A Less Lethal Options Program for Seattle Police Department
A Report with Recommendations

submitted to R. Gil Kerlikowske, Chief of Police
submitted by The Force Options Research Group
A/C Clark Kimerer, Chief of Staff and Chair
Lt. Dave Clavedetscher
Sgt. Liz Eddy
Sgt. Paul McDonagh
Officer Jeff Geoghagan
Officer Clay Stockwell
Officer Steve Ward
Leo Poort
Mimi Walsh

September 2000
Table of Contents
Introduction | Executive Summary | FORG Approach and Activities
Legal and Training Issues in the Police Use of Force | FORG Recommendations

Appendix Information is Not Available Online
INTRODUCTION
This report describes a Seattle Police Department initiative to examine, acquire and deploy a "less lethal"
weapons and response capability.* The work supporting this initiative was undertaken following the
April 2000 incident that resulted in the death of a former mental patient, David Walker. The proposed
initiative will provide officers with alternatives to lethal force when circumstances warrant. At the outset,
a few words of introduction are needed to set the context and describe the purpose of this less lethal
initiative.
* "Less lethal" weapon is a tem of art that refers to weapons that are designed to temporarily disable or
stop a suspect without killing, thereby providing law enforcement and military personnel with an
alternative to lethal force (typically represented by a handgun or rifle). These weapons are less lethal in
the literal sense because none can be guaranteed to avoid fatalities.

Two points are important by way of context. First, society has done a poor job of addressing the needs of
persons with mental illness, particularly persons of limited means. Since the mid-1970s, when budget
constraints (rationalized by the doctrine of community treatment) dictated the release from institutions of
all but the most severely afflicted mental patients, it has become commonplace for individuals suffering
from observable mental problems to be left to wander unsupervised day to day through the streets of our
cities, often ending up homeless. Many of these individuals become the subject of law enforcement, either
as perpetrators of minor offenses or, more commonly, as victims of criminal conduct. Occasionally, these
individuals endanger their own lives or the lives of others in dramatic fashion.
The second point is that police, of necessity, have become the social agency of last resort for these
mentally disturbed individuals. Particularly when these individuals threaten the safety of themselves or
others, police must intervene to attempt to avert life-altering outcomes. In Seattle, during the last two
years (April through March 1998-2000), approximately 5,000 incidents per year have been cleared by
officers using one of the two MIR codes (220 or 221) that document incidents involving mentally
disturbed individuals. A smaller number of cases are cleared using codes that denote specific offenses,
such as assault. In total, between one and two percent of roughly 400,000 dispatched calls or on-view
events annually will involve mentally disturbed persons.
Against this backdrop, brought into sharp focus by public concerns and the police Firearms Review Board
inquiry surrounding the Walker incident - SPD initiated in late April 2000 an "objective and
comprehensive analysis of less lethal force options." Toward this end, Acting Chief of Police Herbert V.
Johnson constituted a small Force Options Research Group (FORG) to undertake the analysis. The
purpose of this work has been to provide officers with options for containing and/or defusing situations
involving mentally disturbed persons as humanely as possible, consistent with the need to ensure the
safety of citizens (third parties as well as the mentally disturbed person) and the officers involved.
By the end of the year 2001, the recommendations of the FORG presented below will yield significant
results bearing on the problem at hand, as follows:
*
CIT Trained Officers: Upwards of 200 Patrol officers (one quarter of the force) will received 40
hours of training in ways to handle the problems of mentally disturbed persons involved in police
incidents; these Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) officers typically seek peaceful ways to defuse potentially
dangerous situations.
*
Patrol Familiarization: Approximately half of all other Patrol officers will have attended
training to familiarize them with problems of the mentally ill, to give them basic skills for communicating
with these persons, and to orient them to situations in which it is appropriate to call for back up by CIT
trained officers. The balance of the Patrol force will receive this training by the end of 2002.
*
Less Lethal Weapons: 260 less-lethal weapons systems will be deployed in the hands of fully
trained officers (130 M26 Tasers and 130 Remington Beanbag Launchers); these systems may be
employed in situations where less lethal force is appropriate.
Bottom Line: These results will establish Seattle Police Department as a state-of-the-art police agency
thoroughly trained and familiarized with the problems of the mentally ill and equipped with less lethal
technologies for law enforcement and order maintenance.
Executive Summary
The SPD Force Options Research Group (FORG) was convened in April 2000, under the direction of
Chief of Staff Clark Kimerer. Its charge was to examine the state-of-the-art regarding less lethal force
options and their deployment by law enforcement agencies, and where appropriate, to make
recommendations to ensure that SPD is at the forefront in the training, deployment and use of such tactics
and munitions. Drawing on the knowledge and expertise of sworn and civilian employees from across the

Department, the FORG began meeting in early May. Since that time, FORG members have pursued an
aggressive work program, culminating in the following report.
The Report begins with a detailed discussion of the methodology, approach and activities of FORG
members. As the Report makes clear, FORG members have been engaged in a wide-ranging work
program. This work program has included review of relevant research literature, case and statutory law,
and training and operational information; contact with vendors and distributors of less lethal weapons and
devices; surveys of other law enforcement agencies concerning their training, equipment, and deployment
practices; testing of various less lethal options; and consultation with national experts on less lethal force
deployment.
Next the Report focuses on the key legal and training issues that shape the police use of force. Central
to this discussion is an understanding of and appreciation for, the following:
*
The legal authority of police officers to use force, including deadly force, to protect themselves
and/or others.

*
The concept of the continuum of force, which guides officers in the application of reasonable and
necessary force to resolve difficult situations with the least amount of risk of death or serious injury to all
involved.

*
The role of less lethal force options within the police response arsenal, not as a substitute for
deadly force, but as a supplement to it under appropriate conditions and circumstances.
*

How SPD trains and prepares officers to use force.

The Report next discusses recommendations to enhance the less lethal force options available to
Seattle police officers. The recommendations, include the following:

*
Expanded CIT training to include all patrol lieutenants and sergeants and to increase the number
of CIT trained patrol officers to ensure that at least one CIT-trained officer is available per squad per
watch on a 24x7 basis.
*
Provision for refresher and skill building training for CIT officers which would include
mandatory, annual classes.
*
Purchase and deployment of the M26 Taser to ensure that there is one Taser-qualified officer in
each patrol squad, on each watch, on a 24x7 basis and that patrol supervisors are trained and equipped to
use the M26 Taser.
*
Purchase and deployment of less lethal launchers using #23DS bean bag rounds to ensure that
there is one qualified bean bag officer per patrol sector squad and that Patrol supervisors are equipped
with less lethal bean bag kits.
*
Implementation of a training program for qualification and certification of officers in the use of
less lethal munitions to include a 4 hour training programs on both the M26 Taser and an 8 hour training
program on use of the #23DS bean bag rounds.

*
Provision for re-qualification and skill-building training on use of less lethal munitions to include
mandatory, annual re-certification.
*
Adoption of appropriate policy and directives governing the deployment of less lethal options and
documentation of their use.
*
Continuation of the FORG to oversee implementation of the less lethal program, to develop and
refine Department policy and directives, to review deployments of the less lethal options recommended
here, and to assess and recommend deployment expansions or new options for deployment.
Implementation costs for the recommended less lethal program are discussed at the end of the
recommendations section, along with estimated annual costs for program continuation. Also included is
the training timeline detailing the number of officers expected to complete CIT and less lethal weaponsrelated training.
The comprehensive program recommended here will result in approximately 50% of the SPD
Patrol force being trained or equipped with some form of less lethal weapon or crisis intervention
option by the end of 2001.
FORG Approach and Activities
Overview. In order to accomplish its objectives in a relatively short period of time, the FORG adopted
an approach consisting of the following: FORG members took on individual assignments in their areas of
expertise, the Group met regularly to report on progress and reassess or refocus efforts as necessary, and
the Group carefully documented all of its activities and all materials gathered and reviewed. Key aspects
of the FORG approach and activities are summarized here.
FORG Meetings. From the time it was created by Interim Police Chief Herbert Johnson in late April
2000 (see the letter from Chief Johnson to Mayor Schell announcing the creation of the Group, at
Appendix A), the FORG met regularly. Each of these meetings was documented as was the progress of
the FORG work program. Since the FORG represented a cross-section of skills and areas of expertise in
the Department, these meetings were an opportunity to learn from each other as well as from the results of
the assignments being carried out by each FORG member.
The FORG was also diligent in keeping others apprised of its work efforts and progress. In July 2000, for
example, FORG members briefed the Council Public Safety and Technology Committee on its activities
and likely schedule for completion of its work. At that time, it was estimated that FORG members had
already devoted approximately 1,200 hours of staff time to the Group’s work program.
Contact with other law enforcement agencies. In order to assess how SPD’s approach to less lethal
force options compares with other agencies, a telephone survey was conducted. The purpose of the survey
was to determine what special training in crisis intervention or other techniques is provided in those
agencies and what less lethal weapons or devices are provided to officers. The deployment patterns for
less lethal options were also documented for the agencies contacted. Twenty-five other departments were
contacted as a part of this survey and the findings are summarized in a chart found at Appendix B.
Convening of citizens less lethal options work group. When the FORG was initially created, the
suggestion was made that the Department should try to solicit the perspectives of community members as
less lethal force options were considered. In order to accomplish this objective, a Community Work
Group on Less Lethal Weapons Options was convened in June 2000. The work of this Citizens Group

was coordinated and facilitated by Director Harry Bailey of the Police/Community Partnership Program.
The Citizens Group operated independently of the FORG, but FORG members met with the Citizens
Group and provided information and demonstrations on request. In particular, the SWAT team members
of the FORG provided a formal demonstration of all the less lethal options currently available in SPD for
the Citizens Group. Crisis Intervention Training officers also met with the Group to explain and answer
questions about the CIT training program. A report from the Citizens Group is imminent and is expected
to be consistent with the recommendations contained in the FORG report.
Seminar attendance. In June 2000, three members of the FORG flew to Los Angeles to attend a two day
seminar on the state-of-the-art weapons and tactics for addressing crisis situations. All of the latest
weapons and technology were on display and vendor representatives and less lethal experts were available
to discuss their recommendations. As a result of this conference, the M26 Taser was identified as a
possible device for consideration by the FORG. A representative of Taser International later visited the
Seattle area and provided a demonstration for the SWAT team, leaving one M26 Taser for further use and
testing.
Expert consultation. In July 2000, Lt. Sid Heal of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office, an
internationally recognized expert on less lethal force options, flew to Seattle to meet with the FORG. Lt.
Heal described the approach he recommends in considering less lethal options and made concrete
suggestions for consideration by the FORG.
Other activities. Other activities undertaken by FORG members included review of research information
concerning police use of force and responses to it, demonstrations and tests of various less lethal devices
(it is estimated that 12-15 such devices were examined by the SWAT team), and contact with area experts
on crisis intervention techniques to identify additional resources for officer training. The results of all
these activities are to be found in the recommendations contained in this report.
FORG timeline of events and activities. Below is a chronology of the activities of the Force Options
Research Group. The FORG carefully documented all of its efforts and has catalogued the large amount
of information gathered. These materials are available for review.
4-28-00: Chief Herbert V. Johnson sent a confirmation memo to Mayor Paul Schell formally advising that
he had convened a Force Options Research Group (FORG) under the direction of Assistant Chief Clark
Kimerer. The memo noted the FORG assigned staff, their expertise, and their purpose of conducting an
exhaustive study, national in scope, of less lethal force options. In addition, their end product would
ensure that our Seattle Police policies and procedures, training curricula, and the laws concerning the
police use of force are summarized and available for review by the public.
5-2-00 FORG Meeting: In this initial FORG meeting, Assistant Chief Kimerer stressed the priority of the
project and outlined the Group purpose and the specific roles envisioned for each member. The intent was
to operate as a research team to document the legal, policy, training, equipment, and deployment options
available to law enforcement. The Group was not expected to produce a formal report, but rather to
provide a compilation of research and information. Lieutenant Clavadetscher was designated as the
official repository for the Group’s records.
5-19-00 FORG Meeting: Sergeant Eddy will attend a training program on crisis intervention techniques
and will gather information on training programs of other departments. Officers Ward and Stockwell
discussed tactics, deployment, and equipment and noted that the National Tactical Officers Association
(NTOA) keeps information on the field experiences of reporting agencies. Officer Geoghagan provided
portions of the lesson plans for the Basic Academy and the Officer Street Skills Class. Other members
discussed their progress to date.

5-30-00: Mimi Walsh submitted a 1996 and a 1999 Department of Justice study including summaries of
both to Lt. Clavadetscher.
6-2-00: Assistant Chief Kimerer submitted a copy of the Advanced Taser M26 literature.
6-5-00 FORG Meeting: Assistant Chief Kimerer announced that Director Harry Bailey, Seattle Police
Office of Police/Community Partnerships, is working with a community advisory group for police use of
force. Sergeant Paul McDonagh reported on deployment options used by other agencies around the nation
and on conversations he had with Seattle Police supervisors regarding Patrol needs. Sergeant Liz Eddy
discussed several issues related to Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training and deployment and submitted
a copy of her CIT training guide. Mimi Walsh discussed her research on police use of force studies. Other
members reviewed their progress on gathering information and gave Lt. Clavadetscher copies of materials
they had collected to date.
6-12-00: Officers Ward, Stockwell, and Geoghagan flew to Los Angeles for a two day seminar sponsored
by Jane’s, an organization internationally recognized for weapons expertise. The seminar, Unconventional
Weapons: The Response to Emerging Threats, examined a wide range of potential urban threats and the
state of the art weapons and tactics for addressing those threats.
6-29-00 FORG Meeting: Officers Ward, Stockwell, and Geoghagan reported on the unconventional
weapons seminar they attended in Los Angeles and noted that while there they had the opportunity to
meet with several national experts to discuss issues of interest to the Group. They reviewed what they
learned, confirmed that FORG was aware of all less lethal options presently available, and stated that the
experts seemed to agree that the Advanced Taser was a new weapon of high potential.
7-6-00: Officer Geoghagan submitted a detailed notebook on use of force policy, legal basis, training, and
accountability.
7-10-00: Officer Ward submitted a catalog documenting the less lethal weapons and munitions examined
by SWAT team members.
7-11-00: Rick Smith, President and CEO of Taser International, flew to Seattle and gave a presentation
and demonstration of the Advanced Taser M-26 at the Seattle Police Range. Several FORG members
attended including Swat Officer Steve Ward. Officer Ward was video taped first being subjected to an
earlier taser model with non-disabling results and then to the M26 which was immediately disabling.
7-12-00 FORG Meeting: Officer Ward demonstrated the M26 to the entire group and we reviewed the
previous day’s demonstration at the range. Officers Ward and Stockwell reported they had made a less
lethal options presentation to Director Bailey’s Citizens Community Advisory Group.
7-18-00: Mini Walsh submitted a copy of her summary of criteria for considering less lethal options.
7-19-00 FORG Meeting: We prepared for and gave a status presentation to the City Council Public Safety
and Technology Committee.
7-20-00 FORG Meeting: We arranged for Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office Lieutenant Sid Heal, an
internationally recognized expert on less lethal options for law enforcement, to fly to Seattle and address
our group. Our discussion covered the full range of less lethal options and included the following key
topics: 1) What less lethal options can and can’t do, 2) You can train at a higher level than you can
maintain, 3) Understanding and managing the risks with less lethal options, 4) A model deployment of

less lethal devices, 5) Technical issues with Extended Range Options, and 5) The Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Office Pilot Testing Model for Less Lethal Options
8-10-00: SWAT Officers Clay Stockwell and Steve Ward demonstrated the M26 Taser and numerous
other less lethal weapons to several FORG members and Director Bailey’s Citizens Community Advisory
Group in the Public Safety Building Gym.
8-30-00 FORG Meeting: It became clear that the Group’s efforts had become crystallized into a series of
concrete recommendations that could be presented in a formal report. The Group discussed budget
considerations and the final recommendations, format, and content of a final report. Responsibility for
each part of the report was assigned. Sergeant Eddy discussed planned CIT training. Officer Ward
reported and the Group discussed his detailed proposal for policy, deployment, and training for less lethal
weapons, including an intranet to document every use of weapons. Also included in this meeting was a
presentation of the draft recommendations of the Citizen Advisory Group, which expects to issue a report
about the same time as FORG.
8-31-00: Mimi Walsh submitted a copy of the 2001-2002 Seattle Police Department Budget Issue Paper
providing the rationale and estimated costs for a less lethal options program.
9-12-00 FORG Meeting: Final details of the draft report were determined and a review schedule
established.
Legal and Training Issues in the Police Use of Force
LEGAL BASIS FOR POLICE USE OF FORCE:
U.S. Constitution (Bill of Rights):
The first ten amendments specifically enumerate rights that safeguard a citizen’s liberties against
governmental intrusion. Police officers as agents of local government are empowered to make arrests
(AKA seizures/governmental intrusion). It’s the 4th Amendment that addresses these seizures.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The use of force against a citizen constitutes a seizure. Paraphrasing, in terms of the use of force, people
have the right to be secure against unreasonable seizures of their persons. Therefore, any force used by
police officers must be REASONABLE as per the U.S. Constitution.
Who decides what’s reasonable? Ultimately, both civilly and criminally, a judge or jury makes that
determination. To do that they use a balancing test called the OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS
STANDARD. The test consists of a citizen’s right to be secure against unreasonable seizures on one hand
and the need for government intrusion on those rights (law enforcement). In other words, the force used
by an officer must be balanced against the heinousness of a person’s activities and the threat they pose.
Constitutional Case Law:

Whereas the U.S. Constitution provides the framework, constitutional law serves to define this standard.
TENNESSEE v. GARNER is the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court applied this "reasonableness
standard" found in the 4th Amendment, to police use of force.
TENNESSEE v. GARNER, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
Memphis Police Officer Hymon shot and killed an unarmed fifteen-year-old burglar (Garner), who was
fleeing a residence. Hymon was "reasonably sure" that the suspect was unarmed. He stated that he shot to
prevent the suspect’s escape. The officer’s actions were justified under an existing Tennessee statute.
Garner’s father filed a lawsuit in Federal Court alleging various civil rights violations. The following are
the major points of the Supreme Court’s decision:
*
State statues that allowed the use of deadly force against non-dangerous fleeing felons were
unconstitutional.
*
The 4th Amendment’s "reasonableness" scrutiny is the appropriate measure for police use of
deadly force against non-dangerous fleeing felons.
*
Deadly force may be used if it is necessary to prevent the escape of a suspect AND the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to
the officer or others AND the officer gives a warning of imminent deadly force if possible. When deadly
force used in this manner it is REASONABLE.
The decision in TENNESSEE v. GARNER only addressed the use of deadly force. The issue of nondeadly force was later examined in GRAHAM v. CONNOR.
GRAHAM V. CONNOR, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
Graham, a diabetic, asked a friend (William Berry) to drive him to a nearby store for some juice to stave
off an oncoming insulin reaction. At the store, Graham decided the line at the register was too long and
opted to go to a friend’s house for the needed juice. Charlotte Police Officer Connor saw Graham running
from the store. Connor became suspicious and stopped Graham and his friend as they drove away.
Connor then called for back-up. When approaching the car Berry told Connor that Graham was having a
reaction. Connor directed them to wait. While waiting for the back-up Graham exited Berry’s car running
around it twice. Berry asked for Connor’s help in catching and restraining Graham. In the ensuing
confusion of the arriving back-up Graham was handcuffed. At one point after being handcuffed Graham
passed out. Officers then placed Graham on the hood of Berry’s car. Graham regained consciousness and
requested the officer’s verify his condition via the diabetic decal he carried in his wallet. Graham was told
to "shut up" and was thrown head first into a police car. As a result Graham suffered various minor
injuries. Graham later filed a lawsuit alleging officers used excessive force. Graham also argued that,
deadly or not, in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen the force
used should be analyzed under the 4th amendment and it’s reasonableness standard. The Supreme Court
held that:
*
The 4th Amendment reasonableness standard regarding seizures extended to all use of force (by
an agent of the government) not just deadly force.
*
The court also recognized that officers must often make, "split second decisions-in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving". Therefore, the court made it clear that the reasonableness
standard was to be applied AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. The court made it clear that in
recognizing the dynamic situations that officers find themselves in, they should not be subjected
hindsight. This understanding also takes into account that officers are not required to use the least amount
of force required to accomplish the task, only a standard of reasonable force.

*
The determination of reasonableness is based on the perspective of a reasonable officer facing the
immediate threat. This is judged from an objective perspective rather than subjective. This means, would
a reasonably prudent and well-trained officer make the same decision?
*
An officer determines that a particular level of force is reasonable by considering the totality of
circumstances surrounding the incident. In GRAHAM v. CONNOR the U.S. Supreme Court identified
four factors that were inclusive in the totality of circumstances:

1.
2.
3.
4.

The severity of the crime;
Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others;
Whether the suspect is actively resisting;
Whether the suspect is attempting to evade arrest by flight.

(This by no means is an exhaustive list of the circumstances that should be considered.)
State Law (Revised Code of Washington):
Non-Deadly Force: As we know, state law can be more restrictive than federal law. RCW 9A.16.010
through 9A.16.040 specifically addresses the use of force against another person. In terms of non-deadly
force, aside from specific provisions allowing for the use of force when dealing with the mentally ill,
incompetent, or disabled, during the commission of their duties an officer’s use of force falls under the
auspices of RCW 9A.16.020(1).
The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the
following cases:

1.
Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person
assisting the officer and acting under the officer’s direction;
The essential part of this section is the term "necessary" which is defined in RCW 9A.16.010 (1).
In this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly required:
1.
"Necessary" means that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist
and that the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended.
*
"Necessary" means that there may have been apparent alternatives to the use of force but they
were not reasonably effective.
*
"Necessary" means that there may have been reasonably effective alternatives. But these
alternatives were not apparent to the officers on scene.
*
"Necessary" means that the force used must be reasonable.
*
"Necessary" means that there must be a lawful purpose for the use of force.
Deadly Force: The use of deadly force by a public officer is covered under RCW 9A.16.040. Section (1)
identifies three cases when justifiable homicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable. Use of force by a
law enforcement officer generally falls under Subsection (c).
(c)When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the peace officer’s command and in
the officer’s aid:

Subsection (c) then lists four specific examples during which the use of deadly force is justifiable:
(i)To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to
commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony;
(ii)To prevent the escape of a person from a federal or state correctional facility or in the retaking a
person who escapes from such facility; or
(iii)To prevent the escape of a person from a county or city jail or holding facility if the person has been
arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony; or
(iv)To lawfully suppress a riot if the actor or another participant is armed with a deadly weapon.
In addition to the use of deadly force having to be necessary, Section 2 states when the officer is
considering to use deadly force they must have probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not
apprehended, poses a " Threat of serious physical harm" to the officer or others. A "threat of serious
physical harm" consists of the following:
(a)The suspect threatens a peace officer with a weapon or displays a weapon in a manner that could be
reasonably construed as threatening; or
(b)There is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed any crime involving the infliction of
serious physical harm
Lastly, the final words in Section 2 add that under these circumstances deadly force may also be used if
it’s necessary to prevent the suspect from escaping from the officer, where, if feasible, some warning is
given.
COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT POLICE USE OF FORCE:
1.

What is a use of force continuum?

A use of force continuum is a teaching tool used by training instructors to teach new officers what would
be considered by experienced officers as a REASONABLE amount of force. It is not a concrete directive
that dictates a level of force that an officer must use during certain circumstances.
2.

Don’t police officers have to follow the continuum?

Actually, police officers are expected to use a REASONABLE amount of force. Whether the force a
police officer uses is REASONABLE depends on all the facts and circumstances of the event.
*
Does the Seattle Police Department have a use of force continuum?
No, several different use of force continuums have been created. A copy of the continuum that is
currently in use at both the Seattle/King County Regional Police Academy and the Washington State
Criminal Justice Training Center has been included in this notebook.
*
Don’t officers have to use the least amount of force?
No, the least amount of force implies subjectivity. It implies that there is always one effective alternative
that utilizes the least amount of force. In reality it is impossible to believe that given the dynamics of a
rapidly evolving incident that officers will always be able to discern which alternative would be the least

amount. Rather, officers are held to a standard of what is REASONABLE. (For supporting case law see
Plakas v. Drinski 19F.3d 1143, 1146)
A section of SPD policy (1.145) requires Seattle police officers to use the minimum amount of force
necessary to resolve a situation. However, language added to this section states that the minimum force
requirement is only for departmental review and the entire section should not be construed as creating a
higher standard than state law.
*
What governs how much force a police officer is authorized to use?
Above all, the U.S. Constitution governs the amount of force a police officer is authorized to use.
Specifically, the 4th Amendment. It is the 4th Amendment that limits the amount of force that a police
officer is authorized to use to a REASONABLE amount. The reasonable concept is further defined in
Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor. At the state level, the term NECESSARY is added. (See
RCW 9A.16.010.) Lastly, SPD policies can also dictate the amount of force an officer is authorized to
use.
*
Who makes the determination of what is REASONABLE? In terms of criminal or civil liability,
ultimately a judge or jury makes that decision. In terms of department discipline, a supervisor makes the
decision. However, the Supreme Court made it clear in Graham v. Connor that for any party to make this
determination, they must do so while considering the totality of the incident from the perspective of a
reasonable police officer. In other words, to what extent would a reasonable police officer have made the
same decision based on all of the factors and circumstances of the incident.
CONTINUUM OF RESISTANCE: OFFICER’S PERCEPTION OF VIOLATOR’S ACTIONS
VIOLATOR’S GOAL: ESCAPE/ASSAULT
NON-VERBAL
VERBAL
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
a violator who is trying to defeat your physical control
clenched fists, eyes stance
threats, statements that indicate an uncooperative subject
a suspect who will not move or "come along"
actively uncooperative static resistance, i.e. resistive tension is generated by the violator
egressive
a violator is attempting to escape control using reactive type movements
aggressive
the violator is attacking the officer and is attempting to injure the officer in the process of resisting or
escaping
aggravated aggression
the violator has pre-planned the attack or is implementing weapons and/or tactics that are highly injurious
or potentially lethal
LEVEL THREE TACTICS: LVNR, tertiary targets with impact weapons, firearms, etc.

LEVEL TWO DEFENSIVE TACTICS: strikes such as knees, kicks, and elbows, impact weapons
(baton, flashlight, radio etc.) chemical agents in projectile forms, taser

LEVEL ONE DEFENSIVE TACTICS: pain compliance through distractions, counter-joint tactics, hair
hold control tactics (OC Spray could be used at this level)

TOUCH CONTROL: guiding, escorting, and out muscling the individual who exhibits on minor
resistance

VERBAL INTERACTION: dialogue, open questions, persuasion, advice, or lawful order

OFFICER PRESENCE: identification by: verbal announcement, badge, vehicle, uniform etc.
OFFICER’S GOALS: CONTROL
IMPEDE
STOP
CONTINUUM OF ENFORCEMENT: REASONABLE OFFICER’S ACTIONS
SUMMARY OF SPD USE OF FORCE TRAINING:
In-service training:
Currently the department is providing 1 hour of use of force training to each officer attending the SPD
Street Skills course. During this time the following subjects are reviewed:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
Totality of the Circumstances
Use of Force Continuum
RCW 9A.16.010 (Definitions)
RCW 9A.16.020 (Use of Force-When Lawful)

RCW 9A.16.040 (Use of Deadly Force)
Basic Law Enforcement Training (BLET):
Currently all SPD recruits are attending the Seattle King County Regional Training Academy located at
the former Sandpoint Naval Station. The BLET recruits receive 112 hours worth of defensive tactics
training. This includes 10 hours of use of force training. The following subjects are covered during those
hours:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
Totality of the Circumstances
Use of Force Continuum
RCW 9A.16.010 (Definitions)
RCW 9A.16.020 (Use of Force-When Lawful)

*
*

RCW 9A.16.040 (Use of Deadly Force)
SPD Use of Force Policy

FORG Recommendations
Overview. The FORG did not initially anticipate that its work would result in the concrete set of
recommendations found here. As the work progressed, however, some clear directions emerged,
permitting development of a comprehensive and sustainable less lethal options program for the SPD.
Though the proposed program recommends limited deployment of less lethal options, it is designed to put
at least one such option in the hands of about 50% of all sworn officers in Patrol (including deployment of
CIT-certified personnel). Furthermore, the program is designed to ensure that trained Patrol personnel are
available to provide redundant, less lethal options capability on a 24 x 7 basis.
FORG members were guided in their consideration of less lethal options by a set of criteria that deserve
mention here.
*
Needs assessment – identifies the routine and/or unusual situations in which officers might
benefit from the availability of less lethal options and the characteristics of those situations (e.g.,
daytime/nighttime, outdoors/indoors) that might affect choices among options.
*
Practicality/useability/deployability – has to do with ease, effectiveness, and flexibility of use,
any special environmental, transportation or deployment restrictions or limitations an option might
present.
*
Effectiveness – concerns the range of use and the short and long range effects of a device, and in
particular, how the effectiveness of a device is balanced against potential liability that may be associated
with its use.
*
Safety and Operational Efficiency – refers to how reliable and controllable are the effects of
various options, and the degree of safety provided to the officer who deploys them, suspects against
which they are used, as well as any third parties who may be affected by use.
*
Political and Legal Liability – involves assessment of the risks of injury or death of various
options (virtually all less lethal options have been "lethal" under certain circumstances), of the degrees of
officer and public acceptance of different devices, and of how deployment may affect liability.
*
Training/Policy and Procedure/Logistical and Maintenance Issues – refers the level of training,
guidance, maintenance required for safe and proficient use of a device as well as any special storage,
testing or transportation requirements.
*
Cost considerations – involves assessment of start-up and ongoing costs, training expenses,
savings/losses associated with reduced/increased liability for use of various options.
The specific recommendations made here reflect application of these criteria. In addition, as this less
lethal program is reviewed, several caveats should be kept in mind.
First, the recommended program constitutes a limited deployment of less lethal options, i.e., these
options will not be standard issue for all officers at all times. Cost considerations certainly played a role
in this recommendation, but more important were issues associated with training, practicality, and need.
Operational data from other agencies indicate that officers must receive proper training if they are to use
any device proficiently and reliably and a department is best served by deploying only to the limits of its

training capacity. Similarly, until SPD’s field experience with various devices is expanded, the need for
and practicality of these options cannot be fully assessed. For these reasons, a limited deployment is
prudent and justified. The practical implication of such a deployment, however, is that it will remain quite
likely that there will be circumstances where less lethal options are not available initially to officers called
to respond to specific incidents or situations.
Second, the recommended deployment of less lethal options does not guarantee their use, even when
available. Situational dynamics, in particular the timing and volatility of an incident, will dictate the
response of officers. A high risk, rapidly evolving situation will not lend itself to the application of a
broad range of response options, even if some of these options happen to be available. Officers on scene
will continue to exercise their best judgment in using reasonable force and will not be expected to deploy
a less lethal option when such deployment is neither appropriate nor likely to be effective. Moreover, it is
important to recognize that the capacity to deploy less lethal options safely is dependent upon the ready
availability of lethal force as protection and back-up. Officers with tasers or with crisis intervention skills,
for example, can only use them safely when other officers are available and in a position to support and
protect them.
Third, less lethal options must be clearly understood as supplements to – and not substitutes for –
deadly force. The paramount duty of police officers to protect themselves and the public does not change
because of the deployment of less lethal options. In this regard, less lethal options do not constitute "first
steps" in some progression of responses, nor are officers required to employ or exhaust all less lethal
options before resorting to deadly force. Based on the circumstances, officers may still respond with the
lethal options available to them if the situation warrants a deadly force response. The recommended
deployment of less lethal options is intended in no way to compromise officer and public safety.
Finally, the less lethal program recommended here is based upon the best information currently
available. FORG members were impressed with how fast-developing the marketplace for less lethal
options is. For example, one weapon (the M26 Taser) that is being recommended for the SPD program
was not available even six months ago. Six months from now, other devices may come on the market that
hold even greater promise than those suggested here. Nevertheless, the FORG is confident that it has
chosen a prudent course of action and that the limited deployment of various devices recommended here
will give SPD the opportunity to consider other options, should they become available.
With these caveats and criteria in mind, the FORG recommends a three-pronged less lethal options
program for SPD, consisting of the following:
*
Expanded training in crisis intervention skills and techniques
*
Acquisition and deployment of less lethal weapons and systems
*
Continuation of the FORG as SPD’s mechanism for planning and implementation, standards
development, and review of less lethal options.
Each of these recommendations is discussed further below.
Expanded Training in Crisis Intervention Skills and Techniques.
Specific Recommendations:
*
*
*
*

Train an additional 60 CIT officers (the majority in Patrol) this fall.
Provide CIT training to all sergeants in Patrol.
Continue training to maintain 200 CIT-trained officers in Patrol at any time.
Provide mandatory, refresher and skill-building training to all CIT officers at least annually.

*
Provide mandatory, one-day CIT familiarization and orientation training to all sworn personnel
in Patrol other than those receiving full CIT training.
*
Issue directives on callouts and deployment of CIT officers.
SPD began its Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) program just over two years ago. The first class of officers
to go through the 40-hour class graduated in February of 1998. Currently, there are 75 CIT-trained
officers assigned to Patrol Operations. In addition, there are 47 other officers who have received the CIT
training, who work in a variety of other assignments. All of SPD’s hostage negotiators have also been
through the CIT training. In addition to the initial 40-hour training course, one-day refresher courses have
been offered at least one time/year for CIT officers to attend on a voluntary basis.
The 40-hour CIT course includes the following subjects: Mental Disorders; Geriatric Mental Disorders;
Understanding Mental Illness, a Family’s Perspective; The Law and Mental Illness; Chronic Public
Inebriates; The Crisis Cycle; Children’s Crisis Response Team; Communication With Mentally Ill
Individuals; Intervention in High Risk Situations (Suicides); Crisis Triage Unit. These subjects are taught
by local professionals who are experts in the specific subject matter.
At this time, there are plans for two more forty-hour classes before the end of 2000. Each class will have
30 attendees. Upon graduation of the second class, the number CIT-trained personnel in SPD will total
182. The majority of new graduates will be assigned to the Patrol Operations Bureau. Our
recommendation is to maintain about 200 CIT-trained officers assigned to Patrol.
Additional plans for training for the remainder of the year 2000, include at least two one-day training
sessions, directed to the non-CIT patrol officer, on how to communicate better with the mentally ill.
Additionally, there are plans to do two, one-day refresher classes for those officers already trained in CIT.
These one-day refresher classes will include training by a local expert, Dr. Ben Johnson, who will focus
on skill enhancements in identifying and responding to aggression, officer safety, and situation
management. It is strongly recommended that the one-day communication training for non-CIT officers
and refresher training for CIT officers be mandatory.
Future training goals include training all patrol officers in the one-day, intensive course on how to
communicate with mentally ill persons. In addition, on-going 40-hour CIT classes will need to be offered
annually, in order to maintain the recommended number of CIT-trained patrol officers, as some will be
lost because of attrition to other units and/or promotion.
There are plans to take advantage of free training whenever possible. One example is a twelve-week
course offered by Washington Alliance for the Mentally Ill. The class is offered to families of mentally ill
persons, but they are inviting officers to attend, to help gain some insight into what families with mentally
ill persons have to go through. It is a FORG recommendation that supervisors provide CIT officers who
wish to participate with training time to attend these evening programs.
Many situations have occurred over the last two years that were very likely resolved peacefully, due to the
skills of the CIT officer. One extreme example, was a domestic violence assault, where a mentally
disturbed man fled his house wielding a machete. The man was very threatening and hostile upon arrival
of the police. CIT officers responded and were able to convince the man to put down his weapon and
surrender. There have been numerous other calls involving weapons and threats of violence to which CIT
officers were called, though we have no way of knowing for sure if the skills of the CIT officers who
responded averted tragedies in those situations.
The future of CIT, and the best use of the Department’s CIT-trained personnel, rests with those
individuals responsible for making sure that CIT officers are called to the scene of critical incidents.

Currently, there is no manual directive specifying the types of situations likely to benefit from a CIT
officer response. FORG members are in the process of developing a written directive on the use of CIT.
Likely, this directive will specify the types of calls that would require that CIT be dispatched, as well as
other recommendations for their use. For example, any call from radio that indicates mental illness is
involved should require a response from a CIT-trained officer. Similarly, calls that could turn into standoff situations should have CIT officers directed to the call as a first responder, to be followed up by
Hostage Negotiation Team and SWAT officers, if necessary.
Support for the use of CIT officers by the Precinct Commanders and Watch Commanders is also
paramount. Plans are being made to address the precinct Commanders about ensuring their Watch
Commanders know how to utilize the CIT officers assigned to their precinct. In addition, the
understanding and use of CIT trained officers is a projected agenda item on the patrol supervisor training
program being developed by the Patrol Operations Bureau. Until SPD has enough CIT-trained officers to
cover all squads, watches and precincts, it is the FORG recommendation that officers and sergeants
request that Communications go outside of precinct boundaries to find a CIT-trained officer, when the
need arises.
Other steps that might be taken to ensure the best use of the CIT trained officers would include formal
recognition of the successful efforts of CIT-trained officers. This will accomplish two purposes: it will
make those officers feel their training has been worthwhile; and it will educate other officers about the
benefits of calling for a CIT officer when dealing with persons in crisis. Another step is to continue CIT
participation in training for new police officers to ensure that these officers are equipped to deal with the
mentally ill and/or to recognize how to get CIT officer help in those situations.
Partnerships are also important for advancing the CIT program. CIT should continue to work closely with
the Mental Health Court, to ensure the best possible outcomes for low level, misdemeanant mentally ill
offenders; and with the legislature and the community mental health professionals, to devise intervention
strategies that ensure the safety of the public while addressing the needs and rights of the mentally ill.
A future direction for the CIT program might include an on-staff mental health professional (MHP) perhaps an intern, working toward a doctorate - who would be interested in being part of a police/mental
health professional partnership team. This team would be available to respond to crises in the field, such
that the MHP would be able to make a field evaluation on the state of the mental illness, while the law
enforcement officer could evaluate the situation based on the criminal laws.
Acquisition and Deployment of Less Lethal Weapons and Systems.
Specific Recommendations:
*
Purchase and deploy the M26 Taser to one officer in each patrol sector squad, on each watch, on
a 24x7 basis, to bike squads, foot beats, ACT teams, Seattle Center squads, and to all sector squad
sergeants.
*
Purchase and deploy less lethal Remington launchers using #23DS bean bag rounds to ensure
they are available to all patrol sector squads and sector squad sergeants.
*
Implement a training program for qualification and certification of officers in the use of less
lethal munitions to include a 4 hour training program on the M26 Taser and an 8 hour training program on
use of the bean bag rounds.
*
Provide re-qualification and skill-building training on use of less lethal munitions to include
annual mandatory re-certification on technique and tactics.
*
Adopt appropriate policy and directives governing the deployment of less lethal options and
documentation of their use.

Two less lethal weapons are recommended for purchase and limited deployment within Patrol and special
response units in the Department. Each is discussed in turn. The overall deployment model applied to
these weapons is to provide less lethal options at the lowest operational level in the Department since
these units are most likely to be the first responders to any incident. First responders generally have the
best chance of using a less lethal response before the situation escalates and a lethal response becomes
necessary. Providing less lethal alternatives to first responders, then, increases the opportunity for these
devices to be used successfully.
The M26 Taser. This weapon, developed by Taser International, is a laser-sited weapon that fires two
prongs at a target up to 21 feet away. The two prongs deliver 26 watts of electricity at over 50,000 volts,
overriding the target’s motor and sensory systems. As a result, targets are unable to control large muscles
and become totally compliant. The M26 delivers its electrical charge over a five second cycle, but once
the weapon is turned off, the effects disappear immediately.
The M26 Taser is recommended for five reasons. First, the M26 delivery system is much like a service
weapon, making it an easy system for officers to learn to use proficiently. Second, the M26 can be
deployed at a safer range (up to 21 feet) than was true of earlier tasers. Third, the M26 provides instant
compliance without injury or lasting effects to the target. (In over 40 deployments nationally, no injuries
have been reported.) Fourth, the M26 is equipped with a dataport that automatically documents each use
of the device and that can be downloaded into a computer. And finally, the initial cost and ongoing
maintenance and munitions replacement expenses are moderate.
The recommended deployment of the M26 is as follows: one officer per squad per watch in Patrol, one
officer per bike beat and foot beat, one officer per ACT team, and per Seattle Center squad, and all Patrol
sector sergeants, for a total of 130 tasers deployed. The M26 will be individually assigned to officers who
will have responsibilty for their security and maintenance. Each Taser officer and sergeant will attend a 4hour Taser User Certification Course that will include use of the device, department policy governing use,
live fire qualification, and training scenarios. Course instructors will be SWAT team members. There will
also be a mandatory annual qualification on the M26 for officers to retain certification in their use.
The #23 DS BeanBag. The #23DS (drag stabilized) BeanBag, developed by Defense Technology
Corporation, is a less lethal round that can be deployed at a greater standoff distance (20-50 feet), with
greater accuracy than previous less lethal munitions. In addition, this round has less potential for
penetration of the body than other less lethal rounds examined.
The #23DS BeanBag is recommended for four reasons. First, it provides officers with a less lethal option
that can be deployed at a safer range than the M26 Taser. Second, it provides officers with a less lethal
alternative that has multiple rounds. The M26 does not. Third, the #23 DS BeanBag uses a Remington
shotgun as its launcher, a weapon with which officers are familiar and have proficiency. Finally, the
degree of accuracy and the lower potential for penetration with the #23 DS BeanBag reduce the chance of
serious bodily injury or death when deployed.
Recommended deployment of the #23DS BeanBag is as follows: a total of 130 will be deployed, with
approximately 30 per Precinct to be distributed among sector squads and sector squad sergeants at the
discretion of the Precinct commander. The #23DS BeanBag systems would not be individually assigned,
but would be available for check-out and use during each watch in each precinct by trained and certified
officers and sergeants. Accountability for deployment of the BeanBag system will be on a sign-in/signout basis. Officers signing out these systems will be solely responsible for them and accountable for any
deployment or use. Each BeanBag officer will attend an 8-hour training class in the use of the #23DS

Beanbag, which will cover classroom instruction, practical scenarios, and live fire qualifications. SWAT
team officers will conduct the training. There will also be a mandatory annual qualification on the #23DS
system to maintain certification for use. The plan is to train 130 officers and sergeants in each of the next
two years, and then to continue the training program such that all Patrol officers and supervisors are
certified in BeanBag use. In another aspect of the deployment, the less lethal launchers will have orange
buttstocks and foregrips, and the rounds will be similarly designated to prevent officers from mistaking
less lethal systems for traditional systems and vice versa.
Adoption of Appropriate Deployment and Documentation Policies. The FORG recommends adoption
of formal policies governing use of the less lethal devices proposed here. Revisions to the Department
Manual and to the use of force statement form will be provided separately for Command Staff review and
approval. In addition, it is essential that officers and command staff learn from SPD’s own field and
operational experience with these devices. This will not only serve to build officer confidence in these
options, but also signal the need for changes in training curricula or directives, where appropriate. It is
suggested that the FORG would be the appropriate vehicle for undertaking periodic review of operational
data and for making recommendations to Command Staff.
Continue the FORG as SPD’s mechanism for planning and implementation, standards
development, and review of less lethal options.
Specific Recommendations:
*
Develop and execute an implementation plan for the less lethal options proposed here.
*
Modify the Department’s use of force statement to capture information relevant to less lethal force
options deployments.
*
Review and recommend revisions to Department manuals and directives appropriate for less
lethal options.
*
Conduct periodic reviews of less lethal force deployments to gain training, supervisory, and
operational insights from field experience.
*
Evaluate current and newly available less lethal systems on an ongoing basis, to ensure that the
Department is taking advantage of the best available options and technologies.
The less lethal force options program recommended here is both comprehensive and ambitious. Its
success is important not only to our officers, but also to the public we serve. This success can be best
assured by tasking specific individuals with the responsibility for carrying out the recommendations
contained in this report. The FORG, it is suggested, would be the appropriate vehicle for taking on this
responsibility. It is, therefore, recommended that the FORG be continued for this purpose. In addition to
implementation of the recommended less lethal force program, continuation of the FORG will accomplish
two other purposes. It will communicate within the Department the importance placed upon less lethal
force options, and it will ensure that the Department remains current on the most recent developments in
the rapidly changing less lethal options marketplace.
Costs and Training Timeline for the Recommended Less Lethal Options Program
Estimated costs. The recommended less lethal options program is estimated to cost approximately
$350,000. SPD requested an appropriation in this amount in the 2001-2002 budget, which the Mayor is
supporting. The $350,000 appropriation will cover less lethal weapons acquisition and related training as
well as CIT program training and related costs. Of the total appropriation, about 46% ($163,800) involves
one-time costs for purchase of weapons and accessories; 28% ($100,000) will be used for costs of
instructors, materials, and other training-related costs; 26% ($90,400) will be required for munitions and

consumable supplies, and for equipment repairs, replacement, and upgrades. The table below details the
expenditures for the less lethal program in 2001 and 2002.
SPD Less Lethal Weapons and Training
Budget for 2001-2002
Item
Unit Cost
# Units
Total Cost
# Units
Total Cost
Total Cost
2001
2001
2002
2002
2001-02
Operational Stockage
M26 Taser
$400
130
$52,000
$52,000
M26 Holster
$100
130
$13,000
$13,000
M26 Cartridge
$18
650
$11,700
160
$2,880
$14,580
Remington Beanbag Launcher
$760
130
$98,800
$98,800
#23DS Beanbag Rounds
$5
1040
$5,200
200
$1,000
$6,200
Subtotal
$180,700
$3,880
$184,580

Training Munitions
M26 Cartridge
$18
520
$9,282
520
$9,282
$18,564
#23 Beanbag Rounds
$5
2600
$13,000
2600
$13,000
$26,000
Subtotal
$22,282
$22,282
$44,564
Equipment Repair
$5,000
$5,000
$10,000
Equipment Replacement
$0
$15,000
$15,000
Training Costs
$80,000
$20,000
$100,000
Total Cost
$287,982
$66,162
$354,144

The ongoing, annual cost of the less lethal program is estimated at $71,200, to include $25,000 per year
for training-related costs, $46,200 for munitions and consumable supplies, and for equipment repairs,
upgrades, and replacements. Costs associated with any new less lethal devices that may be recommended
and acquired would be in addition to these estimates.
Training Plan. An integral part of the recommended less lethal options program is training to improve
and expand crisis intervention and communication skills and to ensure proficiency and reliability in the
use of less lethal weapons. Training for all weapons will be delivered by members of the SPD SWAT
Team (Special Weapons and Tactics). All members of the SWAT Team will be trained and certified by
the end of December 2000. Initial training and qualification for all weapons systems will be completed by
the end of 2001, with mandatory refresher training scheduled for the following year. In total, 130
personnel will be trained on the M26 Taser and 130 on the Remington Beanbag Launcher. By the end of

2001, trained personnel will provide SPD Patrol Operations with redundant less lethal weapons capability
24 hours a day, seven days a week, throughout the year.
SPD also will train approximately 300 CIT (Crisis Intervention Team) officers by the end of 2001 to
respond to calls involving mentally disturbed persons. We also will initiate a one-day program to
familiarize all personnel assigned to Patrol Operations with the protocols for calling CIT officers to the
scene. By the end of 2001, SPD Patrol Operations will have trained or familiarized approximately 60% of
its assigned strength in CIT; the balance will receive familiarization training in 2002. In addition, all CIT
trained officers will attend a one-day refresher class annually.
The table below details the training timeline associated with the recommended program for both CIT and
weapons training.
SPD Less Lethal Weapons Training Timeline
2001-2002
Initial Training
Refresher Training
12/31/00
06/30/01
12/31/01
06/30/02
12/31/02
M26 Taser
- newly trained
30
50
50
65
65
- cumulative total trained
30
80
130
65
130
Remington Beanbag Launcher
- newly trained
30
50
50
65
65
- cumulative total trained
30
80
130
65
130

Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
- newly trained
60
60
60
151
151
- cumulative total trained
182
242
302
151
302
CIT Familiarization
Initial Training (Cont.)
- newly trained
60
150
150
150
150
- cumulative total trained
60
210
360
510
660
Totals Trained per Period
180
310
310
431
431
------------------------------------------------------------------------