Dollars and Detainees
The Growth of For-Profit Detention
Cody Mason
July 2012

For further information:
The Sentencing Project
1705 DeSales St., NW
8th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 628-0871
www.sentencingproject.org

This report was written by Cody Mason, program associate at The
Sentencing Project.
The Sentencing Project is a national non-profit organization engaged
in research and advocacy on criminal justice issues.
The work of The Sentencing Project is supported by many individual
donors and contributions from the following:
Morton K. and Jane Blaustein Foundation
Ford Foundation
Bernard F. and Alva B. Gimbel Foundation
General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church
JK Irwin Foundation
Open Society Foundations
Public Welfare Foundation
David Rockefeller Fund
Elizabeth B. and Arthur E. Roswell Foundation
Tikva Grassroots Empowerment Fund of Tides Foundation
Wallace Global Fund
Working Assets/CREDO
Copyright @ 2012 by The Sentencing Project. Reproduction of this
document in full or in part, and in print or electronic format, only by
permission of The Sentencing Project.

1

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

T

he War on Drugs and harsh sentencing laws led to explosive growth in state
and federal prison populations in the 1980s. The massive rise in prisoners
overwhelmed government budgets and resources, and created opportunities
for private prison companies to flourish. In 2010, one in every 13 prisoners in the
U.S. was held by for-profit companies, 1 despite evidence that private prisons often
provide inadequate levels of service and are no more cost-effective than publicly-run
facilities. In addition, private prisons operate on a business model that emphasizes
profits over the public good, and benefit from policies that maintain America’s high
incarceration rate. 2
Nonetheless, these companies could count on predictable growth in the number of
state and federal prisoners until 2008, when budget crises and policy changes led
some states to reduce their prison populations and private prison contracts. The
resulting losses for private prison companies were more than offset by expansion of
their management of federal detainees under the jurisdiction of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Marshals Service. Between 2008 and 2010,
the number of privately-held inmates decreased by 1,281, 3 while the number of
privately-held detainees increased by 3,327. 4 This growth was part of a larger trend
that saw the total private detainee population increase by 259 percent between 2002
and 2010; a change largely due to stepped up efforts to find, incarcerate, and deport
people who violate immigration laws. There are indications that federal detention will
remain a major market for private companies.
There are two key concerns about the expansion of private federal detention that
need to be addressed. First, many of the problems associated with private corrections
appear equally valid in the area of private detention. These include unsubstantiated
claims of cost savings, problems with oversight, and high staff turnover. Second,
there are considerable concerns regarding transparency in the use of private
detention. The way federal agencies report data on privately-held detainees, along
with the complex contractual arrangements and tiered layers of bureaucracy that
result from privatization, make it difficult to ascertain the full scope of detention
privatization at any given time. Without such transparency, policymakers and citizens
are inherently limited in their ability to assess the full effects of privatization.

2

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

FEDERAL DETAINEES
Federal detainees fall under the jurisdiction of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). These detainees differ
from prisoners in that they are generally waiting to have their case decided in court,
rather than serving time because they were convicted of a crime.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was created following the terror
attacks of September 11th to replace the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. 5 It is the main investigative arm of the Department of
Homeland Security. ICE detainees include individuals who: (1) violate administrative
laws by being in the U.S. without proper documentation; (2) overstay their visas; (3)
are charged or convicted of crimes that subject them to deportation; (4) were
previously deported or ordered to leave the country, but have returned/remained in
the U.S.; and (5) are refugees seeking political asylum. 6
Responsibility for apprehending, arresting, and removing undocumented immigrants
lies with ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). 7 ERO’s stated
priority is removing people immigrating to the U.S. who have been convicted of
crimes, pose a threat to national security, are fugitives, and entered the U.S. illegally. 8
In addition to holding immigrant adults, ICE also detains families, asylum seekers,
and other vulnerable immigrant groups. 9
In 2010, 44 percent of immigrants deported from the U.S. were “convicted criminal
aliens.” The most common crimes these individuals committed were drug offenses
(25 percent), immigration crimes (19 percent), and criminal traffic offenses (18
percent). 10
U.S. Marshals Service
The history of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) traces back to 1789 when it was
established to support the federal courts. The agency’s responsibilities have varied
since its creation, and have included capturing fugitive slaves, conducting the
national census, and swapping spies with the Soviet Union. 11 Today, USMS’ role
includes apprehending fugitives and housing and transporting all federal detainees

3

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

from the time they enter federal custody until they are either acquitted or convicted
and delivered to a federal prison facility. 12
Over the course of 2011, USMS held a total of 209,526 individuals. Only two
percent of those detainees were booked for violent crimes, while the plurality (40
percent) was detained for immigration offenses, 13 including unlawful entry, failure to
follow a deportation order, and reentry after deportation. 14 In 2009, more than 10
percent of those charged with federal crimes were ultimately not convicted in
court. 15 On average, detainees were held for 110 days, with those in custody for a
drug or weapon offense being detained the longest (227 days, on average). 16
USMS and Immigrant Detention
The U.S. Marshals Service has been playing an increasing role in detaining people
attempting to enter the U.S. in violation of immigration laws since the 1990s. In
1994, USMS booked 8,604 individuals on immigration charges. By 2011 that number
was 84,313, representing an 880 percent increase compared to a 39 percent increase
for all other offenses. 17
Since 2005, much of this growth was due to Operation Streamline, 18 which requires
that federal criminal charges be filed against every person crossing the border
illegally, including first time offenders who previously would have faced
administrative deportation proceedings instead. 19 This policy largely affects
individuals apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol, 20 but ICE and U.S. Attorneys’
Offices can also decide to charge people with criminal offenses, rather than allowing
the immigration courts to handle matters as a violation of administrative law. 21
Individuals prosecuted as a consequence of Operation Streamline are held, like all
other federal detainees facing criminal charges, by USMS. In addition, people being
held short-term for criminal immigration violations often complete their sentences
under USMS custody. 22 Between 2005 and 2011, the number of USMS detainees
booked on immigration charges increased 121 percent, compared to 81 percent
during the six years prior. 23 The number of apprehensions made by the U.S. Border
Patrol fell by nearly 250 percent during this period, 24 meaning that USMS’ enlarged
immigrant population was a result of increased criminal arrests and prosecutions
rather than a rise in apprehensions. 25

4

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

ICE, USMS, AND THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY
Although ICE and USMS are very different agencies with very different histories,
both helped private prison companies get their start. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (the predecessor of ICE) provided Wackenhut Corrections
(which later became the GEO Group, Inc.) with its first contract in 1987, 26 and gave
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) its first “design, build and manage”
contract in 1983. 27 This fueled the creation of private prison companies and laid the
groundwork for large-scale prison privatization. It also paved the way for CCA and
the GEO Group to become the two largest private prison companies in America.
Around the same time, USMS also began contracting with private companies for
detention services. 28 This was an early instance of contractors holding adult criminal
detainees, as privatization had until that time largely been limited to the “soft” end of
the correctional continuum, including immigrant and juvenile detention. 29

GROWTH OF PRIVATELY-HELD DETAINEES
The number of privately-held ICE and USMS detainees grew at a faster rate than
privately-held state or federal prisoners in the last decade. Between 2002 and 2010, a
nine-year period for which data are available for these four groups, privately-held
ICE and USMS detainees increased by 206 percent and 322 percent, respectively. In
contrast there was respective growth of 28 percent and 67 percent in the number of
state and federal prisoners held in private facilities. As a result, the combined
population of privately-held ICE and USMS detainees nearly equaled the number of
federal prisoners in private facilities in 2010.
Prisoners and Detainees Held by Private Prison Companies 30, 31, 32
2002

2010

Change (2002-2010)

State Prisons

73,497

94,365

+28%

Federal Prisons

20,274

33,830

+67%

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

4,841

14,814

+206%

U.S. Marshals Service

4,061

17,154

+322%

Prisoners

Detainees

5

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

ICE’s Use of Privatization
Documents obtained from ICE by request trace the average daily population of its
detainees since 2002, and show that a daily average of 18,627 immigrants were held
in publicly operated facilities in January, 2012. This represents a 26 percent increase
in the average daily population from 2002 to 2012. In contrast, the number of
privately-held immigrants grew by 188 percent to 13,927 detainees during this time.
ICE Average Daily Population, 2002-2012 33
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
Private
15,000

Public

10,000
5,000
0
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Forty-three percent of all immigrant detainees are being held privately in 2012,
representing a slight decrease compared to 48 percent in 2009 and 2010. However,
this is still a marked increase compared to 2002, when 25 percent of detainees were
held by for-profit companies. 34 In addition, ICE seems prepared to primarily rely on
private companies to address concerns raised by advocacy groups over the
conditions under which immigrant detainees are held (see box below).
The growth in ICE’s use of private detention helped buoy profits for prison
companies faced with slowing growth in state prisoners, and contributed to the
market’s annual grosses of about $5 billion. 35 In 2011, contracts with ICE accounted
for 20 and 14 percent of revenue for CCA 36 and the GEO Group, respectively. 37

6

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

ICE will remain a lucrative target for private prison companies, as Congress
increased funding for Detention and Removal by over $184 million to $2.75 billion
for FY 2012. 38 This came in spite of a decrease in overall funding for the
Department of Homeland Security and record low levels of illegal crossings on the
U.S. Southwest border. 39
“Reforming” Through Privatization
Like prisoners, people held in detention centers are deprived of their liberty.
However, they are not being detained as punishment for committing crimes, but to
assure they appear at court proceedings. ICE has received severe criticism for
holding immigrants in penal institutions, providing grossly inadequate medical care,
abuses, and violations of human rights. As part of its reform efforts, ICE has begun
to use new “civil detention” facilities, and hopes to ultimately utilize 4,622 new civil
detention beds. These facilities will allow more unescorted movement, contact
visitations, and improved recreational opportunities. 40
The majority of the active and planned facilities will be privately operated, including:
 The Adelanto Detention Center: A 1,300 bed facility operated by the GEO
Group in Adelanto California. 41
 Delaney Hall: Located in Newark, New Jersey, it holds 450 ICE detainees and is
operated by Community Education Centers. 42
 Karnes County Civil Detention Center: A 608-bed GEO Group-operated facility
opened in Karnes City, Texas in March of 2012. 43
 Crete, Illinois: A contract with CCA to build and operate a 788-bed facility faced
stiff opposition by the community, 44 including the state senate voting to prohibit forprofit companies from operating detention centers. 45 In June 2012 the town’s
trustees rejected the plan, 46 but ICE plans to find a new location for the facility. 47
 Southwest Ranches, Florida: ICE contracted with CCA to build a 1,500-bed
facility. The plan resulted in CCA and the neighboring town of Pembroke Pines
suing each other over its construction 48 and the Pembroke Pine city commissioners
threatening to cut off services to the facility if it was completed. 49 ICE decided to
cancel the planned facility in June 2012. 50
U.S. Marshals Service and Private Detention
Between 2000 and 2011 the total USMS detainee population increased 81 percent,
with most of the expansion taking place in private facilities. During this period the

7

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

number of privately-held detainees increased by nearly 606 percent, while the
number held in publicly-operated facilities grew by 32 percent. As a result, 30
percent of USMS’ detainees were held by private companies in 2011, compared to
seven percent in 2000. 51
USMS Average Daily Population, 2000-2011 52
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
Private
30,000

Public

20,000
10,000
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

The increasing number of USMS detainees was accompanied by rising costs for the
federal government. In 2011, USMS paid an average per diem of $68.70 per detainee
to state and local governments, while the average cost for USMS to directly contract
with private prison companies was $90.62. Intergovernmental agreement passthroughs, in which USMS contracts with state or local governments that then
subcontract with private companies, cost USMS an average per diem of $54.37. 53
Many factors, including the health and security level of detainees and the location of
facilities affect expenditures in ways that make comparing the cost of prisons and
detention facilities complicated. 54 For example, one possible reason for the relatively
low cost of USMS’ intergovernmental agreement pass-through contracts could be
that the facilities are located in areas with lower costs of living. 55

8

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

A T A N G L E D W E B O F F A C I L I T I E S 56
ICE and USMS detainees are held in an assortment of federal, state, local, and
private facilities spread throughout the country. The private facilities are operated by
many of the same companies that own and manage private prisons, and it is
common for these facilities to house detainees for ICE and USMS alongside persons
sentenced for criminal convictions. For example, the CCA-operated Torrance
County Detention Facility in New Mexico currently houses USMS and ICE
detainees, as well as inmates from several counties in New Mexico. 57
ICE Contract Facilities
ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Detention Management
Division lists 253 facilities that can hold detainees. The facilities have average daily
detainee populations (ADP) ranging from zero to 1,695. Of these facilities, at least
46 are privately operated. Moreover, 62 percent of the 50 facilities with the largest
detainee populations are privately operated, including eight of the top ten. In
addition, 14 states contain at least one private and at least one public facility, and in
over 70 percent of these cases it is a private facility that holds the largest number of
ICE detainees. 58
ERO’s list, however, was incomplete and represented one of several instances in
which ICE proved to have issues with transparency and providing complete
information. Part of the problem in obtaining a complete list of the facilities ICE
uses to detain people stems from the number of facilities and the complexity of its
contractual agreements. ICE holds individuals in its own facilities and also contracts
directly with for-profit companies. ICE detainees are also held by other federal
agencies, as well as by state and local governments through interagency agreements.
In turn, some of these entities subcontract with private companies for detention
beds.
ICE’s method of classifying facilities adds to the difficulty in identifying where all of
the agency’s detainees are held. The most recent list of facilities provided by ICE in
response to requests for information on its privately-operated facilities stated that it
“does not include ERO Juvenile, Family, Residential, BOP, ORR [Office of Refugee
Resettlement], Holding, Staging, or Other facilities.” 59 Accordingly, this omits

9

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

facilities like the publicly-operated Berks Family Residential Center in Pennsylvania
and the CCA-owned and operated T. Don Hutto Residential Center in Texas, which
only houses adult women. 60 An ICE official stated that a Freedom of Information
Request would need to be submitted to receive information on the facilities omitted
from the list.
The last list ERO provided followed three similarly inconsistent and incomplete lists
provided by ICE over a six-month period. While each list was an improvement over
the previous, all three were missing facilities included on ICE’s website 61 and on the
websites of private prison companies. Facilities omitted from the list were also
identified by directly contacting facilities and asking whether they hold ICE
detainees.
Individual ICE staffers were also sometimes unreliable or ill-informed sources of
information, with some refusing to confirm whether facilities were operated by
private companies. On one occasion an ICE employee reported that a facility did not
exist, only to be contradicted by a representative from the contracted company.
ICE was also slow in responding to information requests when compared to USMS.
For example, it took USMS only two days to compile a list of 2,000 plus facilities in
which it can hold detainees, while ICE never provided a complete and accurate list
of facilities even after months of requesting information and despite the fact that
ICE uses substantially fewer facilities.
The companies that operate facilities housing detainees were also sometimes far
from forthcoming about which facilities, if any, they operate for ICE. Detention
Management Services, for example, repeatedly refused to comment on whether they
manage any facilities other than the Irwin County Detention Center in Georgia.
Similarly, a representative from another company confirmed the operation of one
facility, but would not say where another of their detention centers was located.
Instead, the individual provided clues and only confirmed the location after it was
correctly guessed.

10

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

Based on information gathered from ICE, private prison companies, and individual
prisons and facilities over a six-month period, our best estimation is that there are no
less than 261 ICE-authorized facilities, with at least one facility in every state other
than Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, and Rhode Island (Appendix A). A
minimum of 48 of these facilities are privately managed, including facilities in Puerto
Rico and Cuba operated by MVM, Inc. 62
ICE-Approved Public and Private Facility Characteristics 63
Facility Type

Number of Facilities

ADP Range 64

Median ADP

Public

215

0 – 771

5

Private

48

0 – 1,695

342

Half of ICE’s private facilities are operated by CCA and the GEO Group, with CCA
operating 13 and the GEO Group managing 11. Smaller companies, including
Emerald Companies, Community Education Centers, LCS Corrections Services Inc.,
Management & Training Corporation, LaSalle Corrections, AKAL Security, MVM,
Inc., and Asset Protection and Security SVC LP each operate two to four ICEcontracted facilities. Other companies, including Paladin Eastside Psychological
Services, Ahtna Technical Services, Valley-Metro Barbosa Group, Detention
Management LLC, and ICA-Farmville operate a single ICE-contracted facility.
USMS Contract Facilities
A list of active USMS facilities is available online through the Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee (OFDT). It shows that USMS detainees are held in a collection of
767 federal, state, local, and private facilities spread over all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. However, like data
received from ICE, this information is incomplete. 65
This is due partly to OFDT being reliant on USMS for data, which can lead to delays
in updating information. OFDT’s reporting practices also cloud matters, such as
when OFDT groups multiple nearby detention centers operated by the same
company together under a single facility title. 66 Another contributing factor is the
decentralized nature of intergovernmental agreement (IGA) pass-throughs, in which
USMS contracts with state or local governments that then subcontract with private

11

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

companies. “Sometimes we don’t actually know who’s providing services,” said one
federal detention official while discussing the complexities associated with IGA passthroughs. 67
Directly contacting USMS resulted in a series of documents listing the active and
inactive facilities with which USMS has contracts. In total, these documents show
that USMS has contracts to hold detainees in over 2,500 different facilities, but that
there were only 739 facilities actually holding detainees in June 2012.68 Of these
facilities, at least 48 are privately-operated, representing less than seven percent of
the total active facilities. Private USMS-contracted facilities are located in 17 states,
each of which also contains multiple active publicly-operated facilities. In the
majority of instances it is a private facility that holds the largest number of USMS
detainees in those states. Private facilities also make up 25 of the 50 facilities holding
the most detainees nationwide, including six of the top ten. 69
Active USMS Approved Public and Private Facility Characteristics 70
Facility Type

Number of Facilities

ADP Range

Median ADP

Public

691

1 - 1,970

18

Private

48

2 - 6,119

303

More than half (52 percent) of the private facilities actively utilized by USMS are
operated by CCA and the GEO Group, with CCA operating 15 facilities, and the
GEO Group managing 10. Contracts with USMS accounted for 16 percent of CCA’s
2011 revenue, 71 and 19 percent of the GEO Group’s. 72 Community Education
Centers has the third largest amount of USMS contracts with 8, while Emerald
Companies, LCS Corrections Services Inc., LaSalle Corrections, and Management &
Training Corporation manage between two and four facilities each. Valley-Metro
Barbosa Group and Jail Solutions operate a single facility. Detention Management
LLC operates at least one USMS detention center that also holds ICE detainees, 73
but the company repeatedly refused to state whether it operates any additional
facilities.

12

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

THE FAILINGS OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES
In the 1980s privatization offered a seemingly effective solution to the problem of
rapidly rising inmate populations. However, multiple reports, including The
Sentencing Project’s Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in America, have found that
private prison companies have failed to provide services comparable to publiclyoperated prisons, have an incentive to promote policies that continue America’s
reliance on mass incarceration, and oftentimes fail to provide promised financial
benefits through cost-savings and economic development. Although these findings
were specific to private prisons, the private prison and private detention industries
are dominated by the same companies, which often hold detainees and convicted
inmates in the same facilities. More importantly, these companies operate off of the
same business models employed in prison privatization that prioritize profits over
service and safety.
Quality of Service
Studies have found serious problems with the services and security provided by
private prison companies. 74, 75, 76 In particular, the emphasis on cutting costs to
ensure profits can lead to understaffing and employees with less training, lower pay
and benefits, 77 and higher turnover rates. 78 This has made cases of violence, abuse,
negligence, and substandard healthcare more common. 79
Similarly, there have been many accounts of abuses and substandard care in
privately-operated detention centers including reports of detainees being sexually
assaulted by staff members 80 and of detainees dying from substandard medical care.
In one case detention officials even conspired to send the body of a man who died
from lack of medical care back to Guinea in order to deter the man’s widow from
traveling to the U.S. and drawing attention to the death. 81
The American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia reported that private detention
facilities in that state have committed multiple human rights abuses. These include
coercing detainees into stipulating to charges resulting in them being deported
without court hearings, verbally and physically abusing detainees, failing to provide
sufficient legal aid and medical care, and forcing detainees to live in unhygienic
conditions. 82

13

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

A 2010 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
found that ICE failed to properly oversee local and state governments charged with
providing detention services, which could lead to abuse and discrimination. In
addition, the IACHR found itself “troubled by the frequent outsourcing of the
management and personal care of immigration detainees to private contractors.” 83
Political Impact
Private prison companies’ profits rely on a large prison population, 84 which provides
an incentive for private prison companies to lobby state and federal officials to
ensure a rising prison population and expanding privatization contracts. 85 At a time
when private prison companies are becoming further reliant on housing federal
detainees, there is also a strong incentive to promote policies that keep high numbers
of immigrants in detention. This focus on immigrant detainees is evidenced in the
millions of dollars CCA has spent on federal lobbying, particularly following the
creation of ICE in 2003.
CCA Federal Lobbying Expenditures, 2001-2011 86
$4,000,000
$3,500,000
$3,000,000
$2,500,000
$2,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,000,000
$500,000
$0
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

In 2011, CCA employed 37 federal lobbyists split between four different lobbying
firms and its own in-house lobbying team. CCA, and other private prison companies,
have lobbied the Department of Justice, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and

14

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

Customs Enforcement, the Office of Management and Budget, the U.S. House and
Senate, the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, the Department of Labor, the
Department of State, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Administration for
Children and Families. 87
Most often, lobbying disclosure forms show these efforts to be focused on
appropriations for BOP, USMS, and ICE, with a specific emphasis on funding for
contract facilities. CCA and the GEO Group’s lobbyists have also been involved in
immigration reform, as well as opposing efforts to have the Freedom of Information
Act apply to private prison companies. Other lobbying disclosure forms reveal little
more than that CCA spent tens of thousands of dollars lobbying on “issues related
to the private prison industry” and “corrections initiatives.” 88
Private prison companies have also been active in making contributions to state-level
officials involved in introducing harsh immigration laws. The primary sponsor of
Arizona’s controversial SB1070, former State Senator Russell Pearce, received
campaign contributions from the GEO Group 89 and Management & Training
Corporation. 90 The Supreme Court invalidated portions of SB1070 that would make
being in Arizona illegally a misdemeanor state crime, but let stand a section requiring
law enforcement officers to attempt to determine an individual's immigration status
during lawful stops, detention, arrest, or other “lawful contact” when there
is reasonable suspicion that the individual is an illegal immigrant. 91 Even its partial
implementation will lead to more immigrant detention, 92 as well as other problems. 93
In 2011, similar bills were passed in Utah and Georgia. In Utah, Management &
Training Corporation contributed $10,000 to Governor Gary Herbert, who signed
HB 497 into law in 2011. 94 CCA contributed funds to five out of the eight sponsors
of Georgia’s version of the law, HB 87, as well as to two of the three sponsors of a
bill that would require all jails in the state to comply with the Department of
Homeland Security’s Secure Communities Initiative. CCA also contributed $5,000 to
Georgia Governor Nathan Deal. 95

15

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

Financial Implications
Advocates for prison privatization often cite prison privatization’s cost-saving
benefits for governments and taxpayers. However, many of the more optimistic
financial predictions for private prisons have been based on analyses that employed
suspect methodologies. 96, 97 These include overestimating the cost of publicly-run
prisons 98 and failing to account for many private facilities only handling less
expensive and lower risk individuals. 99
Numerous researchers have instead found that private prison companies cannot
guarantee significant cost savings, and that any resultant savings tend to be minimal
at best. 100 In 1996 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that the
cost comparisons it reviewed did “not offer substantial evidence that savings have
occurred” through privatization, 101 while a 2004 meta-analysis at the University of
Utah found private contracting to be “questionable.” 102 Other studies, including ones
done by the states of Arizona and Michigan have found private facilities to be less
cost-effective than publicly-run facilities. 103, 104
In addition, the construction of private prisons often fails to spur economic activity
and growth for the communities housing them, and can instead cause financial
havoc. 105 For example, Ocilla County, Georgia issued $55 million in tax-exempt
bonds to fund the expansion of the Ocilla County Detention Center in 2007. The
facility would be owned by a company called Municipal Corrections and would
eventually be operated by Detention Management Services. The County hoped that
the project would create jobs and generate tax revenue by housing ICE detainees,
but by 2012 little more than half of the 1,201 beds were filled. Municipal Corrections
was forced into bankruptcy, the bonds were in default, and the county was owed
$1.6 million. 106

16

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

CONCLUSION
The well-documented shortcomings of private prison companies warrant a serious
assessment of detention privatization, but the dramatic growth in ICE and USMS’
use of private detention, particularly for housing immigration detainees, has not been
met with the same breadth of inquiry. Little to no independent research is available
on USMS detention, and ICE is at times unable or unwilling to provide complete
and reliable information on its detainees and facilities. This lack of research and
transparency makes it difficult, if not impossible, to fully understand the implications
of ICE and USMS’ use of private detention.
The companies with which ICE and USMS contract, including CCA and the GEO
Group, are largely the same ones that have been criticized for their handling of
prison operations. More importantly, these companies operate off of the same
business models employed in prison privatization that have led to understaffing,
negligence, and abuse. 107, 108, 109 In addition to harming those housed in contract
facilities, private prison companies fail to save taxpayers money, can have a
deleterious financial effect on communities, 110 and contribute to the continuation of
America’s use of mass incarceration and detention. 111, 112 These private companies
operate within complex and sometimes opaque systems where public and private
officials cannot clearly answer questions and where the private companies managing
federal detainees are not subject to Freedom of Information requests. 113
There are few signs of a slowdown in ICE and USMS’ commitment to contracting
with for-profit companies. New facilities are slated to be built and the private prison
industry is reaping the profits. Millions of dollars of these funds will be funneled
back into the political system to promote policies to assure there will be large
numbers of detainees to bolster companies’ profits.
More transparency and comprehensive oversight is needed to know where, by
whom, and under what conditions people are being detained, and who is profiting
from privatized detention. Yet, that would not address the fact that private
detention, and prison privatization as a whole, is built to fail. It operates off of a
structure where individuals are treated as commodities, and where profit, rather than
public safety, is the bottom line. This incentive structure may benefit the owners of

17

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

private companies, but it is not in the best interest of the detainees, the contracting
agencies, or the general public.

1 Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M., & Sabol, W.J. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
2 Mason, C. (2012). Too good to be true: Private prisons in America. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.
Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf
3 Sabol, W.J., West, H.C., & Cooper, M. (2009). Prisoners in 2008. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf; Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M., &
Sabol, W.J. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
4 Enforcement and Removal Operations, Detention Management Division. (2012). ICE private detention facilities.
Received January 19, 2012 from Lindsey Cole, Outreach Coordinator, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.;
Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Average daily population. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/population.htm
5 U.S. Department on Homeland Security, ICE. Overview. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/
6 Epstein, R. & Acer, E. (2011). Jails and jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. immigration detention system – A two-year
review. Washington, DC and New York, NY: Human Rights First. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf
7 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Enforcement and Removal Operations. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/enforcement-removal-operations/
8 Ibid
9 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (2010). Report on immigration in the United States: Detention and
due process. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/docs/pdf/Migrants2011.pdf
10 Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics. (2011). Immigration enforcement actions:
2010. Retrieved May 30, 2012 from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar2010.pdf
11 U.S. Marshals Service. History – Broad range of authority. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.usmarshals.gov/history/broad_range.htm
12 U.S. Marshals Service. Overview of the U.S. Marshals Service. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/general-2011.html
13 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Prisoner bookings. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/prisoner.htm
14 U.S. Department of Justice. Immigration violations – Passport and visa violations. Retrieved June 4, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/73mcrm.htm
15 Motivans, M. (2011). Federal Justice Statistics, 2009. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved May
15, 2012, from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf
16 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Time in detention. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/detention.htm
17 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Prisoner bookings. Retrieved May 31, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/prisoner.htm
18 Buentello, T., Carswell, S.V., Hudson, N., & Libal, B. (2010). Operation Streamline: Drowning justice and draining
dollars along the Rio Grande. Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership. Retrieved June 1, 2012 from
http://grassrootsleadership.org/OperationStreamline/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Operation-Streamline-GreenPaper.pdf
19 American Civil Liberties Union & National Immigration Forum. (2009). Operation Streamline factsheet. Retrieved
June 5, 2012 from http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/OperationStreamlineFactsheet.pdf
20 Buentello, T., Carswell, S.V., Hudson, N., & Libal, B. (2010). Operation Streamline: Drowning justice and draining
dollars along the Rio Grande. Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership. Retrieved June 1, 2012 from
http://grassrootsleadership.org/OperationStreamline/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Operation-Streamline-GreenPaper.pdf
21 Bennet, D. Spokesperson, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (personal communication, May 30, 2012).
22 Buentello, T., Carswell, S.V., Hudson, N., & Libal, B. (2010). Operation Streamline: Drowning justice and draining
dollars along the Rio Grande. Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership. Retrieved June 1, 2012 from
http://grassrootsleadership.org/OperationStreamline/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Operation-Streamline-GreenPaper.pdf
23 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Prisoner bookings. Retrieved May 31, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/prisoner.htm
24 United States Border Patrol. (2012). Nationwide illegal alien apprehensions fiscals years 1925-2011. Retrieved
May 31, 2012 from
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/25_10_app_stats.ctt/25_11
_app_stats.pdf

18

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

25 Motivans, M. (2012). Immigration offenders in the federal justice system, 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice
Statistics. Retrieved July 18, 2012 from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/iofjs10.pdf
26 The GEO Group. Historic milestones. Retrieved April 4, 2012 from: http://www.thegeogroupinc.com/history.html
27 Corrections Corporation of America. A quarter century of service to America. Retrieved April 4, 2012 from:
http://www.cca.com/about/cca-history/
28 Privatization of Prisons. The evolution and scope of prison privatization. Retrieved March 28, 2012, from
http://privatizationofprisons.com/
29 McDonald, D.C. (1992). Private Penal Institutions. Crime and Justice, 16, 361-419.
30 Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2003). Prisoners in 2002. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved May
15, 2012, from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p02.pdf; ; Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M., & Sabol, W.J. (2011).
Prisoners in 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
31 Enforcement and Removal Operations, Detention Management Division. (2012). ICE private detention facilities.
Received January 19, 2012 from Lindsey Cole, Outreach Coordinator, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
32 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Average daily population. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/population.htm
33 Ibid
34 Enforcement and Removal Operations, Detention Management Division. (2012). ICE private detention facilities.
Received January 19, 2012 from Lindsey Cole, Outreach Coordinator, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
35 Wood, G. (2011, March 25). A boom behind bars. Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42197813/ns/business-us_business/t/boom-behind-bars/#.Tyq0FcVSQ1M
36 Corrections Corporation of America. (2012). 2011 annual report on form 10-K. Nashville, TN: Author. Retrieved
May 15, 2012, from http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDMyMjg1fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
37 The GEO Group. (2012). 2011 annual report. Boca Raton, FL: Author. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/36159R/20120302/AR_120114/
38 National Immigration Forum. (2011). The math of immigration detention: Runaway costs for immigration detention
do not add up to sensible policies. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetention.pdf
39 National Immigration Forum. (2012). FY 2012 Homeland Security appropriations. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2012/FY12_DHS_Appropriations_Summary.pdf
40 Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2010, March 13). ICE opens its first-ever designed-and-built civil
detention center. Retrieved June 7, 2012 from http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1203/120313karnescity.htm
41 The GEO Group. (2011, June 1). The GEO Group announces contract for 1,300-bed detention facility in California.
Retrieved May 15, 2012 from http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=91331&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1569532&highlight=
42 Eustachewich, L. (2011, December 15). Essex County freeholders approve immigration detention center. Newark
Patch. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://newarknj.patch.com/articles/essex-county-freeholders-awardimmigration-detention-contract
43 Bennett, B. (2012, March 17). A kinder, gentler immigrant detention center. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved May 15,
2012, from http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/17/nation/la-na-detention-salad-bar-20120318
44 Rhodes, D. (2012, March 11). More details on Crete detention center. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved May 15, 2012,
from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-03-11/news/ct-met-crete-detention-center-031120120311_1_detention-center-detainees-law-library
45 Kadner, P. (2012, March 29). Kadner: Senate passes bill to kill Crete detention center. Southtown Star. Retrieved
May 15, 2012, from http://southtownstar.suntimes.com/news/kadner/11580125-452/kadner-senate-passes-billto-kill-crete-detention-center.html
46 Nix, N. (2012, June 12). Crete withdraws from detention center consideration. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved June 12,
2012 from http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-crete-withdraws-from-detention-centerconsideration-20120611,0,2788393.story
47 The Associated Press. (2012, June 13). Chicago suburb rejects immigrant detention center. Retrieved June 19,
2012 from http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-06/D9VC90JG0.htm
48 Barkhurst, A. (2012, March 22). Pembroke Pines sues private prison company. Sun Sentinel. Retrieved May 15,
2012, from http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-03-22/news/fl-pembroke-pines-sues-cca-20120322_1_cca-landwater-and-sewer-detention-center
49 Chang, D. (2012, March 6). Pines to consider cutting water, sewer to propose ICE facility. The Miami Herald.
Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/03/06/2679411/pines-to-consider-cuttingwater.html
50 Chang, D. & Vasquez, M. (2012, June 15). ICE pulls plug on immigration detention center in Southwest Ranches.
The Miami Herald. Retrieved June 18, 2012 from http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/15/2851928/ice-pullsplug-on-immigration.html
51 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Average daily population. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/population.htm
52 Ibid

19

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

53 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Per diem paid. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/perdiem-paid.htm
54 Gaes, G. (2008). Cost, performance studies look at prison privatization. National Institute of Justice Journal, 259,
32-36. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/221507.pdf
55 Scalia, J. Statistician, Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (personal communication, April 19, 2012).
56 Dozens of prisons, detention facilities, prison companies, and federal agencies were contacted over several
months via email and phone in order to construct an idea of how many detention facilities exist in the United States,
and what companies are operating them. These organizations and agencies include, but are not limited to,
Corrections Corporation of America, The GEO Group, Community Education Centers, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
and the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
57 Corrections Corporation of America. Torrance County Detention Facility. Retrieved May 9, 2012 from
http://www.cca.com/facility/torrance-county-detention-facility/
58 Enforcement and Removal Operations, Detention Management Division. (2012). Authorized facility list. Obtained
by request from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on July 5, 2012.
59 Ibid
60 McNulty, C. Deputy Public Advocate, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (personal communication, June 1,
2012).
61 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. ICE facility locator. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities/
62 Immigration and Customs Enforcement official (personal communication, April 9, 2012); MVM, Inc. representative.
(personal communication, April 9, 2012)
63 Ibid
64 Average Daily Population (ADP) range and median only apply to facilities listed by Immigration Customs
Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations and do not include facilities identified through other means.
65 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Location of prisoners held. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/prisoner-location.htm
66 Morgan, J. Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (personal communication, May 17, 2012).
67 Day, K.A. General Counsel, Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (personal communication, June 5, 2012).
68 Hildebrand, J. Acting Chief Detention Operations, U.S. Marshals Service. (personal communication, June 5, 2012).
69 United State Marshals Service. (2012). USMS facility status profiles by judicial district. Retrieved from Jack
Hildebrand, Chief Detention Operations (Acting), Prisoner Operations Division, U.S. Marshals Service, on June 8, 2012
and June 22, 2012.
70 Ibid
71 Corrections Corporation of America. (2012). 2011 annual report on form 10-K. Nashville, TN: Author. Retrieved
May 15, 2012, from http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDMyMjg1fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
72 The GEO Group. (2012). 2011 annual report. Boca Raton, FL: Author. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/36159R/20120302/AR_120114/
73 Office of the Federal Detention Trustee. (2012). Location of prisoners held. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/prisoner-location.htm
74 Ibid
75 Camp, S.D. & Gaes, G.G. (2001). Growth and quality of U.S. private prisons: Evidence from a national survey.
Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
76 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost
effectiveness and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, 383-395.
76 Brumfield, P. (2011, May). Walnut Grove called “the depths of hell.” NEMS Daily Journal. Retrieved May 15, 2012,
from http://www.nems360.com/view/full_story/13303052/article-Walnut-Grove-called-%E2%80%98the-depths-ofhell%E2%80%99?instance=secondary_stories_left_column
77 Blakely, C.R. & Bumphus, V.W. (2004). Private and public sector prisons—a comparison of select characteristics.
Federal Probation, 68, 27-31. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4144/is_200406/ai_n9446513/
78 Camp, S.D. & Gaes, G.G. (2001). Growth and quality of U.S. private prisons: Evidence from a national survey.
Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
79 Mattera, P., Khan, M., & Nathan, S. (2003). Corrections Corporation of America: A critical look at its first twenty
years. Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/_publications/CCAAnniversaryReport.pdf
80 U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas. (2011, September 7). Former T. Don
Hutto Correctional Center employee pleads guilty to civil rights charges. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.justice.gov/usao/txw/press_releases/2011/Dunn_plea.pdf
81 Bernstein, N. (2010, January 10). Officials obscured truth of migrant deaths in jail. The New York Times. Retrieved
May 15, 2012, from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/us/10detain.html?pagewanted=all

20

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

82 Cole, A. (2012). Prisoners of profit: Immigrants and detention in Georgia. Atlanta, GA: American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Georgia. Retrieved May 18, 2012 from http://www.acluga.org/Prisoners_of_Profit.pdf
83 Ibid
84 Corrections Corporation of America. (2011). 2010 annual report on form 10-K. Nashville, TN: Author. Retrieved
May 15, 2012, from http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDMyMjg1fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
85 Kirkham, C. (2012, February 14). Private prison corporation offers cash in exchange for state prisons. The
Huffington Post. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/private-prisons-buyingstate-prisons_n_1272143.html
86 Senate Office of Public Records. Lobbying Disclosure Act database. Retrieved May 18, 2012 from
http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=chooseFields&reset=1
87 Ibid
88 Ibid
89 GEO Group noteworthy contributor summary from the National Institute on Money in State Politics’
followthemoney.org. Retrieved June 8, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=1096&y=0
90 Management & Training Corporation noteworthy contributor summary from the National Institute on Money in State
Politics’ followthemoney.org. Retrieved June 8, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=13897&y=0
91 State of Arizona Senate. (49th Legislature, 2nd session, 2010). SB 1070. Retrieved June 8, 2012 from
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf
92 Detention Watch Network. Detention and deportation consequences of Arizona immigration law (SB 1070).
Retrieved June 8, 2012 from http://detentionwatchnetwork.org/SB1070_Talking_Points
93 Esquivel, P. & Glionna, J.M. (2012, June 26). Arizona police see immigration law as enforcement headache. Los
Angeles Times. Retrieved June 26, 2012 from: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-arizonaenforce-20120626,0,2658367.story
94 Management & Training Corporation noteworthy contributor summary from the National Institute on Money in State
Politics’ followthemoney.org. Retrieved June 8, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=13897&y=0
95 Corrections Corp of America noteworthy contributor summary from the National Institute on Money in State Politics’
followthemoney.org. Retrieved June 8, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0
96 Sloane, D.M., Alexander, D.P., Stolz, B.A., Rabinowitz, B.I., Williams, P.V., Hamilton, G.R., Burton, D.R., Boyles, S.D.,
& Svoboda, D.B. (1996). Private and public prisons: studies comparing operational costs and/or quality of service.
Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, General Government Division. Retrieved May 15, 2012,
from http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf
97 Gaes, G. (2008). Cost, performance studies look at prison privatization. National Institute of Justice Journal, 259,
32-36. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/221507.pdf
98 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for sale: Understand prison costs & savings. Cleveland, OH: Policy Matters Ohio. Retrieved
May 15, 2012, from http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/CellsForSale2011.pdf
99 Blakely, C.R. & Bumphus, V.W. (2004). Private and public sector prisons—a comparison of select characteristics.
Federal Probation, 68, 27-31. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4144/is_200406/ai_n9446513/
100 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost
effectiveness and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, 383-395.
101 Sloane, D.M., Alexander, D.P., Stolz, B.A., Rabinowitz, B.I., Williams, P.V., Hamilton, G.R., Burton, D.R., Boyles, S.D.,
& Svoboda, D.B. (1996). Private and public prisons: studies comparing operational costs and/or quality of service.
Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, General Government Division. Retrieved May 18, 2012,
from http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf
102 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost
effectiveness and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, 383-395.
103 Ryan, L.C. (2011). FY 2010 operating per capita cost report: Cost identification and comparison of state and
private contract beds. Arizona: Arizona Department of Corrections, Bureau of Planning, Budget, and Research.
Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://www.azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/ADC_FY2010_PerCapitaRep.pdf
104 McTavish, T.A. (2005). Audit report: Performance audit of the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility. Lansing, MI:
Michigan Office of the Auditor General. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://audgen.michigan.gov/comprpt/docs/r4728004.pdf
105 Hooks, G., Mosher, C., Genter, S., Rotolo, T., & Lobao, L. (2010). Revisiting the impact of prison building on job
growth: Education, incarceration, and county-level employment, 1976-2004. Social Science Quarterly, 91, 229-244.
106 Redmon, J. (2012, April 23). ICE detention center struggling financially. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved
May 15, 2012, from http://www.ajc.com/news/ice-detention-center-struggling-1424001.html
107 Blakely, C.R. & Bumphus, V.W. (2004). Private and public sector prisons—a comparison of selected
characteristics. Federal Probation, 68, 27-33. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2004-06/prisons.html

21

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

Camp, S.D. & Gaes, G.G. (2001). Growth and quality of U.S. private prisons: Evidence from a national survey.
Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
109 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost
effectiveness and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, 383-395.
110 Newkirk, M. (2012, March 22). Small-town lockups without prisoners sends bonds into default. Bloomberg
Businessweek. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-22/small-townlockups-without-prisoners-send-bonds-into-default
111 Mason, C. (2012). Too good to be true: Private prisons in America. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.
Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf
112 Kirkham, C. (2012, February 14). Private prison corporation offers cash in exchange for state prisons. The
Huffington Post. Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/private-prisons-buyingstate-prisons_n_1272143.html
113 Berger, V. (2012, April 9). Jump off the private prison bandwagon. The National Law Journal. Retrieved May 15,
2012, from
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202548225606&Jump_off_the_private_prison_bandwagon&slre
turn=1
108

22

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

APPENDIX A
ICE-Approved Private Facilities
Facility

City

State

ADP

Operator

Adelanto Detention Facility

Adelanto

CA

536

The GEO Group, Inc.

Alhambra City Jail

Alhambra

CA

0

The GEO Group, Inc.

Broward Transitional Center

Pompano Beach

FL

644

The GEO Group, Inc.

Buffalo (Batavia) Service Processing Center

Batavia

NY

435

Valley-Metro Barbosa Group

Burnet County Jail

Burnet

TX

0

California City Correctional Center

California City

CA

119

Corrections Corporation of America

Central Arizona Detention Center

Florence

AZ

73

Corrections Corporation of America

Delaney Hall Detention Facility

Newark

NJ

332

Corrections Corporation of America

Denver Contract Detention Facility

Aurora

CO

397

The GEO Group, Inc.

East Hidalgo Detention Center

La Villa

TX

264

LCS Corrections Services, Inc.

El Centro Service Processing Center

El Centro

CA

392

Asset Protection and Security SVC LP

El Paso Service Processing Center

El Paso

TX

559

AKAL Security

Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility

Elizabeth

NJ

246

Corrections Corporation of America

Eloy Federal Contract Facility

Eloy

AZ

1,494

Corrections Corporation of America

Florence Correctional Center

Florence

AZ

204

Corrections Corporation of America

Florence Service Processing Center

Florence

AZ

387

Asset Protection and Security SVC LP

Guantanamo Bay Migrant Operations Center

Guantanamo Bay

Cuba

Houston Contract Detention Facility

Houston

TX

879

Corrections Corporation of America

Immigration Centers of America Farmville

Farmville

VA

346

Immigration Centers of America

Irwin County Detention Center

Ocilla

GA

343

Detention Management Services

Jena/LaSalle Detention Facility

Jena

LA

893

The GEO Group, Inc.

Joe Corley Detention Facility

Conroe

TX

447

The GEO Group, Inc.

Johnson County Law Enforcement Center

Cleburne

TX

184

LaSalle Corrections

Karnes County Civil Detention Center

Karnes City

TX

169

The GEO Group, Inc.

Karnes County Correctional Center

Karnes City

TX

308

The GEO Group, Inc.

Krome North Service Processing Center

Miami

FL

575

AKAL Security

La Salle County Regional Detention Center

Encinal

TX

97

Laredo Processing Center

Laredo

TX

318

Limestone County Detention Center

Groesbeck

TX

0

North Georgia Detention Center

Gainesville

GA

342

Northwest Detention Center

Tacoma

WA

1,311

Otero County Prison Facility

Chaparral

NM

141

Management & Training Corporation

Otero County Processing Center

Chaparral

NM

701

Management & Training Corporation

Polk County Adult Detention Facility

Livingston

TX

783

Community Education Centers

130*

LaSalle Corrections

MVM, Inc.

Emerald Companies
Corrections Corporation of America
Community Education Centers
Corrections Corporation of America
The GEO Group, Inc.

23

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

ICE-Approved Private Facilities (continued)
Facility

City

State

ADP

Operator

Port Isabel Service Processing Center

Los Fresnos

TX

1,130

Ahtna Technical Services

Rolling Plains Detention Center

Haskell

TX

502

Emerald Companies

San Diego Contract Detention Facility

San Diego

CA

665

Corrections Corporation of America

San Juan Staging Facility

Guaynabo

PR

6

MVM, INC

San Luis Regional Detention Center

San Luis

AZ

0

Emerald Companies

South Louisiana Detention Center

Basile

LA

351

South Texas Detention Complex

Pearsall

TX

1,695

The GEO Group, Inc.

Stewart Detention Center

Lumpkin

GA

1,683

Corrections Corporation of America

T. Don Hutto Residential Center

Taylor

TX

512*

Corrections Corporation of America

Torrance County Detention Center

Estancia

NM

0

Corrections Corporation of America

Tri-County Jail

Ullin

IL

216

Val Verde Correctional Facility

Del Rio

TX

18

West Texas Detention Facility

Sierra Blanca

TX

6

Emerald Companies

Western Tennessee Detention Facility

Mason

TN

7

Corrections Corporation of America

LCS Corrections Services, Inc.

Paladin Eastside Psychological Services
The GEO Group, Inc.

* These numbers represent the total bed-capacity of the facility, and not the average daily population (ADP) of ICE detainees. These
facilities were not included in documents provided by ICE, and their bed-capacities cannot be compared to the ADPs provided by ICE
for other facilities. Bed-capacity numbers were retrieved on June 21, 2012 from the websites of Corrections Corporation of America
and The GEO Group.
Sources: Information was acquired over a six-month period through multiple requests made to ICE; as well as ICE’s website, the
websites and employees of Ahtna Technical Group, AKAL Security, Asset Protection and Security, Community Education Centers,
Corrections Corporation of America, Detention Management Services, Emerald Companies, The GEO Group, Immigration Centers of
America, Jail Solutions, LaSalle Corrections, LCS Corrections, Management & Training Corporation, MVM, Inc., Paladin Eastside
Psychological Services, and Valley-Metro Barbosa Group; and officials from dozens of prisons, detention facilities, and sheriffs’
offices.

24

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

APPENDIX B
Active USMS-Approved Private Facilities
Facility

City

State

ADP

Operator

Alhambra City Jail

Alhambra

CA

2

Bowie County Correctional Center

Texarkana

TX

147

Community Education Centers

Brooks County Detention Center

Falfurrias

TX

325

LCS Corrections Services, Inc.

Buffalo Federal Detention Facility

Batavia

NY

121

Valley-Metro Barbosa Group

Burnet County Jail

Burnet

TX

194

LaSalle Corrections

California City Correctional Center

California City

CA

1,395

Corrections Corporation of America

Central Arizona Detention Center

Florence

AZ

6,119

Corrections Corporation of America

Citrus County Detention Facility

Lecanto

FL

178

Corrections Corporation of America

Coastal Bend Detention Facility

Robstown

TX

556

LCS Corrections Services, Inc.

Correctional Treatment Facility

Washington

DC

98

Corrections Corporation of America

Crossroads Correctional Facility

Shelby

MT

92

Corrections Corporation of America

D. Ray James Prison

Folkston

GA

144

The GEO Group, Inc.

East Hidalgo Detention Center

La Villa

TX

827

LCS Corrections Services, Inc.

Ector County Correctional Center

Odessa

TX

208

Community Education Centers

Fannin County Detention Center

Bonham

TX

398

Community Education Centers

Grenada County Jail

Grenada

MS

6

IAH Adult Detention Facility

Livingston

TX

38

Community Education Centers

Irwin County Detention Center

Ocilla

GA

307

Detention Management Services

Joe Corley Detention Facility

Conroe

TX

497

The GEO Group, Inc.

Karnes County Correctional Center

Karnes City

TX

112

The GEO Group, Inc.

La Salle County Regional Detention Center

Encinal

TX

299

Emerald Companies

Leavenworth Detention Center

Leavenworth

KS

748

Corrections Corporation of America

Liberty County Jail

Liberty

TX

21

Community Education Centers

Lincoln County Detention Center

Carrizozo

NM

40

Emerald Companies

Marion County Jail

Indianapolis

IN

61

Corrections Corporation of America

Maverick County Detention Facility

Eagle Pass

TX

677

The GEO Group, Inc.

McLennan County/Jack Harwell Detention Facility

Waco

TX

126

Community Education Centers

Nevada Southern Detention Center

Pahrump

NV

697

Corrections Corporation of America

Northeast Ohio Correctional Center

Youngstown

OH

566

Corrections Corporation of America

Odessa Detention Center

Odessa

TX

83

Otero County Prison Facility

Chaparral

NM

809

Parker County Jail

Weatherford

TX

75

Community Education Centers

Perry County Detention Center

Uniontown

AL

53

LCS Corrections Services, Inc.

Queens Private Correctional Facility

Jamaica

NY

230

The GEO Group, Inc.

Jail Solutions

Community Education Centers
Management & Training Corporation

The GEO Group, Inc.

25

DOLLARS AND DETAINEES | THE GROWTH OF FOR-PROFIT DETENTION

Active USMS-Approved Private Facilities (continued)
Facility

City

State

ADP

Operator

Richland Parish Detention Center

Rayville

LA

12

LaSalle Corrections

Rio Grande Detention Center

Laredo

TX

1,253

The GEO Group, Inc.

Robert A. Deyton Detention Facility

Lovejoy

GA

441

The GEO Group, Inc.

San Diego (Otay Mesa) Correctional Facility

San Diego

CA

353

Corrections Corporation of America

San Luis Regional Detention and Support Center

San Luis

AZ

408

Emerald Companies

Silverdale Detention Facilities

Chattanooga

TN

90

Corrections Corporation of America

Torrance County Detention Center

Estancia

NM

716

Corrections Corporation of America

Val Verde Correctional Facility

Del Rio

TX

1,197

Webb County Detention Center

Laredo

TX

506

Corrections Corporation of America

West Texas Detention Facility

Sierra Blanca

TX

398

Emerald Companies

Western Region Detention Facility

San Diego

CA

723

The GEO Group, Inc.

Western Tennessee Detention Facility

Mason

TN

378

Corrections Corporation of America

Willacy County Regional Detention Facility

Raymondville

TX

582

Management & Training Corporation

Willacy County State Jail

Raymondville

TX

19

Corrections Corporation of America

The GEO Group, Inc.

Sources: Information was acquired over a six-month period through the United States Marshals Service, the Office of the Federal Detention
Trustee, the websites and employees of Ahtna Technical Group, AKAL Security, Asset Protection and Security, Community Education
Centers, Corrections Corporation of America, Detention Management Services, Emerald Companies, The GEO Group, Immigration Centers
of America, Jail Solutions, LaSalle Corrections, LCS Corrections, Management & Training Corporation, MVM, Inc., Paladin Eastside
Psychological Services, and Valley-Metro Barbosa Group, as well as officials from dozens of prisons, detention facilities, and sheriffs’
offices.

FURTHER READING AVAILABLE AT www.sentencingproject.org:
Too Good to be True: Private Prisons in America
Trends in U.S. Corrections
The State of Sentencing 2011: Developments in Policy and Practice
Sentencing Reforms Amid Mass Incarcerations – Guarded Optimism
On the Chopping Block: State Prison Closings