversight body to
remove shutters from the windows of all the prison cells in that
country. Before that decision, the prisons were dark and dank
dungeons. This shift in practice, to quote Dr. Casale, ―was a
dramatic move to let in the light, symbolizing vividly the effect
of oversight on the closed world of prisons.‖35
Andrew Coyle‘s article is of particular resonance because
he speaks from his experience on the receiving end of oversight
inspections.36 In the early 1990s, Coyle was appointed the
warden of Brixton Prison, which at the time was one of the
largest and most notorious of all British correctional
institutions. He writes about the great benefit that oversight
inspections provided, as he sought to reform the operation of
this prison:37
These two objective and independent reports
provided me with the tools that I could use to
convince staff of the need for change, to
demonstrate to government ministers and
32. The CPT keeps its reports anonymous. See Casale, supra note 29, at
1496, n.20.
33. Id. at 1495.
34. See id. at 1501-02.
35. Id. at 1502.
36. Andrew Coyle, Professionalism in Corrections and the Need for
External Scrutiny: An International Overview, 30 PACE L. REV. 1503 (2010).
37. Id. at 1507.

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national officials that . . . sufficient resources be
provided so that we [could] deliver decent and
humane care to prisoners. The reports also
provided an opportunity to engage with the
media and local public about what was going on
in the prison, what could be expected of it and
what should not be expected of it. . . . [T]he
process of change and improvement which we
began in Brixton in 1991 was greatly assisted by
these two independent reports because they were
able to draw attention to the pressure which
made it difficult to manage the prison. These
were pressures which everyone connected with
the prison was already aware of but it took
external inspections to get them on the public
agenda.38
Coyle points out that there exists a range of international,
regional, and national standards to guide these inspections,
and that these standards ―are not merely theoretical, nor are
they simply aspirational. They are intended to be applied in
practice in the day-to-day management of prisons.‖39 Using
these objective standards, Coyle argues, helps ensure that the
inspections are not ad hoc and subjective. Coyle concludes that
his experience demonstrates that oversight can materially help
in addressing what he sees as common problems in prison
management across cultures and national boundaries.40
Howard Sapers and Ivan Zinger, in their article on the
Canadian prison system, conclude that oversight in that
country provides an ―effective counter-weight to the natural
tendency of large social control institutions to overreact to
social and political pressures.‖41 They describe the Office of the
Correctional Investigator (OCI), which under Canadian Law is
charged with investigating and resolving individual prisoner
grievances.42 The office also has responsibility ―to review and
make recommendations‖ to correctional officials regarding
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1507-08.
Id. at 1511.
Id. at 1511.
Sapers & Zinger, supra note 30, at 1528.
Id. at 1518.

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―policies and procedures associated with individual
complaints.‖43 The authors observe that the OCI is ―above all
an Ombudsman‖ office.44 However, the article explains how
that description fails to recognize the true value of the OCI.
Working with a staff of twenty-four, the office receives between
6000 and 8000 inquiries and complaints from inmates every
year. These communications and the follow up responses give
the OCI an excellent perspective on the Canadian prison
system and a basis for making recommendations for systemic
change. Nevertheless, the authors point out that while this
model has achieved results, there are limitations to what it has
been able to accomplish, particularly when it comes to
addressing the widespread use of administrative segregation in
the Canadian prison system. They conclude their article with
recommendations as to how this external oversight mechanism
can be strengthened. Recommendations include providing the
OCI with power to make independent adjudication of decisions
to place prisoners in administrative segregation; giving the
OCI independent authority to report directly to Parliament;
and creating a national review mechanism in Canada that
meets the requirements of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention against Torture.45
The next article, by Baroness Vivien Stern,46 provides some
insight into the use of citizen review boards in the prison
monitoring context. She draws on her experiences working
with the system of Independent Monitoring Boards in England
to examine the benefits and drawbacks of such an oversight
model, and to assess their potential value for implementation
in the United States.
She writes powerfully about the
importance of involving citizens in the oversight process:
[Citizens] bring with them the values of the
outside world to the closed and deformed world of
prisons. They keep alive in the prison a certain
view of how human beings should be treated.
They can be the eyes and ears from the outside . .

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1527-28.
Stern, supra note 28.

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. .47
Anne Owers makes an important contribution with her
piece on the British Prison Inspectorate, for which she serves
as the Chief Inspector.48 The Inspectorate, established by
Parliament in 1985, has statutory power to inspect every adult
prison and juvenile facility in England and Wales, as well as all
places of immigration detention in the UK and by invitation
the military‘s central detention facility. Each prison in the
country is inspected at least twice every five years.
In her article, Owers provides useful detail about how the
inspections are carried out. Of particular interest is that the
Inspectorate uses four tests to determine whether a prison is
functioning properly. These four tests are:
whether prisoners are held in safety, whether
they are treated with respect for their human
dignity, whether they are able to engage in
purposeful activity, and whether they are
prepared for resettlement back into the
community.49
Following each inspection, the Prison Inspectorate releases
a report with recommendations for improvement. Under
British law, prison officials must respond with an action plan
stating whether each recommendation is accepted and if so how
it will be implemented in the prison.50 Later, the Inspectorate
returns to conduct a follow up inspection to determine the
agency‘s state of compliance with its action plan. Owers
reports that ―it is encouraging that, even in a pressurised
system such as ours, we find that around 70% of our
recommendations have been implemented, wholly or in part.‖51
But the benefits of this inspection process, according to Owers,
are not confined just to the changes made in individual prisons.
Through ―thematic reviews‖ her office has also been able to
47. Id. at 1533.
48. See generally Owers, supra note 27.
49. Id. at 1542.
50. Id. (reporting that about 95% of all recommendations are accepted by
the agency, with about 70% of them ultimately implemented).
51. Id. at 1543.

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―promote and support system-wide changes.‖52
These articles about international models of oversight are
fascinating and provoke obvious questions about whether we
can adapt these models for use in the United States. Of course,
as Owers point out, cultural and political differences between
our country and the countries that these authors write about
must be taken into account.53 At the same time, though, it is
hard to disagree with Andrew Coyle‘s observation that the
―problems that face prisons across the world are broadly
similar and the situation in the United States is no different
from other countries. The common problems related to underresourcing and overcrowding; poor health (including mental
health) of many prisoners; issues relating to staff such as low
pay, poor training and little public respect for what they do.‖54
The articles in this section of the volume serve as a valuable
resource as we learn from the experiences of our international
counterparts.
C.

Correctional oversight in the United States

While prison oversight mechanisms are not well
established or in wide existence in the United States, neither
are these bodies completely unknown. The conference papers
published here provide rich examples of a handful of
correctional oversight bodies in the United States and the
benefits that such oversight provides. The oversight models
profiled in this report fall into four categories: (1) nongovernmental citizen-based oversight; (2) oversight by
independent governmental bodies; (3) oversight by professional
correctional organizations; and (4) judicial oversight.
1. The role of NGOs and civilians in the oversight process
Probably the best-known examples of oversight of the
criminal justice system in the United States arise in the
context of civilian oversight of law enforcement, rather than in
52. Id. at 1544.
53. Id. at 1547 (―[M]odels for protecting prisoners‘ rights cannot simply
be packaged up and exported wholesale to another country.‖).
54. Coyle, supra note 36, at 1511.

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the prison context. Barbara Attard, who served as the
executive director of the National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), describes in her
article what is needed to be an effective oversight body for the
police.55 Those elements of effectiveness include political will,
authority, adequate funding, the ability to make policy
recommendations, connection with the community served by
the oversight body, the ability to report publicly, and the use of
mediation to resolve specific complaints.56 While Attard‘s
article does not deal with prison oversight, it is nevertheless
worthy of review by anyone interested in the effort to ensure
transparency and accountability in criminal justice agencies.
To be sure, there are significant differences between police
oversight and prison oversight—not the least of which is that
police oversight does not involve inspections of facilities—but
the lessons learned through years of experiences on the police
oversight front sound all too familiar to anyone who monitors
correctional institutions.
A rare but interesting model of prison oversight in the
United States involves inspections conducted by private
nongovernmental organizations that have authority to enter
prisons. The Correctional Association of New York is one of
only two private citizen-based organizations in the United
States with a legislative mandate to visit prisons and report on
the conditions of confinement.57 It has had this mandate for
over 165 years. The Board of Directors of this organization is
comprised of private citizens including ―prominent citizens,
lawyers, advocates, formerly incarcerated individuals,
individuals associated with community based organizations . .
. and academics.‖58
55. Barbara Attard, Oversight of Law Enforcement is Beneficial and
Needed—Both Inside and Out, 30 PACE L. REV. 1548 (2010).
56. Id.
57. Jack Beck, Role of the Correctional Association of New York in a New
Paradigm of Prison Monitoring, 30 PACE L. REV. 1572, 1574 (2010).
58. Id. See also John Brickman, The Role of Civilian Organizations with
Prison Access and Citizen Members—The New York Experience, 30 PACE L.
REV. 1562, 1564_(2010) (listing such famous past members of the Correctional
Association as Theodore Roosevelt, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie,
Cornelius Vanderbilt, John J. Astor, Jr., Samuel F. B. Morse, and Jacob H.
Schiff). Co-author Michael Mushlin is a past chair of the Correctional
Association and currently serves as a vice chair of the organization and a
member of its Executive Committee.

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Two articles—one by John Brickman, who served as Chair
of the Board of the Correctional Association,59 and the other by
Jack Beck, the head of the visiting project of this
organization60—describe the work of this impressive
organization in detail and discuss the benefits of this oversight
model as well as its drawbacks. Brickman‘s article also allows
for an interesting contrast between this model and a
government model of oversight, as he also for a time headed
the Board of Correction, a New York City government body
charged with inspection and regulation of the city‘s jails.
According to Brickman, a major benefit derives from
enlisting prominent citizens in the difficult effort to obtain
meaningful reform of prisons. 61 Once recruited, these citizens
can influence legislators and budget officials to provide needed
financial support and can enlist private philanthropy to
support prison affairs.
Moreover, their status in the
community can also influence the media to report on conditions
and can provide political ―cover‖ for administrators who want
to take steps that might otherwise be politically unpopular.
Their very presence in the facilities keeps corrections
professionals ―at the top of their game‖ in running the
prisons.62
John Brickman captures all of these points when he
summarizes and applies an axiom of quantum physics—
Heisenberg‘s ―uncertainty principle‖63—to the field of prison
oversight. This principle, according to Brickman, ―teaches that
the fact of observation will alter the subatomic reaction being
investigated.‖64 Applying this principle in this context, he
concludes that:
59. Brickman, supra note 58.
60. Beck, supra note 57.
61. An additional article discussing the benefits of citizen oversight
bodies is the very useful article of Baroness Vivien Stern, supra note 28.
That article describes the Independent Monitoring Boards comprised of
ordinary citizens, which date back to the 16th century in England, and are in
operation for all 135 prisons and 10 immigration removal centers in England
and Wales.
62. Brickman, supra note 58, at 1569.
63. JAN HILGEVOORD & JOS UFFINK, THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE, IN
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2006),
available
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/qtuncertainty/.
64. Brickman, supra note 58, at 1571.

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Watching something affects its course.
In
facilities that confine people, the presence of
civilian overseers humanizes everyone—inmates
and staff—and makes the prison a better, more
effective and more enlightened institution for
all.65
The approach of the Correctional Association‘s Prison
Visiting Project is described in greater detail in Jack Beck‘s
article.
Correctional Association staff employ numerous
techniques for gathering data about conditions in the New
York‘s prison facilities, including the use of standardized
survey instruments.66 This data, along with the results of the
inspection team‘s observations and interviews, is used to
generate reports either about single prison facilities or about
issues that cut across the entire penal system.
The
sophistication of the monitoring process is exemplified by a
review of correctional programs for treatment of drug and
alcohol abuse conducted under Beck‘s leadership. This project
involved visits to twenty-two prisons, the observation of forty
different treatment programs, detailed surveys of 1,160
inmates, focus group meetings with staff, and discussions with
prison administrators.67
Both Beck and Brickman point out that the independence
of the Correctional Association is both an advantage and a
shortcoming. Its independence from governmental structures
allows the Correctional Association to rise above political
limitations.
However, the Correctional Association‘s
independence is limiting insofar as the law that grants the
Association access to prisons ―does not grant the CA any power
to require change.‖68 Its power to effect change therefore is
only through the ―persuasiveness‖ of its efforts. Beck finds a
paradox here too in that the more ―forcefully the CA advocates
for change, the more difficult it is to have a congenial and
cooperative relationship with the Department.‖69
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Beck, supra note 57, at 1576.
Id. at 1600.
Id. at 1580.
Id.

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One fascinating new development that will impact the
work of the Correctional Association involves the passage of
three separate pieces of recent legislation in New York that
provide for specialized government oversight of certain aspects
of prison operations, including the creation of new oversight
mechanisms for mental health care, substance abuse
treatment, and health care.70 The Correctional Association
advocated for the development of each of these oversight
mechanisms, and will be monitoring the effectiveness of each
entity. In effect, the Correctional Association will be watching
the watchdogs, a fascinating concept.71
Readers may wonder about the replicability of the
Correctional Association model. Beck offers a number of
options for modifying this model in ways that might be
politically feasible today, including the establishment of an
―independent review board.‖72 These options may bear closer
similarities to the independent prison monitoring boards
described in the earlier piece by Vivien Stern.73
2. The Role of Independent Governmental Oversight
One of the best-known examples of governmental oversight
is the New York City Board of Correction, which oversees and
regulates the city‘s jail system. The Board is an agency of the
City of New York that functions independently of the city‘s
Department of Correction. The members of the Board are
political appointments, made by the Mayor, the City Council,
and the Judges of the Appellate Division of the New York State
Supreme Court; they have the legal mandate to enter jail
facilities and to establish legally enforceable minimum
operational standards.74 Members of the Board serve fixed
terms and are not compensated for their service, and there is

70. Id. at 1593-1605 (citing SHU Exclusion Law of 2008; N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 19.09 (McKinney 2010); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 206(26)
(McKinney 2010)).
71. Id. at 1609.
72. Id. at 1583.
73. Stern, supra note 28.
74. For a full description of the authority and composition of the Board,
see Richard Wolf, Reflections on a Government Model of Correctional
Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1610 (2010).

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also a full-time professional staff of inspectors. Thus, even
though this is a government entity, there is an element of
citizen involvement incorporated into this model.75
This volume contains two articles that specifically discuss
the Board. The articles were written by authors who have deep
personal experience with it. John Brickman, whose article
about the Correctional Association was discussed above, also
addresses the work of the Board of Corrections in his piece and
offers useful contrasts between the two models. Brickman
served as the Executive Director of the New York City Board of
Correction in the 1970s before leaving that office to enter
private legal practice. Several decades later he became Chair
of the Board of the Correctional Association discussed above.76
In addition, Richard T. Wolf, the current Executive Director of
the Board of Correction, also contributes a valuable piece on
the role of the Board. Wolf details the history of the Board, its
structure and authority, its field operations unit, the Board‘s
minimum standards, and his insights and observations about
the role of non-judicial oversight extrapolated from his deep
experience in the field.77
In describing the work of the Board, both Brickman and
Wolf stress the importance of its independence. In Wolf‘s
words, ―[t]he fact that correctional facilities are ‗closed worlds‘
is the compelling argument for outside, independent
scrutiny.‖78 Wolf elaborates on what ―independence‖ means:
the oversight body must ―formally . . . establish and maintain
an arms-length relationship‖ between itself and the
Department of Correction.‖79 Independence is so critical to the
effectiveness of prison oversight—and such a complex subject—
that it was the topic of a separate panel discussion at the

75.
New
York
City
Charter
(2004),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/citych arter2004.pdf.
76. Brickman, supra note 58, at 1569-70 (―The non-governmental
organization, exemplified by the Correctional Association, can maintain
leadership that is less likely to change arbitrarily with shifts in the political
landscape. The government agency, such as the Board of Correctional, is
susceptible to budgetary variations, in lean times or because of political
disagreement.‖).
77. Wolf, supra note 74.
78. Id. at 1611 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 1612.

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Opening Up a Closed World conference.80
Wolf and Brickman make strong arguments in these
papers that a ―hybrid‖ model that combines governmental and
citizen involvement in one body could be usefully considered by
governmental authorities seeking to establish oversight of
prisons and jails in jurisdictions that currently have no
oversight structure in place.
Yet another type of governmental oversight arises in the
context of commissions and task forces appointed by
government officials. Jamie Fellner, who recently served as a
Commissioner on the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission, contributed a useful piece that discusses the
Commission‘s deliberations about how to address the tragedy of
prison rape.81 Following an exhaustive period of study and
hearings, the Commission proposed standards for the
elimination of prison rape, currently awaiting approval by the
United States Attorney General.82 A central recommendation
of the Commission is that it is imperative for the prevention of
prison rape that every prison system be subjected to routine
auditing in order to ensure compliance with the standards.83
3. The Role of Professional Organizations
Two articles discuss the role of the American Correctional
Association in raising the quality of prison operations, and
debate the extent to which the accreditation process acts as a
form of oversight. David Bogard, a former Commissioner on
the American Correctional Association‘s Commission on
Accreditation for Corrections and a member of the ACA‘s
Standards Committee, in his article entitled Effective
Corrections Oversight: What Can We Learn from the ACA
Standards and Accreditation?, describes in detail the voluntary
process used by the ACA to accredit correctional institutions
whose administrators request accreditation.84 Lynn Branham,
80. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 57.
81. Jamie Fellner, Ensuring Progress: Accountability Standards
Recommended by the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, 30
PACE L. REV. 1625 (2010).
82. PREA Standards, supra note 11.
83. Fellner, supra note 81, at 1638-41
84. David M. Bogard, Effective Correctional Oversight: What Can We

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a law professor and a member of Commission on Accreditation
of the American Correction Association for thirteen years, in
her piece entitled Accrediting the Accreditors: A New Paradigm
for Correctional Oversight,85 also describes the ACA
accreditation process while advocating for certain reforms of
that system.
The accreditation process is important because, as
Branham notes, the ACA‘s Commission on Accreditation for
Corrections ―is the only entity that accredits entire correctional
facilities nationwide.‖86 According to the ACA's website, there
are 130 accredited jails and 590 accredited prisons in the
country, a significant number, though clearly a minority of all
correctional institutions in the country.87 Bogard observes that
this process is ―as close as we currently get to a national
corrections oversight process‖ in the United States.88
While Bogard considers the accreditation process valuable
and believes that it has produced ―many safer and more
humane correctional facilities in this country,‖89 he does
recognize its shortcomings. To begin with, the accreditation
process is not transparent, nor does it assure accountability.
He also acknowledges that the voluntary nature of the process
reduces the value of accreditation as a form of oversight.
Nevertheless, Bogard does not urge that the voluntary nature
of the process be changed, since as a voluntary system the
―impetus for accreditation . . . derives from an internal quest
for enhanced professionalism . . . .‖90
Branham agrees with much of what Bogard says but takes
a different view on some of these points. She agrees with him
that the process has had many positive effects. She writes that
as a commissioner she has:
witnessed the dramatic potential
accreditation
process
has
to

that the
catalyze

Learn From ACA Standards and Accreditation, 30 PACE L. REV. 1646 (2010).
85. Lynn S. Branham, Accrediting the Accreditors: A New Paradigm for
Correctional Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1656 (2010).
86. Id. at 1658.
87. Bogard, supra note 84, at 1649.
88. Id. at 1652.
89. Id. at 1655.
90. Id. at 1653-54.

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improvement in conditions confinement, abate
practice
that
transgress
constitutional
requirements or professional norms and
transform the culture of a correctional institution
from one marked by debasement of staff and
inmates to one suffused with a commitment to
professionalism.91
Branham attests further based on her extensive firsthand
experience that, because of this process, ―many correctional
facilities in this country are far safer, more humane, and better
operated than they were before undergoing what can be the
rigors of accreditation.‖92
Branham‘s perspective diverges from Bogard‘s when it
comes to the issue of voluntariness. She argues that the
voluntary nature of the ACA accreditation process is a
―systemic‖ problem that ―detracts substantially from, and
potentially could eviscerate, its efficacy as an oversight
mechanism.‖93 Unless there is agency consent to inspection
and accreditation, the process does not take place.
In
Branham‘s view, ―[t]he voluntary nature of accreditations,
combined with the fact that it is fee-based, makes the
accreditation process vulnerable, both financially and
operationally.‖94 For one thing, prison officials or legislatures
can opt out of this process of oversight entirely, which limits its
effectiveness. Moreover, the fact that the ACA is dependent
upon the fees from participating correctional agencies ―spawns
unrelenting and sometimes irresistible pressures to water
down accreditation standards and make accreditation
procedures more lax.‖95
To remedy this problem, Branham proposes a fundamental
reform to the process. She suggests that federal law be
changed so that in order to receive any federal funding for
91. Branham, supra note 85, at 1663-64.
92. Id. at 1664.
93. Id.
94. Id. 1665.
95. Id. Professor Branham makes clear that this watering down process
is not promoted by individuals with ―sinister motives.‖ Instead, pressure to
excuse non compliance comes from prison administrators who are deeply
committed to accreditation but who are unable to obtain needed funding from
legislatures to achieve this result . Id at 1666.

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corrections purposes, a state must operate a prison system that
is formally accredited. She goes on to say that:
Since correctional facilities receive federal money
for an array of purposes, including to fund
construction and institutional programs, making
the receipt of federal funds contingent on
accreditation likely would propel many more
correctional institutions to become accredited
than currently are.96
Branham argues that this reform would not only make
prisons subject to accreditation, it would also make the
operations of prisons more open and accountable, although this
would only be a ―first step.‖97 Furthermore, in Prof. Branham‘s
opinion, making the process compulsory would ―dissipate, at
least somewhat, the inexorable pressures that correctional
institutions often exert on an accrediting agency to dilute its
accreditation requirements.98
4. The Role of the Courts
While the major thrust of this volume focuses on nonjudicial forms of oversight, it cannot be overlooked that, in the
United States to date, the most significant form of oversight
has come about through civil rights litigation brought before
the federal courts of the United States.99 Elizabeth Alexander‘s
significant contribution to this issue entitled Getting to Yes in a
PLRA World100 deals with what is probably the most important
practical aspect of utilizing that system of oversight in the
current time: how to overcome the barriers to judicial review of

96. Id. at 1668.
97. Id at 1671 (recognizing that ―other correctional oversight
mechanisms would need to be developed or refined . . .if the objectives of
correctional oversight are to be met fully.‖)
98. Id. at 1669.
99. The history of that involvement and an assessment of its successes
and failures are discussed in the issue of the PACE LAW REVIEW devoted to
publishing papers from the Prison Reform Revisited conference. Symposium,
supra note 3.
100. 30 Pace L. Rev. 1672 (2010).

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prison conditions that were imposed by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.101 That law imposes formidable obstacles
to commencing and maintaining prison litigation.102
Nevertheless, Alexander (who at the time of the writing of her
article was the Director of the National Prison Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union), demonstrates that prison
litigation is continuing and that in some notable cases
plaintiffs have been successful at persuading defendants to
agree to consent decrees granting relief, despite the
impediments to such agreements in the Act. Alexander offers
practical suggestions for litigators on how to overcome the
PLRA‘s barriers. In the process, her article also confirms ―the
continued relevance of prison conditions of confinement
litigation.‖103
D.

Resources for correctional oversight

The final section of this volume contains two important
resources for anyone pursuing further research on the topic of
independent correctional oversight or for any practitioners or
advocates seeking to develop or enhance prison oversight
mechanisms in their own jurisdiction. First, co-author Michele
Deitch and her graduate students in law and public policy have
produced an Annotated Bibliography of all significant resources
on the topic of correctional oversight.104 This Bibliography is of
particular value because it identifies and summarizes sources
that are especially difficult to locate, including reports,
speeches, unpublished essays, and chapters of books. Much of
the cited material comes from international sources. These
materials are all brought together for the first time in this
Bibliography, and are organized in a sensible, easy-to-follow
manner. The Bibliography begins by highlighting sources that
address the importance of oversight, discuss the meaning of the
oversight concept, and provide guidance on conducting
101. Pub. L. No. 104-134 (April 26, 1996). For a full discussion of the act and the
difficulties it poses for prisoners’ lawyers see MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF
PRISONERS, Chapter 17 (4th ed 2009).
102. For a full description of the provisions of this law, see id.
103. Alexander, supra note 100, at 1686.
104. Michele Deitch, Annotated Bibliography on Independent Prison
Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1687 (2010).

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monitoring activities. Next, the focus is on the wide variety of
international models of correctional oversight. The following
section identifies domestic resources on oversight, including
information about specific oversight models in various
jurisdictions in the United States. Finally, the Bibliography
summarizes literature dealing with the potential for oversight
of specific correctional issues, such as sexual assault, private
prisons, and mental health.
The second resource, also by Michele Deitch, is a massive
inventory of all correctional oversight mechanisms in the
United States and is a major contribution to the field.105 This
groundbreaking document provides us with a baseline
understanding about the extent of correctional oversight in this
country. It provides a quick reference guide for anyone
interested in knowing more about oversight in a particular
jurisdiction. And most importantly, as Deitch points out, it
shows ―major gaps in the systems we have in the United States
for monitoring prison and jail conditions and the treatment of
prisoners.‖106
The scope of the effort to inventory correctional oversight
mechanisms included all oversight bodies operating at a
statewide level, along with some local oversight bodies that
came to light during the course of research. Deitch‘s graduate
students contacted and collected information from every state,
and developed categories for analyzing the oversight
mechanisms they identified. Many of these oversight bodies do
not have unique responsibilities for overseeing correctional
institutions, but have that authority for government agencies
generally. Many others entities have oversight authority only
over specific issues, which might include some issues relevant
to prisons.
Information is presented in various ways, including two
multi-page tables displaying the nationwide results of the
research. The first of these tables (―Models of Formal, External
Prison Oversight‖) presents the types of independent prison
oversight that exist in each state, and categorizes them
according to various criteria.107 The second table serves the

105. Deitch, supra note 6.
106. Id. at 1755.
107. Id at 1766.

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same function for statewide oversight of jails (―Models of
Formal, External Jail Oversight‖).108 The report then provides
state-by-state write-ups. For each state, there is a chart
depicting oversight entities in that state along with their
functions and powers. There is also a brief descriptive
overview of the extent of correctional oversight in that state,
along with contact information and detailed descriptions for
each of the organizations in the charts.
As Deitch reminds us in this report, the inclusion of an
entity in the inventory is not meant to reflect any judgment
upon the quality of that organization‘s work in this correctional
oversight arena. The research was not evaluative in any way,
and the research team aimed to be comprehensive in its
approach to identifying oversight bodies. She emphasizes that
―[t]his inventory is meant to be a starting point for discussion
rather than an endorsement of any particular approach to
correctional oversight.‖109 It is also meant to inspire creative
thinking about ways that oversight bodies can be structured
and empowered.
But what are we to make of the fact that the report
identifies so many oversight entities in this country? Is the
United States perhaps not as far behind the rest of the world in
this regard as has been suggested? Deitch is careful to make
sure readers do not misunderstand the implications of this
research:
Although this report is thick with examples of
entities that perform (or have the authority to
perform) some kind of oversight function, it
should be clear upon closer examination that
formal and comprehensive external oversight—in
the form of inspections and routine monitoring of
conditions that affect the rights of prisoners—is
truly rare in this country. Even more elusive are
forms of oversight that seek to promote both
public transparency of correctional institutions
and accountability for the protection of human

108. Id at 1773.
109. Id. at 1755.

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rights.110
The goal of the work was to spark discussion and debate
regarding the extent of prison and jail oversight in this country
and the sufficiency of current efforts to provide such oversight.
With Deitch‘s baseline study, there can be no doubt that we
must redouble our efforts to educate policy-makers, advocates,
and practitioners about the need for effective correctional
oversight and about the lack of such oversight today.
Conclusion
Shedding for a moment any pretense to modesty, we
believe that this Sourcebook on correctional oversight should be
on the desk of every corrections practitioner and advocate, and
that the papers in this volume deserve careful attention. They
show that external oversight of American prisons is needed,
that it is practical, and that it is essential to good correctional
practice. Once effective oversight structures are established on
a comprehensive basis, such oversight will yield tangible
benefits to prisoners, corrections staff, and the public. This is
an idea whose time has come, and we are proud to have been
associated with the debate and discussion of this issue during
this formative time.

110. Id. at 1762.

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APPENDIX A

Opening Up a Closed World:
What Constitutes Effective Prison
Oversight?
University of Texas at Austin, April 23-26, 2006
Conference Participants*
Elizabeth Alexander, Director, ACLU National Prison
Project, Washington, DC
Barbara Attard, President, National Association for
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, San Jose, CA
Assemblyman Jeffrion Aubry, Chair, NY Assembly
Committee on Corrections, and Co-Chair, Council of State
Governments Task Force on Public Safety and Justice, Queens,
NY**
Major David Balagia, Jail Administrator, Travis County
Sheriff‘s Office
Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, Camp Hill, PA
Dennis Beaty, Assistant Chief Counsel, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Sacramento, CA
Jack Beck, Director, Prison Visiting Project, The
Correctional Association of New York, New York, NY
Kate Black, Program Officer, Open Society Institute, New
York, NY
Merrick Bobb, President, Police Assessment Resource
Center, and Monitor, LA County Jail, Los Angeles, CA
David Bogard, Commissioner, ACA Commission on
Accreditation for Corrections, and Principal, Pulitzer/Bogard &
Associates, Lido Beach, NY
Lynn Branham, Associate Dean, Thomas M. Cooley Law
School, Grand Rapids, MI
John Brickman, Chair, The Correctional Association of
New York, New York, NY

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Alvin J. Bronstein, Board President, Penal Reform
International-The Americas, and Director Emeritus, ACLU
National Prison Project, Washington, DC
Donna Brorby, Special Master of California juvenile
system, San Francisco, CA
Joan Burnham, Executive Director, Texas Inmate
Families Association, Austin, TX
Alex Busansky, Executive Director, Commission on
Safety & Abuse in America‘s Prisons, New York, NY
Silvia Casale, President, Council of Europe‘s Committee
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), London, England
Michael Cassidy, Managing Attorney, Prisoner Legal
Services of NY, Ithaca, NY
Matthew Cate, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector
General for the State of California, Sacramento, CA
Fred Cohen, Professor Emeritus, SUNY Albany, and
Special Master for Ohio Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Tucson, AZ
Larance Coleman, Policy Director, Texas Senate
Criminal Justice Committee, Austin, TX
Terry Collins, Assistant Director, Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections, Columbus, OH
William C. Collins, Co-Editor, Correctional Law
Reporter, and author/consultant, Olympia, WA
Andrew Coyle, Founding Director and Professor,
International Centre for Prison Studies, Kings College,
London, England
Theodorus De Roos, Professor of Law, Univ. of Tilburg,
Tilburg, the Netherlands
Gina DeBottis, Chief Prosecutor, Special Prosecution
Unit, Huntsville, TX
Michele Deitch, Soros Senior Justice Fellow; Adjunct
Professor, UT-LBJ School; and Reporter, ABA Prison Legal
Standards Project, Austin, TX
Kathleen Dennehy, Commissioner, Massachusetts
Department of Corrections, Milford, MA
Helga Dill, Chair, Texas CURE, Garland, TX
William M. DiMascio, Executive Director, The
Pennsylvania Prison Society, Philadelphia, PA
Paul Downing, retired Chief Jail Inspector, Indiana

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Department of Corrections, Plainfield, IN
Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice-Correctional Institutions Division, Huntsville, TX
Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Provost, University of Texas at
Austin, and criminal justice scholar, Austin, TX**
Steve Fama, Staff Attorney, Prison Law Office, San
Quentin, CA
David Fathi, Staff Attorney, ACLU National Prison
Project, Washington, DC
Malcolm Feeley, Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
Jamie Fellner, Director of U.S. Programs, Human Rights
Watch, New York, NY
Matthew Frank, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of
Corrections, Madison, WI
Alex Friedmann, Associate Editor, Prison Legal News,
Antioch, TN
Jenni
Gainsborough,
Director,
Penal
Reform
International—Washington, DC Office, Washington, DC
Robert Gangi, Executive Director, The Correctional
Association of New York, New York, NY
Ted Gest, President, Criminal Justice Journalists,
Washington, DC
Hon. John Gibbons, Co-Chair, Commission on Safety
and Abuse in America‘s Prisons; retired Judge, U.S. Ct. of
Appeals, 3rd Cir., Newark, NJ **
Elizabeth Gondles, President, Institute for Criminal
Justice Health Care, Arlington, VA**
James
Gondles,
Executive
Director,
American
Correctional Association, Lanham, MD**
Geri Green, Attorney, Legal Services for Prisoners with
Children, San Francisco, CA
Robert Green, Warden, Montgomery County Correctional
Facility, Boyds, MD**
Gene Guerrero, Senior Policy Analyst, Open Society
Institute Policy Center, Washington, DC
Michael Hamden, Executive Director, North Carolina
Prisoner Legal Services; and Co-Chair, ABA Corrections and
Sentencing Committee, Raleigh, NC
Dwight Harris, Executive Director, Texas Youth

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Commission, Austin, TX
Kay Harris, Professor, Department of Criminal Justice,
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA
Roderick Q. Hickman, former Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Sacramento, CA
Richard Hoffman, Executive Director, National Prison
Rape Elimination Commission, Washington, DC
Martin Horn, Commissioner, New York City Department
of Corrections and Probation, New York, NY
Michael Jackson, Professor of Law, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Michael Jacobson, Director, Vera Institute of Justice,
New York, NY
Gary Johnson, retired Executive Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Austin, TX
Susan Johnson, Executive Director, Prisoners Legal
Services, Ithaca, NY
Terry Julian, Executive Director, Texas Commission on
Jail Standards, Austin, TX**
Hon. William Wayne Justice, Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District, Austin, TX
Hon. Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Co-Chair, Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons, and former U.S.
Attorney General, Princeton, NJ
George Keiser, Chief, Prisons Division, National
Institute of Corrections, Washington, DC
Lisa Kung, Executive Director, Southern Center for
Human Rights, Atlanta, GA**
Debbie Liles, Director of Administrative Review and Risk
Management, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Huntsville, TX**
Rep. Jerry Madden, Chair, House Corrections
Committee, Texas House of Representatives, Plano, TX
Joseph Mancini, Assistant Attorney General, Ohio,
Columbus, OH
Daniel Manville, Clinical Staff Attorney, Wayne State
Univ. Law School, Ferndale, MI
Steve J. Martin, Attorney and Corrections Consultant,
Austin, TX**
Shereen Miller, Director General of Rights, Redress, and

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Resolution, Correctional Services of Canada, Ottawa, Canada
Beth Mitchell, Senior Attorney, Advocacy, Inc., Austin,
TX
John Moriarty, Inspector General, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Austin, TX
Donald Murray, Senior Legislative Director, National
Association of Counties, Arlington, VA
Karen Murtagh-Monks, Director of Litigation, Prisoners
Legal Services, Ithaca, NY
Michael B. Mushlin, Professor, Pace Law School, White
Plains, NY
Charlene Navarro, Director of Ombudsman‘s Bureau for
the State of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN
Neil Nichols, General Counsel, Texas Youth Commission,
Austin, TX
Pat Nolan, President, Justice Fellowship, Leesburg, VA
Cecilia Nordenfelt, Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman
for Penal Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden
Anne Owers, Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and
Wales, London, England
Major Robert Patterson, President, American Jail
Association, and Jail Director, Bell County Sheriff‘s Office,
Belton, TX **
James Pingeon, Litigation Director, Massachusetts
Correctional Legal Services, Boston, MA
Shirley Pope, Executive Director, Ohio Correctional
Institutions Inspection Committee, Columbus, OH
Nicole Porter, Director, Prison and Jail Accountability
Project, ACLU of Texas, Austin, TX
Carl Reynolds, Administrative Director, Office of Court
Administration, Austin, TX
William Rich, Associate Dean and Professor, Washburn
University School of Law, Topeka, KS
Gail Saliterman, Prisoners‘ Rights Attorney, San
Francisco, CA
Howard Sapers, Correctional Investigator, Office of the
Correctional Investigator, Ottawa, Canada
Brigette Sarabi, Executive Director, Western Prison
Project, Portland, OR
Marc Schindler, General Counsel, DC Dept of Youth

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Rehabilitation Services, Washington, DC
Margo Schlanger, Professor, Washington University
School of Law, St. Louis, MO
Zoe Schonfeld, Staff Attorney, Prison Law Office, San
Quentin, CA
Dora Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of
Corrections, Phoenix, AZ
Frank Smith, Field Organizer, Private Corrections
Institute, Bluff City, KS
Rep. Vernon Smith, Indiana House of Representatives,
Gary, IN
Don Specter, Director, Prison Law Office, San Quentin,
CA
Betsy Sterling, Director of Special Litigation and
Projects, Prisoners‘ Legal Services of New York, Ithaca, NY**
Baroness Vivien Stern, Senior Research Fellow,
International Center for Prison Studies, Kings College; and
Member of the House of Lords, London, England
Stan Stojkovic, Dean, Helen Bader School of Social
Welfare, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI
Morris Thigpen, Director, National Institute of
Corrections, Washington, DC
Greg Trout, Chief Counsel, Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction, Columbus, OH
Nick Turner, Chief Program Officer and Vice President,
Vera Institute of Justice, New York, NY
Paul von Zielbauer, Reporter, The New York Times,
New York, NY
Peter Wagner, Executive Director, Prison Policy
Initiative, Northampton, MA
Leslie Walker, Executive Director, Massachusetts
Correctional Legal Services, Boston, MA
Ashbel T. (A.T.) Wall, Director, Rhode Island Department
of Corrections, Cranston, RI
Arthur Wallenstein, Director, Montgomery County
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Rockville, MD**
Joe Walraven, Review Director, Texas Sunset Advisory
Commission, Austin, TX
Hon. Reggie Walton, Chair, National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission, and Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the

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District of Columbia, Washington, DC
Mike Ward, Reporter, Austin-American Statesman,
Austin, TX
Sen. John Whitmire, Chair, Senate Criminal Justice
Committee, Texas Senate, Houston, TX**
Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction, Columbus, OH
Max Williams, Director, Oregon Department of
Corrections, Salem, OR
Richard T. Wolf, Executive Director, New York City
Board of Correction, New York, NY
Paul Wright, Editor, Prison Legal News, Brattleboro, VT
Malcolm Young, Executive Director, John Howard
Association of Illinois, Chicago, IL
*All affiliations are accurate as of April 2006.
**Confirmed participant, but unable to attend due to latearising circumstances.

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APPENDIX B
The University of Texas
Presents

Opening Up a Closed World: What
Constitutes
Effective Prison Oversight?
Sunday, April 23 - Wednesday, April 26, 2006
Sponsoring Partners:
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs (UT)
Pace Law School (New York)
Co-Sponsors: UT Law School, the William Wayne Justice Center for
Public Interest Law (UT), the Institute for Domestic Violence and Sexual
Assault (UT School of Social Work), the Swedish Studies Endowment Fund
(UT), and Penal Reform International—The Americas
Supporters: Audre and Bernard Rapoport, Harold Simmons
Foundation, Sandy and Paul Rogge, Fred Cohen

Agenda
All events will be held in the Thompson Conference Center on the University
of Texas campus unless otherwise noted.

Sunday, April 23
5:30 – 7:30 p.m.

Opening Reception
Texas Capitol—Lieutenant Governor’s Reception Room
Hosted by Texas Senator John Whitmire
Welcoming Comments:
Senator John Whitmire, Chair, Texas Senate Criminal
Justice Committee
Representative
Jerry
Madden,
Chair,
House
Corrections Committee

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Day One: Monday, April 24
8:30 a.m. Welcome and Conference Overview
Michele Deitch, Conference Chair, Adjunct Professor, LBJ
School of Public Affairs

PART 1: What is Oversight? Why is it
Necessary?
8:45 - 9:30 a.m.

Session I. Introduction and Exploration
Various Functions of Prison Oversight

of

the

Presentations:
―Introduction: U.S. Prisons in the 21st Century and Renewed
Calls for Oversight‖
Michael Mushlin, Professor, Pace Law School
―Independent Inspections as an Alternative to Court-Based
Oversight‖
Alvin Bronstein, Director Emeritus, ACLU National
Prison Project, and Board President, Penal Reform
International—The Americas
―Distinguishing the Various Functions of Prison Oversight‖
Michele Deitch, Adjunct Professor, LBJ School of Public
Affairs, and Soros Senior Justice Fellow
9:30 - 11:00 a.m.

Session II. “Professionalism in Corrections and
the Need for External Scrutiny”
Roundtable discussion:
Does professionalism in corrections demand an openness to
outside scrutiny? Why should corrections professionals
welcome the concept of external oversight and how can such

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oversight benefit administrators?
Does increased
transparency and accountability lead to increased liability
or can it reduce the risk of lawsuits?
Moderator:
A.T. Wall,
Corrections

Director,

Rhode

Island

Department

of

Discussants:
Martin Horn, Commissioner, New York City Department
of Corrections
Kathleen Dennehy, Commissioner, Massachusetts
Department of Corrections
Andrew Coyle, Founding Director, International Centre
for Prison Studies, Kings College, London, and former
executive-level prison administrator, British Prison Service
Bill Collins, former
Assistant
Attorney
General,
Washington State, and author of ―Jail and Prison Legal
Issues: An Administrator‘s Guide‖
Moderated Audience Discussion
11:00 – 11:15 a.m. Break
11:15 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Session III. What Might External Oversight Look
Like? Brief Overviews of a Sampling of Inspection
Models
Moderator:
Michael Mushlin, Professor, Pace Law School
Presentations:
Anne Owers, Chief Inspector, British Prison Inspectorate
Cecilia Nordenfelt, Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman
for penal matters
Matthew Cate, California Inspector General
Richard Wolf, Executive Director, New York City Board of
Correction

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12:15 – 1:30 Lunch, 10th Floor Atrium, LBJ Presidential
Library and Museum
Official UT Welcome, Comments, and Introduction of Luncheon
Speaker
UT Provost Sheldon Ekland-Olson

Luncheon Address:
“The Importance of Dialogue and Collaboration in the
Oversight Process”
Silvia Casale, President, Council of Europe‘s Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment of Prisoners (CPT)

PART 2: The Essential Elements of
External Oversight: A Closer Look
1:45 – 3:15 p.m.

Session IV. “Independence: What does it mean and
why is it critical?”
What does it mean for an oversight entity to be
―independent‖? Of what must the entity be independent?
Does an oversight entity need to be outside of government
entirely in order to be free of constraint or bias? Are there
downside risks to being ―too‖ independent? Who should
fund an independent oversight mechanism?
Is
independence based on structural factors or is it a state of
mind?
Moderator:
Michele Deitch, Adjunct Professor, LBJ School and
Soros Senior Justice Fellow

Presentation:
Anne Owers, Chief Inspector, British Prison Inspectorate

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Discussants:
Matthew Cate, California Inspector General
Cecilia Nordenfelt, Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman
for penal matters
Bob Gangi, Executive Director, Correctional Association of
New York
Moderated Audience Discussion
3:15 – 3:30 p.m. Break
3:30 – 5:00 p.m.

Session V. Politics and Oversight
A.
Case Study of Independence, Politics, and
Oversight: Ohio’s Correctional Institutions Inspection
Committee
Roundtable Discussion:
Ohio’s legislatively-based prison oversight entity has a staff
and a mandate to inspect and report on prison conditions.
Does the placement of this mechanism within the legislature
create any special political challenges? How independent
can it be, given this structural arrangement? How effective
has it been in improving prison conditions and how has its
work been perceived by the correctional agency it monitors?
Moderator:
Fred Cohen, Court Monitor for Ohio‘s correctional medical
services
Discussants
Shirley
Pope,
Executive
Director,
Correctional
Institutions Inspection Committee
Terry Collins, Acting Director, Ohio Dept. of
Rehabilitation and Corrections

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B. Reflections on Politics and Oversight
What is or should be the role of legislators in providing
oversight of prisons? Is all oversight necessarily politicized,
and how can such dynamics be avoided or minimized? Do
policymakers have obligations to ensure that prisons are
respecting the human rights of prisoners, even if the general
public remains unconcerned? To what degree do special
interest group politics affect the success of external oversight
and how can that challenge be addressed?
Discussants:
Max Williams, Director,
Oregon
Department
of
Corrections, and former Oregon state legislator
Roderick Hickman, former Secretary, California Dept. of
Corrections
Moderated Audience Discussion
5:00 p.m.—End of Day Reactions
5:15 – 6:30 p.m.
Reception--Jamail Pavilion, UT Law School
Hosted by UT Law School and the William Wayne Justice
Center for Public Interest Law
Welcome—Interim UT Law School Dean Steve Goode

Day Two: Tuesday, April 25
7:30 – 8:30 a.m. Continental Breakfast
8:30 a.m. Overview of Day’s Activities
Michele Deitch, Conference Chair

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PART 2: The Essential Elements of External
Oversight: A Closer Look (cont’d)
8:35 – 10:00 a.m.

Session VI. Standards
What standards, if any, should apply during an inspection
by a monitoring body? Are standards necessary if the body
is inspecting for human rights violations rather than for
compliance with rules and regulations? If standards are
necessary, who would set and enforce those standards, and
should they be identical to established standards in the
corrections profession? Should standards be national or
local in application?
Should they be mandatory or
voluntary? Should standards be drafted so that they
establish minimum rules, or should they be aspirational
and provide guidance to the agency? Is there a need for
uniformity among all the standards with which an agency
must comply, even if they are promulgated by different
entities?
Moderator:
Silvia Casale, President, Council of Europe‘s CPT
Presentation:
Andrew Coyle, Founding Director, International Centre
for Prison Studies, Kings College, London, and author of ―A
Human Rights Approach to Prison Management—
Handbook for Prison Staff‖
Discussants:
Alvin Bronstein, Chair, American Bar Association‘s Task
Force on prison legal standards
David Bogard, Commissioner, ACA Commission on
Accreditation
Anne Owers, British Prison Inspector and author of
―Expectations‖
Jeff Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections

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Moderated Audience Discussion

PART 3: The Role of Civil Society
10:15-11:45 a.m.
Session VII.
The Role of Citizens and Non-Profit
Advocacy Organizations in Providing Oversight
Should oversight necessarily be the responsibility of
government agencies or can NGOs and citizen groups also
provide meaningful and effective oversight of correctional
institutions? What difference does the right of access to
prisons make in the quality of an NGO’s reports about
prison conditions? What role should we expect lay citizens
to play and how can they be appropriately trained for this
responsibility? Are citizen groups too easily subject to
―capture‖ by the agency they are monitoring? Is there a role
for formerly incarcerated persons to play in the oversight
process? Is there a legitimate fear on the part of corrections
officials that non-governmental monitoring groups are
agenda-driven, and if so, how can distrust on the part of
corrections officials be addressed? What lessons can we
learn from civilian police oversight boards and review
panels?
Moderator:
Michael Mushlin, Professor, Pace Law School
Presentation:
Vivien Stern, Senior Research Fellow, International
Centre for Prison Studies; and Member, British House of
Lords, Independent Monitoring Boards and the role of lay
citizens within a governmental structure
Panelists:
John Brickman, Chair, Correctional Association of New
York, The role of an NGO with prison access rights and the
role of citizen members

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Jamie Fellner, Director of US Programs, Human Rights
Watch, The role of an NGO without formal prison access
rights
Merrick Bobb, Monitor, Los Angeles County Sheriff‘s
Office, and President, Police Assessment Resource Center,
Learning from civilian oversight of the police
Kathleen Dennehy, Commissioner, Massachusetts Dept.
of Corrections, Can corrections agencies work effectively with
NGOs and citizen boards with oversight responsibilities?
Moderated Audience Discussion
12:00 – 1:00 p.m. Lunch, 10th Floor Atrium, LBJ Presidential
Library and Museum
Welcome and Introduction
LBJ School Dean James Steinberg
Luncheon Address:
“Reflections on 40 years of outside scrutiny of prisons
and prison policy in the U.S.”
Hon. Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Co-Chair, Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons; Chair, 1967
Commission on Crime in the United States; and former
U.S. Attorney General
1:15 – 2:15 p.m.

Session VIII. The Role of the Media in Opening Up
a Closed World
Roundtable Discussion:
What role does the media play in helping to keep prisons
and jails transparent and accountable? How much access
should the media have to correctional institutions and to
prisoners? What restrictions on that access are appropriate?
Should some facilities and some information about prisons
remain unavailable to the media? What should count as
―media‖ and should there be differences between local media
and national media? What constitutes responsible reporting

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about prison conditions? What does/should the public have
the right to know about prison conditions and operations?
Moderator:
Ted Gest, President, Criminal Justice Journalists, and
Senior Fellow, Program on Crime and the News Media,
Jerry Lee Center for
Criminology,
University
of
Pennsylvania
Discussants:
Paul von Zielbauer, Investigative Reporter, The New
York Times
Mike Ward, Investigative Reporter, Austin AmericanStatesman
Dora Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of
Corrections
Bill DiMascio, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Prison
Society

PART 4: The Future of External Scrutiny of
Prisons and Jails
2:15 - 3:30 p.m.

Session IX. Oversight of Jails and Private Prisons
What are the unique challenges present by oversight of
county jails in the United States? Should jails be monitored
and inspected by state-level or local-level entities? Should
such oversight be funded by the state or by localities? Should
the form that the oversight entity takes vary according to the
size of the facility and whether it is urban or rural? What
entity should provide oversight of the jails when state
prisoners are housed at numerous county jails throughout
the state as an overflow measure? What should oversight of
private facilities look like? To what degree can contract
monitoring be effective at preventing poor conditions and
human rights abuses in private prison facilities? Is there a
need to include human rights provisions in privatization
contracts? Is contract monitoring also feasible when it comes

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to private jails and to private facilities holding out-of-state or
federal prisoners?
Moderator:
Bill Collins, Co-Editor, Correctional Law Reporter, and
author of ―Jail and Prison Legal Issues: An Administrator‘s
Guide‖
Presentations:
Merrick Bobb, Monitor, Los Angeles County Jail,
Independent inspection of jails
Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice—Correctional Institutions Division, Contract
monitoring of private prisons
Paul Downing, retired Chief Jail Inspector, Indiana
Department of Corrections, State-level government oversight
of county jails
Moderated Audience Discussion
3:45 – 5:00 p.m.

Session X. Thinking about the Future of NonJudicial Oversight of Prisons and Jails in the U.S.
Audience discussion facilitated by Prof. Michele Deitch and
Prof. Michael Mushlin
Topics to be covered:
(1) Targeted Oversight
Is it feasible or appropriate to design oversight mechanisms
that target selected issues such as prison rape, health care,
supermax placement decisions, and care of mentally ill
prisoners?
Preliminary comments from selected audience members:
Hon. Reggie Walton, Chair, National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission, and Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for D.C. Cir., Prison rape

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Fred Cohen, Author, ―The Mentally Disordered Offender
and the Law,‖ Correctional health care
Prof. Michael Jackson, University of British Columbia
School of Law, Placement in supermax
Beth Mitchell, Senior Attorney, Advocacy, Inc., Mentally ill
prisoners
(2) Structural Considerations
Are oversight mechanisms best conceived as national, state,
or local in scope and what are the advantages and
disadvantages of each approach? If oversight bodies should
exist at the state or local level, should federal legislation be
sought to require or provide incentives for the development
of such state-level bodies? Would it be preferable to have
oversight bodies that are governmental or non-governmental
in nature?
(3) Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective External
Oversight
What are the most challenging obstacles to implementing
effective external prison oversight measures?
Are the
obstacles primarily matters of attitude and perception (and
if so, on whose part?), or are there concrete changes that
need to take place? How can these obstacles best be
addressed?
5:00 p.m.
Final Remarks and adjourn formal conference

Day Three: Wednesday, April 26
9:00 a.m. – 3:00 p.m.
Work Session, 10th Floor Atrium, LBJ Presidential Library
and Museum

47