A Report to the Colorado General Assembly on
the Failure of the Colorado Department of
Corrections to Give Effect to the Legislative Intent
of the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime
Supervision Act of 1998

Foreword by:

The Honorable
Frank Dubofsky retired,
Colorado Court of
Appeals

FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2005-2006

Endorsed By:

CO-CURE Sex Offender Issues Group

CONTACT INFORMATION:

Copies of this report may be downloaded from www.lifetimeactreport.org or by writing
to:
Et Alia Paralegal Services
P.O. Box 440092
Aurora, CO 80044-0092

About the Cover: The illustration of a man standing at a crossroads was originally
used by Peggy Heil, former Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program
Administrator, in a summary to the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of
Corrections to indicate the options facing a sex offender incarcerated under the
Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998: Down one path, the offender
could participate in treatment and meet the requirements for parole; down the other
path, according to Ms. Heil, the offender could “refuse” treatment and remain
incarcerated for life. We use this illustration now to represent the choice facing
Colorado legislators: continue down the path of humanistic principles originally
enunciated in the Act’s legislative declaration, or veer off down the path of failed
recidivist legislation by abandoning these humanistic principles in the face of public
fears about sex offenders.

iii

FOREWORD
In the past twenty years Colorado has implemented radical new programs for
sentencing, monitoring and treating sex offenders. These programs are extraordinarily
expensive, and there are serious questions about their effectiveness, legality and fairness.
My article on sex offenders addresses these issues in more detail. (Reflections on
Colorado’s Sex Offenders Law, Boulder County Bar Online Newsletter 1, 14 (November
2004), available at http://www.boulderbar.org)
This report to the General Assembly is an important effort to demonstrate the
failure of the Colorado Department of Corrections to meet its obligation to provide
treatment to sentenced sex offenders. Unless sex offenders are treated, they will never be
released from prison. As a trial judge, I was concerned that sentenced sex offenders were
not being treated and instead were sent into a black hole of a lifetime sentence with no
way out. This study confirms the validity of those concerns. Every legislator, judge and
correctional official will be aghast at the statistical information in this report and should
demand a response from the department of corrections.
This report reflects a betrayal of the law by those who are most responsible for its
enforcement. Those district judges who are uncomfortable with these indeterminate to
life sentences will feel betrayed by the lack of treatment and the resulting likely
“lifetime” sentence. A life is a terrible thing to waste. Because sex offenders are not
receiving their legally mandated treatment, hundreds of millions of dollars will be
squandered on unnecessary incarceration.
The report’s recommended treatment with uniform accountability ideas is good.
Enactment of such concepts is a critical first step in evaluating the legality and fairness of
the treatment aspects of Colorado’s sex offender laws.

/s/ Frank N. Dubofsky retired,
Colorado Court of Appeals

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWARD

i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

5

SECTION II

THE ROLE OF TREATMENT UNDER THE LIFETIME
SUPERVISION ACT

7

THE IMPORTANCE OF TREATMENT UNDER THE
LIFETIME SUPERVISION ACT

9

SECTION III

SECTION IV

FAILURES AND ABUSES IN THE COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE LIFETIME SUPERVISION ACT

11

FAILURE 1: The SOTMP’s Failed Peer Review System

12

FAILURE 2: The SOTMP’s Abuse Of Informed Consent

14

1. Manipulative Informed Consent Disclosures

14

2. Misuse Of Informed Consent To Justify Terminations
From Treatment

15

FAILURE 3: The SOTMP’s Failure To Establish Therapeutic Alliances
1. The Effect Of The SOTMP’s Exaggerated Emphasis
On Community Safety

17

2. The Importance Of Therapeutic Alliances In Treatment

18

3. The SOTMP’s Bare-Knuckle Approach To Treatment

18

4. The SOTMP’s Overemphasis On Termination From
Treatment

18

FAILURE 4: The SOTMP’s Misrepresentation In Required Reporting

SECTION V

17

20

1. Examining The Number Of “Lifetime Supervision”
Offenders In Phase II

20

2. The Significance Of The SOTMP’s Misrepresentations
In Reporting

21

THE IMPACT OF CDOC’S FAILURES AND ABUSES
iii

22

IMPACT 1: The Impact Of The SOTMP’s Failures On The
Prison Population

24

IMPACT 2: The Impact Of The SOTMP’s Failures On The
Number Of “Lifetime Supervision” Offenders In Phase II
Treatment

25

IMPACT 3: The Rate Of Successful Treatment For “Lifetime
Supervision” Offenders

27

IMPACT 4: Colorado Taxpayers

28

SECTION VI

CONCLUSION

31

SECTION VII

RECOMMENDATION

33

ENDNOTES

35
43

APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B

Sex Offender Treatment And Monitoring
Program Termination Guidelines – Phase I

43

Proposed Bill

47

iv

LIST OF CHARTS
No.
1.

Chart Description
Comparison Of The Expected Number Of “Lifetime Supervision”
Offenders In Phase II Treatment With The Number Reported By
SOTMP

Page

20

2.

Actual And Projected Number Of “Lifetime Supervision” Offenders
Incarcerated

24

3.

Percentage Of “Lifetime Supervision” Offenders Reported As
Participating In Phase II Treatment

25

4.

Comparison Of Nationwide Average Completion Rates With SOTMP’s
Success Rate In Phase II For “Lifetime Supervision” Offenders

27

5.

Estimated And Projected Annual Costs Of Incarcerating Offenders Under
The Lifetime Supervision Act

28

6.

Comparison Of Daily Costs For “Lifetime Supervision” Offenders –
Incarceration Versus ISP Community

29

v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1998, the Colorado General Assembly passed into law House Bill 98-1156,
otherwise known as the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998. The
passage of this Act reflected an admirable attempt to address the serious risk of reoffense
posed by sex offenders who were released from prison without having undergone
treatment. Acknowledging the loss of human potential associated with sentencing
schemes that merely result in lifetime incarceration, legislators sought a humane
compromise by combining mandatory indeterminate sentences to incarceration with a
program under which sex offenders could receive treatment and potentially earn their
release to parole.
Seven years after its passage, however, the Act’s impact on community safety, the
number of sex offenses committed, and the incarceration of sex offenders in Colorado is
unclear. As of the end of Fiscal Year 2004-2005, 793 sex offenders were incarcerated
under the Lifetime Supervision Act’s indeterminate sentencing provisions, yet a shocking
78% of these offenders were not receiving the treatment mandated by the Act, and the
Department of Corrections had successfully progressed fewer than 6 offenders in
treatment to community placement - an abominable “success” rate of less than 3%.
Given the Colorado Department of Corrections’ questionable record thus far in
providing treatment to sex offenders incarcerated under the Lifetime Supervision Act,
many professionals in the criminal justice community perceive the indeterminate
sentences imposed under the Act to be life-long sentences to incarceration without
meaningful possibility for successful progression through treatment to community
placement. The result of this perception is an “open secret” - judges are reluctant to
sentence offenders to incarceration under the Act, and both prosecutors and defense
attorneys regularly utilize plea bargaining to avoid the Act’s mandatory sentencing
provision altogether.
Despite the clear legislative intent of the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime
Supervision Act of 1998 to avoid the high costs of lifetime incarceration, the burden of
incarcerating sex offenders sentenced under the Act is already significant, and is rapidly
growing heavier. This fiscal year, Colorado taxpayers will spend an estimated $19.7
million to incarcerate the 793 sex offenders already sentenced to prison under the Act,
and this amount is expected to grow by approximately $3.7 million per year, as new
offenders continue to be sentenced to incarceration under the Act. There is no end in sight
to this ever-increasing financial burden - the Colorado Department of Corrections has
failed to adequately implement the Act’s treatment provisions to provide the treatment
necessary for these incarcerated sex offenders to successfully progress through treatment
to community placement.
Given the clear and affirmative legislative intentions expressed within the
Lifetime Supervision Act, how has the Colorado Department of Corrections come to fail
the people of Colorado? This report explores this question, and documents a pattern of
serious professional failures and abuses by the department’s Sex Offender Treatment and
Monitoring Program, including:
•

Intentional misrepresentations about the consequences of failing to

1

participate in treatment.
•

Abysmal failures in professional peer review systems.

•

Unethical manipulations of informed consent requirements.

•

Deceptive reporting of the numbers of offenders actually participating in
treatment.

•

Excessive numbers of offenders terminated from treatment.

•

Use of fear and coercion instead of therapeutic alliances in treatment.

The professional improprieties documented in this report constitute the ugly byproducts of the SOTMP’s (Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program’s)
insistence on interpreting the Lifetime Supervision Act in such a way as to support
lifetime incarceration as a norm in the “treatment” of sex offenders. Perhaps lifetime
incarceration is a much simpler route to follow – but when legislators passed the Lifetime
Supervision Act, they chose to pursue a higher path, and traveling this higher path
requires a continuing commitment to the humanistic principles enunciated in the Act
itself.
The language of the Lifetime Supervision Act speaks to brighter goals than
lifetime incarceration, to the rehabilitation of sex offenders as “safe, responsible, and
contributing members of society.” At the time the Act became law, the legislature
understood what would be necessary to achieve these goals – it would be necessary to
create “a program under which sex offenders may receive treatment and supervision for
the rest of their lives…”
If the Lifetime Supervision Act is to fulfill the admirable intentions that
accompanied its creation, we must insist that the Colorado Department of Corrections
provide treatment to the offenders sentenced under the Act in a manner that truly reflects
these intentions. The SOTMP has had seven years in which to demonstrate that it is
capable of implementing such a treatment program without additional direction from the
legislature; the abysmal failure of these seven years indicates that it is once again time for
the legislature to speak.

2

The Colorado Department of Corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and
Monitoring Program promotes its sex offender treatment program with the catch phrase
“Treatment with Accountability.” Building upon this theme of “Treatment with
Accountability,” this report finds it appropriate to demand accountability to Colorado
taxpayers from the Colorado Department of Corrections in its Sex Offender Treatment
and Monitoring Program, and therefore recommends that the legislature should amend
the statutory reporting requirements found within the Lifetime Supervision Act to require
additional data from the Colorado Department of Corrections, including:
(1)

The average number of offenders participating in treatment each month;

(2)

the number of offenders denied admission to SOTMP programs each
month;

(3)

the number of offenders terminated from treatment each month;

(4)

the average length of participation in treatment;

(5)

the number of offenders refused readmission to treatment each month after
being terminated from treatment;

(6)

the number of offenders recommended by the SOTMP to the parole board
for release to parole each month; and

(7)

the number of offenders recommended by the SOTMP for release to
community corrections each month.

3

SECTION I.
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Colorado General Assembly passed into law H.B. 98-1156, otherwise
known as the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998. Its passage
reflected admirable intentions, expressed in a legislative declaration:
The general assembly hereby finds that the majority of persons who
commit sex offenses, if incarcerated or supervised without treatment, will
continue to present a danger to the public when released from
incarceration and supervision. The general assembly also finds that
keeping all sex offenders in lifetime incarceration imposes an
unacceptably high cost in both state dollars and loss of human potential.
The general assembly further finds that some sex offenders respond
well to treatment and can function as safe, responsible, and contributing
members of society, so long as they receive treatment and supervision.
The general assembly therefore declares that a program under which sex
offenders may receive treatment and supervision for the rest of their
lives, if necessary, is necessary for the safety, health, and welfare of the
state.1
Seven years after its passage, however, the Act’s impact on community safety, the
number of sex offenses committed, and the incarceration of sex offenders in Colorado is
unclear. As of the end of Fiscal Year 2004-2005, 793 sex offenders were incarcerated in
the Colorado Department of Corrections under the indeterminate sentencing provisions of
the Lifetime Supervision Act, yet a shocking 78% of these offenders were not receiving
the treatment mandated by the Act2, and the department had successfully progressed
fewer than 6 of these offenders through treatment to community placement – a “success”
rate of less than 3%.3
Given the Colorado Department of Corrections’ questionable record thus far in
providing treatment to sex offenders incarcerated under the Lifetime Supervision Act,
many professionals in the criminal justice community perceive the indeterminate
sentences imposed under the Act to be life-long sentences to incarceration without
meaningful possibility for release. The result of this arguably valid perception is an “open
secret” – judges are reluctant to sentence offenders to incarceration under the Act, and
both prosecutors and defense attorneys regularly utilize plea bargaining to avoid the Act’s
mandatory sentencing provisions altogether.4 In its November 1, 2005 Lifetime
Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, the Colorado Department of Corrections
acknowledged:
The Department of Corrections continues to work with the courts and
prosecuting attorneys where possible to clarify cases that appear to meet
the lifetime sentencing requirements but were not sentenced under these
provisions […]5

5

Offenders are being admitted to prison each year for a conviction of a nonlifetime offense, with a concurrent or consecutive lifetime sentence to
probation for the qualifying sexual offense conviction. Additionally, the
Department has seen an increase in the number of offenders originally
sentenced to prison under the Lifetime Provision being released to
probation or court order discharged. Several offenders have been
subsequently re-sentenced to prison for a non-lifetime sentence.6
Despite the clear legislative intent in the Lifetime Supervision Act to avoid the
high costs associated with lifetime incarceration, the burden of incarcerating sex
offenders under the Lifetime Supervision Act is already significant, and is rapidly
growing heavier. This fiscal year, Colorado taxpayers will spend an estimated $19.7
million to incarcerate the 793 offenders already sentenced to prison under the Act7, and
this expense will increase by approximately $3.7 million per year as new offenders
continue to be incarcerated under the Lifetime Supervision Act each year.8 There is no
end in sight to this ever-increasing financial burden – the Colorado Department of
Corrections has failed to adequately implement the Act’s treatment provisions to provide
the treatment necessary for these incarcerated “Lifetime Supervision” offenders to
successfully progress through treatment to community placement.
Given the clear and affirmative legislative intentions expressed within the
Lifetime Supervision Act, how has the Colorado Department of Corrections come to fail
the people of Colorado? This report researched this question and documented a pattern of
serious professional failures and abuses by staff of the department’s Sex Offender
Treatment and Monitoring Program, including webs of deceptive semantics used to
describe treatment, unchecked abuses of authority, meaningless systems of peer review,
unethical manipulations of the Informed Consent Doctrine, and a stubborn refusal by the
Colorado Department of Corrections to adjust its Sex Offender Treatment and
Monitoring Program to reflect the new approach to sex offender treatment mandated by
the Lifetime Supervision Act.
Despite its lackluster and manipulative implementation by the Colorado
Department of Corrections, the Lifetime Supervision Act continues to hold great
promise, both for the people of Colorado and the sex offenders sentenced under it. In
the conclusion, this report recommends that the general assembly amend the
statutory reporting requirements found within the Lifetime Supervision Act to
require additional data from the Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program
concerning its performance in providing treatment to sex offenders incarcerated
under the Act. With the help of state legislators, the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime
Supervision Act of 1998 can live up to the admirable intentions that accompanied its
passage into law.

6

SECTION II.
THE ROLE OF TREATMENT UNDER THE LIFETIME SUPERVISION ACT
Prior to the passage of the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of
1998, participation in sex offender treatment for incarcerated offenders was understood to
be entirely voluntary.9 No incentive or disincentive existed to compel or entice a sex
offender to participate in treatment, other than the deduction of a few days per month
from the sentences of offenders participating in treatment. Given the absence of
incentives and the significant stigmatization experienced by offenders who participated in
treatment, incarcerated offenders often chose to decline participation in treatment.10
The lack of participation in sex offender treatment by incarcerated sex offenders
became a key focal point of the authors of the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime
Supervision Act of 1998. Acting on research suggesting that sex offenders who undergo
sex offender treatment exhibit a lower rate of recidivism than “untreated” sex offenders,11
the bill’s authors attempted to create a sentencing scheme for sex offenders that
predicated the length of incarceration upon each offender’s progression in sex offender
treatment.
The language of the
The language of the Colorado Sex Offender 
Colorado Sex Offender
Lifetime Supervision Act
Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 is clear and 
of 1998 is clear and
unambiguous… 
unambiguous with regard
to the role that treatment is to play: “Each sex offender sentenced pursuant to this section
shall be required as part of the sentence to undergo treatment […]”12 Offenders sentenced
to incarceration under the Act are sentenced to an “indeterminate term of at least the
minimum of the presumptive range […] for the level of offense committed and a
maximum of the sex offender’s natural life.”13 In determining whether a sex offender
serving an indeterminate sentence to incarceration should be released to parole, “the
parole board shall determine whether the sex offender has successfully progressed in
treatment […]”14
Records of the legislative proceedings concerning the passage of the Lifetime
Supervision Act further clarify the role that treatment was intended to play. On April 29,
1998, the Senate Committee on Judiciary held hearings on the Act. Bob Grant, President
of the Colorado District Attorneys Council, testified about the bill:
The issue that is presented by this bill is very real. What we are talking
about here is... you don’t get off supervision, you don’t go back to
community, you don’t have an opportunity to reoffend until and unless
you have made the progress mandated by the Treatment Board in the
treatment program...15

7

Reviewing the language of the Lifetime Supervision Act itself, the transcripts
from the hearings conducted by the legislative committees on the bill, and the dozens of
documents generated during the legislative process, it’s fair to conclude:
(1)

The Colorado general assembly intended for sex offender treatment to be a
required and fundamental part of a sex offender’s sentence to
incarceration;

(2)

The Colorado general assembly intended for the length of a sex offender’s
sentence to incarceration to be predicated upon the sex offender’s
participation and progress in sex offender treatment; and

(3)

The Colorado general assembly was concerned with the high costs
associated with simply incarcerating sex offenders for life.

(4)

The Colorado general assembly viewed sex offender treatment as a costeffective and humane alternative to lifetime incarceration, and therefore
mandated that sex offenders must participate in sex offender treatment as
part of their sentence.

8

SECTION III.
THE IMPORTANCE OF TREATMENT UNDER THE ACT
Treatment serves as the sole means by which sex offenders incarcerated under the
Lifetime Supervision Act may be progressed to community placement – absent
participation and progress in such treatment, the Act requires that “Lifetime Supervision”
offenders remain incarcerated for life.16 As such, treatment represents the sole means of
accomplishing the legislative intent of the Lifetime Supervision Act to avoid the high
costs of lifetime incarceration.17
According to the administrative regulations of the Colorado Department of
Corrections, “it is the policy of the Department of Corrections (DOC) to provide
specialized treatment to identified sex offenders to reduce the risk of sex offense
behavior.”18 To this end, the DOC operates the Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring
Program (SOTMP).19
The SOTMP provides sex offender treatment to incarcerated offenders in two
phases. Phase I is a “time-limited therapy group” that includes a core-curriculum of
thinking errors, anger management, and stress management.20 After successfully
completing Phase I, offenders progress to Phase II, a more intensive treatment in which
offenders participate in a therapeutic community “24 hours a day, 7 days a week.”21
There is no time limit for Phase II - the SOTMP states “inmates stay in this phase of
treatment instead of being placed back in general population in order to maintain the
therapeutic progress they have made.”22
Unfortunately, the SOTMP only offers its Phase II treatment at Arrowhead
Correctional Center, a “Level II” security facility.23 Administrative Regulations permit
sex offenders to be housed in Level II facilities only when they are participating in
treatment.24 As a result, each time the SOTMP terminates a sex offender from Phase II
treatment, the offender must be transferred to a higher security level facility.
Although the SOTMP downplays the negative implications of removing sex
offenders from Phase II (they actually claim that termination is a “treatment tool”),25 the
facts surrounding such terminations show three things: (1) offenders who are terminated
from Phase II are frequently transferred to prisons that do not offer sex offender
treatment, thereby negating the SOTMP’s stated goal of maintaining the “therapeutic
progress” each offender had made in Phase II; (2) terminated offenders are not eligible
for readmission to Phase II for six months; and (3) readmission to Phase II is frequently
delayed by six months or more, as prison officials wait for bed space at Arrowhead or
arrange for the offender to be transported back to Arrowhead.26
If we accept the estimate that it costs an average of $24,800.0027 per year to
incarcerate each sex offender, then each termination of a “Lifetime Supervision” offender
from Phase II costs Colorado taxpayers between $12,400.00 and $24,800.00 in “lost
treatment time,”28 and this cost does not include the lost “therapeutic progress” that the
SOTMP claims to be so concerned about. Once a “Lifetime Supervision” sex offender
has satisfied his minimum sentence to incarceration, each year that sex offender remains
incarcerated without treatment costs taxpayers tens of thousands of dollars, needlessly
spent.

9

SECTION IV.
FAILURES AND ABUSES IN THE COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE LIFETIME SUPERVISION ACT
This report documents a number of serious failures and abuses by the Colorado
Department of Corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program in its
implementation of the Lifetime Supervision Act’s treatment provisions. These failures
and abuses should be considered in the context of the following three fundamental facts
concerning sex offender treatment, all of which are derived from the Sex Offender
Management Board’s and the Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program’s own
publications:

Fact 1:

It costs 2.5 to 3 times more to house a sex offender in prison than it
does to house and treat a sex offender in community placement.29

Fact 2:

Sex offender treatment in prison is merely a precursor to continued
treatment in the community - sex offenders cannot “complete” sex
offender treatment in prison.30

Fact 3:

The legislative intent of the Lifetime Supervision Act is to avoid
the high costs of lifetime incarceration by treating sex offenders in
prison until they can be safely treated in the community.31

11

FAILURE 1: The SOTMP’s Failed Peer Review Systems
If the Lifetime Supervision Act is to successfully accomplish its legislative intent
of limiting the high costs associated with lifetime incarceration, it is critically important
that no “Lifetime Supervision” sex offender is ever removed from treatment
unnecessarily. As discussed in Section III, each termination of a “Lifetime Supervision”
offender from Phase II treatment costs Colorado taxpayers between $12,400.00 and
$24,800.00 in “lost treatment time,” negates much of the therapeutic progress made by
the offender in Phase II, and results in significant delays before treatment is resumed.
The majority of terminations from treatment are attributed to alleged violations of
treatment conditions.32 Procedural protections are readily available to ensure that each
offender so accused has indeed violated treatment conditions before the offender is
terminated from treatment - the SOTMP simply declines to use such procedures.33
In law, these procedural protections are known as due process, and typically
consist of (1) an opportunity to have the determination of whether the offender has
violated treatment conditions made by a neutral person (as opposed to being made by the
same official making the accusation); (2) the right to present a defense against the alleged
violation; and (3) the right to call witnesses in support of that defense.34 The United
States Supreme Court instructs, “the touchstone of due process is the protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government.”35
When asked to describe what due process protections, if any, were employed by
the SOTMP to ensure against arbitrary terminations from treatment, the SOTMP
responded that they do not use due process, but instead use “Termination Guidelines,” a
system of professional peer review.36 At first glance, these Termination Guidelines
appear to offer at least some level of procedural protection:
When a therapist believes it is appropriate to terminate an inmate from
group, he/she will present the reason for termination to the facility sex
offender treatment team.37

12

Actions often speak louder than words, however. If the SOTMP’s Termination
Guidelines were truly part of an effective peer review system, we would expect to see a
percentage of the “termination staffings” required under the guidelines resulting in peer
disagreement with the therapist’s desire to terminate an offender from treatment.
Therapists were asked to provide statistics concerning the operation of their Termination
Guidelines, and their answers are shocking:38
Q.

How many “facility sex offender treatment team” meetings have you
participated in involving the issue of whether an offender should be
terminated from treatment?

A.

Two therapists had participated in approximately 156 meetings over a
three-year period.

Q.

How many of those meetings resulted in a decision that the offender
should not be terminated from treatment?

A.

None - offenders were terminated 100% of the time.

Q.

How many of those meetings ended in an inability of the members
involved to reach a consensus, and thus required the matter to be referred
to supervisors for a decision?

A.

None - therapists never disagreed in the meetings.

The fact that 156 “termination staffings” occurred without a single dissent among
peers demonstrates an abysmal failure in the SOTMP’s Termination Guidelines,
especially since these guidelines were intended to provide a professional peer review
system as an alternative to more formal due process protections against the arbitrary
termination of offenders from treatment. Given this abysmal failure, the SOTMP has
essentially had no process in place during the last seven years to ensure that “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders were not removed from treatment unnecessarily.

13

FAILURE 2: The SOTMP’s Abuse of Informed Consent
The abysmal failure of SOTMP to conduct meaningful peer review when
terminating offenders from treatment is serious enough to warrant legislative review in
itself. Further investigation, however, uncovered much more troubling problems in the
SOTMP, including manipulative abuses of the doctrine of informed consent to justify
terminating offenders from mandated treatment. These abuses reveal a fundamental
failure by the DOC to implement the Lifetime Supervision Act.
1. Manipulative Informed Consent Disclosures
The doctrine of informed consent essentially involves a patient’s right to be fully
informed about the risks associated with a treatment before deciding whether to undergo
that treatment. In the context of this report, it is sufficient to understand that informed
consent “means that the person involved has legal capacity to give consent, is so situated
as to be able to exercise free power of choice, and is provided with a fair explanation of
all material information […]”39
The Colorado Sex Offender Management Board’s Standards & Guidelines
specifically requires therapists providing sex offense-specific treatment to utilize a
written contract with each sex offender prior to the commencement of treatment.40 This
contract must “[d]escribe the right of the client to refuse treatment and/or refuse to waive
confidentiality, and describe the risks and potential outcomes of that decision.”41
An examination of the language from several Treatment Contracts used by the
SOTMP immediately reveals serious misrepresentations concerning treatment under the
Lifetime Supervision Act. For instance, the sole description of the “risks and potential
outcomes” associated with refusing treatment found in the Phase I Treatment Contract is
as follows:
I have been recommended for participation in the Sex Offender Treatment
Program. Although there are certain privileges associated with
participation in recommended programs, I understand that participation is
voluntary and that I have the right to refuse treatment.42
The SOTMP contract fails to describe crucial facts, such as the potential outcome
that, should the offender refuse treatment, he or she will technically be ineligible for
consideration as a candidate for parole, and will therefore be subject to lifetime
incarceration.
Manipulation in the context of informed consent is “any intentional and
successful influence of a person by [. . .] nonpersuasively altering the person’s perception
of those choices.”43 Describing statutorily mandated treatment as voluntary and implying
that
the
only
risk
…referring to statutorily mandated treatment as
associated with refusing
such treatment is the
“voluntary” is at best manipulative…
potential loss of “certain
privileges” is manipulative, and renders the informed consent of the offender to such
treatment impossible. The SOTMP has a duty to adequately inform offenders of the risks
and potential outcomes of refusing treatment, and its failure to do so reinforces this

14

report’s conclusion that the DOC and its SOTMP have failed to implement the Lifetime
Supervision Act’s new approach to sex offender treatment.
2. Misuse of Informed Consent to Justify Terminations
The SOTMP’s manipulative misrepresentation of treatment under the Lifetime
Supervision Act is unfortunately representative of the program’s overall approach to
treating sex offenders. Unethical abuses of authority appear to be pervasive and
ingrained, resulting in an environment where semantics take precedence over meaningful
rehabilitative goals.
The authors of this report were shocked to uncover, for instance, the fact that
SOTMP therapists often attempt to justify their termination of disfavored offenders from
treatment by claiming that the offenders “refused treatment.” The inference in such a
claim is that the offender in question affirmatively exercised his or her right to refuse
treatment under the doctrine of informed consent. In reality, no such refusal occurs in
these instances – instead, therapists deceptively construe the offenders’ lack of progress
in treatment or violation of treatment contract conditions to be refusals of treatment.
When challenged on this unethical practice, SOTMP therapists ironically seek to
justify their deception in terms of ethics: “It would be unethical to allow a sex offender to
continue in treatment
Construing offenders’ lack of progress or
when they [sic] were not
44
contractual violations as a refusal of treatment only
progressing.”
This
serves to insulate therapists from accountability…
assertion, however, has no
support in either Colorado
law or applicable ethical standards. While Colorado law does prohibit psychotherapists
from maintaining therapeutic relationships when it is “reasonably clear that the client [is]
not benefiting from the relationship,”45 this prohibition applies only to extreme instances
where the client “is not likely to gain [. . .] benefit in the future,”46 and offers nothing in
the way of explanation or support for the practice of misusing informed consent to justify
terminating offenders from treatment.
At issue here is accountability in the treatment process. Therapists assert a valid
penological interest in holding sex offenders responsible for their deviant thoughts and
behaviors – an aspect of treatment that the SOTMP refers to as “Treatment with
Accountability”47. The immediate question, however, is whether construing misbehavior
as refusal of treatment furthers this goal?
The answer to this question is a resounding “No”: construing offenders’ lack of
progress or contractual violations as refusal of treatment only serves to insulate the
therapists involved from accountability by obscuring their decision to terminate the
offenders in a confusing fog of semantics. The harm caused by these semantics is a
blurring of the distinction between an offender’s temporary failure to meet treatment
goals and the offender’s deliberate decision of whether to participate in treatment. Such
obscene distortions of informed consent are inexcusable in the context of the Lifetime
Supervision Act, where an offender’s refusal to participate in statutorily mandated
treatment essentially condemns the offender to a lifetime of incarceration.
Treatment is the sole path to rehabilitation for incarcerated sex offenders, and
every termination of an offender from treatment must be regarded as a failure not only on
the part of the offender, but also on the part of the SOTMP. Absent a clear and expressed

15

intent by an offender to refuse treatment, the decision by a therapist to terminate an
offender from treatment should never be disguised as a refusal of treatment. The only
purpose served by such deception is the protection of SOTMP therapists from scrutiny
and accountability.

16

FAILURE 3: The SOTMP’s Failure to Establish Therapeutic Alliances
The professional improprieties discussed in this report – misrepresentations of
treatment, abysmal failures of peer review systems, and the abuse of informed consent –
constitute the ugly byproducts of the SOTMP’s self-serving insistence on interpreting the
Lifetime Supervision Act in such a way as to support lifetime incarceration as a norm in
sex offender treatment. When challenged publicly on any of these unsettling failures, the
SOTMP has to date maintained a haughty ambivalence – the experience of the past seven
years has shown, after all, that the SOTMP is accountable to no one.
As unsettling as the SOTMP’s failures may seem, they nevertheless are to be
expected, given the serious
Foremost among these inherent flaws is an
conceptual flaws that exist
exaggerated emphasis on community safety that
in the program’s approach
sacrifices meaningful treatment for meaningless
to sex offender treatment.
dogma…
Foremost among these
inherent flaws is an
exaggerated emphasis on community safety that sacrifices meaningful treatment for
meaningless dogma.
1. The Effect of the SOTMP’s Exaggerated Emphasis
Robert D. Miller, Professor of Forensic Psychiatry at the University of Colorado
Health Sciences Center and Lecturer in Law at the University of Denver College of Law,
examined the Colorado Sex Offender Management Board’s exaggerated emphasis on
community safety in a 1998 journal article: “Too many so-called SOTPs are so concerned
with victims’ rights and protection of society that they give short shrift to effective
treatment [. . .].”48 After reviewing Colorado’s approach to sex offender treatment, Dr.
Miller observed, “[f]or example, the report of the state sex offender treatment board in
Colorado49 is 106 pages; the original draft did not even mention any type of medical
evaluation, and the final report devotes a total of 31 pages to treatment.”50 Although these
initial documentary shortcomings have since been corrected, the underlying attitude of
blindly emphasizing community safety over treatment remains.
While community safety is of vital importance in instances where sex offenders
are either on probation or parole in the community, such a concern is of substantially less
importance when sex offenders are incarcerated, because incarceration itself removes the
offenders as threats to the community. In the context of the Lifetime Supervision Act, the
SOTMP deals almost exclusively with incarcerated offenders, and should therefore be
primarily focused on providing meaningful treatment to these offenders. Despite this fact,
SOTMP therapists blindly conform to the SOMB’s (Sex Offender Management Board)
guiding principle that “community safety is paramount.”51
A substantial body of research52 indicates that requiring therapists to place
community safety ahead of the treatment needs of their incarcerated clients ultimately
forces these therapists to assume the role of jailers, fundamentally altering the nature of
the therapist-client relationship. The resulting conflict in professional roles poses
devastating consequences for the efficacy of sex offender treatment in the SOTMP.

17

2. The Importance of Therapeutic Alliances in Treatment
Professionals agree that effective treatment requires meaningful therapist-client
relationships in the form of therapeutic alliances.53 “A therapeutic alliance is defined as
the feeling of mutual respect that builds out of the respective roles of helper and the
helped or, in this case, between the mental health clinician who is trying to assist the
patient to change and the patient himself who desires to change.”54
The nature of therapeutic alliances inherently requires a certain level of trust
between clinicians and offenders. “It is vital that patients believe that their treating
therapists sincerely want to
True therapeutic alliances within the SOTMP
help them improve and be
are largely illusory….
released.”55 Absent such
trust, “it should come as no
surprise that there is minimal possibility of forming a therapeutic alliance between
treatment providers and patients.”56
3. The SOTMP’s Bare-Knuckle Approach to Treatment
True therapeutic alliances within the SOTMP are largely illusory. Although the
SOTMP may extol the virtues of its treatment program and employ warm phrases such as
“therapeutic community,” the facts set forth in this report demonstrate that the SOTMP
focuses more effort on its assumed role as jailer than on its assigned role as treatment
provider. Consider, for example, the comments of Kim English (Colorado Department Of
Justice) on the role of treatment in dealing with sex offenders - comments that Ms.
English attributes to Peggy Heil, the former SOTMP Administrator:
Regardless of whether therapy works, its role in the criminal justice
containment strategy is, at a very minimum, to get inside the offender’s
head and obtain the method-of-operation information necessary for
criminal justice officials to safely manage the offender and protect
potential victims.57
Absent from Ms. English’s journal articles is any mention of possible therapeutic
alliances between therapists and sex offenders. Instead, therapists are encouraged to
utilize “criminal justice system consequences” to “motivate” offenders in treatment.58
4. The SOTMP’s Overemphasis on Termination from Treatment
In the context of prison, the “criminal justice system consequences” that therapists
are encouraged to use essentially involve removing the offender from treatment.59
Because “Lifetime Supervision” offenders must participate and progress in treatment,
removing such an offender from treatment has devastating consequences, including the
potential of lifetime
…the SOTMP’s claim that termination is an
incarceration if the
effective treatment tool is analogous to the famed $50,000
offender
cannot
military toilet seats from the 1980’s…
truthfully admit guilt
for the alleged violation for which he was removed from treatment.60
The SOTMP’s Termination Guidelines advises therapists that “probation and
termination can be powerful treatment tools to help motivate an offender.”61 Given the
18

estimated cost of $12,400.00 to $24,800.00 per termination, the resultant loss of
therapeutic progress associated with termination, and the inherent delays in resuming
treatment following termination, the SOTMP’s claim that termination is an effective
treatment tool is analogous to the famed $50,000 military toilet seats from the 1980s both are outrageously expensive, and both are indicative of a lack of accountability by
government employees to taxpayers.

19

FAILURE 4: The SOTMP’s Misrepresentations in Required Reporting
The Colorado Department of Corrections is statutorily required under the Lifetime
Supervision Act to cooperate with the department of public safety and the judicial
department in submitting annual reports to the Colorado General Assembly specifying
“the impact on the prison population, the parole population, and the probation population
in the state due to the extended length of incarceration and supervision provided for” by
the Lifetime Supervision Act.62 To date, the Colorado Department of Corrections has
only marginally complied with this reporting requirement, and it has done so in a manner
that arguably misrepresents its performance in treating sex offenders incarcerated under
the Act.
1. Examining the Number of “Lifetime Supervision” Offenders in Phase II
The Department of Corrections’ misrepresentations in required reporting are best
illustrated by examining the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders reported by the
SOTMP as participating in Phase II each year. Since only 6 “Lifetime Supervision”
offenders have been released to community placement thus far, and since the SOTMP
states that offenders remain in Phase II until they are released to community placement,
the number of “Lifetime Supervision” sex offenders participating in Phase II should have
significantly increased each year, as these offenders successfully complete Phase I and
progress to Phase II.63 Instead, there is a marked disparity between the expected and
reported number of offenders participating in Phase II, as illustrated in Chart 1 below.

Comparison of the Expected Number of
"Lifetime Supervision" Offenders in
Phase II Treatment with the Number
Reported by SOTMP
300
200
Expected

100
Reported

0
2003

20

2004

2005

2006

The disparity between the expected and reported number of “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders participating in Phase II is a result of the SOTMP’s heavy
reliance on termination as a “treatment tool” in lieu of the therapeutic alliances that
experts agree are necessary for effective treatment.64 More importantly, the offenders
reported as participating in Phase II in 2004-2005 are not necessarily the same offenders
as were participating in Phase II in the previous year - a significant number of the earlier
Phase II participants were likely terminated from treatment before 2004-2005.65 If the
number of offenders participating in Phase II significantly changes during a fiscal year
due to terminations of offenders from treatment, or if the majority of “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders are actually in Phase II for so short a time that they do not
meaningfully satisfy the requirements of the Lifetime Supervision Act, these facts need to
be clarified in the department’s annual reports.
2. The Significance of the SOTMP’s Misrepresentations in Reporting
At present, it is impossible to accurately evaluate the true implications of the
SOTMP’s failures and abuses in implementing the treatment provisions of the Lifetime
Supervision Act – the SOTMP intentionally provides an absolute minimum of data in the
statutorily mandated annual report to the Colorado General Assembly. The data
concerning the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders participating in treatment is
undeniably inadequate – rather than providing meaningful statistics, the SOTMP merely
provides a snapshot of participation in treatment for a single day during the fiscal year
being reported.66 The number of offenders actually participating in treatment may vary
significantly the day before or after the snapshot, rendering the data meaningless.
The disparity between the expected and actual numbers of “Lifetime Supervision”
offenders participating in Phase II treatment is especially troubling, because it indicates
an astronomical rate of termination that inherently suggests the SOTMP is a failed
program.67 If the SOTMP is indeed relying on termination as a “treatment tool” as
heavily as the sparse data
suggests, the Colorado
…it indicates an astronomical rate of
Department of Corrections
termination that inherently suggest the SOTMP is a
will never be able to
failed program
satisfy the legislative
intent of the Lifetime Supervision Act to limit the high costs of lifetime incarceration.68
The fact that the Colorado Department of Corrections has failed to advise the Colorado
General Assembly in its annual reports that it will be unable to satisfy its responsibilities
under the Lifetime Supervision Act constitutes a deliberate misrepresentation of fact by
the department that cannot be overlooked.

21

SECTION V.
THE IMPACT OF CDOC’S FAILURES AND ABUSES
The Colorado Department of Corrections has a responsibility under the Lifetime
Supervision Act to treat offenders incarcerated under the Act until they can be safely
treated in less costly community placement. To date, the CDOC’s Sex Offender
Treatment and Monitoring Program has neglected this responsibility, electing instead to
interpret the Lifetime Supervision Act as an endorsement of lifetime incarceration as a
norm in the treatment of sex offenders.
The precise costs and impact of the CDOC’s failures and abuses are impossible to
determine from the sparse data provided thus far by the department in its Annual Reports.
What follows are conservative estimates of these costs and effects, based on published
statistics from the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice, the Colorado Department of
Corrections, and the Safer Society. With the General Assembly’s help in enacting this
Reports recommendations for more detailed reporting requirements for the Colorado
Department of Corrections, future editions of this Report shall provide more accurate cost
analyses.

23

IMPACT 1: The Impact of the SOTMP’s Failures on the Prison Population
While sex offenders incarcerated under the Lifetime Supervision Act currently
represent only 3.4% of the adult inmate population in Colorado,69 they account for a
disproportionate percentage of the annual growth in the state’s prison population. In
2004, the state’s prison population grew by 661 inmates, 172 of which were sentenced
under the Lifetime Supervision Act.70 These 172 “Lifetime Supervision” offenders
therefore accounted for 26% of the prison population growth that year.71
Offenders sentenced under the Lifetime Supervision Act present a unique and
significant challenge to the Colorado Department of Corrections as a result of their
indeterminate sentences to life. Simply stated, a prison population remains stable only
when the number of new prisoners coming into the system equals the number of prisoners
being released from the system. In 2004, 8,165 prisoners came into the state’s prison
system, but only 7,504 were released, leading to a significant growth in the prison
population for that year.72
This problem is magnified a hundredfold within the population of offenders
incarcerated under the Lifetime Supervision Act, because offenders sentenced under this
Act are not being progressed through treatment to community placement – in 2004, 172
new “Lifetime Supervision” offenders came into the state’s prison system, but only 2
were released to community placement.73
Unless the Colorado Department of Corrections can substantially improve the
performance of its Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program, sex offenders
incarcerated under the Lifetime Supervision Act will continue to constitute an everincreasing and potentially permanent burden on the state prison system.

Actual and Projected Number of "Lifetime
Supervision" Offenders Incarcerated
2000
1500
1000
500

19
99
20
00
20
01
20
0
20 2
0
20 3
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
0
20 8
09
20
10

0

24

IMPACT 2: The Impact of the SOTMP’s Failures on The Number of “Lifetime
Supervision” Offenders in Phase II Treatment
The SOTMP advises that once sex offenders progress to Phase II treatment, they
should remain in Phase II until they progress to community placement.74 Logic therefore
dictates that, in the seven years since the Act became law, the percentage of “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders participating in Phase II treatment should have increased each
year, as these offenders progressed through Phase I to Phase II treatment.
In reality, the percentage of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders reported as
participating in Phase II treatment has steadily declined each year, to a shameful 4.5% in
Fiscal Year 2004-2005.75

Percentage of "Lifetime Supervision" Offenders
Reported as Participating in Phase I Treatment
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
2002

2003

2004

2005
25

This disturbing trend cannot be lightly dismissed as the result of budget cuts – the
SOTMP has maintained the same number of beds in Phase II treatment during the entire
period in question.76 Operating under the flawed conviction that the Lifetime Supervision
Act endorses lifetime incarceration as a norm in sex offender treatment, the SOTMP has
simply allocated its Phase II resources for uses other than progressing “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders through treatment to community placement.77

26

IMPACT 3: The Rate of Successful Treatment for “Lifetime Supervision”
Offenders
In its November 1, 2005 Annual Report on the Lifetime Supervision of Sex
Offenders, the Colorado Department of Corrections revealed the first meaningful statistic
in the entire six-year history of the report – it identified the number of “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders who had met the treatment criteria necessary for progression to
community placement78. Unfortunately, the number of qualifying offenders it identified –
14 – is pitifully low, and represents a shameful “success” rate of approximately 3%.79
The Safer Society, a nationwide organization advocating the rights of victims of
sexual abuse, estimates the nationwide average success rate for residential treatment
programs such as the SOTMP’s Phase II therapeutic community is between 59% and
64%.80 The SOTMP’s “success” rate, however, is an abysmal 3% – an indication that the
SOTMP’s approach to sex offender treatment is seriously flawed.
Comparison of Nationwide Average Completion
Rates with SOTMP's Success Rate in Phase II for
Lifetime Supervision Offenders
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%

59.00%

64.00%

20.00%
10.00%
3.00%

0.00%
2000 Study
Nationwide
Average

2002 Study
Nationwide
Average

Lifetime
Supervision
SOTMP Phase II

This report identifies the SOTMP’s heavy reliance on termination as a “treatment
tool” as one of the most serious flaws underlying the SOTMP’s approach to the treatment
of offenders under the Lifetime Supervision Act. Each time that a “Lifetime Supervision”
offender is terminated from Phase II treatment, the offender ceases to meet the criteria
necessary for progression to community placement, the therapeutic progress made by the
offender is compromised, and the offender’s readmission to treatment is significantly
delayed.81
While a certain level of failure in a treatment program may be attributable to the
numerous difficulties associated with treating sex offenders, there comes a point where
the level of failure can no longer be excused. When compared to the nationwide average
success rate of 59-64%, the SOTMP’s 3% success rate is indefensible.

27

IMPACT 4: Colorado Taxpayers
As of the end of Fiscal Year 2004-2005, 793 sex offenders were incarcerated
under the indeterminate sentencing provision of the Lifetime Supervision Act, at an
estimated annual cost of $19.7 million.82 The number of incarcerated “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders is expected to grow by approximately 150+ per year,83 resulting
in an estimated $3.7 million increase in the annual cost of incarcerating “Lifetime
Supervision” offenders each year.84 Since the Lifetime Supervision Act took effect on
November 1, 1998, Colorado taxpayers have spent more than $58 million to incarcerate
sex offenders under the Act,85 and they have only two successful releases of sex
offenders to parole to show for it.86

Estimated and Projected Annual Costs of
Incarcerating Offenders Under the Lifetime
Supervision Act

A nnua l C os t (In M illions )

50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00
1
2005

2
2006

3
2007

4
2008

5
2009

6
2010

Fiscal Year

Instead of successfully treating “lifetime Supervision” offenders the SOTMP’s
history thus far has been one of costly failures. Although the treatment of sex offenders in
the community is a highly cost effective alternative to treating these offenders in prison87
– community treatment saves approximately $ 14,500.00 per year per offender88 – the
SOTMP to date has progressed only 5 of the 793 incarcerated “Lifetime Supervision”
offenders to community treatment.89 At the same time, the Sex Offender Issues Group of
Colorado CURE (Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants) has documented 126
“Lifetime Supervision” offenders who have been terminated by the SOTMP from
mandated treatment, some more than once.90 The total cost to Colorado taxpayers of
these 126+ terminations is estimated to be between $1.5 million and $3.0 million in lost
treatment time alone.91

28

Comparison of Daily Costs for
"Lifetime Supervision" Offenders
Incarceration versus ISP Community
$80.00
$60.00
$40.00

$68.13

$20.00

$28.30

$0.00
Daily Cost of
Incarceration

Daily Cost of ISP
Community

Given the fact that each of these 126 terminated offenders must by law eventually
be treated, the time spent by these offenders outside of treatment has resulted in a
senseless waste of millions of dollars of taxpayer money. Each termination of a “Lifetime
Supervision” offender from treatment should be considered not only a failure by the
offender, but an even larger failure by the SOTMP therapists who were employed to treat
that offender.

29

SECTION VI.
CONCLUSION
The Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 is not a failure – to
consider it as such would be to ignore the reality that it has never been truly implemented
by the Colorado Department of Corrections. For seven years now, CDOC’s Sex Offender
Treatment and Monitoring Program has obstinately refused to view the Lifetime
Supervision Act as anything other than an endorsement of the status quo.
Indeed, SOTMP therapists appear to be obsessed with a sense of their own selfimportance – an obsession that is expressed in their insistence on pursuing a containment
approach to sex offender treatment that places a heavy emphasis on confinement, at the
expense of treatment. Rather than modifying this containment approach to reflect the
legislative view of lifetime incarceration as a costly tool to be avoided, the SOTMP has
convinced itself that lifetime incarceration is the norm rather than the extreme in this
containment approach, and continues to act accordingly.
Doubtless, some readers may approve of the SOTMP’s bare-knuckled approach to
the treatment of incarcerated sex offenders. Lifetime incarceration, after all, is a much
simpler path to pursue than attempting to rehabilitate sex offenders. When legislators
passed the Lifetime Supervision Act, however, they chose to pursue a higher path, and
traveling this higher path requires a continuing commitment to the humanistic principles
enunciated in the Act’s legislative declaration.
If we turn away from this higher path now, the end result shall be
indistinguishable from the failed recidivist laws passed by other states. We are on that
precipice now – as Bob Grant testified before the Senate, “what we are doing here is
prepackaging predatory recidivist [laws].”92
Treatment – meaningful treatment – is the only thing separating the Lifetime
Supervision Act from degenerating into the base nature of recidivist legislation. Without
treatment, voiced concerns of the “loss of human potential” shall ring hollow, and the
Lifetime Supervision Act shall become nothing more than a “return to indefinite
commitments in a (not so) covert attempt to alleviate public fear of sex offenders, not to
provide adequate time for treatment; an incapacitation of offenders, cloaked in the
appearance of beneficence.”93
The language in the Lifetime Supervision Act speaks to brighter goals, to the
rehabilitation of sex offenders as “safe, responsible, and contributing members of
society.” At the time the Act passed into law, the legislature understood what would be
necessary to achieve these goals – it would be necessary to create “a program under
which sex offenders may receive treatment and supervision for the rest of their lives.”
If the Lifetime Supervision Act is to fulfill the admirable intentions that
accompanied its creation, we must insist that the Colorado Department of Corrections
provide treatment to the offenders sentenced under the Act in a manner that truly reflects
these intentions. The SOTMP has had seven years in which to demonstrate that it is
capable of implementing such a treatment program without additional direction from the
legislature; the abysmal failure of these seven years indicates that it is once again time for
the legislature to speak.

31

SECTION VII.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Building upon the SOTMP’s theme of “Treatment with Accountability,” the
authors of this report find it appropriate for the legislature to demand accountability from
the Colorado Department of Corrections in its Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring
Program, and therefore respectfully recommend that the legislature adopt a program of
accountability as follows:
TREATMENT WITH UNIFORM ACCOUNTABILITY
Presently, the Colorado Department of Corrections is subject only to a vague
requirement that it cooperate with the department of public safety and the judicial
department in submitting an annual report specifying “the impact on the prison
population, the parole population, and the probation population in the state due to the
extended length of incarceration and supervision provided for” by the Lifetime
Supervision Act. This reporting requirement, as well as the department of corrections’
compliance with it, is inadequate to address the problems documented in this report.
Specifically, in the past three years the Colorado Department of Corrections has
only marginally complied with the reporting requirement, by reporting the number of sex
offenders sentenced to incarceration pursuant to the Lifetime Supervision Act and the
number of these offenders who are participating in treatment. The data reported
represents a mere “snapshot” of the Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program’s
operation “as of October 13, 2004.”
In order to address the problems documented in this report, the Department of
Corrections and its Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program must be required to
report, in addition to the current reporting requirements:
(1)

the average number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders participating in
Phase I and Phase II of the SOTMP during each of the twelve months in
the fiscal year;

(2)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders denied admission in
Phase I and Phase II of the SOTMP for reasons other than length of
sentence remaining in each of the twelve months in the fiscal year;

(3)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders terminated from Phase I
and Phase II of the SOTMP in each of the twelve months in the fiscal
year;

(4)

the average length of participation by “Lifetime Supervision” offenders in
Phase I and Phase II of the SOTMP during each of the twelve months of
the fiscal year;

33

(5)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders refused readmission to
Phase I and Phase II of the SOTMP during each of the twelve months in
the fiscal year;

(6)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders recommended by the
SOTMP to the parole board for release to parole in each of the twelve
months of the fiscal year; and

(7)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders recommended by the
SOTMP for placement in community corrections in each of the twelve
months in the fiscal year.

34

ENDNOTES
1

COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1001 (2002).

2

The November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report states on page 3 that 793
offenders have been sentenced to prison under the Lifetime Supervision provisions through Fiscal Year
2004-2005. As of October 13, 2005, 101 of these offenders were participating in treatment, while 69 were
on wait lists for treatment after having progressed in at least one phase of treatment (Our figures do not
include the 80 offenders listed as waiting for Core Curriculum, as those offenders have not yet met the
minimum requirement of progressing in treatment). This leaves 623 offenders not in treatment or on
waiting lists for treatment following progression (793 – 101 – 69 = 623). The number 623 represents 78%
of the total 793 offenders incarcerated under the Lifetime Supervision Act at the time of the Annual Report.
3

The success rate is calculated by dividing the number of offenders reported as meeting the treatment
criteria for community placement by the number of offenders who have been incarcerated for at least one
year (and who therefore have had sufficient time to progress in treatment, if treatment had been offered).
We decline to calculate the success rate using the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders who are
actually participating in treatment, because by law all “Lifetime Supervision” offenders are required to
undergo treatment as part of their sentence to incarceration.

4

See, e.g., F. Dubofsky, Reflections on Colorado’s Sex Offenders Law, Boulder County Bar Online
Newsletter 1, 14 (November 2004), available at http://www.boulderbar.org (“Because of the harshness of
the new sex offender laws, fair-minded DA’s are often forced to agree to enter plea agreements that belie
the truth and undermine the law.”)

5

November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at 3. The full text is “The
Department of Corrections continues to work with the courts and prosecuting attorneys where possible to
clarify cases that appear to meet the lifetime sentencing requirements but were not sentenced under these
provisions and to clarify issues surrounding Lifetime Supervision sentencing,”

6

Id.

7

This estimate is based on data provided in the Colorado Department of Corrections’ Statistical Report for
Fiscal Year 2004, and takes into account the distribution of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders among
various facilities in the department, as well as the average cost per inmate at each of the facilities in
question.
8

The estimated increase in the annual cost of incarcerating “Lifetime Supervision” offenders as a result of
new offenders entering the system under the act is calculated by multiplying the estimated number of new
offenders each year by the estimated annual cost of incarcerating each “Lifetime Supervision” offender.

9

See, e.g., Chambers v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000)(“[The
Colorado Department of Corrections] insists Mr. Chambers, even without his participation in the SOTP,
will not be held beyond his sentence or denied his statutory right to appear before the Parole Board on his
parole eligibility date”). One exception to this would be the Colorado Sex Offender Act of 1968, codified
as COLO.REV.STAT. §§ 16-13-201 to 16-13-216. This Act of 1968 is a sexually violent predator sentencing
scheme in which the legislature “[e]mphasized penal goals of protection and restraint rather than treatment
[...]” See People v. White, 656 P.2d 690, 693 (Colo. 1983).

35

10

The stigmatization related to being identified as a sex offender in prison is very real, and can lead to lifethreatening situations. At the Fremont Correctional Facility, for instance, the sex offender treatment groups
meet in a separate building dedicated to mental health treatment, and often inmates attending such groups
are forced to wait outside this building in plain view of other inmates, where they can easily be identified as
waiting for sex offender treatment. The situation at Arrowhead Correctional Center is even more serious, as
this facility is widely known within the CDOC inmate population as a therapeutic community for sex
offenders. Inmates terminated from Arrowhead’s Phase II sex offender treatment program are intentionally
transferred by CDOC staff to prisons other than Fremont Correctional Facility, and upon arrival at these
new facilities, these inmates are easily identified by their identification labels on their uniforms (which bear
a symbol indicating Arrowhead Correctional Center) as having been transferred from Arrowhead. Such
identification at a minimum results in stigmatization, and often leads to threats or physical assault.
11

The language of the legislative declaration in the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of
1998 itself cites this line of reasoning. See, e.g., COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1001 (“The general assembly
hereby finds that the majority of persons who commit sex offenses, if incarcerated or supervised without
treatment, will continue to present a danger to the public [...]”).

12

See COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1004(3). The full text of this subsection is “Each sex offender sentenced
pursuant to this section shall be required as a part of the sentence to undergo treatment to the extent
appropriate pursuant to section 16-11.7-105, C.R.S.”

13

See COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a)(“[t]he district court having jurisdiction shall sentence a sex
offender to the custody of the department for an indeterminate term of at least the minimum of the
presumptive range specified in section 18-1.3-401 for the level of offense committed and a maximum of the
sex offender’s natural life”).

14

See COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1006(1)(a)(“In determining whether to release the sex offender on parole,
the parole board shall determine whether the sex offender has successfully progressed in treatment and
would not pose an undue threat to the community if released under appropriate treatment and monitoring
requirements and whether there is a strong and reasonable probability that the person will not thereafter
violate the law”).
15

A Bill for an Act Concerning Supervision of Sex Offenders: Hearing on H.B. 98-1156 Before the House
Comm. on Judiciary, Sixty-first General Assembly (Colo. January 27, 1998) (statement of Bob Grant,
President, Colorado District Attorneys Council).
16

See, e.g., COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1004(3) (“Each sex offender sentenced pursuant to this section shall
be required as a part of the sentence to undergo treatment to the extent appropriate pursuant to section 1611.7-105, C.R.S.”); see also COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1006(1)(a) (“In determining whether to release the
sex offender on parole, the parole board shall determine whether the sex offender has successfully
progressed in treatment […]”)
17

The Colorado General Assembly specifically found “that keeping all sex offenders in lifetime
incarceration imposes an unacceptably high cost in both state dollars and loss of human potential.” See
COLO.REV.STAT. §18-1.3-1001. Since a “Lifetime Supervision” offender’s release from incarceration to
community placement is predicated upon participation and progress in treatment, treatment serves as the
only means of limiting the expenses of lifetime incarceration within the context of the Act.
18

Colorado Department of Corrections’ Administrative Regulation 700-19, “Sex Offender Treatment and
Management Program,” at 1.
19

Id.

20

November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at 8.

36

21

Id., at 9

22

Colorado Department of Corrections, “CURE Questions and Responses,” 11, ¶ E.5., available at
http://search.state.co.us/ . The actual question and text are: Q: “Does Phase II ever end?” A: “As stated
earlier once an inmate is placed in Phase II, he remains in this phase of treatment until he receives a
community corrections placement, parole, discharge, drops out of the program, or is expelled from the
program, Inmates stay in this phase of treatment instead of being placed back into general population in
order to maintain the therapeutic progress they have made.”
23

See, e.g., November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at 9 (“Phase II is
offered at Arrowhead Correctional Center with an adapted format of Phase II offered at the Colorado
Women’s Correctional Facility and the Youthful Offender System”). The Colorado Department of
Corrections’ Fiscal Year 2004 Statistical Report identifies Arrowhead Correctional Center as a “Level II”
security facility on page 17. See also COLO.REV.STAT. § 17-1-104.3.
24

See Colorado Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation 600-01 “Offender Classification,” at
§ IV.K.4 (“Offenders who are required to attend, or are recommended to attend, specialized programs (Sex
Offender Treatment Program, therapeutic communities) will be screened for referral to the appropriate
program. In the event that an offender fails to comply with the specific program requirements, their facility
assignment will not be lower than a Level III facility, regardless of scored custody level. If their facility
assignment for the specialized program was Level II, the offender will be assigned to a Level III facility”).
25

See, e.g., “Sex Offender Treatment Program Probation and Termination Guidelines Phase I,” at 1
(“Probation and Termination can be powerful treatment tools to help motivate an offender”).

26

The six month delay in eligibility for readmission to treatment is set forth in some, but not all, of the
notices the SOTMP uses in terminating offenders from treatment. The six month delay is not documented
in the Colorado Department of Corrections’ Administrative Regulation 700-19 “Sex Offender Treatment
and Monitoring Program,” nor is it set forth in either state law or the Sex Offender Management Board’s
Standards and Guidelines for the Assessment, Evaluation, Treatment and Behavioral Monitoring of Adult
Sex Offenders publication – it is, instead, merely an internal SOTMP policy. The Sex Offense Issues Group
of Colorado-CURE has documented instances of delays in readmission to Phase II attributable to lack of
bed-space or to delays in transferring the offender back to Arrowhead Correctional Center.
27

This estimate is based on data provided in the Colorado Department of Corrections’ Statistical Report for
Fiscal Year 2004, and takes into account the distribution of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders among
various facilities in the department, as well as the average cost per inmate for each facility in question.
28

The concept of “lost treatment time” is used in this Report to refer to any time that a “Lifetime
Supervision” offender is incarcerated but not in treatment. Once an incarcerated “Lifetime Supervision”
offender serves his or her minimum sentence, the length of his or her incarceration thereafter is almost
entirely predicated on his or her progress in treatment. Termination removes the offender from treatment
and places the offender essentially in “storage,” resulting in lost treatment time. If, for example, a “Lifetime
Supervision” offender is terminated from treatment and “stored” for 12 months before being readmitted to
treatment, that entire 12 month period is lost treatment time, because taxpayers were paying to incarcerate
the offender but no progress was being made by the offender in treatment towards placement in less
expensive, more effective treatment in the community. The calculated cost of a termination is based upon
the average cost of incarcerating a “Lifetime Supervision” offender for a year, multiplied by the time that
the offender was incarcerated but not in treatment. If, for instance, an offender is terminated and removed
from treatment for 6 months, the cost of that termination to Colorado taxpayers would be ½ year x $24,800
= $12,400. This report estimates that the average termination result is between 6 months and 1 year in lost
treatment time, thus the range in estimated cost per termination.
29

This fundamental fact is based on data from the Colorado Department of Corrections’ Statistical Report
for Fiscal Year 2004. The calculated average cost of incarcerating a “Lifetime Supervision” offender is

37

$68.13 per day, and this cost does not include the cost of providing sex offender treatment. Housing the
same offender in ISP Community Corrections, meanwhile, costs $28.00 per day, and “in community based
programs, most sex offenders are expected to bear the costs of treatment and behavioral monitoring
themselves.” See November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at 19.
30

See, e.g., Sex Offender Management Board Lifetime Supervision Criteria, LS 4.210 (“Sex offender
treatment in the prison setting is always preliminary to continued treatment and supervision in the
community post release from prison. Since sex offenders who participate in treatment in the prison setting
cannot complete treatment in prison, the Sex Offender Treatment and Management [sic] Program has
developed three formats for sex offender participation in prison treatment based on differing minimum
sentences and time to parole eligibility”).
31

See, e.g., COLO.REV.STAT. § 18-1.3-1001 (2002).

32

This assertion is based on 126 “Lifetime Supervision” offenders documented by the Sex Offense Issues
group of Colorado-CURE as having been terminated from treatment.
33

This information was obtained from the plaintiff in Beebe v. Heil, No. 02-cv-1993-WYD-BNB (D.Colo.
October 7, 2002), prior to the entry of counsel for the plaintiff in that case.

34

See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-68, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979-80, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).

35

Id. at 558, 94 S.Ct. at 2976.

36

This information was obtained from the plaintiff in Beebe v. Heil, No. 02-cv-1993-WYD-BNB (D.Colo.
October 7, 2002), prior to the entry of counsel for the plaintiff in that case.
37

See “Sex Offender Treatment Program Probation and Termination Guidelines Phase I” at p. 3, ¶ 3.

38

This information was obtained from the plaintiff in Beebe v. Heil, No. 02-cv-1993-WYD-BNB (D.Colo.
October 7, 2002), prior to the entry of counsel for the plaintiff in that case.
39

See Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent 282 (1996)
(quoting FDA regulations).
40

See Standards & Guidelines for the Assessment, Evaluation, Treatment and Behavioral Monitoring of
Adult Sex Offenders § 3.310 (Sex Offender Management Board 2001).
41

See id. § 3.310.A.3.

42

Phase I Treatment Contract at 6.

43

Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 39 at 261.

44

This information was obtained from the plaintiff in Beebe v. Heil, No. 02-cv-1993-WYD-BNB (D.Colo.
October 7, 2002), prior to the entry of counsel for the plaintiff in that case.
45

See COLO.REV.STAT. § 12-43-222(1)(h).

46

Id.

47

Colorado Department of Corrections Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program CURE
Presentation 18 (June 15, 2004)

38

48

Robert D. Miller, Forced Administration of Sex-Drive Reducing Medications to Sex Offenders:
Treatment or Punishment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 175, 197 (June 1998).
49

Id. at n. 133.

50

Id.

51

See Sex Offender Management Board, supra note 40 at Guiding Principle 2.

52

See, e.g., Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in
the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DEN. U.L. REV. 1169, 1188 (1997); See also generally
John Q. LaFond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral? Sexual Predator Laws: Their
Impact on Participants and Policy, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 375 (1999).
53

See generally John Q. LaFond, supra note 52, at § IV.C.

54

Id. at § IV.C. n. 201.

55

Id. at § IV.C.

56

Id.

57

Kim English, The Containment Approach: An Aggressive Strategy for the Community Management of
Adult Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 218, 226 (1998).

58

The actual sentence is “Also, by using criminal justice system consequences, therapists help to motivate
nonvoluntary clients to engage in treatment, complete homework assignments, and learn and use the tools
of internal management.”
59

Ms. English’s article addressed the use of “criminal justice system consequences” in the context of sex
offenders being treated in the community, and states that “[i]n cases of noncompliance with treatment or
supervision requirements, [probation or parole] officers can request that the court or parole board
consequence [sic] the offender with supervised community service, jail time, halfway house placement, or
long term prison sentences.” See English, supra note 57, at 227. The emphasis on restricting a
noncompliant sex offender’s movement in the community through criminal justice system consequences is
appropriate, as the offender’s noncompliance may be indicative of an increased risk of reoffense. The
SOTMP, however, is applying the containment approach’s “criminal justice system consequences” in the
context of sex offenders who are already incarcerated in prison, where the risk of reoffense is negated by
the very nature of incarceration. Although the SOTMP does utilize various restrictions of privileges in
prison to “motivate” noncompliant sex offenders in treatment, it is the SOTMP’s reliance on termination
from treatment as a “criminal justice system consequence” and “treatment tool” that is most troubling.
60

When a sex offender is terminated from treatment for allegedly violating treatment conditions, the
SOTMP requires the offender to admit guilt or responsibility for the violation before the offender will be
readmitted to treatment. This requirement is troubling, because the SOTMP fails to employ any procedural
protection prior to termination to verify that the offender actually violated treatment conditions. Absent
even a minimally effective peer review system, see Section IV at FAILURE 1, supra, the potential for
terminating an offender from treatment for a violation that the offender did not actually commit is very real,
and requiring an offender who has been erroneously terminated from treatment to admit guilt to a violation
he or she did not commit is both inappropriate and anti-therapeutic.
61

See, e.g., “Sex Offender Treatment Program Probation and Termination Guidelines Phase I,” at 1
(“Probation and Termination can be powerful treatment tools to help motivate an offender”).

39

62

See COLO.REV.STAT. §§ 18-1.3-1011(1), (1)(a).

63

The SOTMP advises that Phase I is a “time-limited therapy group.” See November 1, 2005 Lifetime
Supervision of Sex offenders Annual Report, at 8. Phase I takes between 6 months and one year to
complete. Given these facts, those offenders identified by the SOTMP as participating in Phase I in the
previous year’s Annual Report should be identified as participating in Phase II in the current Annual
Report, as should those offenders identified as being on a “Wait List” for Phase II in the previous year’s
Annual Report. A certain percentage of offenders in Phase I can, of course, be expected to fail to
successfully complete Phase I, and these offenders will need to participate in Phase I again, instead of
progressing to Phase II. At the same time, the SOTMP conducts more than one “round” of Phase I therapy
groups per year, yet it fails to report these additional rounds of Phase I in its Annual Reports. As such, it is
impossible to accurately calculate the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders who should be in Phase
II treatment each year. Since the SOTMP conducts more than one round of Phase I therapy groups per year,
however, this report’s estimates are conservative; if data was provided by the SOTMP on the additional
Phase I groups it conducts each year, the expected number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders in Phase II
would rise considerably.
64

See Section IV at FAILURE 3, supra, for a discussion of termination and the importance of therapeutic
alliances in treatment.

65

The data currently provided by the SOTMP in its Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual
Reports makes it impossible to determine how many offenders have been in Phase II treatment for more
than one continuous year.
66

See, e.g., November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at Table 1.10
(“Lifetime Sex Offenders in Treatment As of October 13, 2005”).
67

The only way that the SOTMP can progress “Lifetime Supervision” offenders to community placement
is through successful progression in treatment. The SOTMP therefore essentially “shoots itself in the foot”
each time that it terminates a “Lifetime Supervision” offender from Phase II treatment.
68

Given its unacceptably low 3% success rate, the SOTMP will not be able to successfully progress
through treatment as many “Lifetime Supervision” offenders as are coming into the system each year. The
population of incarcerated “Lifetime Supervision” offenders will therefore continue to grow each year, as
will the cost to taxpayers of incarcerating the ever-growing “Lifetime Supervision” population.
69

See Colorado Department of Corrections’ Statistical Report for Fiscal Year 2004, at Table 58

70

The figure of 661 inmates is calculated by subtracting the number of inmates released by the Colorado
Department of Corrections in Fiscal Year 2004 from the number of “new admissions” in the same year. See
Colorado Department of Corrections’ Statistical Report for Fiscal Year 2004, at Table 23.
71

The state’s prison population grew by 661 inmates in Fiscal Year 2004. See note 70, supra. The 172 new
“Lifetime Supervision” offenders incarcerated in 2004 represent 26% of these 661 inmates.
72

See note 70, supra.

73

See Colorado Department of Corrections’ Statistical Report for Fiscal Year 2004, at 43 (“The lifetime
prison commitments to date include: [. . .] 172 in 2004”); see also November 1, 2004 Lifetime Supervision
of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at 11 (“Two lifetime sex offenders have been accepted and placed in
transition community corrections and one lifetime sex offender is currently in the Intensive Supervision
(inmate status) Program as of September 30, 2004”).
74

See, e.g., Colorado Department of Corrections, “CURE Questions and Responses,” supra note 22.

40

75

The percentage of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders reported as participating in Phase II treatment is
calculated by dividing the number of such offenders reported in the Lifetime Supervision of Sex offenders
Annual Report for each year by the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders reported as incarcerated in
the same year.
76

See, e.g., “Colorado Department of Corrections’ State Sex Offender Treatment Programs: 50-State
Survey” 31, available at http://www.doc.state.co.us/programs (“One unit at Arrowhead Correctional Center
is dedicated to a 96-bed residential therapeutic community for sex offenders”). The SOTMP has maintained
this 96-bed unit during the entire time-period in question.
77

The SOTMP controls how many beds in its 96-bed unit at Arrowhead Correctional Center are allocated
to the treatment of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders. Evidence suggests that the SOTMP has elected to
allocate many of its Arrowhead beds to non-Lifetime Supervision offenders who are close to discharging
their sentences to incarceration.
78

See November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at 7 (“Five lifetime sex
offenders have been accepted and placed in transition community corrections out of fourteen offenders who
have met SOMB criteria for community corrections recommendation”).
79

The success rate is calculated by dividing the number of offenders reported as meeting the treatment
criteria for community placement by the number of offenders who have been incarcerated for at least one
year (and who therefore have had sufficient time to progress in treatment, if treatment had been offered).
We decline to calculate the success rate by the number of offenders who have actually been in treatment,
because by law all “Lifetime Supervision” offenders are required to undergo treatment – the SOTMP
should not be permitted to benefit from its decision to terminate or otherwise deny “Lifetime Supervision”
offenders treatment by using those decisions to artificially inflate its “success” rate.
80

Robert J. McGrath, Georgia F. Cumming, & Brenda L. Buchard, Current Practices and Trends in Sexual
Abuser Management: The Safer Society 2002 Nationwide Survey 66 (Safer Society Press 2003)
(“Residential programs for adult males have the lowest average completion rate (see Table 14.2). The 64
percent average completion rate is similar to the 59 percent rate reported by West, Hromas, and Wegner
(2000) in their study of sex offender treatment programs in United States adult prisons”).
81

See discussion in section IV at FAILURE 3, supra.

82

See note 27, supra.

83

In the period beginning with Fiscal Year 2002 and ending with Fiscal Year 2005, an average of 158.5
offenders per year were sentenced to incarceration under the Lifetime Supervision Act. A trend exists in the
criminal justice community, however, in which sex offenders are increasingly utilizing plea bargaining to
avoid the indeterminate sentencing provisions of the Act - if this trend continues, the number of sex
offenders sentenced under the Lifetime Supervision Act may continue to decline each year. This report’s
estimate of 150+ new offenders entering the system is therefore conservative.
84

The estimated increase in the annual cost of incarcerating “Lifetime Supervision” offenders as a result of
new offenders entering the system under the Act is calculated by multiplying the estimated number of new
offenders each year by the estimated annual cost of incarcerating each “Lifetime Supervision” offender.
85

The estimated cost-to-date is calculated by multiplying the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders
incarcerated in each year since the Lifetime Supervision Act took effect by the estimated average annual
cost of incarcerating a “Lifetime Supervision” offender.

86

See note 73, supra.

41

87

This fundamental fact is based on data from the Colorado Department of Corrections’ Statistical Report
for Fiscal Year 2004. The calculated average cost of incarcerating a “Lifetime Supervision” offender is $
68.13 per day, and this cost does not include the cost of providing sex offender treatment. Housing the
same offender in ISP Community Corrections, meanwhile, costs $28.00 per day, and “in community based
programs, most sex offenders are expected to bear the costs of treatment and behavioral monitoring
themselves.” See November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report, at 19.
88

The estimated savings is the difference in cost between incarcerating a “Lifetime Supervision” offender
for a year and housing the same offender in ISP Community Corrections for a year. The cost savings does
not include the cost of treating the sex offender while he or she is incarcerated - in community placement,
the offender would bear the costs of treatment, resulting in even more savings per year over an incarcerated
offender.
89

The SOTMP’s language in the November 1, 2005 Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Annual Report
is confusing concerning the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders actually in community placement.
The language in question is as follows: “Five lifetime sex offenders have been accepted and placed in
transition community corrections out of fourteen offenders who have met SOMB criteria for a community
corrections recommendation. Two lifetime sex offenders are currently in community corrections programs
as of September 20, 2005.” See id. at 7.
90

Several “Lifetime Supervision” offenders documented by the Sex Offense Issues Group of ColoradoCURE describe having been terminated from treatment two or more times over several years.
91

The total estimated cost of the terminations is calculated by multiplying the number of offenders
terminated by the estimated cost per termination of between $12,138 and $24,275. The total estimated cost
is conservative, as it does not include the potential additional cost of those offenders who have been
terminated more than once from treatment.
92

A Bill for an Act Concerning Supervision of Sex Offenders: Hearing on H.B. 98-1156 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, Sixty-first General Assembly (Colo. April 29, 1998) (statement of Bob Grant,
President, Colorado District Attorneys Council).
93

See Robert D. Miller, supra note 52, at § III.

42

SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAM
Probation and Termination Guidelines
Phase I
Probation and termination can be powerful treatment tools to help motivate an offender.
The following guidelines are not meant to discourage a therapist from using probation
and/or termination. These guidelines are designed to provide direction and consistency in
expectations for group participation across facilities.
Probation
1.

Probation is an official documented status warning an inmate group member that
he is at risk of being terminated from treatment. If a sex offender displays
problematic behavior while he is in a sex offender treatment group, he in most
cases should be placed on probation. The probation period is generally for one
month and may be extended. For more serious issues, the period of probation may
be for less than one month. During the probationary period it may be determined
that the inmate is not making sufficient progress to successfully complete
probation. If the facility treatment team has expressed unanimous consensus
through the termination staffing process, termination can occur before the
probationary period expires. The inmate should be informed through the
probationary contract that it may not take the therapists the entire probationary
period to determine if the inmate will successfully complete probation. In other
words, the therapists need not wait until the end of probation to terminate him
from group.
Examples of situations that might call for expedited probation ending early in
termination could be: Refusal to speak in group; denial of being at risk to reoffend; repeated denial of essential or central elements of his sexual assault; not
meeting the basic treatment participation requirement; or displaying markedly
disruptive group behavior.

2.

When a therapist believes that it is appropriate to place an inmate on probation,
s/he will discuss it with the co-therapist outside of group. If the co-therapist
agrees, they will collaborate on writing a probationary contract. The co-therapists
are encouraged to consult with the facility SOTMP team leaders and the mental
health coordinator or other team members before presenting the probationary
contract to the inmate. The probationary contract will be written using the
attached Probation Contract Form. The probation conditions will be individually
designed to address the inmate's problems. The plan for improvement needs to be
written in specific measurable behavioral terms. During the probation it is the
responsibility of the inmate to address the needed changes and the therapists'
responsibility to give feedback. The probationary status will always be reviewed
with the inmate when the probationary period ends. Copies of the signed contract
will be placed in the working file and the department file, and a copy will be
given to the inmate. The original will be placed in the mental health file.

Appendix A, Page 1

3.

After the contract is written and the co-therapists have signed it, it will be
presented to the inmate at the next group session. The therapists may feel it is
more appropriate to call the inmate in individually to present the probationary
contract. In that case, the therapists will discuss the inmate's probationary status
with the group at the next group meeting.

4.

At the next facility mental health staff meeting, the co-therapists must present the
written probationary contract and make a clinical presentation of this inmate's
issues to the SOTMP team. Discussion about how to handle the inmate's treatment
will be encouraged. In difficult cases where there is considerable disagreement in
the team's feedback or if the team wishes additional ideas on how to handle the
inmate's treatment, the case can be restaffed with the mental health SOTMP
coordinators and the program administrator. The inmate's probationary status will
be reviewed at each SOTMP facility team meeting during which the inmate
remains on probation.
Some possible reasons for probation:

(This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all the reasons an inmate may be placed on
probation. There will always be cases that require use of clinical judgment. This list is
meant to give some guidance and examples of possible reasons for placing a group
member on probation.)
~ Habitual tardiness (being late more than 5 minutes more
than twice without a verifiable reason)
~ Excessively tardy for one session (missing most of the session without a verifiable
reason)
~ Failure to complete homework assignments when assigned (turning in homework
late more than twice)
~ Persistent minimization of the sex offense and/or problem
~ Persistent resistance to material presented in group
~ Non-participation in group discussions
~ Denial or severe minimization of problem areas
~ Denial of the need to address problematic patterns and behaviors
~ Denial of a risk to re-offend
~ Failure to comply with any of the conditions of the contract
Termination
1. When a therapist believes it is appropriate to terminate an inmate from group,
he/she will present the reason for termination to the facility sex offender treatment
team*. In some situations it may be necessary to terminate the inmate's presence
in group immediately. If the inmate's presence in group constitutes a dangerous
situation, the therapist may terminate the inmate from group but will review the
termination with the facility team the next working day. Terminations should
generally follow periods of probation except under the following circumstances:
~ Unexcused absence**

Appendix A, Page 2

~ Dangerous/disruptive situations (threats, verified breaches of
confidentiality, etc.)
~ COPD conviction for sexual misconduct or sexual abuse
~ Refusal to participate in a group activity such as videotaped role plays
~ Denial of being a sex offender
2. A note should be placed in the mental health file outlining date staffed, reason for
termination, and tasks for reconsideration for future treatment. This note is signed
by both therapists and the facility coordinator.
3. In difficult cases where the facility team is unable to come to consensus*** on
whether an inmate should be terminated or placed on probation, the case will be
restaffed with the SOTMP coordinators and administrator.
* Facility sex offender treatment team – Those members of the sex offender treatment
team present in the facility that day, including the coordinator or the coordinator's
designee.
** Missing group due to administrative segregation or punitive segregation is not
automatically an unexcused absence unless it is for verified sexual misconduct, sexual
abuse, or threats of violence and/or violence which is not the result of self defense. We
should be stressing to inmates that they should follow rules since giving themselves
permission to break rules has resulted in victimization of others. However, rigid
expectations for behavior outside of group are not required at the Phase I level of
treatment since inmates are not given significant time in group to discuss current
problems.
*** Consensus – Every member present at the staffing should be able to support the final
decision whether they initially agreed with it or not. If there is one or more persons who
cannot support the decision, the coordinator will bring the decision to the coordinators
group to determine a program direction.
Revised 11/7/95

Appendix A, Page 3

Second Regular Session
Sixty-fifth General Assembly

STATE OF COLORADO
INTRODUCED
SENATE BILL 00-000
SENATE SPONSORSHIP

HOUSE SPONSORSHIP

Senate Committees
Judiciary

House Committees

A BILL FOR AN ACT
101
102

CONCERNING

THE MODIFICATION OF THE

COLORADO SEX OFFENDER LIFETIME

SUPERVISION ACT OF 1998.
Bill Summary
(Note: This summary applies to this bill as introduced and does not necessarily
reflect any amendments that may be subsequently adopted.)
Amends the “Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998” (Lifetime
Supervision Act) by establishing additional reporting requirements concerning the
Colorado Department of Corrections’ performance in providing sex offense-specific
treatment to sex offenders incarcerated pursuant to the Lifetime Supervision Act.

Shading denotes HOUSE amendment. Double underlining denotes SENATE amendment.
Capital letters indicate new material to be added to existing statute.
Dashes through the words indicate deletions from existing statute.

1
2
3
4

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1.

18-1.3-1011(1), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended by

THE ADDITION OF NEW PARAGRAPHS to read:
(h)

the

average

number

of

“Lifetime

Supervision”

offenders

5

participating in Phase I and Phase II of the department of corrections’ Sex Offender

6

Treatment and Monitoring Program during each of the twelve months in the fiscal year;

7

(i)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders denied admission to

8

treatment in Phase I and Phase II of the department of corrections’ Sex Offender

9

Treatment and Monitoring Program for reasons other than length of remaining sentence

10
11

in each of the twelve months in the fiscal year;
(j)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders terminated from

12

Phase I and Phase II of the department of corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and

13

Monitoring Program in each of the twelve months in the fiscal year;

14

(k)

the average length of participation by “Lifetime Supervision”

15

offenders in Phase I and Phase II of the department of corrections’ Sex Offender

16

Treatment and Monitoring Program during each of the twelve months in the fiscal year;

17

(l)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders denied readmission

18

to Phase I and Phase II of the department of corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and

19

Monitoring Program after having previously been terminated from such treatment during

20

each of the twelve months in the fiscal year;

21
22

(m)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders recommended by the

department of corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program to the

APPENDIX B Page 2

SB00-000

23
24

parole board for release to parole in each of the twelve months in the fiscal year; and
(n)

the number of “Lifetime Supervision” offenders recommended by the

25

department of corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program for

26

placement in community corrections in each of the twelve months in the fiscal year.

APPENDIX B Page 3

SB00-000