Us Doj Oig Review of Fbi Involvement Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay Afghanistan and Iraq May 2008

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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General

A Review of the FBI's Involvement in
and Observations of Detainee
Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay,
Afghanistan, and Iraq

Oversight and Review Division
Office of the Inspector General

May 2008

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................i
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 1
I.

Introduction ......................................................................................1

II.

The OIG Investigation ........................................................................2

III.

Prior Reports Regarding Detainee Mistreatment .................................3

IV.

Methodology of OIG Review of Knowledge of FBI Agents Regarding
Detainee Treatment ........................................................................... 5

The OIG June 2005 Survey ......................................................5

OIG Selection of FBI Personnel for. Interviews ...........................7

OIG Treatment of Military Conduct ..........................................7

Organization of the OIG Report .......................................................... 8

CHAPTER TWO: FACTUAL BACKGROUND .............................................. 11
I.

The Changing Role of the FBI After September 11 ............................11

II.

FBI Headquarters Organizational Structure for Military Zones ......... 12
A.

Counterterrorism Division ...................................................... 13
1.
2.

International Terrorism Operations Sections ................. 13
Counterterrorism Operations Response Section ............ 14

Critical Incident Response Group ........................................... 15

Office of General Counsel ....................................................... 15

III.

Other DOJ Entities Involved in Overseas Detainee Matters .............. 16

IV.

Inter-Agency Entities and Agreements Relating to Detainee Matters. 16

The Policy Coordinating Committee ........................................ 16

Inter-Agency Memorandums of Understanding ....................... 18

Background Regarding the FBI's Role in the Military Zones ............. 19
A.

Afghanistan .............................................
1.
2.

.......................19

Military Operations and Detention Facilities ................. 19
The FBI's Mission .........................................................21

3.
4.
5.
B.

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba .........................................................27
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

FBI Deployments ..........................................................22
Organizational Structure of the FBI in Afghanistan .......23
FBI Activities in Afghanistan .........................................24

Military Operations and Detention Facilities .................27
The FBI's Mission ........................................................ 31
FBI Deployments ..........................................................32
FBI Organizational Structure at GTMO .........................32
FBI Activities at GTMO .................................................33

Iraq ....................................................................................... 35
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Military and CIA Operations and Detention Facilities ....35
The FBI's Mission in Iraq ..............................................36
FBI Deployments to Iraq ............................................... 37
Organizational Structure of the FBI in Iraq ...................37
FBI Activities in Iraq ..................................................... 38

CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND REGARDING INTERROGATION
POLICIES ........................................................................................47
I.

Pre-existing, FBI Policies and Practices .............................................47
A.

FBI Interview / Interrogation Techniques .................................47

Working with Other Agencies .................................................49
1.
2.

C.
II.

III.

FBI Interaction with Other Domestic Law Enforcement
Agencies .................................................. .................. 50
FBI Interaction with Agencies of Foreign Governments.. 50

FBI Duty to Report .................................................................. 51

Department of Defense Interrogation Policies ................................... 53
A.

Legal Background : the Geneva Conventions, the Convention
Against Torture , and Related Statutes .................................... 54

DOD Interrogation Policies Relating to GTMO ......................... 56

DOD Policies Relating to Afghanistan ..................................... 59

DOD Policies Relating to Iraq ................................................. 61

Recent Changes to DOD Policy ...............................................63

Reasons for the Differences Between the FBI and Military
Approaches to Interviews .................................................................63

CHAPTER FOUR: THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF FBI POLICIES
REGARDING DETAINEE INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS ......67

II.

The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah .................................................67
A.

FBI Agents Interview Zubaydah and Report to FBI
Headquarters on CIA Techniques ...........................................67

FBI Assistant Director D'Amuro Meets with DOJ Officials
Regarding the Zubaydah Interrogation ................................... 69

D'Amuro Meets with the FBI Director , Who Decides that the
FBI Will Not Participate .......................................................... 71

Subsequent Decisions Regarding FBI Involvement with High Value
Detainees ........................................................................................74

CHAPTER FIVE: FBI CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY INTERROGATION
AT GUANTANAMO BAY ...................................................................77
1.

Background on Al-Qahtani ..............................................................77

II.

Discovery of Al-Qahtani 's Links to September 11 .............................78

III.

FBI Interviews of Al-Qahtani: August 2002 .....................................80

IV.

FBI Supervisory Special Agents Foy and Lyle Observe Military
Interrogations of Al-Qahtani: Early October 2002 ...........................82

The FBI's MLDU Unit Chief and DOJ Counsel Nahmias Visit
GTMO : October 15 to 18 , 2002 .......................................................85

VI.

FBI Continues Objecting to the Al-Qahtani Interrogation Plans:
November 2002 ............................................................................... 86

VII.

Proposal To - Al- Qahtani To Be Interrogated Using an
Alternative Debriefing Model of the Sort Used on Zubaydah ............. 92

VIII.

The Military Proceeds with the Interrogation of Al- Qahtani, Over
FBI Objections ............................................................................... 102

IX.

Concerns about the Interrogation of Al-Qahtani and Other
Detainees Are Elevated at FBI Headquarters .................................. 104

Concerns Regarding Interrogations of Al - Qahtani and Others Are
Elevated by the FBI to the DOJ Criminal Division .......................... 107

XI.

Concerns Regarding Efficacy of DOD Interrogations at GTMO Are
Raised to the Attorney General ...................................................... 113

XII.

DOJ Efforts to Address Guantanamo Interrogation Issues in the
Inter-Agency Process .....................................................................115

XIII.

Al-Qahtani Becomes Fully Cooperative .......................................... 117

XIV.

The May 30, 2003 Electronic Communication ................................ 120

XV.

Concerns Raised Regarding Slahi's Interrogation ........................... 122

XVI.

Conclusion ....................................................................................128

CHAPTER SIX: THE FBI's RESPONSE TO THE DISCLOSURE OF
DETAINEE MISTREATMENT AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON .................. 131
1.

Abu Ghraib Prison and the Development of the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy ..............................................................................131

Ii.

The Horton Matter ........................... . . . ...........................................135

III.

FBI Employees Raise Concerns About the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy ..............................................................................137

IV.

The Iraq On-Scene Commander and the Meaning of
"Abuse" .......................................................
....................137

The FBI Counterterrorism Division's Draft "Clarification" of
the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy ...................................... 139

FBI OGC Concerns Regarding the Meaning of
"Participation" ......................................................................140

FBI OGC and CTD Respond to Agent Concerns Regarding a
Facility in Iraq ..................................................... . . . . .............142

OIG Assessment of the FBI Policies Regarding Detainee
Treatment ..................................................................................... 144
A.

FBI-Approved Interrogation Techniques ................................ 145

FBI Policy When Another Agency's Interrogator Uses
Non-FBI Techniques ............................................................. 146

FBI Interrogation of Detainees After Other Agencies Use
Non-FBI Techniques ............................................................. 147

Reporting Abuse or Mistreatment ......................................... 150

Comparison: December 2002 CITF Guidance ...................... 152

FBI Internal Investigations ............................................................ 154
A.

The Iraq Inquiry ........................................................... ........ 154

The GTMO Special Inquiry ..................................... ..............156

The Afghanistan Poll ............................................................ 158

The GTMO Review of FD-302 Forms and Development of a
Reporting Process for Detainee Abuse Allegations ................. 159

CHAPTER SEVEN: TRAINING REGARDING DETAINEE TREATMENT
PROVIDED TO FBI AGENTS IN THE MILITARY ZONES .................. 161
I.

II.

Training During the Period Before the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy ........................................................................................... 161
A.

FBI Training for Overseas Deployments ................................ 161

Training Topics Relating to Detainees ................................... 164

Expanded Training Provided to FBI Agents After Issuance of the
FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy ..................................................... 168

CHAPTER EIGHT: FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DETAINEE
TREATMENT IN GUANTANAMO BAY ............................................. 171
I.

Introduction ..................................................................................171

II.

Observations Regarding Specific Techniques .................................. 174
A.

Beating or Physically Abusing a Detainee ............................. 174

Prolonged Shackling and Stress Positions ............................ 179

Sleep Deprivation or Sleep Disruption .................................. 182

Extreme Temperatures ......................................................... 184

Use of Working Dogs ............................................................ 185

Isolation .............................................................................. . 185

Mistreatment of the Koran ...................................................187

Touching or Acting Toward a Detainee in a Sexual Manner ..188

Use of Bright Flashing Lights or Loud Music ........................ 190

Use of Duct Tape on Detainees ............................................. 191

Forced Shaving ....................................................................193

Withholding Medical Care .................................................... 193

Forced Cell Extractions ........................................................ 195

Placing Women's Clothing on a Detainee ..............................195

Transfer to Another Country for More Aggressive
Interrogation ........................................................................ 196

Threatened Transfer to Another Country .............................. 197

Threatening a Detainee's Family ...........................................198

III.

IV.

Depriving a Detainee of Food or Water .................................. 199

Depriving a Detainee of Clothing ..........................................199

FBI Impersonation ............................................................... 200

Other Conduct ..................................................................... 201

Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment
at GTMO .......................................................................................203
A.

Early Reports of Short-Shackling .........................................204

Agent Reports to Their On-Scene Commanders ....................205

Detainee Allegations of Mistreatment ....................................206

Referral Back to the Military .................................................208

Conclusion .................................................................................... 209

CHAPTER NINE: FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DETAINEE
TREATMENT IN AFGHANISTAN .....................................................213
1.

Introduction .................................................................................. 213

II.

Observations Regarding Particular Techniques ..............................216
A.

FBI Knowledge of Detainee Beating Deaths ...........................216

Beating, Choking, Strangling, or Other Abusive Handling
of Detainees ......................................................................... 217

Using Shackles or Other Restraints in a Harsh or
Prolonged Manner ................................................................ 218

Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact ..............................220

Abusive Body Cavity Searches ..............................................220

Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics ........................221

Deprivation of Clothing ........................................................222

Hooding or Blindfolding ........................................................223

Sleep Deprivation or Interruption .........................................224

Undocumented "Ghost" Detainees ........................................ 226

Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country ................ 226

Isolation of Detainees ........................................................... 227

Impersonation of FBI Agents ................................................228

Other Techniques ................................................................229

III.

Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment
in Afghanistan ............................................................................... 231

IV.

Conclusion .................................................................................... 234

CHAPTER TEN: FBI OBSERVATIONS IN IRAQ .......................................235
I.

Introduction .................................................................................. 235

II.

Observations Regarding Particular Techniques ..............................238
A.

FBI Knowledge Regarding Detainee Deaths ...........................238

Beating, Choking, Strangling, or Other Abusive Handling
of Detainees ............................................................
.... 238

Causing Burns by Placing Detainees on Hot Surfaces...........241

Use of Electric Shock ........................................................... 243

Harsh or Prolonged Shackling .............................................. 244

Using Military Working Dogs ................................................ 246

Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact ..............................247

Using Water To Prevent Breathing by a Detainee or To
Create the Sensation of Drowning ........................................ 247

Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics ........................248

Deprivation of Food and Water ............................................. 250

Depriving Detainees of Clothing ...........................................250
1.
2.

Abu Ghraib Prison ...................................................... 251
..............................252

Hooding or Blindfolding Detainees ........................................253

Sleep Deprivation or Interruption .........................................255

Unregistered "Ghost" Detainees ............................................256

Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country ................258

Threats Against Detainee Family Members ...........................258
Impersonation of FBI Agents by Other U.S. Government
Personnel ............................................................................. 259

R.
III.

Other Findings Concerning Agent Observations ....................260

Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment

in Iraq ........................................
IV.

..................................... 261

Conclusion ....................................................................................264

CHAPTER ELEVEN: OIG REVIEW OF ALLEGATIONS OF
MISCONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY ZONES .............265
I.

Alleged Mistreatment of Moazzam Begg ..........................................266
A.

Background ......................................................................... 266

Begg's Allegations ................................................................267

OIG Investigation ................................................................. 268

OIG Analysis of Begg's Allegations ........................................ 268

1.
2.
3.
II.

Allegations of Mistreatment of Saleh Muklif Saleh ..........................276
A.

Background and Allegations .................................................277

OIG Investigation ................................................................. 281
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

FBI Special Agent Bennett ..........................................281
FBI Special Agent Howard ...........................................284
FBI Special Agent Rohr ............................................... 285
FBI Special Agent Cisco ..............................................286
Other Witnesses ......................................................... 287

OIG Conclusions ................................. I................................. 288
1.
2.

III.

Alleged Threats and Psychological Ploys in
Afghanistan ................................................................ 269
Alleged Physical Abuse in Afghanistan ........................ 271
Alleged Threats and Coercion at GTMO .......................273

Saleh's Allegations Regarding
Detai______
Alleged Mistreatment of

_________

...........288
...........290

Allegations of FBI Mistreatment of Mohamedou Ould Slahi ............ 295
A.

Slahi's Allegations ................................................................ 295

OIG Analysis ........................................................................ 296
1.
2.

Alleged FBI Participation in the "Boat Ride" Incident ... 296
Alleged FBI Predictions of Harsh Treatment by

Alleged FBI Threat to Transfer Slahi to Afghanistan
or Iraq ........................................................................ 298

Alleged Threat by a Task Force Officer ........................ 299

Military ............................ ....................................... .... 296

IV.

Misconduct Involving Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi ................................300
A.

OIG Investigation ................................................................. 300
1.
2.
3.

Contemporaneous FBI Documents ..............................300
Interview of Al-Sharabi ...............................................301
Interview of FBI Special Agent Demeter .......................301

4.
B.

OIG Analysis of the Allegations .............................................304
1.
2.

Interviews of Other Agents .......................................... 303

Analysis of Allegations of "Psychological Torture" ........304
Analysis of Demeter's Conduct ....................................305

Allegations Regarding FBI Participation in Interrogation of Detainee
Yousef Abkir Salih Al Qarani .........................................................306
A.

Background ......................................................................... 306

FBI Special Agents Brandon and Stephenson ....................... 307

The Alleged Short-Chaining Incident .................................... 308

Alleged Use of the "Frequent Flyer Program" on Al Qarani ....312

Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding "Clint".............................. 3

Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding "Daoud" ......................... 315

VI.

Alleged Mistreatment of Mohammad A. A. Al Harbi ........................316

VII.

Abuse Allegations Involving Abu Zubaydah ....................................317

VIII.

The FBI Investigation of the Allegations against FBI Special
Agent Gibson ....................................................................... 317

FBI Interviews of Landis and Morehead ................................ 318

Gibson's Statement to the FBI ..............................................320

Gibson's Polygraph Examinations ........................................320

Findings by the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility ......321

FBI Special Agent Gibson's OIG Interview .............................321

OIG Interviews of FBI Special Agent Thomas and Acting
Deputy Assistant Director Frahm ......................................... 323

OIG Analysis ........................................................................ 323

Alle ations of Abuse at the
328
A.

Background ........................................................................ .329
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
FBI
The
FBI

Facility ................................................................. 329
Special Agent Adair ..............................................329
Team of FBI Agents ..............................................330
Special Agent Ryan ...............................................331

Allegations by Ryan ..............................................................332

Prior Investigations ..............................................................333

OIG Investigation ................................................................. 335

OIG Analysis of the Allegations .............................................336
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Alleged Inhumane Physical Conditions ........................336
Allegations Regarding Medical and Hygiene Conditions337
Alleged Deprivation of Food or Water .......................... 339
Alleged Sleep Deprivation ............................................340
Allegations Regarding Harsh Interrogation Techniques 342
Allegations Regarding Use of Restraints ......................344
Allegations Regarding Blindfolding/ Goggles ................ 349
Alleged Threats ...........................................................350
Allegations that Detainee Was Subjected to Electric
Shock ......................................................................... 350
Allegation Concerning Abuse of a Female Detainee...... 351

OIG Conclusions Concerning Allegations at

...................................................... 351
CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUSIONS ......................................................353
I.

Background ................................................................................... 353

II.

FBI Policies Regarding Detainee Interrogations ..............................354

III.

Agent Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment ........................354

IV.

The Disposition of FBI Agents' Reports Regarding Detainee
Mistreatment .......................................................... .................... 357

OIG Analysis ................................................................................. 361
A.

FBI Conduct in the Military Zones ........................................361

FBI Guidance ....................................................................... 363
1.
2.
3.
4.

VI.

FBI-Approved Interrogation Techniques ......................363
FBI Policy When Another Agency's Interrogator Uses
Non-FBI Techniques ...................................................364
FBI Interrogation of Detainees After Other Agencies
Use Non-FBI Techniques ............................................. 365
Reporting Abuse or Mistreatment ................................365

OIG Assessment of FBI Headquarters and DOJ Handling of
Agents' Reports Regarding Detainee Mistreatment ................367

Conclusion ............................................................

APPENDICES

.................... 369

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY'
1.

Introduction

This Executive Summary summarizes the results of the review
conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
involvement in and observations of detainee interrogations in
Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Afghanistan, and Iraq. The focus of our
review was whether FBI agents witnessed incidents of detainee abuse in
the military zones, whether FBI employees reported any such abuse to
their superiors or others, and how those reports were handled. The OIG
also examined whether FBI employees participated in any detainee
abuse. In addition, we examined the development and adequacy of the
policies, guidance, and training that the FBI provided to the agents it
deployed to the military zones.
As part of our review, the OIG developed and distributed a detailed
survey to over 1,000 FBI employees who had deployed to one or more of
the military zones. Among other things, the OIG survey sought
information regarding observations or knowledge of specifically listed
interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee
treatment, and whether the FBI employees reported such incidents to
their FBI supervisors or others.2

1 The OIG has redacted (blacked out) from the public version of this report
information that the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the Department of
Defense (DOD) considered classified. We have provided full versions of the classified
reports to the Department of Justice, the CIA, the DOD, and Congressional committees.
The effort to identify classified information in this report has been a significant factor
delaying release of this report. To obtain the agencies' classification comments, we
provided a draft report to the FBI, the CIA, and the DOD for classification review on
October 25, 2007. The FBI and the CIA provided timely responses. The DOD's
response was not timely. Eventually, the DOD provided initial classification comments
to us on March 28, 2008. However, we believed those classification markings were
over-inclusive. After several additional weeks of discussion with the DOD about these
issues, the DOD provided revised classification comments. The DOD's delay in
providing comments, and its over-inclusive initial comments, delayed release of this
report.
2 Although a major focus of our investigation was to collect information about
the observations by FBI agents of DOD interrogation practices in the military zones, the
OIG did not attempt to make an ultimate factual determination regarding the alleged
misconduct by non-FBI personnel. Such a determination would have exceeded the DOJ
OIG's jurisdiction. Moreover, the OIG did not have access to all of the witnesses, such
(Cont'd.)

The OIG also interviewed more than 230 witnesses and reviewed
over 500,000 pages of documents provided by the FBI, other components
of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Defense
(DOD). OIG employees made two trips to GTMO to tour the detention
facilities, review documents, and interview witnesses, including five
detainees held there. We also interviewed one released detainee by
telephone.3
Our review focused primarily on the activities and observations of
FBI agents deployed to military facilities under the control of the
Department of Defense between 2001 and 2004. With limited
exceptions, we were unable to and did not investigate the conduct or
observations of FBI agents regarding detainees held at CIA facilities for
several reasons. First, we were unable to obtain highly classified
information about CIA-controlled facilities, what occurred there, and
what legal authorities governed their operations. Second, during the
course of our review we learned that in January 2003 the CIA Inspector
General had initiated a review of the CIA terrorist detention and
interrogation program. Therefore, our review focused mainly on the
conduct and observations of the approximately 1,000 FBI employees
related to detainee interviews in military zones.

Organization of Report

The OIG's complete report, which contains the full results of our
review, has been classified by the relevant government agencies at the
Top Secret/ SCI level. The full report contains 12 chapters. The first
three chapters provide introductory and background information,
including a description of the role of the FBI in the military zones and the
various FBI interrogation policies in place at the time of the September
11 attacks. Chapter Four discusses the FBI's involvement in the joint
interrogation of a "high value detainee," Zayn Abidin Muhammed
Hussein Abu Zubaydah, shortly after his capture, and the subsequent
deliberations within the FBI regarding the participation of its agents in
joint interrogations with agencies that did not follow FBI interview
policies.4 Chapter Five examines the dispute between the FBI and the
as DOD or CIA personnel, who would have been necessary to make such a
determination.
3 In addition, the OIG examined prior reports addressing the issue of detainee
treatment in the military zones. Among the most significant of those reports were the
Church Report, a review of DOD interrogation operations conducted in 2004 and 2005
by the DOD, and the Schmidt-Furlow Report, a DOD investigation in 2005 into
allegations of detainee abuse at GTMO.
4 When the OIG investigative team was preparing for its trip to GTMO in early
2007, we asked the DOD for permission to interview several detainees, including
(Cont'd.)

DOD regarding the treatment of another detainee held at GTMO,
Muhammad Al-Qahtani. The dispute regarding Al-Qahtani arose from
the tension between the differing interrogation techniques employed by
the FBI and the military. This dispute was elevated to higher-level
officials and eventually resolved in favor of the DOD's approach.
Chapter Six examines the FBI's response to the public disclosure
of detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and related
concerns expressed by FBI agents in the military zones. These responses
included issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, which
reminded FBI agents not to use force, threats, or abuse in detainee
interviews and instructed FBI agents not to participate in joint interviews
in which other agencies were using techniques that were not in
compliance with FBI rules. The FBI also conducted an internal review to
determine the extent of the FBI's knowledge regarding detainee
mistreatment. The seventh chapter discusses the communication of FBI
policies to FBI employees who were deployed in military zones, including
the FBI's efforts to provide training and guidance to its agents on
appropriate interrogation techniques.
Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten detail the results of the OIG's
survey and investigation into what FBI agents saw, heard about, and
reported with respect to detainee interrogations in GTMO, Afghanistan,
and Iraq.

Zubaydah. The DOD agreed, stating that our interviews would not interfere with their
attempts to obtain any intelligence from the detainees, including Zubayd ah. However,
the CIA Acting General Counsel obiected to our interviewing Zubavdah.

In addition , the CIA Acting General
Counsel asserted that the OIG had not persuaded him that the OIG had a
"demonstrable and immediate need to interview Zubaydah at that time" given what the
Acting General Counsel understood to be the OIG's "investigative mandate." In
addition, the CIA Acting General Counsel asserted that Zubaydah could make false
allegations against CIA employees. We believe that none of these reasons were
persuasive or warranted denying us access to Zubaydah. First, neither the FBI nor the
DOD objected to our access to Zubaydah at that time. In addition, neither the FBI nor
the DOD stated that an OIG interview would interfere with their interviews of him.
Second, at GTMO we were given access to other high value detainees. Third, we did
have a demonstrable and immediate need to interview Zubaydah at that time, as well as
the other detainees who we were given access to, notwithstanding the CIA Acting
General Counsel's position that we had not persuaded him. Finally, the fact that
Zubaydah could make false allegations against CIA employees - as could other
detainees - was not in our view a legitimate reason to object to our access to him. In
sum, we believe that the CIA's reasons for objecting to OIG access to Zubaydah were
unwarranted, and its lack of cooperation hampered our investigation.

111

Chapter Eleven discusses our investigation of eight separate
allegations that FBI agents in the military zones were involved in
detainee abuse or mistreatment.
Chapter Twelve presents the OIG's conclusions and
recommendations.
B.

Summary of OIG Conclusions

Our report found that after FBI agents in GTMO and other military
zones were confronted with interrogators from other agencies who used
more aggressive interrogation techniques than the techniques that the
FBI had successfully employed for many years, the FBI decided that it
would not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other
agencies in which techniques not allowed by the FBI were used.
Our review determined that the vast majority of FBI agents
complied with FBI interview policies and separated themselves from
interrogators who used non-FBI techniques. In a few instances, FBI
agents used or participated in interrogations during which techniques
were used that would not normally be permitted in the United States.
These incidents were infrequent and were sometimes related to the
unfamiliar circumstances agents encountered in the military zones.
They in no way resembled the incidents of detainee mistreatment that
occurred at Abu Ghraib.
However, FBI agents continued to witness interrogation techniques
by other agencies that caused them concern. Some of these concerns
were reported to their supervisors, which sometimes resulted in friction
between FBI and the military over the use of these interrogation
techniques on detainees. Some FBI agents' concerns were resolved
directly by the agents working with their military counterparts, while
other concerns were never reported. Ultimately, however, the DOD made
the decisions regarding which interrogation techniques could be used on
the detainees in military zones. In our report, we describe the types of
techniques that FBI employees reported to their supervisors.
We also concluded that the FBI had not provided sufficient
guidance to its agents on how to respond when confronted with military
interrogators who used interrogation techniques that were not permitted
by FBI policies.

In sum, while our report concluded that the FBI could have
provided clearer guidance earlier, and while the FBI and DOJ could have
pressed harder for resolution of FBI concerns about detainee treatment,
we believe the FBI should be credited for its conduct and professionalism

in detainee interrogations in the military zones and in generally avoiding
participation in detainee abuse.
The remainder of this unclassified Executive Summary
summarizes in more detail the factual background and findings
contained in our full report.

II.

Factual Background

As a result of the September 11 attacks, the FBI changed its top
priority to counterterrorism and preventing terrorist attacks in the
United States. As a consequence of this shift in its priorities, and in
recognition of the FBI's investigative expertise and familiarity with
al-Qaeda, the FBI became more involved in collecting intelligence and
evidence overseas, particularly in military zones in Afghanistan, at
GTMO, and in Iraq.
Beginning in December 2001, the FBI sent a small number of
agents and other employees to Afghanistan to obtain actionable
intelligence for its counterterrorism efforts, primarily by interviewing
detainees at various facilities. In January 2002, the military began
transferring "illegal enemy combatants" from Afghanistan to GTMO, and
the FBI began deploying personnel to GTMO to obtain further intelligence
and evidence from detainees in cooperation with military interrogators.
Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the FBI also sent agents
and other employees to Iraq for the primary objective of collecting and
analyzing information to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States
and to protect U.S. personnel or interests overseas.
FBI deployments in the military zones peaked at approximately 25
employees in Afghanistan, 30 at GTMO, and 60 in Iraq at any one time
between 2001 and the end of 2004, the period covered by our review. In
total, more than 200 FBI employees served in Afghanistan between late
2001 and the end of 2004, more than 500 employees served at GTMO
during this period, and more than 260 served in Iraq. In each military
zone, FBI agents were supervised by an FBI On-Scene Commander.

III.

FBI and DOD Interrogation Policies
A.

FBI Policies Prior to the September 11 Attacks

Most of the FBI's written policies regarding permissible
interrogation techniques for its agents and for its agents' conduct in
collaborative or foreign interviews were developed prior to the
September 11 attacks. When these policies were drafted, they reflected

the FBI's primary focus on domestic law enforcement, which emphasized
obtaining information for use in investigating and prosecuting crimes.
These policies are designed to ensure that witness statements met legal
and constitutional requirements of voluntariness so that they would be
admissible in U.S. courts. In addition, the FBI has consistently stated its
belief that the most effective way to obtain accurate information is to use
rapport-building techniques in interviews.
Conducting Interviews The FBI's Legal Handbook for Special
Agents states, among other things, that "[i]t is the policy of the FBI that
no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force, threats, or promises."
The FBI's Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures (MAOP)
describes the importance of FBI agents not engaging in certain activities
when conducting investigative activities, including foreign
counterintelligence, and specifically states that "[n]o brutality, physical
violence, duress or intimidation of individuals by our employees will be
countenanced . . . ."
Joint Interviews Prior to the September 11 attacks, the FBI had
policies for working with other government agencies, both domestic and
foreign, in joint or cooperative investigations. However, the FBI's work
with the military in GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq raised new issues
regarding which agency's interrogation policies would apply and how the
FBI would work with personnel from other agencies who operated under
different interrogation rules. FBI agents told us that they have always
been trained to adhere to FBI protocols, not to other agencies' rules with
respect to interview policies or evidence collection.
However, the FBI's expanded mission after the September 11
attacks gave rise to circumstances in which (1) entities other than the
FBI were the lead agencies and had custody of the witnesses, (2)
prosecution of crimes was not necessarily the primary goal of the
interrogations, and (3) the evidentiary rules of U.S. Article III courts did
not necessarily apply. As a consequence and as detailed below, existing
FBI policies were not always sufficient to address these circumstances.
Reporting Misconduct FBI policies prior to the September 11
attacks required FBI agents to report to FBI Headquarters any incidents
of misconduct or improper performance by other FBI employees.
However, the duty of an FBI employee to report on the activities of nonFBI government personnel was limited to criminal behavior by other
personnel. We did not find any FBI policy prior to May 2004 imposing an
obligation on FBI employees to report abuse or mistreatment of detainees
by non-FBI government employees falling short of a crime.

DOD Interrogation Policies

In our report, we summarize the detainee interrogation policies
adopted by the DOD after the September 11 attacks for prisoners and
detainees. These policies were generally developed for use in war zones
rather than in the law-enforcement context. The range of permissible
DOD techniques was expanded after the September 11 attacks and was
modified over time. These military policies permitted techniques that
were inconsistent with the FBI's longstanding approach towards witness
interrogations.
Although DOD policies were not applicable to FBI agents, they
were relevant to our report for several reasons. First, as detailed below,
the tensions between DOD policies and the FBI's interview policies
created concerns for some FBI agents in the military zones which
sometimes led to conflicts between FBI and DOD employees.
Second, FBI agents in the military zones had a unique opportunity
to observe the conduct of other agencies' interrogators, including conduct
related to alleged detainee abuse in GTMO, Iraq, and other detention
facilities. A significant portion of our review involved the FBI's
observations regarding the treatment of detainees by military
interrogators. Because military interrogators were governed by the
DOD's interrogation policies, these policies are relevant to the OIG's
report.
Third, in May 2004 the FBI instructed its agents to report to their
superiors any incidents of known or suspected abuse or mistreatment of
detainees by other agencies' interrogators. Some FBI agents were told
that they should report any abusive interrogation technique that the
agent believed was outside the legal authority of the interrogator. This
instruction required FBI agents to have some familiarity with other
agencies' policies, which we briefly summarize below.
DOD Policies for GTMO When interrogations began at GTMO in
January 2002, military interrogators relied on Army Field Manual 34-52,
Intelligence Interrogation, for guidance as to permissible interrogation
techniques. In additional to conventional direct questioning techniques,
Field Manual 34-52 permitted military interrogators to utilize methods
that, depending on the manner of their use, might not be permitted
under FBI policies, such as "Fear Up (Harsh)," defined as exploiting a
detainee's pre-existing fears including behaving in an overpowering
manner with a loud and threatening voice. On December 2, 2002, the
Secretary of Defense approved additional techniques for use on detainees
at GTMO, including stress positions for a maximum of 4 hours, isolation,
deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, 20-hour

vii

interrogations, removal of clothing, and exploiting a detainee's individual
phobias (such as fear of dogs).
On January 15, 2003, the Secretary of Defense rescinded his
approval of these techniques. On April 16, 2003, the Secretary of
Defense promulgated revised guidance approving 24 techniques for use
at GTMO, most of which were taken from or closely resembled those in
Field Manual 34-52. The April 2003 GTMO Policy also approved the use
of dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment,
and isolation. This policy continued in effect for GTMO until September
2006 when the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3, discussed below.
DOD Policies for Afghanistan Prior to 2003, the only official
guidance regarding military detainee interrogation techniques in effect in
Afghanistan was that contained in Field Manual 34-52. In early 2003,
the military followed a policy that permitted techniques similar to those
approved under the December 2002 GTMO Policy, including isolation,
sleep adjustment, hooding, stress positions, sensory deprivation, and
mild physical contact. In February 2003, after a military investigation
into two detainee deaths at the Bagram Collection Point in December
2002, the military revised its approved, interrogation tactics and
prohibited handcuffing as a means to enforce sleep deprivation and
physical contact for interrogation purposes.
In March 2004 the military issued a new policy for Afghanistan
interrogations that was based on the prior Afghanistan policies and the
April 2003 GTMO Policy. This policy added dietary manipulation and
environmental manipulation to the list of approved techniques and
relaxed the prior prohibitions on using stress positions as an incentive
for cooperation. In June 2004, in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib
disclosures, the military in Afghanistan adopted the same policy that was
issued for Iraq on May 13, 2004 (discussed below).
DOD Policies for Iraq For the first few months of the war in Iraq,
military interrogators were governed by Field Manual 34-52. In
September 2003, the DOD adopted a policy describing 29 permissible
interrogation techniques. Most were adopted nearly verbatim from the
April 2003 GTMO Policy approved by the Secretary of Defense, but
additional approved techniques included muzzled military working dogs,
sleep management, yelling, loud music, light control, and stress
positions for up to 1 hour per use.
On October 12, 2003, the Commander in Iraq rescinded approval
for several of these techniques. On May 13, 2004, in the wake of the Abu
Ghraib abuse revelations, the military further revised its policies to
specify that "under no circumstances" would requests for certain

viii

techniques be approved, including "sleep management, stress positions,
change of scenery, diet manipulation, environment manipulation, or
sensory deprivation." In January 2005, the military adopted an
interrogation policy for Iraq that approved only those techniques listed in
Field Manual 34-52, with additional safeguards, prohibitions, and
clarifications, including explicit prohibitions against the removal of
clothing and the use or presence of military working dogs during
interrogations.
Field Manual 2-22.3 In September 2006, the U.S. Army issued
Field Manual 2-22.3 in fulfillment of a mandate of the Detainee
Treatment Act, enacted in December 2005, requiring a uniform standard
for treatment of detainees under DOD custody. Field Manual 2-22.3
reiterated and elaborated on many of the techniques listed in its
predecessor, Field Manual 34-52, but placed much greater emphasis on
rapport-based interrogation techniques similar to those endorsed by the
FBI. It also identified several prohibited actions, including nudity, sexual
acts or poses, beatings, waterboarding, use of military dogs, and
deprivation of food or water. Field Manual 2-22.3 also placed specific
controls on the use of the technique of isolating detainees from other
detainees. However, Field Manual 2-22.3 was not in effect during any
part of the period that was the focus of the OIG's review.

IV.

The Interrogation of Zubaydah and the Development of Early
FBI Policies Regarding Detainee Interviews in the Military
Zones

In the spring of 2002, the FBI began addressing the need for
specific policies governing the conduct of its agents during detainee
interrogations overseas. This need came to light in connection with the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, a "high value detainee" then being held
by the CIA. Zubaydah had been severely wounded when he was
captured, and two FBI agents were assigned to assist the CIA in
obtaining intelligence from him while he was recovering from his injuries.
The FBI agents conducted the initial interviews of Zubaydah, assisting in
his care and developing rapport with him. However, when the CIA
interrogators arrived at the site they assumed control of the
interrogation. After observing the CIA use interrogation techniques that
undoubtedly would not be permitted under FBI interview policies, one of
the FBI agents expressed strong concerns about these techniques to
senior officials in the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters.
This agent's reports led to discussions at FBI Headquarters and
with the DOJ and the CIA about the FBI's role in joint interrogations with
other agencies. Ultimately, these discussions resulted in a determination

by FBI Director Robert Mueller in approximately August 2002 that the
FBI would not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other
agencies in which harsh or extreme techniques not allowed by the FBI
would be employed.
However, the issue arose again in late 2002 and early 2003 in
connection with the FBI's efforts to gain access to another high value
detainee held in a foreign location. FBI agents assisted another agency
in developing questions for this detainee during a period when he was
being subjected to interrogation techniques that FBI. agents would not be
allowed to use in the United States.5

FBI Concerns about Military Interrogations at GTMO

Late in 2002, FBI agents assigned to GTMO also began raising
questions to FBI Headquarters regarding harsh interrogation techniques
being used by the military. These concerns were focused particularly on
the treatment of Muhammad Al-Qahtani, who had unsuccessfully
attempted to enter the United States in August 2001 shortly before the
September 11 attacks, allegedly for the purpose of being an additional
highjacker. After his capture and transfer to GTMO, Al-Qahtani resisted
initial FBI attempts to interview him. In September 2002, the military
assumed control over his interrogation, although behavioral specialists
from the FBI continued to observe and provide advice.
The FBI agents became concerned when the military announced a
plan to keep Al-Qahtani awake during continuous 20-hour interviews
every day for an indefinite period and when the FBI agents observed
military interrogators use increasingly harsh and demeaning techniques,
such as menacing Al-Qahtani with a snarling dog during his
interrogation.
The friction between FBI officials and the military over the
interrogation plans for Al-Qahtani increased during October and
November 2002. The FBI continued to advocate a long-term rapportbased strategy, while the military insisted on a different, more aggressive
approach. Between late November 2002 and mid-January 2003, the
military used numerous aggressive techniques on Al-Qahtani, including
attaching a leash to him and making him perform dog tricks, placing him
5 The FBI agents' accounts of the techniques they witnessed during the
interrogations of Zubaydah and the other high value detainee are described in our
classified full report. Although the CIA has publicly acknowledged using waterboarding
with three detainees, none of the FBI agents we interviewed reported witnessing this
technique.

in stress positions, forcing him to be nude in front of a female, accusing
him of homosexuality, placing women's underwear on his head and over
his clothing, and instructing him to pray.to an idol shrine. FBI and DOJ
officials did not learn about the techniques used between late November
2002 and mid-January 2003 until much later. However, in early

December 2002, an agent learned that Al-Qahtani was hospitalized
briefly for what the military told the FBI was low blood pressure and low
core body temperature.
As a result of the interrogations of Al-Qahtani and other detainees
at GTMO, several FBI agents raised concerns with the DOD and FBI
Headquarters about: (1) the legality and effectiveness of DOD
techniques; (2) the impact of these techniques on the future prosecution
of detainees in court or before military commissions; and (3) the potential
problems that public exposure of these techniques would create for the
FBI as an agency and FBI agents individually. Some of these concerns
were expressed to FBI Headquarters in e-mails from agents at GTMO.
The informal response that some of these agents received from FBI
Headquarters was that agents could continue to witness DOD
interrogations involving non-FBI authorized techniques so long as they
did not participate.
During this period, however, FBI agents continued to raise
objections directly with DOD officials at GTMO and to seek guidance
from senior officials in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. No formal
responses were ever received by the agents who wrote these
communications.
We determined, however, that some of the FBI agents' concerns
regarding the DOD's interrogation approach at GTMO were
communicated by officials in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division to
senior officials in the Criminal Division of DOJ and ultimately to the
Attorney General. FBI Headquarters officials said they discussed the
issue in meetings with senior officials in the DOJ Criminal Division. Two
witnesses told us that they recalled conversations with Alice Fisher (at
the time the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division)
regarding the ineffectiveness of military interrogations at GTMO, but they
did not recall discussing specific techniques with Fisher. Fisher told us
that she could not recall discussing detainee treatment or particular
interrogation techniques with the FBI, but that she was aware that the
FBI did not consider DOD interrogations at GTMO to be effective.
Concerns about the efficacy of DOD interrogation techniques also
reached then Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division

Michael Chertoff, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, and
Attorney General John Ashcroft.6 The senior-level witnesses we
interviewed generally said they recalled that the primary concern
expressed about the GTMO interrogations was that DOD techniques and
interrogators were ineffective at developing actionable intelligence. These
senior DOJ officials did not identify FBI agents' concerns about the
legality of the techniques or their impact on future prosecutions as a
focus of these discussions.
In addition, we were unable to determine definitively whether the
concerns of the FBI and DOJ about DOD interrogation techniques were
ever addressed by any of the federal government's inter-agency
structures created for resolving disputes about anti-terrorism issues.
These structures included the Policy Coordinating Committee, the
"Principals" Committee, and the "Deputies" Committee, all chaired by the
National Security Council (NSC).
Several senior DOJ Criminal Division officials told us that they
raised concerns about particular DOD detainee practices in 2003 with
the National Security Council, but they did not recall that any changes
were made at GTMO as a result. Several witnesses also told us that they
believed that Attorney General Ashcroft spoke with the NSC or the DOD
about these concerns, but we could not confirm this because former
Attorney General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed for this review.
We found no evidence that the FBI's concerns influenced DOD
interrogation policies. Ultimately, the DOD made the decisions regarding
what interrogation techniques would be used by military interrogators at
GTMO, because GTMO was a DOD facility and the FBI was there in a
support capacity. Similarly, the DOD controlled what techniques were
used in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, once it was clearly established
within each zone that military interrogators were permitted to use
interrogation techniques that were not available to FBI agents, the FBI
On-Scene Commanders said they often did not elevate additional reports
of harsh detainee interrogations to their superiors at FBI Headquarters.
Eventually, the DOD modified its own policies as a result of its
internal deliberations. As noted above, on January 15, 2003, Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded his prior authorization of some of the more
aggressive DOD interrogation techniques. In April 2003, Al-Qahtani
became cooperative with military interrogators. Based on the
information we obtained in the OIG survey and our follow-up interviews,
we believe that around this time the military also reduced the frequency
6 Former Attorney General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed for this review.

xii

and severity of its use of many of the techniques that concerned the FBI
agents deployed at GTMO.
FBI witnesses almost uniformly told us that they strongly favored
non-coercive rapport-based interview techniques to the harsher
techniques used on Al-Qahtani and others due to the FBI's extensive
history of success with such techniques in the law enforcement context.
However, we also learned about a proposal advanced by certain officials
from the FBI and DOJ in late 2002 to change the circumstances of AlQahtani's interrogation. A draft letter prepared for the purpose of
presenting this proposal to the National Security Council indicated that
this proposal involved subjecting Al-Qahtani to interrogation techniques
of the sort that had previously been used by the CIA on Zubaydah- and
another detainee. DOJ and FBI officials involved with this proposal
stated to us that the rationale for this proposal was to bring more
effective interrogation techniques to bear on Al-Qahtani than the
ineffective interrogation techniques that the military had been using on
him up to that time. The techniques that had been previously used by
the CIA on Zubaydah included methods that did not remotely resemble
the rapport-based techniques that are permitted under FBI policy.
However, the DOJ and FBI officials involved in the proposal stated to the
OIG that they did not learn what specific techniques had been used by
the CIA until much later, and that they based their recommendation on
the fact that the CIA had been effective at obtaining useful information
from Zubaydah. Senior officials in DOJ and the FBI such as FBI Director
Mueller, former Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, current Assistant
Attorney General Fisher, and others, told us the draft letter never
reached them, that they were not aware of a proposal to subject AlQahtani to methods of the sort that had been used on Zubaydah, and did
not take part in any specific discussion of such a proposal.
We also determined that the DOD opposed the proposal for AlQahtani, and the proposal was never adopted. Moreover, Al-Qahtani
began cooperating with military interrogators in April 2003, obviating the
underlying rationale for the proposal.
We concluded that the proposal to subject Al-Qahtani to the type
of techniques that the CIA had used on Zubaydah was inconsistent with
Director Mueller's directive that the FBI should not be involved with
interrogations in which non-FBI techniques would be utilized, and with
the frequently stated position of DOJ and FBI officials that the FBI's
rapport-based techniques were superior to other techniques. We were
also troubled that FBI and DOJ officials would suggest this proposal
without knowing what interrogation techniques the proposal entailed.

xiii

VI.

The FBI's Response to the Disclosure of Detainee
Mistreatment at Abu Ghraib

In January 2004, senior managers in the FBI learned about
allegations of prisoner mistreatment at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Managers in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division agreed with the
recommendation of the FBI's On-Scene Commander that the military
should conduct the investigation into the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib
without the assistance of the FBI, because the matter was outside of the
FBI's mission and the FBI's participation might harm its relationship
with.the military.
However, as described below, public disclosure of explicit
photographs and accounts of detainee mistreatment at the Abu Ghraib
prison in late April 2004 triggered a significant effort within the FBI to
assess the adequacy of its own policies regarding detainee treatment in
the military zones and to determine what, if anything, its agents knew
about detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, GTMO, and Afghanistan.
A.

The FBI ' s May 2004 Detainee Policy

Following the Abu Ghraib disclosures, the FBI quickly determined
that although existing FBI policies prohibited FBI agents from utilizing
coercive interview techniques, no policy had ever been issued to address
the question of what FBI agents should do if they saw non-FBI
interrogators using coercive or abusive techniques. On May 19, 2004,
the FBI General Counsel issued an official FBI policy regarding
"Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees."7 This policy included the
following instructions for FBI agents in dealing with detainees:
•

Agents were reminded that existing FBI policy prohibited
agents from obtaining statements during interrogations by
the use of force, threats, physical abuse, threats of such
abuse, or severe physical conditions.

•

Agents were told that FBI personnel may not participate in
any treatment or use any interrogation technique that is in
violation of these guidelines, regardless of whether the cointerrogator is in compliance with his or her own guidelines.
If a co-interrogator is complying with the rules of his or her
agency, but is not in compliance with FBI rules, FBI
personnel may not participate in the interrogation and must
remove themselves from the situation.

7 We refer to the policy as the "FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy."

xiv

•

Agents were told that if an FBI employee knows or suspects
non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a
detainee, the FBI employee must report the incident to the
FBI On-Scene Commander, who shall report the situation to
the appropriate official at FBI Headquarters. FBI
Headquarters is responsible for further follow up with the
other party.
Concerns Expressed by FBI Agents in the Field

Shortly after the public disclosure of the Abu Ghraib abuses,
several FBI agents in the military zones expressed significant concerns
about how the military's use of certain interrogation techniques could
affect the FBI. For example, in May 2004 an FBI supervisor stationed in
Afghanistan sent a series of e-mails to senior Counterterrorism Division
officials in FBI Headquarters stating that although the military had
temporarily restricted the use of aggressive interrogation techniques
such as stress positions, dogs, and sleep deprivation, military
interrogators were likely to resume such methods soon. The FBI
supervisor stated that even if the FBI was not present during such
interrogations, FBI agents would inherently be participating in the
process because they would be interviewing detainees who had either
recently been subjected to such techniques by the military or who would
be subjected to them after the FBI interviews were completed. He
questioned whether it would be ethical for FBI agents to be involved in
such a process and whether they would be held culpable for detainee
abuse. He recommended that the FBI move quickly to issue definitive
guidance to its agents in Afghanistan. By this time, the FBI Office of
General Counsel was in the process of drafting the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy (described above).
However, almost immediately after the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy was issued, several FBI employees raised additional questions and
concerns. In late May 2004, the FBI's On-Scene Commander in Iraq
transmitted an e-mail to senior managers in the FBI's Counterterrorism
Division stating that the instruction in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy that agents report any known or suspected abuse or mistreatment
did not draw an adequate line between conduct that is "abusive" and
techniques such as stress positions, sleep management, stripping, or
loud music that, while seemingly harsh, may have been permissible
under orders or policies applicable to non-FBI interrogators.
In late May 2004, the FBI General Counsel stated in an e-mail to
the FBI Director that agents who asked about the meaning of "abuse" in
the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy were being told that the intent of the
Policy was for agents to report conduct that they "know or suspect is

beyond the authorization of the person doing the harsh interrogation,"
and that there was no reason to report on "routine" harsh interrogation
techniques that the DOD had authorized its interrogators to use.
Consistent with this interpretation, senior FBI officials in the
Counterterrorism Division drafted a "clarification" of the May 2004
Detainee Policy instructing FBI agents to report any techniques that
exceed "lawfully authorized practices." This clarification was never
formally issued, although the interpretation contained in it was
communicated to some FBI agents in the military zones.
In addition, in response to concerns expressed by agents and
attorneys in the FBI after the May 2004 Policy was issued, the FBI
General Counsel directed lawyers in the Office of General Counsel to
prepare legal advice that addressed, among other things, how long FBI
agents needed to wait after another agency interrogated a detainee so as
not to be considered a participant in the harsh interrogation. Several
drafts of supplemental policy to address this issue were prepared by the
Office of General Counsel, but none was ever finalized. However, as
detailed in Section VII below, this issue was addressed in training
provided to agents prior to their deployment in the military zones.
C.

OIG Assessment of FBI Policies

As described below, our report concluded that while the FBI
provided some guidance to its agents about conduct in the military
zones, FBI Headquarters did not fully or timely respond to repeated
requests from its agents in the military zones for additional guidance
regarding their participation in detainee interrogations.
FBI Interview Techniques Although FBI agents were aware that
FBI policies regarding interviews prohibited the use of threats or
coercion, we believe that the agents had several reasons to be uncertain
about whether the rules were different in the military zones. Following
the September 11 attacks, the FBI announced a change in priorities from
evidence collection for prosecution to intelligence collection for terrorism
prevention. In addition, conditions at detention facilities in the military
zones were vastly different from conditions in U.S. jails or prisons. We
believe that under these circumstances FBI agents in the military zones
could reasonably have concluded that traditional law enforcement
constraints on interview techniques were not strictly applicable in the
military zones, particularly with respect to "high value" detainees.
Ultimately, senior FBI management determined that pre-existing
FBI standards should remain in effect for all FBI interrogations in
military zones even where future prosecution was not contemplated.
However, we determined that this message did not reach all FBI agents

xvi

in the military zones. We also found that a few FBI interrogators used
interrogation strategies that might not be appropriate in the United
States, such as extreme isolation from other detainees or other strategies
to undermine detainee solidarity. We concluded that FBI management
should have realized sooner than May 2004 that it needed to issue
written guidance addressing the question of whether its pre-

September 11 policies and standards for custodial interviews should
continue to be strictly applied in the military zones.
Joint Interrogations The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy stated:
"If a co-interrogator is in compliance with the rules of his or her agency,
but is not in compliance with FBI rules, FBI personnel may not
participate in the interrogation and must remove themselves from the
situation." Yet, the question of whether the FBI should participate in,
assist, or observe interrogations conducted by others using non-FBI
techniques was raised to FBI Headquarters well before the Abu Ghraib
scandal broke, and we believe that the FBI should have clarified its
guidance before May 2004.
FBI Interrogations Following Other Agencies' Interrogations
The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy also does not address the issue of
whether FBI agents may interview a detainee who had previously been
subjected to non-FBI interrogation techniques by other agencies.
Although the problem was diminished somewhat when the military
promulgated a new, uniform interrogation policy in 2006 for all military
theaters that stresses non-coercive interrogation approaches (Field
Manual 2-22.3), we believe this has not fully eliminated the need for
clearer FBI guidance with regard to this question. The revised military
policy still permits DOD interrogators to use some techniques that FBI
agents probably cannot employ. Moreover, to the extent that the FBI is
involved with interrogating detainees who have been interrogated by the
CIA, the issue remains significant.
We therefore recommend in our report that the FBI consider
completing the project that its Office of General Counsel began shortly
after the issuance of its May 2004 Detainee Policy and address the issue
of when FBI agents may interview detainees previously interrogated by
other agencies using non-FBI techniques. We also recommend that the
FBI address the circumstances under which FBI agents may use
information obtained in interrogations by other agencies that employed
non-FBI techniques.
Reporting Prior to issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy, the FBI did not provide specific or consistent guidance to its
agents regarding when or how the conduct of other agencies toward
detainees should be reported. Some agents told us they were instructed

xvii

to report problematic interrogation techniques, but the definition of what
to report was left unclear. Leaving this matter to the discretion of
individual FBI agents put them in a difficult position because FBI agents
were trying to establish a cooperative working relationship with the DOD
while fulfilling their intelligence-gathering responsibilities. Under these
circumstances, FBI agents had reasons to avoid making reports
regarding potential mistreatment of detainees. In addition, the agents
lacked information regarding what techniques were permissible for nonFBI interrogators. It was therefore not surprising that some agents who
later told us that they observed or heard about potentially coercive
interrogation techniques did not report such incidents to anyone at the
time.
It is important to note, however, that despite the absence of clear
guidance, several FBI agents brought concerns about other agencies'
interrogation techniques to the attention of their On-Scene Commanders
or senior officials at the FBI. We believe these agents should be
commended for their actions.
In addition, in light of the recurring instances beginning in 2002 in
which FBI agents in the military zones raised questions about the
appropriateness of other agencies' interrogation techniques, we believe
that FBI management should have recognized sooner the need for clearer
and more consistent standards and procedures for FBI agents to make
these reports. If this issue had been more fully addressed by FBI and
DOD Headquarters officials, it would have reduced friction between FBI
agents in the military zones and their military counterparts. Such an
approach should have clarified: (1) what DOD policies were, (2) how the
DOD was dealing with deviations from these policies, and (3) what FBI
agents should do in the event they observed such deviations.
The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, while providing some
guidance, did not fully resolve these issues. The Policy requires FBI
employees to report any instance when the employee "knows or suspects
non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a detainee,"
but it contains no definition of abuse or mistreatment. According to an
e-mail from the FBI General Counsel to the Director dated May 28, 2004,
agents with questions about the definitions of abuse or mistreatment
were instructed to report conduct that they know or suspect is "beyond
the authorization of the person doing the harsh interrogation." Agents
told us, however, that they often did not know what techniques were
permitted under military policies.
Going forward, the military's adoption of a single interrogation
policy for all military zones (Field Manual 2-22.3) may reduce the
difficulties for FBI agents seeking to comply with the reporting

xviii

requirement in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy. Nevertheless,
military interrogators are still permitted to use some techniques not
available to FBI agents, and it is therefore important for agents to receive
training on the approved military interrogation policies and for the FBI to
clarify what conduct should or should not be reported.
As a result, in our report we recommend that the FBI consider
supplementing its May 2004 Detainee Policy or expanding predeployment training to clarify the circumstances under which FBI agents
should report potential mistreatment by other agencies' interrogators. If
the FBI requires its employees to report any conduct beyond the
interrogator's authority, then the FBI should provide guidance to its
agents on what interrogation techniques are permitted under military
policy. If the FBI requires agents to report "abuse or mistreatment," it
should define these terms and explain them with examples, either in the
policy itself or in agent training.

VII.

FBI Training Regarding Detainee Treatment

We also examined the training that FBI agents received regarding
issues of detainee interrogation and detainee abuse or mistreatment in
connection with their deployments to the military zones during the
periods before and after issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.
A large majority of agents who completed their deployments prior
to May 19, 2004, reported in the OIG survey that they did not receive any
training, instruction, or guidance concerning FBI or other agency
standards of conduct relating to detainees prior to or during their
deployment. Most of the FBI agents who reported receiving training
regarding detainee mistreatment issues said they received it orally from
their On-Scene Commander or other FBI agents after they arrived at the
military zone.
By January 2004, the FBI had implemented a 5-day predeployment training program for agents detailed to Iraq. The agenda
provided to the OIG included approximately 1 hour of training regarding
"Interviewing Techniques," but it did not specifically identify any issues
relating to detainee mistreatment.
Almost all the FBI agents who received training during this period
told us that they were instructed to continue to adhere to the same FBI
standards of conduct that applied to custodial interviews in the United
States. Most agents told us they did not receive any specific information
regarding which interrogation techniques were permissible for military
interrogators. Several agents told us the FBI did not provide specific
training about how to conduct joint interviews with the DOD, including
xix

whether agents could observe or assist in interviews led by other
agencies who were using techniques not permitted in the FBI. Several
agents told us they were instructed to leave the interview if they saw
anything "extreme" or "inappropriate." A few FBI agents also said they
were told to report detainee mistreatment by other agencies, but they
received little guidance on what conduct was sufficiently improper to
trigger the reporting requirement.
We determined that in the months following the issuance of the
FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, the FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee
Unit (MLDU) substantially increased the scope of pre-deployment
training provided to FBI agents who were being sent to the military
zones, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. After May 2004, the FBI began
addressing the issue of detainee treatment in a more systematic way
than it had prior to the Abu Ghraib disclosures. Agents received a legal
briefing that included training regarding the contents of the May 2004
Detainee Policy. Agents were also told to "attenuate" their interviews of
potential criminal defendants in cases where the detainee had previously
been questioned by a foreign government or other intelligence community
agency so as to enhance the likelihood that any resulting statement
would be admissible in a judicial proceeding, such as by allowing a lapse
of time and choosing a different location for the FBI interview.
We found no indication that the FBI devised a comparable predeployment program for agents assigned to GTMO. However, in August
2004 the FBI Office of General Counsel attorney stationed at GTMO
began giving training to FBI personnel deployed there, advising them to
rely on the guidance provided in the Legal Handbook for Special Agents.
He told the newly arrived FBI employees that if they saw anything
"untoward" beyond what the FBI was authorized to do or outside the
scope of the military's authority, the agent was to remove himself from
the room and report the incident to the Office of General Counsel
attorney or to the FBI's On-Scene Commander at GTMO. The Office of
General Counsel attorney told us that he and the On-Scene Commander
instructed the newly arrived employees on the scope of the military's
approved techniques.
Although the quantity and quality of FBI training clearly increased
after issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, numerous agents
told us in survey responses and interviews that it would have been useful
to them to receive a more detailed explanation of what constituted
"abuse" and what techniques were permissible to military or other
government agency interrogators under their agencies' policies.

VIII . FBI Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment at GTMO
In this section we summarize our report's findings regarding what
more than 450 FBI agents who served at GTMO told us they observed or
heard about regarding detainee interrogations, any reports by these
agents concerning detainee mistreatment, and what the FBI did with
such reports. These findings, as well as our corresponding findings
relating to Afghanistan and Iraq that are also summarized below, were
based on our survey of FBI employees and numerous follow-up
interviews.
Our survey sought information about whether FBI agents observed
or heard about approximately 40 separate aggressive interrogation
techniques, including such techniques as using water to create the sense
of drowning ("waterboarding"), using military dogs to frighten detainees,
and mistreating the Koran.
A majority of FBI employees who served at GTMO reported in
response to our survey that they never saw or heard about any of the
specific aggressive interrogation techniques listed in our survey.
However, over 200 FBI agents said they had observed or heard about
military interrogators using a variety of harsh interrogation techniques
on detainees. These techniques generally were not comparable to the
most egregious abuses that were observed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Moreover, it appears that some but not all of these harsh interrogation
techniques were authorized under military policies in effect at GTMO.
The most commonly reported technique used by non-FBI
interrogators on detainees at GTMO was sleep deprivation or disruption.
Over 70 FBI employees had information regarding this technique. "Sleep
adjustment" was explicitly approved for use by the military at GTMO
under the policy approved by the Secretary of Defense on April 16, 2003.
Numerous FBI agents told the OIG that they witnessed the military's use
of a regimen known as the "frequent flyer program" to disrupt detainees'
sleep in an effort to lessen their resistance to questioning and to
undermine cell block relationships among detainees. Only a few FBI
agents participated in this program by requesting military officials to
subject particular detainees to frequent cell relocations.
Other FBI agents described observing military interrogators use a
variety of techniques to keep detainees awake or otherwise wear down
their resistance. Many FBI agents told the OIG that they witnessed or
heard about the military's use of bright flashing strobe lights on
detainees, sometimes in conjunction with loud rock music. Other agents
described the use of extreme temperatures on detainees.

Prolonged short-shackling, in which a detainee's hands were
shackled close to his feet to prevent him from standing or sitting
comfortably, was another of the most frequently reported techniques
observed by FBI agents at GTMO. This technique was sometimes used in
conjunction with holding detainees in rooms where the temperature was
very cold or very hot in order to break the detainees' resolve. A DOD
investigation, discussed in the Church Report, classified the practice of
short-shackling prisoners as a "stress position." Stress positions were
prohibited at GTMO under DOD policy beginning in January 2003.
However, these FBI agents' observations confirm that prolonged shortshackling continued at GTMO for at least a year after the revised DOD
policy took effect.
Many FBI agents reported the use of isolation at GTMO, sometimes
for periods of 30 days or more. In some cases, isolation was used to
prevent detainees from coordinating their responses to interrogators. It
was also used to deprive detainees of human contact as a means of
reducing their resistance to interrogation.
In addition, a few FBI agents reported other harsh or unusual
interrogation techniques used by the military at GTMO. These incidents
tended to be small in number, but they became notorious at GTMO
because of their nature. They included using a growling military dog to
intimidate a detainee during an interrogation; twisting a detainee's
thumbs back; using a female interrogator to touch or provoke a detainee
in a sexual manner; wrapping a detainee's head in duct tape; and
exposing a detainee to pornography.
We also examined how the reports from FBI agents regarding
detainee treatment at GTMO were handled by the FBI. In addition to the
reports relating to Al-Qahtani described above in Part V of this Executive
Summary, we found that early FBI concerns about detainee shortshackling were raised with the military command at GTMO in June
2002. However, FBI agents continued to observe the use of shortshackling as a military interrogation technique as late as February 2004.
Reports to FBI Headquarters about these techniques led to the
instructions that FBI agents should stand clear of non-FBI techniques.
As time passed, other reports from FBI agents to their On-Scene
Commanders regarding military conduct were not elevated within the FBI
chain of command because the On-Scene Commanders understood that
the conduct in question was permitted under DOD policy.
FBI agents also reported to us that detainees sometimes told FBI
agents they had previously been abused or mistreated. FBI practices in
dealing with such allegations varied over time. Some agents were told to
record such allegations for inclusion in a "war crimes" file; others were

xxii

told to include the allegations in their regular FD-302 interview
summaries. As noted above, other FBI agents told us they were
instructed not to record such allegations at all. No formal FBI procedure
for reporting incidents or allegations of mistreatment to the military was
established until after the Abu Ghraib prison abuses became public in
2004.

IX.

FBI Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment in
Afghanistan

In this section we summarize our report's findings regarding what
more than 170 FBI agents who served in Afghanistan told us they
observed or heard about with respect to detainee interrogations, any
reports by these agents concerning detainee mistreatment, and what the
FBI did with such reports.
FBI employees in Afghanistan conducted detainee interviews at the
major military collection points in Bagram and Kandahar and at other
smaller facilities. A majority of FBI employees who served in Afghanistan
reported in response to our survey that they never saw or heard about
any of the specific aggressive interrogation techniques listed in our
survey. However, some FBI employees reported witnessing or hearing
about certain techniques.
Like at GTMO, the most frequently reported technique used by
military interrogators in Afghanistan was sleep deprivation or disruption.
According to the Church Report, sleep deprivation was a prohibited
technique under military policy, but sleep disruption (in which the
detainee was permitted to sleep a total of at least 4 hours per 24-hour
period) was permitted prior to June 2004. FBI agents observed sleep
deprivation or disruption at the major detainee facilities in both
Kandahar and Bagram. Many FBI agents also described the use of loud
music or bright or flashing lights to interfere with detainees' sleep.
FBI agents in Afghanistan also told us about observing the use of
shackles or other restraints in a harsh, painful, or prolonged manner in
Afghanistan. However, most of the agents stated that these restraints
were used primarily as a military security measure rather than an
interrogation technique. In addition, several agents told us that they
observed or heard about the use of stressful or painful positions by the
military in Afghanistan.

Several FBI agents also described the use of prolonged isolation by
the military in Afghanistan, but not as a punishment for a detainee's
refusal to cooperate with questioners. Instead, the agents described the

xxiii

use of isolation to prevent the coordination of stories among detainees
and as punishment for disruptive behavior.
Several FBI employees told us they had heard about two detainee
deaths at the military facility in Bagram, but none of the FBI employees
said they had personal knowledge of these deaths. According to the
Church Report, two detainees died at the Bagram facility following
interrogations in which they were shackled in standing positions and
kicked and beaten by military interrogators and military police.8
We found few contemporaneous reports by FBI agents to their
supervisors in Afghanistan regarding concerns about the potential
mistreatment of detainees. In several cases the agents believed,
sometimes incorrectly, that the conduct they saw or heard about was
authorized for use by military interrogators and therefore did not need to
be reported. Moreover, the need for FBI agents to establish their role in
Afghanistan and their dependence on the military for their protection and
material support may have contributed to their reluctance to elevate
their concerns about the military's treatment of detainees. In addition,
several agents told the OIG that they were able to resolve concerns about
the mistreatment of individual detainees by speaking directly to military
supervisors in Afghanistan.

FBI Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment in Iraq

In this section we summarize our report's findings regarding what
more than 260 FBI agents who served in Iraq told us they observed or
heard about regarding detainee interrogations, any reports by these
agents concerning detainee mistreatment, and what the FBI did with
such reports.
We received varied reports from FBI agents who were detailed to
Iraq. For example, several FBI agents said they observed detainees
deprived of clothing. Other frequently reported techniques identified by
FBI agents as used by military personnel in Iraq included sleep
deprivation or interruption, loud music and bright lights, isolation of
detainees, and hooding or blindfolding during interrogations. FBI
employees also reported the use of stress positions, prolonged shackling,
and forced exercise in Iraq. In addition, several FBI agents told the OIG

8 The Army's Criminal Investigative Division recommended charges against 28
soldiers in connection with these deaths. At least 15 of these soldiers have been
prosecuted by the Army, and at least 6 have pleaded guilty or been convicted of assault
and other crimes. Several have been acquitted.

that they became aware of unregistered "ghost detainees" at Abu Ghraib
whose presence was not reflected in official DOD records.
Although several FBI agents had been deployed to the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq, they told us that they did not witness the extreme conduct
that occurred at that facility in late 2003 and that was publicly reported
in April 2004. The FBI agents explained that they typically worked
outside of the main prison building where the abuses occurred, and they
did not have access to the facility at night when much of the abuse took
place.
Few of the FBI agents who served in Iraq made contemporaneous
reports to anyone in the FBI or the military regarding mistreatment of
detainees in Iraq. Almost all of the FBI On-Scene Commanders who
served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 told the OIG that they never received
any reports from FBI agents regarding detainee mistreatment. We
believe this occurred at least in part because there was no formal FBI
reporting requirement prior to May 19, 2004, and some agents assumed
that the conduct that they observed was permitted under military
interrogation policies in Iraq. As in the other military zones, FBI agents
in Iraq generally did not consider their role to include policing the
conduct of the military personnel with whom they were working. Some
agents also told us that they were able to get their concerns resolved by
taking them directly to military officials.

XI.

Specific Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents

We also investigated several specific allegations that FBI agents
participated in abuse of detainees in connection with interrogations in
the military zones. Some of these allegations were referred to us by the
FBI, and others came to our attention during the course of our review.
In general, we did not find support for these allegations. We found
that the vast majority of FBI agents in the military zones understood that
existing FBI policies prohibiting coercive interrogation tactics continued
to apply in the military zones and that they should not engage in conduct
overseas that would not be permitted under FBI policy in the United
States. To the FBI's credit, as noted above, it decided in 2002 to
continue to apply FBI interrogation policies to the detainees in the
military zones. As a result, most FBI agents adhered to the FBI's
traditional rapport-based interview strategies in the military zones and
avoided participating in the aggressive or questionable interrogation
techniques that the military employed. We found no instances in which
an FBI agent participated in clear detainee abuse of the kind that some
military interrogators used at Abu Ghraib prison. For this, we credit the

xxv

good judgment of the agents deployed to the military zones as well as the
guidance that some FBI supervisors provided.
The following paragraphs discuss the most significant allegations
against FBI agents that we reviewed.
Begg We investigated allegations made against the FBI by
Moazzam Begg, a British national who was arrested in Pakistan in late
January 2002 and detained in Afghanistan and at GTMO until his
release in January 2005. Begg alleged that an FBI agent and a New York
Police Department (NYPD) officer working with the agent participated in
interrogations at Bagram Air Force Base during which Begg was
threatened with rendition to Egypt and implied threats were made
against Begg's family. Begg stated he was also subjected to a ploy to
make him believe his wife was being tortured in a nearby room in the
facility. Begg also alleged that on one occasion he was hooded and "hogtied" by military personnel as punishment for failing to tell the
interrogators what they wanted to hear, struck or kicked in the back and
head, and left in this position overnight. He stated that the FBI agent
and the NYPD officer directed or were aware of this treatment. Begg also
alleged that the same FBI agent and NYPD officer later coerced him into
signing a written statement at GTMO by threats of imprisonment and
execution.
We did not find sufficient evidence to support Begg's allegations
with respect to the FBI agent. Specifically, Begg stated that the CIA and
the DOD were in charge of his interrogations in Afghanistan. Begg's own
version of events did not establish that an FBI employee participated in
threatening Begg with rendition, threatening his family, or staging a
harsh interrogation of a female. There was also no evidence that the FBI
participated in, observed, or knew about the alleged "hog-tying" incident.
Saleh We investigated allegations that the FBI participated in
abusive interrogations of detainee Saleh Mukleif Saleh in Iraq in early
2004. Saleh claimed that interrogators tortured him, cuffed him in a
"scorpion" position, punched him, forced him to drink water until he
vomited, dragged him across barbed wire, and subjected him to loud
music. We did not find evidence of FBI involvement in most of these
activities. However, we found that four FBI agents were present during
an interview of Saleh and another detainee in March 2004 in which a
DOD interrogator poured water down the detainees' throat while the
detainees were in a cuffed, kneeling position, and in a rough manner that

would be considered coercive and would not be permissible conduct for
FBI agents conducting interviews in the United States.9
The FBI agents did not join actively in this conduct. In addition,
the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy requiring agents to remove
themselves from such situations and report them to their superiors had
not yet been issued. However, the FBI was the lead agency during this
interrogation and we believe that agents could have influenced the
techniques used by other interrogators during this interview, or at least
reported this incident to their On-Scene Commander. We also found
that the FBI participated in using duct tape to blindfold one of the
detainees in a potentially painful matter, but we were unable to
determine which FBI agent participated in this activity.
Slahi We investigated several allegations by detainee Mohammed
Ould Slahi relating to FBI agents at GTMO. Slahi alleged that an FBI
agent was involved in subjecting him to a harrowing boat ride as a ruse
for making him believe he was being transferred to a different location,
that another FBI agent implied that Slahi would be tortured by the
military if Slahi did not cooperate with the FBI, that another FBI agent
said Slahi would be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan if the charges against
him were proved, and that an interrogator told Slahi he would be sent to
a "very bad place" if Slahi did not provide certain information.
However, we determined that the FBI was not involved in the boat
ride ruse that the military used with Slahi. We concluded that an Army
Sergeant impersonated an FBI agent, without the consent of the FBI, in
connection with this incident.
We also concluded that although an FBI agent who was leaving
GTMO may have told Slahi that the military would treat him differently
than the FBI, he did not intend to threaten Slahi. The military
implemented a plan to use much harsher techniques on Slahi, but this
plan was not agreed to or condoned by the FBI. We also found
insufficient evidence to conclude that another FBI agent threatened Slahi
by telling him he would be transferred to Iraq or Afghanistan if convicted.
Al-Sharabi We investigated several allegations relating to FBI
agents who were involved in questioning GTMO detainee Zuhail Abdo AlSharabi. We found that the military kept Al-Sharabi in an isolation cell
for at least 2 months in 2003 in order to break his resistance to
cooperating with interrogators. FBI agents participated in this tactic by

9 This activity was not equivalent to "waterboarding" as that technique has been
described in media reports.

repeatedly telling Al-Sharabi that he would only be removed from
isolation if he began to provide information. The FBI agents also
suggested to Al-Sharabi that he could win his freedom by speaking
openly. We found that although these tactics were fairly widespread at
GTMO, and several agents told us they understood that the FBI could
use these tactics at GTMO, these tactics would not be permissible for FBI
agents to use in the United States.
As discussed previously, the FBI policy reiterating that existing FBI
policies applied in the military zones was not issued until May 19, 2004.
We believe that the Al-Sharabi matter illustrated the inadequacy and
lack of clarity in the guidance provided to FBI agents regarding
permissible interrogation techniques in the military zones.
Al Qarani We investigated allegations regarding the FBI's
treatment of detainee Yousef Abkir Salih Al Qarani at GTMO. We
determined that in September 2003 FBI agents participated in a joint
interview with the military in which a military interrogator directed that
Al Qarani be short-chained to the floor. This technique would not be
permissible to FBI agents under existing interview policies. Al Qarani
was left alone in this position for several hours, during which time he
urinated on himself. There was no evidence that the FBI agents knew in
advance that the military interrogator would put Al Qarani in this
position. We found this incident to be a further illustration of the
inadequacy of FBI guidance. At the time, FBI policy was not clear about
what an FBI agent should do if another agency's interrogator utilized
such a technique.
We also found that at least one FBI agent participated in
subjecting Al Qarani to a program of disorientation and sleep disruption,
and that the On-Scene Commander at GTMO was aware that other FBI
agents participated in this technique.

Al Qarani told the OIG that he was abused by two FBI agents. We
investigated Al Qarani's allegations and found that the evidence did not
support the conclusion that the allegations related to any FBI employees.
Al Harbi We investigated an allegation in a written FBI interview
summary that detainee Muhammad A. A. Al Harbi claimed he was
beaten by unidentified FBI agents in Afghanistan. However, during his
interview with the OIG, Al Harbi told us that he had no complaints about
his treatment by the FBI and that he believed that the individuals who
struck him in Afghanistan were from another agency.
Zubaydah We investigated an allegation that an FBI agent who
was assigned to assist in the CIA's interrogation of Zubaydah at a secret

xxviii

location participated in the use of "brutal" interrogation techniques.'°
The FBI agent was present when the CIA used techniques on Zubaydah
that clearly and obviously would not be available to FBI agents for use in
the United States. However, these interrogations took place in early
2002, before the FBI had determined whether its traditional policies
regarding interviews would apply to overseas interrogations of terrorism
suspects. The agent described these interrogations to his superiors at
the FBI. At the time of the interrogation, the FBI agent was told that the
other agency was in charge of the interrogation and that normal FBI
procedures should not be followed. The FBI's formal policy addressing
participation in joint interrogations with other agencies in overseas
locations was not issued until 2 years later, in May 2004.
We also examined the FBI's internal investigation regarding an
allegation that the same FBI agent disclosed classified information about
this interrogation and other subjects to persons not authorized to receive
such information. The FBI agent's ex-fiance and a friend of hers alleged
that the agent told them numerous specific details about his
participation in the interrogation of a terrorism subject at an overseas
location. The FBI's Inspection Division investigated the matter, and the
FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility concluded that it was unable to
determine whether information alleged to have been improperly disclosed
was in fact classified or sensitive because of the vague descriptions
provided by the ex-fiance and her friend.
However, we found that the information the ex-fiance attributed to
the FBI agent was detailed, specific, and accurate, and appeared to
contain classified information about the Zubaydah interrogation.
Further, we found no indication that the FBI made any attempt to
determine whether the ex-fiance's detailed account of the FBI agent's
activities was accurate and if so whether the information was classified
or sensitive. Consequently, we believe that the FBI's investigation of this
allegation was deficient.
Facility in or near Baghdad We addressed allegations relating to
FBI conduct during the spring and summer of 2004 at a DOD facility in
or near Baghdad. An FBI agent serving in his capacity as an active duty
officer in the U.S. Army was the officer in charge of the facility. Several
other FBI agents were detailed to the facility to serve as interrogators
during this period. The allegations included claims that detainees were
kept in inhumane conditions at the facility, were denied showers and
medical attention, were deprived of food and water, and were subjected
10 As noted above in footnote 4, because the CIA objected to our access to
Zubaydah we were unable to fully investigate these allegations.

to harsh interrogation techniques such as nudity and dripping cold
water, prolonged in-cell restraints, and threats.
In evaluating the conduct of the officer in charge, we recognized
that the officer was acting in his capacity as a military commander while
he was stationed at the detention facility, not as an FBI employee. In
this capacity, he was expected to comply with military regulations
relating to the treatment of detainees, not FBI policies. The other FBI
agents deployed to the facility were not military, however, and were
subject to FBI rules.
We found that conditions inside the cells in the facility were
primitive and likely extremely hot and uncomfortable during the
summer. However, we did not find that the officer in charge of the
facility was responsible for these conditions, which existed before he
arrived, or that he could control them. We also found insufficient
evidence to conclude that the officer was responsible for any
inadequacies in medical treatment at the facility.

We found evidence that the military used the following
interrogation techniques at the facility, which may have been prohibited
under military policies in effect at the time:
•

Depriving detainees of food and water for the first 24 hours
after their arrival

•

Sleep deprivation

•

"Harsh up" interrogation techniques such as nudity, stress
positions, dripping cold water on the detainee, and forced
exercise

•

A categorization system in which detainees who did not
cooperate with interrogators were kept with hands cuffed
behind their backs while in their cells, while more
cooperative detainees were not restrained in the cells

•

Use of blindfolds or blacked-in goggles during interrogations

•

Threatening detainees with the arrest and prosecution of
family members

We recommend that the military make its own findings regarding
whether these practices at the facility violated military policies, and
whether the officer in charge was responsible for any violation.
We did not find evidence to substantiate that the other FBI agents
who served as interrogators at the facility from May to June 2004
engaged in most of the conduct described above, such as deprivation of

food and sleep and inhumane treatment. However, two FBI agents
knowingly participated in the categorization system for restraining
detainees in the cells who were not cooperative during interrogations.
We believe that this activity probably would not have been permitted in
the United States under FBI policies. The FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy, which reiterated the applicability of existing FBI interrogation
policies in the military zones, was issued near or during the time that
this conduct took place. We also believe that these incidents
demonstrate that the applicability of existing FBI policies in the military
zones was not made clear to all FBI agents prior to the issuance of the
May 2004 Detainee Policy.

XII.

Conclusion

The FBI deployed agents to military zones after the September 11
attacks in large part because of its expertise in conducting custodial
interviews and in furtherance of its expanded counterterrorism mission.
The FBI has had a long history of success in custodial interrogations
using non-coercive, rapport-based interview techniques developed for the
law enforcement context. Some FBI agents deployed to GTMO
experienced disputes with the DOD, which used more aggressive
interrogation techniques. These disputes placed some FBI agents in
difficult situations at GTMO and in the military zones. However, apart
from raising concerns with their immediate supervisors or military
officials, the FBI had little leverage to change DOD policy.
Our review found that the vast majority of the FBI agents deployed
in the military zones dealt with these issues by separating themselves
from other interrogators who used non-FBI techniques and by continuing
to adhere to FBI policies. In only a few instances did FBI agents use or
participate in interrogations using techniques that would not be
permitted under FBI policy in the United States.
The FBI decided in the summer of 2002 that it would not
participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other agencies in
which techniques not allowed by the FBI were used. However, the FBI
did not issue formal written guidance about detainee treatment to its
agents until May 2004, shortly after the Abu Ghraib abuses became
public. We believe that the FBI should have recognized earlier the issues
raised by the FBI's participating with the military in detainee
interrogations in the military zones and should have moved more quickly
to provide clearer guidance to its agents on these issues.

In sum, we believe that while the FBI could have provided clearer
guidance earlier, and while the FBI could have pressed harder for

xxxi

resolution of concerns about detainee interrogations by other agencies,
the FBI should be credited for its conduct and professionalism in
detainee interrogations in the military zones in Guantanamo Bay,
Afghanistan, and Iraq and in generally avoiding participation in detainee
abuse.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
I.

Introduction

On April 28, 2004, the television news program 60 Minutes II
broadcast photographs of detainee abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
In the days and weeks that followed, many more details of detainee abuses
at the prison were made public. Published photographs included images of
soldiers taunting naked Iraqi prisoners in humiliating poses, a hooded
detainee mounted on a box and attached to electrical wires, and military
dogs threatening or attacking Iraq prisoners. In addition, excerpts from a
secret U.S. Army Report were published, which detailed some of the abuse
as follows:
Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric acid on
detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police
guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after
being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a
detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick; using
military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with
threats of attack; and in one instance actually biting a
detainee. 11
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had been deployed in Iraq
during October through December 2003, the period when many of these
abuses occurred. Some FBI agents spent time at the Abu Ghraib prison
during this time period. Within days of the Abu Ghraib disclosures
becoming public, the FBI began an internal inquiry to determine whether
any of its agents had "first hand knowledge of any abuses" at Abu Ghraib
and if so, how the FBI had responded. Within a short time the FBI also
initiated internal inquiries into whether agents had observed aggressive
treatment of detainees at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
(GTMO) and in Afghanistan.
The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
became aware of these FBI investigations, and the OIG made a document
request to the FBI for the purpose of determining whether the OIG should

11 "Torture at Abu Ghraib," The New Yorker, May 10, 2004, quoting from Article 156 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade ("Taguba Report") at 17.

initiate an independent review of FBI activities in the military zones. The
FBI provided approximately 2,500 pages of documents in response to this
request. In addition, the FBI released a large quantity of documents relating
to detainee issues to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) pursuant to
a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Many of the
documents released to the ACLU were heavily redacted;.unredacted versions
were supplied to the OIG. Taken together, the documents made available to
the OIG revealed that FBI agents deployed to GTMO had raised concerns to
their superiors about the military's interrogation practices as early as
October 2002.
The OIG decided to initiate a review relating to the conduct and
observations of FBI agents in the military zones with respect to the
treatment of detainees. Subsequent to the initiation of this review, the OIG
received several communications from members of Congress seeking
information about the OIG's investigation and urging the OIG to address
various issues and documents relating to the FBI's role in detainee matters.

II.

The OIG Investigation

The focus of the OIG investigation was whether FBI agents witnessed
incidents of detainee abuse in the military zones, whether FBI employees
reported any such abuse to their superiors or others, and how those reports
were handled by the FBI. We also examined the development and adequacy
ofthe policies, guidance, and training that the FBI provided to the agents
that it deployed to the military zones. In addition, the OIG examined
whether FBI employees participated in any incident of detainee abuse. The
FBI referred several specific allegations of wrongdoing by FBI agents for
investigation by the OIG. In other cases, the OIG initiated an investigation
of particular FBI employees on the basis of information that the OIG
developed during the course of our review.
The OIG team investigating these issues included OIG attorneys,
special agents, and a paralegal specialist. The OIG developed and
distributed a detailed survey to over 1,000 FBI employees who had deployed
overseas to one of the military zones. Among other things, the OIG survey
sought information regarding observations or knowledge of specifically listed
interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee treatment,
and whether the FBI employees reported such incidents to their FBI
supervisors or others.
The OIG team also interviewed over 230 witnesses. We selected many
of these witnesses on the basis of survey responses indicating that the
respondent had information relevant to our review. Other witnesses were
selected on the basis of their positions or responsibilities within the FBI.

We reviewed over 500,000 pages of documents provided by the FBI, other
components of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of
Defense (DOD). We made two trips to GTMO to tour the detention facilities,
review documents, and interview witnesses, including five detainees. We
also interviewed one released detainee by telephone.

Our review focused on the activities and observations of FBI agents
de-ploved to facilities under the control of the DOD.
With limited
exceptions, we did not investigate the conduct or observations of FBI agents
regarding detainees held at CIA facilities. We were unable, with limited
exceptions, to obtain highly classified information about these facilities,
what occurred there, and what legal authorities governed their operations.
Second, during the course of our review we learned that in January 2003
the CIA Inspector General initiated a special review of the CIA terrorist
detention and interrogation bro-aram.
Therefore, our review focused
mainly on the conduct and observations of the approximately 1,000 FBI
employees related to detainee interviews in military facilities.12

III.

Prior Reports Regarding Detainee Mistreatment

Several prior reports have addressed the issue of detainee treatment
in the military zones. Among the most significant of these are the following:
Taguba Report. In response to reports of detainee abuse at Abu
Ghraib prison, in January 2004 the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Central
Command directed an investigation into the 800th Military Police (MP)
Brigade detention and internment operations from November 2003 to
present. The report of this investigation (Article 15-6 Investigation of the
800th Military Police Brigade, also known as the "Taguba Report") was
completed in March 2004; as noted above, it found intentional abuse of
detainees by military police personnel. The forms of abuse included
punching and kicking detainees, photographing naked detainees in sexually
explicit and humiliating circumstances, and using unmuzzled military dogs
to intimidate detainees.
12 We did review the activities and observations of the FBI in connection with the
interrogation of Zubaydah and a few other detainees at CIA facilities overseas. As detailed
in Chapter Four, these activities and the FBI's reaction to them were important influence
on the development of FBI policies with respect to subsequent detainee interviews. The
conduct of one of the agents in connection with Zubaydah was also the subject of
allegations of agent misconduct that we address in Chapter Eleven.

Fay and Jones Reports . Following the completion of the Taguba
Report, the Combined Joint Task Force Commander ordered an
investigation into the conduct of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at
Abu Ghraib. Two reports were issued as a result of this request: the "Fay
Report" and the "Jones Report." These two reports found numerous
instances in which detainee abuse was "requested, encouraged, condoned,
or solicited" by military intelligence personnel and that in some cases,
military intelligence personnel were directly involved. The reports identified
the primary cause of the abuse as "misconduct (ranging from inhumane to
sadistic) by a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians." The
reports also identified systemic failures that contributed to the abuse, such
as inadequate interrogation policies and training, the intense pressure to
produce actionable intelligence, lack of clear lines of responsibility between
Military Intelligence and Military Police personnel, and inadequate
leadership oversight. The Fay Report and Jones Report also identified
interactions with non-DOD agencies (the CIA) that were perceived to operate
under different rules as a contributing factor that led to abuse.
Schlesinger Report. In May 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld chartered an independent panel chaired by James R. Schlesinger
to review ongoing or completed DOD investigations on detention operations
and to identify the causes and contributing factors to problems in detainee
operations. The Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Detention
Operations (the "Schlesinger Report") was issued in August 2004. It
identified 66 confirmed incidents of detainee abuse in GTMO, Afghanistan,
and Iraq including five deaths. With respect to the Abu Ghraib prison,
which was the location of the vast majority of confirmed abuses, the
Schlesinger Report found that contributing causes included deficient and
frequently changing interrogation policies and inadequate resources,
training, leadership, and oversight.
Church Report. On May 25, 2004, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
directed the Naval Inspector General to conduct a comprehensive review of
DOD interrogation operations. The resulting report (the "Church Report")
was submitted on March 7, 2005. The Church Report detailed the history of
DOD interrogation policies issued in each of the military zones. It reviewed
the interrogation techniques employed by military interrogators in GTMO,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Church Report was complimentary of military
operations at GTMO, but it found that dissemination of interrogation
policies in Afghanistan and Iraq was generally poor, and that unit-level
compliance with the policy was poor in Iraq even when the policies were
known. The Church Report found no evidence that the environment at Abu
Ghraib in the fall of 2003 related to detainee mistreatment was repeated
elsewhere. The Church Report found 71 instances of substantiated detainee
abuse, including 6 detainee deaths. The Church Report determined that
DOD interrogation policies did not cause detainee abuse. Instead, the

Church investigators attributed instances of detainee abuse to episodic
breakdowns in discipline and oversight, particularly at the point of capture
in Afghanistan or Iraq.
Schmidt-Furlow Report. Following the FBI's release of documents to
the ACLU in December 2004, the U.S. Army Southern Command ordered an
investigation into several allegations about the conduct of military
interrogators contained in FBI communications released to the public. The
investigation was led by Lieutenant General Randall M. Schmidt and
Brigadier General John T. Furlow. The results of this investigation are set
forth in the AR-15-6 Report FBI Allegations of Abuse (9 June 2005) (the
"SchmidtFurlow Report'). This report found that out of the 24,000
interrogations conducted at GTMO, there were a total of 3 violations of DOD
interrogation policies: (1) detainees were "short-shackled" to the eye-bolt in
the floor of an interrogation room; (2) duct tape was used to "quiet" a
detainee; and (3) military interrogators improperly threatened a detainee
and his family. The investigators also found that the interrogation of one
high value detainee resulted in degrading and abusive treatment, but did
not rise to the level of inhumane treatment.

IV.

Methodology of OIG Review of Knowledge of FBI Agents
Regarding Detainee Treatment

In this section we describe the methodology of the OIG's investigation
relating to what FBI employees deployed to Afghanistan, GTMO, and Iraq
saw or heard about the treatment of detainees in those military zones. FBI
employees were deployed in significant numbers to assist with interviewing
detainees at many of the locations where abuses allegedly occurred.
Although the FBI generally had limited authority to control the conditions of
detainees in the military zones, FBI employees deployed to these locations
participated in interviewing detainees and were also potential witnesses to
incidents of detainee abuse.
The focus of this part of the OIG's review was to obtain information
from FBI employees who were detailed to the military zones during the
period our survey covered (from late 2001 until December 2004) regarding
the treatment of detainees in those zones. Our review relied primarily on
the results of a comprehensive survey sent to more than 1,000 FBI
employees in June 2005, and our follow-up interviews of FBI employees.
A.

The OIG June 2005 Survey

On June 2, 2005, the OIG distributed a detailed survey to FBI
personnel who had deployed overseas. This survey was distributed to a
total of 1,031 FBI personnel who had been deployed at some time to one or
more of the military zones. The distribution list was compiled from FBI

records and responses to an internal FBI e-mail instructing all employees
who were deployed to the military zones to identify themselves. The OIG
received a total of 913 responses, for a response rate of approximately 90
percent. 13

The survey consisted of 76 questions, some with subparts, and some
with additional questions which were asked depending on the agent's
response. A copy of the survey is provided as Appendix A to this report.
The survey was divided into six parts: (1) basic contact information and
basic information concerning where and when the respondents were
deployed; (2) the nature and extent of training for agents prior to and during
their deployments; (3) respondent observations or knowledge of specific
interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee treatment;
(4) knowledge of incidents involving impersonation of FBI agents, sham
interviews, or denial of access to detainees; (5) information concerning
whether agents reported interview or interrogation techniques and other
types of detainee treatment, and any actions taken in response to such
reports; and (6) the extent and nature of any post-deployment FBI
debriefings.
The 37 questions we asked about particular interview or interrogation
techniques and other types of detainee treatment (Questions 27 through 63)
were based upon information indicating that such forms of coercive or
otherwise questionable treatment of detainees had occurred in one or more
of the overseas locations to which FBI personnel had been deployed. The
sources of such information included documents produced to us by the FBI,
interviews conducted prior to the survey, reports of military and other
investigations, and press reports. For each form of conduct, we asked
respondents to state whether they personally observed the conduct or
observed detainees in a condition that led them to believe the conduct had
occurred, whether detainees told them that this conduct had occurred,
whether others who observed the conduct described it to them, whether
they otherwise obtained information about such conduct other than from
media accounts, or if they never observed such conduct or heard about it
from someone who did. We also asked respondents to indicate whether they
had relevant information as to each form of conduct that was classified
above "Secret." Finally, we included several questions soliciting information

13 We did not or could not obtain responses from 118 individuals who were
originally identified as survey recipients for a variety of reasons. These recipients fell
primarily into the following categories: (1) agents who were posted to overseas locations
without the necessary software to complete the survey; (2) persons who had been identified
erroneously as FBI personnel but who were not; (3) persons who had been erroneously
identified as having served in the military zones when they never did; and (4) persons who
were no longer FBI employees by the time of the survey.

concerning other interrogation practices about which the respondents had
knowledge, but which were not specified in our other questions.14
B.

OIG Selection of FBI Personnel for Interviews

Using the survey responses as a screening tool, we interviewed
selected respondents who indicated they had information pertaining to
several interrogation techniques, or pertaining to the most serious forms of
alleged abuse. We also attempted to interview all of the On-Scene
Commanders (OSC) and Deputy OSCs who served in each military zone
because these agents had supervisory responsibility for FBI personnel and
were positioned to observe or receive reports regarding detainee
mistreatment.15 We interviewed almost all of the former OSCs and all of the
6 Deputy OSCs who served in Afghanistan between late December 2001 and
the end of 2004. We also interviewed all eight of the FBI OSCs in Iraq and
five of the seven Deputy OSCs who served during that period. We
interviewed 15 of the 16 OSCs who served in GTMO. (There were no Deputy
OSCs in GTMO.) We also interviewed several employees who did not
respond to the survey but who we otherwise determined had significant
relevant information.
Because OIG resources did not enable us to interview all of the FBI
personnel who served in the military zones, we generally did not interview
survey respondents who only described conduct clearly justified by concerns
for safety and security of U.S. personnel, or by the need for proper prison
order and discipline. We often chose not to interview those who said that
they had merely heard about conduct observed by others. We also excluded
some respondents who indicated in their survey responses that they had
information only about techniques such as sleep disruption, about which
we had substantial other information from other respondents and
witnesses. Finally, we excluded those respondents who provided
information that we concluded was in fact not within the scope of the
question or our investigation.
C.

OIG Treatment of Military Conduct

We report the results of our investigation regarding what the FBI
agents observed in the military zones in Chapters Eight through Ten. Some
of the interrogation techniques reported by FBI agents in the military zones
are addressed in policies applicable to military interrogators. The question
14 The FBI Inspection Division provided valuable assistance to the OIG in
identifying appropriate respondents and designing and administering the questionnaire.
15 As detailed in Chapter Six, the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy required agents
serving in military zones to report known or suspected abuse of detainees to their OSCs.

of whether military interrogators violated their own agencies' policies is
outside the jurisdiction and expertise of the DOJ OIG. Moreover, we did not
attempt to determine whether military witnesses would dispute the accuracy
of reports made to the OIG by FBI employees. An investigation of this scope
would have been beyond our jurisdiction and our available resources.
However, in this report, we identify potentially applicable DOD
policies in each discussion of a particular technique reported by FBI agents
based on the description of those policies supplied in the Church Report or
the Schmidt-Furlow Report. For comparative purposes, we also indicate
whether prior investigations found instances of conduct similar to that
reported by the FBI agents.

Organization of the OIG Report

This OIG report is organized into 12 chapters. Chapter One contains
this Introduction. Chapter Two provides background information relevant
to the issues addressed later in this report. It describes how the FBI
became involved in the military zones as a result of its changing emphasis
on preventing terrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Chapter Two also describes the organizational structure of FBI
Headquarters with respect to international terrorism and detainee
operations. It also discusses other DOJ entities involved in overseas
detainee issues, as well as inter-agency entities and agreements relevant to
this OIG investigation. In the last part of Chapter Two, we discuss each of
the three zones (GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq), including a brief review of
military detainee operations, a discussion of the FBI's missions and
deployments within the zone, a discussion of the FBI's organizational
structure as it related to the zone, and a detailed description of FBI
interview activities in cooperation with the military within the zone.
Chapter Three provides background information regarding the preexisting interrogation policies of the FBI prior to the September 11 attacks.
These policies, which prohibit the use of coercive interrogation techniques,
are based on constitutional considerations regarding the voluntariness of
custodial confessions and the FBI's position, from years of law enforcement
experience, that rapport-based interview techniques are the most effective
and yield the most reliable information. In Chapter Three, we also address
the various interrogation policies that the DOD adopted for use in the
military zones, and we explain reasons for the dramatic differences between
the FBI's interrogation policies and those issued by the military for use in
military zones overseas.
Chapter Four examines the FBI's initial deliberations regarding how
its agents should conduct themselves in the context of the FBI's new

terrorism prevention function overseas, and its unfamiliar role of being
subordinate to other agencies that controlled most detainees in the military
zones. These deliberations began in 2002 when the FBI sought to assist in
the interrogation of certain high value detainees in the custody of other
agencies. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III decided that the FBI would not
participate in interrogations involving aggressive techniques that were
approved for other agencies in the military zones.
Chapter Five examines the dispute between the FBI and the DOD
relating to Muhammad Al-Qahtani, a detainee held at GTMO who is widely
believed to have been an additional hijacker in the September 11 conspiracy
but who was prevented from entering the United States by immigration
officials at the airport in Orlando, Florida. We examine the treatment of this
detainee in detail because his interrogation became a focal point for tension
between the divergent interrogation models followed by the FBI and the
military. The dispute regarding the interrogation strategy for Al-Qahtani,
which was elevated to senior officials in the FBI and DOJ, was ultimately
resolved in favor of DOD's interrogation approach.
In Chapter Six, we examine the FBI's response to the Abu Ghraib
disclosures in the spring of 2004. We discuss the development of the FBI's
formal written policy addressing agent conduct with respect to detainees in
GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq: an Electronic Communication (EC) issued by
the FBI Office of General Counsel on May 19, 2004 (the "FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy"). Chapter Six also examines how the FBI addressed the
concerns raised by agents in the field after the policy was promulgated.
These concerns related to whether the FBI agents would be deemed to have
"participated" in coercive interrogation techniques used by other agencies by
their presence alone, and the circumstances under which FBI agents would
be required to report interrogation tactics used by other agencies. We also
describe the internal investigations that the FBI conducted following the
Abu Ghraib disclosures.
In Chapter Seven we examine the communication of FBI policies to
agents who were deployed to the military zones. First, we describe the FBI's
early efforts to provide training or guidance to its agents regarding how they
should address detainee issues, including the question of what action they
should take in response to witnessing the use of aggressive interrogation
techniques by other agencies. Second, we describe the expanded training
programs that the FBI developed for agents deployed to the military zones
after the Abu Ghraib disclosures and the issuance of the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy.
Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten detail the results of the OIG's
investigation into what FBI agents saw, heard about, and reported with
respect to detainee mistreatment in GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each of

these chapters follows the same organization. The responses to the OIG's
survey are summarized in tabular form. We then describe the FBI agents'
observations regarding specific techniques, with particular attention to the
harshest techniques and those techniques most commonly observed in the
particular military zone. In the last part of each of these chapters, we
examine the disposition of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to
military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment.
In Chapter Eleven we discuss our investigation of eight separate
allegations that FBI agents in the military zones were involved in detainee
abuse or mistreatment. While some of the allegations we investigated were
made by detainees, others allegations came from other FBI agents, in most
instances in response to the OIG's survey.
Chapter Twelve presents the OIG's conclusions and recommendations
regarding the FBI's involvement in detainee interrogations in the military
zones.

CHAPTER TWO
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In this chapter we provide background information regarding the
FBI's activities in overseas military zones. In Part I we explain how the FBI
became involved in the military zones as a result of its changing emphasis
on preventing terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks. In Part II
we describe the FBI Headquarters organizational structure with respect to
international terrorism and detainee operations. In Part III we describe
other DOJ entities involved in overseas detainee issues, and in Part IV we
describe inter-agency entities and agreements relevant to this OIG
investigation. In Part V we describe each of the three zones (GTMO,
Afghanistan, and Iraq), including a brief review of military detainee
operations, a discussion of the FBI's missions and deployments within the
zone, a discussion of the FBI's organizational structure as it related to the
zone, and a detailed description of FBI interview activities in cooperation
with the military within the zone.

The Changing Role of the FBI After September 11

The FBI is the nation's lead domestic agency for the collection of
foreign counterintelligence information, which includes information relating
to international terrorist activities.16 Since September 11, the Attorney
General and the FBI Director have elevated counterterrorism and the
prevention of future terrorist attacks against United States interests as the
top priority of the DOJ and the FBI. In response to the attacks, Attorney
General Ashcroft directed all DOJ components to focus their efforts on
disrupting any additional terrorist threats. The Attorney General
summarized the Department's new mandate in a speech he gave on
October 25, 2001, in which he said: "Our single objective is to prevent
terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street." This caused a
dramatic shift in the focus of the Department of Justice, including the FBI.
Former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson described this change to
the OIG as a huge paradigm shift within DOJ from prosecution to
prevention. Similarly, other high-level DOJ and FBI officials told us that
after September 11, they worked to transform the FBI into an organization
that would prevent attacks as opposed to react to attacks.

16 The authority for the FBI's broad mission to act at the nation's lead domestic
intelligence agency is set forth most clearly in Presidential Executive Order 12333,
implemented on December 4, 1981.

Part of the transformation of DOJ and the FBI focused on increasing
information sharing within DOJ and the FBI and among all the entities
involved in the collection of intelligence relating to terrorist activities.17
Previously, the FBI's overseas presence was primarily carried out by its legal
attaches (LEGAT), who were assigned to U.S. Embassies around the world
and who facilitated and supported the FBI's investigative interests in the
overseas arena that pertained to threats against the United States. While
the LEGAT system remains in place, after September 11 the FBI sought to
place significant numbers of agents directly in zones outside the United
States where first-hand intelligence relating to potential domestic terrorism
threats could be gathered.18 In particular, the FBI began sending agents to
Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and Iraq. While the activities of the agents
assigned to GTMO were directed for a short time by FBI field offices, the
responsibility for these overseas assignments quickly shifted to officials at
FBI Headquarters. In the next section, we describe the FBI Headquarters
entities relevant to international terrorism generally, and FBI agent
assignments to overseas military zones in particular.

II.

FBI Headquarters Organizational Structure for Military Zones

To assess FBI observations of detainee treatment and how concerns
regarding detainee treatment made their way from line FBI agents up the
FBI chain of command, it is important to understand the various FBI

17 One effect of September 11 and the FBI's change in emphasis was the dissolution
of divisions between the "intelligence" and "criminal investigative" functions. Prior to the
September 11 attacks, procedural restrictions - known informally as the "wall" - were
created to separate intelligence and criminal investigations. These restrictions were created
in response to concerns that if intelligence investigators consulted with prosecutors about
intelligence information or provided intelligence information to criminal investigators, this
interaction could affect the prosecution of a case by allowing defense counsel to argue that
the government had misused its authority to conduct surveillance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Although information could be "passed over the wall" shared with criminal investigators - this occurred subject to defined procedures. In late
2001 and 2002, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the issuance of new guidelines on
intelligence sharing by the Attorney General, and a ruling by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review combined to dismantle the "wall." In its ruling, the FISA
Court of Review wrote, "[E]ffective counterintelligence, we have learned, requires the
wholehearted cooperation of all the government's personnel who can be brought to the
task." In Re Sealed Case , 310 F.3d 717, 743 (2002).
18 The FBI's merging of the intelligence and criminal investigative functions stands
in contrast to the military, which continues to have separate entities for its law enforcement
functions and its intelligence function, as we describe in Section IV.B. 1 of this chapter.

Headquarters entities responsible for counterterrorism, intelligence
collection, and detainee issues.19
A.

Counterterrorism Division

In 1999, the FBI created a separate Counterterrorism Division (CTD).
At FBI Headquarters, CTD has been responsible for the deployments of
personnel and the management of information to and from Afghanistan,
Iraq and GTMO.20 In addition, the number of agents assigned to
counterterrorism nearly tripled between 1995 and 2002. Within CTD,
various entities had jurisdiction over, or management responsibility for, the
collection of terrorism-related counterintelligence information and the
agents collecting such information in Afghanistan, and Iraq. The primary
components within CTD with such responsibilities were the International
Terrorism Operations Sections (ITOS-1 and ITOS-2), and the
Counterterrorism Operational Response Section (CTORS). The Assistant
Director for CTD reports to the Executive Assistant Director for
Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism, who reports to the FBI Director.
1.

International Terrorism Operations Sections

One of the four major components of the FBI's CTD is the
International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS), which is responsible for
overseeing the FBI's international terrorism investigation, including both
criminal and intelligence investigations. The mission of the ITOS is to
prevent terrorist acts before they occur, and to mount an effective
investigative response to any terrorist attacks with the goal of prosecuting
those responsible. ITOS responsibilities are divided between ITOS-1 and
ITOS-2. With respect to the matters covered in this report, ITOS-1 played
an important role. In this regard, the focus of ITOS-1 has been operational
matters relating to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda within the United States.
ITOS-1 distributed information being sent back from FBI agents in
Afghanistan to the relevant FBI field offices, and similarly forwarded
requests by field offices to agents deployed overseas for further
investigation. ITOS-2, on the other hand, had "oversight responsibility for
all FBI counterterrorism operations in Iraq" including the handling of
intelligence gathered there, as well as for all other terrorism matters
elsewhere. The Section Chief for ITOS-1 reports to a Deputy Assistant
Director (Deputy AD) in CTD, who in turn reports to the AD for CTD.

19 Appendix B contains organizational charts for DOJ, the FBI, and the
Counterterrorism Division of the FBI.
20 Six different Assistant Directors were in charge of CTD in the slightly greater
than three-year period covered by this report - from late 2001 to the end of 2004.

Counterterrorism Operations Response Section

The Counterterrorism Operations Response Section (CTORS) was
created in January 2003 as part of the FBI's reorganization and expansion
in counterterrorism efforts. CTORS now includes the Military and Liaison
Detainee Unit (MLDU), the Fly Team, and the FBI Headquarters portion of
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The Section Chief of CTORS reports
to the Deputy AD for Operational Support, who reports to the AD for CTD.
a.

Military Liaison and Detainee Unit

The.agents who are sent on these overseas assignments are overseen,
for the duration of the assignment, by the Military Liaison and Detainee
Unit (MLDU) (initially called the GTMO Task Force). Since its inception, the
MLDU has focused largely on logistics and training. 21 It was originally
formed as an ad hoc task force within the FBI's CTD in late 2002 or early
2003 "to oversee the newly created FBI mission in Afghanistan." MLDU's
duties were been expanded to support agents deployed to Iraq, and it has
been responsible for the FBI's operations in GTMO' as well. MLDU now has
liaison personnel with all of the major military combatant commands Northern Command, Central Command, and Southern Command. The Unit
Chief for MLDU reports to the CTORS Section Chief.

Fly Team

The "Fly Team" was originally established as part of the FBI's
counterterrorism effort on June 1, 2002. This unit's functions include
serving as the FBI's first rapid responders with investigative capabilities
whenever there is an incident overseas, such as the London terrorist
bombings in July 2005. The Fly Team's duties include assessing what the
FBI can contribute to such situations and recommending to FBI
management what resources should be directed to these incidents. The Fly
Team has roughly 30 investigators, many of whom have been deployed for
detainee interviews and other duties in Afghanistan and Iraq several times.
Many Fly Team members were formerly in the military and therefore
operated more easily in the battlefield environment. For these reasons, they
are often paired up for deployments in military zones with agents from field
offices. The Unit Chief for the Fly Team reports to the CTORS Section Chief.
c.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces

The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) are squads within FBI field
offices that focus primarily on addressing and preventing terrorism threats.
21 At the end of 2002 or beginning of 2003, the GTMO Task Force became the

MLDU.

JTTFs include members from other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, including local police departments. Before the September 11
attacks there were 35 JTTFs nationwide. As of March 2005 there were 103.
The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) is a unit within CTORS
that was created to support JTTFs and to enhance communication and
cooperation among federal, state, and local government agencies by
providing for coordination of terrorism intelligence collection activities.
Later in this report, we discuss a limited number of instances involving the
participation of non-FBI JTTF members in detainee interrogations. The Unit
Chief for the NJTTF reports to the CTORS Section Chief.
B.

Critical Incident Response Group

The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) facilitates the FBI's rapid
response to, and management of, crisis incidents. The CIRG includes a
Crisis Negotiation Unit, an Aviation and Surveillance Operations Section,
and a Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). Throughout the period covered by our
review, HRT has contributed a number of agents for FBI force protection
purposes in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) is
another branch of the CIRG that has played a significant role in the military
zones. The mission of the NCAVC is to combine investigative, operational
support functions, research, and training in order to provide assistance to
federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement agencies investigating
unusual or repetitive violent crimes. The NCAVC is composed of three
Behavioral Analysis Units and a Violent Crime Apprehension Program Unit.
Agents from Behavioral Analysis Unit number 1 (BAU-1), which focuses on
terrorism threats, were sent to GTMO to provide behavioral based
investigative and operational support. The CIRG also has a Chief Division
Counsel who provides legal guidance to the group, and who reports to the
CIRG SAC. The CIRG SAC reports to the Executive Assistant Director for
Law Enforcement Services, who reports to the FBI Director's Office.
C.

Office of General Counsel

The FBI Office of the General Counsel provided staff to GTMO and
responded to detainee related inquiries from other FBI divisions, including
inquiries coming from agents assigned to GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The Office of the General Counsel also assisted in developing policy and
preparing FBI Officials for congressional hearings. At GTMO an Associate
General Counsel provided legal advice. The General Counsel reports to the
Director of the FBI.

III.

Other DOJ Entities Involved in Overseas Detainee Matters

In addition to the FBI, other offices within DOJ were involved with
overseas detainee issues discussed in this report. The Deputy Attorney
General and his staff advised and assisted the Attorney General in providing
overall supervision and direction to all organizational units of DOJ,
including the FBI. As part of those duties, the Deputy Attorney General and
members of his office participated in intra and inter agency meetings at
which detainee-related issues were discussed. The FBI reports to the
Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney General.
In addition, DOJ's Criminal Division exercises general supervision
over the Department's enforcement of all federal criminal laws not
specifically assigned to other divisions. Included within the jurisdiction of
the Criminal Division are all criminal terrorism cases. The Criminal
Division is led by an Assistant Attorney General. Members of the Assistant
Attorney General's staff helped supervise and coordinate international
terrorism investigations. In that role, they collected information from the
FBI and U.S. Attorneys' offices and shared it with the DOD, the CIA, and the
White House. Other members of the Assistant Attorney General's staff
oversee the Criminal Division office that handles all criminal foreign policy
of the United States, including liaison with the Department of State and the
National Security Council (NSC). The Criminal Division receives criminal
referrals from the FBI. The Criminal Division was the entity responsible for
oversight of federal criminal matters relating to terrorism and acted as the
primary liaison to the FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU).22
The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) assists the Attorney General in
his function as legal advisor to the President and all executive branch
agencies. The Office drafts the legal opinions of the Attorney General and
provides its own written opinions and oral advice in response to requests
from the Counsel to the President, various agencies of the executive branch,
and offices within DOJ. During the years covered by this report, OLC
generated written opinions and advice relating to certain detainee issues.

IV.

Inter-Agency Entities and Agreements Relating to Detainee
Matters
A.

The Policy Coordinating Committee

Officials from DOJ and the NSC told the OIG that many inter agency
discussions on a variety of overseas detainee matters, such as developing
22 The National Security Division of DOJ is now the entity responsible for oversight
of criminal matters relating to terrorism.

processes for sorting detainees and later for the repatriation or release of
detainees, took place in a Policy Coordinating Committee. The Policy
Coordinating Committee for detainee issues was led by a National Security
Council (NSC) staff member, and was composed of representatives from
DOJ, the Department of State (DOS) (including members of the DOS Office
of the Legal Advisor), the DOD (General Counsel's Office and sometimes
others from the Joint Chiefs), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A
Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division was the official
DOJ point of contact for the PCC, and others from the Criminal Division,
the Deputy Attorney General's Office, and the FBI attended at various times.
By late 2001 or early 2002, there were regular (sometimes weekly)
PCC video conferences or meetings on detainee issues that were chaired by
the NSC legal advisor. Issues that could not be resolved at the PCC could
be "bumped up" to the "Deputies" meeting, which was attended by the
Deputy Attorney General or his designee (such as Patrick Philbin, the
Associate Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence/ National Security). If a
resolution still could not be reached, an issue could be raised to the
"Principals" meeting, which included the Attorney General or his designee.
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division,
David Nahmias, said that separate from the PCC meetings, a group of
individuals reviewed enemy combatant or potential enemy combatant cases
to evaluate the government's options on how to proceed. Nahmias and
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Alice Fisher
both described an informal working group, formed after the Jose Padilla
case arose, which included representatives from DOJ's Criminal Division
and OLC, as well as representatives of the CIA and the DOD.23 The group
was intended to promote inter agency coordination on certain detainee
matters. The role of DOJ at these meetings, according to Nahmias, was to
share information about people domestically who, in theory, could be enemy
combatants, and to see who were being held as enemy combatants who
potentially might be prosecuted. He told the OIG that the CIA
representative considered intelligence aspects of these cases, and the DOD
considered military aspects.

23 Jose Padilla was arrested by the FBI when he entered the United
States on May
8, 2002, based on a federal material witness warrant. The President declared Padilla an
enemy combatant, and Padilla was transferred to military custody in June 2002. He was
subsequently transferred to DOJ custody and was convicted of conspiracy to murder,
kidnap and maim individuals in a foreign country, conspiracy to provide material support
to terrorists, and providing material support to terrorists on August 16, 2007.

Inter-Agency Memorandums of Understanding

There are several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the
FBI or DOJ and other government agencies that are relevant to detainee
abuse issues or otherwise relevant to this review.
In 1984 DOJ and the DOD entered into an MOU relating to the
investigation and prosecution of criminal matters over which the two
Departments have jurisdiction. The 1984 MOU provides that most crimes
taking place on a "military installation" will be investigated by the DOD.
When such a crime is committed by a person subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the DOD will also prosecute the matter. With respect to
"significant cases in which an individual subject/victim is other than a
military member or dependent thereof," the DOD must provide notice of the
matter to DOJ. Witnesses and documents indicate that pursuant to this
1984 MOU, the DOD has assumed jurisdiction over the investigation of
potential crimes relating to detainee abuse at DOD facilities in the military
zones.
In 1995, DOJ entered into an MOU with several intelligence agencies,
including the DOD and the CIA. This MOU requires each employee of an
intelligence agency to report to the agency's General Counsel or Inspector
General any facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate that an
employee of an intelligence agency has committed a crime. If the subject of
the allegation is an employee of a different intelligence agency than the
person making the report, the General Counsel of the accusing person's
agency must notify the General Counsel of the accused employee's agency.
The General Counsel of the accused employee's agency must then conduct a
preliminary investigation of the matter. If the inquiry reveals a reasonable
basis for the allegations, and the crime falls within certain specified
violations of federal criminal law (including crimes involving intentional
infliction or threat of serious physical harm and crimes likely to affect the
national security, defense, or foreign relations of the United States), the
General Counsel must report the matter to DOJ. The MOU also requires
employees of intelligence agencies to report to their General Counsel any
violations of specified crimes by persons who are not employees of any
intelligence agency (such as civilian contractors), and these crimes must
also be reported to the DOJ.
In 2003, the FBI and the CIA entered into an MOU concerning the
detailing of FBI agents to the CIA to assist in debriefing certain high value
detainees at "sensitive CIA debriefing sites." The MOU primarily addresses
how information obtained by FBI agents detailed to such sites will be used
and protected. The FBI agreed to observe strict need-to-know principles
and limit knowledge of the existence of the MOU. This MOU did not address

standards for detainee interrogations or how detainee abuse allegations
would be handled.
In late 2004, the FBI entered into an MOU with the DOD Criminal
Investigative Task Force (CITF). As detailed below, CITF is the military's law
enforcement arm with responsibility for gathering evidence for the military
commission process and possible war crimes prosecutions. The FBI's MOU
with CITF primarily addresses information sharing between the agencies in
the performance of law enforcement functions (not intelligence). It does not
address detainee treatment standards or reporting of detainee abuse
allegations.
We are not aware of the existence of any MOU between the FBI or
DOJ and the DOD or the CIA relating to standards for interrogation of
detainees in DOD or CIA custody.

Background Regarding the FBI's Role in the Military Zones

In this section we provide background regarding the FBI's activities in
each of the three military zones discussed in this report. FBI operations
began in Afghanistan in late 2001, shortly before the FBI began sending
agents to GTMO. The FBI sent its first deployment of agents to Iraq in
March 2003.
A.

Afghanistan

The United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to
remove the Taliban government from power, capture or kill al-Qaeda
personnel responsible for the September 11 attacks, and destroy or
diminish al-Qaeda's ability to mount further terrorist attacks.
1.

Military Operations and Detention Facilities

The DOD conducted U.S. military operations in Afghanistan under the
DOD's Central Command (CENTCOM). Beginning in May 2002, senior
command in the military theater was vested in Combined Joint Task Force
180 (CJTF-180), later redesignated CJTF-76. Church Report at 6-7, 180183. The military's primary bases were located near the cities of Bagram in
the north and Kandahar in the south. Church Report at 181-83. As
operations in Afghanistan progressed, the military established several
forward operating bases, sometimes called firebases, in remote areas around
the country to support units operating in the field. These bases were
operated by DOD Special Operations Forces or conventional forces. Church
Report at 184. Several firebases were operated jointly by the military and
the CIA.

According to the Church Report, over 30,000 U.S. military personnel
were serving in Afghanistan as of August 2004, and U.S. forces had
detained, beyond individuals questioned in an initial screening process,
roughly 2,000 persons since late 2001. Church Report at 233.
We briefly summarize here the evolution of military detention facilities
in Afghanistan, a topic described in detail at pages 180-186 of the Church
Rep ort. Beginning in May 2002, a U.S. military facility in Bagram

The military had custody and control over the detainees throughout
Afghanistan, and FBI agents were required to arrange access to the
detainees through military police and military intelligence personnel.
2.

The FBI' s Mission

In September or October 2001, prior to the invasion of Afghanistan,
FBI agents met with CENTCOM to discuss the military's and the FBI's
knowledge about al-Qaeda. Shortly thereafter, the military requested the
assistance of the FBI in Afghanistan. In December 2001, the FBI sent the
first group of eight agents to Kandahar, Afghanistan. According to the Team
Leader for this group, this deployment of FBI agents into a theater of war
working side by side with the military was unprecedented. 24 In addition, as
a result of the Afghanistan deployment and the deployment to GTMO in
January 2002, the FBI had personnel at "both ends of the pipeline" for
counterterrorism information.25
The FBI mission in Afghanistan evolved over time. Initially, the
primary focus was interviews of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees captured by
coalition forces and review of captured documents. FBI agents understood
from the outset that they would likely be interviewing detainees together
with U.S. military or CIA personnel. In addition, FBI agents assisted the
military with "sensitive site exploitation" missions, which involved the
collection of time-sensitive information at selected priority targets, such as
24 Similarly, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent deployed in Iraq told us that FBI
agents had not been deployed to a combat zone since World War II.
25 The Church Report stated that CENTCOM forces in Afghanistan first transferred
detainees to GTMO on January 7, 2002. Church Report at 182-183.

caves and homes that had been vacated by al-Qaeda personnel during
coalition attacks.
In February 2004, based on a DOD request, the FBI expanded its
contingent in Afghanistan and positioned investigators with more forward
deployed military units to assist in the collection of intelligence. In June
2004, the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) sent a team to Afghanistan
to assess the role of FBI personnel in that country.26 As a result of that
assessment, the FBI CTD issued an Electronic Communication (EC) that
clarified the FBI's primary mission in Afghanistan as the collection of
actionable threat intelligence which may have a possible nexus to the
United States, its citizens and interests." The EC identified the following
priorities within this mission, including:
Interviewing detainees or Persons Under Custody (PUC) and
other individuals of interest at the detainee collection points
and other smaller facilities, using rapport-based strategies, to
obtain actionable intelligence in the war on terrorism.
Participating in "Sensitive Site Exploitations" and "forward
staged interrogations"

, with an emphasis on
collecting strategic intelligence with a nexus to the United
States. Establishing a liaison with all coalition forces to ensure
the collection and appropriate communication of information
with a nexus to the United States., Supporting the in Afghanistan with FBI technical
and forensic assets. Supporting specialized joint FBI-CIA
operations at
Providing training to the Government of
Afghanistan.
3.

FBI Deployments

Based on the results of the OIG survey and other information, we
estimated that between 200 and 250 FBI agents served in Afghanistan
between late 2001 and the end of 2004. An FBI Deputy OSC stated that the
FBI personnel in Afghanistan "were there as a force multiplier, but it was
the [military's] show." Between late 2001 and the end of 2004, the number
of FBI personnel deployed in Afghanistan at any one time ranged between
10 and 25. These totals included agents who conducted interviews as well
as other FBI personnel who did not have detainee interview responsibilities,
26 This assessment followed several incidents in which FBI agents were involved in
ambushes or other violent actions. Because of these incidents, FBI participation in
sensitive site exploitations was temporarily suspended.

such as Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) personnel, bomb technicians, and
technically trained agents.
FBI agents who served in Afghanistan volunteered from FBI field
offices. FBI Headquarters personnel said they tried to recruit agents who
had previously served in the military or had special weapons and tactics
(SWAT) team experience. Sometime in 2004, the FBI increased the length of
these assignments from 60 days to 90 days for agents. Between December
2001 and April 2002, the tenure for OSCs in Afghanistan varied between
one and two months. Thereafter, most of the OSCs served in Afghanistan
for 90-day rotations.
FBI-agents were deployed to

FBI personnel in Afghanistan depended upon the military for
transportation, translators, supplies, housing, and protection.
4.

Organizational Structure of the FBI in Afghanistan

During much of the period covered by our review, the rotations of FBI
agents deployed to Afghanistan were supervised by an experienced agent
serving as the On-Scene Commander (OSC). Thirteen agents served as the
FBI's OSC in Afghanistan at various times during the period covered by this
review. CTD established the position of Deputy OSC in Afghanistan in early
2004, and six agents served in that position through the end of 2004.
However, for most of 2002 and all of 2003, the FBI did not have any OSC
present in Afghanistan, and the FBI's Afghanistan operations were managed
from the New York Field Office or, beginning in June 2002, from FBI
Headquarters in Washington. In mid-2003, a senior agent was present in
Afghanistan.
OSCs and Deputy OSCs in Afghanistan and elsewhere served as the
direct representatives of FBI Headquarters. They assigned and supervised
the deployed personnel, served as points of contact and liaison with military
and intelligence personnel, kept FBI Headquarters informed about the
agents' work, the logistics issues, and the military personnel with whom
they were working, and arranged for the transfer of information, leads, and
requests to and from U.S. FBI offices and the military. To varying degrees,
OSCs and Deputy OSCs also participated in detainee interviews as time and
other duties permitted.
The FBI OSCs in Afghanistan supervised the preparation of Daily
Situation Reports that were transmitted to FBI Headquarters. The OSCs

and Deputy OSCs also maintained daily contact with FBI Headquarters by
satellite telephone.
5.

FBI Activities in Afghanistan

FBI agents' activities in Afghanistan consisted primarily of detainee
interviews, participation in military sensitive site exploitations (comparable
to domestic execution of search warrants and crime scene processing),
collection of detainee biometric information, and traditional FBI criminal
investigation work as a result of bombings against U.S. citizens or
facilities.27 Because the primary focus of this report is detainee
interrogations, we describe the FBI's interview/ interrogation activities in
more detail below. The FBI's other activities in Afghanistan are summarized
in the second part of this subsection.
a.

Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents

Most of the detainee interviews conducted by the FBI in Afghanistan
took place at military facilities, such as the detainee collection facilities at
Bagram and Kandahar. Due to the small number of FBI personnel in
Afghanistan, it was not possible for them to interview all of the detainees
that came through U.S. military facilities. Several agents told us that FBI
personnel focused their efforts primarily on Arabic-speakers and al-Qaeda
personnel, rather than the Afghan locals such as the Taliban. As a result,
FBI agents had contact with only a small percentage of the detainees who
were interrogated in Afghanistan by military personnel.
The number of detainees each FBI agent interviewed while in
Afghanistan also appears to have been small, often fewer than 20 detainees
during an agent's deployment. Agents frequently interviewed the same
detainee several times. In addition, many FBI agents also briefly
interviewed "Persons Under Control" (PUC). (According to the Church
Report, all captured persons were initially considered PUCs. If they satisfied
screening criteria set by the Secretary of Defense, they became "detainees."
Church Report at 191-192.)
The FBI Daily Situation Reports from May through December 2004
(which were the only Situation Reports produced to the OIG) indicated that
during that 8 month period the total number of FBI custodial detainee
interviews was 681 and the total number of field interviews of PUCs was
303.

27 The written work product from those deployed generally consisted of interview
FD-302s or ECs, After-Action Reports for sensitive site exploitations, and Daily Situation
Reports.

The FBI determined who it wanted to interview by variou s methods,

FBI interviews of detainees, at least at Kandahar from late 2001 into
early 2002, were conducted in the same tents and rooms used by the
military interrogators. We were told that before the FBI could conduct its
lengthier detainee interviews, military interrogators completed their priority
interrogations to obtain time-sensitive tactical battlefield intelligence. For
the FBI interviews, detainees were brought in by the Military Police, and sat
down with the FBI agents at a table with folding chairs. Some detainees
were brought in hooded or blindfolded, depending on their level of
compliance or security risk, and most detainees were restrained with hand
shackles. According to an after-action memorandum from a former OSC to
FBI Headquarters dated March 5, 2002, during the early months of FBI
deployments in Afghanistan, agents in Kandahar "were limited" in their
ability to conduct "in depth interviews due to limitations with translators,
lack of available intelligence, space restrictions, and prioritization of
interviews to the military."

As explained in Chapter One, we are not addressing
FBI activities at these sites.

Joint Interviews with Military Investigators

FBI agents often worked jointly with military personnel in Afghanistan
in planning, preparing for, and conducting detainee interviews, particularly
until mid-2004. Of the roughly 200 agents who served in Afghanistan and
responded to the OIG survey, 86 stated that they jointly interviewed
detainees with military or intelligence agency personnel.

Other agents told us that FBI agents only conducted interviews with
other FBI agents. Some agents told us they avoided joint interviews because
they knew the military was operating under different rules. The FBI OSC in
Afghanistan in the spring of 2004 told us that as of approximately April
2004, the military would not invite FBI personnel in to interviews in which
they thought there would be a conflict between FBI rules and military rules.
He stated that if there was a joint interview, it was understood from the
start what the FBI could and could not do. However, the evidence indicates
that the FBI's practice of conducting joint interviews with other agencies
continued at least occasionally after April 2004. Other information
indicates that military observers were often present during FBI interviews in
Afghanistan.
c.

Other FBI Activities in Afghanistan

Substantial FBI resources were also devoted to other aspects of its
counterterrorism mission, such as participation in military "sensitive site
exploitations" and the collection of detainee biometric data.

FBI participation in sensitive site exploitations began during the first
rotation of agents at the request of a

The FBI also collected and disseminated to other agencies detainee
biometric information such as fingerprints, DNA samples, and standard

identification photographs. As groups of detainees were captured on
battlefields throughout Afghanistan and brought to detention facilities, FBI
agents worked with military personnel in the initial fingerprinting, DNA
sample collection, and photographing of the detainees. This work was done
largely by FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS
ersonnel at various locations in Afghanistan.

The FBI also conducted traditional criminal investigations of
bombings and other crimes against American citizens, companies, and
facilities in Afghanistan. For example, an FBI agent told us that in
September 2004 he interviewed several detainees in Kabul who were in the
custody of the Afghan National Directorate of Security, in connection with
the bombing of the Dyncorp building in which three Americans were killed.
B.

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1.

Military Operations and Detention Facilities

In October 2001, soon after the start of the United States' military
operations in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, the United
States began detaining suspected al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban fighters.
The President declared these detainees "illegal enemy combatants" and the
United Stated decided to detain them at the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Church Report at 99. After receiving the order to establish
detention operations at GTMO, the military was directed to have detention
facilities up and running within 96 hours.
The first planeload of 20 detainees arrived at GTMO on January 11,
2002, less than 5 days after the order was given to build a detention facility
to house 100 captured enemy combatants. Church Report at 99. According
to FBI documents, agents from the FBI and the DOD Criminal Investigative
Task Force (CITF) began formally interviewing detainees on February 4,

2002.
a.

GTMO Camps

(1)

Camp X-Ray

The first camp to house detainees was called Camp X-Ray. Camp XRay was the site of an old detention facility that had housed Haitian
refugees. Cells at Camp X-Ray were temporary 8 foot by 8 foot by 10 foot
units constructed of chain-link fencing. The cells did not have solid walls;
the military used tarps to keep out the sun and rain. Detainees slept on 4inch thick mattresses on cement slabs. The roof of each cell was

constructed of metal and wood. Portable toilets and showers were available
for the detainees outside of their individual cells. The interrogation rooms
were also very primitive, although the walls were plywood rather than chain
link. Camp X-Ray was used to house detainees for 3 months until more
permanent detention facilities could be built.

(2)

Camp Delta

Construction on Camp Delta began almost immediately after Camp XRay was completed. Detainees were moved to Camp Delta starting on
April 28-29, 2002. Camp X-Ray was closed when the last detainees moved
out.
Camp Delta consists of multiple detainee cell blocks or "camps"
numbered consecutively in the order in which they were built. Detainees
are assigned to the camps based on an assessment of their cooperation or
potential for violence.
Camps I through III house detainees considered to be less compliant
than the most cooperative detainees at GTMO. The living conditions at
these three camps are almost identical. The individual cells or detention
units are 8 feet long, 6 feet 8 inches wide, and 8 feet tall and are
constructed of metal mesh material on a solid steel frame and a metal roof.
Each unit has its own floor-style flush toilet, a metal bed frame raised off
the floor, and a sink and faucet with running water. There are two
recreation yards and four showers per block. Exhaust fans mounted in the
ceiling ventilate the cell blocks.
Camp IV houses the more compliant and cooperative detainees at
GTMO. Camp IV received its first detainees in February 2003. The
detainees live in communal living areas that resemble dormitories. The
camp has a common recreational area to which the detainees have access 7
to 9 hours a day.
Camps V and VI house detainees who are considered to be the most
dangerous detainees at GTMO and those that have the most valuable
intelligence. Camp V is a 2-story maximum security complex made of
concrete and steel designed to hold 100 detainees. Completed in May 2004,
it was modeled after the Miami Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana.
The camp is composed of five wings. Each cell is 7 feet six inches long and
12 feet 10 inches wide and is made of cast cement containing a cement
formed bed, stainless steel sink, toilet, and window. The cells have cement
floors. Camp V has its own interrogation facilities, which are two rooms per
floor with video and audio capability that can be monitored from a central
control room. Church Report at 103. Camp VI, the most recent addition to
Camp Delta, is another concrete and steel structure modeled after a jail in

Lenawee County, Michigan, designed to hold approximately 200 detainees.
It was initially planned as a medium security facility for GTMO, but was
later modified to be a maximum security facility.

Camp Delta also includes a 20-bed hospital dedicated to providing
medical care to the detainees. It has an outpatient clinic, two operating
tables, a dental clinic, a physical rehabilitation area, and quarantine
chambers for contagious arrivals.

(3)

Other GTMO Facilities

Camps Echo and Iguana are located just outside Camp Delta. Church
Report at 103. Camp Echo is a small camp that houses detainees who have
been segregated from the general detainee population for a variety of
reasons, such as disciplinary issues, meetings with counsel, or preparation
for departure from GTMO. Each wooden building in the camp has two cells.
A cinder block wall separates the cells. Each cell has a toilet, a sink, and a
bed. A shower is adjacent to each cell. Outside each cell is an area for a
guard to sit or for use during an interrogation.
Camp Iguana was originally designed as a lower security detention
facility to hold a small number of juvenile detainees believed to be under the
age of 16. Camp Iguana is now generally used to house detainees who are
no longer deemed to be enemy combatants, or who are awaiting transfer to
their home country.
The Navy Brig, a small detention facility at GTMO outside the camps
described above, that has been used to house detainees for various
purposes, such as disciplinary reasons or for special interrogations. A
control center located at the end of the communal living area operates all
doors and cells within the facility and two rows of metal segregation cells. A
cell is approximately 6 feet long, 8 feet wide and 8 feet tall. Each cell has a
window located on the cell door facing the communal living area. The
control center has a view of all cell doors and all detention areas.
b.

GTMO Organizational Structure

The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), located in
Miami, Florida, is one of nine unified Combatant Commands in the

Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing contingency
planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South
America, the Caribbean, Cuba and the Bahamas, and their territorial
waters, as well as the force protection of U.S. military resources at these
locations. SOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the
Panama Canal and the canal region. GTMO falls within the jurisdiction of
the SOUTHCOM.

According to the Church Report, the command organization at GTMO
"evolved significantly over time." Church Report at 103. The original
organization had separate chains of command for intelligence operations
(JTF-170) and detention operations (JTF-160). Id. at 104. These two
separate joint task forces created a bifurcated chain of command that,
according to the Church Report, impeded cooperation between the military
intelligence and military police units responsible for GTMO. Id. These
separate chains of command were combined on November 4, 2002, and
were re-designated JTF-GTMO. Id. at 104-05. JTF-GTMO is responsible
both for operating the detainee detention facility at GTMO and for
conducting interrogations to collect intelligence in support of the United
States' efforts to combat terrorism. Major General Geoffrey Miller was
appointed on November 4, 2002, to lead this new joint task force. Id. at
105. He was succeeded by Brigadier General Jay Hood.28
JTF-GTMO is composed of three groups, each of which reports to the
JTF-GTMO commander and deputy commander, who in turn report to the
commander of SOUTHCOM. The Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG)
includes six military police companies and is responsible for security at the
various camps. The Joint Interrogation Group (JIG), discussed in more
detail below, is responsible for the collection and dissemination of
intelligence from all the detainees in the custody of the DOD at GTMO. The
Joint Medical Group (JMG) is responsible for the detainee hospital.
The JIG combines military intelligence elements to pursue its
interrogation mission. According to the Church Report, the centerpiece of
the JIG is the Interrogation Control Element, which coordinates and
supervises the efforts of the military intelligence interrogators, analysts,
linguists, and civilian contract personnel who work on interrogations.
Church Report at 105. The collection of intelligence at GTMO is pursued
primarily through detainee interrogations, but also through
The Interrogation
Control Element at GTMO includes members of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). Throughout this report, members of the DIA, Defense
28 As of October 2007 the current Commander of JTF-GTMO is Rear Admiral Mark
H. Buzby.

HUMINT Service, and other military intelligence gathering entities will be
referred to as "military intelligence." The JIG at GTMO also included a
"Special Projects" team that focused on detainees believed to be of high
value.
The interrogation operations at GTMO included some entities that did
not fall within the Interrogation Control Element, including the FBI and the
DOD Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF). Unlike the FBI, in which
intelligence gathering and criminal investigative functions are now merged,
the military has kept its law enforcement groups separate from its
intelligence collection groups. The law enforcement groups that make up
the CITF are the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the Army
Criminal Investigation Command (CID), and the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (OSI). CITF conducts interrogations in order to gather
evidence for the military commission process and possible war crimes
prosecutions. Church Report at 107.
2.

The FBI's Mission

In a December 2001 Electronic Communication (EC), FBI
Headquarters directed the Miami Field Office to coordinate with the U.S.
military and establish an FBI presence on the U.S. Naval base at GTMO.
According to the EC, the Miami Field Office was to

On January 7, 2002, the first FBI agents arrived at GTMO. This first
group of agents consisted of one Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), one
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), and two Spe cial Agents (SA) from
the Miami Field Office. These agents were assigned to

. When they
arrived there were only cells at Camp X-Ray that were left over from the
Haitian refugee operation of many years past. Navy personnel were building
more chain link cells to house the incoming detainees whose arrival was
imminent.

29 On January 11, 2002, the first
plane load of 20 detainees arrived at GTMO. Church Report at 99.
FBI Director Mueller told the OIG that he visited GTMO in early 2002.
He said he then decided to reorganize how the FBI managed its operations
at GTMO because it appeared that a much larger FBI component would be
29

As it turn s out,

The failure to obtain useable intelligence was primarily
due to

participating in the FBI's mission there than previously anticipated. He also
stated that to better manage GTMO staffing and oversight, the FBI's
activities should be handled from FBI Headquarters. The entity established
to do that, as described above, was first called the GTMO Task Force and
was later named the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU). Director
Mueller said he was told at that time that the FBI was working closely with
the military.

FBI Deployments

Between January 2002 and December 2004 over 400 FBI agents were
deployed to GTMO. Approximately half of these agents were assigned to
conduct detainee interviews. Others were sent to GTMO to fulfill roles
relating to detainee interviews, such as behavioral analysis of detainees,
that could be used to develop interview strategies, translation of detainee
interviews, and photographing or fingerprinting of detainees for
identification purposes. The remainder were sent to GTMO in more eneral
support roles such as administrative support, computer support,

FBI personnel in GTMO primarily used FBI-supplied equipment and
transportation, but sometimes relied on military equipment when FBI
equipment was unavailable. The housing used by the FBI was supplied by
the military and was at first very limited, which in turn limited the number
of FBI personnel who could be on the island at any given time.
4.

FBI Organizational Structure at GTMO

As noted above, the first group of FBI agents sent to GTMO consisted
of one SSA, one ASAC, and at least two technically trained agents from the
Miami Field Office. Shortly thereafter, the SSA and his replacements began
to act as the FBI's "On-Scene Commanders" (OSC). From January 2002 to
August 2003, the FBI assigned 16 different temporary OSCs, some of whom
served multiple deployments. These OSCs were deployed to GTMO on
temporary duty assignments for terms ranging from 2 to 6 weeks. By
August 19, 2003, the FBI created a longer-term position at GTMO for the
OSC, and from that point on the OSCs have served for terms of up to 2
years.
The FBI generally assigns a "case agent" to each of its major
investigations. The Miami Field Office assigned a case agent to coordinate
all GTMO-related investigative activities. Although, as noted above,
responsibility was subsequently transferred to FBI Headquarters, this case
agent initially assigned by the Miami Field Office remained assigned to
GTMO for over a year in that position. This case agent told the OIG that the
FBI's chain of command was not as clear cut on GTMO as it would be back

in the United States. He said there was a high turnover of agents and
temporary supervisors at GTMO, and that personnel worked long days on
many different tasks. He said that this atmosphere did not lend itself to a
regimented system in which everything was done in "lockstep" with SAC
authority.
In March 2002, the FBI contingent at GTMO had grown to
approximately 25-30 people on the island. at any given time , and the
number of FBI personnel remained relatively constant until approximately
September 2003, when it dropped to approximately a dozen people.
By August 2004, the FBI had sent a representative from its General
Counsel's office to work at GTMO and provide legal assistance to FBI
personnel at GTMO. The first legal advisor served at GTMO for nearly 3
years.
5.

FBI Activities at GTMO
a.

Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents

FBI documents reflect that FBI agents, along with agents from the
CITF (in some cases) and military intelligence (in other cases), began
formally interviewing detainees on February 4, 2002. The FBI's first GTMO
case agent told the OIG that early on the interview process at GTMO was
not very systematic or organized. He said the process was driven by the
limited space available for interviews and that each agency assigned to
GTMO vigorously competed for that space. He said FBI agents generally
were given very short notice of when they would get a 4-hour block for
interview time. It was up to each agent to determine which detainee was
most important to interview when space became available. In addition, due
to the high turnover in OSCs noted above, FBI interviewing practices varied
widely. Some OSCs permitted agents to conduct joint interviews with the
military and others instructed agents only to conduct interviews with other
FBI agents.
Initially, the FBI separated the detainees at GTMO by "activities" or
"themes." This system soon became cumbersome and inefficient because
the military was categorizing the detainees geographically. Accordingly, the
FBI's initial system was eventually abandoned and the FBI adopted the
military's system of separating the detainees by geographic region. Later,
the FBI agents who were sent to GTMO to conduct detainee interviews were
divided into two groups, one for detainees from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
States, the other for detainees from North Africa, Europe, and Central Asia.
Each of these two groups was led by an SSA and was staffed by FBI special
agents and intelligence analysts.

Early on, the military and intelligence components at GTMO were,
according to FBI officials, unclear as to what the FBI's role at GTMO would
be. Art Cummings, Section Chief of CTORS and later ITOS-1, was sent to
GTMO by FBI headquarters to address some of the initial start-up issues,
and he served as GTMO's fifth OSC. He told the OIG that when he first
arrived, the Commander of JTF-170, Major General Dunlavey, and the
military's intelligence task force thought the FBI was there "to put handcuffs
on people." Cummings said he explained to Dunlavey and his Executive
Officer that the FBI were experts in conducting adversarial interviews and
getting people to talk to them when it is not in their interest to do so.
According to Cummings, Dunlavey seemed surprised when Cummings
explained that the FBI could offer this service at GTMO. The original FBI
case agent for GTMO also said that early on the military and CIA at GTMO
were worried that the FBI was going to "gum up the works" by "collecting
evidence" instead of just collecting intelligence in order to stop the next
terrorist attack. Cummings said that initially there was no disagreement
with the military about interview techniques. He also said that during this
period most interviews were done separately. However, if a detainee was
very important for both groups then the interview would be conducted
jointly.
In May 2002, the military and the FBI adopted the "Tiger Team"
concept for interrogating detainees. According to the first GTMO case agent,
these teams consisted of an FBI agent, an analyst, a contract linguist, two
CITF investigators, and a military intelligence interrogator.30 He said that
the Tiger Teams continued for about the next 4 or 5 months. Each Tiger
Team conducted two detainee debriefings a day. There were several reports
from each debriefing because each agency participating in an interview
produced a report. The first GTMO case agent said that in his opinion the
Tiger Teams were successful, from the FBI's perspective, mainly because the
FBI agents were usually the most experienced members of the team.
Therefore, he said, most Tiger Teams were essentially being run by the FBI
agent on the team. However, the FBI withdrew from participation in the
Tiger Teams in the fall of 2002 after disagreements arose between the FBI
and military intelligence over interrogation tactics. Several FBI agents told
the OIG that while they continued to have a good relationship with CITF,
their relationship with the military intelligence entities greatly deteriorated
over the course of time, primarily due to the FBI's opposition to the military
intelligence approach to interrogating detainees. This conflict is addressed
in detail later in this report.

30 An FBI On-Scene Commander said that the CIA was invited but rarely came
because they were upset with how the detainees were assigned to the teams. According to
the OSC, there were detainees of interest to the CIA that were off limits to the Tiger Teams.

Other FBI Activities in GTMO

As noted above, the first FBI agents sent to GTMO in January 2002
were assigned to
. It was only after
February 4, 2002, that FBI agents began to participate in interviews. In
addition, from 2002 - 2004, the FBI sent agents to GTMO to take
fingerprints and photographs of detainees.
C.

Iraq

In late March 2003, the United States and other coalition military
forces invaded Iraq. Within a few weeks, these coalition forces defeated the
Iraqi military, deposed Saddam Hussein and his government, and
established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad. On
June 28, 2004, responsibility and authority for governing Iraq was formally
transferred to the Iraqi interim government, while coalition forces continued
to support Iraqi security and reconstruction.
1.

Military and CIA Operations and Detention Facilities

As in Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was
responsible for military operations in Iraq. Beginning in May 2003,
Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) assumed responsibility for
coalition military operations. In June 2003, CENTCOM transferred the title
and authority of CJTF-7 to the U.S. Army V Corps. Church Report at 243,
249-250.
Operations in Iraq resulted in the capture of large numbers of "enemy
prisoners of war" (EPW) and civilian detainees. One of CJTF-7's missions
was to interrogate detainees for intelligence relevant to the Iraqi insurgency
and other matters. Church Report at 250. The Church Report described the
evolution of military detention facilities in Iraq at length.
We determined that FBI agents conducted interviews at the following
facilities in Iraq, which are described in greater detail in Section 5.a. below:
•

The Abu Ghraib prison , which was the primary civilian
detention facility in Iraq.

•

Camp Ashraf, a facility operated by the
near the Iranian border to house captured members of the
Mujahedin-E-Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iranian paramilitary group.

•

Other locations.
2.

The FBI's Mission in Iraq

On February 10, 2003, FBI Director Mueller signed Operations Order
1015, which stated that the FBI's mission in Iraq was to "deploy a taskorganized exploitation unit to fully exploit all Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)
sites and personnel for information regarding planned terrorist attacks in
the United States, or against U.S. personnel or interests outside the Iraq
theater of operations (ITO), and to gather intelligence related to other
matters of U.S. national security." In furtherance of this mission, the order
authorized the FBI to conduct operations in Iraq with the military and other
U.S. government intelligence agencies. Operations Order 1015 described
CTD's "plan for integration of FBI assets with" the military and the CIA in
Iraq once U.S. ground combat forces had secured areas and facilities in
Iraq, and to collect and interview or analyze Iraqi Intelligence Service
personnel, documents, and electronic media.
The FBI's primary objective in Iraq was collection and analysis of
information to help protect against terrorist threats in the United States and
protect U.S. personnel or interests overseas, rather than waiting for the
military and other agencies to pass on such information to the FBI. The FBI
was particularly concerned about terrorist sleeper cells within the United
States, and believed that information from Iraq could be relevant to
uncovering those cells. More specifically, CTD stated in a January 2004
briefing packet for agents that the mission of the FBI's Baghdad Operations
Center was to "take deliberate and carefully planned actions to protect the
United States against terrorist attack and espionage activity by engaging in
intelligence gathering activities, including high value detainee interviews,
document exploitation, biometric processing and other activities as
directed."
The FBI also supported Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) efforts to
address terrorist acts within Iraq, including the processing of bombing and
other crime scenes, and to share intelligence information with other U.S.
agencies and military units. The FBI's objectives in Iraq also included the
investigation of Saddam Hussein and his personnel for crimes against the
Iraqi people.

FBI Deployments to Iraq

FBI agents who served in Iraq volunteered from FBI field offices. In
2004, the FBI increased the length of the assignments for agents deployed
to Iraq from 60 days to 90 days. The FBI also increased the tenure for OnScene Commanders (OSC) in Iraq from 3 to 6 months as of January 2004,
and their Deputies served for at least 90 days.
The number of FBI personnel deployed to Iraq increased significantly
during 2003 and throughout 2004. The FBI Daily Situation Reports
indicate that between 13 and 24 FBI personnel, including technical
personnel and analysts, worked in Iraq at any given time between June and
August 2003, and that between 23 and 44 FBI personnel worked there at
any given time from September through December 2003. From January
through December 2004, the number of FBI personnel in Iraq usually
ranged between 50 and 60.
Most FBI personnel deployed to Iraq worked in the FBI's Baghdad
Operations Center (BOC), which was located first within the Baghdad
International Airport complex, and starting in mid-2004 within the Green
Zone downtown.

FBI agents and interpreters conducted detainee interviews and
athered detainee biometric information primarily at the Abu Ghraib prison,

Organizational Structure of the FBI in Iraq

The FBI agents deployed to Iraq were supervised by an FBI On-Scene
Commander (OSC). Between March 2003 and the end of 2004; eight FBI
OSCs and five Deputy OSCs served in Iraq. We interviewed most of the
OSCs and Deputy OSCs who served in Iraq during 2003 and 2004.
As in Afghanistan and GTMO, the FBI in Iraq had a subordinate and
dependent role to the military. Several agents told us that FBI personnel
considered themselves guests of the military, who established the rules to
be followed there by other U.S. agencies. The FBI also depended upon the
military in Iraq for critical services and materials, such as protection,
transportation, housing, and food. All detainees in Iraq were in the custody
and control of the U.S. military. The FBI was not designated as the lead
agency for any purpose in Iraq, and the scope of the FBI's activities in those

zones, including its access to detainees, was at the discretion of the military
or the CIA.
5.

FBI Activities in Iraq

During the early stages of the Iraq conflict, from March through July
2003, FBI agents were deployed to Kuwait and Iraq to focus on the
collection, analysis, and exploitation of documents collected from many
former Iraqi Intelligence Service sites in Iraq. We found no evidence that,
during this early period, any of these FBI personnel interacted with
detainees or worked at military sites where they were held.
After this early period in 2003, the other primary FBI
counterterrorism activities in Iraq included: (1) detainee interviews; (2) the
collection of biometric information from detainees; and (3) participation in a
limited number of military sensitive site exploitation missions. FBI agents
have also devoted significant time and resources to conventional criminal
investigations of bombings, murders, and kidnappings involving American
citizens in Iraq.
a.

Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents.

FBI agents in Iraq generally focused their interview efforts on alQaeda personnel, foreign fighters, and detainees who had also been in
Afghanistan. These groups together constituted only a small part of the
detainee population. As a result, FBI agents interviewed only a small
percentage of the detainees in the custody of the military at its various
detention facilities. The Church Report stated that between March 2003 and
March 2005, over 50,000 detainees were held in Iraq. Church Report at 292302.
Many of the FBI agents told us they interviewed only a small number
of detainees - sometimes 10 or fewer - during their deployment to Iraq. FBI
agents at
. FBI documents give a sense of the volume of interviews
that the agents conducted in Iraq. In July 2004, the FBI reported in a
classified statement for the record to a congressional committee that
between January and March 2004 FBI agents in Iraq
The FBI Situation Reports
in late 2004 indicate that FBI agents conducted 0 interviews in October
and M interviews in November 2004 at the various military facilities in
Iraq.
The nature of FBI agent activities and interactions with military
personnel varied with the different military detention and interrogation

facilities in Iraq. These are described below for each of the major Iraq
facilities.
Abu Ghraib Prison . The Abu Ghraib prison was selected by the
Coalition Provisional Authority as the primary civilian detention facility in
Iraq, despite its Saddam-era history and poor condition, when the CJTF-7
commander concluded there were no other suitable facilities available.
Church Report at 248. Detention operations began at Abu Ghraib in
approximately September 2003, and the prisoner population there,
including criminals, insurgents, and detainees with potential intelligence
value, soon grew to an estimated 4,000 to 5,000. Id. at 248, 250. As of
January 2004, over 7,000 detainees were held there in September 2004,
Abu Ghraib held approximately 3,000 detainees, a number which held
steady as of February 2005. Id.; The Washington Post 2/21/05 at Al, A22.
Abu Ghraib consisted of three sections: the main compound and
prison building from the Saddam Hussein era; a make-shift concertina-wire
detention area in the interior courtyard; and facilities within the courtyard
walls for interviews by FBI and other non-military personnel, comprising
two or three tents and at other times two trailers. One former OSC
described Abu Ghraib as dismal, run down, medieval, and "grossly
understaffed." Another agent who conducted interviews there stated that
the situation was "borderline chaotic," and that the prison was understaffed
and frequently attacked by insurgents.
FBI interviews of detainees at Abu Ghraib began in September 2003.
Our review found that FBI agents seldom interviewed detainees within the
main stone prison building at Abu Ghraib, and seldom went into that
building for other reasons. Instead, FBI personnel conducted most of their
detainee interviews in the military tents or trailers within the larger prison
compound.
FBI Agents made arrangements with military personnel for access to
detainees for interviews. Military guards delivered handcuffed detainees to
the FBI and returned them to their cells after the interview. Typically, two
FBI agents conducted the interview with an interpreter. One FBI agent who
served at Abu Ghraib in 2003 stated that the military officer assigned to the
particular prisoner was always required to be present and observe the FBI
interview.
According to an FBI agent who served at Abu Ghraib in November
2003, FBI agents who wanted to conduct interviews were instructed by
Military Police (MP) personnel regarding detainee interview procedures, and
were given a form to read and sign in which the agents acknowledged that
certain interrogation techniques were permissible, others were not, and still
others required command level approval before they could be used.

However, the FBI agent said that this form "was of no importance to me
because I had no intention of using any of [the listed techniques]." He
stated that the only interrogation techniques that he recalled being
described on the form were leaving lights on and sleep deprivation.
Another FBI agent stated that in 2004 the military described
permissible interrogation practices in a standard printed form of not more
than one or two pages that military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib
gave agents to review and sign. She stated that there was nothing on the
form that surprised her as being allowed for use by the military, but there
were a number of techniques that the FBI does not use. The form identified
the techniques with labels such as "Fear Up" or "Ego Down," and the
practices on the form related to sleep deprivation, diet manipulation, and
intimidation tactics31.
Several FBI agents told us that, for the security and safety of FBI
personnel, they did not work or stay at Abu Ghraib at night, but left at the
end of each day to go back to the FBI's Baghdad Operations Center. An FBI
OSC said that he established this policy because Abu Ghraib was being
mortared every night by insurgents, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)
were found nearby every morning. As a result, FBI personnel did not go to
Abu Ghraib until mid-morning, and left well before dark.
The abuse of prisoners by military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison
has been the subject of several investigations, including the Taguba and
Jones investigations, the Church Commission, and the Schlesinger Panel.32
Press reports and prior investigations have indicated that many of the
detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred inside the main stone prison at
night. As detailed in Chapter Ten, FBI agents told us they observed some
aggressive or abusive conduct at Abu Ghraib, but with a few exceptions they
said they generally did not observe or otherwise learn about conduct as
extreme or abusive as that described in the published reports. The fact that
FBI agents worked at the prison in the daytime and conducted interviews
outside of the detention areas in the prison is the likely reason that the
agents did not observe this more extreme conduct.

31 A third agent told us about the use of such a form at the
( discussed in the next section ) in early 2004.
32 VADM A.T. Church, III, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations
and Detainee Interrogation Techniques ( March 2005 ); 2004 US Army, LTG Anthony R.
Jones, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib, AR 15-6; Honorable James R.
Schlesinger , Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations
(August 2004 ); MG Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15- 6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police
Brigade (2004).

FBI agents began interviewing detainees, assisting military
interrogators, and receiving assistance from military personne l at

the fall of 2003, and by mid-2004 FBI agents were working in
The decision to send FBI personnel to work with
later in 2004 stemmed from the conclusion that
interviewing agents would be best positioned there to obtain information
that was fresher and more useful than what they were obtaining at Abu
Ghraib. According to a former Deputy OSC, however, he met with the commander in the spring of 2004 in connection with the decision to involve
FBI agents, and told him that the FBI could not and would not participate in
interviews in which techniques or tactics beyond those permitted for FBI
agents were used. According to the Deputy OSC, the commander told him
this would not be a problem.
Another FBI agent told us that the military used a form at the •
detainee interrogation facility that was similar to the form used at Abu
Ghraib. The agent told us that before he was allowed to enter the M
in the first half of 2004, the military required him to sign a
pre-printed form indicating that this was a classified facility and that the
types of methods used to gather information from detainees included the
use of

From the time the military moved
in mid-2004
through the end of the year, the FBI deployed between 8 and 14 FBI
ersonnel at - at any one time. The FBI contingent working at
included agents, language specialists, a Computer Analysis and
Response Team (CART) examiner, a reports officer, a Criminal Justice
Information Systems Division (CJIS) biometric processing technician, and a
supervisor.

its would sometimes wait

until the detainees were sent to
or Abu Ghraib, before
interviewing the detainees at those facilities. As elsewhere in Iraq, FBI
agents who worked at _ considered themselves as visitors or "guests"
on
"turf." They said they were instructed by the FBI to
conduct themselves as FBI agents in detainee interviews and otherwise.
FBI agents also told us that the military commanders were always
present at
, were actively engaged to ensure that control was
maintained over the detainees, guards, and interrogators, and participated
in the twice-daily shift-change staff meetings. FBI personnel participated in
the 24-hour per day operations at the facility, which were divided into two
1.2-hour shifts seven days per week.

After the
, the detainees were
made available to FBI personnel. The FBI focused on selected detainees
believed to have some U.S. connection or information regarding potential
terrorism threats to the United States, such as friends or family living in the
. Beginning in 2004, the FBI agents' work expanded to

include assistance to the military in debriefing detainees for locally useful
military information

Church Report at 249. Between
and September 2003, for example, FBIatentsco
a
nducted one or two
interviews of such detainees per week
. An OSC told
that the military brought in and set u air-conditioned trailers, which
used for various purposes at
, such as housing, offices,

July
us
were
mess

hall, and detainee interview rooms. The FBI primarily sought to interview
detainees who had been members of the Iraqi intelligence services,
particularly those who may have traveled to the United States. The military
also asked for FBI assistance in questioning former Iraqi political leaders
held there. In general, the military personnel escorted the detainees to the
trailers and back to their cells after the interviews were completed.

The Church Report stated that the U.S. milit
assumed
responsibility for the detention facility at
in April 2003.
Church Report at 249. The March 2004 Taguba Report of the military's
investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade mentioned alle ations of
detainee abuses, including abuses by four soldiers at
in May
2003, but did not describe the alleged incidents. Taguba Report at 6, 7.
The bulk of the FBI's work at
related to collecting
detainee biometric data. However, FBI agents also conducted a significant
number of detainee interviews at the camp. A team of FBI agents was first
deployed there during the first half of 2004 and conducted approximately
120 detainee interviews during that period. During the second half of 2004,
other FBI personnel traveled to
for short periods to interview
specific detainees.
Camp Ashraf. Camp Ashraf, which is located in eastern Iraq near the
Iranian border, was operated by
. As of early 2005,
the camp housed approximately 3,800 members of the Mujahedin-E-Khalq
(MEK), an anti-Iranian paramilitary group designated as a terrorist
organization by the State Department in 1997. Church Report at 249. The
MEK members held there were Iraqi defectors who had been allied with
Saddam Hussein in an effort to overthrow the current Iranian government.
FBI personnel told us that the FBI started interviewing MEK
personnel at this camp sometime during the fall of 2003. In 2004, FBI
agents continued to interview detainees there to support potential criminal
cases in the US. During 2004, between 10 and 17 FBI personnel worked at
Camp Ashraf at any one time. In addition, between November 2003 to
January 2004, FBI personnel biometrically processed some 3,600 MEK
detainees there.

Mosul and Other Iraqi Cities . The FBI's counterterrorism operations
in Iraq included detainee interviews during the period of September 2003
through March 2004 in and around the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. The
FBI contingent in Mosul varied from seven to nine people. Their work
included assistance to military intelligence and Iraqi personnel with
detainee interrogations. FBI agents also went to Fallujah and Ramadi
during this period to gather information and documents from high value
targets after they were captured by the military and the Iraqi police.
b.

Joint Interviews with Military Investigators

Many FBI agents who served in Iraq told the OIG that they worked
jointly with military personnel in planning, preparing for, and conducting
detainee interviews, particularly in 2003. Of the approximately 275 FBI
personnel who served in Iraq and responded to the OIG survey, 125 stated
that they jointly interviewed detainees with military or intelligence agency
personnel. In some of these cases, however, the non-FBI participant was a
contract interpreter or was merely observing the interview rather than
participating in it.
The practice of conducting joint interviews with other agencies
appears to have been more common in the early part of the Iraq conflict
than in later years. A former Deputy OSC told us that in late 2003 and
early 2004 it was not unusual for both FBI and military personnel to
question a detainee together, and several other agents described conducting
joint interviews during this period at various detention facilities.
As 2004 progressed, however, it appears that FBI agents teamed up
with each other as much as possible for detainee interviews.34 A former
OSC told us that in the first half of 2004, his agents generally did not jointly
interview detainees with military personnel, and that to the extent that they
did the FBI agent controlled the interview and FBI rules were followed.
Some agents stated that they never jointly interviewed detainees with
military interrogators in the second half of 2004. Moreover, another former
OSC told the OIG that during his work in Iraq between July 2004 and
January 2005, the general rule for FBI personnel was that all FBI interviews
were to be done with a team of two FBI agents in the room at all times.

An FBI supervisor at - told us that he established guidelines
for detainee interviews at the facility with guidance from the OSC and FBI
Headquarters, including the rule that the interviews were to be conducted
34 This evolution in practice may have been related to the Abu Ghraib disclosures in
April 2004 and the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, which reiterated that
agents should not participate in interrogations involving techniques not approved under
FBI policies (see Chapter Six).

by teams of two FBI agents only, ending a practice of joint interviews with
the military at the facility. However, one of the De uty OSCs during the
second half of 2004 told us that at
it was not unusual for
FBI agents to be teamed up with military interrogators for particular
interviews of detainees, and that he was not aware of any policy that FBI
agents had to work only with other agents.

Other FBI agents said they worked in close coordination with the
military. For example, one FBI agent told us that he conducted joint
interviews with a military analyst who sat in and took notes, and that the
military analyst would make suggestions to the FBI agent for further
questioning based on his experience in Afghanistan and his understanding
of the information needed. The FBI agent also stated that there was a
military interrogator who was assigned to interview the same detainee. The
military interrogator would interview this detainee during the day while the
FBI agent interviewed the detainee at night. In between shifts, the two
would share the information they had received and develop strategies for
further questioning of the detainee.
Another FBI agent noted that in Mosul there was no established
prison, and FBI agents deployed there conducted more joint interviews of
detainees with military interrogators than elsewhere in Iraq.
c.

Other FBI Activities in Iraq

The FBI also devoted significant resources in Iraq to collecting
biometric data from large numbers of detainees, and conducting a small
number of military sensitive site exploitations.
The FBI's CJIS agents collected biometric information from more than
8,000 detainees in Iraq during the latter part of 2003 through the end of
2004.35 For example, in September through December 2003, CJIS agents
fingerprinted, photographed, and collected DNA from approximately 2,000
detainees at Abu Ghraib,
, Mosul, and other
3s At Abu Ghraib Prison, CJIS personnel did not process the detainees inside any of
interior
brick and mortar structures, but instead worked in tents within the walled
the
prison compound.

locations. The FBI also participated in military sensitive site exploitations in
Iraq, but to a much lesser extent than in Afghanistan.
In addition to counterterrorism work, the FBI allocated substantial
resources during 2003 and 2004 to criminal field investigations of bombings
and murders in Baghdad and other locations. FBI resources were also
focused in large measure on the recovery and analysis of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IED) and vehicle borne IEDs. This FBI activity included
extensive work on the bombings of the Jordanian and Turkish Embassies,
the Red Cross and United Nations buildings, and the mosque in an Najaf, as
well as several high-profile murder investigations of U.S. or CPA personnel.

CHAPTER THREE
BACKGROUND REGARDING INTERROGATION POLICIES
In this chapter we describe the interview policies of the FBI and the
interrogation policies adopted by the military for questioning detainees.
These policies, and the tensions between them, provide essential context for
the rest of this report. First, we describe the FBI's policies for conducting
custodial interviews that were in place when the FBI began participating in
the questioning of detainees in military zones. These policies were based in
large part on constitutional requirements of voluntariness and legal
admissibility of witness statements in subsequent prosecutions, together
with the FBI's belief that rapport-based interview techniques are the most
reliable and effective means of obtaining accurate information. Second, we
summarize the vastly different interrogation policies adopted by the
Department of Defense (DOD) for use in the military zones. The DOD
policies approved many methods that were prohibited for use by FBI agents
under FBI policies.

Pre - existing FBI Policies and Practices

Most of the FBI's written policies regarding permissible interview
techniques for agents and for agent conduct in collaborative or foreign
interviews were developed prior to the September 11 attacks. When these
policies were drafted, they reflected the FBI's primary focus on domestic law
enforcement, which emphasized obtaining information for use in
investigating and prosecuting crimes. These policies are designed to assure
that witness statements meet legal and constitutional requirements of
voluntariness so that they are admissible in court and do not undermine the
admissibility of any other evidence developed in the investigation as a result
of the witness interview.
However, constitutional and evidentiary considerations were not the
only rationales for the FBI's prohibition on the use of coercive interview
techniques. On various occasions, the FBI has asserted its belief that the
most effective way to obtain accurate information is to use rapport-building
techniques in interviews.
A.

FBI Interview/ Interrogation Techniques

The FBI's interrogation policies are set forth in the FBI's Legal
Handbook for Special Agents ("the LHBSA" or "the Handbook"), the Manual
of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG), and the Manual of

Administrative and Operational Procedures (MAOP).36 Section 7 of the
Handbook relates to "Confessions and Interrogations." Section 7-1 of the
Handbook states: "The most important limitations on the admissibility of
an accused's incriminating statements are the requirements that they be
voluntary; that they be obtained without the government resorting to
outrageous behavior; and that they be obtained without violating the
accused's right to remain silent or to have a lawyer present." Section 7-2
states: "A conviction based on an involuntary statement, without regard to
its truth or falsity, is a denial of the accused's right to due process of law. A
coerced confession will undermine the legitimacy of a conviction." Section
7-2.1 of the Handbook states, among other things, that "[i]t is the policy of
the FBI that no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force, threats, or
promises."
The Handbook discusses the factors affecting judicial assessments of
voluntariness, including: (a) notification of charges; (b) age, intelligence,
and experience of the accused; (c) physical condition of the accused; (d)
physical abuse, threats of abuse, use of weapons, number of officers
present; (e) threats and psychological pressure; (f) privation: food, sleep,
medication; g) isolation, incommunicado interrogation; (h) duration of
questioning; (i) trickery, ruse, deception; (j) advice of rights; and (k)
promises of leniency or other inducements. The Handbook notes that
courts use a "totality of circumstances" test when determining the
voluntariness of a witness's statement, and that the presence of any one or
more of the factors mentioned above will not necessarily render a statement
involuntary. LHBSA at 7-2.2. FBI training materials also focus on the
"totality of the circumstances" standard and give examples of circumstances
under which courts have held that confessions are coercive and
36 Although some FBI agents told us that they conduct "interviews" rather than
"interrogations," several FBI policies use the latter term. An FBI Unit Chief described the
distinction: "An interview is the process of obtaining information from an individual willing
to provide information about themselves or others. An interview is also usually the first
step prior to moving to an interrogation phase with someone believed to be unwilling to
provide accurate or truthful details about information they have. When the interview is
done immediately prior to an interrogation it is used to obtain the information the person is
readily willing to provide, biographical info and `their version of events,' and is used to build
rapport and identify themes that can be used during the interrogation. The interrogation
phase is the process used to obtain the information that the person does not want to
provide for any number of reasons.... The interrogation phase will typically involve the
interrogator accusing, directly or indirectly, the interrogee of something, such as
withholding information or having provided false information." FBI training materials make
a similar distinction. E.g. FBI Law Enforcement Communication Unit, "Interviewing and
Interrogation" (10/ 14/04) at 72. However, the FBI and DOD policies discussed in this
section regarding the use of potentially coercive techniques do not distinguish between the
interview and interrogation phases with respect to preserving the voluntariness of a
statement. In this report, we generally do not distinguish between interviews and
interrogations for purposes of discussing compliance with FBI or DOD policies.

inadmissible, including: a confession made to avoid a credible threat of
physical violence; a confession induced by an explicit promise of leniency;
and a confession induced by misleading the subject to believe that failure to
confess will result in adverse consequences for others.37
In general, prior to a custodial interrogation in a criminal
investigation, an accused individual is entitled to be warned of his
constitutional rights, typically by receiving a Miranda warning. LHBSA 73.1. If, after being advised of his rights, a suspect in custody indicates that
he wishes to remain silent or that he wants an attorney, all interrogation
must cease at that time. LHBSA 7-2.1(1). Section 7-15 of the Handbook
states: "Persons interviewed by Agents while in police custody in a foreign
country must be given the usual warning of rights under American Federal
law as fully as possible."
The FBI's MAOP also describes the importance of FBI agents not
engaging in certain activities when conducting investigative activities,
including foreign counterintelligence. MAOP Part 1, Section 1-4. The MAOP
states that "[n]o brutality, physical violence, duress or intimidation of
individuals by our employees will be countenanced...." MAOP, Part 1,
Section 1-4(4). The MAOP also stresses that "[a]s member of a federal
investigative agency, FBI employees must at all times zealously guard and
defend the rights and liberties guaranteed to all individuals by the
constitution." MAOP, Part 1, Section 1-4(2). According to the MAOP,
violations of these policies must be reported to FBI Headquarters. MAOP,
Part 1, Section 1-4(5); see also MAOP, Part 1, Section 13-1(2) ("It is
imperative that any information pertaining to allegations of misconduct or
improper performance of duty coming to the attention of any Bureau
employee be promptly and fully reported to FBIHQ.")
Although the FBI's involvement in intelligence gathering functions
expanded significantly after the September 11 attacks, the FBI often
participated in intelligence-gathering activities before that date. Before the
September 11 terrorist attacks and the change in FBI priorities, the FBI had
not established a different set of procedures for interviews or interrogations
for situations where no prosecution in U.S. courts was contemplated.
B.

Working with Other Agencies

Prior to the September 11 attacks, the FBI had policies in place for
working with other government agencies, both domestic and foreign, in joint

37 A. Louis DiPietro, "Lies, Promises, or Threats - The Voluntariness of
Confessions," reprinted in FBI Academy training manual "Interviewing and Interrogation"
(10/ 14/2004) at 92-96.

or cooperative investigations. However, the FBI's work with the military in
GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq raised issues regarding which agency's
interrogation policies would apply, and how the FBI would work with
personnel from other agencies operating under different interrogation rules.
1.

FBI Interaction with Other Domestic Law
Enforcement Agencies

The FBI has extensive experience working jointly with other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. FBI agents often conduct joint
interviews in the normal course of their duties. FBI agents told us that they
are trained to always adhere to FBI protocols, not to other agencies' rules
with respect to interview policies or evidence collection.
Yet, the FBI's experience working with other domestic agencies
provided limited precedent for the FBI's work with the military overseas on
detainee interviews. In past cases, the other agencies were usually other
law enforcement organizations (such as state or local police) that were also
focused on prosecuting crimes in domestic courts and were subject to
similar concerns about voluntariness that drive the FBI's established
interrogation policies. Typically, there was not a major conflict between the
policies and practices of these agencies and those of the FBI. Moreover, in
most cases prior to September 11 the FBI was the lead agency and therefore
positioned to direct which interrogation policies would apply.
After the September 11 attacks, the FBI's mission expanded to
include working jointly with the military frequently. This mission gave rise
to circumstances in which (1) entities other than the FBI were the lead
agencies and had custody of the witnesses, (2) prosecution of crimes was
not necessarily the primary goal of the interrogations, and (3) the
evidentiary rules of U.S. Article III courts did not necessarily apply.
2.

FBI Interaction with Agencies of Foreign
Governments

Even prior to the September 11 attacks, FBI investigations required
agents to work abroad. For example, the FBI regularly investigated terrorist
attacks that occurred abroad but that involved U.S. targets. These activities
required the FBI to cooperate with or assist the law enforcement agencies of
foreign governments. The FBI has an extensive system of Legal Attaches
(LEGAT) stationed in U.S. embassies to coordinate FBI work in foreign
countries.
FBI policy states: "Agents have no jurisdiction in foreign countries,
hence, cannot exercise the power of arrest, search or seizure in such
places." LHBSA 3-11; see also MIOG, Part 2, Sections 1-2.3.3 and 238.2(3)(a). The FBI's Legal Handbook further states that agents cannot

participate in interviews with prisoners except in places of incarceration and
in the presence of foreign authorities. It also states, "Agents are not to
participate in any unauthorized or unlawful actions even though invited to
do so by a cooperating foreign officer." Id.
In some cases, the FBI worked with agencies of foreign governments
that were governed by a different set of rules for interrogations. In such
cases, for example, an FBI agent might observe a foreign agent using a
technique in a foreign interrogation that was lawful for the foreign agent but
that would be prohibited for an FBI agent. This scenario provides a
potential analogy for the issue of FBI cooperation with U.S. military
investigators conducting interrogations using techniques permitted by the
military but not by the FBI.
As detailed in Chapter Six of this Report, on May 19, 2004, the FBI
issued a policy specifically relating to the treatment of prisoners and
detainees (the "FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy"). The Policy includes the
following statement, which the FBI's Office of General Counsel characterized
not as a new policy but rather as "reaffirm[ing] prior FBI policy":
FBI personnel who participate in interrogations with non-FBI
personnel
. shall at all times comply with FBI policy for the
treatment of persons detained. FBI personnel shall not
participate in any treatment or use any interrogation technique
that is in violation of these guidelines regardless of whether the
co-interrogator is in compliance with his or her own guidelines.
If a co-interrogator is complying with the rules of his or her
agency, but is not in compliance with FBI rules, FBI personnel
may not participate in the interrogation and must remove
themselves from the situation. (Emphasis in original.)
However, we did not find any pre-September 11 FBI written policies
specifically addressing the scenario of FBI agents working with agencies of
foreign governments who were governed by a different set of rules for
interrogations, or that defined what constitutes "participation" in an
interrogation controlled by another entity.
C.

FBI Duty to Report

Another set of FBI policies in place prior to the September 11 attacks
that are potentially applicable to the FBI's activities in GTMO, Afghanistan,
and Iraq related to the duty of FBI personnel to report allegations of
misconduct by FBI employees and other government employees. The FBI's
MAOP requires FBI agents to report allegations of misconduct by FBI
employees to FBI Headquarters:

As the government's primary investigative service ... [i]t is
imperative that any information pertaining to allegations of
misconduct or improper performance of duty coming to the
attention of any Bureau employee be promptly and fully
reported to FBIHQ, and it is the continuing responsibility of
Bureau officials to see to it that the employees under their
supervision are properly indoctrinated regarding this
requirement so that they not only will fully understand it, but
will comply with it.
MAOP Part 1, Section 13-1 (1) and 13-1(2). Part 1, Section 263-2 of the
MIOG provides similar guidance, stating that all allegations of "criminality
or serious misconduct" on the part of FBI employees must be reported to
FBI Headquarters.
The Legal Handbook for Special Agents specifically addresses the
obligation of agents to report misconduct during witness interviews. The
Handbook's Policy for Confessions and Interrogations states:
If, during an interview with a witness, suspect, or subject,
questions are raised by such persons or if anything transpires
which gives reasonable grounds to believe that subsequently
such questions or incident may be used by someone in an effort
to place an Agent or the FBI in an unfavorable light, an
electronic communication regarding such questions or incident
should be immediately prepared for the SAC. The SAC is
responsible for promptly advising FBIHQ and the USA of such
questions or incident and FBIHQ must be promptly informed of
all developments. LHBSA 7-2.1(2).
Thus, the duty of an FBI employee to report on activities of other FBI
employees goes beyond reports of criminal conduct. This duty includes an
obligation to report on misconduct, improper performance, and events that
may reasonably be used to place an agent or the FBI in an "unfavorable
light."
In contrast, prior to the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy, the duty of an FBI employee to report on the activities of non-FBI
government personnel was limited to criminal behavior. This limited duty
arose not from any FBI policy, but from federal law, which requires all
government employees, including those of the FBI, to report criminal
behavior by any government employees, including employees of the DOD, to
the Department of Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 535. We did not find any FBI
policy prior to May 2004 imposing an obligation on FBI employees to report
misconduct by non-FBI government employees falling short of a crime, such
as conduct that might violate other agencies' own interrogation policies.

II.

Department of Defense Interrogation Policies

In this Section we provide a brief summary of the detainee
interrogation policies adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD) after the
September 11 attacks for prisoners and detainees.38 These policies are
relevant to the OIG's review for several reasons. First, the tension between
DOD policies and the FBI's interview policies was an important factor in the
FBI's efforts to provide workable guidance for its agents in the military
zones. FBI agents in the military zones faced difficulties as a result of the
stark differences between the FBI's conventional law enforcement
techniques and the more aggressive interrogation techniques of military and
intelligence agencies.
Second, a significant portion of our review was directed at
determining what information FBI agents acquired during their deployments
in the military zones regarding the treatment of detainees by any U.S.
government personnel, not just by FBI agents themselves. The vast majority
of the incidents that the FBI agents reported to us involved the conduct of
interrogators from the DOD and the CIA. However, interrogators from other
agencies were governed by their own agencies' interrogation policies, not the
policies of the FBI.
It is generally beyond the jurisdiction of the OIG and the scope of this
investigation to make determinations regarding whether particular conduct
by non-FBI interrogators violated their agencies' policies. However, as
detailed in Chapter Six, beginning in May 2004 FBI policy required FBI
agents to report to their superiors any incidents of known or suspected
abuse or mistreatment of detainees by other agencies' interrogators. As
explained in Chapter Six, some FBI agents were told that, under this policy,
they should report any interrogation technique that the agent believed was
outside the legal authority of the interrogator. Under this interpretation,
FBI agents would need to have some familiarity with other agencies' policies
in order to comply with the FBI's policy.
Third, FBI agents in the military zones had a unique opportunity to
observe the conduct of other agencies' interrogators. The public allegations
of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison, GTMO, and other detention
facilities mainly related to the conduct of non-FBI personnel. Therefore,
while we do not make determinations regarding whether the conduct of
other agency personnel reported to us by FBI agents violated their agencies'
38 As detailed in subsequent chapters, some of the interrogation techniques that
caused the most concern to the FBI were used by the CIA, not the military. However, as
stated in Chapter One, our review generally did not cover activities at facilities used by the
CIA. Moreover, the vast majority of FBI agent observations discussed in this report relate
to DOD interrogations.

policies, we refer in this report to potentially applicable policies of other
agencies.
However, it is important to note that we did not review all DOD
policies regarding interrogation of detainees. Our summary of the
interrogation policies of DOD is based primarily on information contained in
the Church Report.
A.

Legal Background : the Geneva Conventions, the
Convention Against Torture, and Related Statutes

The legal background for DOD policies regarding the interrogation of
detainees includes the United States' obligations under the Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
and the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (collectively "the Geneva Conventions").39
Additional relevant authorities include the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M.
1027, and the Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340. The applicability of these
authorities to various categories of detainees, as well as the meaning of
"torture" as the word is used in these authorities, have been the subject of
extensive debate and controversy. It is beyond the scope of this report to
address these legal issues. Rather, we briefly summarize these authorities
to provide context for the more specific DOD interrogation policies that are
relevant to our review.
In general, the Geneva Conventions require that enemy prisoners of
war and certain captured civilians be treated humanely at all times. The
Geneva Conventions also prohibit the use of physical or mental torture, or
other forms, of coercion, to obtain information from prisoners of war, and
prohibit the use of physical or moral coercion to obtain information from
protected civilians. The provision known as "Common Article 3" protects
detainees from cruel treatment, torture, and outrages upon personal
dignity, "in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." The War
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, criminalizes under U.S. law certain breaches
of the Geneva Conventions, including breaches of Common Article 3.
On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum
declaring that none of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to
members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere. The memorandum also
stated that members of the Taliban are "unlawful combatants" and do not
qualify as prisoners of war entitled to the stronger protections of the Geneva

39 The Geneva Conventions also include Geneva I and II, which relate to treatment
wounded
and sick in armed forces in the field or at sea.
the
of

Conventions. However, the President stated that al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees were to be treated "humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the
principles of Geneva." Church Report at 187.
The United States also has obligations under the Convention Against
Torture. The Convention Against Torture defines torture as "any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person" for certain purposes. The United States conditioned
its ratification of the treaty on an understanding that in order to constitute
torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering, and that mental pain or suffering refers to
prolonged mental harm from:
(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;

(2) the administration or threatened administration of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(3) the threat of imminent death; or
(4) the threat that another person will be imminently subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
The Convention Against Torture also prohibits cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. However, the Bush Administration has
taken the position that the Convention Against Torture does not apply to
alien detainees held outside of the United States.
The Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, prohibits torture outside the
United States. Its definition of torture tracks the language of the U.S.
understanding on which the Convention Against Torture was ratified,
summarized above. Citing a DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (6 Op.
OLC 236 (1982)), the DOD has stated that GTMO is within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and, as such, is
not "outside of the United States" for purposes of the Torture Statute.
Therefore, according to this interpretation, the Torture Statute applies in
Afghanistan and Iraq but does not apply in GTMO.
On December 30, 2005, the President signed into law the Detainee
Treatment Act, Pub L. No. 109-148. Section 1002 of the Detainee
Treatment Act established the U.S. Army Field Manual as a uniform
standard for detainee treatment and interrogation techniques available for
use on detainees in DOD custody. Section 1003 provided for a global

prohibition on the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on all
persons in the custody or effective control of the U.S. government. This
provision responded to the Administration's argument that the Convention
Against Torture did not apply to alien detainees held outside U.S. territory.
In July 2006, the Administration announced that, pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006),
the U.S. government would henceforth apply Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions to all detainees.
B.

DOD Interrogation Policies Relating to GTMO

When interrogations began at GTMO in January 2002, military
interrogators relied on Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation,
for guidance as to permissible interrogation techniques. Field Manual 3452 listed the following techniques as permissible:
•

Direct questioning.

•

Incentive - use of luxury items to reward cooperation, with the
implication that the items will be withheld for failure to
cooperate. No withholding of any basic human need such as
food or medicine.

•

Emotional Love - playing on detainee's emotional attachments
to create a psychological burden that might be relieved through
cooperation.

•

Emotional Hate - playing on detainee's emotional hate, such as
desire for revenge.

•

Fear Up (Harsh) - exploiting a detainee's pre-existing fears,
including behaving in an overpowering manner with a loud and
threatening voice.

•

Fear Up (Mild) - using a calm, rational approach to exploit the
detainee's pre-existing fears.

•

Fear Down - the detainee is soothed and calmed to build
rapport.

•

Pride and Ego-Up - use of flattery to prompt cooperation.

•

Pride and Ego-Down - goading the detainee by challenging his
loyalty, intelligence, etc., to induce the detainee to provide
information disproving the interrogator.

•

Futility - rationally persuading the detainee that it is futile to
resist questioning.

•

We Know All - convince the detainee that the interrogator is.allknowing and resistance to questioning is pointless.

•

File and Dossier - preparing a decoy dossier that convinces the
detainee that everything is already known, so resistance is
pointless.

•

Establish Your Identity - insist that the detainee is someone
else to induce him to reveal information to clear himself.

•

Repetition - induce the detainee to break the monotony by
answering.

•

Rapid Fire - questioning in rapid succession, without permitting
detainee to answer.

•

Silent - staring at detainee for extended period to induce
nervousness.

•

Change of Scene - engaging the detainee in a different
environment to ease his apprehension or catch him with his
guard down.

Church Report at 35-37, 107.
On December 2, 2002, in response to a request from the Commander
of the intelligence task force at GTMO for approval of additional counterresistance techniques not specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52, the
Secretary of Defense approved the following techniques for use at GTMO:

•

Yelling

•

Use of multiple interrogators

•

Deceiving the detainee by having the interrogator present a false
identity

•

Stress positions ("like standing") for a maximum of four hours

•

The use of falsified documents or reports

•

Isolation for up to 30 days, with any extensions beyond the 30
days requiring approval from the JTF-GTMO Commander

•

Interrogation of the detainee in an environment other than the
standard interrogation booth

•

Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli

•

The use of a hood placed over the detainee's head during
transportation and questioning

•

The use of 20-hour interrogations

•

The removal of all comfort items (including religious items)

•

Switching the detainee's diet from hot meals to Meals, Ready-toEat (MRE) (American military field rations)

•

Removal of clothing

•

Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.)

•

The use of a detainee's individual phobias (such as fear of dogs)
to induce stress

•

The use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as
grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.

Church Report at 4-5, 116-7.
On January 15, 2003, however, the Secretary of Defense rescinded
his approval of all of the techniques he had approved in December 2002;
except the first three (yelling, multiple interrogators, and false identity).
Church Report at 5, 118-121. According to the Church Report, this decision
was made in response to concerns raised by the General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy and others. Id. at 120. The Secretary of Defense
then obtained recommendations from a working group he established to
assess interrogation techniques for use in the war on terror. On April 16,
2003, he promulgated guidance (the April 2003 GTMO Policy) approving 24
techniques for use at GTMO, most of which were taken from or closely
resembled those in Field Manual 34-52. The April 2003 GTMO Policy also
approved the following additional techniques:
•

Mutt and Jeff, - using a team consisting of a friendly and a
harsh interrogator (i.e. "good cop/bad cop").

•

Change of Scenery Down - placing detainee in a less
comfortable setting (not a substantial change in environmental
quality).

•

Dietary Manipulation - changing detainee's diet (no deprivation
of food or water).

•

Environmental Manipulation - creating moderate discomfort
such as by adjusting temperature or introducing unpleasant
smell (avoid injury to detainee; detainee accompanied at all
times).

•

Sleep Adjustment - adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee
(not "sleep deprivation").

•

False Flag - convincing detainee that the interrogator is from a
country other than the U.S.

•

Isolation - isolating the detainee from other detainees while
complying with basic standard of treatment.

Church Report at 137-39.
The April 2003 GTMO Policy specified conditions for the use of these
techniques, including the requirement that the techniques be used as part
of a specific interrogation plan with appropriate supervision, limits on
duration, and the availability of medical personnel. Church Report at 140.
It also required an advance determination of military necessity from the
SOUTHCOM Commander and notice to the Secretary of Defense for the use
of techniques called Incentive/ Removal of Incentive, Pride and Ego-Down,
Mutt and Jeff, and Isolation. Id.
The April 2003 GTMO Policy continued in effect for GTMO until
September 2006, when the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3,
discussed below in part E of this Section.
C.

DOD Policies Relating to Afghanistan

According to the Church Report, from October 2001 until January
2003 the only official guidance regarding military detainee interrogation
techniques in effect in Afghanistan was that contained in Field Manual 3452, which is described above. Church Report at 186.
On January 24, 2003, an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate sent a
memorandum to CENTCOM that described the interrogation techniques
being used in Afghanistan and recommended that that these techniques be
approved as official policy. The memorandum listed many techniques
similar to those approved under the December 2002 GTMO Policy. The
memorandum divided the techniques into "battlefield" techniques and
techniques being used at the Bagram Collection Point. The listed
techniques included:
Battlefield Techniques

Bagram Collection Point Techniques

Church Report at 196-99.
In addition, the January 2003 memorandum requested approval for
several additional battlefield techniques:

Church Report at 198-99, 202.
According to the Church Report, neither CENTCOM nor the Joint Staff
responded to the January 2003 memorandum, and the Combined Joint
Task Force legal staff concluded that the techniques then in use were
unobjectionable to military superiors and could be considered an approved
policy for Afghanistan. Church Report at 201.

In February 2003, after a military investigation into two detainee
deaths at the Bagram Collection Point in December 2002,
issued several changes to approved interrogation tactics:

Church Report at 203-04.
In March 2004, the military issued a new policy for Afghanistan
interrogations (the "March 2004 Afghanistan Policy"), which was based on
the prior Afghanistan policies and the April 2003 GTMO Policy. The March
2004 Afghanistan Policy added dietary manipulation, environmental
manipulation, and "false flag" to the list of approved techniques, and relaxed
the prior prohibitions on hooding and using "safety positions" as an
incentive for cooperation. Church Report at 205-09.
In June 2004, in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib disclosures, the
military in Afghanistan adopted the same policy that was issued for Iraq on
May 13, 2004 (discussed in the next section). Church Report at 209-11.
D.

DOD Policies Relating to Iraq

For the first few months of the war in Iraq, beginning in March 2003,
military interrogators were governed by Field Manual 34-52, described in
Section B above. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez issued the first
CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy on September 14,
2003, describing 29 specific permissible interrogation techniques (the

"Sep tember 2003 Iraq Policy"). Church Report at 257, 263-264.

Church Report at 265.
The September 2003 Iraq Policy also required that military
interrogators obtain approval from the Commander of CJTF-7 for the use of
certain techniques on enemy prisoners of war. Church Report at 265.
On October 12, 2003, the Commander of CJTF-7 issued a revised
Interrogation and Counter- Re sistan ce Policy (the "October 2003 Iraq
Policy"). Church Report at 268. This policy superseded the September 2003
Iraq Policy and removed 12 of the techniques that had been approved in it,
including "Sleep Adjustment," "Sleep Management," "Presence of Military
Working Dogs," and "Stress Positions." Nevertheless, the October 2003 Iraq
Policy included a "General Safeguard" that "should military working dogs be
present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under the control of
the handler at all times . . . ." Church Report at 257, 267-269. Like its
predecessor, the October 2003 Iraq Policy required Commander approval for
techniques not specifically listed. The policy was limited in application to
interrogations of "security detainees," thereby excluding enemy prisoners of
war and criminal detainees. According to the Church Report, however, the
policy contained no specific guidance to assist soldiers in making the
practical determination as to how standards of treatment varied for each
category of detainee. Church Report at 268.
On May 13, 2004, CJTF-7 adopted a new Interrogation and Counter
Resistance Policy for Iraq, which was issued in the wake of the Abu Ghraib
abuse revelations. The list of approved techniques did not change from the
October 2003 Iraq Policy, but the revision further specified that "under no
circumstances" would requests for the use of "sleep management, stress
positions, change of scenery, diet manipulation, environment manipulation,
or sensory deprivation ... be approved." Church Report at 270. In January
2005, the military adopted an interrogation policy for Iraq which, according
to the Church Report, approved only those techniques listed in Field Manual
34-52 and which provided additional safeguards, prohibitions, and
clarifications. It added explicit prohibitions against the removal of clothing
and the use or presence of military working dogs during interrogations. Id.
at 271.

Recent Changes to DOD Policy

In September 2006, the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3
regarding Human Intelligence Collector Operations. This manual responded
to the mandate of the Detainee Treatment Act, which was enacted in
December 2005, for a uniform standard for treatment of detainees under
DOD custody. Id. at 5-74. Field Manual 2-22.3 reiterated and elaborated
on many of the techniques listed in its predecessor, Field Manual 34-52, but
placed much greater emphasis on rapport-based interrogation techniques
similar to those endorsed by the FBI. It also identified several prohibited
actions, including:
•

Nudity, or sexual acts or poses

•

Hooding or duct-tape over the detainee's eyes

•

Beatings, shock, burns, or other pain

•

Waterboarding

•

Using military working dogs in interrogations

•

Inducing hypothermia or heat injury

•

Mock executions

•

Deprivation of food, water, or medical care

Id. at 5-75. Field Manual 2-22.3 also placed detailed controls on the use of
the technique of "separation," which is the isolation of detainees from other
detainees. Id. at 8-71.
However, Field Manual 2-22.3 was not in effect during any part of the
period that was the focus of the OIG's review.

III.

Reasons for the Differences Between the FBI and Military
Approaches to Interviews

Several witnesses explained the reasons for the differences between
the interview philosophies of the FBI and the military, which resulted in the
dramatically different interview policies adopted by each organization during
the period of this review and eventually led to a dispute between the FBI
and the DOD over the interrogation of a high value detainee.

FBI witnesses and documents described the rationale for the noncoercive rapport-based techniques traditionally used by the FBI in
combination with purposeful and incremental manipulation of a detainee's
environment and perceptions. As explained by FBI agents and described. in
FBI documents, these techniques are designed to obtain reliable cooperation

on a long-term basis, even from individuals who have been repeatedly
interviewed and may have become cynical of any offers of early release or
special consideration. FBI agents told us that the FBI's approach, coupled
with a strong substantive knowledge of al Qaeda, had produced extensive
useful information in pre-September 11 terrorism investigations and were
also successful in the post-September 11 context. Many FBI witnesses also
stated that they believed that FBI agents had skills and expertise that would
enable them to make a significant contribution to the government's overseas
intelligence gathering mission.
FBI agents and documents indicated that the FBI understood that the
more aggressive or coercive techniques used by military intelligence were
originally designed for short-term use in a combat environment with
recently captured individuals, where the immediate retrieval of tactical
intelligence is critical for force protection. Some military techniques were
based on methods used in military training known as SERE (Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, and Escape), which prepares U.S. soldiers and airmen
on methods to resist interrogation. For example, a former FBI Section Chief
in CTD asserted that the military's view was: "You have your way and we
have our way. You have the luxury of time; we have force protection and
need info fast."
Department of Justice officials also told the OIG that they agreed with
the FBI's viewpoint regarding the best approach to take with the detainees.
For example, David Nahmias, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for
the Criminal Division, stated that this view, which was "shared strongly by
those of us in the Criminal Division and ... in the Department generally,"
was that the FBI's approach to detainees had been very successful with
terrorism subjects in criminal cases. This approach, according to Nahmias,
is to establish a rapport, treat the people with respect, and try to make them
into long-term strategic sources of information in the way we flip bad guys
all the time." Nahmias told the OIG the he understood that the military's
aggressive approach was rooted in military intelligence training designed to
obtain time-sensitive battlefield information, but that these techniques do
not work in the long run. Similarly, David Ayres, Chief of Staff to Attorney
General Ashcroft, told the OIG that DOJ's view was that long-term
cooperation leads to better cooperation and leads to better protection of the
country.4o

DOJ witnesses told us that from the outset, there was an operating
viewpoint dictated at a very high level that this was a military situation and
40 Several witnesses told us that the dispute over the best approach was
exacerbated by the fact that the DOD interrogators were often inexperienced and not
particularly well trained about al-Qaeda.

the military approach should prevail, in part because the military controlled
the detainees and locations. As detailed in Chapter Five, this dispute came
to a head during the interrogation of a particular high value detainee at
GTMO.

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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF FBI POLICIES REGARDING
DETAINEE INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS
In this chapter we describe the early development of the FBI's policies
governing the conduct of its agents who participated in interviews or
interrogations in foreign military zones. This process began in 2002, when
FBI Director Mueller decided that the FBI would not participate in
interrogations involving aggressive techniques that were approved for other
agencies in military zones. The issue came to a head when the FBI sought
to participate in the interrogation of a high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah,
who was under the control of the CIA.

The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

The first major incident involving the use of aggressive interrogation
techniques on a detainee that was reported to senior executives at FBI
Headquarters was the case of a detainee known as Abu Zubaydah.
Zubaydah was suspected of being a principal al Qaeda operational
commander. In late March 2002, he was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
There was a gunfight during the arrest operation and Zubaydah was
severely wounded. He was then taken to a secret CIA facility for medical
treatment and interrogation.
Initially, the FBI and the CIA planned a joint effort to obtain
intelligence from Zubaydah regarding potential future terrorist attacks. The
FBI selected SSAs Gibson and Thomas to travel to the CIA facility to
interview Zubaydah.41 Gibson and Thomas were selected for the
assignment because they were familiar with al-Qaeda and the Zubaydah
investigation, were skilled interviewers, and spoke Arabic.
A.

FBI Agents Interview Zubaydah and Report to FBI
Headquarters on CIA Techniques

Gibson and Thomas were instructed by their FBI supervisor, Charles
Frahm (Acting Deputy Assistant Director for the section that later became
the Counterterrorism Division), that the CIA was in charge of the Zubaydah
matter and that the FBI agents were there to provide assistance. Frahm
told the agents that Zubaydah was not to be given any Miranda warnings.
Frahm told the OIG that he instructed Thomas and Gibson to leave the

41 Thomas and Gibson are pseudonyms.

facility and call Headquarters if the CIA beganusing techniques that gave
the agents discomfort.
Gibson said that he and Thomas initially took the lead in interviewing
Zubaydah at the CIA facility because the CIA interrogators were not at the
scene when Zubaydah arrived. Gibson said he used relationship-building
techniques with Zubaydah and succeeded in getting Zubaydah to admit his
identity. When Zubaydah's medical condition became grave, he was taken
to a hospital and Gibson assisted in giving him care, even to the point of
cleaning him up after bowel movements. Gibson told us he continued
interviewing Zubaydah in the hospital, and Zubaydah identified a
photograph of Khalid Sheik Muhammad as "Muktar," the mastermind of the
September 11 attacks.
Within a few days, CIA personnel assumed control over the interviews,
although they asked Gibson and Thomas to observe and assist. Gibson told
the OIG that the CIA interrogators said Zubaydah was only providing
"throw-away-information" and that they needed to diminish his capacity to
resist.
Thomas described for the OIG the techniques that he saw the CIA
interrogators use on Zubaydah after they took control of the interrogation.

Thomas
said he raised objections to these techniques to the CIA and told the CIA it
was "borderline torture."42 He stated that Zubaydah was responding to the
FBI's rapport-based approach before the CIA assumed control over the
interrogation, but became uncooperative after being subjected to the CIA's
techniques.
During his interview with the OIG, Gibson did not express as much
concern about the techniques used by the CIA as Thomas did. Gibson
stated, however, that during the period he was working with the CIA,

Gibson said
that the CIA personnel assured him that the procedures being used on
Zubaydah had been ap proved "at the highest levels" and that Gibson would

not get in any trouble.

Thomas communicated his concerns about the CIA's methods to FBI
Counterterrorism Assistant Director Pasquale D'Amuro by telephone.
D'Amuro and Thomas told the OIG that D'Amuro ultimately gave the
instruction that Thomas and Gibson should come home and not participate
in the CIA interrogation. However, Gibson and Thomas provided the OIG
differing accounts of the circumstances of their departure from the CIA
facility where Zubaydah was being interrogated. Thomas stated that
D'Amuro instructed the agents to leave the facility immediately and that he
complied.
However, Gibson said he was not immediately ordered to leave the
facility. Gibson said that he remained at the CIA facility until some time in
early June 2002, several weeks after Thomas left, and that he continued to
work with the CIA and participate in interviewing Zubaydah. Gibson stated
that he kept Frahm informed of his activities with the CIA by means of
several telephone calls, which Frahm confirmed. Gibson stated the final
decision regarding whether the FBI would continue to participate in the
Zubaydah interrogations was not made until after Gibson returned to the
United States for a meeting about Zubaydah.
Gibson stated that after he returned to the United States he told
D'Amuro that he did not have a "moral objection" to being present for the
CIA techniques because the CIA was acting professionally and Gibson
himself had undergone comparable harsh interrogation techniques as part
of U.S. Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training.
Gibson said that after a meeting with the CIA, D'Amuro told him that he
would not be returning to the Zubaydah interview.
B.

FBI Assistant Director D'Amuro Meets with DOJ Officials
Regarding the Zubaydah Interrogation

D'Amuro said he discussed the Zubaydah matter with Director
Mueller and later met with Michael Chertoff (then the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division), Alice Fisher (at the time the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division), and possibly David
Kelley (who was then the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern

District of New York), in Chertoff's office in the Justice Department.
D'Amuro said his purpose was to discuss how the FBI could "add value" by
participating in the interviews of "highvalue detainees" because the FBI
already knew the subjects so well. D'Amuro told the OIG that during the
meeting he learned that the CIA had obtained a leg al opinion from DOJ that

certain techniques could legally be used, includin

. D'Amuro stated that Chertoff and Fisher

made it clear that the CIA had requested the legal opinion from Attorney
General Ashcroft.
Based on DOJ and CIA documents, we believe that the meeting that
D'Amuro described took place in approximately late July or August 2002.
DOJ documents indicated that the CIA requested an opinion from the DOJ
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding the proposed use of

Fisher told the OIG that it is possible that she attended a meeting in
Chertoff's office with Kelley, D'Amuro, and Chertoff, which concerned who
would take the lead (FBI versus another agency) on the interviews of a high
value detainee. However, she said she had no specific recollection of such a
meeting. Fisher also stated that she did not recall discussing with the FBI
specific techniques for use with detainees. Fisher said she vaguely
remembered a meeting with then FBI General Counsel Kenneth Wainstein
in which they discussed the FBI not being present at CIA interrogations,
and she stated that the meeting would have related to interrogation tactics,
but she said she did not recall any specific techniques being discussed.43
Wainstein, who joined the FBI in July 2002, told us he recalled a number of
discussions relating to the issue of FBI participation in CIA interrogations,

43 Fisher stated that at some point she became aware that the CIA requested advice
regarding specific interrogation techniques, and that OLC had conducted a legal analysis.
She also said she was aware of two OLC memoranda on that topic, but they did not relate
to the FBI. Fisher also told the OIG that Chertoff was very clear that the Criminal Division
was not giving advice on which interrogation techniques were permissible and was not
"signing off" in advance on any techniques.

but he did not recall this issue arising in connection with a particular
detainee.
Kelley told the OIG that he had numerous conversations with Fisher,
Nahmias, and other DOJ attorneys about topics relating to the
September 11 investigation, but that he could not recall any specific
meetings or conversations regarding the interrogation methods to be used
on high value detainees. Kelley stated that D'Amuro was present during one
or more of these discussions.
Chertoff told us that he could not recall specific conversations about
Zubaydah, but that he did generally recall discussions about whether the
FBI could preserve the admissibility of detainee statements by interviewing
detainees some period after other agencies had completed their
interrogations using non-FBI techniques. Chertoff also told us that he did
not think this approach would successfully prevent the statement from
being "tainted" by any prior enhanced interview techniques.
C.

D'Amuro Meets with the FBI Director , Who Decides that the
FBI Will Not Participate

D'Amuro told the OIG that after his meeting at Chertoff's office he met
with Director Mueller and recommended that the FBI not get involved in
interviews in which aggressive interrogation techniques were being used.
He stated that his exact words to Mueller were "we don't do that," and that
someday the FBI would be called to testify and he wanted to be able to say
that the FBI did not participate in this type of activity. D'Amuro said that
the Director agreed with his recommendation that the FBI should not
participate in interviews in which these techniques were used. Based on
D'Amuro's description of events and the dates of contemporaneous
documents relating to the CIA's request for a legal opinion from the OLC, we
believe that D'Amuro's meeting with Mueller took place in approximately
August 2002. This time frame is also consistent with Gibson's recollection
that the final decision regarding whether the FBI would participate in the
Zubaydah interrogations occurred some time after Gibson left the location
where Zubaydah was being held and returned to the United States in June
2002.
D'Amuro gave several reasons to the OIG for his recommendation that
the FBI refrain from participating in the use of these techniques. First, he
said he felt that these techniques were not as effective for developing
accurate information as the FBI's rapport-based approach, which he stated
had previously been used successfully to get cooperation from al-Qaeda
members. He explained that the FBI did not believe these techniques would
provide the intelligence it needed and the FBI's proven techniques would.
He said the individuals being interrogated came from parts of the world

where much worse interview techniques were used, and they expected the
United States to use these harsh techniques. As a result, D'Amuro did not
think the techniques would be effective in obtaining accurate information.
He said what the detainees did not expect was to be treated as human
beings. He said the FBI had successfully obtained information through
cooperation without the use of "aggressive" techniques. D'Amuro said that
when the interrogator knows the subject matter, vets the information, and
catches an interviewee when he lies, the interrogator can eventually get him
to tell the truth. In contrast, if "aggressive" techniques are used long
enough, detainees will start saying things they think the interrogator wants
to hear just to get them to stop.
Second, D'Amuro told the OIG that the use of the aggressive
techniques failed to take into account an "end game." D'Amuro stated that
even a military tribunal would require some standard for admissibility of
evidence. Obtaining information by way of "aggressive" techniques would
not only jeopardize the government's ability to use the information against
the detainees, but also might have a negative impact on the agents' ability to
testify in future proceedings. D'Amuro also stated that using the techniques
complicated the FBI's ability to develop sources.
Third, D'Amuro stated that in addition to being ineffective and shortsighted, using these techniques was wrong and helped al-Qaeda in
spreading negative views of the United States. In contrast, D'Amuro noted,
the East Africa bombing trials were public for all the world to see. He said
they were conducted legally and above board and the world saw that the
defendants killed not only Americans but also innocent Muslims. D'Amuro
said he took some criticism from FBI agents who wanted to participate in
interviews involving "aggressive" techniques, but he felt strongly that they
should not participate, and the Director agreed.
Andrew Arena, the Section Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism
Operations Section 1 (ITOS-1), confirmed that D'Amuro argued against the
use of aggressive procedures. Arena told the OIG that he attended a
meeting involving Mueller, D'Amuro, and other FBI employees in 2002
regarding the FBI's participation in aggressive interrogation techniques.
Arena stated that the issue arose when FBI agents became aware that
another government agency was using specific techniques on high value
detainees. Arena stated that there were discussions within the FBI
regarding "should we also go down that track?" Arena told the OIG that
during the meeting D'Amuro predicted that the FBI would have to testify
before Congress some day and that the FBI should be able to say that it did
not participate. Arena said he was present when Director Mueller stated

that the FBI was not going to get involved with other agencies in using these
techniques at any location.44
We interviewed Director Mueller, who recalled that the FBI wanted to
interrogate someone held by the CIA because the FBI's agents were
knowledgeable about the detainee from prior investigations. Director
Mueller told us he did not know what techniques the CIA would be using
but that he understood they would go beyond techniques that FBI agents
were authorized to use. He stated that he and D'Amuro discussed the fact
that the FBI could not control the interrogation, and they decided that the
FBI would not participate under these circumstances. Director Mueller told
the OIG that although his decision initially did not contemplate other
detainee interrogations, it was carried forward as a bright-line rule when the
issue arose again.
Director Mueller's former Chief of Staff, Daniel Levin, told the OIG
that in the context of the Zubaydah interrogation, he attended a meeting at
the National Security Council (NSC) at which CIA techniques were
discussed. Levin stated that a DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) attorney
gave advice at the meeting about the legality of CIA interrogation
techniques. Levin stated that in connection with this meeting, or
immediately after it, FBI Director Mueller decided that FBI agents would not
participate in interrogations involving techniques the FBI did not normally
use in the United States, even though OLC had determined such techniques
were legal. Levin stated he agreed with this decision because FBI agents
were not trained to use such techniques, using such techniques might
create problems for FBI agents who needed to testify in court, and other
agencies were available to do it.
D'Amuro also described another meeting after the Zubaydah incident
among himself, Director Mueller, a CIA agent, and CIA Director George
Tenet. D'Amuro said that during this meeting, an effort was made to find a
solution that would permit the FBI to interview detainees in CIA custody.
D'Amuro proposed that the FBI be permitted to interview the detainees first,
before the CIA would use its "special techniques." D'Amuro said that the
FBI recognized that it would have a "taint problem" if the FBI conducted its
interviews after the CIA had used the more aggressive techniques. However,
no agreement was reached with the CIA at that time. Director Mueller told
us that he did not specifically recall such a meeting, but that such a

44 Arena stated that FBI Deputy Director Bruce Gebhardt also attended this
meeting. Gebhardt told us he did not recall specific discussions regarding the use of nonFBI interview methods but stated that neither he nor the Director would have ever allowed
agents to use such techniques.

discussion may have happened in connection with some lower-level
detainees.

II.

Subsequent Decisions Regarding FBI Involvement with High
Value Detainees

The issue of whether the FBI would participate in interviews in which
other agencies used non-FBI interrogation techniques arose again
repeatedly, as new high value detainees were captured. For example,
D'Amuro said that the FBI wanted to participate in the interrogations of
these detainees because its agents had been investigating them for a long
time and had a lot of knowledge and experience that would be useful in
gaining information from the detainees. Each time, however, the result was
the same: the FBI decided that it would not participate.
We determined that the issue arose again in late 2002 and early 2003,
in connection with efforts to gain access to Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh
was captured in September 2002. According to the, Assistant Chief for the
FBI's Counterterrorism Operational Response Section (CTORS), he and
several agents, including Thomas, traveled to a CIA-controlled facility to
conduct a joint interview of Binalshibh
with the CIA.

According to the notes of FBI General Counsel Valerie
Caproni, Deputy Assistant Director T.J. Harrington told her that the FBI
agents who went to the CIA site saw Binalshibh

The
matter indicates that a "bright line rule" against FBI
participation in or assistance to interrogations in which other investigators
used non-FBI techniques was not fully established or followed as of
September 2002. FBI agents assisted others to question
during
when
was
he
being subjected to interrogation techniques that the
a period
FBI agents would not be allowed to use. According to former FBI General

Counsel Wainstein, the FBI ultimately decided that its agents could not
interview detainees without a "clean break" from other agencies' use of nonFBI techniques. Wainstein told us he thought this conclusion was reached
in 2003.

As discussed in subsequent chapters of this report, the FBI continued
to wrestle with interpreting the mandate not to "participate" in
interrogations involving non-FBI techniques, particularly with respect to the
circumstances under which FBI agents wanted to interview detainees who
had previously been subjected to coercive interrogations by other agencies.
The disagreements between the FBI and the military focused in particular
on the treatment of another high value detainee, Muhammad Ma'ana AlQahtani, which we describe in the next chapter.

[Page Intentionally Left Blank]

CHAPTER FIVE
FBI CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY INTERROGATION AT
GUANTANAMO BAY
In this chapter we describe the response of the FBI and DOJ to the
military's interrogation of Muhammad Ma'ana A1-Qahtani at GTMO in 2002
and 2003. Al-Qahtani is a Saudi Arabian national who was allegedly sent to
the United States to be one of the September 11, 2001, hijackers.45 The AlQahtani interrogation became the focus of a major disagreement between
FBI agents and the military regarding interrogation techniques. As detailed
below, FBI agents at GTMO became concerned that the DOD's approach
was ineffective and possibly illegal, that they would complicate or preclude
any effort to prosecute Al-Qahtani, and that the agents' exposure to these
techniques would create problems for the agents and the FBI in the future.
We determined that some of these concerns reached senior officials at the
FBI and DOJ. However, these officials focused primarily on the issue of
whether the DOD's techniques were effective at obtaining intelligence from
Al-Qahtani and other detainees. Ultimately, the military prevailed in the
inter agency dispute resolution process and the military's methods were
pursued over DOJ's objections. We also determined that at one point

officials from the FBI and DOJ participated in develop ing a proposal to
for interrogation
usin

of the sort that had been used on Abu Zubaydah and
tiiia . This proposal was never finalized or acted upon.

In this chapter we also describe how the FBI handled reports
regarding the alleged mistreatment of another high value detainee,
Mohamedou Ould Slahi (#760). Some of the FBI agents' concerns about
treatment of this detainee were communicated to senior officials at DOJ.

Background on A1-Qahtani

Al-Qahtani was captured by Pakistani forces on December 15, 2001,
while trying to enter Pakistan from Afghanistan. He was turned over to U.S.
custody, and on February 13, 2002, was transferred to GTMO. When Camp
Delta was set up at GTMO in April 2002, Al-Qahtani was moved there along
with the rest of the detainee population, as described in more detail in
Chapter Two.

45 Church Report at 115. A1-Qahtani has also been known as: Mohammed Ma'ana
Ahmed Al-Qatani, Muhammad Mani' Ahmed Al-Shal-lan Al-Qahtani, and Mohammad AlKahtani.

Records provided to the OIG indicate that Al-Qahtani was interviewed
by the FBI and the DOD four or five times between February and June of
2002. In these interviews, he provided basic biographical information and a
"cover story" that he had traveled to Afghanistan to buy and sell falcons.
One military interrogator described him as "obtuse and confrontational" and
another noted that he "refuses to give any traceable detail for any part of his
story." During this time the military and the FBI did not suspect that AlQahtani was directly linked to the September 11 plot.

II.

Discovery of Al- Qahtani's Links to September 11

During the investigation after the September 11 plot, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) determined that a person who fit the
pattern of some of the September 11 hijackers had been denied entry at the
Orlando, Florida, airport as he attempted to enter the United States in
August 2001. In July 2002, the FBI identified Al-Qahtani from fingerprint
records as the person who had been turned away by the INS.46 The FBI also
determined that hijacker Mohammed Atta's calling card was used at a pay
phone in the Orlando airport to call a September 11 financier at precisely
the time Al-Qahtani was being detained by the INS.47
On July 15, 2002, FBI Headquarters provided this information to FBI
agents in GTMO, who in turn provided it to the military. The MLDU Unit
Chief told us the information about Al-Qahtani's connection to

September 11 was briefed to Attorney General Ashcroft and President Bush.
The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that after Al-Qahtani's link to the
September 11 attacks was discovered, he learned from David Nahmias,
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, that
someone had made a determination that "not one single [detainee] will see
the inside of a courtroom in the United States." The Unit Chief stated that
Nahmias told him that after information about the potential intelligence
46 Al-Qahtani was denied entry to the United States by a U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officer who was suspicious because Al-Qahtani spoke no English and when
questioned by Customs officials became defensive and evasive in his responses. In
addition, Al-Qahtani had no return ticket, no credit cards, and less than $3,000 in cash.
Al-Qahtani was "excluded" from the U.S. and put on a return flight to the United Kingdom
and eventually back to his original departure city of Dubai. Before Al-Qahtani was
excluded from the U.S., he was photographed and electronically fingerprinted by an INS
Inspector who entered this data into an INS database.
47 The link between Al-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks was confirmed after
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who has been described as the mastermind of the
September 11 attacks, was captured on March 1, 2003, and started providing intelligence.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was transferred from CIA custody to the U.S. military base at
Guantanamo Bay in 2006.

value of Al-Qahtani had been briefed to the White House and possibly the
National Security Counsel, the answer came back that there was no interest
in prosecuting Al-Qahtani in a U.S. court at that time.
Nahmias told the OIG he could not specifically recall telling the FBI
Unit Chief that a decision had been made that Al-Qahtani would not be
prosecuted in an Article III court, but he noted that, at that time, DOJ was
in the midst of difficulties in the Zacarias Moussaoui case and DOJ thought
that the military commissions would be an effective way to handle these
detainees. Nahmias added that he did not think he advocated for AlQahtani to be brought to the United States to be tried. He said that it would
have been difficult to prosecute Al-Qahtani in the United States because the
decision had been made much earlier not to give Miranda warnings to
detainees, which would have precluded the admissibility of any detainee
statements in an Article III court.
Bruce Swartz, Deputy Attorney General for the Criminal Division, told
the OIG that he consistently took the position that detainees should be tried
in Article III courts, but that he was not aware of how Al-Qahtani had been
interrogated until publication of a TIME magazine article about it in June
2005. Swartz said he understood that the Criminal Division initially
thought there was a possibility of prosecuting Al-Qahtani in an Article III
court for his role in the September 11 attacks, and that Nahmias argued in
favor of that, but Swartz later heard Nahmias make comments to the effect
that "we won't be able to use him [in an Article III proceeding]."
Former Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff told the OIG that
there was discussion of bringing Al-Qahtani to the United States to be tried
in an Article III court. He said the ultimate decision on that question would
not have been made by the Attorney General alone. According to Chertoff, it
would have been decided at a higher level. As a general matter, he said
those kinds of issues would be resolved at the National Security Council
(NSC) level, though he said that he does not have any specific recollection of
discussion of this issue at the NSC.
Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher, FBI Director
Robert Mueller, and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson all said they
could not recall any specific discussion as to whether Al-Qahtani would be
prosecuted in an Article III court. Former Attorney General Ashcroft
declined to be interviewed by the OIG for this review.

III.

FBI Interviews of Al- Qahtani : August 2002

Special Agent Demeter was the case agent for GTMO from February
2002 until April 2003.48 Demeter told the OIG that once the FBI learned of
the connection between AI-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks, the FBI
sought to take the lead in interviewing him. The FBI's argument for seeking
the lead was that the FBI had discovered and initially investigated the
connection between Al-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks, and the FBI
was leading the investigation into the attacks. Demeter said the person in
charge of the DOD's Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) gave the FBI
access to Al-Qahtani.
After learning in mid-July 2002 of AI-Qahtani's connection to the
September 11 attacks, the military moved Al-Qahtani to a cell in Camp
Delta

Over the course of the next week,
AI-Qahtani was interviewed daily by FBI and military personnel. He first
denied ever traveling to the United States, but when confronted with
evidence of his trip to Florida he claimed he came to the United States to
sell used cars. He continued to maintain the same cover story in
subsequent interviews. On July 27, he was transferred to the Maximum
Security Facility at Camp Delta to minimize influence and social support
from other detainees.
Demeter told the OIG that, at this point, he requested that FBI Special
Agent Thomas interview Al-Qahtani, because Thomas was in Demeter's view
the FBI's "strongest interviewer."49 According to one of the first FBI OnScene Commanders (OSC) at GTMO, Thomas had already obtained
confessions from several detainees at GTMO and Major General Dunlavey,
the Commander of Joint Task Force 170, called him "a national treasure."
After his initial interviews of AI-Qahtani, Thomas recommended that
AI-Qahtani be moved to a more remote location at GTMO so that he would
not get social support from the other detainees in resisting the interviewers'
questions. Demeter said that sending someone to isolation is not normally
employed by law enforcement agencies because of concerns about the
voluntariness of any subsequent statements. However, Demeter stated that
isolation can be a very effective technique, and that in this instance the
government's interest in getting the information outweighed any potential
concerns of voluntariness. Demeter said the FBI agents reported the
recommendation up their chain of command, through the MLDU Unit Chief,
48 Demeter is a pseudonym.
49 Thomas is a pseudonym. Thomas was one of the agents who also interviewed
Zubaydah, as described in Chapters Four and Eleven.

and that he obtained the necessary approvals from senior officials above the
Unit Chief. Demeter told us that the military had to approve the transfer
because the military controlled GTMO.
On August 8, 2002, Al-Qahtani was transported via military
ambulance from his cell in Camp Delta to the Navy Brig in GTMO.so
Thomas continued to interview Al-Qahtani after he was moved to the Brig.
Demeter said that Thomas urged the guards at the Brig to refrain from
speaking with Al-Qahtani to increase his isolation. He stated that the
guards covered their faces or ordered Al-Qahtani to face away when they
were present to further isolate Al-Qahtani from human contact.51
The OIG interviewed Al-Qahtani at GTMO on February 27, 2007. AlQahtani told the OIG that the Brig was "the worst place I was taken to." He
said he did not know when to pray because the window was covered up and
he could not tell what time of day it was. In addition, he said that he did
not know the direction of Mecca. Al-Qahtani told the OIG that the entire
time he was at the Brig the guards covered their faces when they dealt with
him. He also said he was not allowed any recreation, and while he was
allowed into the hallway outside his cell, he never saw the sun. Al-Qahtani
said the lights in his cell were left on continuously for the entire time he was
there, which he said was half a year. Al-Qahtani also described the Brig as
very, very cold. He said he sometimes had a mattress, but if the
interrogators did not like his answers, they would take things like that
away.
Al-Qahtani described an FBI agent who spoke Arabic. This was
Thomas. Al-Qahtani said Thomas had "some sense of humanity."
According to Al-Qahtani, Thomas never used aggression or physical violence
on him. According to Al-Qahtani, Thomas said things such as "you will find
yourself in a difficult situation if you don't talk to me" and "if you're not
going to talk now, you will talk in the future." When asked if he took this as
a "warning or a threat," Al-Qahtani replied that it was "a little bit of both."

5° As described in Chapter Two, the Navy Brig is located on the grounds of the U.S.
Naval base at GTMO, separate from the detainee camps. Before Al-Qahtani was moved to
the Navy Brig, the FBI set up a closed-circuit television so that the FBI could monitor him.
51 We note that severe isolation of the type used on Al-Qahtani for interrogation
purposes rather than as a disciplinary or security measure would likely be considered to be
coercive and contrary to FBI policies for custodial interviews in the United States. The
same may be true of the actual or implied threats that Thomas made, as described later in
this chapter. However, these incidents took place very close to the time concerns about the
Zubaydah interrogation were being raised within the FBI, as described in Chapter Four. It
is clear that the Director's instruction had not yet been communicated to Thomas or those
in his chain of command that approved Al-Qahtani's isolation.

Al-Qahtani told the OIG that he had been removed from his cell by
force, prior to being taken to the Brig. He said the day after the move to the
Brig, Thomas came and sat next to him and said something like "this is
your place until you change your story." A1-Qahtani said he did not recall
meeting with anyone from the FBI at the Brig other than Thomas and one
civilian who took his picture and fingerprints. However, FBI records and
witnesses indicate that Al-Qahtani was interviewed by several different FBI
agents during the period when he was confined in the Brig, including
Thomas, Demeter and members of the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit.
As additional intelligence entities learned about the connection
between Al-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks, interest in the
information he might provide increased. Demeter said that within 2 weeks
of confirmation of Al-Qahtani's role, the military decided they "wanted a
piece of Al-Qahtani" but the FBI had "beat them to the punch" and was
taking the lead on the interviews. According to Demeter, the military began
pressing the FBI for results. Demeter said that Thomas's view at this point
was that the FBI's interview approach would take a long time to work, given
Al-Qahtani's mindset.
After the FBI had been interviewing Al-Qahtani at the Brig for
approximately 30 days, Demeter said, the military told the FBI to "step
aside" and took over. According to Demeter, the military's decision to
pursue a more aggressive approach was the "beginning of a real schism"
between the FBI and the military regarding detainee interrogation
techniques.

IV.

FBI Supervisory Special Agents Foy and Lyle Observe Military
Interrogations of Al-Qahtani : Early October 2002

After the military determined that it would take the lead on the AlQahtani interrogations, a military intelligence "special projects" team put
together a proposed interrogation plan. During this time, the FBI continued
to attempt to influence his interrogation. From September 13, 2002, until
October 29, 2002, FBI SSAs Foy and Lyle from the Behavioral Analysis Unit
(BAU) were deployed to GTMO to provide behavioral analysis of detainees to
help develop interview strategies.52 On September 30, 2002, Foy e-mailed
his superiors at the BAU about the latest military intelligence plan for AlQahtani, which included moving him from the Brig to Camp Delta for a
short stay to see if he would cooperate, followed by transferring him to
Camp X-Ray for an indefinite period of 20-hour interviews. Foy's e-mail
stated that when he asked for guidance from the MLDU Unit Chief, the Unit
52 Lyle and Foy are pseudonyms.

Chief told him that as long as there was no "torture" involved, he could
participate in the interrogations. The Unit Chief told the OIG that he did
not recall this exchange, but that it could have occurred.
The next day Foy e-mailed the MLDU Unit Chief that he and Lyle
would only "observe" the Camp Delta portion and the first 6 hours at Camp
X-Ray. In addition, Foy recommended that if FBI Headquarters were to
send FBI employees to GTMO to question Al-Qahtani, the FBI interviewers
should wait at least a week after military intelligence had completed their
interrogation.
On October 3, 2002, Foy and Lyle observed the Al-Qahtani
interrogations. After interviewing Qahtani for a few hours at Camp Delta where he continued to refuse to cooperate - the military moved him to a
plywood hut in Camp X-Ray. Al-Qahtani was interrogated by another
military interrogation team from October 3 until the early morning hours of
October 4. Lyle said Al-Qahtani was "aggressively" interrogated and that the
military interrogators yelled and screamed at him. Foy told the OIG that the
plan was to "keep him up until he broke."53 Foy said he did not know if that
ultimately is what happened, because he and Lyle stopped observing the
process. Foy stated in an e-mail to The FBI Unit Chief and the OSC at
GTMO the next morning that an FBI approach to Al-Qahtani the following
week would not be worthwhile "due to the current mental/physical status of
the detainee."
Foy and Lyle returned to Camp X-Ray in the late afternoon of
October 4 to continue their observations. Lyle told the OIG that one of the
interrogators, a Marine Captain, had been interrogating Al-Qahtani by
yelling at him and calling him names. Lyle stated that the Captain got up
on the table in the room to yell at Al-Qahtani in a more intimidating fashion,
at which point he squatted over a Koran that had been provided to AlQahtani. This action incensed Al-Qahtani, who lunged toward the Captain
and the Koran. Al-Qahtani was quickly subdued by the military guards in
the room. Foy gave a similar account of this incident. He stated that he
and Lyle heard a commotion coming from the interview room where the
Marine Captain and another military interrogator were interviewing AlQahtani. Foy said that it appeared that the Captain and the other
interrogator were playing "good cop, bad cop."54

53 Foy told the OIG that the technique being used was sleep deprivation, not sleep
disruption, because the military interrogators were keeping him awake rather than letting
him fall asleep and then waking him up. Foy said they used bright lights and music to
keep him awake.
54 Foy and Lyle gave consistent accounts of this incident to the FBI Inspection
Division in September 2004. Foy stated that the Koran incident took place on October 4,
(Cont'd.)

Lyle and Foy also described an incident the next day in which a guard
received a signal to bring a working dog into the interrogation room where
Al-Qahtani was being interrogated. Lyle said that the use of dogs as an
interrogation tool was exclusively the military's idea, based on their belief
that Arabs feared dogs because they viewed dogs as unclean. Lyle said that
the guard handling the dog first agitated the dog outside the interrogation
room, and then brought the dog into the room close to Al-Qahtani. Lyle said
that the dog barked, growled, and snarled at Al-Qahtani in very close
proximity to him, but was never allowed to have contact with him.-95 Foy
gave a similar account of the incident, and told the OIG that he and Lyle
were not comfortable with the situation with the dog so they left the
interrogation. 56
On October 8, 2002, Foy e-mailed the GTMO On-Scene Commander
and the MLDU Unit Chief to describe other "techniques" used on AlQahtani, including sleep deprivation, loud music, bright lights, and "body
placement discomfort." Foy reported that the technique had "negative"
results and that Al-Qahtani remained "as fervent as ever" in not
cooperating. Foy stated in the e-mail that Al-Qahtani was "down to 100
pounds" and that military intelligence personnel planned to initiate another
phase in the interrogation in the coming weekend.57
Although "aggressive" techniques had already been used on AlQahtani, it was not until October 11, 2002, that Major General Dunlavey,
the Commander of Joint Task Force 170, requested that the Commander of
SOUTHCOM approve 19 counter-resistance techniques that were not
specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 5. Those
counter-resistance techniques were listed in three categories. Category I
2002. Also, the Schmidt-Furlow Report described an incident in December 2002 similar to
the incident described by Lyle and Foy, in which an interrogator " squatted down in front of
[Al-Qahtani] in an aggressive manner and unintentionally squatted over the detainee's
Koran."
55 Lyle and Foy provided consistent accounts of this incident to FBI Inspection
Division interviewers in September 2004. The Schmidt-Furlow Report also found that a
military working dog was used in connection with the interrogation of Al-Qahtani on one or
two occasions in October to November 2002.
56 Al-Qahtani told the OIG that during one interrogation at Camp X-Ray, a dog with
a soldier was in the room with him. He said the soldier did not order the dog to attack AlQahtani. Rather, he said the dog was used as a tool to intimidate him during interrogation.
Al-Qahtani said that the dog tried to bite him but it was restrained by its handler. AlQahtani added that the dog was walked around the interrogation room and the handler let
the dog get very close to him and it was barking and growling the whole time.
57 In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD stated that Foy's comment
regarding Al-Qahtani's weight was irrelevant because it did not provide his beginning
weight. However, the OIG did not receive information about Al-Qahtani's initial weight.

included strategies such as yelling and deception. Category II included
stress positions (maximum of 4 hours), deprivation of light, removal of
clothing, and using individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce
stress. Category III included "use of scenarios designed to convince the
detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him
and/or his family" and "use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the
misperception of suffocation." Church Report at 111. Along with the list of
techniques, Dunlavey provided SOUTHCOM two memoranda he received
from the Staff Judge Advocate stating that the proposed strategies "do not
violate applicable federal law."58

The FBI 's MLDU Unit Chief and DOJ Counsel Nahmias Visit
GTMO : October 15 to 18, 2002

Friction between the FBI and the military intelligence entities over the
best way to handle the Al-Qahtani interrogations increased during October
and November 2002. During that time, the FBI's MLDU Unit Chief and
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division David
Nahmias traveled together to GTMO for a visit during October 15 to 18,
2002.
According to Nahmias, at some point prior to his trip to GTMO, the
DOD claimed to have "broken" Al-Qahtani and gotten him to cooperate.
Nahmias told the OIG that he learned that Al-Qahtani had been interrogated
for many hours and blurted out the name Mohammed Atta, which the DOD
interrogators considered a breakthrough. The reaction of the FBI's
Behavioral Science people, according to Nahmias, was that Al-Qahtani was
just giving the interrogators what they wanted so that they would let him
eat or go to the bathroom.
Nahmias stated that when he was at GTMO, Al-Qahtani was being
held in isolation and the interrogators were getting no information
whatsoever from him. Nahmias stated that the DOD was using "aggressive"
techniques and there was a "heated debate" with the FBI and CITF on one
side and military intelligence on the other about what to do with Al-

58 Schmidt-Furlow Report, Exhibit 14. According to the Church Report, on
October 25, 2002, the SOUTHCOM Commander, General Hill, sought Secretary of Defense
approval for the use of "additional techniques beyond those specifically listed in FM 34-52."
In the SOUTHCOM Commander's request, he stated that he believed the Category I and II
techniques are "legal and humane," but that he was unsure regarding Category III. As
noted below, Secretary Rumsfeld gave formal approval for some of the techniques on
December 2, 2002.

Qahtani.59 Nahmias said the FBI wanted to talk to Al-Qahtani during this
period but the DOD refused.
The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that during this visit to GTMO he
participated in a video-teleconference discussing Al-Qahtani's interrogation
plan. The other participants in the teleconference included Nahmias, Major
General Geoffrey Miller (the new Commander of
JTF-GTMO), the Lieutenant Colonel who was in charge of the GTMO
interrogations at that time, the Chief CITF Psychologist, and a
representative of the CIA. The Unit Chief stated that DOD personnel at the
Pentagon were also on the call. During the teleconference, the Unit Chief
said, the Lieutenant Colonel presented the DOD's plan to use aggressive
interrogation techniques. According to the FBI Unit Chief, the Lieutenant
Colonel gave an explanation of all the information the DOD had obtained
from Al-Qahtani using aggressive interrogation practices. At that point the
FBI Unit Chief said he spoke up and said "look, everything you've gotten
thus far is what the FBI gave you on Al-Qahtani from its paper
investigation." The Unit Chief said the conversation became heated.
According to the Unit Chief, the Chief CITF Psychologist and Nahmias
agreed that the information the Lieutenant Colonel presented had been
provided by the FBI and that the Lieutenant Colonel's suggested
interrogation methods were not effective and were not providing positive
intelligence. The Unit Chief stated that the meeting ended because of the
controversy. The Unit Chief said he did not believe the legality of the DOD
techniques was discussed during the teleconference.
Although he did not describe the specific conference call mentioned
above, Nahmias told the OIG that plans for the Al-Qahtani interrogation
were discussed at meetings which included the FBI, the military at GTMO,
military officials at the Pentagon, and others. He told the OIG that it was
the general view of the FBI, DOJ and CITF that the proposed plan would not
work and that the military were "completely ineffective in getting any kind of
intelligence out of [Al-Qahtani]."

VI.

FBI Continues Objecting to the Al-Qahtani Interrogation Plans:
November 2002

From late October to mid-December 2002, a new set of FBI BAU
agents, SSA Brett and SSA McMahon, were stationed at GTMO.60 During
59 As noted in Chapter Two, CITF conducts interrogations in order to gather
evidence for the military commission process and possible war crimes prosecutions. The
law enforcement groups that make up the CITF are the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS), the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (OSI).

this period, the FBI and CITF continued to object to the approach military
intelligence officials sought to take with Al-Qahtani.
On November 12, 2002, General Hill orally approved the use of
Category I and II techniques on Al-Qahtani. The next day, he approved an
interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani against the FBI's objections.61 The plan
described 20-hour interrogation sessions, followed by 4-hour rest periods.
It stated that Al-Qahtani had been "segregated with minimal human
contact" for several months, and that this appeared to be having an effect
on his mental state. The plan stated that "[i]t is believed that with an
intense interrogation cycle where he is not allowed to speak and is then
suddenly allowed to speak, he may tell all." The plan called for Al-Qahtani's
head and beard to be shaved, "for psychological and hygiene purposes." In
addition, the plan stated that if he was uncooperative, he would be placed in
stress positions and blindfolded. The plan further stated that the
blindfolding and the presence of dogs, had been approved by the
Commanding General.
Another portion of the plan called for telling Al-Qahtani about how the
"rules have changed" since September 11. The plan contained a description
of four different "phases" for the interrogation, which would begin on
November 15, 2002. If a phase was unsuccessful within the time allotted,
then the interrogation would move to the next phase. The phases were
described in the military's interrogation plan as follows:
•

Phase I: the military would permit the FBI access to Al-Qahtani
until November 22. The FBI would present him with a "window
of opportunity" to cooperate, and the FBI would explain that
this was his "last chance" before he was returned to the
military. After that, interrogators would increase the pressure
on Al-Qahtani while preventing him from speaking for one week,
so that when he was presented with the opportunity to talk, he
would "provide his whole story."

•

Phase II: the military would place a government translator with
Al-Qahtani. The translator would act and be treated as like a
detainee, and he would engage Al-Qahtani in conversation and
ask targeted specific questions to extract the sought-after

information.
60 Brett and McMahon are pseudonyms.
61 We reviewed several versions of the Al-Qahtani interrogation plan and we have
been unable to determine which one was actually approved. The elements described above
appear in all versions, however, including the version attached as an exhibit to the SchmidtFurlow Report.

•

Phase III: The plan referred to "Level III techniques." (This
appears to be a reference to the techniques listed in the
October 11, 2002, memorandum in which Major General
Dunlavey requested that the Commander of SOUTHCOM
approve 19 counter-resistance techniques that were not
specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52). SERE and other
counter interrogation resistance training techniques would be
employed.62

•

Phase IV: Al-Qahtani would be sent "off Island" either
temporarily or permanently to "either Jordan, Egypt or another
third country to allow those countries to employ interrogation
techniques that will enable them to obtain the requisite
information."

FBI agents McMahon and Brett examined the military intelligence
interrogation plan and concluded that it was deeply flawed. For example, in
connection with the strategy of preventing Al-Qahtani from speaking for a
week in the hope that he would then "tell all," the agents noted that they
were aware of no such recognized interrogation technique. In a report to
FBI Headquarters, they stated: "It is our information that this interrogation
technique was recommended by ... an ARMY Linguist, who claims to have
a number of years of `Agency' experience. Other than the word of this
linguist there has been no data proffered which justifies the use of this
technique." With respect to Phase IV, the agents stated simply, "Unless this
plan is modified to exclude aspects that have not been approved for FBI
personnel, we cannot be a signatory on this plan."63
The CITF officials at GTMO raised similar objections to the military
intelligence plan. A memorandum from the CITF legal advisor to the
Commander of JTF-GTMO, dated November 15, 2002, stated that CITF had
raised "formal legal objections" to the plan, and asserted that the
SOUTHCOM Command's approval could not be considered authoritative
given that the matter was "currently under legal review" by the DOD
General Counsel's Office. With respect to Phase IV, this memorandum
stated that the plan "implies that third country nationals ... could be used

62 As noted in Chapter Three, SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) is
a training program which prepares U.S. soldiers and airmen on methods to resist
interrogation. SERE techniques include dietary manipulation, use of nudity, sleep
deprivation, and waterboarding.
63 However, as detailed in Section VII of this chapter, some FBI and DOJ officials
did advocate
during this period.
As detailed in footnote 71, there were significant differences between this proposal and the
military's plan.

to convey threats to person or family or inflict harm" contrary to the
Convention Against Torture.
Similarly, in a November 14, 2002, e-mail from the Commander of
CITF to Major General Miller, the Commander expressed his strong
objections to the use of Category III and some Category II techniques and
stated his opinion that they would be largely ineffective, would have "serious
negative material and legal effects" on the investigation, and that the use of
such techniques could "open any military members up for potential criminal
charges." The Commander also stated that the DOD General Counsel's
office has "instructed DOJ that any plan with #63 will be a DOD plan, since
DOD [law enforcement] and Intell have the lead." The Commander then
proposed the creation of a "joint working group" through which CITF, JTFGTMO, FBI and CIA would all participate in the development of a detailed
interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani.
Brett and McMahon also attended an "interrogation strategy session"
in mid-November at which military intelligence officials discussed aspects of
the interview of Al-Qahtani in great detail, including the "questionable"
techniques which were of concern to Brett and McMahon. According to the
FBI, Brett and McMahon had concerns not only about the proposed
techniques, but also about the "glee" with which the would-be participants
discussed their respective roles in carrying out these techniques and the
"utter lack of sophistication" and "circus-like atmosphere" within this
interrogation strategy session.
An FBI/CITF plan prepared in consultation with Brett and McMahon,
in contrast, emphasized a long-term rapport-building interrogation
approach.64 Under this plan, Al-Qahtani would have contact with only one
interviewer. The plan proposed "periodic stressors" such as removing
comfort items, with the expectation that Al-Qahtani would look to the

64 FBI e-mails also discussed a "hybrid" plan that apparently combined elements of
the military intelligence's plan with elements of the FBI/CITF plan, and was created to
fulfill a request by General Miller for the FBI and military intelligence to "determine if there
is any middle ground" between their two approaches.
McMahon opposed the idea of
blessing the hybrid plan, because, according to the OSC, it essentially contained "rapport
building" for 5-7 days (in "phase I"), then reverted to the military intelligence plan for
"phase II." Brett suggested that the FBI give its "blessing" to the hybrid plan because it was
the "lesser of two evils." Brett thought that military intelligence would likely immediately
institute their original plan for Al-Qahtani if the FBI did not give its "blessing" to the hybrid
plan. Brett hoped that instituting the hybrid plan would put off the harsh treatment of AlQahtani for a least a week during which time the FBI and CITF could work toward changing
the future plans for this detainee. Both Brett and McMahon adamantly objected to the
remaining phases of the hybrid plan after phase I. The OIG was not able to obtain a copy of
the hybrid plan.

interviewer for help, thereby increasing the interviewer's status. The FBI
also recommended the introduction of "visual stimuli" designed to invoke
sympathy and weaken his sense of loyalty to al-Qaeda associates.
Major General Miller met with Brett, McMahon, Demeter, and the FBI
OSC to discuss the plans for interrogating Al-Qahtani.65 McMahon told the
OIG that although Miller acknowledged positive aspects of the rapportbased approach, Miller favored military intelligence's interrogation methods.
According to McMahon, the FBI's arguments against the coercive techniques
were met with "considerable skepticism and resistance by senior [military
intelligence] officials in GTMO."
According to Demeter, Major General Miller wanted to take a much
more aggressive approach with Al-Qahtani than advocated by the FBI.
Demeter said that Miller used military phrases such as "relentless" and
"sustained attack" to describe the military's proposed approach. Demeter
told the OIG that he argued with Miller that by using proven law
enforcement interview tactics such as rationalizing the conduct along with
the subject, joining the subject in projecting blame for the conduct on
others, or minimizing the severity of the conduct with the subject, the
barriers to confession are reduced and cooperation becomes more likely.
Demeter told the OIG that these tactics may sound "touchy-feely" or
"counterintuitive," but they had been very successful with hard core
criminals in the past. Demeter said he explained to Miller that, when
dealing with a person who believes that his suffering will be rewarded by
God, causing more suffering is not effective in the long term. Demeter said
he told Miller that the aggressive approach would simply create an
additional obstacle, because the interrogator would still have to get the
subject to confess to something that may not be in his best interest, and the
interrogator would also have to overcome the detainee's personal animosity.
Despite Demeter's arguments, however, the military decided that its
aggressive approach had a greater chance of success, and DOD
interrogators began using harsher techniques on Al-Qahtani.
In mid-November, 2002, FBI agents at GTMO continued their efforts
to influence the military's Al-Qahtani interrogation plan, without success.
On November 20, at Miller's instruction, the FBI met with JTF-GTMO staff
in an effort to find some "common ground." Military intelligence presented
its plan and the FBI objected based on concerns regarding efficacy,
coercion, and possible illegality. Brett told the OIG that it became apparent
to him that the military could not agree to a plan that did not include the
application of SERE techniques and a phase which involved sending Al65 We are not certain of the date of this meeting but we believe it took place in late
November or early December 2002.

Qahtani to a third country where he could be tortured to get information,
two things the FBI would not agree to do.
The FBI offered its alternative plan which used rapport-based
techniques and military intelligence and JTF-GTMO staff members agreed to
revise their plan by incorporating some of the FBI's techniques. The FBI
personnel present said the revised plan would have to be reviewed and
approved by FBI Headquarters and BAU before the FBI could agree to
pursue the plan. Military intelligence officials at GTMO did not advise the
FBI that a revised plan would be presented to the General the next day.
Nonetheless, according to McMahon, the FBI's MLDU Unit Chief, and the
OSC, during a video teleconference the next day at which the interrogation
of Al-Qahtani was discussed, the same Lieutenant Colonel who had falsely
claimed in the October 2002 teleconference that the DOD had obtained
information from Al-Qahtani using aggressive methods (as described above)
"blatantly misled the Pentagon into believing that the BAU endorsed
[military intelligence]'s aggressive and controversial Interrogation Plan." The
OSC stated that one of the FBI agents in attendance wanted the OSC to
interrupt the Lieutenant Colonel to correct the record during the
teleconference, but the OSC said he chose not to do so because he did not
want to embarrass General Miller and he wanted to address the matter with
the Lieutenant Colonel privately. The next day, the OSC sent a letter to
Major General Miller to correct the Lieutenant Colonel's
misrepresentation. 66

In addition to raising concerns to military officials, Brett and
McMahon sought assistance and guidance from FBI Headquarters. FBI
Assistant General Counsel Spike Bowman told the OIG that in late 2002 he
requested that the concerns about interrogation techniques raised by
McMahon and Brett be documented in a written report for him to use in
raising concerns to the DOD. Six months later, on May 30, 2003, McMahon
received the necessary approvals for this EC and transmitted it to Bowman,
the FBI's MLDU Chief, and the Acting CTORS Section Chief.67 Bowman's
actions in connection with this EC are discussed later in this chapter.

66 Sometime in early December, the FBI's MLDU Unit Chief traveled to GTMO and
participated in a teleconference with Pentagon officials in which he challenged military
intelligence's assertion that the FBI had endorsed military intelligence's interrogation
techniques.
67 Brett told the OIG the delay was due, in part, to the controversial nature of the
EC. Brett said that he believed the controversy centered around the fact that the FBI were
guests of the military at GTMO and that this EC was actually telling the military that they
should not be doing what they were doing because their tactics were both ineffective and
possibly illegal.

VII.

Proposal To - Al- Qahtani To Be Interrogated Using an
Alternative Debriefing Model of the Sort Used on Zubaydah

We also determined that at one point during the controversy regarding
the interrogation of Al-Qahtani, U.S. government officials, includin officials
from the FBI and DOJ, advanced a proposal to
At least some DOJ and FBI
officials understood that this proposal involved subjecting Al-Qahtani to
interrogation using the same
used on Zubaydah,
although these officials told the OIG that they did not know specifically what
interrogation techniques would be involved.
The OIG obtained a draft document describing such a proposal
during this investigation. The only two officials we interviewed who told us
they were familiar with the document were David Nahmias (then Counsel to
the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at DOJ) and an FBI
agent who was the Unit Chief for the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit
(MLDU) at the time the document was drafted. The Unit Chief said it was
written to solicit assistance
in dealing with Al-Qahtani.
Nahmias told the OIG that the document was a draft of a letter to be sent by
the Attorney General to the National Security Council.
Nahmias stated that he is certain that the document was drafted by
the FBI - either by the FBI Unit Chief or someone in MLDU. The "header"
information on the document reflects that it was printed from Nahmias' FBI
computer. The FBI Unit Chief said the FBI provided the facts in the
document, but that someone at DOJ may have reformatted them into a
draft. None of the other witnesses the OIG interviewed about this issue
could identify the author.
The document described the connection between Al-Qahtani and the
September 11 attacks, and stated that preliminary interrogations had led to
"some success" with Al-Qahtani. The draft further stated:
There has been significant discussion regarding the relative
safety and comfort of the detainee facilities at GTMO. Among
the issues discussed is the lack of a multi-tiered system of
physical holding areas which could employ varying degrees of
privilege and interaction with others. It is the collective opinion
of FBI investigators, FBI Behavioral'Anal sis Unit (BAU) ,
and the Department of Defense (DOD) Criminal Investigative
Task Force (CITF) that this environment has created
complacency in [AL-QAHTANI].
It is firmly believed that AL-QATANI traveled to the U.S. in 2001
for the purposes of committing or supporting a terrorist act. It

is further believed that AL-QATANI possesses critical
intelligence regarding the identification of individuals also
involved in planning, supporting, or committing terrorist acts
against U.S. interests. Although some progress has been made
with AL-QATANI at GTMO,
being
used with subjects including ABU ZABAIDA
could greatly enhance his productivity.
The FBIHQ GTMO Task Force has discussed the following
proposed strategy with representatives of the Department of
Justice DOJ , FBI investigators, FBI-BAU,
and with DOD-OASD (SOLIC). Further
debriefings of AL-QATANI at GTMO are unlikely to result in
actionable intelligence. As long as AL-QATANI remains in law
enforcement or military custody, he does not at this time pose a
continued threat to U.S. interests.

To improve the produc tivity of further intelligence exploitation,
AL-QATANI should be

AL-QATANI would be debriefed by highly knowledgeable
personnel, and disseminations regarding the results of these
debriefings would be released to the appropriate U.S.
intelligence entities expeditious)

The document is undated, and neither Nahmias nor the FBI Unit
Chief could recall exactly when it was drafted, although both agreed that it
was probably created in the fall of 2002 or early in 2003.68

68 The document refers to the interrogations of Binalshibh, who was not captured
until September 11, 2002. The document makes no mention of Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed's interrogation, which began after his capture on March 1, 2003. Therefore,
the OIG believes this document was created between October 2002 and March 2003. The
MLDU Unit Chief estimated that the document was written in mid-November 2002. In
addition, a November 14, 2002, e-mail from the Commander of the Criminal Investigative
Task Force (CITF) to Major General Miller (discussed below) appears to make a reference to
this proposal.

Nahmias provided to the OIG contemporaneous notes and other
documents from this period that contain several general references to a plan
being actively pursued to change the circumstances of Al-Qahtani's
interrogation. Although these documents desc ribe a plan for Al-Qahtani

that involved
they do not specifically discuss what techniques would be used to
ate Al-Qahtani and there is no specific reference in the notes to
iiiaiiia6i or to methods used with any other detainee,
including Zubaydah. Nahmias' notes from a meeting with the FBI Unit
Chief on September 27, 2002, state that the FBI Unit Chief met with a
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and with _ regarding
the proposal to
The notes also indicate
that the DOD's Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) (Fort Belvoir) was
"on board" with the proposal. In an October 2002 e-mail to DOD officials
with a copy to Alice Fisher, Nahmias stated that the FBI Unit Chief had
recently met with an official from CITF in Fort Belvoir regarding the proposal
for Al-Qahtani. The e-mail stated: "I also advised [the FBI Unit Chief] that
the write-up of the proposal should be discussed by us first...." We believe
that the reference to a "write-up of the proposal" concerns some version of
the draft letter quoted above.
An e-mail dated November 14, 2002, sent by the Commander of CITF
to Major General Miller, makes an apparent reference to the proposed
strategy
. In the e-mail the Commander
stated: "There has been repeated discussion by several agencies that they
wanted to take [Al-Qahtani] to another location to try other techniques to
get him to talk ... FBI in particular has made several requests thru DOJ to
allow them to execute a plan whereby #63 would be taken to alternate
locations .... So far, DOD had refused approval until both JTF-GTMO and
CITF both agree. What you need to know is that apparently, several times it
has been represented that we at CITF HAVE agreed to this plan, but in fact
we have not done so ...." Although the e-mail refers to the use of "other
techniques" with Al-Qahtani, the e-mail does not specify. the techniques or
directly connect them to the techniques that had previously been used on
Zubaydah.
It appears that in early 2003 DOJ formally raised the issue of the AlQahtani interrogations at the NSC. Nahmias provided the OIG with an
agenda for a January 8, 2003, NSC meeting, including an attachment
entitled "Detainee Issues (1/8/03)" which stated:
Interrogations of Al Qatani in Afghanistan and at GTMO have
produced little information. Since September, his
interrogations have been conducted by [Defense Intelligence
Agency]. Since late September, FBI, DOJ,
,and some
elements of DOD have been proposing

Very recent and unevaluated reports suggest that he may now
be providing intelligence; if so,
may not be appropriate.
Other than the draft letter itself, the contemporaneous documents
provided to the OIG do not make reference to

or to Zubaydah and therefore do not reveal which if any of the
participants was aware of the specific interrogation methods that were
involved. They do, however, establish that a proposal
was actively pursued by
certain officials from DOJ and the FBI in late 2002 and early 2003.
As detailed in Chapter Four, the interrogations of Zubaydah M
included interrogation techniques that cannot be characterized
as "rapport-based" and that clearly would never have been permitted for FBI
agents in the United States under any FBI policy. Indeed, when the FBI
originally learned about some of the techniques that had been used or
approved for use on Zubaydah, Director Mueller gave instructions that FBI
agents should not participate in any interrogations in which such
techniques would be used. In addition, the CIA has acknowledged that
Zubaydah was waterboarded, although there is no evidence that FBI agents
observed or were aware of this conduct at the time. Although the proposal
as described in the draft letter did not include direct FBI participation in the
implementation of alternative debriefing models of the sort that were used
with Zubaydah, advocating that others use such an approach with AlQahtani appears to conflict with the spirit if not the letter of Director
Mueller's instructions.
However, both the FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias told the OIG that
although they advocated for the plan described in the draft letter, they did
not know specifically what techniques had been used on Zuba dah.
Nahmias's contemporaneous notes relating to the prop osal to
do not reflect any
discussion of particular techniques to be used with Al-Qahtani. Both the
FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias told the OIG that their belief that approach would greatly enhance Al-Qahtani's productivity was based not on
any familiarity with the specific interrogation techniques that had been used
on Zubaydah, but instead on the quality of the intelligence the CIA was
providing to the FBI and DOJ from high value detainees in CIA custody.
Given the statements by the FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias that they
did not know what the
entailed, the OIG
sought to determine what the thou ht would happen to Al-Qahtani under
the proposal
. The FBI Unit Chief said he
wanted Al-Qahtani to be in an environment
with native
speakers,
where
he
Arabic
would be "drinking tea" instead of eating "MREs,"

and where he would let his guard down. The Unit Chief said he believed
onl
69 He said he thought the
techniques the military wanted to use on Al-Qahtani at GTMO might
preclude trying Al-Qahtani in court or in a tribunal and would produce
statements that would be "suspect, at best."

Similarly, Nahmias said that he presumed
was legal,
but said he did not know the details of the program and did not see the
authorizing memoranda (which are discussed in Chapter Four of this
report). Nahmias told the OIG that he did not think that the proposal in the
draft letter involved waterboarding Al-Qahtani. Nahmias said he believed
interrogation practices than the FBI, but

he had never even heard of the term "waterboarding" at that time.

said the military's interrogation model was largely to scream at the
detainees,

Nahmias also told the OIG that conditions at GTMO were not
promoting successful interrogations of Al-Qahtani. He said that at GTMO
there was no way to "separate" someone, so people who had been
cooperative prior to their arrival became uncooperative when mixed in with
the general detainee population. He said there was no system of rewards or
protection for those who cooperated or penalties for those who did not.
Nahmias told the OIG that Al-Qahtani had "shut down" after the DOD took
over the interrogations, and the DOD's tactics were "completely ineffective."
He also stated that at the time the letter was drafted the military had
stopped interrogating Al-Qahtani due to legal issues over whether military
69 The evidence regarding what the FBI Unit Chief knew about CIA techniques at
the time is limited. The Unit Chief stated he did not know what techniques the CIA used on
Zubaydah
at the time of the proposal for Al-Qahtani. One FBI a ent told us
that in late 2001 or early 2002 he told the Unit Chief about visiting a
. The FBI agent said he did not witness any torture at the facili
. The FBI agent said
told him
to avoid the facility in the future unless he wanted to be subpoenaed by a congressional
committee to testify. The agent said he described this experience to the FBI Unit Chief.
However, the Unit Chief told us he did not recall hearing about this incident from the FBI
agent. We also note that the FBI Unit Chief reported to Arena and D'Amuro, who were
aware of at least some of the techniques the CIA employed on Zubaydah. However, Arena
told us he could not recall if the Unit Chief was involved in the discussions he had about
the CIA's use
on Zubaydah.

orders were being accurately followed . Nahmias also stated that he had
"significant con cerns " that the DOD was not "accurately reporting what they
were Lyettin

We also attempted to determine the extent to which the proposal for
Al-Qahtani described in the draft letter was known to other officials in the
FBI and DOJ. The FBI MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that the proposal in
the draft letter was briefed and discussed with his chain of command, and
that approval of the FBI Director and the Attorney General ultimately would
have been required to put this proposal into effect. However, the other FBI
officials we interviewed told us they had not seen the draft letter and had
not heard of the proposal described in it.
The OIG asked ITOS-1 Section Chief Andrew Arena about the draft
letter because his section of the Counterterrorism Division had
responsibility for intelligence issues relating to GTMO. Arena told the OIG
that he had never seen the document before the OIG provided it to him and
he was unaware of any proposal for Al-Qahtani along the lines described in
the draft letter. In addition, Arena said he was "shocked" to learn that any
officials from the FBI and DOJ ever advocated for such a measure. Arena
said he believes the
referred to in the draft
proposal refers to the
the CIA was using on
Zubaydah
. He said that in discussions with the FBI the
DOD would often cite a DOJ legal opinion, which Arena had not seen, that
said
However, Arena could not recall if the FBI MLDU Unit Chief was ever
involved in discussions about the CIA's use of such techniques.
Pasquale D'Amuro was the Assistant Director for CTD and was
promoted to Executive Assistant Director in November 2002, near the time
this draft proposal was prepared. D'Amuro told us that he never saw the
document before his OIG interview and never heard of a proposal to for employment of an alternative

debriefing model of the sort that had been approved for use by the CIA on
Zubaydah. D'Amuro stated that he would have opposed such a strategy
because he believed that FBI interview techniques were superior at
developing reliable information. D'Amuro told us he could not recall having
any discussions with the FBI Unit Chief regarding strategies for obtaining
information from Al-Qahtani.7°

70 The OIG also attempted to interview former Counterterrorism Division Assistant
Director Larry Mefford regarding this proposal. Mefford was in the FBI Unit Chief's chain of
(Cont'd.)

FBI Director Mueller told the OIG that the proposal regarding AlQahtani described in the draft letter was never discussed with him and
never reached him. He said he did not know the circumstances under
which the document was written. Similarly, Mueller's Chief of Staff at the
time, Daniel Levin, told us that he did not recall seeing the draft letter,
u h he vaguely recalled discussion of
i
We also sought to determine whether the pro osal was discussed
within DOJ. Nahmias stated that a proposal to
_ was discussed in the informal working group (described in Chapter
Two) which included Nahmias or Fisher from the DOJ Criminal Division, a
member of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, someone from the DOD Office of

the General Counsel, and
-. However, Nahmias told the OIG that these discussions did not
address the idea that the techniques that had been used on Zubaydah
would be used on Al-Qahtani. Fisher confirmed that the case of Al-Qahtani
was discussed at these informal meetings, but she and Nahmias said that
the topics of mistreatment, abuse, and voluntariness were not discussed in

connection with Al-Qahtani. Fisher told the OIG that she does not recall
ever seeing the draft letter and she does not recall discussing the strategy
described in it. Fisher said she had a vague recollec tion that there might
have been a discussion with the CIA about whether
. However, Fisher said she does not believe it was
within the Criminal Division's jurisdiction to "sign off" on something like
that. Fisher said she does not believe anyone thought it was a good idea
and that she does not believe that it was done.71
Nahmias told the OIG that the draft letter was created as a means for
the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General to suggest that if the

command, but had left the FBI by the time the OIG became aware of the draft letter. We
were not able to obtain an interview with Mefford.
71 We also note that Phase IV of the military's plan for Al-Qahtani, described in
detail earlier in this chapter, proposed sending him "off Island" either temporarily of
permanently to "either Jordan, Egypt or another third country to allow those countries to
employ interrogation techniques that will enable them to obtain the requisite information."

Some witnesses , however, were only
able to recall a proposal to send Al-Qahtani
and were
not able to recall further details, so it was not possible for the OIG to determine in those
instances whether the witnesses' recollection related to the military's plan or to the draft
letter described here.

FBI could not interro ate Al-Qahtani that he should be
. Nahmias said he thought the DOJ officials
involved in the development of the general strategy to
may have included Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy
Attorney General Thompson, Attorney General Ashcroft, and his Chief of
Staff David Ayres.72 Nahmias told the OIG, however, that his discussions
with these people related to a general strategy for Al-Qahtani, did not
include sharing the draft letter, and did not address the specific concept
that interrogation techniques of the type used on Zubaydah would be used
on Al-Qahtani.
Assistant Attorney General Chertoff told the OIG that he does not
recall an specific discussion of
. Chertoff said he did not recall whether he had
specific knowled e at that point of the specific techniques used on
Zubaydah
. However, he said it would not surprise him if,

iven Al-Qahtani's perceived value, there was some discussion as to whether

. In contrast, he said, the information obtained by the
DOD was not very good. He also said he understood that while a detainee
was at GTMO, the DOD controlled who would have access to that detainee
and the FBI might be allowed to participate, but only as a guest. Thompson
and Ayres both told the OIG that the did not recall the draft letter or any

ro osal to

for interrogation using

Nahmias stated that he is not aware that a final version of the letter
ever reached Attorney General Ashcroft, but that he believed that the
Attorney General was aware of the concerns about Al-Qahtani and was
aware that the general strategy to change the circumstances of Al-Qahtani's
interrogation was being considered. As previously noted, former Attorney
General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed for this review.
The OIG also interviewed the Chief of the BAU unit primarily
responsible for sending FBI agents to GTMO regarding the draft letter,

72 Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz told the OIG that neither the draft
letter nor the proposal outlined in it were discussed with him at the time, and that he was
unaware of such a proposal prior to being questioned by the 01G.

because the draft letter states specifically that the proposed strategy had
been discussed with representatives of the FBI-BAU. The BAU Chief told
the OIG that he had never seen the proposal contained in the draft letter
and would not have supported such a proposal had he been consulted
about it. He said the BAU advocated exclusively for a long-term rapportbuilding approach by a qualified interviewer, and he believed such an
approach could be effective in gathering intelligence from detainees at
GTMO. He said he suspects the methods used with Zubaydah as referred to
in the draft consisted of techniques that the BAU would not support.
As noted above, the FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias said they did not
know what techniques the CIA had used on Zubaydah. We attempted to
determine the extent to which other officials in the FBI and DOJ had
information about such techniques at the time of the draft letter, even if
they were not aware of the specific proposal to use such techniques with AlQahtani. We found that by the time the draft letter proposing transfer of AlQahtani was written, some other counterterrorism officials at the FBI were
aware that the CIA's interrogation methods included
techniques. Agents with whom the FBI Unit Chief worked as
head of the GTMO Task Force and officials in his chain of command at the
FBI were aware that techniques had been used on Zubaydah M
that involved treatment that did not remotely resemble the
rapport-based approach embodied in FBI policy. At the time of this
proposal, Special Agents Thomas and Gibson, ITOS-1 Section Chief Andrew
Arena, FBI Counterterrorism Assistant Director D'Amuro, and others at the
FBI had learned about some of the types of techniques that had been used
or proposed for use by the CIA on Zubaydah, as described in Chapter Four.
In addition, the Assistant Chief of the FBI's Counterterrorism Operational
Response Section (CTORS of which MLDU was a unit) and Special Agent
Thomas told us that
-. However, none of these FBI officials told the OIG that they were
aware of any proposal to use the same techniques with Al-Qahtani.
There is also some evidence that some officials in the DOJ Criminal
Division were aware of some of the techniques involved in the CIA's

in the fall of 2002.

D'Amuro stated that he had attended a meeting
with Chertoff, Fisher, and others in which he learned that the CIA had
obtained a legal opinion from the DOJ that certain techniques could legally
be used,
. Chertoff and
Fisher told us they did not recall this meeting. Chertoff told the OIG that he
was aware that the CIA had requested DOJ approval for certain
interrogation techniques and that the CIA had obtained a general opinion
from the OLC relating to its interrogations. Chertoff said that the Criminal

100

Division was asked to provide an "advance declination" in connection with
the CIA's use of some techniques, but that he had refused to provide it. In
testimony before the U.S. Senate on February 2, 2005, Chertoff stated that
he was asked to review a draft of an OLC memorandum that eventually
became the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum regarding "Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation," which is sometimes referred to as the "Yoo
memorandum."73 Chertoff stated in his Senate testimony and his OIG
interview that at least some of the CIA "techniques" were described to him at
the time.
Nahmias said that Al-Qahtani
because the
strategy was "overtaken by events." As detailed below, in the spring of 2003
Al-Qahtani began to provide significant amounts of intelligence and he has
subsequently remained at GTMO . Although Al-Qahtani
, we are not aware of any CIA
being used with him. In addition, by mid-December 2003
the FBI was provided sporadic access to Al-Qahtani and the FBI has
interrogated him on multiple occasions since then.

It is important to note that the plan to
for interrogation using an
did not come
to fruition. We also note, however, that advocacy of a plan that included the
use of an approach such as the one used on Zubaydah was not consistent
with the Director's determination that the FBI should not participate in
interrogations in which non-FBI techniques would be used.
We did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the FBI Unit Chief
or Nahmias knew specifically what techniques had been used on Zubaydah
at the time they advanced this proposal. We found it
troubling, however, that officials in the FBI and DOJ would advocate for
usin the interrogation approach that was employed with Zubaydah •
without knowing what techniques that approach included. We
do not believe that this proposal would have been approved by the other FBI
officials in the FBI Unit Chief's chain of command who were aware of the
nature of these techniques during the time frame the proposal was drafted
and who also were aware of Director Mueller's determination that the FBI
should have no part in such techniques.

73 This general opinion did not describe any specific interrogation techniques, but
did include an examination of "possible defenses that would negate any claim that certain
interrogation methods violate the statute" prohibiting torture. A separate DOJ opinion
issued the same day stated that the specific techniques approved for use on Zubaydah
included waterboardin ,

101

VIII . The Military Proceeds with the Interrogation of Al-Qahtani, Over
FBI Objections
Despite the FBI objections, the military proceeded with its
interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani. Between November 23, 2002, and
January 15, 2003, Al-Qahtani was interrogated by a "special projects" team
of military intelligence personnel. We believe that during this period Phase
II and Phase III of the interrogation plan were executed without the
involvement of the FBI or DOJ.
Special Agent Demeter told the OIG that the military employed Phase
II of the plan (placing a government translator with Al-Qahtani who would
act like a detainee and would engage Al-Qahtani in conversation) briefly, but
it was unsuccessful. It appears that the military then moved on to Phase III
(use of the 19 counter-resistance techniques listed in Major General
Dunlavey's October 11, 2002, memorandum).
According to the Schmidt-Furlow and Church Reports, as well as other
military records, the techniques used on Al-Qahtani during this time period
included
•

Tying a dog leash to detainee's chain, walking him around the
room and leading him through a series of dog tricks

•

Repeatedly pouring water on his head

•

Stress positions

•

20-hour interrogations

•

Forced shaving for hygienic and psychological purposes

•

Stripping him naked in the presence of a female

•

Holding him down while a female interrogator straddled the
detainee without placing weight on him

•

Women's underwear placed over his head and bra placed over
his clothing

•

Female interrogator massaging his back and neck region over
his clothing

•

Describing his mother and sister to him as whores

•

Showing him pictures of scantily clothed women

•

Discussing his repressed homosexual tendencies in his
presence
Male interrogator dancing with him

102

•

Telling him that people would tell other detainees that he got
aroused when male guards searched him

•

Forced physical training

•

Instructing him to pray to idol shrine

•

Adjusting the air conditioner to make him uncomfortable

The Schmidt-Furlow Report concluded that many of these techniques
were authorized under the military's Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence
Interrogation, which we describe in Chapter Three of this report.
Schmidt/Furlow Report at 20. For example, according to the Schmidt-Furlow
Report, holding Al-Qahtani down while a female interrogator straddled the
detainee was determined to be within the scope of the "Futility" technique
(an act used to highlight the futility of the detainee's situation). Id. at 1617. Other techniques used on Al-Qahtani by the military during this time
period, such as use of cold temperature to make the detainee
uncomfortable, were deemed by the Schmidt-Furlow Report to be
"unauthorized" at the time they were employed. Id. at 18.
As noted in Chapter Three, on December 2, 2002, Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld formally approved a new policy for GTMO (the "December 2002
Policy") listing additional counter resistance techniques that were not
specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52. The new policy specifically
approved several of the techniques that had been or were being employed on
Al-Qahtani, including stress positions, 20-hour interrogations, forced
nudity, and military working dogs. Church Report at 4-5, 116-7.
In early December 2002, Al-Qahtani was hospitalized as a result of
the DOD interrogations. Demeter told the OIG that a U.S. Navy nurse
informed him that Al-Qahtani had been admitted to the base hospital for
hypothermia. During a daily staff meeting, Demeter inquired about this
incident, and the Lieutenant Colonel who was in charge of GTMO
interrogations at that time stated that Al-Qahtani had not been diagnosed
with hypothermia, but rather low blood pressure along with low body core
temperature.74 Apart from FBI's knowledge of this incident, we have no
evidence that members of the FBI or DOJ were aware that the specific
techniques described above were used on Al-Qahtani during this time
frame.

74 In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD stated that "[a] footnote from
review of the medical records ... would lend credibility to either the agent's or the
lieutenant colonel's comments." However, the DOD did not provide a copy of the referenced
records.

103

IX.

Concerns about the Interrogation of Al- Qahtani and Other
Detainees Are Elevated at FBI Headquarters

During late 2002, several FBI agents attempted to raise their concerns
about the interrogation techniques the DOD was using on Al-Qahtani with
FBI Headquarters and requested guidance for agents exposed to such
interrogation activities.
On November 22, 2002, after having returned from GTMO, FBI BAU
SSA Lyle sent an e-mail to the Chief Division Counsel in the front office of
the Critical Incident Response Group (of which the BAU is one unit)
requesting documentation of the military's authority to engage in
"extraordinary" interrogation techniques and inquiring whether there were
any orders providing authority or guidance to FBI agents exposed to such
techniques. The Chief Division Counsel responded that, absent human
rights violations "such as physical torture, rape, starvation and murder,"
the authority of the military to engage in such techniques was not the FBI's
concern, but that FBI agents should not be "involved in" such
interrogations. Lyle raised the issue of agents being "exposed" to such
techniques utilized by others and suggested the development of written
guidelines from the FBI's General Counsel. The Chief Division Counsel
responded that he was not concerned about FBI agents witnessing such
techniques as long as they did not participate, because the techniques were
".apparently lawful" for the military. The Chief Division Counsel also
emphasized during his interview with the OIG that Judge Advocate General
Corps officers were present at GTMO. He told the OIG that the fact that the
techniques continued to be employed led him to conclude that they were
lawful. However, he said he advised the FBI agents that if they were
uncomfortable in such a situation, then they should leave.
Also on November 22, 2002, Foy wrote an EC to senior officials at the
FBI, including CTD Deputy Assistant Director John Pistole, ITOS-1 Section
Chief Andrew Arena, and the MLDU Unit Chief, providing his observations
and recommendations regarding the FBI mission in GTMO. Foy told the
OIG that the Unit Chief had instructed him to draft the EC during the
MLDU Unit Chiefs visit to GTMO in October 2002. Among other things, the
EC stated:
[Military Intelligence] interrogators are routinely utilizing nonlaw enforcement tactics in their interview tactics. NCAVC
personnel witnessed sleep deprivation, duct tape on an
individual's mouth, loud music, bright.lights, and growling dogs
in the [Military Intelligence] detainee interview process.
The use of these tactics put FBI personnel in a tenuous
situation that will perhaps necessitate FBI representatives being
utilized as defense witnesses in future judicial proceedings

104

against a Detainee. Additionally, the aforementioned tactics
may preclude law enforcement from successfully obtaining
valuable intelligence from these Detainees in future interview
scenarios. 75

Foy's EC was reviewed by the BAU Chief before it was finalized. Foy
told the OIG that there was no response from anyone who received the EC,
and that he had no other discussions with the MLDU Unit Chief about the
EC. The BAU Chief said he did not recall ever seeing any response to Foy's
EC.
The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that he raised the issues described
in Foy's November 22, 2002, EC with ITOS-1 Section Chief Arena, and
Arena said the FBI should stay away from the kinds of techniques Foy
described. Arena told the OIG he did not recall receiving the EC. However,
he said the general issues raised in the EC were brought to the attention of
the FBI Office of the General Counsel (OGC). He also said that he spoke
with his superiors about the fact that the military intended to use SERE
techniques on Al-Qahtani. Arena said he assumed his superiors raised
these issues up to Director Mueller.
CTD Deputy Assistant Director Pistole told the OIG that although he
did not specifically recall Foy's EC, at some point he became aware of the
DOD techniques described in the EC, such as the use of growling dogs.
Pistole told the OIG that he recognized that the FBI needed to provide clear
guidance so that agents did not become a party to or a beneficiary of these
techniques. However, he said he did not recall asking for an assessment or
requesting any recommendations to address the matters raised in the EC.
We determined that reports regarding the treatment of other detainees
at GTMO were also elevated to MLDU in 2002 and 2003. An SSA who was
temporarily detailed to this unit during 2002 told us that the MLDU Unit
Chief or another agent in the unit received reports of military interrogation
techniques such as yelling at the detainees and throwing objects in the
interrogation rooms such as chairs or other small pieces of furniture. An
agent who served two rotations as OSC at GTMO in 2002 and 2003 stated
that he was aware that techniques such as sleep deprivation, shackling,
stress positions, and cold temperatures were being used at GTMO and that
he sent e-mails to the MLDU Unit Chief to let him know what was going on.
The Unit Chief confirmed to the OIG that he received reports from agents at
GTMO regarding their concerns about various techniques the military was

75 The EC, which does not mention Al-Qahtani by name, covers a broader range of
mistreatment allegations and GTMO-related management issues than those presented by
the dispute over the Al-Qahtani interrogations.

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using. The Unit Chief said he recalled hearing about sleep deprivation, a
female interrogator exposing her breast to a detainee, and an interrogator
rubbing vegetable oil on a detainee while telling him it was "pig's oil." The
Unit Chief stated that he relayed any such reports to his superiors (CTORS
Section Chief Frankie Battle and CTD DAD T.J. Harrington).
Some of the agents' concerns reached the FBI's OGC. In late
November 2002, Special Agent Brett wrote a legal analysis of the
interrogation techniques being proposed for use by the military, and
forwarded it to Spike Bowman, head of the National Security Law Branch in
the OGC. In his analysis, Brett stated that hooding, use of phobias (such as
fear of dogs) to induce stress, use of "scenarios designed to convince the
detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent,"
exposure to cold weather or water, and waterboarding may violate the
Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340. Brett also stated that the technique of
sending a detainee to "Jordan or Egypt or another third country to allow
those countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable them to
obtain the requisite information" was a "per se" violation of the Torture
Statute if done with the intent that the third country would use techniques
that violate the Torture Statute. Brett's memorandum stated that even
"discussing any plan which includes this category could be seen as a
conspiracy to violate [the Torture Statute]." Brett included an urgent
request for guidance regarding these issues.
In early December 2002, the Chief Division Counsel of the CIRG
forwarded several documents to Bowman, including Brett's legal analysis.
Bowman responded:
I do not feel that the FBI should be perceived to approve this
and continue to believe that a [Behavioral Analysis Program]
evaluation is needed - both to aid in documenting an FBI
position and to help FBI policy-makers in evaluating this
situation.
I concur that we can't control what the military is doing, but we
need to stand well clear of it and get as much information as
possible to [CTD Assistant Director] D'Amuro, [Deputy Director]
Gebhardt and [Director] Mueller as soon as possible....
The Chief Division Counsel for CIRG stated that he forwarded
Bowman's advice to members of the CIRG.
Bowman told the OIG he may have talked to CTD Assistant Director
D'Amuro, FBI Deputy Director Gebhardt, and FBI General Counsel

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Wainstein about these concerns.76 However, none of these officials could
specifically recall being told any details regarding DOD techniques during
this period. Wainstein told the OIG that he did not recall any specific
discussions about the effectiveness of military interviews at GTMO until
after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal broke in May 2004. D'Amuro said he
did not recall BAU agents communicating concerns about DOD techniques
or any discussion with Bowman about this subject. However, he told the
OIG that he learned at some point that the military was using aggressive
techniques at GTMO, and that the FBI had reiterated its instruction to
agents that they should not participate in such techniques. Gebhardt said
he recalled Bowman or CTD Deputy Assistant Director Harrington bringing
these issues to his attention, though he was not sure when this occurred.
He said he did not recall the specific techniques in question or any specific
instructions being given to FBI agents as a result.
Director Mueller told the OIG that, in general, he did not recall being
aware of a dispute between the military and the FBI over interrogation
techniques at GTMO prior to the spring of 2004, after the Abu Ghraib
disclosures.77 He said he did not recall seeing either the November 2002 EC
written by Foy or the May 2003 EC written by McMahon (described below in
Section XIV). He also said he had no discussions with military officials
about these issues, and he was unaware of any FBI input on DOD
interrogation protocols apart from input that might have been given at
GTMO by FBI personnel working there. With respect to Al-Qahtani
specifically, Director Mueller said he had no recollection of weighing in on
how he should be handled.

Concerns Regarding Interrogations of Al-Qahtani and Others Are
Elevated by the FBI to the DOJ Criminal Division

We determined that the FBI's concerns about the DOD's approach
reached high levels in the DOJ Criminal Division during 2002 and 2003.
The issue was initially reported by the MLDU Unit Chief to Criminal Division
76 Bowman also told the OIG that he thought he could influence the military by
bringing these issues directly to his counterparts in the DOD Office of General Counsel.
His efforts in that regard came several months later, however, and are described in Section
XIV of this chapter.
77 We also interviewed Daniel Levin, Director Mueller's former Chief of Staff. Levin
left the FBI in September 2002, before many of the agents' concerns about the Al-Qahtani
interrogations had been raised with Headquarters. However, he said he was aware of
general concerns regarding the effectiveness of the techniques the DOD and others were
using at GTMO. He stated that the FBI's assessment was that the detainee interviews at
GTMO were not eliciting much useful information, and this led to a debate about whether
there was a better way to handle these detainees.

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officials during weekly meetings that the Unit Chief later described in an email to CTD DAD T.J. Harrington dated May 10, 2004, as follows:
In my weekly meetings with DOJ we often discussed DoD
techniques and how they were not effective or producing Intel
that was reliable. Bruce Swartz (SES), Dave Nahmias (SES),
Laura Parsky (now SES, GS 15 at the time) and Alice Fisher
(SES Appointee) all from DOJ Criminal Division attended
meetings with FBI. We all agreed DoD tactics were going to be
an issue in the military commission cases. I know Mr. Swartz
brought this to the attention of DoD OGC.78
The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that in the course of weekly
meetings with David Nahmias, the counsel to the Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division, he made Nahmias aware that the military was
using aggressive techniques on Al-Qahtani and others at GTMO.79 The Unit

78 The MLDU Unit Chief later indicated that the he did not intend to imply that
Fisher was present during discussions of specific DOD interrogation tactics. In a letter
dated July 26, 2005, which was sent in response to a request from the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary for clarification of this e-mail, Assistant Attorney
General William Moschella stated that the "author of the e-mail" (the MLDU Unit Chief)
stated that:
He did not have conversations with Ms. Fisher nor does he recall discussions in Ms.
Fisher's presence about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. He did
participate in conversations with Ms. Fisher and other Department and FBI
representatives about a specific detainee and that detainee's links to law
enforcement efforts. These discussions focused on the information gathered
regarding the individual and his associations, but not on his treatment or
interrogation.
In the July 26 letter, Moschella stated that:
As set forth in the email,. the author [of the e-mail] attended meeting with
Department representatives about detainees generally; there was no discussion of
DOD techniques at the couple of those meetings that Ms. Fisher attended. Ms.
Fisher was not part of the group referenced in the portion of the e-mail regarding
DOD tactics as an issue in the military commission cases. He does not recall any
conversation with or in the presence of Ms. Fisher regarding interrogation
techniques or the treatment of detainees. His conversations with her focused on the
particular detainee described above and pre-dated the broader conversations about
DOD techniques with other Department representatives.
The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that although there may have been some meetings about
Al-Qahtani at which Fisher was present, those meetings were focused on discussions about
investigative information relating to Al-Qahtani, not interrogation tactics. He said he does
not think Fisher knew about particular interrogation tactics used against Al-Qahtani.
79 The MLDU Unit Chief said these meetings were primarily for the purpose of
keeping DOJ officials informed on intelligence gathered at GTMO, not to discuss detainee
treatment.

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Chief said he was confident Nahmias was also aware of the details of the
observations set out in Foy's EC of November 22, 2002. He told the OIG
that he recalled telling Nahmias in October or November 2002 that one of
the planned or actual techniques used on Al-Qahtani was simulated
drowning.80 Nahmias denied that the Unit Chief ever mentioned this
technique. In addition, the Unit Chief said he provided Foy's November 22
EC along with Foy's e-mails (described earlier) to Nahmias, and that he may
have also given Nahmias a copy of the interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani.
Nahmias stated he did not receive this EC from the Unit Chief.

The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that Nahmias said the FBI should
stay away from this approach, and that he or others at DOJ would raise the
issue with their DOD counterparts. He told us he expected Secretary
Rumsfeld would have the final say because Al-Qahtani was the DOD's
detainee. The Unit Chief said he later asked Nahmias what the DOD's
response was, but he told the OIG he could not recall Nahmias' response.
Andrew Arena, the Section Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism
Operations Section 1 (ITOS-1) and beginning in March of 2003, the Special
Assistant to the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence, told the OIG that he also brought FBI concerns about
military interrogation approach to the attention of DOJ Criminal Division
officials. Arena said that every other week Nahmias, Fisher, and other
Criminal Division attorneys attended a meeting Arena held with his FBI unit
chiefs. Arena said that he did not recall particular techniques being
discussed at these meetings, but that the FBI's general concern that the
military's techniques at GTMO would not be effective was discussed. Later
in his interview, Arena stated that there were numerous occasions when he
had discussions with his chain of command and with attorneys at DOJ
regarding allegations or rumors of aggressive techniques being used at
GTMO or by the CIA at other locations. He recalled, as an example,
discussing the use of humiliation by having a naked detainee being
interrogated by a female. Nahmias and Fisher told the OIG they did not
receive a report of this nature.
In his OIG interview, Nahmias confirmed that he participated in
meetings with the FBI and others about the military's Al-Qahtani
interrogation plan. Nahmias said the military had a graduated plan that got
more "severe," but he did not think the actual interrogation ever got that far.
He said that parts of the plan were "clearly over the top," but he was told
that the interrogators would not implement the more severe techniques
80 Although Major General Dunlavey requested permission to use the technique of
"a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation" on October 11,
2002, we found no other evidence showing that technique was actually used on Al-Qahtani.

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unless everyone "regrouped" for further discussion. He said he could not
recall anyone raising concerns about the legality of the military's
techniques. 81 Nahmias also told the OIG that he raised concerns about the
DOD's interrogations approach with the the DOD Office of the General
Counsel and with the head of the DOD group that dealt with issues of
whether detainees were enemy combatants.
It appears that the MLDU Unit Chief sent Nahmias a copy of a CITF
legal advisor's memorandum dated November 15, 2002, that objected to the
Al-Qahtani interrogation plan. Among other things, the memorandum
stated that CITF has raised "formal legal objections" to the plan, including
that the plan potentially violated the Convention Against Torture. The CITF
memorandum also stated that the focus of the questioning of Al-Qahtani
related to a "historical event" (his participation in the September 11 attacks)
and that the interrogation methods used should be designed to preserve the
statements for use in a military commission proceeding. The MLDU Unit
Chief told the OIG that he also discussed this memorandum with Nahmias.
Nahmias said he had no recollection of this memorandum.82
The FBI's MLDU Unit Chief also described other incidents at GTMO to
officials in the DOJ Criminal Division. For example, Nahmias said that
during the summer of 2003 the MLDU Unit Chief told him anecdotal stories
about incidents at GTMO such as a female interrogator baring her chest to a
detainee, someone using an Israeli flag during an interrogation, and
dropping a Koran on the floor. Nahmias told us that he never heard reports
of actual physical mistreatment, but that he and the FBI were concerned
that the techniques the military was using were stupid, demeaning, and
ineffective.
Bruce Swartz the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division who was responsible for international matters, stated that he and
Laura Parsky (then Counsel to Assistant Attorney General Chertoff) were
assigned to attend the NSC-led Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to deal
with international requests regarding detainees. Swartz told the OIG that

81 Nahmias told the OIG that he did not recall having seen Brett's Legal Analysis
document at the time, but that it was possible he had seen it after the Criminal Division
started investigating other alleged detainee abuses.
82 Upon reviewing the CITF memo during his OIG interview,
Nahmias said the
legality concerns are "buried" in the memo, and that he did not recall seeing the discussion
of the Convention Against Torture in the memo at the time. Nahmias added that he
disagreed with the statement in the memorandum that the focus of the questioning of AlQahtani was an "historical event." Nahmias said that the focus was on gathering
intelligence regarding others who posed an ongoing threat and on preventing future
planned attacks.

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he was never part of any formal meetings with the MLDU Unit Chief or
others at the FBI regarding interrogation techniques or plans at GTMO or
elsewhere. However, Swartz said he had conversations with the MLDU Unit
Chief about the ineffectiveness of DOD interrogations on the way to or from
PCC meetings. Swartz recalled the Unit Chief expressing concerns about
the military posing as FBI agents and interrogating people in a room with
the flag of Israel. According to Swartz, the MLDU Unit Chief was
particularly concerned that the military was inefficient at getting valuable
intelligence, because the DOD was using inexperienced interrogators.
Parsky also told the OIG that she did not participate in formal
meetings with the FBI regarding interrogation techniques.83 Parsky said
that the MLDU Unit Chief told her some "offhand anecdotes" about DOD
interrogation methods at GTMO, such as a female interrogator who removed
her top and rubbed her breasts in the detainee's face, an interrogator who
wrapped himself in an Israeli flag in an interrogation, and an interrogator
who rubbed himself with oil that he told the detainee was "pig's oil." She
said the Unit Chief did not identify any particular detainees in connection
with these anecdotes. Parsky stated that these techniques were not
criminal but were "disgusting and highly inappropriate" for a U.S. official,
and that she described the Unit Chief's anecdotes to Swartz.
Nahmias told the OIG that he usually briefed Fisher on his meetings
about GTMO, and that Fisher certainly knew about the issue of the
effectiveness of the military's interrogation techniques at GTMO. Nahmias
said he recalled that Fisher was present during conversations in which the
interrogation methods were described in a general way, but that he did not
recall discussing specific techniques with Fisher.
Fisher told the OIG that she did not recall discussing detainee
treatment or interrogation techniques with the FBI during this time period.
Fisher told the OIG that she became aware at some time" about an issue
relating to the FBI's concerns about the effectiveness of the DOD's
interrogations at GTMO, but she could not recall how or when she learned
about these concerns. She said she heard that the FBI was concerned that
GTMO was not set up as an effective place to get intelligence information
from detainees because there were no incentives available ("carrots") to
induce better cooperation. She also stated that the FBI believed it got
cooperation and good intelligence in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

83 Parsky told the OIG that the May 10 e-mail was incorrect in that she did not
participate in weekly meetings in which particular detainees and interrogation techniques
were discussed.

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case through rapport building, an interview technique that was "tried and
true."84
Fisher also told the OIG that she did not learn about allegations of
detainee abuse by the military until information about mistreatment at Abu
Ghraib became public. Fisher stated that she did not recall discussion of
DOD interrogating detainees with techniques of the type that are used in
training U.S. Special Forces. She said she recalled learning about the use of
such techniques on detainees in a context that had nothing to do with the
FBI.85
Fisher said she did not recall the FBI MLDU Unit Chief raising these
issues nor does she recall being aware of any other interrogation methods or
plans for Al-Qahtani.86 However, Fisher told the OIG that someone told her
(she did not recall who) that there was a strategy to stop interrogating a
detainee for 20 or 30 days, and that theoretically once the interrogators
went back in the detainee would reveal all the desired information. She said
the FBI said such a technique would not work. Fisher did recall, however,
hearing that the FBI did not consider DOD interrogations at GTMO to be
effective at obtaining useful information because GTMO was not set up to
provide incentives for cooperation.

Nahmias said that he and Fisher raised the FBI's concerns about the
ineffectiveness of the military's interrogations with Chertoff, who was then
the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. Chertoff told the
84 We sought to interview former Attorney General Ashcroft about this and other
matters, but he declined our request. Larry Thompson, who was Ashcroft's Deputy
Attorney General during 2001-2003, told the OIG that the FBI's position was that the other
agencies do not really know how to conduct interviews, but that FBI agents were trained in
it and that this is what they did for a living. Thompson said he recalled getting reports of
"clumsy" interrogation by CIA or the military.
85 Fisher stated she became aware at some point, she could not say when,
that the
CIA requested advice regarding the legality of specific interrogation techniques, and that the
Office of Legal Counsel worked on that issue. She said she was aware of the "Jay Bybee"
memo and another memo on that topic, but they did not relate to the FBI. Fisher also told
the OIG that Assistant Attorney General Chertoff was very clear that the Criminal Division
was not giving advice on which interrogation techniques were permissible and was not
"signing off" on techniques. She said she recalled there was an investigation based on a
CIA referral that may have related to detainee treatment or interrogation techniques, and
that she became aware of some facts relating to CIA interrogations. She did not say when
DOJ received the CIA referral, though she noted that it was sometime "later." Documents
reflect a total of five referrals by the CIA OIG to DOJ. These referrals were made between

February 6, 2003 and March 30, 2004.
86 As described earlier in this chapter, Fisher told the OIG she had a "vague"
recollection that there might have been a discussion
about whether

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OIG that the Criminal Division had an interest in the efficacy of DOD
interrogations at GTMO because its prosecutors were looking for
"actionable" information. Chertoff said he understood generally that the FBI
did not have a high opinion of the skills of the DOD interrogators, though he
said he did not have any recollection of the FBI's view of the military's AlQahtani interrogations. Chertoff said he shared the FBI's concerns, and
that he had a very high opinion of the FBI's interrogation skills. In contrast,
Chertoff said he did not get the sense that the DOD interrogators had
significant experience with interrogations outside a battlefield context.
However, he said he does not recall anyone suggesting that the DOD was
doing something illegal.

XI.

Concerns Regarding Efficacy of DOD Interrogations at GTMO Are
Raised to the Attorney General

Chertoff and Nahmias told the OIG that general concerns about the
efficacy of the DOD's GTMO interrogations were brought to the attention of
Attorney General Ashcroft. Chertoff said these concerns were brought to the
attention of Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson as well. Chertoff said
that Thompson and Ashcroft both shared his concern about whether the
DOD was doing the best possible job in questioning the GTMO detainees.
Nahmias said that concerns specific to the DOD's interrogations of AlQahtani were brought to the Attorney General's attention. Nahmias told the
OIG that after being briefed, Ashcroft had questions about whether AlQahtani was being effectively interrogated. Former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Alice Fisher told the OIG that she does not recall ever
seeking Attorney General Ashcroft's input on what strategy to use with AlQahtani. Fisher said she does not know if anyone discussed the Al-Qahtani
interrogations with the Attorney General's office or the Deputy Attorney
General's office.
Nahmias also told the OIG that "pretty much everyone" involved in
counterterrorism issues at DOJ, including the senior leadership of the
Department, was aware of concerns about the effectiveness of DOD
interrogations. He said that concern about ineffectiveness generally, as well
as concerns about ineffectiveness of interrogations of specific detainees,
were "a repeated issue during my entire time at Justice."
Former Deputy Attorney General Thompson told the OIG that while
there was some friction between the FBI and the DOD, he thought it related
mostly to a different detainee, Jose Padilla. While Thompson described the
DOD's techniques as "clumsy," he said he did not recall specific concerns
about Al-Qahtani. He said he had a general recollection of one instance in
which the CIA or the military had a plan to leave a detainee alone for a long

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period of time with the expectation that the detainee would then open up
and begin providing intelligence.
We also interviewed David Ayres, the former Chief of Staff to Attorney
General Ashcroft, who stated that as a general matter DOJ did not feel that
the quality of the intelligence being collected by the DOD at GTMO was high.
Ayres told us that the dispute between DOJ and FBI on one side and
elements of the military on the other was the subject of "ongoing, longstanding, trench warfare in the inter agency discussions" between the FBI
and the military, including at the Principals Committee, the Deputies
Committee, and the line-level. However, Ayres said he did not recall any
discussion of what interrogation approach to take with Al-Qahtani.87
The OIG received a copy of a memorandum dated November 6, 2002,
from Michael Chertoff (then Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division) through the Deputy Attorney General to the Attorney General, with
a copy to the FBI Director. In the memorandum, Chertoff provided a
detailed summary of the Al-Qahtani investigation and efforts to elicit
information from Al-Qahtani. With respect to Al-Qahtani's "Current
Status," he stated:

This memorandum indicates that concerns about the effectiveness of DOD
interrogation tactics at GTMO were raised to the Attorney General as early
as November 2002.

As noted above, former Attorney General Ashcroft declined our
request for an interview.

87 Ayres said he did recall inquiring repeatedly about what intelligence Al-Qahtani
was providing, and being told that Al-Qahtani was "not talking."

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XII.

DOJ Efforts to Address Guantanamo Interrogation Issues in the
Inter-Agency Process

The OIG sought to determine what efforts, if any, DOJ officials made
to raise concerns about DOD interrogation techniques with officials outside
DOJ through the inter-agency process.88 Nahmias said that he did not
know "in detail" what former Attorney General Ashcroft did with the
concerns brought to him about the Al-Qahtani interrogations, but said he
was "fairly confident that the military's handling of A1-Qahtani" was raised
by DOJ officials at the Principals or Deputies committee meetings about
GTMO. Nahmias also told the OIG that Attorney General Ashcroft spoke
with someone at the NSC, most likely National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice, about DOJ's concerns about the approach the DOD was taking in the
Al-Qahtani interrogations.89 Nahmias also said he believed there were
meetings, though he was not certain with whom, in which Ashcroft and
Chertoff expressed two concerns: first, that Al-Qahtani was a very valuable
detainee and DOJ did not think it was getting the intelligence this detainee
had; and second, that reported intelligence from Al-Qahtani was not always
accurate, either because he may have been lying or because the DOD may
not have accurately reported what he said. When asked if anything ever
happened as a result of these meetings, Nahmias said that DOJ officials
were continually frustrated by their inability to get any changes or make
progress with regard to the Al-Qahtani matter.90
Parsky, Nahmias, and Swartz all told the OIG that they recalled
discussions of DOJ's concerns about detainee interrogations at GTMO with
the legal advisor to the National Security Council. Parsky stated that it was
not uncommon for DOJ to raise various issues of concern to the NSC legal
advisor, as he had the lead at the PCC. Parsky recalled a conference call
with the NSC legal advisor in November 2003 that included herself, Swartz,
and Nahmias. Parsky stated that Swartz decided to make the call after
Parsky relayed the offhand anecdotes the FBI MLDU Unit Chief had told her
about DOD interrogations at GTMO (described in the previous section). She
88 As described in Chapter Two, there are structures in place for resolving inter
agency issues, including the Policy Coordinating Committee, the "Principals" Committee
and the "Deputies" Committee, all chaired by the NSC.
89 Nahmias told the OIG that the issue of treatment of people was rarely, if ever,
discussed at the Policy Coordinating Committee itself, and he noted that he would not
expect to discuss issues such as detainee treatment in such a large group. Nahmias said
that DOJ would "weigh in on the FBI's behalf" on the "margins" of the PCC meetings, when
talking to the NSC legal advisor or in talking directly to CIA OGC or DOD OGC
representatives.
90 Nahmias stated that he also raised these matters with a counterpart at the DOD
who headed a group that dealt with detainee issues, though he did not see any changes or
progress as a result of his raising these matters.

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said that another concern behind the call was the concern that the DOD's
interrogation methods were making GTMO detainees unusable in U.S.
cases. She said that during the call they discussed the difference between
the FBI approach (rapport building) and the confrontational DOD approach
(SERE method). In the call, the DOJ participants suggested that the FBI
either be in on the interrogations from the beginning with the DOD, or that
the FBI start the interrogation process so that if the detainee cooperated the
information could be used in a legal proceeding. Parsky said she does not
believe the details of the MLDU Unit Chief's anecdotes regarding particular
detainee incidents were described to the NSC legal advisor during the call,
but that they told the legal advisor that DOD interrogators were doing a
terrible job and were doing things that the FBI agents would never do.
Nahmias said that in the latter part of 2003 he told the NSC legal
advisor about techniques the MLDU Unit Chief had brought to his attention
over time, such as female personnel exposing their breasts and use of "pig
oil" on detainees. Nahmias told the NSC legal advisor that they did not
know for a fact that these things happened. Nahmias told the OIG that he
was not referring these matters as specific incidents or allegations of
misconduct, but rather attempting to relate the kinds of stories that were
going around about the military's tactics. Nahmias told the OIG that DOJ
raised the matter as an "effectiveness" issue, and that he believed the NSC
legal advisor shared their concerns regarding effectiveness.
Swartz also told us that he recalled discussing interrogation issues in
meetings at the NSC-chaired PCC meetings regarding the return of GTMO
detainees. He said that he raised the ineffective and wrongheaded practice
of the military interrogations at GTMO as a continuing theme of these PCC
meetings. Swartz said that from GTMO's inception he took the position
within DOJ and in inter-agency meetings that GTMO was doing grave
damage to the United States' position internationally and in particular with
regard to law enforcement and the rule of law.91 However, Swartz stated
that he did not raise any reports of abuse of a particular GTMO detainee,
because he did not become aware of any such reports until he heard about
an alleged helicopter incident (discussed below in Section XV of this
chapter).
The DOJ officials who discussed the issue of GTMO interrogations
with the NSC legal advisor told us that they generally did not recall learning
of any follow-up or change in policy as a result of these discussions. For
example, Nahmias told the OIG that he did not hear more about these kinds

91 Documents provided by Swartz indicate that as a result of media reports, he
became concerned about detainees were being subjected to abusive treatment, and that in
March 2003 he raised this issue during a PCC meeting.

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of concerns until the materials that the FBI released to the ACLU were
published in the press. Nahmias described the issue of detainee
interrogation approaches as "an ongoing fight." He said "DOD always won
the fight because they controlled the locations and they had ultimate
control, which we acknowledged, of the [detainees]."
The OIG also sought to determine whether high-level DOJ officials
were aware of efforts to raise concerns about the Al-Qahtani interrogations
at inter agency meetings. Fisher said she does not recall if high-level DOJ
officials raised the issue outside the DOJ. Assistant Attorney General
Chertoff said he believes that, over time, Deputy Attorney General
Thompson and Attorney General Ashcroft had discussions with DOD
officials about the efficacy of its interrogations, but he said he does not
recall the specifics of those discussions and is not aware of the specific
outcome. He noted that DOJ also urged the DOD to move forward with the
Military Commission process to provide the possibility of plea bargaining as
a method of obtaining cooperation, but DOJ had little success.
Director Mueller told the OIG that he had no recollection of a dispute
over Al-Qahtani and how he would be interrogated, and he had no
recollection of the matter ever being raised at inter agency meetings.
Deputy Attorney General Thompson told the OIG he is not aware of
discussions of the Al-Qahtani interrogations except discussions internal to
DOJ. David Ayres, the former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General, told
the OIG he did not recall the Attorney General raising any issue at the
Policy Coordinating Committee regarding the interrogation techniques
planned for Al-Qahtani. As noted above, former Attorney General Ashcroft
declined the OIG's request for an interview in this matter.

XIII . Al-Qahtani Becomes Fully Cooperative
We determined that some point in early 2003, Al-Qahtani became
cooperative with DOD interrogators, although the available evidence does
not make clear exactly when or why this happened. According to the
Church Report, Al-Qahtani's resistance "began to crumble" after the DOD
began the application of "Category II" techniques in the DOD interrogation
plan.92 Church Report at 121. The Church Report stated that these
interrogations took place between November 23, 2002, and January 15,
2003, and produced "tangible results." Id. In addition, a January 21, 2003,
memorandum sent by Major General Miller to the Commander of

92 A comparison of the Al-Qahtani interrogation plan with the list of techniques
included in "Category II" reflects that the use "Category II" techniques corresponds with
Phase III of the plan.

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SOUTHCOM stated that the use of the techniques had allowed the military
to obtain "significant intelligence of enormous long term operations and
strategic value." Schmidt/Furlow Report, Exhibit 66. The memorandum
contained examples of "high value" intelligence obtained from Al-Qahtani:
he admitted being al-Qaeda and said Bin Laden sent him to the United
States in August 2001 for a mission; he described where he obtained a visa
to enter the United States; he gave the location of the passport office; and he
provided the names of associates and three possible terrorists who could be
in the United States. Id.
On January 15, 2003, after the General Counsel of the Department of
the Navy, Alberto Mora, and others raised concerns about the authorization
of aggressive techniques in the DOD's December 2002 Policy; Secretary
Rumsfeld officially rescinded his approval of the Category II techniques and
one Category III technique. Church Report at 118-121. According to a
subsequent memorandum from General Hill to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, when the interrogators suspended use of the Category II
techniques, Al-Qahtani reverted to his cover story and the interrogations
"became noticeably less effective." Church Report at 121-22.
On January 21, 2003, Major General Miller wrote to the Director of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Category II techniques were "essential to
mission success" and should be approved for future use (except stress
positions, removal of clothing, and use of detainee's individual phobias to
induce stress): Church Report at 122. He also stated that "none of the
Category III techniques are necessary to accomplish this mission and are
not requested." Id. On March 21, 2003, General Hill noted in a
memorandum to General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that without
the use of the recently rescinded Category II and Category III techniques, "it
is likely that these high-value detainees will be capable of holding out
indefinitely, depriving the US of valuable intelligence." Id. at 121-22.
However, as described below, other evidence indicates that Al-Qahtani did
not become fully cooperative until April 2003.
After the approval of Category II and III techniques was rescinded, the
military reverted to a less aggressive approach with Al-Qahtani. This
included the administration of a polygraph examination on March 31, 2003,
which Al-Qahtani had been requesting for over 4 months. After failing to
pass the polygraph, according to the military's "memorandum for record"
(MFR), Al-Qahtani's attitude began to shift dramatically, and he began to
inquire about whether he would be able to return to Saudi Arabia if he told
the truth.93 The MFR for April 7, 2003, stated that Al-Qahtani "is concerned
93 An MFR (Memorandum For Record) is a military intelligence document that
generally summarizes interaction with a detainee. MFRs usually include what types of
interrogation methods were used on the detainee and how the detainee reacted to those
(Cont'd.)

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with cutting the best deal possible for him, evading US prosecution for his
crimes, and avoiding incarceration in Saudi Arabia once he is returned
home." The next day, Al-Qahtani began to describe his knowledge of alQaeda in great detail, and the subsequent MFRs reflect that from that point
on he provided a significant amount of detailed information about al-Qaeda
and its pre-September 11 operations.

An analysis of the Al-Qahtani case written by military interrogators
and analysts pointed to a number of factors that contributed to his decision
to finally cooperate. According to this analysis, the major factors were:
•

Polygraph . Al-Qahtani was "shocked" to learn that he had
failed the polygraph, and he became very flustered and nervous
when confronted with the fact that the examiners detected him
employing techniques to counter the polygraph's accuracy.

•

Perception of betrayal by other al- Qaeda members.
Following the polygraph, he was confronted with the fact that
other al-Qaeda members were being apprehended and were
providing valuable intelligence. He was both surprised and
upset when interrogators used a "kunai" [nickname] with him
that he had not told them he had.

•

Segregation and lack of contact with others . Al-Qahtani was
described as a "narcissist" who thrived on being the center of
attention. Interrogators ceased seeing him daily and explained
they had less and less interest in him because they were getting
what they needed from other sources.

•

Incentive of being returned to Saudi Arabia . Interrogators
told him he had no hope of being released or transferred back to
Saudi Arabia unless he cooperated and told them all he knew.
The analysis stated that Al-Qahtani was hopeful that he would
eventually be returned to Saudi Arabia and believed the
interrogators would make recommendations in his favor if he
was truthful.

The analysis did not cite the application of harsh interrogation
techniques prior to January 15, 2003, as a factor in Al-Qahtani's changed
behavior.

methods. MFRs may also include details about the physical treatment of the detainee,
such as whether he was offered food or water, bathroom breaks, exercise periods, and
sleep. Also, MFRs report any information that the detainee provides pursuant to the
interrogator's questions and the interrogation team's analysis of the information provided
by the detainee, as well as an assessment of the detainee's truthfulness and level of
cooperation.

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Al-Qahtani told the OIG that he changed his story because the
military tortured him. He said the military engaged in physical torture, but
the FBI used psychological torture. However, as noted above, during other
parts of Al-Qahtani's interview he described the FBI agent who interviewed
him as having "humanity."
On April 16, 2003, more than a week after Al-Qahtani became
cooperative, the Secretary of Defense approved 24 "Counter-Resistance
Techniques" for use in interrogations of unlawful combatants. Church
Report at 137. In May 2003, Lieutenant Colonel Moss, the Commander of
the JIG/ Interrogation Control Element, wrote to Major General Miller that
Al-Qahtani had been "fully exploited" and his continued presence at GTMO
for questioning was "no longer necessary." However, as of May 2008, AlQahtani remains at GTMO and a variety of law enforcement and military
intelligence officials have interviewed him during the past few years.

XIV. The May 30 , 2003 Electronic Communication
A separate FBI effort to raise the issue of detainee mistreatment with
the military took place in June 2003. By that time, the DOD had ceased
using its more severe techniques on Al-Qahtani and he had become
cooperative, but the individuals who elevated their concerns apparently
were not aware of these developments.
As previously noted, in late 2002 FBI Assistant General Counsel Spike
Bowman requested that concerns raised by Special Agents McMahon and
Brett about interrogation techniques be documented in a written report for
him to use in raising concerns to the DOD.94 Six months later, on May 30,
2003, McMahon completed this report in the form of an Electronic
Communication (EC) and transmitted it to Bowman, the MLDU Unit Chief,
and the Acting CTORS Section Chief.
McMahon's EC described in detail the history of the dispute at GTMO
between the FBI and military intelligence regarding the comparative merits
of rapport-based interview techniques and the aggressive SERE techniques
advocated by military intelligence, particularly with respect to Al-Qahtani.
The EC referenced' 12 attachments relating to the dispute, including SA
Brett's legal analysis of the military's interrogation techniques and the
BAU's critique of the military interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani. The EC
concluded that "it is essential that FBIHQ, DOJ and the DOD provide

94 Before joining the FBI, Bowman had a long career with the military. He was an
instructor at the Naval War college teaching rules of armed conflict and rules of
engagement.

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specific guidance to protect agents and to avoid tainting cases which may be
referred for prosecution."
On July 1, 2003, after reviewing McMahon's EC and interviewing one
of the military's Judge Advocates General (JAG) who had worked with the
FBI interrogators in GTMO, Bowman sent an e-mail to CTD Deputy
Assistant Director Pistole, Executive Assistant Director D'Amuro, and
others, alerting them that the military had been using techniques of
"aggressive interrogation," including "physically striking the detainees,
stripping them and pouring cold water on them and leaving them exposed
(one got hypothermia), and similar measures." Bowman opined that:
"Beyond any doubt, what they are doing (and I don't know the extent of it)
would be unlawful were these Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). That they are
not so designated cannot be license to do something that you cannot do to
an EPW or a criminal prisoner." Bowman expressed concern that the FBI
would be "tarred by the same brush" and sought input on whether the FBI
should refer the matter to the DOD Inspector General, stating that "[w]ere I
still on active duty, there is no question in my mind that it would be a duty
to do so." He also offered to prepare guidance for FBI agents who are
exposed to these aggressive techniques as requested in the McMahon EC.
Neither D'Amuro nor Pistole said they could recall McMahon's EC or
Bowman's e-mail. Bowman told the OIG that he did not recall any response
being sent to McMahon regarding his EC of May 30, 2003.
In addition, Bowman said that once he received the EC, he discussed
it with the DOD. Bowman told the OIG that he also contacted the DOD
Deputy General Counsel responsible for intelligence issues. Bowman said
that the DOD Deputy General Counsel assured him that they knew about
the FBI's concerns and the matter was being handled. A member of the
DOD General's Counsel's office came to FBI Headquarters approximately
one week later to review the EC and its attachments. According to Bowman,
the person who reviewed the documents seemed "disturbed" by what he
read. Bowman said that when he called to follow up, however, he was
unable to obtain any information about what actions the DOD planned to
take, if any, in response to the information in the EC. Bowman said he even
called the DOD General Counsel to inquire, and the response he received
was that the Deputy General Counsel was handling it.
Documents reflect that McMahon's EC and its attachments were
provided to officials at DOJ Headquarters in May 2004, after the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal became public. One reason that we believe this EC did not
receive much attention in the FBI was that many of the concerns expressed
in it had been mooted by events during the months between McMahon's
deployment to GTMO and May 30, 2003. As detailed above, by May 30,
2003, Secretary Rumsfeld had rescinded his approval for the harshest

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interrogation techniques, the DOD had ceased using such techniques on AlQahtani, and Al-Qahtani had become fully cooperative. However, Bowman
apparently was not aware of these developments when he contacted the
DOD about the allegations in McMahon's EC.

XV.

Concerns Raised Regarding Slahi ' s Interrogation

The case of Mohamedou Ould Slahi (#760) presents another example
in which FBI agents raised concerns through their chain of command about
rumors of detainee mistreatment at GTMO. In this case, some of these
concerns were communicated to senior officials at DOJ.
Slahi was an al-Qaeda operative who is believed to have recruited
several of the September 11 hijackers in Germany. Church Report at 159.
According to FBI records, Slahi was arrested in Mauritania at the request of
the United States, held in Jordan for several months, and then transferred
to U.S. custody in Afghanistan (Bagram). He was taken to GTMO in August
2002.
The FBI sought to interview Slahi immediately after he arrived at
GTMO. FBI and task force agents interviewed Slahi over the next few
months, utilizing rapport-building techniques.95 An FBI agent who was
assigned to Slahi told us that the military disagreed with the FBI's approach
and wanted to use interrogation techniques similar to those employed on AlQahtani. One of the FBI's OSCs at GTMO told us that a military contract
interrogator was extremely critical of the friendly tenor of the FBI's interview
strategy. In late May 2003 the FBI agents who were involved with Slahi left
GTMO, and the military assumed control over Slahi's interrogation. One of
the FBI agents told us that before he left GTMO he saw a draft of special
interrogation plan that the military was preparing for Slahi, and that it was
similar to Al-Qahtani's interrogation plan.
According to FBI documents, on July 1, 2003, General Miller signed a
request from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) seeking "Special Projects
Status" for Slahi and approval of a 90-day special interrogation plan that
included "techniques not specified the Secretary of Defense guidance
document, `Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism' dated
16 April 2003." The plan stated that Slahi would be hooded and flown
around Guantanamo Bay for one or two hours in a helicopter to persuade
him he had been moved out of GTMO to a location where "the rules have
changed." According to the Church Report, the interrogation plan for Slahi

95 Allegations of misconduct by two of these agents are addressed in Section III of
Chapter Eleven.

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also included isolation, interrogations for up to 20 hours, sensory
deprivation, and "sleep adjustment." Church Report at 159. The version of
the plan provided to the OIG called for 15-hour interrogations (during which
Slahi would be prevented from sleeping) followed by 4 hours of rest, as well
as using continuous sound to hinder Slahi's concentration and establish
fear. We did not find any evidence of FBI involvement in the development of
this interrogation plan or in the interrogations of Slahi during the summer
of 2003.
According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report, the military used a masked
interrogator called "Mr. X" to interrogate Slahi. Schmidt-Furlow Report at
25-26. On August 2, 2003, a different military interrogator posing as a
Navy Captain from the White House gave Slahi a fake memorandum from
the "Joint Staff, U.S. Army Director for Intelligence," indicating that because
of Slahi's lack of cooperation, his mother would be apprehended for
interrogation by U.S. and Mauritanian authorities, and that if she was
uncooperative she might be transferred to GTMO. The letter referred to "the
administrative and logistical difficulties her presence would present in this
previously all-male prison environment." The interrogator told Slahi that
his family was "in danger if he (760) didn't cooperate." Schmidt-Furlow
Report at 26 and Ex. 72. On August 3, military interrogators told Slahi to
"use his imagination to think up the worst possible scenario he could end
up in," that "beatings and physical pain are not the worst thing in the
world," and that unless he began to cooperate, he would "disappear down a
dark hole." Id. at 26 and Ex. 75.
Secretary Rumsfeld approved the interrogation plan for Slahi on
August 13, 2003. The movement plan for Slahi was amended, however, to
utilize a several-hour boat ride rather than a helicopter to deceive Slahi.
According to the Church Report, on August 25, 2003, Slahi was removed
from his cell in Camp Delta, fitted with blackout goggles, and taken on a
disorienting boat ride during which he was permitted to hear pre-planned
deceptive conversations among other passengers. He was then placed in
isolation in Camp Echo. Church Report at 160.
The extent to which the harsher elements of the interrogation plan
approved by Secretary Rumsfeld for Slahi were ever implemented is not
clear to us. The Church Report states that the special interrogation plan
was implemented in early September 2003 and Slahi soon began providing
useful information. Church Report at 160. The Special Projects Team Chief
stated that "once the [interrogation plan] for 760 was approved in August
2003, we started the [interrogation plan] in earnest." However, he also
stated: "Most of the [plan] was not executed. The only thing we ever did

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was the direct approach."96 Schmidt-Furlow Report Ex. 20. The SchmidtFurlow Report concluded that the "techniques" in the plan were never
implemented because Slahi began to cooperate prior to the approval.
Schmidt-Furlow Report at 23.
According to military documents, Slahi began cooperating with
military interrogators on September 8, 2003, and immediately began
providing intelligence. A military report on that date stated that the
interrogator told Slahi: "After interrogators are finished with all our
questions, only then would his family be returned and Detainee's overall
situation would improve."
Over a year later, Slahi made allegations to military interrogators that
he had been mistreated during the summer of 2003. He made similar
allegations in interviews with the OIG.97 He alleged that:
•

He was left alone in a cold room known as "the freezer," where
guards would prevent him from sleeping by putting ice or cold
water on him or making noise;

•

He was subjected to sleep deprivation for a period of 70 days by
means of prolonged interrogations, strobe lights, threatening
music, forced intake of water, and forced standing;

•

He was deprived of clothing by a female interrogator;

•

Two female interrogators touched him sexually and made
sexual statements to him;

•

Prior to and during the boat ride incident he was severely
beaten; and

•

During the boat ride incident he overheard an Egyptian and
Jordanian arguing over who would get him.98

96 Military documents indicate that techniques other than direct questioning were
used on Slahi during this period. For example, a memorandum dated July 17, 2003, stated
that on July 8, Slahi had been exposed to "variable lighting patterns and rock music, to the
tune of Drowning Pool's `Let the Bodies Hit the Floor,' which kept Slahi "awake and in a
state of agitation." It further stated that on July 17, the interrogators employed a "Fear Up"
approach on Slahi in which he was deprived of some clothes and yelled at. Schmidt-Furlow
Report, Ex. 73.
97 The OIG provided a list of questions to Slahi's U.S. Army assigned interrogator,
which she then posed to Slahi. This unusual step was taken at the behest of JTF-GTMO
Commander General Hood in an effort to avoid compromising in any way the significant
progress that the interrogator had made in obtaining information from Slahi. The OIG was
later given permission to interview Slahi directly.
98 The only allegation of improper conduct with respect to Slahi that the SchmidtFurlow Report found to be corroborated was the use of threats against Slahi and his family.
(Cont'd.)

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Schmidt-Furlow Report, Exs. 5 and 6. During Slahi's OIG interview,
he stated that he had never been in a helicopter since he has been at
GTMO.
We determined that FBI agents became concerned about the potential
mistreatment of Slahi in the fall of 2003. In October or November of 2003, a
special agent from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) who was
assigned to CITF contacted two FBI agents who were on temporary duty
assignment to CITF at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The NCIS agent told the FBI
agents that he was concerned that tactics being utilized by the military on
Slahi at GTMO would jeopardize the military commission's prosecution of
Slahi. He showed the FBI a copy of an e-mail containing a second-hand
report that Slahi was pulled off a helicopter at GTMO, was led to believe he
was going to be executed, and urinated on himself. The NCIS agent also
told the FBI that he had received reports that a military interrogator had
displayed a letter to Slahi on State Department letterhead threatening to
have Slahi's family taken to Morocco for possible torture, which caused
Slahi to "crack."
The FBI agents who received this report then reviewed numerous
Memoranda for Record (MFR) regarding Slahi maintained in CITF files, and
determined, among other things, that on several occasions in early June
2003 an Army Sergeant on the DIA Special Projects Team at GTMO
identified herself to Slahi as FBI SSA "Samantha Martin" in an effort to
persuade Slahi to cooperate with interrogators. The FBI agents prepared a
draft EC dated November 25, 2003, that summarized the MFRs, with
particular emphasis on the threats against Slahi's family. It also described
the alleged helicopter incident and the impersonation of an FBI agent by a
military interrogator. The draft EC indicated that the military was repeating
its techniques on other detainees.
On December 5, 2003, an SSA assigned to the FBI's Military Liaison
and Detainee Unit (MLDU) sent an e-mail forwarding the draft EC up the
chain of command in the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD). His e-mail
was addressed to CTD Deputy Assistant Director Gary Bald, CTORS Section
Chief Frankie Battle, and ITOS-1 Section Chief Arthur Cummings. The email stated:

The Schmidt-Furlow Report concluded that placing Slahi in cold temperatures was an
approved technique under DOD's April 2003 GTMO Policy. It found Slahi's claims of
having been subjected to sexual behavior could not be corroborated, and that although he
was treated for "edema of the lower lip" and a small head laceration, his allegation of having
been beaten "very hard all over" during his transfer from Camp Delta to Camp Echo was
"not substantiated." Schmidt-Furlow Report at 23-27.

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MLDU requested this information be documented to protect the
FBI. MLDU has had a long standing and documented position
against use of some of DOD's interrogation practices, however,
we were not aware of these latest techniques until recently.
Of concern, DOD interrogators impersonating Supervisory
Special Agents of the FBI told a detainee that the "FBI" could
protect him from prosecution. These same interrogation teams
then took the detainee on a helicopter ride and threatened to
execute him. The detainee was also told by this interrogation
team that the detainee's family was detained in Mauritania by
the USG and that things would get worse for his family until he
cooperated.
These tactics have produced no intelligence of a threat
neutralization nature to date and CITF believes that techniques
have destroyed any chance of prosecuting this detainee.
If this detainee is ever released or his story made public in any
way, DOD interrogators will not be held accountable because
these torture techniques were done [by] the "FBI" interrogators.
The FBI will [be] left holding the bag before the public.
The draft EC was not immediately finalized and disseminated because
there was concern within the FBI regarding whether it was appropriate to
document this information and whether it was adequately supported.
Special Agent Scott, one of the FBI agents who drafted the EC, told us that
the contents of the EC were briefed to Battle, Deputy Assistant Director T.J.
Harrington, the MLDU Unit Chief, and an attorney in FBI-OGC. 99 Scott
also discussed the matter with the FBI's OSC at GTMO.
Battle told the OIG that he could not recall how the FBI followed up
on the issues in the draft EC. He said he did not recall any communications
with Scott or with the MLDU Unit Chief. Harrington told the OIG that he
instructed the OSC at GTMO to raise the issues in the EC with the military.
He also said he discussed the EC with Bald. Bald and Cummings told the
OIG they recalled hearing about an incident in which a detainee was taken
up in a helicopter and was threatened to be dropped out. Bald said he
thought the matter was referred to the military.
The FBI's OSC at GTMO told us that he did not think the FBI
impersonation issue was as serious as Scott and the MLDU Unit Chief were
making it out to be. He said they were concerned that if military
interrogators tortured Slahi and were impersonating the FBI, then if Slahi
were later released he could say that the FBI tortured him. The OSC said
99. Scott is a pseudonym.

126

he did not consider this scenario realistic, and he declined Scott's
recommendation that he see General Miller about it immediately. Instead,
the OSC discussed the matter with the GTMO Interrogation Control Element
Chief, who told the OSC he was not aware that the FBI had not been
consulted about the impersonation ruse, and agreed that in the future this
type of approach would be strictly coordinated with the FBI.
The OSC also discussed the alleged helicopter incident with military
personnel at GTMO. He said he was told that a helicopter was never used
in conjunction with the movement of Slahi or in the implementation of the
special interrogation plan for him. The Interrogation Control Element Chief
told the OSC that they did not use a helicopter because General Miller
decided that it was too difficult logistically to pull off, and that too many
people on the base would have to know about it to get this done. The MLDU
Unit Chief told us that he thought the OSC reported to him that the alleged
helicopter incident did not happen.
The FBI's MLDU Unit Chief communicated his concerns about the
rumored helicopter incident to Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the DOJ Criminal Division. Swartz said that based on the Unit
Chief's description, Swartz did not believe that any FBI agents had
witnessed the incident, and he did not ask the Unit Chief to get any more
details about it. However, Swartz stated that in his opinion the alleged
conduct amounted to torture, and he discussed the incident with Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson, someone in the FBI General Counsel's
office, and a legal advisor to the National Security Council (NSC). Swartz
told us that he later learned from the NSC legal advisor that Navy Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) looked into it and had concluded that no such
incident took place. Swartz said it was "unfortunate" that he had chosen to
elevate an allegation that had proved to be false, since it suggested that
Swartz was "crying wolf' when he continued to raise questions about
whether detainees were being treated humanely.
Other senior officials at DOJ told us that they could not recall the
allegation about a helicopter incident. Former Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson told us he did not recall anyone raising an allegation of this
nature to him, and he did not recall DOJ raising these types of concerns
with the NSC. He said the only thing he remembers along those lines was a
proposal to give a detainee the illusion that he was going to be buried alive,
but he said a decision was made that DOJ would not permit that. Former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General David Nahmias told us he heard about a
detainee being taken up in a helicopter by FBI, but was confident that no
one ever presented it to him as a fact, because otherwise he would have
taken it up the "chain." Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice
Fisher said she did not recall an allegation about a detainee being taken on
a helicopter ride. Similarly, former Assistant Attorney General Michael

127

Chertoff told us that he did not remember hearing about such an incident.
As detailed above, the concerns about Slahi's treatment were first elevated
within the FBI in December 2003, which was after Fisher and Chertoff had
left DOJ.
The draft EC prepared by Special Agent Scott identified three
concerns about military interrogation tactics: the impersonation of an FBI
agent, the helicopter incident, and the use of threats against Slahi's family
to induce him to cooperate. The first two issues were addressed relatively
easily when the OSC obtained a promise that the impersonation tactic
would be coordinated with the FBI, and when it was determined that the
helicopter incident never took place. It does not appear that the question of
the use of threats against Slahi's family created any significant concerns
among senior officials in the FBI, or that the issue ever reached DOJ. We
believe that the FBI likely considered this tactic to be within the scope of
permissible techniques under military policy. Furthermore, the FBI was
generally reluctant to become involved in issues relating to the scope of
military policies with respect to tactics (like threats) that did not clearly
constitute torture or physical abuse.

XVI. Conclusion
The Al-Qahtani interrogation was the focal point of the dispute
between the FBI and the DOD regarding interrogation techniques at GTMO.
Several agents who observed the interrogation of Al-Qahtani at GTMO
became deeply concerned not only about the efficacy of these techniques,
but also about their legality and the complications it would create for FBI
agents in the future to be involved in or even witness interrogations where
such techniques were used. The agents requested guidance from FBI
Headquarters regarding these issues.
We found that as concerns regarding the Al-Qahtani interrogations
filtered upward within the FBI and in DOJ, the focus shifted almost
exclusively to the question of whether the DOD techniques were effective at
obtaining information from the detainee. Officials at all levels of the FBI and
DOJ recognized, however, that the DOD ultimately had the final call on the
interrogation of Al-Qahtani, who was in military custody at a military
facility. Nevertheless, as result of their concerns about the efficacy of DOD
interrogations, certain officials in the FBI and DOJ developed a proposal to

At least
some officials understood that under this proposal Al-Qahtani would be
subjected to an alternative debriefing model of the sort used on Zubaydah
and
. This proposal was never adopted, possibly because other
factors led the military to change its interrogation policies in January 2003
and Al.Qahtani began cooperating within weeks thereafter.

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Agents also expressed concerns about the military's treatment of
Slahi, including rumors that military personnel threatened to throw him out
of a helicopter. When senior officials learned that Slahi was never taken up
in a helicopter they largely dropped the issue, although questions remained
about a boat ride that the military took Slahi on as a ruse.
FBI Headquarters officials responded to the requests from agents for
guidance by orally advising agents at GTMO not to be involved in coercive
techniques used by the DOD. We found, however, that these instructions
did not address several important issues raised by the reported incidents
involving Al-Qahtani, Slahi, and other detainees, including: (1) what agents
should do if confronted with DOD techniques that would not be permitted
under FBI policy; (2) the circumstances under which agents could interview
detainees who had previously been interrogated with coercive techniques; or
(3) whether and how to report incidents of detainee mistreatment. As
explained in Chapter Six, the FBI began confronting these issues more
directly after the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse incidents became publicly
known in 2004.

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CHAPTER SIX
THE FBI 'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCLOSURE OF DETAINEE
MISTREATMENT AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON
The public disclosure of explicit photographs and accounts of detainee
mistreatment at the Abu Ghraib prison triggered a significant effort within
the FBI to assess the adequacy of its policies regarding detainee treatment
in the military zones and to determine what, if anything, its agents knew
about detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, in GTMO, and in Afghanistan.
In this chapter we discuss this effort, which included an expedited
undertaking to codify FBI interview procedures in a written policy to address
ambiguities and other problems identified by agents in the field, and an
effort to quickly assess the knowledge of FBI agents regarding detainee
mistreatment by other agencies.
Section I of this chapter describes the development of the FBI's formal
written policy addressing agent conduct with respect to detainees in GTMO,
Afghanistan, and Iraq: an Electronic Communication (EC) issued by the FBI
Office of General Counsel (OGC) on May 19, 2004 (the "FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy"). Section II describes how the FBI addressed one agent's
urgent concerns, raised at the time that the policy was being developed, that
the FBI would be deemed to have participated in coercive interrogation
techniques used by other agencies in Afghanistan. Section III describes
additional concerns raised by FBI employees about the practicality of the
FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, and describes the FBI's efforts to address
these concerns. Section IV discusses the internal investigations that the
FBI conducted following the Abu Ghraib disclosures. Section V describes
the expanded training programs that the FBI developed for agents deployed
to the military zones following issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy.

Abu Ghraib Prison and the Development of the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy

In April 2004, public disclosure of detainee abuses at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq prompted an expedited effort by the FBI to develop a written
policy regarding detainee interviews.
FBI Headquarters received notice of the mistreatment of prisoners at
Abu Ghraib several months before this information became public. On
January 21, 2004, a U.S. Army Captain informed the FBI Team Leader for
high value detainee interviews at Abu Ghraib that "the recent allegations of
prisoner mistreatment at [Abu Ghraib] Prison are founded .... [T]here is
video taped evidence of the mistreatment, which includes beating and rape."
131

The Captain told the FBI Team Leader that the incident was being
investigated by the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and that
the FBI was being advised for informational purposes. On January 22,
2004, the FBI Team Leader communicated this information to the FBI's OnScene Commander (OSC) and Deputy OSC in Iraq by e-mail.'°°
On January 24, 2004, the OSC forwarded the e-mail to FBI Deputy
Assistant Director Gary Bald and other senior managers in the
Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters. The OSC told Bald:
Abu G is a Saddam-era prison being utilized by the Coalition to
house detainees. It is over-crowded and my recent force
protection memorandum spoke of the dangers there.
Nonetheless, our access to detainees at the prison is a central
part of our mission and very important to our ability to get the
job done. Therefore, the allegations contained in the attached
e-mail, if true, or even if not true but heavily publicized, could
make life difficult for us. I met yesterday on another subject
with [two Assistant U.S. Attorneys].... I told [one of the
AUSAs] that the FBI will not enter into an investigation of the
alleged abuse, that it would be outside the scope of our mission,
and that I believed CID should handle it without our assistance.
I will maintain this position unless instructed otherwise by
FBIHQ. First, the matter truly is outside our mission and
would squander resources. Second, we need to maintain good
will and relations with those operating the prison. Our
involvement in the investigation of the alleged abuse might
harm our liaison.
On January 25, 2004, Bald responded: "Agreed. Lets let [Army] CID
handle it."
The Abu Ghraib abuses began receiving intense media coverage on
April 28, 2004.101 On May 9, 2004, FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni
100 During their interviews with the OIG, the Team Leader, the OSC, and the
Deputy OSC did not recall specifically what "recent allegations" of prisoner mistreatment
were being referred to in the Team Leader's e-mail in January 2002. The OSC told us that
he thought that he had heard allegations about beatings at the prison, but nothing like the
prisoner abuse that was eventually revealed.
101 The Abu Ghraib disclosures also triggered a temporary suspension of FBI
interviews in Afghanistan. A message to FBI Headquarters from an FBI agent in
Afghanistan dated May 13, 2004, stated that "due to the issues at Abu G prison in Iraq, all
interrogations have been suspended at [a particular facility] until further notice." Two
former FBI OSCs told us that the military stopped detainee interviews by all non-military
agencies in Afghanistan in order to develop controls and procedures to ensure that the
problems in Iraq did not occur in Afghanistan. Several agents also said that in July 2004,
(Cont'd.)

132

made an e-mail inquiry within the FBI regarding the existence of relevant
written guidances:
Has there been any written guidance given to FBI agents in
either GTMO or Iraq about when they should "stand clear" b/c
of the interrogation techniques being used by DOD or [Defense
HUMINT Service] or the Agency?
Has there been any written guidance given to FBI agents along
the lines of: DOD/DHS/CIA is authorized to use a, b and c
techniques when interrogating detainees. To the extent you
become aware (either personally or through subsequent
interrogation of a detainee) of anyone using techniques other
than a, b and c, you should notify Mr. X?
Caproni said she determined that no such written guidance had ever
been prepared. On May 12, Caproni and CTD Deputy Assistant Director
T.J. Harrington agreed that CTD and OGC would work together in preparing
such written guidance.
Caproni assigned the task of drafting the policy to an FBI OGC
attorney. That attorney told the OIG that he reviewed the MIOG, the MAOP,
and the Legal Handbook, and concluded that existing policy already
addressed how FBI agents should conduct interrogations. He stated that
Caproni instructed him to add an explicit requirement addressing when
agents should report incidents of prisoner abuse.
Caproni told the OIG that she believed there was always an
"expectation" that an agent would report incidents of torture or other
egregious conduct by another agency's interrogator, but that no written
requirement existed at that time.
Within CTD, an Assistant Unit Chief was assigned to help develop the
guidance. On May 14, 2004, the Assistant Unit Chief transmitted a draft
"temporary guidance" to the OGC attorney, stating that Deputy Assistant
Director Harrington had approved it in order to allow our people some
ability to continue working over the weekend. They had been ordered to
`stand down'."102 The "temporary guidance" provided:

FBI agents were again stopped from conducting detainee interviews in Afghanistan for a
week to 10 days because a military officer insisted that the FBI agents provide their FBI
Academy interview training syllabus in order to demonstrate their interviewing
qualifications. We did not receive any evidence of similar moratoriums on FBI interviews in
GTMO or Iraq.
102 We believe that the "stand down" reference related to the temporary suspension
of interviews discussed in footnote 101 above.

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Re: Interviews/ Interrogations
Our people will continue to conduct interviews of detainees
(PUC's) at secure locations only.
If, during the conduct of any interview, events occur that, in the
opinion of the FBI agent(s) present, exceed acceptable FBI
interview practices, the agent(s) will immediately remove
themselves from the scene and will report their concerns to the
Afghanistan On-Scene Commander.
The OGC attorney forwarded the e-mail to Caproni, stating that he
thought it looked "ok." FBI documents indicate that temporary guidance
containing the Assistant Unit Chief's language or language like it was
disseminated to the field on approximately May 16, 2004.
The official policy, "Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees," was issued
by the FBI General Counsel on May 19, 2004, to all FBI Divisions. (We refer
to the policy as the "FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.") The synopsis in the
beginning of the policy explained why the policy was being issued:
In light of the widely publicized abuses at the Abu Ghraib
Prison, Iraq, this EC reiterates and memorializes existing FBI
policy with regard to the interrogation of prisoners, detainees,
or persons under United States control (collectively "detainees").
These guidelines serve as a reminder that FBI personnel may
not obtain statements during interrogations by the use of force,
threats, physical abuse, threats of such abuse or severe
physical conditions. In addition, this EC sets forth the
reporting requirements for known or suspected abuse or
mistreatment of detainees.
FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy at 1.
The second paragraph, labeled "Details," stated that FBI personnel
posted abroad can come into contact with detainees in a variety of
situations, and that persons who are detained or otherwise in the custody of
the U.S. are:
entitled to varying levels of procedural rights depending upon
their situation or category of detention (e.g. unlawful
combatant, prisoner of war.) Although procedural rights, such
as Miranda rights, do not apply in all situations overseas,
certain minimum standards of treatment apply in all cases. 103
103 As support for the basic guidelines, the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy quoted
the policy set forth in the Legal Handbook, Section 7-2.2.

134

Id. at 1. The Policy also stated:
FBI personnel shall not participate in any treatment or use any
interrogation technique that is in violation of these guidelines
regardless of whether the co-interrogator is in compliance with
his or her own guidelines . If a co-interrogator is complying with
the rules of his or her agency, but is not in compliance with FBI
rules, FBI personnel may not participate in the interrogation
and must remove themselves from the situation.
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). We believe that the instruction to agents to
"remove themselves" from interrogations involving non-FBI techniques was
not previously articulated in any formal FBI guidance or policy.
The final paragraph of the policy discussed a new reporting
requirement:
If an FBI employee knows or suspects non-FBI personnel has
abused or is abusing or mistreating a detainee, the FBI
employee must report the incident to the FBI on-scene
commander, who shall report the situation to the appropriate
FBI Headquarters chain of command. FBI Headquarters is
responsible for further follow up with the other party.

Id. at 2.
II.

The Horton Matter

During the same period that the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was
being developed, urgent requests for guidance were being communicated to
FBI Headquarters by SSA Horton, who was the supervisor of a team of four
FBI agents assigned to a

Horton told us that he became concerned during the initial milit
briefing his team received immediately after arriving at the facili

104 Horton is a pseudonym.

135

Horton sent a series of e-mails to senior CTD officials, including
Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald and the MLDU Unit Chief , on
May 13, 16, 18, and 20, 2004. Horton's e-mails predicted that although the
military had temporaril restricted the use of aggressive interrogation
techniques such as
, military
interrogators were likely to resume such methods soon. Horton stated that
even if the FBI was not present during such interrogations, FBI agents
would inherently be participating in the process because they would be
interviewing detainees who had either recently been subjected to such
techniques by the military or who would be subjected to them after the FBI
interviews were completed. He questioned whether it would be ethical for
FBI agents to be involved in such a process and whether they would be held
culpable for detainee abuse. He stated that the FBI's only existing guidance
was for agents to use their "best judgment" in interviews, which he found to
be inadequate. Horton recommended that the FBI move quickly to issue
definitive guidance to its agents in Afghanistan. He proposed that FBI
agents be given exclusive access to the detainees they would be interviewing
quickly after capture, and that the detainees be turned over to military
interrogators only if FBI methods proved unsuccessful.
In late May 2004, Horton was recalled by FBI Headquarters from
Afghanistan.105 ITOS-1 Section Chief Arthur Cummings sent an e-mail to
several Headquarters officials in the CTD instructing them to meet with
Horton. Horton told us that at the meeting he emphasized the need for a
policy in the unique environment of a war zone, but he said he received the
impression "these guys did not want rules, because they might have to
follow" them, and that they preferred a looser, less restrictive situation.
105 Accounts differ as to the underlying circumstances of Horton's recall. Horton
told us that the MLDU Unit Chief called and told him he was coming home to brief senior
management because "they valued his opinion." However, several senior CTD officials told
us that Horton was recalled at least in part because of concerns about whether he was
emotionally suited to the Afghanistan assignment.

136

Horton said he spent most of the meeting on the defensive, and left feeling
that he had been treated very poorly.
Several CTD Headquarters agents who attended the Horton meeting
told us that they believed Horton was overreacting because he had not
actually observed any instances of detainee abuse and that other FBI agents
in Afghanistan did not share Horton's concerns.
Cummings instructed CTD officials to work with the National Security
Law Branch in FBI OGC to develop written guidelines "which we can defend
legally regarding our presence either directly or indirectly during
interrogations conducted by the DOD." In fact, OGC was already in the
process of drafting the document that was ultimately issued as the FBI's
May 2004 Detainee Policy. However, we did not find any evidence that the
issues raised by Horton beginning on May 13 had any impact on the
development or final wording of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.

III.

FBI Employees Raise Concerns About the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy

Almost immediately after the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was
issued, several FBI employees raised questions and concerns with it. As
discussed below, the primary issues of concern were what constituted
"abuse" within the meaning of the policy, how the agents would know what
techniques had been approved for use by the military or the CIA, and
whether the FBI would be considered to be "participating" in unauthorized
techniques if it interviewed a detainee who had previously been subjected to
aggressive interrogation by another agency.
A.

The Iraq On- Scene Commander and the Meaning of "Abuse"

On May 22, 2004, the FBI OSC in Iraq transmitted an e-mail to senior
managers in CTD raising questions as to how the FBI's new policy could be
applied and asking for further guidance. The OSC wrote that while none of
the FBI employees he worked with during his three rotations at Abu Ghraib
witnessed the abuses recently publicized, he was fairly certain that FBI
employees were in the general vicinity of interrogations where tactics were
being used that were outside FBI policy but allowed by "applicable Executive
Order," such as loud music, yelling, and hooding. The OSC's questions
related to the instruction in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy to report
known or suspected "abuse":
This instruction begs the question of what constitutes "abuse."
We assume this does not include lawful interrogation
techniques authorized by Executive Order. We are aware that
prior to a revision in policy last week, an executive order signed

137

by President Bush authorized the following techniques among
others: sleep "management," use of MWDs (military working
dogs), "stress positions" such as half squats, "environmental
manipulation" such as the use of loud music, sensory
deprivation through the use of hoods, etc. We assume the OGC
instruction does not include the reporting of these authorized
interrogation techniques, and that the use of these techniques
does not constitute "abuse."
As stated, there was a revision last week in the military's
standard operating procedures based on the Executive Order. I
have been told that all interrogation techniques previously
authorized by the Executive Order are still on the table but that
certain techniques can only be used if very high-level authori
is granted.

[Unless advised to the contrary by the FBI], we will still not
report the use of these techniques as "abuse" since we will not
be in a position to know whether, or not, the authorization for
these tactics was received from the aforementioned high-level
officials.
We will consider as abuse any physical beatings, sexual
humiliation or touching, and other conduct clearly constituting
abuse. Yet, there may be a problem if OGC does not clearly
define "abuse," and if OGC does not draw a clear line between
conduct that is clearly abusive and conduct that, while
seemingly harsh, is permissible under applicable Executive
Orders and other laws. In other words, we know what's
permissible for FBI agents but are less sure what is permissible
for military interrogators.
These are issues that must be addressed and resolved, with
specific guidance being crafted and communicated to our
personnel. We cannot have our personnel [working] with
military units abroad which regularly use these interrogation
techniques without more explicit and specific guidance.
On May 25, Bald forwarded the OSC's email to FBI General Counsel
Caproni, asking for her thoughts. On the same day, Caproni responded:
Does it answer his question to say that conduct that is known
to be authorized need not be reported. However, most agents
may be unaware of the parameters of the rules that govern

138

someone else. In that situation, they should rely on their
judgment as FBI agents/ employees to determine whether a
detainee is being abused or mistreated to an extent that
someone should be notified....

Bald's e-mail reply stated, among other things:
Although I don't know the best way to characterize the types of
techniques we want reported, I do understand [the OSC's]
concern. We hold our employees to a high standard. We expect
them to follow through on what they are instructed to do. I
suspect that if we are not clear on the types of techniques we
want reported, we will have all techniques beyond our own
reported, out of an abundance of caution. In addition, we may
be setting our employees up (and ultimately the FBI) if someone
fails to report what others think they should. Can we have
someone draw up clear language that will further guide our
troops?
No further written guidance was ever issued in response to Bald's request.
In late May 2004, Caproni sent an e-mail to Director Mueller that
raised the issue of the definition of "abuse":
So you know, some agents have asked what it means that a
prisoner is being "abused or mistreated". We have said our
intent is for them to report conduct that they know or suspect
is beyond the authorization of the person doing the harsh
interrogation. While the agent may not know exactly what is
permitted, an agent would suspect that pulling out fingernails
or sodomizing the detainee is beyond the level of authorization.
On the other hand, there is no reason to report on "routine"
harsh interrogation techniques that DOD has authorized their
employees/ contractors to use.
Director Mueller told the OIG that the general purpose of the reporting
requirement was for agents to err on the side of caution and to ensure that
incidents such as those that occurred at Abu Ghraib came to the attention
of FBI management. He stated, however, that he did not want agents to be
put into the position of having to determine whether particular techniques
used by other agencies were lawful under their policies.
B.

The FBI Counterterrorism Division's Draft "Clarification" of
the FBI ' s May 2004 Detainee Policy

A draft EC dated May 26, 2004, attempted to "further clarify" the
FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, which had been issued a week earlier.

139

According to the May 26 draft EC, this clarification was drafted for approval
by FBI Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald. Thus, the May 26 draft EC
appears to be the CTD's attempt to further clarify the guidance provided in
the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.
The primary difference between the May 26 draft EC and the FBI's
May 2004 Detainee Policy is the guidance regarding when FBI personnel
should report the interrogation practices of another agency's employees.
The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy stated that "[i]f an FBI employee knows
or suspects non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a
detainee, the FBI must report the incident to the FBI on-scene
commander...." (Italics added.) The May 26 draft EC states that "[i]f, in the
.opinion of FBI personnel present, interview techniques being applied exceed
lawfully authorized practices, it is his/her responsibility to report this fact to
the [OSC]." (Italics added.)
Thus, the "clarification" in the May 26 draft EC is consistent with
Caproni's e-mail to the Director equating "abuse" under the FBI's May 2004
Detainee Policy with "beyond the authorization of the person doing the
harsh interrogation." However, in order to make the determination required
under this clarification, the agents would be expected to know what
techniques were "lawfully authorized" for use by employees of other
agencies. As detailed in Chapter Seven below, we found that few if any
agents received specific guidance on what techniques were authorized for
use by other agencies, and many agents told the OIG that this omission was
a significant problem. We found no evidence that the May 26 "clarification"
was ever finalized.or disseminated. The Assistant Unit Chief told the OIG
that he participated in drafting the May 26 draft EC and that although he
did not know why it was never issued, it was consistent with the
instructions he later gave to FBI agents in Afghanistan.
Caproni told the OIG that her office continued working on another
advice memorandum long after the OSC raised the question of what
constituted reportable conduct, but that none has ever been issued. She
said her problem as a lawyer was that she could not list every interrogation
technique or scenario that the agents might face, so the FBI must rely on
the agents' judgment.
C.

FBI OGC Concerns Regarding the Meaning of
"Participation"

Within a short time after issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy, attorneys within the FBI Office of General Counsel began discussing
a different problem from the issue of what conduct would trigger the
reporting requirement of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy. FBI agents
and attorneys began asking whether an FBI agent who questioned a

140

detainee after another agency had used aggressive techniques on the
detainee would be deemed to have "participated" in the techniques. On
May 27, Caproni e-mailed Deputy Director John Pistole regarding this issue:
A detainee who is bounced back and forth between DOD where
he is subjected to harsh techniques and FBI where he is given a
cup of tea and nice treatment is essentially being subjected to
"mutt and jeff" with us being Jeff. When does that amount to
FBI participating in techniques that are not authorized?
Later on May 27, Caproni solicited the thoughts of others within OGC
regarding the practicality of the GTMO "stand clear" advice in theaters like
Afghanistan and Iraq. This stimulated further discussion of the "mutt and
jeff" issue, including the observation by one OGC attorney that:
1-So long as the DOD interrogation techniques used were
lawful, I do not believe it is unlawful for FBI agents, consistent
with FBI guidelines, to question detainees after DOD techniques

are used.
2-FBI is participating (or certainly will be viewed as
participating) in aggressive but lawful DOD techniques where
FBI agents are [working] with the military interrogators and
merely as a policy absent themselves from the rough stuff and
then come back in (minutes, hours or days later) to question
the detainee;
3-If there is a decision that the FBI's continued involvement in
the interrogation of detainees is in the best interests of the
Nation, that decision must be confirmed at the highest levels of
the Department in order to give the men and women of the FBI
the comfort that down the road they will not be hung out to dry.
4-Without a clear statement of benefits versus the risks, I
believe that extreme forward deployment of FBI must be
reconsidered.
Other attorneys in OGC similarly stressed the need to obtain senior
management assurance that agents were authorized to question detainees
who had previously been subjected to other agencies' techniques.
On May 28, 2004, OGC received an inquiry from CTD regarding
whether the FBI should interview a detainee who had previously been
interrogated by the DOD using techniques believed to be consistent with
DOD guidelines but not FBI guidelines. After consulting with General
Counsel Caproni, an OGC attorney advised CTD that "so long as the DOD
offers the detainee to us and FBI is following FBI guidelines in [its]
interviews and is unaware of violations of law in DOD's questioning, we

141

should proceed to interview the detainee." The OGC advice did not address
the issue of how an FBI agent in the field would know what was a violation
of "law" (by which OGC apparently meant "military policy").
Caproni eventually requested that an OGC lawyer prepare legal advice
for FBI agents in Iraq and Afghanistan. In October 2004 she sent an e-mail
explaining that the advice should address the issue of:
what does it mean to not participate" in aggressive
interrogation (outside our guidelines) when you are in forward
positions. What happens if the Army beats the stuffing out of a
detainee, gives him to the FBI, he starts talking to the FBI and
then the Army wants him back. Have we just "participated" in
good cop - bad cop with the Army? How long after Army does
its thing do we need to wait to not be viewed as a "participant"
in the harsh interrogation.
An OGC attorney began work on the requested legal advice and in
October 2004 he interviewed several agents with overseas experience,
including Horton. From November 2004 through April 2005, the attorney
drafted several proposals to address the "participation" issue. Ultimately,
he proposed a "totality of the circumstances" test, suggesting that an FBI
interrogation of a subject that was "distinctly apart in time from an
interrogation by non-FBI personnel where methods which could be
reasonably interpreted as abusive or inherently coercive were employed"
could be found as having occurred in accordance with FBI policy. Although
this draft was extensively edited and was the subject of subsequent
communications within OGC, no final version of it or of any other formal
clarification of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was issued.
D.

FBI OGC and CTD Respond to Agent Concerns Regarding a
Facility in Iraq

In November 2005 FBI agents deployed to
transmitted written questions regarding their mission in
Iraq and requested responses from the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and
Office of General Counsel (OGC). The issues posed by the FBI's activities at
this facility once again raised the question of what constituted FBI
"participation" in interrogation practices used by other agencies. The FBI

agents in Iraq pointed out that the detainees at this facility were

The agents added: "With the
current issues involving secret detention facilities, we as FBI agents ...
want to ensure that the full scope of our duties here are known by upper
management." They posed several questions about the legal status of

142

detainees at this facility, the knowledge of FBI management and the FBI
Office of General Counsel (OGC) of operations at the facility, and whether
FBI employees or the FBI as an institution might be liable for actions at the
facility.
The FBI CTD issued an electronic communication (EC) in response to
the issues raised by the agents within days, on November 29, 2005. This
EC emphasized the importance of the FBI's involvement at this facility and
stated that FBI executives, including the Director and the Deputy Director,
had been "fully briefed on the CTD mission" at this facility. It added a
"reiteration and clarification of the standing FBI policy regarding the
interrogations in Iraq," which included the following points:
•

Detainees at the facility are not "enemy prisoners of war" and
therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not apply
to them. However, "certain minimum standards apply" and the
military "raises its level of treatment of the detainees to levels
outlined in the Geneva Conventions."

•

Because the provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not apply,
there is no requirement that detainees at the facili

•

The requirements of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy
continue to apply to all FBI personnel in Iraq.

On May 25, 2006, the FBI's OGC issued an EC providing "Legal
Advice and Opinion" that also addressed the issues that FBI agents had
raised the prior November. This EC was issued following a tour of the
facility by the OGC Assistant General Counsel. This EC summarized the

DOD's positions ree-ardin

. The EC emphasized that OGC was not offering an
independent legal position on the DOD's position.

The OGC's EC of May 25, 2006, also addressed whether FBI agents
should interview detainees who had been

106 The FBI OGC observed that

although the DOD sets the conditions of confinement,
106 We address the issue of FBI participation in the
in Section VIII of Chapter Eleven.

143

at this facility

the FBI's role in interrogation is inextricably intertwined with
the treatment of detainees outside of the actual interrogation
room. There is no time gap between the time the detainee is
held in certain conditions and the period of time the detainee is
being questioned by the FBI, and there is no time after
questioning by the FBI before the detainee is returned to those
conditions. In short, any reasonable person would view the
interview as inseparable from the harsh conditions of
confinement for detainees being held

The OGC concluded that "the FBI cannot,, consistent with our Ma 2004]
policy on interrogation, interrogate detainees who have been
because such detainees are
being subjected to `severe physical conditions' (Footnote omitted.) The
OGC therefore recommended that CTD prohibit its employees from
interrogating detainees who had been
= until completion of a "cooling off" period (typically at least 12 hours)
following removal of these conditions.'°7

IV.

OIG Assessment of the FBI Policies Regarding Detainee
Treatment

We found that the FBI did not respond to repeated requests from its
agents in the military zones for guidance regarding detainee treatment. No
formal policy was issued until a crisis arose as a result of the Abu Ghraib
disclosures in late April 2004. At that point, the FBI's Detainee Policy was
quickly prepared and released on May 19, 2004.
We found it understandable that the FBI did not revise or supplement
its interrogation policies immediately after the September 11 attacks. The
FBI was conducting a world-wide investigation into the terrorist attacks and
was taking on its new counterterrorism responsibilities, as described in
Chapter Two. But during the 21/2 years between the attacks and the Abu
Ghraib disclosures, FBI Headquarters received multiple expressions of
concern from its agents about detainee treatment issues and should have
recognized that a review of difficult policy questions was needed.
As described in our report, FBI agents sought guidance on at least
four separate issues: (1) what interrogation techniques should FBI agents
be allowed to use in the military zones; (2) what should FBI agents do at the
107 OGC also recommended that a formal Memorandum of Understanding between
the DOD and the FBI be drafted and that a legal review and modification of the nondisclosure agreement signed by FBI personnel assigned to this facility be instituted.

144

moment that other agencies begin using non-FBI approved interrogation
techniques during joint interviews; (3) when should FBI agents be allowed to
interview detainees who have previously been subjected to non-FBI
techniques; and (4) when and how should FBI agents report harsh
interrogation techniques used by other agencies. We assess the FBI's
response to each of these issues separately below.
A.

FBI-Approved Interrogation Techniques

As detailed in Chapter Four, as a result of the Zubaydah incident in
the summer of 2002 senior FBI officials confronted the issue of whether the
FBI would be involved in the use of "enhanced" interrogation tactics.
Andrew Arena, the ITOS-1 Section Chief in CTD at the time, stated that
there were discussions within the FBI regarding "should we also go down
that track?" According to several witnesses, this incident ultimately led to a
decision by Director Mueller that the FBI would not be involved in such
interrogations.
As explained in Chapter Two, following the September 11 attacks the
FBI shifted its emphasis with respect to terrorism from prosecution of
completed acts to prevention of future attacks. One result of this shift has
been to give primacy to the collection of intelligence for terrorism prevention
over the collection of admissible evidence for terrorism prosecution.
Consequently, the message within the FBI, as in many other agencies of
government, was that "September 11 changed everything."
However, existing policies were based on the law enforcement and
prosecution model that emphasized constitutional considerations and
evidentiary admissibility. A reasonable inference from the FBI's announced
change in priorities was that these considerations might not drive FBI policy
in detainee interrogations to the extent that they had in the past driven law
enforcement interviews. We believe that in this changing environment it
would not be unreasonable for agents and their supervisors to conclude that
traditional law enforcement constraints on interview techniques were not
strictly applicable in the military zones, particularly with respect to "high
value" detainees.
In addition, conditions at detention facilities in the military zones
were vastly different from conditions in U.S. jails or prisons. In Afghanistan
and Iraq, the available detention facilities were sometimes in or near battle
zones, and security considerations might trump or at least influence the
conditions under which interviews were conducted, including concerns
about the voluntariness of custodial interviews. In addition, U.S. officials
were dealing with detainees who had sworn allegiance to groups dedicated
to the violent overthrow of the United States and who worked cooperatively
with other detainees in preparing cover stories and resistance strategies.

145

This dynamic is not present to the same extent in more diverse populations
of criminals and criminal defendants in U.S. jails and prisons.
Consequently, as described in Chapters Eight through Eleven, some FBI
interviewers used strategies that might not be necessary or appropriate in
the United States, such as extreme isolation from other detainees or other
strategies to undermine detainee solidarity.
The FBI's position as guest of the military and, in the battle zones, the
agents' dependence on the military for protection placed FBI agents in an
awkward position to refuse to participate or assist in joint interviews in
which non-FBI techniques were employed. FBI agents in the military zones
knew the FBI was attempting to carve out a major new role in the war on
terror. Refusing to assist the military in a particular interview because of
disagreements about techniques potentially undercut that goal.
We believe that factors such as these at least raised a legitimate
question of whether conventional FBI law enforcement interview policies and
standards continued to apply to FBI interviews of detainees in the military
zones. Ultimately, senior FBI management determined that pre-existing FBI
standards should remain in effect for all FBI interrogations in military
zones, even where future prosecution is not contemplated. The FBI affirmed
this position because its extensive interrogation experience showed that
rapport-based techniques are simply more effective at obtaining reliable
information than more coercive interrogation techniques.
Yet we believe that FBI management should have realized much
sooner than May 2004 that it needed to issue a written policy addressing
the question of whether its pre-September 11 policies and standards for
custodial interviews should continue to be strictly applied in the military
zones.
B.

FBI Policy When Another Agency ' s Interrogator Uses NonFBI Techniques

146

In light of this dynamic, we believe that the FBI should have clarified
this issue before May 2004.108 The issue was raised to FBI Headquarters
well before the Abu Ghraib scandal became public. For example, as
discussed in Chapter Four, FBI agents were exposed to severe interrogation
techniques at the CIA facilities where Zubaydah
were
detained. Although the FBI did not directly participate in interrogations
where these techniques were used, its agents did not "remove themselves"
but rather assisted in the interrogations. Similarly, in October 2002 an FBI
agent e-mailed his superiors for guidance regarding his continued
participation in a program of 20-hour interrogations of Al-Qahtani that were
scheduled to continue for an indefinite period. The agent was told that as
long as there was no "torture" involved, he could participate. In November
2002 another FBI agent raised the issue of agents being "exposed" to harsh
techniques utilized by other agencies; his FBI Chief Division Counsel
responded that he was not concerned about FBI agents witnessing such
techniques as long as they did not participate, because the techniques were
"apparently lawful" for the military.109
C.

FBI Interrogation of Detainees After Other Agencies Use
Non-FBI Techniques

Even if an FBI agent "stands clear" from another agency's interview in
which potentially coercive non-FBI techniques are used, the question
remains: under what conditions may an FBI agent conduct a subsequent
interview of a detainee who has previously been subjected to techniques
that the FBI cannot itself use? A related issue is whether an FBI agent may
use information derived from another agency's interrogation in which nonFBI-approved techniques have been used.
The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy does not address these issues.
As detailed in Chapter Six, agents and attorneys in the FBI raised these
problems before and after the FBI's policy was issued. The FBI General

108 As detailed in Chapter Seven, some agents said they were told to leave
interrogations if they saw anything "extreme," "inappropriate," or that made them
"uncomfortable." However, many FBI agents who were deployed to the military zones
before the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was issued told us they received no training or
guidance on conducting joint interviews with military or other agency officials.
109 As detailed above, SSA Horton pointed out in May 2004 that even if the FBI
agents avoided being present during coercive interrogations conducted by other agencies,
the agents might inherently be participating in the process and later be held culpable for
their involvement at facilities in which such coercive techniques were used. We found that
CTD supervisors at FBI Headquarters did not address the substantive issues raised by
Horton, in part because they became distracted from the substance of his legitimate
concerns by his circumvention of the chain of command, and because they suspected him
of overreaction.

147

Counsel directed her subordinates in OGC to prepare legal advice that
addressed, among other things, "[h]ow long after [the] Army does its thing
do we need to wait to not be viewed as a `participant' in the harsh
interrogation." Several drafts of supplemental policy to address this issue
were prepared by OGC, but nothing was ever finalized.
As noted in Section III.D. of this chapter, in May 2006 the FBI OGC
issued legal advice that addressed the "participation" issue, recommending
that FBI agents at a particular facility in Iraq abstain from interrogating
detainees until a "cooling off" period had elapsed after the detainees had
been subjected to certain DOD activities. This advice was limited to a
particular facility and a particular DOD activity, but it recognized and
squarely addressed the issue of when FBI agents should interrogate
detainees who had been subjected to non-FBI techniques by other agencies.
As described in Chapter Seven, after the May 2004 Detainee Policy
was issued the FBI expanded its pre-deployment training for agents being
deployed overseas to address some of these issues. Training materials
provided to the OIG indicate that agents who were being deployed to Iraq
were given a "legal briefing" that addressed how to "attenuate" their
interviews of potential criminal defendants in cases where the detainee had
previously been questioned by a foreign government or other intelligence
community agency. According to the FBI, the purpose of attenuation is
both to enhance the likelihood that any resulting statement would be
admissible in a judicial proceeding and to assure the credibility and
accuracy of statements obtained from detainees who have previously been
subjected to non-FBI techniques, regardless of whether the goal is to use
the statement in a judicial proceeding. The training instructed the agents to
consider multiple means of "attenuation," including changing the interview
location, allowing a lapse of time, and avoiding the use of information
derived from previous interrogations.
This attenuation training focused on balancing factors identified by
judges when ruling on the admissibility of evidence in domestic criminal
prosecutions. We note, however, that after the September 11 terrorist
attacks, FBI agents in the military zones conducted many detainee
interviews solely or substantially for intelligence purposes and not for
criminal prosecution. In these cases, an approach based on U.S. case law
that walls an FBI agent off from relevant intelligence previously derived by
other agencies may not be appropriate or productive.' 0

110 The materials provided by the FBI do not indicate whether training addressing
these particular issues was prepared for agents deployed to Afghanistan or GTMO.

148

The FBI has described its current training regarding FBI interviews
that occur after aggressive interviews by other agencies as follows:
First, we train that this is a facts and circumstances
determination, and we recommend seeking advice from
supervisors when in doubt. We continue to train agents on
intelligence versus criminal interviews and on the need to
attenuate and to establish so-called "clean teams." We
extensively cover FBI participation in environments in which the
detainees are under the control of other agencies, since these
detainees are never in the custody of the FBI. We cover FBI
policies, including reporting requirements and the requirement
of FBI personnel to remove themselves from situations in which
they know or suspect that detainees may be subjected to severe
conditions or abusive treatment as provided in the May 2004
policy EC on treatment of detainees. And we give them a
generalized discussion about severe conditions and abusive
treatment, referencing guidance provided by the General
Counsel in May 2006.
We recognize that there are several factors complicating any effort to
devise policies addressing these issues. For example, in cases in which a
detainee interview is being conducted for purposes of a future prosecution
(as opposed to pure intelligence collection), it may be appropriate for the FBI
to keep its agents walled off from any intelligence previously derived by
other agencies who used non-FBI techniques. But at the time of some FBI
interviews it is not yet known whether the U.S. government would ever seek
to prosecute a particular detainee. In addition, it is still not clear how the
military commissions will rule on the admissibility of statements obtained
by non-FBI interrogation techniques. The FBI has no control over these and
other related matters.
The FBI has wrestled with this problem from the beginning of the time
that it sought a major role in detainee interrogations. As discussed in
Chapter Four, several witnesses told the OIG about an unsuccessful FBI
proposal that its agents be permitted first access to newly captured
detainees to allow the FBI to use a rapport-based approach before the
detainees became "tainted" by other agencies' interrogation techniques.
More recently, the FBI OGC's May 2006 EC provided useful guidance with
respect to a particular facility and a particular DOD practice, as described
above.
The problem has been diminished somewhat by the fact that the
military has promulgated a new, uniform interrogation policy (Field Manual
2-22.3) for all military theaters that stresses non-coercive interrogation
approaches. However, this development has not obviated the need for

149

improved FBI guidance with regard to these questions. The revised military
policy still permits DOD interrogators to use some approaches that FBI
agents probably cannot employ, such as the methods known as "fear up" or
"pride and ego down."
To the extent that the FBI is or becomes involved with interrogating
detainees who previously have been interrogated by the CIA, the problems
remain significant and unresolved. This issue is particularly acute with
respect to the CIA, because CIA interrogation rules apparently diverge from
FBI rules much more dramatically than does current military policy.
Despite these difficulties, we recommend that the FBI consider
completing the project that OGC began shortly after the issuance of its May
2004 Detainee Policy to address not only participation by FBI agents in
subsequent detainee interrogations, but also the FBI's use of information
obtained by the use of non-FBI techniques.
D.

Reporting Abuse or Mistreatment

Prior to issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, the FBI did
not provide specific or consistent guidance to its agents regarding when or
how the conduct of other agencies toward detainees should be reported."
Leaving this matter to the judgment and discretion of individual FBI
agents put them in a difficult position. Neither the FBI as an institution nor
individual agents wanted to police the military. The FBI was trying to
establish a cooperative working relationship with the DOD while fulfilling its
important intelligence-gathering responsibilities. Agents in the military
zones were sensitive to the need to maintain day-to-day relationships with
their military counterparts and were highly dependent on the military for
access to the detainees. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the agents were also
dependent on the military for their personal safety in a war zone. Under
these circumstances FBI agents had many reasons to avoid making reports
regarding potential mistreatment of detainees. We were therefore not
surprised that some agents who said they observed or heard about
potentially coercive interrogation techniques told us that they did not report
such incidents to anyone.
The difficulty in deciding whether to report such concerns was
exacerbated by FBI agents' lack of information regarding what techniques
were permissible for non-FBI interrogators. For example, as discussed in
Chapter Eight, one agent at GTMO told us that she understood that
111 As detailed in Chapter Seven, some FBI agents told us they were instructed to
report problematic interrogation techniques, but no specific definition of what to report was
provided.

150

prolonged short-shackling was allowed under DOD policies and therefore
she did not report it at a time when, according to the Church Report,
permission to use "stress positions" had been rescinded. (The Church
Report found that short-shackling constituted a "stress position.")
Furthermore, the Church Report found that in some theaters permissible
DOD interrogation policies were inadequately communicated to military
personnel. FBI agents cannot be criticized for failing to know DOD policies
that were not fully or clearly disseminated to their military counterparts.
In light of the recurring instances beginning in 2002 in which FBI
agents in the military zones raised questions about the appropriateness of
other agencies' interrogation techniques, we think that the FBI should have
recognized sooner the need for clear and consistent standards and
procedures for FBI agents to make these reports. When agents began
expressing concerns to senior officials at the FBI, CTD should have clarified
the standards for reporting detainee mistreatment. We believe that the
matter could have been best addressed by FBI Headquarters and DOD
officials to minimize tensions between FBI agents in the military zones and
their counterparts. A cooperative approach could have clarified: (1) what
DOD policies were, (2) how the DOD was dealing with deviations from these
policies, and (3) what FBI agents should do in the event they observed
deviations.
Instead, the FBI issued its Detainee Policy in May 2004 after less than
two weeks preparation. We found that the Policy did not give clear guidance
on when agents can resume interviewing detainees who have previously
been interrogated with non-FBI techniques and when agents should report
abusive interrogation techniques used by other agencies. The policy
requires FBI employees to report any instance when the employee "knows or
suspects non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a
detainee." It contains no definition of abuse or mistreatment. 112
As noted above, FBI General Counsel Caproni sent an e-mail to the
FBI Director dated May 28, 2004, nine days after the Detainee Policy was
issued, which stated that "our intent is for [FBI agents] to report conduct
that they know or suspect is beyond the authorization of the person doing
the harsh interrogation." We found that this approach did not resolve
difficulties for agents who did not know what the DOD had authorized its
interrogators to do.

112 As detailed above, the shortcomings in the policy were identified almost
immediately by the FBI's OSC in Iraq, who composed a lengthy e-mail explaining the
practical difficulties with this standard and requesting "more explicit and specific
guidance."

151

Going forward, we believe the military's adoption. of a single
interrogation policy for all military zones that focuses more on rapportbased techniques (Field Manual 2-22.3) will likely reduce the difficulties for
FBI agents seeking to comply with the reporting requirement in the FBI's
May 2004 Detainee Policy. Nevertheless, as noted above, military
interrogators are still permitted to use some techniques unlikely to be
available to FBI agents, and it will therefore be useful for agents to receive
training on military policies or to otherwise clarify what conduct should be
reported.
We recommend that the FBI consider supplementing its May 2004
Detainee Policy or expanding its pre-deployment training to clarify the
circumstances under which FBI agents should report potential
mistreatment by other agencies' interrogators. If the triggering event
continues to hinge on conduct that exceeds the interrogator's authority,
then the FBI should train agents deployed to military zones on available
military techniques. Training of OSCs regarding these military techniques
should be even more detailed, so that they can answer FBI agent inquiries
in the military zones and determine whether a report should be elevated to
FBI Headquarters or to the other agency.
If the triggering event for reporting is something more than merely
exceeding the interrogator's own agency policies, the FBI needs to give more
meaning to terms such as "abuse or mistreatment" either in the policy itself
or in agent training. We do not agree with the suggestion made by some
senior FBI officials that a more detailed list of reportable techniques would
result in agents underreporting other abusive techniques that do not appear
on the list. We believe FBI agents are capable of understanding that such a
list is illustrative and not exclusive. Consequently, any policy or training
should use words such as "including but not limited to the following
techniques" before providing examples.
E.

Comparison: December 2002 CITF Guidance

The DOD Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) generated a policy
for its agents in December 2002 that addressed several of the issues raised
by FBI agents in the military zone in a timely and specific manner. We
believe that the CITF policy demonstrates that it would have been feasible
for the FBI to produce such a policy in response to its agents' repeated
requests for guidance significantly earlier than May 2004.
As discussed in Chapter Two, CITF is the military's law enforcement
arm with responsibility for gathering evidence for the military commission
process and possible war crimes prosecutions. CITF was involved in many
of the disputes regarding detainee treatment at GTMO, often siding with the
FBI regarding the superiority of rapport-based techniques and the problems

152

created by harsh interrogations of detainees. (See e.g. Parts V and VI of
Chapter Five.)
On December 16, 2002, within a few weeks of the time that the
dispute regarding the treatment of Al-Qahtani (#63) had come to a head,
CITF issued ALCITF Memorandum 004-02 (the "CITF December 2002
Guidance"), the purpose of which was "to provide guidance to [CITF]
personnel on the conduct of interrogations of detainees or persons under
custody." A copy of the CITF December 2002 Guidance is provided in
Appendix C. This guidance addresses for CTIF agents many of the same
issues on which FBI personnel repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought
guidance from FBI Headquarters. The CITF December 2002 Guidance
provides that:
•

Physical torture, corporal punishment, mental torture, and the
withholding of basic human needs such as food and water as a
means to obtain information are prohibited.

•

CITF will not arbitrarily limit the duration of interrogations, but
"excessively lengthy interrogations are discouraged."

•

CITF personnel must immediately disengage from any joint
interrogation in which another agency uses tactics that are
"inhumane," report the incident to the CITF chain of command,
and document the incident.

•

The "Maximum Confinement Facility" (isolation) will not be
employed as an interrogation tactic. (An exception is made for
using isolation as a positive incentive for detainees who desire
to be isolated from other detainees.)

•

Deceptions and ruses may be employed as an interrogation
tactic.

•

CITF agents will not participate, provide support for, or advise
on interviews utilizing any non-law enforcement techniques,
and will not observe any such interviews where it is known
such techniques will be used.

•

In the event of a dispute with JTF-GTMO or another agency
regarding interrogation approaches, CITF agents should make
their objections in a professional manner and report the matter
to CITF-Headquarters, but should also continue participating in
discussions.

•

Promises to detainees (such as promises of release or transfer)
may not be made without authority and pre-approval.

153

In October 2003 a virtually identical version of this guidance was
issued by the CITF that reiterated that the same requirements applied to
CITF personnel deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. 113
The CITF guidance did not resolve every issue discussed in this
section. For example, the guidance requires CITF agents to report tactics
that are "inhumane," with no explanation of that term or examples given.
However, it did provide specific guidance regarding CITF agents' use of
particular techniques such as deception (allowed) and isolation (prohibited).
The CITF guidance compares favorably with the FBI's Detainee Policy in
terms of its timing (December 2002 rather than May 2004) and specificity.
The CITF effort demonstrates that the FBI could have done a better job, far
sooner, at providing guidance to respond to its agents' repeated requests.

FBI Internal Investigations

In addition to issuing the 2004 Detainee Policy, the FBI responded to
the Abu Ghraib prison disclosures by conducting its own internal
investigations to determine what its agents witnessed in the three military
zones.
A.

The Iraq Inquiry

Shortly after the Abu Ghraib abuses became public, FBI Director
Mueller ordered an internal review of what the FBI had known about abuses
at Abu Ghraib. He assigned FBI General Counsel Caproni to collect the
information. The inquiry was conducted in anticipation of a previously
scheduled appearance by the Director before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in May 2004. The inquiry was initiated by an e-mail dated
April 30, 2004, from the ITOS-2 Section Chief to most of the OSCs and
Deputy OSCs who had served in Iraq up to that time. The e-mail stated:
The Director wanted to know (by the end of the day) if anyone
from the FBI had first hand knowledge of any abuses at Abu G
prison. If so, how did we handle it. I know that we have been
made aware of allegations in the past, but I do not know of any

113 Documents made available to the OIG do not make it clear whether the
December 2002 CITF Guidance was formally issued or merely circulated for comment or
reference at that time. The October 2003 version of the guidance was signed by the CITF
Commander and therefore appears to have been formally issued.

154

instance where we had to make a referral. 114 Please advise as
soon as possible.
The OSCs and Deputy OSCs who responded to the e-mail indicated
that they had never observed or heard of any such abuses at Abu Ghraib.
The Deputy OSC in Iraq at the time of this e-mail reported that he had
spoken to two agents who had spent much of their time overseeing FBI
interviews at Abu Ghraib, and that none of the agents on their teams had
observed any abuses. The Deputy OSC also noted that in January 2004 the
military had advised the FBI that an investigation of alleged abuses of
detainees at Abu Ghraib was underway, and that "we advised all agents
working at the prison to watch for any activity they considered abusive."
The results of this survey were relayed up the chain of command in CTD
and reached the Director on May 3, 2004.
The FBI also conducted a document review, including detainee
interview summaries (FD-302), managed by ITOS-2 personnel in May 2004,
seeking any document in CTD files indicating any questionable detainee
treatment. The ITOS-2 Section Chief told us that this "complete scrub" of
files was as comprehensive as possible, and that while they had an
impossibly short deadline, he nevertheless considered the review to be
thorough. Several agents told us that the file review produced no evidence
of detainee mistreatment by U.S. personnel.
The FBI also attempted to identify and interview its own agents who
had conducted interviews at the Abu Ghraib prison during October through
December 2003, which was the period of the abuses described in the
Taguba Report. On May 17 and 18, 2004, the FBI Inspection Division
interviewed 14 FBI employees who had conducted interviews or otherwise
had been present at Abu Ghraib from October through December 2003.
The results of these inquiries were summarized in an Inspection
Division report to CTD, the Director's Office, and the FBI Office of General
Counsel, dated May 19, 2004 (the same day the Detainee Policy was issued).
The Inspection report stated that none of the 14 FBI personnel interviewed
said they had seen misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib
similar to that which had been reported in recent media accounts.
However, the report stated that several of the FBI employees had observed
other actions concerning detainees, such as: (1) detainees hooded with a
sand bag and draped in a shower curtain while handcuffed to a waist-high
railing and kept awake by light slapping on the back; (2) the "spread eagle"
114 "Allegations in the past" may have been a reference to the Zubaydah incident
discussed above or to issues that had been raised inside the FBI with respect to the
treatment of Al-Qahtani or other detainees at GTMO, which are detailed in Chapter Five.

155

restraint on a mattress on the floor of a detainee who was yelling and
flailing, and who appeared to be mentally ill; (3) a detainee, either naked or
only in boxer shorts, lying on a wet floor; (4) stripping of detainees who were
then placed in isolation without clothes; (5) shouting by an MP at a detainee
who did not understand the MP's directions; and (6) hooding of detainees
while being escorted on prison grounds. The Inspection Division report also
concluded that all FBI interviews at Abu Ghraib comported with DOJ/FBI
protocols and that none of the 14 FBI personnel "possessed or were aware of
any photographs, videotapes or notes depicting misconduct or inappropriate
behavior by U.S. personnel."
As detailed in Chapter Ten, the OIG found a significantly larger
number of incidents in which FBI agents observed or saw evidence of the
use of harsh interrogation techniques in Iraq than was described in the
Inspection Division report. We believe that this difference is due to the fact
that the Inspection Division inquiry was not intended or designed to be a
comprehensive investigation of what FBI agents observed throughout in
Iraq. It was limited in scope to observations at a single location - the Abu
Ghraib prison - during a 3-month period at the end of 2003. The OIG's
review of what FBI agents saw and reported regarding the treatment of
detainees in Iraq was significantly broader in scope, addressing all locations
in Iraq and the period from the spring of 2003 when FBI agents were first
deployed to Iraq through the end of 2004.
B.

The GTMO Special Inquiry

On May 6, 2004, during the time that information was being collected
about Abu Ghraib, the FBI OGC Senior Counsel for National Security
Affairs, Spike Bowman, sent an e-mail to FBI General Counsel Caproni
alerting her to a potential problem relating to the prior allegations of abuse
at GTMO. Bowman's e-mail referenced an EC dated May 30, 2003, written
by an SSA who had been deployed to GTMO, which detailed concerns about
aggressive interrogation tactics employed by the military at GTMO in late
2002. (This EC and the incidents described in it are addressed in more
detail in Chapter Five.) Bowman's e-mail also stated "I guess I am a little
concerned that we [are] sitting here with records of misconduct, not
knowing if the military ever did anything to correct matters in GTMO."
In early May 2004, in response to Caproni's inquiries, CTD conducted
an informal poll of OSCs who had served at GTMO up to that point. On
May 10, 2004, CTD Deputy Assistant Director Harrington sent an e-mail to
Caproni stating that "[e]ach of the OSC[s] has been polled re: abuse
allegations and each has been negative."
At Caproni's request, the Inspection Division conducted a "Special
Inquiry" into whether FBI personnel had observed any mistreatment of or

156

aggressive behavior toward detainees at GTMO. According to an Inspection
Division report describing the Special Inquiry, FBI-CTD generated a list of
493 FBI employees who had served at GTMO in some capacity since
September 11, 2001. On July 9, 2004, the Inspection Division transmitted
an e-mail to those individuals still employed by the FBI, requesting that the
employees state whether they "observed aggressive treatment,
interrogations, or interview techniques on GTMO detainees which was not
consistent with Bureau interview policy/guidelines."
According to the Inspection Division report, 434 employees responded
to the e-mail request. 115 Twenty-six FBI employees responded that they had
witnessed "aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview techniques on
GTMO detainees which was not consistent with Bureau interview
policy/guidelines"; the rest gave negative responses. An Inspection Division
e-mail states that FBI General Counsel Caproni and an agent from the
Inspection Division reviewed the 26 responses and "were able to determine
that most were not violations of DOD rules and regs pertaining to
interrogation procedures." For example, Caproni determined that some
reported practices did not violate DOD policy, such as loud music, strobe
lights, cold temperatures, prolonged shackling, and draping a detainee in an
Israeli flag.
However, OGC determined that 9 of the 26 respondents should be
interviewed. These interviews were conducted during the first 2 weeks of
September 2004. The agents who were interviewed reported a variety of
observations regarding detainee mistreatment, including:

•

A detainee was shackled in a stress position.

•

Detainee #63 (Al-Qahtani) was subjected to "special
interrogative techniques" and later admitted to the base
hospital for hypothermia or "low body core temperature." He
was also subjected to a growling military working dog and
disrespectful treatment of the Koran.

•

Female interrogators were rumored to have wet their hands and
touch a detainee's face to make him feel "unclean."

•

A detainee was observed "crumpled over" and crying, with an
apparent bloody nose, during an interrogation.

115 An Inspection Division e-mail dated August 17, 2004, stated that the July 9 email was sent to 530 employees and that 478 responded. We do not know the source of the
discrepancy between these numbers and the numbers in the final INSD Special Inquiry
report.

157

•

A detainee claimed he sustained injuries, including facial cuts
and injured fingers, from military police.

•

A detainee's entire head. was duct-taped to stop him from
chanting the Koran.

•

Detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation by means of 16hour sessions of strobe lights and loud music.

•

A DOD interrogator was rumored to have subjected a detainee
to "satanic black metal music," then dressed as a priest and
baptized the detainee.

•

A female military interrogator was rumored to have put female
clothes on a detainee and performed a lap dance on him.

•

Detainees were shackled "hand and foot" to the floor for
prolonged periods in uncomfortable temperatures and defecated
or urinated on themselves.

As detailed in Chapter Eight, the OIG survey and follow-up interviews
uncovered a much larger number and wider variety of aggressive techniques
used at GTMO. We believe that the difference was primarily attributable to
the OIG's use of a detailed survey instrument that sought information about
numerous specifically identified techniques rather than an e-mail seeking
general reports of "aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview
techniques ... which [were] not consistent with Bureau interview
policy/ guidelines."
C.

The Afghanistan Poll

In early May 2004, at the same time that CTD was surveying the
OSCs who had served at GTMO, CTD conducted an informal survey of the
four OSCs who had served in Afghanistan to that point. One of these OSCs
described the survey as a conversation of less than five minutes, in which
he was asked whether there was anything he did not report before and was
told that if there was any doubt, the information was needed immediately.
The OSC said he was asked whether he knew about anything inappropriate
or in violation of rules or policy by FBI, military, or intelligence personnel,
not just what had been disclosed in the media. The OSC told us that this
was the only occasion he could recall having been questioned by the FBI
regarding this subject.

Another OSC told the OIG that he thought the poll arose out of
concerns raised by Special Agent Horton when he was assigned to a _
in Afghanistan, as described above in this chapter. The OSC
said he was probably contacted by telephone, and he reported that he was
aware of nothing.

158

On May 10, 2004, CTD Deputy Assistant Director Harrington e-mailed
Caproni and reported that the poll of the Afghanistan OSCs had been
completed and "each has been negative." We found no evidence that the FBI
conducted any additional or more formal inquiry into what its agents saw in
Afghanistan with respect to detainee mistreatment or abuse.
As detailed in Chapter Nine, however, the OIG found that FBI agents
in Afghanistan observed interrogation techniques that were not consistent
with FBI policy.
D.

The GTMO Review of FD - 302 Forms and Development of a
Reporting Process for Detainee Abuse Allegations

In October 2004, in the course of collecting documents responsive to a
Freedom of Information Act request from the American Civil Liberties Union,
the FBI Office of General Counsel noticed that an FBI document stated that
detainee Mohamed A.A. Al Harbi (#333) had alleged he was assaulted by FBI
agents in Afghanistan. 116 FBI General Counsel Caproni sent an e-mail to
the MLDU Unit Chief and to the Assistant General Counsel stationed at
GTMO stating: "I know that once these are released the question is going to
be what did we do upon learning of such allegation against FBI agents. So,
what did we do?" The MLDU Unit Chief told Caproni that no investigation
had been conducted. Caproni sent an e-mail to the Assistant General
Counsel at GTMO stating: "Seems to me there needs to be a system so that
when we learn of allegations against our agents, even if we believe them to
be untrue, someone needs to run it down so we have a record that we did
so. If the military is investigating allegations against the FBI, I would want
to know that as well."
The Assistant General Counsel at GTMO was tasked with reviewing all
FBI interview summaries produced at GTMO for use in DOD-initiated
administrative proceedings for detainees. He found several documents
containing allegations by detainees of mistreatment by U.S. officials. The
FBI at GTMO reported these allegations to FBI Headquarters and to the
military's legal and command elements at JTF-GTMO.
In light of these developments, the FBI developed a memorandum
setting forth a "Reporting Process for Detainee Abuse Allegations Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," dated February 28, 2005 (the "GTMO Reporting
Process Memo"). The memorandum instructed FBI personnel who identified
abuse allegations by detainees in FBI documents such as Situation Reports,
FD-302 summaries, or ECs to provide notification and a copy of the
116 As detained in Section VI of Chapter Eleven, Al Harbi subsequently recanted his
allegation regarding the FBI.

159

documents to the Assistant General Counsel and to the OSC at GTMO. If
the Assistant General Counsel and the OSC determined that the allegation
had not previously been reported, a summary of the allegation and a copy of
the document were to be provided to:
•

The FBI Inspection Division

•

With respect to allegations incriminating FBI/DOJ personnel,
the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility and the DOJ Office
of the Inspector General

•

The Staff Judge Advocate at JTF-GTMO

•

The CTD-CTORS chain of command

•

The Commander and Chief of Staff at JTF-GTMO

The GTMO Reporting Process Memo also stated:
All incoming personnel to FBI GTMO are briefed to report any
and all incidents of Detainee mistreatment to the FBI GTMO
management team. Any incident related to the Guards
mishandling/ mistreating Detainees or aggressive interrogation
techniques employed by any agency, witnessed by FBI
personnel should be reported. FBI personnel witnessing
incidents should make every effort to note the time, place and
personnel involved.
We are not aware of any corresponding memorandum having been
issued for FBI agents in Afghanistan or Iraq.

160

CHAPTER SEVEN
TRAINING REGARDING DETAINEE TREATMENT PROVIDED
TO FBI AGENTS IN THE MILITARY ZONES
In this chapter we describe the training that FBI agents received
regarding issues of detainee interrogation and detainee abuse or
mistreatment in connection with their deployments to the military zones.
Our information is derived from the agents' responses to the OIG survey,
our interviews of agents and their supervisors, and documents from FBI
files. In Part I we focus on the agents who completed their deployments
before May 19, 2004, when the FBI issued its first written policy specifically
addressing agent conduct toward detainees in military zones. In Part II we
discuss the issue of training in the period after May 19, 2004.

Training During the Period Before the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy
A.

FBI Training for Overseas Deployments

A large majority of agents who completed their deployments prior to
May 19, 2004, reported in the OIG survey that they did not receive any
training, instruction, or guidance concerning FBI or other agency standards
of conduct relating to detainees prior to or during their deployment. Of the
419 agents whose deployments to GTMO, Afghanistan, or Iraq were
completed before May 19, 2004, when the FBI issued a formal policy, 267
(64 percent) told the OIG that they received no training on the standards of
conduct to be applied to their interactions with detainees. "7 The lack of
training during the early period was similar across military theaters. Of the
survey respondents who were deployed to GTMO, 63 percent said they
received no training. The corresponding percentages for Afghanistan and
Iraq were 75 percent and 59 percent, respectively. Many of the agents we
interviewed confirmed they received no training at all on these standards of
conduct.
Of the FBI agents who reported receiving training on these issues, 20
percent stated that written training materials were provided; the remainder
said written materials were not provided (44 percent) or that they could not
recall whether written materials were provided (36 percent). One of the first
FBI agents deployed to GTMO told the OIG that "the question of how to
117 It is important to note that some agents who deployed to the military zones did
not have responsibilities relating to detainee interviews, and therefore logically might not
have been expected to receive training on these issues.

161

handle working at GTMO as an FBI Agent while possibly being exposed to or
drawn into non-law enforcement techniques was primarily answered by the
Agents on the ground." This agent also said that the FBI stayed out of
trouble on these issues by relying on the good judgment of its agents rather
than any edict from FBI Headquarters.
Most of the FBI agents who reported receiving training regarding
detainee mistreatment issues said they received it orally after they arrived at
the military zone. They said this training was part of a briefing that the FBI
On-Scene Commander (OSC) or other senior FBI agent provided either
shortly after the agent arrived in the zone, or in the case of GTMO during
weekly meetings among FBI agents. Several agents deployed to GTMO
reported being briefed by DOD Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)
personnel or a combination of FBI and DOD CITF personnel. According to
the agent who served as OSC during October and November 2002, by the
time he arrived at GTMO a weekly training program was already in place,
put on by CITF personnel, the OSC, and agents from the FBI's Behavioral
Analysis Unit (BAU).
Several FBI OSCs told us they devised their own training or briefing
for new agents coming to the military zone.118 Two of the early OSCs at
GTMO said they received no clear guidance from their superiors regarding
detainee issues, such as what circumstances would trigger the obligation to
report conduct by a non-FBI interrogator. Both said that they did not think
they needed such guidance because they already knew how agents should
conduct themselves at GTMO based on their training, experience, and
judgment as FBI agents.
The early OSCs in Afghanistan described varying amounts of predeployment training. Two of the OSCs said they received no training at all
regarding the standards of conduct for interrogating detainees. Another
said he received general instructions from the New York Field Office to the
effect that FBI agents should continue to comply with FBI standards in
Afghanistan so as to preserve the admissibility of evidence that they
collected. A third OSC said he received 2 or 3 days of briefing at FBI
Headquarters prior to his deployment, where he was told to follow FBI policy
concerning interviews of detainees, to use common sense and good
judgment, and that if other agencies used non-FBI techniques he was to
take "forward motion toward the door." The OSC in Iraq during the fall of
118 We received a document from the FBI titled "Proposed GTMO Training Package,"
which outlined topics for preparing agents to conduct detainee interviews at GTMO. The
outline, which we believe was prepared by the FBI's BAU, includes topics relating to
rapport-based interview techniques and themes. It does not specifically address the issue
of non-FBI interview techniques. We could not determine whether this outline was actually
used in training agents at GTMO.

162

2003 told us that he did not receive specific training about the military's
standards of conduct for detainee treatment issues as part of his predeployment briefing.
During 2002 and early 2003, agents from the FBI's Behavioral
Analysis Unit (BAU) within the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG)
provided training on interviewing techniques to the FBI interviewing agents,
CITF investigators, and Defense HUMINT Service personnel at GTMO. The
first BAU agent deployed to GTMO told us that she prepared a PowerPoint
presentation that she used at GTMO beginning in September 2002. The FBI
provided the OIG with several PowerPoint presentations that appear to be
detainee interview/ interrogation training materials, but we were unable to
determine precisely when each of these presentations was used. Most of
these materials focused primarily on rapport-based interview techniques
and background material regarding detainee culture and training. The
materials did not address the use of coercive techniques, other than general
statements that they are not effective. No similar presentations for Iraq or
Afghanistan were provided to the OIG.
The amount of time devoted to training of new agents sent to GTMO
apparently declined over time. As of early 2003, the training provided to
newly-arrived agents regarding interview techniques at GTMO was limited to
approximately 30 minutes.
Several of the BAU agents told us that before they went to GTMO they
attended training provided by the military at Fort Belvoir. These BAU
agents stated that the training they received provided orientation to
operations at GTMO and instruction on Islam and the mindset of terrorists,
but the agents said there was no discussion of what interrogation
techniques were permissible.
The FBI considered requiring all FBI interviewing agents to attend the
training at Fort Belvoir prior to deploying to GTMO. On October 1, 2002,
one of the first BAU agents who served at GTMO made the following
recommendation to the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU):
Include the FBI interviewing agents in the pre-GTMO training
that is currently being provided for the CITF interviewing agents
at Ft. Belvoir. This training includes instruction in Islam,
appropriate legal issues and interview strategies. Having this
training before departing for GTMO would save valuable time for
the agents, who now have to undergo this training on-site
before they begin the interview process.
However, it does not appear that this recommendation was ever
implemented. As noted above, most agents who reported getting any

163

training for their military zone assignments told us they received it after
arriving in the military zone.
By January 2004, the FBI had created a 5-day pre-deployment
training program for agents detailed to Iraq. The agenda included
approximately 1 hour of training regarding "Interviewing Techniques."
However, the agenda does not specifically identify any issues relating to
detainee mistreatment for training.
FBI documents suggest that the pre-deployment training for agents
detailed to Afghanistan was brief. An EC dated April 18, 2004, prepared by
the FBI OSC described the current training as "a 30-minute CD-ROM photo
collage by CTD, which serves as the totality of the briefing provided by
FBIHQ/CTD." The EC recommended that personnel deploying to
Afghanistan go through a 2-week pre-deployment course of instruction at
Quantico, although it did not identify detainee treatment issues as a
proposed topic for more in-depth training.
B.

Training Topics Relating to Detainees

We also attempted to determine the content of FBI training with
respect to detainee treatment in military zones prior to May 2004. In our
survey of agents deployed to the military zones, we focused on four aspects
of potential training or guidance: (1) the standards of conduct regarding
detainee interviews applicable to FBI agents in military zones; (2) standards
of conduct applicable to personnel from other agencies, such as military
interrogators; (3) what agents should do if an agent from another agency
used a non-FBI technique during a joint interview with the FBI; and (4)
under what circumstances an agent should report the conduct of personnel
from another agency.
Standards of Conduct for FBI Agents . FBI agents told the OIG that
they understood that they were required to continue to adhere to the same
standards of conduct for detainee interviews that applied to custodial
interviews in the United States. Those agents who received training almost
unanimously reported that this instruction was included in the training.
Moreover, those agents who told us that they did not receive specific
training regarding detainee treatment overwhelmingly stated that they
nevertheless understood that the same standards applicable in the United
States continued to apply to their conduct at GTMO. Several agents stated
that they were attempting to gather information that would be admissible in
later prosecutions, so they had to comply with ordinary standards of
conduct for interviews. These agents' accounts are consistent with the
statement by the MLDU Unit Chief in an e-mail dated May 10, 2004, that
the GTMO supervisors were told that, except with respect to Miranda

164

warnings, "follow FBI/DOJ policy just as you would in your field office. Use
common sense...."
Some agents told us that they received specific instructions not to use
certain techniques that might have been employed by the military. For
example, one agent whose deployment began in February 2002 told the OIG
that early in his deployment his OSC emphasized that if he had any doubt"
about a particular technique being used by the military, "we are not in that
business." Other agents told us that they were specifically instructed not to
use particular techniques, such as cold temperatures (air conditioners set
high), leaving a detainee alone in the interrogation room for a long time, or
forcing a detainee to stand or sit in an uncomfortable position. One OSC
cited "forcing a detainee to watch gay pornography" as an example of a nonlaw enforcement technique that he instructed FBI agents to avoid. An agent
who deployed to GTMO in March 2003 said that FBI personnel were told
during a closed-door briefing that the FBI did not condone or participate in
certain interrogation techniques utilized by military intelligence personnel.
Standards Applicable to Non-FBI Investigators . Most agents told
us that they did not receive any specific information regarding which
interrogation techniques were permissible for military interrogators. An
OSC at GTMO told the OIG that he was never briefed on what interrogation
techniques were available to the military, and he was not interested to know
this information. The OSC stated that there was no way for the FBI to
determine whether a military interrogator had obtained the necessary
authorization to use a particular military technique.
When asked how the FBI could improve training for future
deployments, several agents responded that information should be provided
regarding the parameters applicable to non-FBI interrogators.
Only a few agents reported that they received detailed information
regarding which interrogation techniques were approved for the military.
Some reported that this information was provided in writing. It appears
that they were usually referring to information provided by the military, not
the FBI. For example, several agents who served in Iraq told us the military
required them to sign a form acknowledging the types of methods used to
gather information from detainees, such as using working dogs and sleep
deprivation.
Joint Interviews . As discussed in Chapter Two, at various times and
locations the FBI worked jointly with the military in planning and
conducting detainee interrogations. This practice raised the potential for
FBI agents to be involved in interrogations in which methods might be
planned or used that the FBI did not permit for its own agents. The
mandate that FBI agents continue to adhere to FBI policy did not

165

necessarily resolve the issue of what agents should do if another agency's
investigator planned or used non-FBI techniques in an interview at which
an FBI agent was present, or in which he was otherwise involved, such as
by assisting the interrogator with questions for the detainee or using

information derived from the interrogation in subsequent interviews.
T.J. Harrington, the FBI's Deputy Assistant Director for Operational
Support in the Counterterrorism Division beginning in December 2002,
confirmed for the OIG that the FBI did not provide specific training about
how to conduct joint interviews with the DOD. He stated that existing FBI
policies remained in effect and pointed out that the FBI had no jurisdiction
over the military investigators. However, as noted in Chapter Three, existing
policies did not clearly address joint interrogations in which other U.S.
agencies with different rules were in charge.
Several agents also noted that the FBI did not provide guidance
addressing joint interviews with the DOD. For example, an FBI SSA who
served as OSC in GTMO for 2 months in 2002 and from August 2003 to
August 2005 told the OIG that he knew that his agents were not allowed to
engage in some conduct that was permissible for military interrogators, but
that it was unclear whether the agents could observe interviews in which
such techniques were used by other agencies or utilize information derived
from interviews in which such techniques were used. This question was not
merely hypothetical, because FBI agents sometimes relied on military
interrogators to obtain information for them from particular detainees. The
OSC told the OIG that the guidance he provided to agents at GTMO was to
conduct themselves like FBI agents, but that the guidance never went
further than that.
Some FBI agents told the OIG that they received training or
instruction to the effect that they should leave any interview in which nonFBI techniques were being utilized. For example, one agent who served at
GTMO during the summer of 2003 told us that he was instructed to leave
any joint interview in which the other interviewer was using any non-FBI
approved technique. Another agent who served at GTMO in early 2003
stated in his survey response that he was told to leave the interview if Army
personnel used any "extreme interrogation techniques." Another said he
was instructed to leave if he saw anything "inappropriate" or that made him
"uncomfortable." One of the first agents deployed to GTMO said that the
"stand clear" policy "devolved from leadership on [the] ground."
Reporting Mistreatment . We also sought information regarding
training about the circumstances under which an FBI agent should report
on the abuse or mistreatment of a detainee by another interrogator. Again,
most agents reported receiving no guidance on this issue prior to May 2004.
A few agents told us they were instructed to report detainee mistreatment by

166

other interrogators, but they gave varying descriptions of the triggering
criteria for making such a report. The OSC at GTMO in October and
November 2002 told us he instructed his new agents to let him know if they
heard or saw abuse. Some agents said they were instructed to make a
report if they saw any interrogation technique that would violate FBI
guidelines if used by an FBI agent, even though the agents were aware that
military interrogators were governed by more permissive standards. Other
agents used a variety of adjectives to describe this criterion, ranging from
"abusive" to "inappropriate," "questionable," or "unprofessional." However,
as one agent who was deployed to Iraq stated:
The Asst. On Scene Commander ... merely said if you see
anything inappropriate you should report it. However, no one
ever defined what was inappropriate. For example, we had been
informed that [a particular Task Force] had legitimately received
special permission to conduct interviews using techniques that
were not available to the FBI. There was never any indication at
the time whether those techniques used by [the Task Force]
were appropriate. In fact, the [FBI's] on scene senior command
staff in Baghdad as well as AD Bald who visited the [Baghdad
Operations Center] were aware of the techniques available to
[the Task Force] and condoned their use.
An agent who served as OSC in Afghanistan during February and
March 2002 stated that prior to deployment, DOD personnel indicated that
if FBI agents saw "inappropriate" conduct by DOD personnel, they should
report it to appropriate officials in the DOD.
Several agents recommended to the OIG that the FBI provide more
specific training regarding standards of conduct applicable to military
interrogators. We believe these recommendations reflected the difficulty the
agents encountered in knowing when to report the conduct of military
interrogators. In addition, several agents told the OIG that the issue of
whether non-FBI interrogators were violating their own agencies' rules
created tensions for the FBI, because the FBI was the guest of the military
and the FBI's purpose in being in the military zones was not to police other
agencies. Other agents suggested that training be provided to clarify the
FBI's "policing" role with respect to other agencies' interrogators.
Some agents who served at GTMO told the OIG that they were told
that they should write up any potential "war crimes" allegations in an FD302 for inclusion in the "war crimes" case files in the FBI office at GTMO.
At some point in 2003, however, the OSC at GTMO received instructions not
to maintain a separate "war crimes" file. The OSC stated that the MLDU
Unit Chief told him that investigating detainee allegations of abuse was not
the FBI's mission. The OSC stated that he was told that the agents could

167

continue to memorialize such allegations in their FD-302 interview
summaries, but that the FBI would not segregate such allegations into a
separate file.
In sum, prior to May 2004 the FBI provided only limited training,
instruction, or guidance to FBI agents concerning standards of conduct
relating to detainees. Most FBI employees understood that they should not
participate in abusive treatment of detainees, consistent with FBI policies in
the United States. However, there was considerable uncertainty about how
FBI personnel should interact with military interrogators using non-FBI
techniques and whether to report suspected abuse.

II.

Expanded Training Provided to FBI Agents After Issuance of the
FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy

In the months following the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee
Policy, the FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU) substantially
increased the scope of pre-deployment training provided to FBI agents who
were being sent to the military zones, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan.
Much of this enhanced training related to the unique conditions
encountered by FBI agents in foreign military zones and addressed issues
such as logistics, weapons, force protection, and convoy procedures. The
FBI began addressing the issue of detainee treatment in a more systematic
way than it had prior to the Abu Ghraib disclosures.
For example, beginning in approximately October 2004, the FBI began
periodically conducting a formal pre-deployment training program at
Quantico for agents being deployed to Iraq that lasted approximately 5 to 7
days. An attorney from the FBI's Office of General Counsel (OGC) prepared
a "Legal Briefing" as part of this training. The briefing addressed several of
the issues discussed in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, including: (1)
reiterating that the long-standing FBI prohibitions on coercion and abuse of
persons in custody also applied to detainees in the military zones; (2)
instructing FBI employees not to participate in any interrogation technique
in violation of FBI guidelines regardless of whether the co-interrogator was
in compliance with his or her own guidelines; and (3) telling each agent to
report any instance in which he or she "knows or suspects non-FBI
personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a detainee."

The training also instructed agents to "attenuate" their interviews of
potential criminal defendants in cases where the detainee had previously
been questioned by a foreign government or other intelligence community
agency so as to enhance the likelihood that any resulting statement would
be admissible in a judicial proceeding. The training instructed the agents to
consider:

168

•

Allowing a lapse of time from the prior interview and the FBI
interview

•

Choosing a different location for the FBI interview than the prior
interviews

•

Assuring that previous interrogators are absent from the FBI
interview

•

Avoiding the use of material obtained from previous
interrogations

•

Concentrating on the criminal facts versus intelligence facts
gathered by intelligence community or military

•

Using a new investigative team who have been isolated from
previous interview material, but not necessarily from preinterrogation intelligence on the subject

•

Getting the detainee on record as to his current status (as
potential defendant) versus previous status

The OGC attorney who prepared the training told us that in order to address
the issue of what constituted FBI "participation" in an interview conducted
by a non-FBI employee, he discussed five to seven hypothetical scenarios.
Beginning in December 2004, the FBI also periodically conducted
expanded multi-day pre-deployment training for FBI employees who were
being sent to Afghanistan. In developing this training, MLDU and CTD staff
noted the differences between training for Iraq and for Afghanistan, since in
Afghanistan FBI personnel "often operate as part of military units widely
dispersed throughout the theater." Detainee interview and treatment issues
were not covered in the original syllabus, but this issue was later added into
the training program.
We found no indication that the FBI devised a comparable predeployment program for agents assigned to GTMO, most likely because
GTMO was not a battle zone. However, in August 2004 the FBI OGC
attorney stationed at GTMO began giving training to FBI personnel deployed
there, advising them to rely on the guidance provided in the Legal Handbook
for Special Agents. He told the newly-arrived FBI employees that if they saw
anything "untoward," beyond what the FBI was authorized to do or outside
the scope of the military's authority, the agent was to remove himself from
the room and report the incident to the OGC attorney or to the FBI's OSC at
GTMO. The OGC attorney told us that he and the OSC instructed the
newly-arrived employees on the scope of the military's approved techniques
as they were set forth in the April 2003 Policy approved by the Secretary of
Defense.

169

As previously noted, the OIG survey sought information regarding the
content and adequacy of training for FBI employees deployed to Iraq,
Afghanistan and GTMO. Most FBI agents whose foreign deployments began
after the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy told us that they
received specific instruction as to the major elements of the Policy. Most of
them told us they were instructed to comply with FBI policies applicable to
custodial interviews in the United States, and to report any abuse or
mistreatment of detainees by non-FBI employees.
However, numerous agents told us in survey responses and interviews
that it would have been useful to them to receive a more detailed
explanation of what constituted "abuse" and what techniques were
permissible to military or other government agency interrogators under their
agencies' policies. For example, one agent who served in Iraq in early 2005
stated: "A clear explanation of definitions of [permissible non-FBI]
interrogation techniques, [e.g.] `pride and ego up,' fear up, etc. would have
been helpful." Another agent who served in Iraq during May through July of
2005 stated:
I believe better guidance could be provided as to what the FBI
defines as "mistreatment" of detainees. In addition, the manner
in which such mistreatment should be reported can be better
articulated and disseminated to predeployment FBI
employees.... [T]he lack of specific definitions as to what is or is
not detainee mistreatment, made any determination of
perceived mistreatment--outside the obvious, rather subjective
and ambiguous and therefore argumentative.
Because the OIG survey was conducted in 2005, most of the responses we
received regarding training issues did not reflect the expanded training
programs described above.
The policies and training that the FBI provided to its agents both
governed the agents' conduct toward detainees and informed their decisions
regarding what action to take when they observed personnel from other
agencies using interrogation techniques not available to the FBI. In the next
three chapters, we address in detail what nearly 1,000 agents who served in
the military zones told us they observed or heard about with respect to
detainee mistreatment, what if anything they did to report such conduct,
and what the FBI did with such reports.

170

CHAPTER EIGHT
FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DETAINEE TREATMENT IN
GUANTANAMO BAY
1.

Introduction

During the course of our review, we contacted over 450 FBI employees
who were detailed at various times to GTMO. More than half of these
witnesses - approximately 240 - reported that they never observed nor
heard about potentially abusive treatment of detainees at GTMO.
Nevertheless, over 200 FBI agents who served at GTMO reported that
they observed or heard about various rough or aggressive treatment of
detainees, primarily by military interrogators. The most frequently reported
techniques included sleep deprivation or disruption, prolonged shackling,
stress positions, isolation, and the use of bright lights and loud music.
Table 8.1 summarizes the survey responses to our questions regarding the
use of particular interrogation techniques at GTMO.
In presenting these results in summary form, we emphasize the limits
to the interpretation of this data. The numbers in the Table indicate how
many survey recipients gave positive responses to particular questions. We
determined during the interviews, however, that some respondents gave
overly inclusive responses, sometimes describing conduct that they
observed or heard about that did not meet the definitions within the
survey. "9 We believe that some agents may have responded this way out of
an abundance of caution, to be sure that they had responded fully and were
not excluding any information of potential relevance. In addition, we believe
that in some cases multiple agents were reporting on the same incident.
Merely counting the number of positive responses therefore would overstate
the number of incidents that may have actually taken place.
On the other hand, we also cannot exclude the possibility that some
respondents did not report all incidents of detainee mistreatment of which
they had knowledge. Moreover, the FBI agents were only present at a small
percentage of detainee interrogations in the military zones, most of which
were conducted by personnel from other agencies. For all of these reasons,

119 For example, Question 49 sought information regarding the use of military
working dogs other than during detainee transportation, such as for purposes of
intimidation of detainees during interrogations. We determined that several agents who
responded positively to this question were in fact describing the use of dogs as a security
measure during detainee movement and not during interrogations.

171

the survey results should not be interpreted as an estimate of how often a
particular technique was employed within a particular military zone.
TABLE 8.1
Survey Results Concerning
Interrogation Techniques Observed in Guantanamo

Interrogation Technique
1 . ....................................................................................
Depriving a detainee
of food._.................
or water
.........
_._..._............................_._..............
---.........._._.._
2 Depriving a detainee of clothing
3 Depriving a detainee of sleep, or interrupting
sleep by frequent cell relocations or other
methods
_._........._..............._._..........._._....._................_........._._........ ---........... . . . . . _..._...._......_-.......
4 Beating a detainee
5 Using water to prevent breathing by a
detainee or to create the sensation of
. . . drowning
. . . . . . . ... . . . . . ................................_...................__..................... _....----._.._.......................... .......................... ............._...............
Using hands, rope, or anything else to choke
or strangle a detainee
7

354

441

Threatening other action to cause physical
pain, injury, disfigurement, or death

435

Other treatment or action causing significant
physical pain or injury, or causing
disfigurement or death
9 Placing a detainee on a hot surface or
burning a detainee
. .............. ................................................ _............................. ---..............._...._................................ _...._....__......_._.__........
10 Using shackles or other restraints in a
prolonged manner
._............ . . . . _ ........................ _........... ...... ................................. _..._............... __..._............ ........................._......_.._.._..__._....._.
11 Requiring a detainee to maintain, or
restraining a detainee in, a stressful or
painful position
12 Forcing a detainee to perform demanding
physical exercise

437

Using electrical shock on a detainee.
Threatening to use electrical shock on a
detainee
Intentionally delaying or denying detainee
medical care
Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other
than during transportation

444
441

13
14
15
16
17

Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or
hot room temperatures for extended periods

Subjecting a detainee to loud music

444

442

431

172

420

384

a
q >
4J a
e^ pq

e^ o

a
0

ao
4-)

+' 0
°^
Interro .anon
ue
_ . . __.. . _.. . . . .Tech
. . . . . ..............
. . . . n1. . . 9_..._..__......_..__......................_-............._a..._0
. . . . __0. ...,.._... _......._... A.............. ._..._Q . . !_

Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing

. ._. . . . . . . . .
403

lights or darkness
20
21

Isolating a detainee for an extended . period
30
5 ...
1__...
22
384
.._....._. ........_...._.... -_................_....
...
....._._........ ---........_................... __...__..... _.... ._............
_....
....._....................
_.........
Using duct tape to restrain, gag,
_.............
................ or punish
... a
2
...................... 4
438

detainee
22

Using rapid response teams and/or forced
11
8
9
43
376
cell extractions
..................... . . .............._.........................__..._.._.___._...._........._.......__....._..............................._.._..._..- ..-_-..... _................_..._.._...._....................._.........._........ - ---------.. .........._............... ..__........_...._.........._ ._...................._..................._.....
23 Using a military working dog on or near a
3
6
434
detainee other than during detainee
transp ortation
24 Threatening to use military working dogs on
2
1
440
or near a detainee
25

Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other
animals on or near a detainee

441

Threatening to use spiders, scorpions,
444
snakes, or other animals on a detainee
................................ .__._........_................... . . .__ . . . ---...... . . . . . . ..............................__...._........_.........__................................ __...__................... ..................
__........_............_...._. ..._..........._............_.._............._
27 Disrespectful statements, handling, or
. . . . . _....
2
19
10
414
actions involving the Koran
.._......__...._._... _..........._............................................ _..........._........_............... _............. _......._.........._....._.._................ ..............._.......... _....._.............._.........__._.._..._..... . . . . . . .....__........_................
_..................... ._.............._..... _........ . . . . _.__............................. _.....
28 Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to
3
4 ............ 6
6
427
embarrass or humiliate a detainee
Placing a woman's clothing on a detainee
2
4
441
Touching a detainee or acting toward a
2
2
2
11
426
detainee in a sexual manner
.....................__.._ _._....................................... ---........................... _..._......._....._.................._.........._._.................... __............. ........................... _...__._.............
....
. ..........................._..............._......
.................._.......... _...
_.....
31 Holding detainee(s) who were not officially
.......................2 ............. 1 __..........................
1 -................ 438
acknowledged or registered as such by the
agency detaining the person.
29
30

32
_._. .. . . .
33

34
35

36
37

Sending a detainee to another country for
1
more aggressive interrogation
..................................................... ...._......_........................ . . . . . . _................. _ ...................... .......................... __.. .._---..................
Threatening to send a detainee to another
6
country for detention or more aggressive
interro gation
Threatening to take action against a
2
detainee's family
Other treatment or action causing severe
2
emotional or psychological trauma to a
detainee
Other religious or sexual harassment or
humiliation of a detainee
Other treatment of a detainee that in your
opinion was unprofessional, unduly harsh or
aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful

Observation Totals

173

434

433

439
443

437

433

108

282

15,824

In Part II of this chapter, we describe the FBI agents' specific
observations regarding particular interrogation techniques.120 In Part III, we
examine the handling of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to
military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment at
GTMO.

II.

Observations Regarding Specific Techniques
A.

Beating or Physically Abusing a Detainee

Several FBI agents told the OIG about incidents involving the alleged
beating or other physical abuse of detainees at GTMO.121 However, in only
one case did any agent report having directly witnessed such conduct. The
other reports involved allegations from detainees regarding incidents that
the FBI agents did not themselves witness. Beating and physical violence
were never approved interrogation techniques at GTMO. The Church
investigators reported that a small number of "minor" cases of assault of
detainees at GTMO were substantiated, and noted that other, more serious
allegations were under investigation by the military. Church Report at 175178.
Brett / McMahon . The only report by an FBI agent regarding the
direct observation of physical abuse at GTMO was an incident in November
or December 2002 reported by SSAs Brett and McMahon.122 As noted in
Chapter Five, Brett and McMahon were agents from the Behavioral Analysis
Unit (BAU) of the FBI's Criminal Incident Response Group (CIRG) who were
assigned to observe and assist with interviews of detainees at GTMO.
Brett provided the following details to the OIG. On one occasion while
Brett and McMahon were in an observation booth at GTMO observing an
FBI interview, they saw a female military interrogator and her partner bring
a detainee into a vacant interrogation room. After a few minutes the female
interrogator ordered a Marine guard to duct tape the curtain in front of the
two-way mirror, blocking the view into the interrogation room. The second
military interrogator then came into the observation booth and sat in front
120 Many of the incidents described below have previously been discussed in press
accounts of FBI documents that were released to the American Civil Liberties Union
pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.
121 The OIG's survey asked separate questions regarding beatings and other
treatment causing significant physical pain, but the responses were sufficiently similar that
we have combined these categories for purposes of describing agent responses.
122 Brett and McMahon are pseudonyms.

174

of the monitor, and the Marine guard went into the interrogation room.
However, Brett said he could see most of the interrogation by looking at the
monitor. The female interrogator sat close to the detainee with her back to
the camera. Her left knee was in the detainee's crotch area, and she was
rubbing the detainee's arms from his shoulders down past his elbows into
his crotch area.
Brett told us that several times he could see the detainee turn his
head away, grimace in pain, rear back and make noise consistent with a
response to pain. The female interrogator leaned in and apparently
whispered in the detainee's ear from time to time. After the military
interrogators were finished with this detainee, Brett asked the Marine guard
what the female interrogator had done to the detainee. The guard told Brett
she was bending his thumbs back and grabbing his genitals. Brett asked
why she was doing that, and the guard replied, "to cause him pain." The
guard added: "If you think that is bad, I have seen her having guys on the
floor crying tears in the fetal position." Brett said that the Marine guard's
name tag had been taped over, and so he did not see his name. Brett also
said that the guard seemed uncomfortable about his questions, and Brett
did not want to press the issue by asking his name.
Brett also stated that the female applied some sort of lotion on the
arms of the detainee prior to bending his thumbs back and grabbing his
genitals. Brett stated that this interrogation occurred during Ramadan and
that he understood that if a Muslim male is touched by a woman who is not
his wife he would be considered unclean and could not pray. Brett also said
he had heard that Army interrogators would use perfumed lotion to make it
obvious to the other detainees that the particular detainee had been
touched by a woman.
McMahon stated during his OIG interview that both he and Brett
observed the female interrogator bend back the thumbs of a detainee.
McMahon said that he could not really see what was happening in the
interrogation room, but that another military interrogator confirmed what
the female interrogator was doing to the detainee.
Brett and McMahon reported this incident to the FBI On-Scene
Commander (OSC) at GTMO, and to the CITF-DOD Supervisor. Brett stated
that at some point he, McMahon, and the OSC called the Critical Incident
Response Group (CIRG) to report this incident. Brett told the OIG that he
and McMahon were instructed to report any similar incidents to BAU
management at Quantico. Brett said he got the impression that his
superiors definitely did not want him to raise this kind of issue with General
Miller, the military commander of JTF-GTMO at the time. However, Brett
told us that he, McMahon, and the OSC did bring up this issue during a
meeting with General Miller a few days before Brett left the island, in

175

connection with their attempt to persuade General Miller that the FBI's
rapport-based approach was superior to the military's interrogation
techniques. Brett said that General Miller responded with words to the
effect of, "thank you gentlemen, but my boys know what they're doing."
We determined that Brett's concerns regarding this incident and other
incidents were elevated within FBI Headquarters, and from there the matter
was eventually referred back to the DOD. This incident was described in
general terms in one of the attachments to SSA McMahon's EC to the
Counterterrorism Division and the FBI Office of General Counsel dated
May 30, 2003, which was described in Chapter Five.
Brett told the OIG that he believed that the U.S. Army interrogators
were being encouraged by their superior officers to engage in aggressive
interrogation techniques. He gave as an example a "pep rally" meeting he
attended, conducted by the Chief of the DOD's Interrogation Control
Element, in which the interrogators were encouraged to get as close to the
torture statute line as possible. Brett said he did not feel that the incident
he witnessed involving the female interrogator was a case of a rogue
interrogator acting on her own.123
Brett gave an account of this incident to the Schmidt-Furlow
investigators, who also interviewed the female interrogator and her
supervisor. Schmidt-Furlow Report Exhibits 21, 24 and 32. The interrogator

and her supervisor stated that she did rub perfume or lotion on a detainee's
arm in order to make him stop praying because he would be "unclean," and
that when the detainee attempted to attack the interrogator he fell and
chipped a tooth. The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that the interrogator's
conduct was an authorized technique under Field Manual 34-52 (mild noninjurious touching), although the report did not address Brett's allegations
regarding bending the detainee's thumbs back. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 8.
Another FBI agent told the OIG about an incident that occurred
during his deployment at GTMO between October and November 2002,
which could have been the same incident. The agent said he observed three
U.S. military personnel picking a detainee up off the floor of the
123 A different FBI agent gave an account of what might have been the same
incident or a similar incident involving the same female military interrogator. He stated
that on one occasion he observed a military interrogator who was "invading the space" of a
detainee and speaking into his ear. She was also trying to hold hands with the detainee
and he was resisting. The agent said the interrogator seemed to be speaking seductively
and may have put her hand on the detainee's leg. The agent said that it did not appear
that the detainee was in any pain or physical distress. He said that the interrogator and
the detainee looked like they were "hand wrestling" but it did not appear that she was
bending back his thumbs. The FBI agent described these actions as "non-standard," but
said he definitely did not consider them abuse.

176

interrogation room, and that the detainee was bleeding from the nose. The
agent said there was a female interrogator who appeared to have her hands
on the detainee. The agent identified the interrogator by the same name
that Brett provided to the OIG in connection with the thumb-bending
incident. The agent reported that he overheard other military personnel in
the observation booth say that the female interrogator had been rubbing
perfumed lotion on the detainee, including on his genital area, and that
when the detainee began yelling and tried to stand up he immediately fell
because his handcuffs were shackled to the floor. The agent stated that he
spoke to the CITF Commander about this incident.
SA Siebern .124 SA Siebern told the OIG that on one occasion while he
was conducting an interview at Camp Delta with an Army Sergeant and
Major, they heard a loud noise down the hall and stopped their interview to
investigate. What they found was a detainee on the floor of a different
interview room, on his knees. The detainee was leaning forward with his
forehead touching the floor and he was moaning. Siebern asked the military
personnel in the room what had happened and they replied that the
detainee had gotten upset and thrown himself to the floor. They also said
that they had already called for a medic to treat the detainee. Siebern told
the OIG that there was a small amount of blood on the floor in front of the
detainee that was consistent with a nose bleed. Siebern said that the Major
began to question the other military personnel in the room about this
incident and Siebern then left with the Sergeant.125
Siebern said he felt that the explanation he received regarding the
detainee was both plausible and credible. He said that such an action by
the detainee seemed consistent with behavior that Siebern had observed
from other detainees at GTMO. Siebern said that the military personnel in
the room did not seem to be agitated and nobody was being restrained away
from the detainee as if there had been some sort of confrontation. Siebern
believed this was a military issue that most likely would be handled by the
Army Major, who was a field grade officer. Siebern said he did not report
this incident to his OSC because he did not "feel that it was an issue," and
he thought the Major was doing what appeared to be a sufficient albeit
superficial investigation. Siebern stated that he did not document the
incident or tell anyone else about it at the time. 126

124 This name is a pseudonym.
125 This incident may be the same incident that Brett related regarding the chipped
tooth.
126 Siebern later reported this incident on August 18, 2004, in response to the email inquiry from the FBI Inspection Division regarding observation of aggressive
techniques. He told the OIG he reported it out of an abundance of caution.

177

Allegations made by detainees to the FBI regarding physical
abuse by military personnel . Several FBI agents deployed to GTMO noted
that detainees had complained to them about beatings or other physical
abuse by military personnel. Some of these complaints were recorded
contemporaneously in FBI FD-302 interview summaries and others were
reported to the OIG in survey responses and interviews. No FBI agents
reported that they witnessed these events and none were alleged to have
participated in them.
For example, according to FBI documents and two agents interviewed
by the OIG, an allegation regarding a beating by military personnel was
made by detainee Juma Muhammad Abdul Latif Al-Dosari (#261). On
May 22, 2002, Al-Dosari told an FBI agent that three or four weeks earlier
an unknown number of guards had entered his cell unprovoked and began
spitting and cursing at him. Al-Dosari said that a soldier named Smith had
jumped on his back, beat him in the face, and choked him until he passed
out, and that a female guard named Martin beat him and banged his head
against the cell floor. According to the FD-302 interview summary prepared
by the FBI agent, Al-Dosari had a recent wound on his nose. Two other FBI
agents told the OIG that they heard allegations from detainees of beatings
by military guards which we believe related to the same incident, but
neither agent witnessed the alleged beatings. The agents told the OIG that
Al-Dosari's allegations were well known at GTMO and that they understood
that the allegations had been reported to military officials.
Another agent told the OIG about allegations made by detainee
Mamdough Ahmed Habib (#66 1). Habib alleged that "Mike," a private
contract interrogator with Lockheed Martin, had hit him during an
interrogation approximately a year before the agent arrived at GTMO. The
agent said she found Habib's allegation "very hard to believe" based on the
agent's experience of working with the interrogator at GTMO.127
We also received FD-302 interview summaries prepared by FBI agents
at GTMO that indicated detainees had reported other incidents or rumors of
beatings or other physical abuse. According to an FD-302 prepared by
special agents from the FBI and the CID, on October 4, 2002, detainee Allal
Ab Alj allil Abd Al Rahman Abd (# 156) told FBI interviewers that he had
127 According to another FBI agent, Habib also made allegations about beatings of
other detainees during an interview with the FBI agent on January 8, 2003. The agent
reported these allegations in an FD-302 interview summary that he prepared at the time,
which stated among other things that Habib claimed that detainees were beaten when
guards searched their cells. According to the Church Report, Habib has been released and
has made widely-publicized claims of torture that are the subject of an ongoing
investigation by the NCIS. The OIG has requested updated information regarding this
investigation from the DOD, but to date it has not been provided.

178

witnessed U.S. guards shoot another detainee and throw him in the ocean,
and that four or five Camp Delta guards had hit him (# 156) in the head
about two weeks earlier. Another FD-302 prepared by the FBI states that
on January 21, 2003, detainee Abdel Wahab (#37) told the interviewer he
had heard that a detainee had been severely beaten by a guard and had
died as the result of an altercation that began when the guards treated the
Koran disrespectfully.
An FD-302 summary prepared by an FBI agent stated that on May 31,
2003, detainee Abdallah Aiza Al Matrafi (#5) claimed that some detainees
were being beaten during late night interrogations. Another FD-302
prepared by an FBI agent stated that on July 19, 2003, detainee Zahir Shah
(# 1010) complained that he was shackled and hooded by U.S. Forces in
Bagram and was subsequently beaten by guards during transfer to GTMO.

Prolonged Shackling and Stress Positions

Over 30 FBI agents told the OIG in survey responses or interviews
that they saw or heard about the use of prolonged shackling or stress
positions on detainees at GTMO.128 Many described a particular practice
known as "short chaining" or "short-shackling" in which the detainee's
hands and feet were chained close to a bolt on the floor so that the detainee
could not stand or sit comfortably. Several agents described detainees
being short-shackled overnight or while being subjected to cold
temperatures, loud music, or flashing lights. We describe the more severe
examples of short-shackling and stress positions reported by the agents
below.
According to the Church Report, "[t]hroughout interrogation operations
at GTMO, interrogators have made a practice of chaining detainees' hands
and feet to an eyebolt in the floor of the interrogation room, ostensibly as a
matter of safety." Church Report at 168. The Church Report found that this
practice prevented seated detainees from standing up straight, and forced
standing detainees into a stooped or hunched over position. Id. The
Church investigators observed that the practice of "short chaining"
(intentionally placing a detainee's hands even closer to the eyebolt) caused
"moderate physical discomfort" and was employed "to intimidate and
establish control over resistant detainees." Accordingly, they classified this
practice as a "stress position." Id. Stress positions were approved for use at
GTMO by Secretary Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, but permission to use
128 The OIG survey asked separate questions about prolonged shackling and stress
positions. However, respondents described incidents of short-shackling under both
categories. In addition, as mentioned above, the Church investigators have classified shortshackling as a type of stress position. We therefore combined the categories in this
discussion.

179

stress positions without advance approval from the Secretary was rescinded
on January 12, 2003. Id. at 117-120. The military at GTMO apparently did
not consider short-shackling to be a prohibited "stress position," at least
until May 2004 when the military commander at GTMO specifically
prohibited this practice. Id. at 168.
Direct observations . The OIG interviewed 23 FBI agents who
personally observed prolonged shackling or detainees in stress positions.129
For example, one FBI agent stated that during her deployment from
December 2003 to September 2004, she personally observed detainee
Mohammad Mehdi (#166) "short-shackled" in an interrogation room. Mehdi
was also being forced to listen to loud music with flashing strobe lights, and
later placed in a hot room. The agent did not know how long Mehdi was in
the hot room, but she thought it was for several hours. She also estimated
that the room temperature was about 90 to 95 degrees. She stated that two
Lockheed Martin contract interrogators most likely ordered that Mehdi be
short-shackled. The agent told the OIG that she understood that shortshackling was a permitted interrogation tactic for military personnel, and
that she therefore did not report this activity to anyone in the FBI until
July 9, 2004, when she responded to the Inspection Division's survey of
agents deployed to military zones. In her e-mail she stated that Mehdi was
short-shackled for approximately 15 hours.
Another FBI agent indicated in her OIG survey response and her OIG
interview that on a few occasions during her deployment to GTMO in
February and March 2003 she observed detainees that were "short chained"
to the floor for extended periods and subjected to extreme temperatures.
She said that the first time she encountered this was when she walked into
an interview room and encountered a detainee whose hands and feet were
shackled to the floor so that the detainee could not stand. She said that the
room was stifling hot, there was a strong smell of urine and feces, and there
was a small pile of hair next to the detainee's head. The MPs on duty told
the agent that the detainee had been there since the day before and that the
MPs were told by his interrogators to leave him there and not bring him any
food or water until the interrogators came back. The MPs also told the FBI
agent that they had been instructed to do this for other detainees.
The same FBI agent told the OIG that approximately two weeks later
she encountered another detainee who was shackled to the floor of an
interview room. She said the air conditioner had been set to make it very
cold in the room and the detainee was shivering. Also, the detainee had
129 In addition to the incidents described in this Section we also address an incident
involving the short-shackling of detainee Yousef Abkir Saleh Al Qarani (#269) in Chapter
Eleven.

180

urinated in his pants. The MPs advised her that the detainee had been in
the room since the previous day with the air conditioner left on the whole
time, and that they were told not to bring the detainee food, water, or
anything else until the interrogators returned. The agent said the MPs told
her that the interrogators were trying to "break down" detainees through the
use of temperature manipulation, loud music, and immobility.
The FBI agent stated that she did not report either incident to her FBI
OSC, but she believes that she did discuss this with her FBI colleagues at
GTMO, some of whom told her that they had heard about this sort of thing
being done at GTMO.130
Two other witnesses also told the OIG about another incident
involving use of a stress position on detainee Salman Yahya Hassan
Mohammed Rabeii (#508). One FBI agent said that early in his deployment
at GTMO in 2002 he observed two young soldiers laughing and snickering
at a detainee who was in what appeared to be a stress position on his knees.
The detainee was rubbing his leg and the Arabic translator in the room was
yelling at the detainee. The agent asked the soldiers if what was taking
place was authorized activity. One soldier told the agent that the activity
was authorized, but the agent was not convinced and he sought out a CITF
legal advisor. The two of them brought this incident to the attention of the
Commanding General's JAG.131 We interviewed the former CITF legal
advisor (who has since left the military and is now an Assistant General
Counsel for the FBI), who provided a similar account to the OIG and
identified the detainee as Rabeii. The former CITF legal advisor also told the
OIG that on another occasion near that time he observed a detainee being
short-shackled to the floor in a squatting position during an interview for
the purpose of using the offer of a chair as an incentive for cooperation.
Second hand reports and detainee allegations . Several FBI agents
told the OIG that they heard about incidents of prolonged shackling or
stress positions from other agents or from detainees.132 For example, the
FBI OSC at GTMO during June 2002 said that he heard that some
detainees had been shackled to the floor for prolonged periods in a manner
that put some stress on the lumbar region of the back as a way to induce
130 The agent later reported these incidents in an e-mail response to the FBI
Inspection Division survey and in an interview with the Inspection Division.
131 The disposition of this report to military superiors is discussed below in Section
III of this chapter.
132 In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD stated that "short shackling" is
also a technique used to control violent or belligerent detainees to ensure the safety of
others, and that this use could explain some of the agents' observations and second-hand
information on the use of this measure.

181

the detainees to talk. The OSC said he told his staff "we're not going to do
that anymore," and to the best of his knowledge most agents stopped using
this technique. The OSC stated that he heard that two task force officers
from New York (not FBI agents) continued to use this technique, however,
and that the OSC threatened to have them removed from GTMO if they
continued to use this technique. The OSC said he could not recall the
names of the New York task force agents or of any FBI agents who had
employed this technique. None of the approximately 440 other FBI agents
who served at GTMO that responded to the OIG in this review reported in
their survey responses or interviews that they ever observed FBI agents use
short-shackling or other stress positions at GTMO, and we were unable to
determine the identity of any agents that the OSC said had used this
technique.
Another FBI agent said that detainees Shafiq Rasul (#86), Asif Iqbal
(#87), and Ruhel Ahmed (#I 10) told her that they had been "short-shackled"
by the military on occasion to get them to cooperate in interrogations. The
agent told the OIG that she understood that these detainees were shortshackled to wear down their resistance to interrogation. She stated that the
alleged incident happened about 6 months before she arrived at GTMO, and
it was used in conjunction with loud music, strobe lights, and temperature
manipulation.
The same agent told the OIG that another detainee, Ahmed Ould
Abdel Aziz (#757), complained that he was shackled for an extended period
of time in conjunction with other aggressive interrogation techniques. The
agent stated that during her time at GTMO, from December 2003 to
September 2004, she was a member of a multi-agency interrogation team
that had been building rapport with Aziz over a long period of time. She told
us that another interrogator told her that Aziz had alleged that in February
2004 he had been subjected to yelling, short-shackling, lowered room
temperature, strobe lights, and music. Aziz also alleged that he was left in
the interrogation room for over 12 hours with no food, bathroom breaks, or
breaks to pray. The agent told us that she and her team believed that the
CIA had conducted this interview. She said she and the other interrogators
on her team were angry because the incident undermined their lengthy
effort to build rapport with this detainee, and because there had been no
coordination with them prior to interrogating the detainee. She said she
reported this incident to an FBI SSA and the FBI OSC, and the problem did
not recur.

Sleep Deprivation or Sleep Disruption

Over 70 FBI agents deployed to GTMO told the OIG that they had
information regarding the use of sleep deprivation or sleep disruption on

182

detainees. This was the single most frequently reported interrogation
technique. 133

According to the Church Report, "sleep adjustment" was utilized
frequently throughout the period of interrogation operations at GTMO.
Church Report at 155, 170. The Memorandum approved by Secretary
Rumsfeld on April 16, 2003, explicitly approved the use of "sleep
adjustment," which it defined as "[a]djusting the sleeping times of the
detainee (e.g. reversing sleep cycles from night to day." It further stated that
this technique is not "sleep deprivation." According to the Church Report,
the distinction between permissible "sleep adjustment" and prohibited
"sleep deprivation" was imprecise and "blurry." Id. at 171, 174.
Many FBI agents described a program of sleep disruption employed by
the military at GTMO designed to disorient detainees and thereby obtain
their cooperation, which was known as the "frequent flyer program."
According to military documents, this program consisted of frequent cell
movements for a detainee in order to disrupt his sleep patterns and lower
his ability to resist interrogation. The length and frequency of the cell
moves varied with each detainee.
An FBI agent who was deployed to GTMO from December 2003
through September 2004 told the OIG that she was briefed by the U.S.
military about this program, which consisted of moving detainees every few
hours in order to disrupt their sleep pattern and to undermine any
supportive relationships on their cell block. She stated that under the
program detainees were moved every 4 hours, but that that the program
could only be continued for about a week or two. The agent was not told by
anyone in the FBI that this program was not available for her to use, and
she believed that this technique would not be prohibited by any FBI policy.
She told the OIG she never utilized this program, because she felt there
were much more effective ways to accomplish the same goals.
Another FBI agent stated in his survey response that several Uighur
detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation or disruption while being
interrogated at Camp X-Ray by Chinese officials prior to April 2002.134 The
133 In addition to the incidents described in this Section, several FBI agents told us
that sleep deprivation or sleep disruption was a technique that the military employed with
detainee #63, Al-Qahtani, in 2003. This information is described in Chapter Five. Also, as
discussed in Part IV of Chapter Eleven, FBI agents participated in subjecting detainee
Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi (#569) to extended isolation in 2003 at GTMO.
134 Uighurs are an ethnic minority in China who are predominantly Muslim. While
the Uighurs were detained at Camp X-Ray, some Chinese officials visited GTMO and were
granted access to these detainees for interrogation purposes. The agent stated that he
understood that the treatment of the Uighur detainees was either carried out by the
(Cont'd.)

183

agent said that one Uighur detainee, Bahtiyar Mahnut (#277), claimed that
the night before his interrogation by Chinese officials he was awakened at
15-minute intervals the entire night and into the next day. Mahnut also
claimed he was exposed to low room temperatures for long periods of time
and was deprived of at least one meal.
The FBI agent who served as OSC at GTMO from June to August
2003 also told the OIG about a program at GTMO called "Operation
Sandman," which involved sleep interruption and frequent cell relocations.
He said he was briefed on this operation at a command staff meeting at
which General Miller and all the department heads at GTMO were present.
The OSC stated that at this time the military was concerned that the Saudi
detainees were exerting too much influence over the other detainees and
encouraging them not to cooperate with U.S. officials. As the OSC
understood it, Operation Sandman was designed to keep some of the Saudi
detainees mentally off balance, to isolate them either linguistically or
culturally, and to induce them to cooperate.
D.

Extreme Temperatures

Approximately 29 agents provided information to the OIG regarding
the use of extreme temperatures on detainees at GTMO. Some agents
simply observed that most interview rooms were cold. In a few cases
however, it appears that detainees were intentionally subjected to extreme
temperatures by unknown interrogators in an apparent effort to break the
detainees' resolve to resist cooperating. As noted above, several agents
reported the use of extreme temperatures in conjunction with prolonged
short-shackling.
FBI agent observations regarding this technique were confirmed by
the Church Report, which found that "environmental manipulation has been
regularly employed throughout interrogation operations at GTMO. By far
the most common version of this technique involved turning the air
conditioning up in the interrogation room to induce moderate discomfort in
the detainees, most of whom are accustomed to warm climates." Church
Report at 171. According to the Church Report, environmental manipulation
was not specifically addressed in a military interrogation policy for GTMO
until it was listed as an approved technique in the April 16, 2003, Policy.
Id. at 138, 155.

Chinese interrogators or was carried out by U.S. military personnel at the behest of the
Chinese interrogators. He said he also heard from the Uighur translator that other Uighur
detainees experienced this same treatment.

184

Although temperature manipulation was an approved military
technique, FBI agents told us that they avoided using this technique in
connection with their interviews. One agent stated that the FBI OSC at
GTMO told agents deployed to GTMO that the FBI was "not in that
business."
E.

Use of Working Dogs

We found no evidence of any FBI employees involved in the use of
military working dogs in any fashion. Several agents described the use of
dogs by the military, however. Secretary Rumsfeld's December 2, 2002,
memorandum explicitly approved the exploitation of a detainee's individual
phobias (such as fear of dogs) as an interrogation technique at GTMO.
Church Report at 116. This technique was one of those for which approval
was rescinded on January 12, 2003, however. Id. at 118-121.
Several FBI agents reported that military dogs were used at GTMO for
purposes other than interrogations, including for the purpose of controlling
or intimidating detainees when they arrived at GTMO.
In addition, as detailed in Chapter Five, SSAs Lyle and Foy from the
FBI's Behavioral Assessment Unit (BAU) reported that they witnessed the
use of a military dog to interrogate Al-Qahtani during the fall of 2002.13-9
Several other agents stated in survey responses or interviews that they
heard about the incident with the dog and Al-Qahtani, but that they did not
witness it personally. The information they provided was generally
consistent with the accounts given by Lyle and Foy. No other FBI agents
reported the use of dogs during interrogations of any other detainees.
F.

Isolation

GTMO had several areas that were used to segregate or isolate
detainees, including the Navy Brig, certain sections of Camp Delta, Camp
Echo, and Camp X-Ray.
.Over 50 FBI agents provided the OIG with information regarding the
use of isolation at GTMO. Some agents reported the use of extended
isolation as part of an interrogation strategy to wear down a detainee's
resistance. Others described the use of isolation by the military for
disciplinary or security purposes. Different FBI agents had different
understandings regarding whether the FBI could participate in the use of
isolation as an interrogation strategy: some told us that they participated in

135 Lyle and Foy are pseudonyms

185

the decision to put a detainee in isolation, while others stated that they
understood that FBI agents were not authorized to employ this technique.
Secretary Rumsfeld explicitly approved the use of isolation for military
interrogation purposes at GTMO on December 2, 2002. The December 2002
Policy provided for isolation up to 30 days, with any extensions requiring
approval from the JTF-GTMO Commander. This approval was rescinded on
January 12, 2003, but approval for this technique at GTMO with prior
notice to the Secretary of Defense was reinstated on April 16, 2003.136
Isolation as an interrogation technique . Several FBI agents told us
that the FBI participated in using isolation as an interrogation technique.137
For example, one agent stated in his survey response that detainee Ghassan
Abdullah Al-Sharbi (#682) was believed to have knowledge of a potential
terrorist cell in the United States. Despite efforts to build rapport with this
detainee, he remained uncooperative and even started to incite trouble
within his cell block. The agent stated that the military and the FBI agreed
that Al-Sharbi should be isolated for a period of 30 days in Camp Echo
before the interview process resumed.
Two SSAs from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) who were
deployed to GTMO in early 2003 told the OIG that isolation of detainees was
a common practice at GTMO and was not considered abusive. These two
SSAs encouraged the use of isolation with respect to certain detainees'
interview strategies. One stated that if a detainee was behaving like a leader
and gaining status, power, and momentum with other detainees, sometimes
it was helpful to isolate him to make him more dependent on the
interrogator. The agent stated that this practice was not necessarily in
conflict with rapport building. The other BAU agent said that isolation of
detainees was an appropriate practice, and said she never saw or heard of it
being used improperly.
Another FBI agent said that while at GTMO she was aware of three
detainees, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Ruhel Ahmed, who were isolated
within Camp Delta for an extended period of time as part of a concerted
plan to gain actionable intelligence from them. She stated that the term
"segregation" might be a more appropriate term than "isolation" for the
conditions she observed.

136 Church Report at 117-121, 138. According to the Church Report, isolation was
used by the military throughout interrogation operations at GTMO. Id. at 155.
137 In addition to these incidents, 11 agents also described the use of isolation as
an interrogation technique on Al-Qahtani (#63) as described in Chapter Five.

186

Another agent who was deployed to GTMO during June and July
2003 told the OIG that isolation was an allowable interrogation technique
available to both military and FBI interrogators at GTMO, and that an
interviewer could request that a detainee be put into isolation. He said he
never used this technique and was not aware of any other FBI or military
interrogators using it. The agent said that isolation was used for only a
short period of time and that the Commanding General of GTMO had to
approve the request.
Other agents reported the opposite, and said that FBI agents were
prohibited from using isolation as an interview technique. Similarly, the
legal advisor to the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) from March to
July 2002 stated that the law enforcement agents of the CITF were not
permitted to recommend that a detainee be placed in isolation and that
CITF avoided even being consulted on the decision. One FBI agent
expressed frustration that detainees could be isolated in Camp Echo for
disciplinary reasons but not for intelligence gathering, because she thought
it would be an effective technique.
Isolation for Disciplinary or Security Purposes . Several agents
described incidents in which the military isolated detainees for disciplinary
or security purposes, which sometimes complicated the agents' interview
efforts. For example, one agent indicated in his survey response that
detainee Shaker Abdul Raheem Mohammed Aamer (#239) was put into
isolation at Camp Echo by the military for the maximum of 30 days because
he was causing trouble at Camp Delta. The agent stated that although this
may have served some behavioral purpose, it was counterproductive to the
agent's efforts to get Aamer to provide information. In addition, agents told
us the military would segregate detainees who were about to be released in
order to ensure their safety just prior to release, and that detainees were
isolated immediately before and after they met with the Red Cross.
G.

Mistreatment of the Koran

Thirty-one FBI agents told the OIG they were aware of allegations
regarding disrespectful statements, handling, or actions involving the Koran
at GTMO.138 However, the only two agents who said they personally
witnessed such an incident during an interrogation were the SSAs who
reported the incident with detainee Al-Qahtani, as previously described in
Chapter Five. The remaining witnesses reported allegations they heard,

138 We are not aware of any military interrogation policy that explicitly addressed
conduct designed to provoke a detainee by showing disrespect to a religion or religious
item, although it is possible to characterize such conduct as part of a "pride and ego down"
or "futility" technique.

187

mainly from detainees, of guards disrespecting the Koran in noninterrogation contexts, such as during cell searches.
Several agents identified a particular detainee, Ghassan Abdullah AlSharbi (#682), as having complained about disrespectful treatment of the
Koran. According to these agents, Al-Sharbi claimed that the Koran would
sometimes be knocked on the ground during detainee cell searches and that
guards handled it disrespectfully. One agent told us that Al-Sharbi said
that the simple act of a non-Muslim handling a Koran was considered
inappropriate, which sometimes resulted in detainees being encouraged by
block-mates to throw water or urine on the MPs. Al-Sharbi told the agent
that a compromise was reached in which detainees would flip through their
Korans while the MP watched to ensure nothing was hidden inside. Then
the detainee would put the Koran down while the MP searched the rest of
his cell. Other agents reported similar claims by detainees that military
personnel had mistreated the Koran. We did not find any allegations or
evidence that any FBI agents mistreated a Koran.
H.

Touching or Acting Toward a Detainee in a Sexual Manner

Over 20 FBI agents reported in interviews or survey responses that
they had seen or heard about female interrogators touching or acting toward
a detainee in a sexual manner. We determined that several of these reports
related to one interrogator and possibly to the same incident. In most of the
other cases, the agents did not have personal knowledge of the incident and
were reporting detainee allegations or information they had heard from
others at GTMO. We describe the most specific and significant of these
reports below.
According to the Church Report, sexual acts and mock sexual acts
have always been prohibited interrogation techniques. The Church
investigators found a single incident of an interrogator violating this
prohibition, involving sexually suggestive comments and body movements.
Church Report at 174-176. The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated that some
conduct by female interrogators "designed to take advantage of their gender
in relation to Muslim males" were authorized under military policies as
"futility," and "mild non-injurious physical touching." Schmidt-Furlow
Report at 7-9, 16-17.
As discussed in a prior Section of this chapter, SSA Brett told the OIG
that during his deployment to GTMO in November or December 2002 he
observed a female military interrogator apply lotion to the arms of a
detainee, bend the detainee's thumbs back, and grab his genitals. As also
discussed in that Section, another agent reported an incident involving the
same female interrogator in which a detainee fell when he sought to evade
the female rubbing lotion on him.

188

Another agent who was deployed to GTMO during March through May
2003 described a claim by detainee Adel Fattough Ali Algazzar (#369) that
Algazzar had seen another unnamed detainee return from an interrogation
with blood on his face and head. Algazzar told the agent that when the
other detainee did not cooperate with a female interrogator, she called four
guards into the room to restrain him, removed her blouse, embraced him
from behind, put her hand on his genitals, and wiped menstrual blood on
him. The agent said he did not know the identity of the female interrogator
and that at the time he suspected that the story was a lie or had been
embellished. The agent said he reported the allegation to the FBI OSC, and
that at the OSC's instruction the agent put the information in an FD-302
report dated April 21, 2003. We interviewed the OSC, who stated that he
had no recollection of the agent or the fact that any agent reported such an
allegation to him.
However, the Schmidt-Furlow investigation found that in March 2003
a female military interrogator retaliated against a detainee who had spit on
her by showing him red ink on her hand and saying she was
menstruating. 139

According to an FBI FD-302 interview report that was dated April 8,
2003, detainee Abdul Latif Nasir (#244) made allegations of possible rapes of
more than one detainee by either a military guard or interrogator during the
1:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift. The FD-302 also stated that Nasir described
instances when detainees were searched in the groin area and touched
sexually by male guards in the interview rooms. Nasir also described the
possible attempted suicide of a Saudi detainee who had allegedly been raped
and beaten by guards. Neither of the agents identified in the FD-302 stated
in their OIG survey responses that they had heard these allegations. As
previously noted, the FBI did not have a formal procedure for
communicating allegations of this type to appropriate military officials until
February 2005. According to the FBI, Nasir's allegations were transmitted
to military officials at GTMO.
Several FBI SSAs told the OIG that they received reports about
military interrogators behaving in a sexually provocative manner toward
detainees. An SSA who served as OSC at GTMO from June 2003 to August
2003 stated in his survey response and interview that while he was at
GTMO FBI agents told him that they observed female military interrogators
139 The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that the interrogator wiped the ink on
detainee's arm after showing him her hand and telling him that it was menstrual blood.
The report found that this technique was authorized under military policy as an act to
demonstrate the "futility" of the detainee's situation, but faulted the interrogator for using a
technique that was not approved in advance and recommended that she be formally
reprimanded. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 9.

189

straddling detainees, whispering in their ears, and generally invading the
detainees' personal space. The SSA stated that one agent told him a female
military interrogator unbuttoned her blouse while straddling a detainee.
The SSA said he could not recall the agents who provided this information
to him.
Two other FBI SSAs told the OIG that an FBI Intelligence Analyst told
them that a female military interrogator named "Sydney" had exposed her
breasts and performed sexual lap dances on detainees to make them
uncomfortable and ashamed, although the analyst had not witnessed this
conduct personally.
Also, one FBI agent indicated in his survey response that he had
information that detainees Slahi (#760) and Al-Qahtani (#63) were subjected
to sexual conduct or touching. The agent was not specific about the actual
techniques that were employed on Slahi and Al-Qahtani. Further
information regarding the interrogation of Slahi and Al-Qahtani is provided
in Chapters Five and Eight.
1.

Use of Bright Flashing Lights or Loud Music

Approximately 50 FBI agents told the OIG that they had witnessed or
heard about the use of bright lights on detainees, sometimes in conjunction
with other harsh non-law enforcement techniques. Many agents stated they
observed or heard about the use of loud music. These were among the most
frequently reported techniques at GTMO. None of the witnesses we

interviewed described the use of this technique by an FBI agent.140
According to the Church Report, these techniques were never
specifically addressed by military interrogation policies for GTMO, although
some interrogators consider them a form of "environmental manipulation"
approved by the Secretary of Defense on April 16, 2003. Church Report at
138, 172. The Church investigators found that bright lights and loud music
were used "occasionally" throughout the interrogation operations at GTMO.
Id. at 155, 172. The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that this technique was
used on "numerous occasions" between July 2002 and October 2004, and
that this technique was authorized by Field Manual 34-52, "Incentive and
Futility." Schmidt-Furlow Report at 9-10.
Many FBI agents witnessed the use of these techniques while walking
through the interrogation trailers at Camp Delta. For example, one FBI
agent told the OIG that approximately halfway through his tour at GTMO,
140 In addition to the incidents described in this section, bright lights and loud
music were apparently employed by the military against detainee Al-Qahtani (#63), as
described in Chapter Five.

190

which was from June 25, 2003, through August 14, 2003, he observed a
detainee alone in a darkened interrogation room, apparently bolted to the
floor in a kneeling position, with a strobe light close to his face and loud
music blaring in the room. The agent described the music as hard rock
music, similar to the music performed by the group Metallica, played at a
volume equivalent to a rock concert. The agent stated that he and another
agent reported this activity at a meeting with their OSC. Other agents
reported similar incidents during the same general time period.
The SSA who served as the OSC at GTMO from June to August 2003,
when most of these incidents apparently occurred, told the OIG that he
heard from his agents that military interrogators were using loud music as a
pre-interrogation technique. He stated that although he did not think this
technique was effective, he also did not think that the music was ever
played at a level that would have been damaging to someone's hearing. The
OSC stated that he may have mentioned this activity in a phone call with
the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU) Unit Chief, but that by that
time it was well established that the military was employing this
technique.141
J.

Use of Duct Tape on Detainees

Five OIG survey respondents stated that they observed or heard about
the use of duct tape on a detainee. We believe that most or all of these
agents were likely referring to the same incident.
As noted in Chapter Five, SSAs Lyle and Foy were agents from the
FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) who were deployed to GTMO in
September and October 2002.142 Lyle told the OIG that one evening while
he and Foy were observing a law enforcement interview at Camp Delta,
Andrews, the Chief of the the DOD's Interrogation Control Element at GTMO
at the time, came into their observation room and said to them: "Hey come
here I want to show you something."143 Lyle followed Andrews to another
observation room that was "packed" with military personnel, and pointed to
one of the interrogation rooms that contained a detainee with duct tape
wrapped around his head. Lyle said that two bands of tape went entirely
around the detainee's head, one that covered his eyes and one that covered
his mouth. Lyle said that the detainee had a full head of hair and a beard.
The detainee was sitting on the floor handcuffed to the I-bolt in the floor.
141 Several of the survey respondents described the use of loud music over the
public address system at Camp X-Ray in 2002 rather than as a specific interrogation
technique. We received no reports that this practice occurred outside of Camp X-Ray.
142 Lyle and Foy are pseudonyms.
143 Andrews is a pseudonym.

191

There were two interrogators and two guards in the room with the detainee,
and one of the interrogators was yelling at the detainee. Lyle asked
Andrews, "Was he [the detainee] spitting on someone?" Andrews responded,
"No, he just wouldn't stop chanting the Koran."
Lyle told the OIG that he left the room and described the incident to
Foy and to the FBI OSC. Lyle stated that he then briefed the CITF
commander and the chief JAG officer at GTMO.
SSA Foy and the FBI OSC provided accounts of the incident that were
consistent with Lyle's description. The OSC told us that Foy told him about
the duct tape incident and that he in turn reported the incident to his JAG
counterpart and to FBI Headquarters. Foy also included a description of the
duct tape incident in his EC to senior officials at FBI Headquarters dated
November 22, 2003, which is discussed in Chapter Five. As also discussed
in that chapter, around the time the MLDU Unit Chief learned of this
incident, he raised the larger issue of aggressive military interrogation
tactics - particularly in the context of the al-Qahtani interrogations - with
DOJ officials.
The duct tape incident was addressed in the Schmidt-Furlow Report,
which stated that duct tape was wrapped around the detainee's mouth and
head in an effort to quiet the detainee. According to that report, Andrews
claimed that he ordered the detainee to be duct taped because the detainee
was screaming resistance messages and was potentially provoking a riot.
Andrews claimed that at the time there were from seven to ten other
detainees in the interrogation facility at the time and he was concerned
about losing control of the situation. The Schmidt-Furlow investigators took
statements from SSAs Lyle and Foy in which the FBI agents provided
essentially the same information that they provided to the OIG. SchmidtFurlow Exhibit 6.. The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that Andrews's conduct
was "unauthorized." 144

144 There were differences between the statements provided by Andrews and the FBI
agents, which the Schmidt-Furlow Report did not attempt to resolve. For example, Lyle and
Foy stated that there were only one or two other interrogations underway at the time.
Andrews, however, asserted that there was anywhere between seven and ten other
interrogations taking place at the time of the duct tape incident, and that his action was
necessary to prevent the possible incitement of other detainees. Yet, both Lyle and Foy
described Andrews's demeanor as laughing or giggling. Lyle also indicated he was certain
that Andrews said the reason he had the detainee duct taped was because he would not
stop chanting the Koran.

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Forced Shaving

Approximately 20 FBI agents provided information to the OIG
regarding the forced shaving of detainees' heads and faces. One agent
described the use of shaving to undermine a detainee's standing within the
cell block, while others reported the use of forced shaving as a disciplinary
or hygiene measure.
"Forced grooming" (shaving of hair and beard) was specifically
approved as a military interrogation technique by Secretary Rumsfeld on
December 2, 2002, but this approval was rescinded on January 12, 2003.
Church Report at 117-121. According to the Church Report, military
interrogators sometimes used this technique at GTMO, including during the
period after the Secretary's approval had been withdrawn. Id. at 155.
A former FBI OSC at GTMO said that in 2002 the FBI agent
interviewing detainee Ghassan Abdullah Al-Sharbi (#682) told him that AlSharbi should have his beard shaved. The agent told the OSC that AlSharbi's beard was down to his waist and he was getting too much respect
on the cell block for this. The agent recommended that Al-Sharbi be shaved
in order to reduce his influence and the level of respect he was receiving
from the other detainees on the cell block. The OSC said he thought that
the agent had already consulted with the military about having Al-Sharbi's
beard shaved. The OSC gave his consent and shortly thereafter Al-Sharbi's
beard was shaved. However, the agent told the OIG said he neither
observed nor heard about subjecting a detainee to forced shaving, except for
hygiene purposes.
Two FBI agents reported to the OIG allegations from detainees that
guards were shaving some of the detainees' beards half off in an effort to
embarrass them, although neither agent observed this conduct. Several
other agents described incidents of shaving as a punishment for detainee
misconduct, such as attacking a member of the military.145 Other agents
reported that the shaving of detainee's heads and their facial hair was
usually done for hygienic or health reasons.

Withholding Medical Care

We questioned the FBI agents about allegations that medical care was
withheld from detainees. One agent described an incident that caused her
to question whether adequate care was provided to a detainee, and several
145 During the OIG's visit to GTMO in February 2007, military personnel stated that
cutting a detainee's hair and beard was a standard punishment for certain disciplinary
infractions. At least one of the detainees interviewed by the OIG in 2007 had recently been
subjected to such punishment.

193

other FBI agents told us about complaints from detainees that their medical
needs had not been addressed. However, we received no reports that
medical care was ever intentionally delayed or denied to a detainee.
One agent told the OIG that in early April 2004 she observed an
interview of Mamdough Ahmed Habib (#661) in which he repeatedly vomited
during the course of a lengthy interrogation. 146 She said she did not
observe Habib receive any medical treatment, but that she heard that Habib
was given Motrin to help alleviate his condition at some point during the
interrogation. The agent reported that a Lieutenant Colonel who was a
medical doctor was present at the time. The agent told the OIG that Habib's
condition did not bother her at the time, but in retrospect she questioned
whether the treatment of Habib was appropriate. However, she said she
was certain that there was no plan or intention on the interrogators part to
make Habib sick or take advantage of his condition.
Another FBI agent told the OIG that he interviewed a detainee at
GTMO who complained that he needed to see a doctor about treatment for a
wound he received in a shootout with the U.S. military in Afghanistan. The
agent stated that the detainee did not appear to be in pain or distress at the
time. The agent said that the guards told him that they were aware of the
detainee's condition, and that military officials later told him that this
detainee said that he needed to go to the base hospital every time he was
interviewed.
Another agent told the OIG that one detainee at GTMO complained to
her several times about what appeared to be a gastro-intestinal problem.
The agent said she thought that the detainee in question should have been
evaluated by military medical staff, and that she believed that the military
was not taking this detainee's complaints seriously because he complained
about many things. She said it took several complaints by her to the MPs
before the detainee was evaluated, and that it turned out the detainee did
have a real medical problem that required treatment. However, she stated
that language barriers and limited availability of translators may have
contributed to the delay in getting him treatment.
We found no evidence of any FBI agent who intentionally or otherwise
delayed or denied a detainee's access to medical care. In fact, some agents
told us that interceding on a detainee's behalf regarding a medical issue was
extremely helpful in building rapport.

146 The agent said that she observed two interview sessions with Habib and that
both lasted 15 hours with only a short break in between. She said that that she did not
schedule these interviews but that FBI management at GTMO knew that she was
participating and nobody ever told her not to be a part of it.

194

Forced Cell Extractions

During an OIG visit to GTMO in April 2005, military officials advised
that detainees held at GTMO were not allowed to refuse to report to any
interviews or interrogations scheduled by any of the intelligence agencies.
OIG investigators were told that if a detainee refused to attend an interview,
he was subject to being forcibly removed by a special team of soldiers from
the Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG). In April 2005 the noncommissioned officer in charge of detention operations told the OIG that the
extraction would be performed by a seven-man team consisting of one
medical person, one person designated to video tape the extraction, and five
people to perform the extraction. However, during an OIG visit to GTMO in
February 2007, military officials advised that this policy had changed and
that detainees are no longer required to attend interrogation or interview
sessions with the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Several FBI agents confirmed that forced cell extractions were used
when detainees refused to comply with guard instructions. None of the
agents we interviewed reported that forced cell extractions were used as an
interrogation technique to break down a detainee.
N.

Placing Women ' s Clothing on a Detainee

Four FBI agents deployed to GTMO reported that they heard about
military personnel placing women's clothing on detainees, although none of
them personally witnessed this conduct.
One agent described an incident involving detainee Yussef Mohammed
Mubarak Al-Shihri (#114) during March to May of 2003. The agent stated
that he and another FBI agent were building rapport with Al-Shihri over the
course of three interviews, but that during their fourth interview Al-Shihri
told them that "the mean ladies" came and got him from his cell in the
middle of the night and interrogated him for hours. Al-Shihri said that
during this interrogation he was also forced to listen to a recorded loop of
the "meow mix" jingle for hours, was sprayed with perfume, and had a
woman's dress draped on him. The agent told us he confronted a young
female military intelligence contract interrogator whose name was unknown.
She admitted to "poaching" his detainee and subjecting him to the
treatment that he had alleged. The agent told us that after this incident AlShihri became uncooperative and that the techniques employed on Al-Shihri
were counterproductive. The agent said he did not report this incident to

195

the OSC at GTMO at the time or describe it in his FD-302 interview
summaries for Al-Shihri.147
Other FBI employees told us they heard rumors of the use of women's
clothing on detainees. An FBI Investigative Support Specialist said that
while at GTMO he heard rumors that a detainee was forced to wear women's
clothing and makeup during an interrogation and that this same detainee
was also given a "lap-dance" by a female guard. An FBI Intelligence Analyst
told us that while at a social function at GTMO she was told that a female
military interrogator placed women's undergarments on a detainee during
an interrogation. The analyst said that it was obvious to her that this was
done to humiliate and demean the detainee. The analyst was also told that
the female military interrogator performed a lap dance on this same
detainee during the same interrogation.148
0.

Transfer to Another Country for More Aggressive
Interrogation

A few FBI agents who served at GTMO reported hearing about claims
that detainees had been sent to another country for more aggressive
interrogation by foreign interrogators. 149 However, it appears that these
agents were likely describing an allegation relating to the same detainees.
One agent stated in his survey response that detainees Mohamadou
Ould Slahi (#760) and Mahmdouh Habib (#661) told him that they had been
sent to different countries before they were sent to GTMO: Slahi from
Mauritania to Jordan, and Habib from Afghanistan to Egypt.150 Another
agent told the OIG that Habib told her that when he was in Afghanistan he
was turned over to Egyptian authorities. The agent said that although
Habib had been born in Egypt, he was a citizen of Australia. Habib told her
that prior to his transfer to Egypt he met with both Australian and U.S.
Government officials, and that while he was in Egypt he was subjected to
several forms of torture. A third agent described hearing a second-hand
report about an Australian detainee (likely Habib) who had been sent to
147 Another detainee told us that an FBI agent made him put on a woman's coat
that had perfume on it, and that when he took it off he smelled like the perfume. We
address this matter in Part IV of Chapter Eleven.
148 As noted in Chapter Five and confirmed in the Schmidt-Furlow Report, in late
2002 military interrogators forced Al-Qahtani to wear women's clothing in an attempt to
humiliate and embarrass him.
149 The military policies for GTMO did not explicitly address actual or threatened
rendition.
150 Military and FBI documents indicate that Slahi was arrested in Mauritania and
interrogated in Jordan for several months before he was transferred to GTMO.

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Egypt and interrogated by the Egyptian intelligence service prior to being
transferred to GTMO.

Threatened Transfer to Another Country

Several FBI agents told the OIG that they had information about
threats to send detainees to another country for detention or more
aggressive interrogation. According to the Church Report, threat of transfer
to another country was never specifically listed as a pre-approved
interrogation technique under military policy for GTMO, and beginning in
January 2003 prior notice to the Secretary of Defense was required before
using it. The Church investigators identified one incident involving the use
of this technique in a June 2003 interrogation of a high value detainee.
Church Report at 168-69, 173.
SSA Lyle stated in his OIG survey response that military interrogators
threatened Al-Qahtani using this technique.151 Lyle said that at some point
during the military's interrogation of Al-Qahtani at Camp X-Ray military
interrogators threatened to send him to another country. Lyle believes that
the country they threatened him with was Jordan. Lyle paraphrased what
the interrogators said to Al-Qahtani as "we are going to send you to a place
where the people aren't as nice as we are."
An SSA who served at GTMO in 2002 told the OIG that he was
present at a GTMO staff meeting where this technique was discussed
concerning Al-Qahtani and other detainees. The SSA said that the military
wanted to handcuff Al-Qahtani, put a hood over his head, and fly him
around in a helicopter and then an airplane. The plan was to return AlQahtani to GTMO but completely isolate him so that he would believe he
was somewhere else. The agent said the goal was to make Al-Qahtani
believe that they were just about to turn him over to officials from another
country. We believe that this SSA may have in fact have been referring to
interrogation plan for Slahi (#760) rather than Al-Qahtani. This plan is
discussed in Section XV of Chapter Five. The SSA said that after he
objected to this plan, he was not invited to any more staff meetings.
Another FBI agent who served at GTMO from December 2003 until
September 2004 said that some detainees at GTMO were threatened with
the prospect of being returned to their home countries which could go badly
for the detainee. She indicated that this could be threatening to some
detainees depending on where they were from, and that she probably used
this technique herself. She stated that she did not consider this a threat
because it was a real possibility for some of the detainees. As an example,
151 Lyle is a pseudonym.

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she said that the Russian detainees did everything they could to be as
valuable as possible in order to avoid returning to Russia. However, the
agent stated that eventually these detainees were repatriated to Russia
despite their cooperation.
Another FBI agent stated in his survey response that he asked certain
uncooperative detainees if they would like to be sent back to their home
countries for interrogation. He stated that some of the detainees may have
perceived this as a threat and that some of them acknowledged that they
were being treated better at GMTO than they would be in their home
countries.
Other agents reported that they heard about the use of this technique
from others. One agent reported that he heard that some detainees were
threatened with being sent to Israel for interrogation. In addition, a
Detective from the Phoenix Police Department who was deployed to GTMO
as part of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force stated in his survey response
that a New York City Detective posed as an Egyptian Intelligence Officer,
and the detainee involved was told that he would go back to Egypt with this
Intelligence Officer unless he was cooperative.
Q.

Threatening a Detainee ' s Family

Four agents told the OIG that they were aware of threats to take
action against a detainee's family. According to the Church Report,
threatening harm to others was a prohibited technique for military
interrogators at GTMO. The Church investigators found one incident of
threats made against the family of detainee Slahi (#760). Church Report at
174.
A police officer from California who served at GTMO as a member of
the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force stated in his survey response that
detainee Ahmed Esmatullah Fedah refused to give truthful answers in his
interviews and that the officer told Fedah that he would attempt to deport
any of Fedah's relatives living illegally in the United States.
Several FBI agents indicated that they had second-hand information
about threats to detainees' families. Two FBI employees reported that they
read or heard from others that military interrogators threatened detainee
Slahi (#760) with the possible mistreatment of his family, including his
mother, unless he cooperated with interrogators. 152

152 The military' s use of threats with Slahi is discussed in more detail in Section XV
of Chapter Five.

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Depriving a Detainee of Food or Water

Six FBI agents reported that they saw or heard about detainees who
were deprived of food or water, although some of them were citing instances
in which detainees simply said they were hungry. According to the Church
Report, denial of basic human needs such as food was always prohibited at
GTMO. The Church investigators did not find any violations of this
prohibition at GTMO. Church Report at 35, 106, 155, 173-4.
Two agents stated that detainees were likely deprived of food or water
during periods of extended shackling. The incidents they reported are
described in detail in Section II.B above. In addition, an FBI Intelligence
Analyst said that she heard from agents at GTMO that water and certain
food items were used as bargaining tools in interviews. She said that she
heard that in some interviews if the detainee asked for water the agent
would say "first you have to give me some information then I will get you
some water." She added that agents would let the detainees have snacks or
cigarettes if the detainees would first give them some information. She also
stated that this technique was used by the FBI, NCIS, CID, CIA, and the
U.S. military.153

Depriving a Detainee of Clothing

Several agents told the OIG that they saw or heard about detainees
who were deprived of clothing. Removal of clothing was an explicitly
authorized interrogation technique at GTMO between December 2, 2002,
and January 12, 2003. Church Report at 117-121. As described in Chapter
Five, two witnesses stated that Al-Qahtani (#63) had been at least partially
deprived of clothing during part of his interrogation by the military.154 The
other incidents reported by the agents did not involve the removal of
clothing as an interrogation technique, but rather as a disciplinary measure
in response to detainee misconduct.
For example, one agent reported that the DOD's Joint Detention
Operations Group confiscated the long pants from a segment of the detainee
population that was notorious for throwing urine and feces on the guards,
leaving the detainees with only short pants or underwear. The agent said
that there were no other comfort items left to confiscate from these
153 The FBI has stated that this technique falls short of "depriving" a detainee of
or
water.
food
154 The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that in December 2002 interrogators forced AlQahtani to stand naked in front of a female interrogator, and used strip searches as an
interrogation technique. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 20-2 1. This contradicted a finding in
the Church Report that removal of clothing was not a technique used in the interrogation of
Al-Qahtani. Church Report at 158.

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detainees. She said the incident was referred to as "Pants Jihad" because
other detainees protested by refusing to come to scheduled interrogations
and generally being very uncooperative. Another agent stated in his survey
response that detainees told him that the guards took away a detainee's
clothing due to repeated suicide attempts.
T.

FBI Impersonation

Approximately 20 FBI agents told the OIG that they had information
regarding non-FBI personnel impersonating FBI agents. However, only one
agent reported that she personally observed this conduct. In many cases
FBI agents reported that detainees told them they had already been
interviewed by the FBI, when the agents knew otherwise.
An FBI agent who was deployed to GTMO from December 2003
through September 2004 told the OIG about two occasions when a CIA
interrogator represented herself as an FBI agent in a detainee interrogation.
The agent stated that she reported this activity to her immediate supervisor
at GTMO and also to the OSC. She also described another incident in
which a detainee told her that he had been polygraphed by a female AfricanAmerican FBI polygrapher. She said she could not confirm that the FBI
ever had an African American female polygrapher on the island, and that
she concluded that someone from another agency was impersonating FBI
personnel.
Several other FBI agents reported to the OIG that detainees told them
they had previously been questioned by other FBI personnel under
circumstances that led the agents to believe that they had in fact been
questioned by personnel from other agencies posing as FBI agents. Two
agents told the OIG that they heard that intelligence personnel from the
Defense HUMINT Service and the CIA started to dress like FBI agents at
GTMO in order to either confuse detainees or to outright impersonate FBI
agents during interrogations.
The FBI OSC at GTMO from June 2003 to August 2003 said that
before he arrived at GTMO he was aware that U.S. military interrogators
had been representing themselves as FBI agents by dressing casually and
telling detainees they were FBI agents. He stated that he knew that some
military and CIA interrogators would tell detainees that they were FBI as a
ruse in an interrogation, and that it was a common practice for CIA agents
to say they were FBI so as not to reveal their presence.'55

155 The OIG also determined that a U.S. Army Sergeant falsely identified herself to
detainee Slahi (760) as an FBI agent. This incident is discussed further in Section XV of
Chapter Five.

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Other Conduct

A small number of FBI agents at GTMO told the OIG that they
observed or heard about various other interrogation or detention techniques
not addressed above. Some of this information was provided in response to
the "catch all" OIG survey question regarding other interrogation techniques
that were unprofessional, unduly harsh or aggressive, coercive, abusive, or
unlawful.
Using water to simulate drowning . No FBI employees reported
witnessing the use of water to simulate drowning (including
"waterboarding") or similar techniques at GTMO. Out of the approximately
500 FBI employees who were deployed to GTMO, only 2 told the OIG that
they had even heard of the use of such a technique. The first agent's
information is described above at page 109. The second agent told the OIG
that he once heard a discussion at GTMO when someone mentioned using
water as an interrogation tool and someone else in the group said, "Yeah I've
seen that." The agent told the OIG he doubted that anyone he talked to
actually saw such a technique being employed at GTMO.
Hooding or Blindfolding . We sought information regarding the
hooding or blindfolding of detainees for reasons other than the
transportation of detainees at GTMO. Several agents indicated that they
were aware of the use of hoods during the transportation of detainees, but
not situations involving interrogations or detention operations.
Using Snakes . One FBI employee reported in his survey response
that a detainee, whose name or number he could not recall, told him that he
found a snake in his cell and he suspected that his "interrogators" had
something to do with it. The employee indicated in his survey response that
he too suspected that an interrogator from another agency might have been
responsible for placing the snake in the detainee's cell.
Use of Pornography . Several FBI agents reported incidents involving
the exposure of a detainee to pornography. For example, one SSA told the
OIG that on July 30, 2003, he observed two military intelligence
interrogators showing homosexual pornographic movies to a detainee and
using a strobe light in the room. The SSA reported this incident in an email to his Unit Chief.156 Several other FBI agents also reported hearing

156 This incident was the subject of a "Commander's Inquiry" at GTMO in which
Major General Jay W. Hood found no credible evidence to support" the agent's claim that a
homosexual pornographic movie was used during a military interrogation. However,
General Hood did find that from August 2002 through July 2003 pornographic photos were
used in 14 instances as an interrogation technique during military interrogations. As of
March 20, 2006, General Hood prohibited the use of pornography in any form as part of an
(Cont'd.)

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allegations that detainees had been exposed to pornography at GTMO, but
they did not themselves observe this conduct.157
Mistranslation . One FBI agent who served at GTMO from late
December 2002 until early February 2003 told the OIG that on one occasion
he and a translator listened in on an interview being conducted by an FBI
agent and a translator named George (last name unknown). The observing
agent said his translator told him that George was mistranslating what the
interviewing agent was attempting to communicate to the detainee, and that
what George was telling the detainee was considerably more inflammatory
than what the interviewing agent was saying. The agent said that at some
point much later he wrote an EC documenting this incident.
Draping a detainee in the flag of Israel . One agent reported an
incident during the summer of 2003 in which a detainee was draped in an
Israeli flag. The agent said that after finishing an interview he walked into
an observation room where he heard loud music, saw a strobe light, and
saw a detainee sitting on the floor with an Israeli flag draped over his
shoulders.158 There was no one in the interview room or in the monitoring
room, but there were one or two men in the hallway wearing olive green
fatigues with tape over their name badges. The agent said he reported this
incident to the OSC, who responded that he would raise the incident with
the General at the next staff meeting. The OSC told the OIG he had no
recollection of being told about an incident involving an Israeli flag.

Performing a mock baptism . One agent told the OIG that he tried to
establish rapport with detainee Yussef Mohammed Mubarak Al-Shihri
(# 114). The agent said that prior to his attempts to interview Al-Shihri, he
heard that the military had someone dress up as a Catholic priest and
pretend to baptize Al-Shihri. However, he said he never verified that this
actually happened. The OSC at the time told the OIG said he did not recall
the agent telling him about this incident.

interrogation plan or as an incentive without prior approval of the Joint Task Force
Commander.
157 Two SSAs described circumstances surrounding the alleged treatment of a
detainee Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi (#569) by another FBI agent. Among other things, they
alleged that the agent placed pornography in Al-Sharabi's cell. The OIG's investigation of
this incident is discussed in Chapter Eleven of this report. In addition, during an OIG
interview on February 28, 2007, detainee Muhammad Al-Qarani alleged that an FBI agent
exposed him to pornographic pictures. This incident is addressed in Chapter Eleven.
158 A different agent said in his survey response that detainee Juma Mohammed
Abdul Latif Al-Dosari, #261 told him that an interrogator wrapped an Israeli flag around AlDosari and then urinated on the flag.

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Sham interviews . The OIG survey also asked respondents to report
any information they had concerning any "sham" or "staged" detainee
interviews or interrogations conducted for Members of Congress or their
staff. Two agents reported that they saw interviews that were being
observed by congressional staffers. (From the dates and descriptions given,
we believe that they may have been reporting the same incident.) In neither
case did the agents consider the interview to be a sham. Another agent
reported that she heard a second-hand account from a DOD interrogator
that a sham or staged interview had taken place on multiple occasions, but
that she did not observe this practice herself.

III.

Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment
at GTMO

In this Section we examine the disposition of reports by FBI agents to
their superiors or to military personnel regarding their concerns about
detainee treatment at GTMO. The most significant such reports were the
series of communications relating to military's use and planned use of
various aggressive interrogation techniques on Al-Qahtani (#63) during
2002 and 2003, which are described in detail in Chapter Five. The agents
who made the greatest efforts to elevate these issues were SSAs Lyle, Foy,
McMahon, and Brett from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU). As
previously detailed in Chapter Five, these agents' concerns were elevated to
officials in FBI Headquarters through Foy's EC of November 22, 2002, and
McMahon's EC dated May 30, 2003, and were ultimately taken to the
Department of Justice and the inter-agency process. In the end, the DOJ
representatives were told that the military's methods would be pursued over
DOJ's objections. In addition, the agents did not receive the formal
guidance they requested from FBI Headquarters regarding how they should
respond to the use of non-FBI techniques by interrogators from other
agencies. Prior to the Abu Ghraib disclosures in 2004, most FBI agents who
requested guidance regarding aggressive military interrogation techniques
were given oral instructions to "stand clear" of such techniques.
The outcome of the FBI's attempts to elevate the dispute regarding AlQahtani inevitably influenced how the FBI handled subsequent reports
regarding potential detainee mistreatment. FBI agents came to understand
that military interrogators were authorized to use more aggressive
interrogation techniques than were permitted for FBI agents, although the
outer boundaries of military policy were not necessarily made clear. Many
agents saw no point in reporting or complaining about conduct that they
understood had been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The reluctance
of many FBI agents to elevate their concerns about aggressive techniques
was increased by the fact that the FBI was seeking to carve out a significant
role in counterterrorism rather than to be cast in the unwelcome role of

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policing the conduct of other agencies' investigators. The FBI also generally
sought to avoid becoming involved in determining whether particular
techniques employed by the military were permitted under military policy.
There were additional factors that operated to limit the number of
contemporaneous reports regarding detainee mistreatment at GTMO.
Although some agents told us they understood that they were supposed to
make such reports if they witnessed such abuses, other agents said they
were never given any instructions in this regard, or that no mechanism for
official reporting was in place. As noted in Chapter Six, the FBI had no
formal reporting requirement prior to May 19, 2004. In addition, many FBI
agents told us that they were never given clear instruction on what
procedures were prohibited or permissible under military policy.
Despite these factors, some agents did report their concerns about
detainee mistreatment, as detailed below. In general, these reports did not
appear to have had a significant impact on military practices at GTMO.
A.

Early Reports of Short - Shackling

Even before the concerns relating to Al-Qahtani reached FBI
Headquarters, some FBI agents attempted to elevate the issue of rough
interrogation tactics by military interrogators. As described in Section II.B
of this chapter, in June 2002 an FBI agent observed a detainee in what
appeared to be a stress position on his knees, being yelled at by a translator
while two soldiers laughed. The agent reported what he observed to the
CITF legal advisor, who relayed the report to the CITF chain of command
and to the Staff Judge Advocate for Joint Task Force 170, to which the
interrogators were assigned.
According to the FBI agent and CITF legal advisor, a meeting about
this issue was held with the JTF 170 Deputy Commander. Both witnesses
told the OIG that the Deputy Commander quickly lost his temper during
this meeting. The FBI agent told us that the Deputy Commander
misinterpreted the agent's concern as constituting a torture investigation,
but that the agent was able to clarify the matter with the Deputy
Commander.
The CITF legal advisor told us that after the meeting with the Deputy
Commander the CITF Special Agent in Charge determined that the conduct
in question was unacceptable and required further training and supervision,
but that an investigation was not necessary. He said that all FBI and CITF
agents were instructed that detainees would have the opportunity to be
seated during FBI and CITF interviews. The legal advisor told us that the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) supervisor also agreed to instruct the
Defense HUMINT Service interrogators to observe this rule.

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This incident apparently did not resolve the issue of short-shackling,
however. Another FBI agent who was deployed at GTMO a few months
later, in September 2002, stated that he observed non-FBI interviews where
the interviewers instructed the guards to chain the detainee to a bolt in the
floor in a sitting position that the agent believed was stressful and painful.
The agent reported the conduct to his SSA, after which all of the interview
teams were called together and given specific instructions about what
techniques were not allowed. The agent told the OIG that after this, he no
longer heard stories about or observed questionable interviewing
techniques. However, as detailed in Section II.B, other FBI agents deployed
at GTMO continued to see or hear about instances of short-shackling as late
as February of 2004.
B.

Agent Reports to Their On-Scene Commanders

Several agents told the OIG that, consistent with instructions that
they received at or before the time they arrived at GTMO, they reported their
concerns about incidents of detainee mistreatment that they had witnessed
to their FBI superiors on the island such as an SSA or the On-Scene
Commander (OSC). The incidents or techniques reported in this way
included the thumb-bending incident observed by SSA Brett, the incident in
which a detainee was draped in an Israeli flag, stress positions, strobe
lights, short-shackling, and FBI impersonation. As described in Chapter
Five, we found that some of these reports worked their way up the chain of
command in the FBI and in DOJ. The MLDU Unit Chief told us that in
response to these reports, he relayed instructions to FBI agents at GTMO
that there was no revision to the FBI's existing policies about interviews and
the FBI was not to participate in any tactics that were questionable. He said
that Andrew Arena (Section Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism
Operations Section 1) gave the same instruction during a visit to GTMO in
2002.
Some reports that FBI agents made to their OSCs never got elevated
to officials in FBI Headquarters or DOJ. For example, once it was
established that military interrogators were permitted to use certain
interrogation techniques that were not available to FBI agents, the OSC
often did not take the matter further up the FBI chain of command. One
OSC told us that during his tenure at GTMO in the summer of 2003, FBI
agents told him that they had concerns about a variety of techniques,
including forcing a detainee to watch gay pornography, flashing red strobe
lights in the detainee's face, loud music, and female interviewers straddling
a detainee and whispering in his ear in an attempt to belittle him. The OSC
told us he discussed these techniques with General Miller's Chief of Staff at
GTMO. However, the OSC told the OIG he did not think that any of these
techniques warranted intervention by the FBI and that these techniques
most likely comported with the techniques approved by the Secretary of

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Defense, such as "pride down." The OSC told us that he may have
mentioned some of these techniques to the MLDU Unit Chief, but that by
that time it was well established that the military was employing these
techniques, so he was not "burning down the phone line" to FBI
Headquarters. An agent who served at GTMO in the summer of 2003 under
this OSC told us that although he told the OSC about the military using
short-shackling, strobe lights, and loud music during detainee
interrogations, by that time it was "common knowledge" that these
techniques were being used on detainees and he considered it an "ordinary"
event.
Other agents described similar experiences. One agent stated that on
most occasions when she raised questions about military techniques to her
superiors at GTMO in early 2004, she was told something to the effect of
"Yes, we agree that this is a bad practice, but it is not illegal." This agent
told us that she was advised that most or all of the techniques she reported
were permitted for the military under a policy memorandum issued by the
Secretary of Defense or his Deputy. Sometimes the OSCs would adopt
strategies to help FBI agents avoid using a particular interrogation trailer on
a day that the military was using it, so that the agents would not be exposed
to military techniques such as loud music.
C.

Detainee Allegations of Mistreatment

The FBI agents at GTMO followed somewhat different procedures for
dealing with the situation in which a detainee made an allegation during an
interview with an FBI agent that the detainee or other detainees had
previously been abused. Often these allegations related to alleged abuse
that occurred prior to the detainee's arrival at GTMO. These allegations
presented different considerations from incidents in which FBI agents
personally observed the use of non-FBI tactics by military interrogators. To
begin with, in many instances the agent hearing the allegations did not
deem them credible. They knew that captured al-Qaeda training materials
recommended that detainees should make false allegations of mistreatment.
However, FBI agents did not find all detainee allegations to be incredible,
and several agents sought guidance regarding what to do with such claims.
One SSA who served two rotations as OSC at GTMO told us that he
initially told the agents to write up detainee abuse allegations to a "war
crimes" file so the FBI could retrieve the information if it was needed for
further investigation. Two agents described instances in which they made
such reports.
For example, one agent who served in 2002 told the OIG that during
his administrative orientation with the FBI when he first arrived at GTMO
he was told that he should write up any potential "war crimes" allegations in

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an FD-302 for inclusion in the "war crimes" case files in the FBI office at
GTMO. He stated that the agents were not given a definition of "war crime,"
however. This agent wrote up one such allegation from detainee Abbas
Abed Romi Al Na'ely (#758) in an FD-302. The detainee claimed that while
being interrogated by an American in Bagram, Afghanistan, he was required
to stand or kneel with his hands and arms over his head for hours at a time
over a period of three days, until he would admit to his interrogators having
connections to al-Qaeda. The FBI agent told the OIG he did not have the
resources to further investigate the detainee's claims but that it was his
understanding was that it "would be looked at sometime in the future" and
"leads" would be sent out to agents working in the field where the incidents
occurred. The agent did not know if this particular detainee's claims were
ever actually investigated.
Another detainee told an FBI agent in November 2002 that he was
beaten by an FBI or CIA agent in Afghanistan before his transfer to GTMO,
and that stress positions had been used on him . It was not clear how the
detainee knew the FBI was involved . The detainee gave very specific details
about what happened to him , which the agent wrote up in an FD-302
interview summary for inclusion in the "war crimes" file. The agent told the
OIG that he believed that something bad had happened to the detainee but
doubted that the FBI was involved.
At some point in 2003, however, the OSC at GTMO received
instructions not to maintain a separate "war crimes" file. The OSC stated
that the MLDU Unit Chief told him that investigating detainee allegations of
abuse was not the FBI's mission. The OSC stated that he was told that the
agents could continue to memorialize such allegations in their FD-302
interview summaries, but that the FBI wouldn't segregate such allegations
into a separate file.
The documents provided by the FBI to the OIG included several FD302 interview summaries that reported detainee claims of mistreatment
together with the substantive information obtained during the interview. As
previously noted, one agent told us that in April 2003 a detainee claimed
that a female interrogator touched the genitals of another, unidentified
detainee, removed her blouse, and wiped what she said was menstrual
blood on the detainee. The agent told his OSC, who instructed him to
record the allegations in an FD-302 report. The agent told the OIG that he
doubted the credibility of the detainee's account or believed the incident had
been embellished.
Another agent who served at GTMO in the summer of 2003 told the
OIG that he made a report to his OSC at GTMO about a detainee who
claimed he had been raped by a female CIA agent in Afghanistan. The agent
also reported the allegation in the FD-302 he prepared at the time, but

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indicated that the interviewers doubted the truth of these claims. The OSC
told us he did not recall hearing about this allegation, but that he probably
did and would not have believed it, based on the OSC's own experiences in
Afghanistan. We concluded that this allegation was not elevated further
because the agents at GTMO (including the OSC) did not find it credible.
We believe that the OIG did not receive an FD-302 summary for every
claim of mistreatment that a detainee made to an FBI agent. There were
several reasons that some allegations were not reported contemporaneously
in the interview summaries. Some agents told us they did not recall getting
instructions about what steps to take if a detainee made a claim of
mistreatment. In other cases, the agent believed that the alleged conduct
was consistent with military policy and therefore did not need to be
reported. Further, some agents reported that their OSC specifically
instructed them not to include allegations of abuse in their FD-302 reports.
D.

Referral Back to the Military

The FBI and DOJ generally did not consider themselves to have
jurisdiction over detainee claims of abuse by interrogators from other
agencies in the military zones. Although some FBI agents understood that
they should report incidents of detainee mistreatment to their supervisors or
record detainee allegations of abuse in their FD-302 interview summaries,
we found no indication that there was any formal procedure for
communicating the incidents or detainee claims of abuse back to the
military or of otherwise following up on such claims until after the Abu
Ghraib scandal became public.159
On July 14, 2004, the FBI referred three particular incidents to the
military for "appropriate action": the thumb-bending incident witness by
SSA Brett (described in Section II. A of this chapter), the duct tape incident
witnessed by SA Lyle (described in Section II.J of this chapter), and the use
of a dog during the interrogation of Al-Qahtani witnessed by SAs Lyle and
Foy (described in Section II.E of this chapter.160 These incidents were
referred by means of a letter from DAD Harrington to Major General Donald
J. Ryder of the Army Criminal Investigation Command. The incidents
reported in this letter involved matters personally observed by FBI agents in
the fall of 2002, nearly 2 years before the letter was sent. In selecting which

159 Military personnel had access to the FD-302 interview summaries, some of
which were prepared jointly by FBI and military interrogators. However, such access was
primarily for the purpose of developing intelligence or evidence rather than for seeking out
or tracking allegations of detainee mistreatment.
160 The FBI also referred several allegations of detainee mistreatment by FBI agents
at GTMO to the OIG for investigation. These are addressed in Chapter Eleven.

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incidents to refer, the FBI excluded incidents involving techniques such as
stress positions that the FBI believed were approved under military policy.
Harrington told the OIG that although there had been prior discussions of
these incidents with the military, the FBI was concerned that the incidents
had not been formally reported to the proper personnel.
As detailed in Chapter Six, during July 2004 the FBI surveyed
approximately 500 employees who served at GTMO to determine the extent
of the FBI's knowledge of aggressive interviews of detainees. In September
of that year the FBI conducted several follow-up interviews. FBI General
Counsel Valerie Caproni forwarded the results of the survey and the
interviews to John H. Smith, Deputy General Counsel for the DOD.
Caproni's letter stated:
Our initial evaluation [of the results of the GTMO inquiry] was
that no employee reported conduct appropriate for referral
(either because the conduct appeared to be within the
techniques authorized for Department of Defense employees or
because the employee had insufficient factual detail on the
reported incident). Nonetheless, all affirmative responses to the
survey are attached for any follow-up investigation the
Department of Defense deems appropriate.
We did not attempt to ascertain what action the DOD took in response to
Caproni's letter.
In August 2004, the FBI Assistant General Counsel assigned to GTMO
reviewed FBI interview summaries (FD-302 Forms) and relayed any
allegations of abuse contained in them to FBI Headquarters and to the legal
and command elements of the military at GTMO. As discussed in Chapter
Six, in February 2005 the FBI established a formal process for reporting any
such allegations to the military and, in the case of allegations against FBI
agents, to the OIG or the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility.

IV.

Conclusion

The most commonly reported technique used by non-FBI
interrogators on detainees at GTMO was sleep deprivation or disruption.
Numerous FBI agents told the OIG that they witnessed the military's use of
a regimen known as the "frequent flyer program" to undermine cell block
relationships among detainees and to disrupt detainees' sleep in an effort to
lessen their resistance to questioning. A few FBI agents participated in this
program by requesting military officials to subject particular detainees to
these frequent cell relocations. Other FBI agents described observing
military interrogators use bright lights, loud music, and extreme

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temperatures to keep detainees awake or otherwise wear down their
resistance.
Prolonged short-shackling, in which a detainee's hands were shackled
close to his feet to prevent him from standing or sitting comfortably, was
another of the most frequently reported techniques observed by FBI agents
at GTMO. This technique was sometimes used in conjunction with holding
detainees in rooms where the temperature was very cold or very hot in order
to break the detainees' resolve. "Stress positions" were prohibited at GTMO
under DOD policy beginning in January 2003. FBI agents' observations
confirm that prolonged short-shackling continued at GTMO for at least a
year after the DOD policy prohibiting stress positions took effect.
FBI agents also observed the use of isolation at GTMO, both to
prevent detainees from coordinating their responses to interrogators and, in
its most extreme form, to deprive detainees of human contact as a means of
reducing their resistance to interrogation. We found that, in several cases,
FBI agents participated in interrogations of detainees who were subjected to
prolonged isolation by the military.
In addition, FBI agents reported a number of other harsh or unusual
interrogation techniques used by the military at GTMO. These incidents
tended to be small in number but became notorious because of their
extreme nature. They included using a growling military dog to intimidate a
detainee during interrogation; twisting a detainee's thumbs back; using a
female interrogator to touch or provoke a detainee in a sexual manner;
wrapping a detainee's head in duct tape; exposing a detainee to
pornography; and wrapping a detainee in the flag of Israel.
We examined how reports from agents regarding detainee treatment at
GTMO were handled by the FBI. In addition to the reports addressed in
Chapter Five, we found that early FBI concerns about detainee shortshackling were raised with JTF-GTMO in June 2002. However, FBI agents
continued to observe the use of short-shackling as a military interrogation
technique as late as February 2004. Some reports to FBI Headquarters led
to instructions that FBI agents should stand clear of non-FBI techniques.
As time passed, other reports from FBI agents to their OSCs regarding
military conduct were not elevated within the FBI chain of command
because the OSCs understood that the conduct in question was permitted
under DOD policy.
Detainees sometimes told FBI agents they had previously been abused
or mistreated. FBI practices in dealing with such allegations varied over
time. Some agents were told to record such allegations for inclusion in a
"war crimes" file; others were told to include the allegations in their regular
FD-302 interview summaries; and others told us they were instructed not to

210

record such allegations at all. No formal FBI procedure for reporting
incidents or allegations of mistreatment to the military was established until
after the Abu Ghraib prison abuses became public in 2004.

211

[Page Intentionally Left Blank]

212

CHAPTER NINE
FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING
DETAINEE TREATMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
Introduction

Most of the FBI employees we contacted reported that they never
observed or heard about any potentially abusive treatment of detainees in
Afghanistan. Overall, of the 172 FBI agents who responded to our survey
and who served in Afghanistan between late 2001 and the end of 2004, 118
stated that they neither observed nor heard about any of the kinds of
detainee treatment described in the survey. We received similar reports
during our interviews with agents who had served in Afghanistan.
Several of the FBI agents sent to Afghanistan reported that they
observed or heard about various rough or aggressive treatment of detainees
by military interrogators, including harsh or prolonged use of shackles or
restraints, coercive use of stress positions, deprivation of clothing, and sleep
deprivation by means of frequent awakenings, loud music, or lights. Table
9.1 summarizes the survey responses to our questions regarding the use of
particular interrogation techniques in Afghanistan.161
TABLE 9.1
Survey Results Concerning
Interrogation Techniques Observed in Afghanistan
a>

a >

0
64

°
1
2
3

Interro g ation Techni q ue
Depriving a detainee of food or water
Depriving a detainee of clothing
Depriving a detainee of sleep, or interrupting
sleep by frequent cell relocations or other

p., 0

2
8

d
0

41 c
0
1
2

1
14

0
Z
185
180
153

178

methods
4

Beating a detainee

161 For a discussion of the limitations to the interpretation of this data, see Chapter
Eight, Section I.

213

y
5

Interro g ation Techni q ue
Using water to prevent breathing by a detainee
or to create the sensation of drowning

Using hands, rope, or anything else to choke or
strangle a detainee

Threatening other action to cause physical pain,
injury, disfigurement, or death

Other treatment or action causing significant
physical pain or injury, or causing disfigurement
or death
Placing a detainee on a hot surface or burning a
detainee

q >

4J
0°

0
x187

o°

0
a

185
2

185

184

185

Using shackles or other restraints in a prolonged
manner

Requiring a detainee to maintain, or restraining
a detainee in, a stressful or painful position

Forcing a detainee to perform demanding
physical exercise

13
14
15

Using electrical shock on a detainee
184
Threatening
to
use
electrical
shock
on
a
detainee
183
.......
. ......
............_........ .._..._ . . . ............ _ _...........__....
Intentionally delaying or denying detainee
186
medical care
_._.___ _.___._.._..._.
5 _........_..__....._ i . . . . _......_._..... _._....._ ..................._ . . ..............._.__
Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other than
2
177
during transportation

16
17

Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or hot
room temperatures for extended periods

183
5

179

182

185

Subjecting a detainee to loud music
18 ..............---..........._..........................._.__......_..._.._._......_._........_._.................._.........._.._........
13
5 ....................................
165_...
_........_.......................... _............ ---.... _.__............ __..._.. .._..................................
............__................
. . . . . . . ................. . . . . . . --- --...... ....._..........._..._......
19 Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or
2
1
4
177
darkness
. . . . . . . . _ . . . . _.. . . . . . . . ..a.._._..__._...:.__......................... _.__.._................. _....................................................._...................... ----....... _..................._.......... . . . . . . . . . . _ _....................... ...................................... ..................................... .......................... _..._._ ...__._........ _....... --- ................._...._....................
20 Isolating a detainee for an extended period
5
1
2
5
172
21 { Using duct tape to restrain, gag, or punish a
1
185
detainee
22 Using rapid response teams and/or forced cell
3
4
2
175
extractions
23

24
25

Using a military working dog on or near a
detainee other than during detainee
transp ortation
Threatening to use military working dogs on or
near a detainee
Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other

181

183
184

animals on or near a detainee
26

Threatening to use spiders, scorpions, snakes, or
other animals on a detainee

214

185

°c

0.2

Interro g ation Techniq ue
Disrespectful statements, handling, or actions
involving the Koran

Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to
embarrass or humiliate a detainee

29
30

Placing a woman's clothing on a detainee
Touching a detainee or acting toward a detainee
in a sexual manner

p., 0

0 45

N 0
O

y
A

iJ 0
0

182

Holding detainee(s) who were not officially
2
1
acknowledged or registered as such by the
agency detaining the person.
_............................... . . ............................__...._......................__..........._....._...._......................................_.........._ .......__.._._._......._........_........................................................................__....
32 Sending.. a detainee to another country for more
2
3
aggressive interrogation

34
35
36

Threatening to send a detainee to another
country for detention or more aggressive
interro gation
Threatening to take action against a detainee's
family
Other treatment or action causing severe
emotional or p sychologica l trauma to a detainee

185
186

179

_.... ._..._............... ................._ f
2
178
3

182

183
184

[

Other religious
or sexual harassment or
g
humiliation of a detainee

..................... .......... .._............................ _..........._.._...................................... _............................ _................................... _.._._.__..._......................................... _...................... _......._.

185

0
Z

184
._.-..__................... .................................... .................... _.-_._......... _._.... _....... ......... ...... _..._

Other treatment of a detainee that in your
opinion was unprofessional, unduly harsh or
aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful

Observation Totals

185

6, 701

In Part II of this chapter, we describe the FBI agents' specific
observations regarding particular interrogation techniques.162 In Part III, we
examine the handling of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to
military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment in
Afghanistan.

162 Many of the incidents described below have previously been discussed in press
accounts of FBI documents that were released to the American Civil Liberties Union
pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.

215

II.

Observations Regarding Particular Techniques
A.

FBI Knowledge of Detainee Beating Deaths

None of the FBI employees reported that they ever personally
witnessed any beating or other treatment which caused physical injury to a
detainee in Afghanistan.
Four FBI agents stated in their survey responses or interviews that
while they were in Afghanistan they heard about two detainee deaths at the
military facility in Bagram. These agents were referring to two incidents in
December 2002 at Bagram that have been described in the Church Report
and news reports. The two detainees died at the Bagram facility following
interrogations in which the detainees were shackled in standing positions to
prevent them from sleeping and were kicked and beaten by military
interrogators and military police.163 Church Report at 235-236; 2/13/2006
www.NYTimes.com ; New York Times, 9/14/05.
None of the FBI agents who referred to these deaths said that they
had personal knowledge of the incidents or were aware of any of the details,
and none indicated that any FBI personnel had contact with either of these
detainees. One of the FBI agents told the OIG that he and his FBI partner
discussed the matter and called back to FBI Headquarters about it. He said
they were told that U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command was
investigating the deaths.

164 However, no FBI agent provided any information to us
relating to these incidents.

163 The Army's Criminal Investigative Division recommended charges against 28
soldiers in connection with these deaths. Church Report at 235-6. At least 15 of these
soldiers have been prosecuted by the Army. At least 6 have pleaded guilty or been
convicted of assault and other crimes, but several have been acquitted. New York Times,
2/13/06 "The Bagram File."
164

The Department of Justice decided that there was inadequate evidence to support criminal
prosecution of any individual in connection with this incident. In June 2003 a military
detainee died at Asadabad Base after being assaulted by a CIA contractor. David Passaro,
a civilian CIA contractor, was found guilty on several counts of assault in that case, and his
conviction is on appeal as of August 2007. 8/17/2006 Washington Post, at A17;
USAToday.com (Aug. 17, 2006); PACER Docket Summary (4th Cir.). According to the
Church Report, Afghan lawyers have also alleged that

216

Beating, Choking , Strangling, or Other Abusive Handling of
Detainees

The OIG survey asked FBI agents to provide information concerning
physical violence against detainees, including beatings, the use of hands,
rope, or anything else to choke or strangle a detainee, or other treatment
causing significant physical pain, injury, disfigurement, or death. Nothing
in the Church Report suggests that techniques involving the infliction of
pain, injury, or death were ever officially approved for use in military
interrogations in Afghanistan. According to the Church Report, "mild, noninjurious physical contact" that did not cause pain was approved for use in
Afghanistan for at least part of the relevant period, but this would not
encompass beating, choking, or other treatment causing pain,
disfigurement, or death. Church Report at 221. The Church Report
described allegations of detainee beatings by military personnel that were
either confirmed by military investigators or still under investigation by the
Army Criminal Investigation Command. Id. at 234-35, 237.
No FBI agents reported to us that they ever saw a detainee whom they
suspected had been injured other than during battle or capture, or reported
that they observed any injuries which by their nature or appearance
suggested post-capture mistreatment. Two agents stated in their survey
responses that they witnessed incidents involving rough treatment of
detainees by military personnel. One agent who served at Kandahar during
January and February 2002 reported that, on occasion, he observed MPs at
Kandahar "man-handling" or roughly handling detainees. For example, the
agent told us that on one or two occasions MPs brought a detainee to an
interview tent with his arms restrained behind his back, and that the MPs
raised his arms, causing him to wince in apparent pain as they brought him
in. The agent said he became angry when the MPs laughed about it because
this started the interview badly. He told us that when he spoke to the
Sergeant in charge about it, the Sergeant agreed this should not happen,
and the agent said he "did not see this again from the same people." The
agent indicated that in general, "[t]he Army chain of command was
supportive" in response to FBI concerns about detainee treatment and in
correcting the problems. The agent stated he also raised his concerns orally
with his OSC, but that he did not know if any FBI action was taken as a
result of his report.
Another FBI agent told us that in July 2003, during his processing of
detainees at Bagram, he observed two military personnel escorting a
shackled detainee. He said that one of the soldiers started yelling at the
detainee, and then gave him a two-handed push which "bounced him off a
wall.". This agent said that he immediately brought this to the attention of a
Master Sergeant who was present, and that she reprimanded the soldier.

217

When the FBI agent also described the incident to a military Captain, the
soldier was removed from the operation.
FBI documents, including FD-302 detainee interview summaries
prepared in 2003 and a timeline prepared by the FBI Office of General
Counsel, describe other claims by detainees that they had been physically
abused in Afghanistan. For example, detainee Naqibullah Shawali Zair
Mohammed (#834) told FBI interviewers that after his arrest by U.S. forces
in October 2002, he was taken to Bagram and hung from the rafters by his
handcuffs for five to seven days and had his head smashed against the wall.
Detainee Bashir Nasir Ali Al Marwalah (#837) told FBI agents at GTMO that
after being arrested in Pakistan he was beaten by unidentified captors in
Bagram. In another interview, Marwalah stated the beatings occurred at a
prison run by Pakistanis before he was transferred to Bagram. Detainee
Zahir Shah (# 1010) told the FBI that he was beaten by guards while in
detention in Bagram or in transit to GTMO.165
As noted in Chapter Six, the FBI eventually implemented a procedure
for recording and tracking detainee claims of abuse at GTMO and referring
them to the military for possible investigation. We found no indication that
any similar procedure was adopted for Afghanistan.
The FBI OSC in Afghanistan during February to April 2005 told the
OIG that shortly before he left Afghanistan, he was advised by the Provost
Marshal at the Bagram Airbase that a detainee had alleged that he had
suffered physical abuse in Kabul by an unnamed FBI agent many months
earlier. The OSC said he was not aware of any holding facility in Kabul at
which any FBI personnel worked during his tour and so advised the Provost
Marshal. The OSC sought further information from the Army Criminal
Investigation Command on the base in an effort to collect information
regarding the detainee making the allegation, in order to begin an
appropriate investigation. However, the OSC stated that no further
information was provided to him prior to his departure on April 26, 2005.
C.

Using Shackles or Other Restraints in a Harsh or Prolonged
Manner

Five FBI agents provided information in their survey responses and
follow-up interviews regarding the use of shackles or other restraints in a
harsh, painful, or prolonged manner in Afghanistan. These agents generally

165 The FBI also learned about allegations that CIA agents physically assaulted
detainees in Afghanistan in August and September 2002. This information was provided by
the CIA OIG in connection with a request that the FBI conduct a criminal investigation.

218

described the use of restraints as a military security measure for U.S.
personnel and operations.
The Church Report did not specifically describe the use of prolonged
shackling by the military as an interrogation technique in Afghanistan.
Such a technique could be considered a form of a "safety position" or "stress
position," which the Church Report generally described as requiring a
detainee to maintain an awkward or uncomfortable position in order to
control his movement during interrogation, both for purposes of interrogator
safety and as an incentive to cooperate. Church Report at 216-18.
According to the Church Report, military policies governing this technique
were not always clear and changed several times during the relevant
period.166 The Church Report found that military interrogators used stress
positions in Afghanistan as an interrogation tool at least until February
2003 and again between March and June 2004. Id. at 217-18.
Two FBI agents told us that they observed the prolonged use of
shackles or restraints by military personnel at Bagram in March and April
2002 on several detainees whom they understood posed a significant danger
to U.S. personnel. They said that while outside of the holding enclosures,
all detainees were handcuffed and usually shackled at the feet. Depending
on the threat level of a detainee, the handcuffs would be removed in the
interview room and the leg shackles left on, but for the few dangerous
"hard-core" detainees, the handcuffs were left on as well. Neither of these
agents believed that the restraints were used to coerce information or
cooperation from detainees. One agent said that if the FBI agent felt that he
was developing a rapport with the detainee, he would ask to have the
restraints removed, but the military guards usually refused.
Similarly, an FBI agent at Bagram and Kabul in the first few months
of 2003 reported that "detainees were often handcuffed during entire
interrogations for security purposes," and that he was told that "sometimes
violent detainees remained handcuffed in [their] cells" as well.

166 This method was not specifically discussed in Field Manual. 34-52, which
governed interrogations in Afghanistan during the early part of that war. Church Report at
196-204. According to the military documents described in the Church Report, the practice
was a "frequent occurrence" in Afghanistan. Id. at 217. In February 2003, CJTF-180
directed that safety positions be limited to safety considerations and not "to increase
discomfort or as a means of interrogation." Id. at 203. In March 2004, however, the use of
uncomfortable "safety positions" as an incentive for cooperation was reinstated as an
approved interrogation technique as part of an interrogation plan approved by an officer-incharge or an interrogation team leader. Id. at 217. In June 2004, following the Abu Ghraib
disclosures,."stress positions" were specifically prohibited in Afghanistan. Id. at 211, 21718.

219

Another agent reported in his survey response that in January and
February 2002 detainees were often brought to the interview tent in
shackles or cuffs that were too tight. The agent said that once when he
complained a soldier laughed and said the agents were being "too soft."
However, after the agents took their complaint up the military chain of
command, they did not see the soldier in that capacity again. The agent
said incidents like this occurred several times. The agent stated that when
he raised this issue with different soldiers, the reaction depended on the
individual MP -- some said they would use some other kind of restraints to
help the FBI establish more rapport with the detainee, and others said they
were too busy to give the detainee special treatment.
The same FBI agent also noted that on several occasions MPs used an
"almost medieval-looking," rigid, wrought iron shackle system he had never
seen before. The clamps on the wrists were connected by a stiff metal rod,
and the rod was joined by a chain to shackles around the detainees' ankles.
The devices were not adjustable for the size of the detainees' wrists or
ankles or height, and he saw that the detainees were uncomfortable as they
shuffled into the interview tent. The agent said that these shackles did not
look like anything the U.S. government would have provided, and he

believed that they may have been locally obtained.
D.

Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact

One FBI agent provided information concerning a detainee's allegation
that U.S. personnel engaged in sexually abusive conduct toward him in
Afghanistan. The agent stated that in July 2003 a detainee in GTMO
alleged that a white female CIA agent had raped the detainee while he was a
prisoner at Bagram. Because this allegation was reported at GTMO, we
address it in Section III of Chapter Eight.
E.

Abusive Body Cavity Searches

According to two April 2004 DOD Inspector General memoranda, two
military attorneys reported to military investigators that they learned of
potential detainee abuses during a dinner with two FBI agents in January
2004 in Florida. We determined that one of the agents was an FBI Special
Agent and the other was a New York City Police Department employee
assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (the "NYPD detective").
These agents were deployed to Afghanistan and later to GTMO.
According to the DOD memoranda, during the dinner the NYPD
detective told the attorneys that he had been in Bagram sometime in
December 2001 or early 2002 "and was involved in photographing detainees

during the in-take process." The NYPD detective also said that he observed
several detainees coming out of an area where they were being processed

220

and searched. He said he saw feces running down their legs and that they
were in apparent pain. The NYPD detective said he went into the area and
noticed that the detainees were being given what appeared to be anal cavity
searches, and that an unknown individual involved in the process asked the
agent to photograph him while he performed such a search, but the NYPD
detective refused. In addition, the second military attorney told DOD
investigators that the NYPD detective stated that the individual performing
these searches "was not changing gloves" after each search, because the
NYPD detective "observed feces and blood inside a bottle of Vaseline that he
observed in the area." The attorney stated that while both agents were
intoxicated at the dinner, he "believed the [NYPD detective] was telling the
truth ...."
We confirmed that the NYPD detective was serving in Afghanistan at
the time of the alleged events described. The FBI agent told us that he was
deployed to Afghanistan from the end of April 2002 through the beginning of
June 2002. The NYPD detective declined our request for an interview.
We interviewed the FBI agent, who stated that he disagreed with the
way the military attorneys had characterized in their memoranda what the
NYPD detective had described at the dinner. The FBI agent said that he had
not been in Afghanistan when the January 2002 cavity searches described
by the NYPD detective occurred, but had served in Afghanistan with the
NYPD detective later in 2002. The FBI agent believed that the young
military lawyers, who had no combat or law enforcement experience,
misunderstood or misconstrued the veteran NYPD detective's "locker room"
or "battlefield" humor relating to an unpleasant but standard aspect of
detainee in-processing in that military theater. The FBI agent said he was
not made uncomfortable by the NYPD detective's description, nor did he
believe as a result that something inappropriate or abusive had occurred.
He also said he did not believe that anyone at the dinner was intoxicated.
The conduct described in the DOD Inspector General memoranda
does not appear to have been related to interrogations, but rather to military
in-processing of newly captured detainees. Nothing in the materials made
available to us suggests that abusive body cavity searches were approved as
a military interrogation technique. No similar information regarding abusive
cavity searches in Afghanistan was described in the Church Report.
F.

Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics

The OIG investigation determined that several FBI agents observed or
heard about the use of stressful or painful positions by the military in

221

Afghanistan.167 According to their survey responses, one FBI agent
observed and five other FBI agents heard about the use of stress positions
in Afghanistan. One agent reported that he observed that some detainees
were restrained with their hands together above their head, behind their
back, or to the wall for long periods of time. Several agents told us that
military personnel told them that stress or uncomfortable positions were
authorized military interrogation or disciplinary techniques.
An FBI Intelligence Analyst reported in his survey response that he
was told that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, "[d]etainees who wouldn't talk
were told to do push-ups and other forms of exercise[.] [T]hey weren't forced
to do it but they would do it anyway, probably out of fear. They exercised
until they talked or for no longer than 1 hour every twenty-four hours[;]
water was always on hand and medics readily available."
Other agents told the OIG that detainees alleged during interviews at
GTMO that stress positions had been used on detainees in Afghanistan.
One agent stated that he heard that a detainee had claimed that he was
hung by his heels in Afghanistan, but the agent could not remember which
detainee made the claim. Another agent reported in an FD-302 and told the
OIG that a detainee in GTMO claimed that in Afghanistan a U.S.
interrogator had forced him to admit to being a member of al-Qaeda by
requiring him to stand or kneel with his arms over his head for 3-hour
intervals.
G.

Deprivation of Clothing

The OIG investigated allegations about the removal of clothes as an
interrogation technique in Afghanistan. Use of this tactic as an
interrogation technique was never expressly approved or prohibited under
military policies in Afghanistan. The Church investigators did not report
any instances of nudity being employed by the military as an interrogation
technique in Afghanistan. Church Report at 226-7.
Four FBI agents reported to the OIG that detainees were stripped
prior to being issued standard jumpsuits during routine intake procedures
in late 2001 and early 2002 in Kandahar, but the agents did not indicate
that forced nudity was used as an interrogation technique. The agents told
the OIG that after detainees were brought in from the battlefield, military
- personnel conducted medical exams, strip searches, and body
cavity searches. The detainees had their clothing removed or cut off so that
they were completely naked and had empty sand bags placed over their
167 The evolution of the military's policies regarding stress positions in Afghanistan
is addressed above in Section II.C of this chapter, footnote 169.

222

heads. They were then led through a processing tent in which FBI agents
were working. The detainees were given jump suits, sandals, blankets, and
water, after which FBI personnel fingerprinted, photographed, collected DNA
swabs, and asked a few questions to obtain basic biographical information
from the detainees. These agents stated that while in the tent, the detainees
were naked for usually less than one-half hour, and were unclothed outside
of the tent for only a few minutes. These agents did not consider these
intervals unduly long or inappropriate.
The agents also told us they understood that the detainee strip and
cavity searches were done for safety and security reasons rather than to
humiliate the detainees. They further understood that the sandbags helped
prevent the detainees from getting a sense of the layout of the camp. None
of these agents were aware of any other situation where detainees were
deprived of clothing or had hoods placed on their heads, or where either was
done in order to coerce information from the detainees. The agents said
they believed these actions were reasonable and necessary detention
procedures used by the military.

Hooding or Blindfolding

Several FBI agents told the OIG that they observed or heard about the
use of hoods or blindfolds on detainees in Afghanistan, primarily for
security purposes. According to the Church Report, between February 2003
and March 2004 the use of hoods during interrogations was prohibited in
Afghanistan, although the use of blacked-out goggles was allowed. Church
Report at 220. The military's prohibition was changed in March 2004. The
Church investigation determined that the military in Afghanistan routinely
hooded detainees for security during movement and transportation, and
sometimes also used hoods or blackout goggles as an interrogation
technique. Id. Beginning in June 2004, military policy required prior legal
review and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander approval for
hooding or blindfolding, and the Church investigation found no evidence
that this technique was used by the military after that date. Id.
Five FBI agents responded to the OIG survey said that they observed
hooding or blindfolding in Afghanistan, and two said that they heard about
it from detainees or others. Several of the agents indicated, however, that
the hoods were used for military safety and security purposes only. For
example, one of the agents we interviewed said that he saw the military use
green sandbags placed loosely over the heads of detainees to prevent them
from observing their surroundings. Another agent told us that he often
observed hoods on detainees, usually during transportation, but that he did
not see this done during interrogations. One agent described a high-profile
detainee in military custody Paracha (#593) - whom she interviewed in
July 2003 at Bagram. She observed Paracha "in his cell, ... sitting on the

223

ground, blindfolded with ear coverings on ...." It was not clear to the FBI
agent whether these sensory deprivation measures were to make the
detainee more cooperative in interrogations or for safety reasons.

Sleep Deprivation or Interruption

We sought information from FBI agents about the use of sleep
deprivation or disruption on detainees in Afghanistan. According to the
Church Report, "sleep adjustment" (defined as limiting a detainee to as little
as 4 hours of sleep, not necessarily consecutive, per 24-hour period) was an
approved military interrogation technique in Afghanistan for much of the
relevant time period until it was prohibited in June 2004. Church Report at
221-22. The Church investigators found that military interrogators
employed this technique throughout this period. However, according to the
Church Report, "sleep deprivation" (anything less than 4 total hours of sleep
per 24-hour period) was prohibited by law or policy at all times in
Afghanistan. Id. at 213. The only instances of "sleep deprivation" described
in the Church Report occurred in connection with the incidents leading to
the deaths of two detainees at Bagram in December 2002, discussed above.
Id. at 228.
Numerous FBI agents told the OIG in their survey responses and
interviews that they observed or heard about the use of sleep deprivation or
interrupted sleep cycles on detainees in Afghanistan. Twenty-seven survey
respondents said that they observed or heard about detainee sleep
management or deprivation practices in Afghanistan throughout the period
covered by our investigation. Many agents also described the use of loud
music or bright or flashing lights to interfere with detainees' sleep or with
communications among prisoners.
For example, one agent told us that in early 2002 the military would
awaken high value detainees at Kandahar at frequent intervals during their
rest period, after which the detainees would be interrogated. The same
agent said that he and the other FBI agents often disagreed with the
military's use of this technique and did not want to interview detainees who
had recently been subjected to a sleep interruption or deprivation regimen
because it would not be productive. This agent also told us that FBI agents
expressed their opinions to the military commanders. He stated that "[o]nce
the military obtained info to their satisfaction, we could generally lay out
our conditions and requests for the interview setting and request that the
detainees could sleep in advance and/or feed them during the interviews."
This agent also stated that agents elected not to participate or attend
interrogations of detainees who had been subjected to such treatment.
Other FBI personnel reported similar military practices at Bagram,
but they did not describe the specific means used to interfere with detainee

224

sleep. Some of the reports were from FBI personnel who obtained their
information while serving as members of the military. For example, an FBI
agent who served as an Air Force intelligence officer at Bagram in April
through June 2002 told us that he "had heard ... that they altered the
sleep times of the detainees to keep them off balance and increase their
susceptibility to our interrogation techniques." Another agent reported that
in July 2002, while he served in the Army, military intelligence personnel at
Bagram described interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation,
generally as a way "to `set the conditions' for an interrogation." An agent at
Bagram in March 2003 said in his survey response that he observed
detainee sleep deprivation by military police during an introductory tour of
the Bagram detainee facility, which he was told was a disciplinary procedure
for detainees who were not cooperating with detention procedures, rather
than as an interrogation technique.
An FBI communications support technician at Bagram told us that he
learned in daily prison briefings that "Sleep deprivation was a common
practice with High Value Targets. The military said that the prisoner did get
8 hours of sleep a day, just not all in one shot." An FBI electronics
technician stated that during various conversations throughout 2003 and
2004 at Bagram and Kandahar, he was told that the "more difficult
detainees would be awakened every 15 minutes during their rest period by
the military police in an effort to wear down their resistance." None of these
agents or support personnel reported the use of sleep deprivation to their
supervisors or to military personnel.
In one case, an FBI agent acknowledged his own participation in a
regimen of sleep deprivation. The agent was deployed primarily to Bagram
in July and August 2003. He told the OIG that he and a military
interrogator "agreed on a course of sleep deprivation" for a detainee who
they believed had information about a recent attack. The lights were left on
in the detainee's cell and the detainee was awakened periodically. The
agent told us he believed that sleep deprivation was appropriate in that
situation. He further stated that he did not know if FBI agents are
permitted to use sleep deprivation in the United States, although he "would
not think so." The agent stated that he had no discussions about this with
anyone at FBI Headquarters.
This incident occurred in 2003, prior to the issuance of the FBI's May
2004 Detainee Policy stating that agents in the military zones should
continue to comply with FBI guidelines for custodial interviews applicable
inside the United States. The FBI has frequently stated that the 2004 Policy
merely reiterated existing policies with respect to FBI conduct during
interrogations. We believe that under existing policy it is unlikely that an
FBI agent would have been permitted to use sleep deprivation as an
interview tool in the United States.

225

Undocumented "Ghost" Detainees

We also attempted to determine whether any FBI employees observed
or heard about incidents in which U.S. personnel held detainees who had
not been officially acknowledged or registered as detainees by the U.S.
agency resp onsible for their detention, a practice known as holding "ghost

detainees."

Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country

Thirteen survey respondents who were deployed to Afghanistan

reported that they had information concernin
Four

respondents said that they had information that
had
occurred, four said that detainees alleged that this had occurred to them,
and one said he heard such allegations from someone other than a detainee.
Ei ht agents said the were aware of threats to detainees that they would be
for interrogation.
i

226

When we sought further information
One
agent said that a detainee claimed that he had been
where
the interrogators "yelled at him," and another agent stated that a detainee
making an allegation about
appeared mentally unstable
and not credible.
L.

Isolation of Detainees

We sought information regarding the prolonged isolation of detainees
in Afghanistan.

Twelve survey respondents reported that they had information
regarding the isolation of detainees in Afghanistan for extended periods.
Five of these respondents said that they observed the isolation of detainees,
and six of them said that they heard about such isolation from detainees or
others. However, none of the FBI employees were referring to the use of
extended isolation as a coercive interrogation technique, such as a
punishment for failure to provide requested information or as a means to
manipulate the mental state of the detainee. The FBI agents described
several purposes for the isolation of detainees by military personnel within
locations such as Kandahar and Bagram, such as prevention of detainee
coordination of stories for investigative integrity, rewards for cooperative
detainees, and disciplinary measures for disruptive detainees. For example,
one agent said that during January and February 2002, he was aware of the
isolation of detainees at Kandahar for an extended period to prevent them
from telling other detainees what questions were being asked and how to
respond, to keep high value detainees from being exposed to the general
detainee population, and in some cases as a reward for cooperative
detainees. He was not aware of isolation being used as a way of coercing
any detainees.
Another FBI agent deployed to Afghanistan in early 2002 stated that
"the Marines would isolate" detainees who were disciplinary problems, "just
like we put prisoners in the U.S. in isolation if they are causing problems,"
and stated that he "saw no issue with this." Another agent deployed to
Afghanistan later in 2002 also noted the use of isolation as a reward for
cooperative detainees.

227

The agent who served as Deputy OSC in Afghanistan during the last
quarter of 2004 said he observed the isolation of detainees by the military at
Bagram. However, he stated that the isolation he observed was warranted
by safety, security, and tactical considerations, and was not abusive. He
likened it to separating suspects in a conspiracy and questioning them
individually to get their separate versions of events as a truth verification
tool.
M.

Impersonation of FBI Agents

We sought information regarding the impersonation of FBI agents by
non-FBI personnel in Afghanistan. The Church Report did not specifically
discuss the practice of impersonating an FBI. agent in Afghanistan. It
stated, however, that deception was common to many doctrinal techniques
approved for use in Afghanistan, and that deception had been employed in
detainee interrogations throughout the war in Afghanistan. Church Report
at 216.
Some FBI agents reported to the OIG that they either observed or
heard that military or CIA personnel had falsely represented themselves as
FBI agents in Afghanistan. One OIG survey respondent stated that he
observed the impersonation of FBI personnel by others, and five agents
reported that they heard about such conduct from others.
For example, one FBI agent stated in his survey response that in
January or February 2002 an Army specialist told him that he was going to
wear an FBI hat in a detainee interrogation. The agent characterized the
Army specialist as "an aggressive interviewer" who played the "bad cop."
The agent stated he told the specialist "that there was no need for him to
pose as an FBI agent when we had agents there...." The agent also
indicated he saw the soldier on another occasion with the same hat and that
he therefore raised the issue with the soldier's sergeant, who agreed that it
was unacceptable and unprofessional for the soldier to act in this way. The
FBI agent said he had no knowledge of any subsequent problems of this
kind at Kandahar. The agent told the OIG that he may have casually
mentioned the impersonation incident to his OSC, who told him that if it
happened again the OSC would, if needed, take it up with more senior
military personnel.
Several agents told the OIG that they inferred that someone had
impersonated an FBI agent from the statements of detainees who claimed
they had already been interviewed by the FBI. For example, one agent
stated in his survey response that a detainee in either March or April 2002
told him at the outset of an interview that he had already talked to the FBI,
which the agent said was impossible because there were only two FBI
agents there. The agent suspected that CIA personnel had claimed to be

228

FBI personnel. Another agent reported that in October or November 2002
two detainees told him they had been interviewed by FBI agents just days
before the agent interviewed them. This agent determined that CIA officers
had "tricked the detainees into believing they were FBI agents," and that
this problem was handled locally in Afghanistan.
Similarly, the agent who served as the OSC in Afghanistan during
February through April 2002 told us that when FBI agents identified
themselves, some detainees at Kandahar told them that they had already
been interviewed by the FBI, and the agents drew the conclusion that
military personnel had said so to the detainees. The OSC believed that this
hampered detainees' cooperation with genuine FBI agents. He said he
raised this two or three times at the daily joint U.S. personnel meetings at
Bagram, and his military contact said that he would bring this up with the
commander at Kandahar.
The most notorious instance of someone impersonating a U.S. official
in Afghanistan was the Idema matter, although this incident apparently did
not involve impersonation of an FBI agent. In mid-2004, Jonathan Idema
and two other private U.S. citizens were detained by Afghan authorities for
allegedly impersonating U.S. government personnel while detaining,
interrogating, and torturing Afghan citizens in an illegal prison in Kabul. An
FBI document stated that Idema had impersonated an Army Major and later
a CIA agent, but had apparently not impersonated an FBI agent. According
to FBI documents, witnesses and videotapes indicated that Idema and a
second U.S. citizen interrogated prisoners by dunking their heads into
buckets of water and striking their bodies and heads with rifles. The
documents also indicate that prior to being arrested, Idema had repeatedly
contacted the FBI and other U.S. government agencies claiming to have
information about planned future terrorist attacks in the United States and
abroad, but that Idema failed one or two polygraph tests and the FBI was
skeptical of his credibility. The documents do not reflect any FBI
involvement with Idema's activities. The documents indicate that Idema
traveled to Afghanistan on his own accord and against FBI direction in April
2004.
N.

Other Techniques

The OIG survey sought information regarding other interrogation
techniques in addition to those discussed above. In several cases,
respondents stated that they had seen or heard of additional techniques,
but follow-up investigation revealed that the agents were reporting about
measures undertaken for security or hygiene purposes and not as part of an
interrogation plan.

229

For example, we sought information regarding the use of military
working dogs to intimidate detainees, a technique that was publicized in
connection with the Abu Ghraib disclosures. Several survey respondents
reported the use of dogs as a security measure in Afghanistan, such as
during the movement of prisoners or to gain compliance with military police
instructions to a detainee. No FBI witness reported the use of dogs during
interviews or interrogations in Afghanistan.
We also sought information regarding the shaving of detainees' facial
or other hair to embarrass or humiliate them. Although several agents
reported that detainees were shaved in Afghanistan, they indicated that this
was a hygiene or identification measure undertaken during initial
processing rather than for punishment or humiliation.
We sought information concerning threats to detainees by U.S.
personnel to take action against members of a detainee's family. Two
survey respondents stated that they told a detainee that the agents
themselves would have to question detainee family members on certain
matters. The agents explained that the sons of one detainee and the wife of
another were themselves implicated by other information in terrorist or
insurgent activities and were in fact interviewed by the FBI as a result.
One agent reported in a survey response that during his deployment
to Kandahar in early 2002 he was told by a detainee that the detainee was
"not receiving regular meals." Another agent said that a detainee at GTMO
had claimed to him that U.S. personnel in Afghanistan had subjected the
detainee to extremely cold or hot room temperatures for extended periods,
but this agent provided no specifics.
None of the FBI employees who responded to the survey or whom we
interviewed stated that they observed or heard about any the following
specific kinds of conduct: (a) placing a detainee on a hot surface or burning
him; (b) using water to prevent breathing by a detainee or to create the
sensation of drowning, including the practice known as "water-boarding"; (c)
using electrical shock on detainees; (d) intentionally delaying or depriving a
detainee of medical care; (e) using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other
animals on or near a detainee; or (f) forcibly removing detainees from their
cells. In addition, none of the survey respondents or interview witnesses
told us that they had observed, heard about, or had other information
concerning any instances in Afghanistan when U.S. personnel made
disrespectful statements about the Koran, handled the Koran in a
disrespectful manner, or placed women's clothing on male detainees.
The OIG survey also asked respondents to report any information they
had concerning any "sham" or "staged" detainee interviews or interrogations

230

conducted for Members of Congress or their staff. None of the respondents
who were deployed to Afghanistan reported any information on this subject.

III.

Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment
in Afghanistan

We found few contemporaneous reports by FBI agents in Afghanistan
regarding concerns about the potential mistreatment of detainees.168 Of the
roughly 200 FBI agents who served in Afghanistan and responded to our
survey, only 10 agents stated that they made such reports to FBI
supervisors, military personnel, or both. When we interviewed FBI agents
about particular techniques they observed or heard about in Afghanistan,
most indicated that they did not report what they saw or heard about to
anyone.
We believe that several factors contributed to the small number of
reports made by FBI agents to FBI or military supervisors. As indicated
above, the vast majority of FBI agents who served in Afghanistan reported
that they never saw or heard about any incidents of detainee treatment that
caused them discomfort or that fell into any of the specific categories of
potential mistreatment that were listed in the OIG survey. Further, there
was no formal requirement to report suspected abuse prior to May 19, 2004,
when the FBI issued a policy requiring agents to alert their OSCs about any
known or suspected abuse or mistreatment of detainees by non-FBI
personnel.
Some agents believed, sometimes incorrectly, that the conduct they
saw or heard about was authorized for use by military interrogators and
therefore did not need to be reported, even though it was not a technique
that was approved for use by the FBI. As a related matter, many agents told
us they were never trained regarding what techniques military interrogators
were permitted to use. Therefore, some agents assumed that conduct that
they saw was consistent with military policy and did not need to be
reported.
In addition, unlike the situation at GTMO, many FBI agents in
Afghanistan were operating in a war zone in which they were dependent on
the military for their protection and material support. They said they
understood their role in Afghanistan as seeking information about terrorist
168 This Section addresses only the disposition of contemporaneous reports of
potential detainee mistreatment in Afghanistan. After the Abu Ghraib prison abuses were
publicized in April 2004, FBI Headquarters conducted an informal survey of the four OSCs
who had served in Afghanistan to determine if the FBI had additional information about
detainee abuses in Afghanistan. This survey is discussed in Section IV.C of Chapter Six.

231

threats to the United States or its personnel or interests overseas, not as
policing or overseeing the conduct of the military. These circumstances
made some agents reluctant to elevate their concerns about the military's
treatment of detainees.
Despite these factors, several agents told us that they did make
reports regarding particular incidents or allegations of detainee
mistreatment to their supervisors. The report that received the greatest
attention was the one made by SSA Horton, which is addressed in detail in
Section II of Chapter Six. As detailed there, Horton did not actually witness
any detainee abuse, and several of his supervisors and CTD personnel in
FBI Headquarters said they concluded that he had overreacted. However,
the FBI supervisors did not specifically address his larger concern that the
FBI could be deemed to have participated in detainee abuse simply by
interviewing detainees at a location where rougher military techniques were
being used on the same detainees.
As noted in Section II.A of this chapter, FBI Headquarters also
received a report from FBI agents regarding detainee deaths at Bagram.
One of the agents told the OIG that he and his partner were told that the
Army Criminal Investigation Command was investigating the deaths, and
that the FBI was not in Afghanistan to investigate such matters.

There were several other cases in which FBI agents reported their
concerns about detainee mistreatment.
One agent said he alerted his OSC in early 2002 to the fact that
military interrogators had treated detainees roughly. But this agent also
discussed his concerns with military supervisors, as discussed in more detail
below, and he told the OIG that they resolved his concerns. Therefore, there
was no need for the OSC to take further action on these reports.
One agent told the OIG that before he arrived in Afghanistan in April
2004, he heard general, second-hand rumors about mistreatment of
detainees from other agents who had been deployed to GTMO. In Afghanistan
he asked his OSC about detainee treatment and the OSC told him that on his
visits to detention facilities in Afghanistan he had witnessed no evidence of
improper treatment of detainees. 169 Since the agent had not reported a
particular incident or allegation about detainee mistreatment to the OSC, the
OSC did not report up the chain of command.

169 The agent said he also discussed the rumors with
, who
informed the agent that the rules of the Geneva Convention did not apply in this conflict,
but that prisoners were not being mistreated.

232

One agent told us that he reported concerns about detainee treatment
in Afghanistan to the MLDU Unit Chief at FBI Headquarters. The agent
reported in his survey response that during a tour of

there unless we
wanted to be part of a congressional hearing at some later date." The agent
wrote in his survey response that: "This info was reported up to [the Unit
Chiefl" in writing "without any response or guidance." When we interviewed
this agent, he explained that he and another agent sent the Unit Chief
multiple e-mails and became frustrated that the could not get any
guidance relating to detainees and
. The Unit
Chief told us that he may have received a call from this agent but he did not
recall his response or what instructions he mi ht have given. He said that
he generally told agents to
We interviewed all but one of the 14 former OSCs and all of the 6
Deputy OSCs who served in Afghanistan between late December 2001 and
the end of 2004. None of these OSCs or Deputy OSCs said that they
received any report from an agent in Afghanistan concerning potential
mistreatment of any detainees. Given the nature of the reports that were
described to the OIG by the agents who made them, it is not surprising that
the OSCs did not recall these reports. Some of the reports were actually
questions about rumors rather than reports of witnessed incidents. Others
involved matters that were resolved cooperatively with the military and did
not require further elevation.
Several agents told the OIG that they spoke to military supervisors in
Afghanistan about the treatment of detainees by military personnel. One of
the agents deployed to Afghanistan in late 2001 told us he felt the military
was ill-equipped to deal with interrogating detainees. He stated:
Many of the interviewers were young and inexperienced and
yelled and screamed at the detainees, but had no knowledge of
al-Qaeda. Any concerns we as the FBI raised were dismissed
because the military]= needed intelligence immediately. We
(FBI) were also told in no uncertain terms we were not in charge
and the military - were running the show.
Another agent reported in her survey response that during her service
in Afghanistan in July 2003 she raised concerns about military
interrogators at the Bagram Collection Point who wanted to interrogate a
detainee in "a different way." She stated that she informed the Major that
there would be no disrespectful or potentially harmful things done to the
detainee. Three other agents told us that they elevated concerns about
detainee treatment with military supervisors, and that these concerns were

233

resolved as a result. For example, one FBI agent who served in Bagram and
Kandahar told us he complained to military supervisors about military
personnel who hurt a detainee whose arms were restrained behind his back,
by lifting his arms in a painful manner. The same agent said he also
complained to military supervisors about MPs who shackled detainees too
tightly and about military interrogators who posed as FBI agents. The agent
told us that the military chain of command was supportive and that after
these complaints he did not see a repeat of this conduct.
Another FBI agent deployed to Bagram reported to military
supervisors his objection to military police shoving a shackled detainee
against a wall. The agent told us that the soldier was removed from
detainee escort duty as a result.

IV.

Conclusion

FBI employees in Afghanistan conducted detainee interviews at the
major military collection points in Bagram and Kandahar and at other
smaller facilities. The most frequently reported techniques used by military
interrogators in Afghanistan were sleep deprivation or disruption, prolonged
shackling, stress positions, loud music, and isolation. Several FBI
employees also told us they had heard about two detainee deaths at the
military facility in Bagram, but none of the FBI employees said they had
personal knowledge of these death's, which were investigated by the DOD.
We found few contemporaneous reports by FBI agents in Afghanistan
regarding concerns about the potential mistreatment of detainees. In many
cases the agents believed, sometimes incorrectly, that the conduct they saw
or heard about was authorized for use by military interrogators and
therefore did not need to be reported. The desire of the FBI agents to
establish their role in Afghanistan and their dependence on the military for
their protection and material support may have contributed to a reluctance
to elevate their concerns about the military's treatment of detainees. In
addition, several agents told the OIG that they were able to resolve concerns
about the mistreatment of individual detainees by speaking directly to
military supervisors in Afghanistan.

234

CHAPTER TEN
FBI OBSERVATIONS IN IRAQ
1.

Introduction

Iraq was the location of the Abu Ghraib prison, the site of many
notorious incidents of detainee abuse that were widely publicized in April
2004. Although FBI agents served at Abu Ghraib and other detention
facilities in Iraq, most of the FBI employees reported to the OIG that they
never observed potentially abusive treatment of detainees in Iraq or heard
about it from detainees or other witnesses. Overall, of the 267 survey
respondents who served in Iraq between March 2003 and the end of 2004,
188 stated that they neither observed nor heard about any of the kinds of
detainee treatment described in the survey.
However, some of the FBI agents sent to Iraq reported that they
observed or heard about the use of various rough or aggressive treatment of
detainees by military personnel. With a few exceptions, the FBI agents did
not report seeing detainee abuse in Iraq that was similar to the most
notorious abuses reported in connection with the Abu Ghraib scandal. The
most frequently reported techniques were deprivation of clothing, sleep
deprivation or interruption, and hooding or blindfolding. A smaller number
of agents reported incidents such as detainees being accidentally burned by
exposure to hot vehicle surfaces during transport, prolonged shackling, and
stress positions. Table 3 summarizes the survey responses to our questions
regarding the use of particular interrogation techniques in Iraq.170
The agents' specific observations regarding particular techniques as
reported to the OIG are discussed in Part II of this chapter. In Part III, we
describe the handling of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to
military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment in
Iraq.

170 For a discussion regarding the limitations to the appropriate interpretation of
this data, see Chapter Eight, Section I.

235

TABLE 10.1
Survey Results Concerning
Interrogation Techniques Observed in Iraq

a^i

^o
0

a
0 >

i a
Q

a
4J

Interrogation Techni que
p. O
O o
A
o
0
_284
Depriving a detainee of food or water
2
-._............... _..........._..._.................. ......_............. _.........._..... . . . . _......_......... _ . . _ ..... . ....................1 _... ._._......... _.... __.._
:_.............. ....._........._.........
Depriving a detainee of clothing
5
3
3
5
273
Depriving a detainee of sleep, or interrupting
10
6
7
28
234
sleep by frequent cell relocations or other
_....._...._.............. . .... . methods
. . .............. _....................................................... __.............__...._..........__......_..................._....._..._._.................._.......__............_...__............_....._.... __._....__._..._....._..... .................................... ........_.__._......._........ . ........._........._._.._... ..........__.....__..._....__....._._..
4 Beating a detainee
3
7
4
274
5 Using water to prevent breathing by a detainee
1
[
287
or to create the sensation of drowning
1
2
3

Using hands, rope, or anything else to choke or
strangle a detainee

Threatening other action to cause physical pain,
injury, disfigurement, or death

...........

....... ....... _..... _......................... _................ _......... _..... _....

......

.. _.._....._._.._....

......._...

_---••_ _

287
1

. ...

__....... __......... _........... _

.. __.._............. _..

... .

Other treatment or action causing significant
physical pain or injury, or causing disfigurement

-. ..... _.....

.. .
.

-..... _.......

281

........ .
_

.................. _.__ ....... _..._......... _.... ...__....._-

287

281

or death
9

Placing a detainee on a hot surface or burning a
detainee

Using shackles or other restraints in a prolonged
manner

11
...................._..........
12
13
14
15
16

277

Requiring a detainee to maintain, or restraining
6
1
2
5
274
a detainee in, a stressful or painful position
._.................................
......................_........................... -- ---......... . . . . . ........._............ _... ................................... ........_...... --........... ._._................... _....._ ............................_................._
Forcing a detainee to perform demanding
1
1
4
277
physical
exercise._.._...............................................
Using electrical shock on a detainee
1
2
283
Threatening to use electrical shock on a detainee
289
Intentionally delaying or denying detainee
289
medical care
Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other than
22
3
1
260
during transportation

Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or hot
room temperatures for extended periods

18
19

Subjecting a detainee to loud music
Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or

20
21

285

1
1

3
2

19
7

252
268

Isolating a detainee
for an extended
period
1 -.._...... .1. . _ ...... 6
..._......_.......__._..._._...._............_..__..._......._
....................
..... _....... -----....................... _ . . . . . . -- 20
............ .................... ---Using duct tape to restrain, gag, or punish a
1
1
detainee
...
.

257
286

darkness
-

. . . --- . . . . . . . . . _. . . _ . _. . . _. . _. . . . . . _ ._. . . . . . _ . . . . . _ . . . . _. . . . _.._...__......_. . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . _. . . . . . . ----._...... _. . . . _._. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . . . _.._ . . . .
236

-...... ....

'^"
r

,.
^'

Cd M

Interrogation Techni que
p; O
O 2 E A
0 c
Z
Using rapid response teams and/or forced cell
2
3
1
9
275
extractions
............._................. ...... _..._..._.._.._............ _......................._....._....._..__._..........................__........... -----------._........ __.._...... _.............................
_............_._....... _............. . . . . . . . . . . . _......._..._ ._._............... _........... _........
...__................... ..................... -23 Using a military working dog on or near a _........
1
3
285
detainee other than during detainee
22

1 transportation
24

Threatening to use military working dogs on or
near a detainee

Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other
animals on or near a detainee

288

Threatening to use spiders, scorpions, snakes, or
other animals on a detainee

287

Disrespectful statements, handling, or actions
involving the Koran
............................... .............................. __............................... _.................. _....__.............._..........._......................__.........._.......... _......._.........._..........................._._........................ . .
28 Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to
embarrass or humiliate a detainee
Placing a woman's clothing on a detainee
Touching a detainee or acting toward a detainee
in a sexual manner
................................._.........._............__.........................................._.............._.........------........................_..........._............._._....
31 Holding detainee(s) who were not officially
acknowledged or registered as such by the
agency detaining the person.

................................... . .
2

...^...

1 [

. . . . . ....................
285
286
290

. . . . _.._..._........._..... .............................. _........._.................... ............ . . . ....... _.....................
2
4
280

Other religious or sexual harassment or
humiliation of a detainee

Other treatment of a detainee that in your
opinion was unprofessional, unduly harsh or
aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful

112

237

.......... . . .
1

[

Sending a detainee to another country for more
aggressive interrogation

servat i on T ota l s
. . . . . . . . . _...._.._.............._. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __..................._..._............ ----....... _.... _..-- Ob
--.......................................

. €....
1

287

29
30

284

2 f

279

278

283
290
287

284

117

10 , 333

II.

Observations Regarding Particular Techniques

FBI Knowledge Regarding Detainee Deaths
Several detainees died while in military or CIA custody in Iraq
under circumstances raising questions about detainee abuse.171 For
example, news reports stated that a former Iraqi Major General, Abed
Hamed Mowhoush, died of asphyxia in November 2003 while being
interrogated by U.S. and/or Iraqi personnel, and that his chest and legs
bore "evidence of blunt force trauma."172 Other news reports described
the November 2003 death of another detainee, Manadei al-Jamadi, at
Abu Ghraib. According to these public reports, al-Jamadi was captured
by Special Forces personnel and died while being interrogated at Abu
Ghraib by the CIA.173
None of the FBI employees contacted by the OIG reported that they
ever personally witnessed, or heard about from those who witnessed, any
beating or other treatment which caused the death of a detainee in Iraq,

including the two detainee deaths described above.

Beating, Choking, Strangling , or Other Abusive Handling
of Detainees

The OIG survey asked respondents to provide information
concerning detainee beatings, the use of hands, rope, or anything else to
171 According to the Church Report, as of September 30, 2004, there were five
substantiated abuse cases in Iraq that resulted in a detainee's death, although none of
them involved interrogation-related abuse. Church Report at 293-94.
172 5/28/04, 12/22/04, 8/3/05, www.talkleft.com; 1/ 15/05 www.smh.com.au
,4/3/05 www.washingtonpost.com ; Washington Post - 4/19/2005; 12/18/06 New York
Times. We found no evidence that FBI personnel were deployed to the facility in Iraq
where this incident allegedly occurred. An Army Chief Warrant Officer was convicted of
negligent homicide in a court martial in January 2006 in connection with this incident.
CNN.com 1/22/06; New York Times 9/4/07.
173 In 2005 the commanding officer of the Navy SEALs who were allegedly
involved in the interrogation of this detainee was acquitted of responsibility for the
death in a court-martial. We are not aware of any charges or other discipline having
been brought against any CIA agent involved in the interrogation of this detainee.

238

choke or strangle a detainee, or other actual or threatened kinds of
treatment causing significant physical pain, injury, disfigurement, or
death. These techniques do not appear to have been approved in Iraq
under any military policy. Church Report at 257-273. Other than the
widely publicized incidents at Abu Ghraib, the Church investigators
stated there were only "rare reports" of beatings. The Church Report
described 16 cases in which interrogation-related abuse of detainees was
substantiated, including several closed military investigations concluding
that interrogators struck detainees, as well as other incidents of
detainees being slapped, punched, kicked, or struck with objects.
Additional cases remained open as of the time the Church Report was
issued.
None of the approximately 267 FBI agents who served in Iraq
through the end of 2004 and who responded to the OIG survey reported
that they ever observed any beating or other physical abuse that caused
physical harm or injury to a detainee. However, 14 agents responded
either that their observations led them to believe that such physical
abuse had occurred or that they had heard about it from others. For
example, one agent told us that a detainee alleged he had been
mistreated by the Iraqi police, and another detainee claimed that U.S.
military personnel had mistreated him. The agent said that the first
detainee looked like he had been beaten. Another agent stated in his
survey that a detainee claimed he was beaten at "Camp Babylon" by
Polish soldiers before being transferred to U.S. custody at Abu Ghraib.
The agent said the detainee's face was bruised and swollen and that it
was requested he be given medical treatment. Another FBI agent stated
that he recalled one or two detainees at a particular facility who claimed
to have been beaten when they were first taken into custody by the
military, but that these detainees showed no signs of bruising or
mistreatment.
In addition, most agents told us that they had no information that
any detainee injuries that they observed were sustained as a result of the
conduct of U.S. personnel other than in battle or during capture. Other
agents stated that detainee claims of such abuse were not corroborated.
On March 14, 2004, CENTCOM Major General Taguba completed
the investigation and report concerning the Abu Ghraib abuses. Church
Report at 257. The Taguba Report stated that between October and
December 2003, the "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and
wanton criminal abuses of detainees intentionally perpetrated" by
military personnel at Abu Ghraib included "punching, slapping and
kicking detainees and jumping on their naked feet." Taguba Report at
16-17. We found no evidence that FBI personnel were aware of the
.conduct described in the Taguba Report at the time it occurred.

239

One FBI agent reported in his survey responses that he had seen a
detainee in early 2004 that appeared to have been beaten by a member of
the U.S. military or by Iraqi personnel. During his interview, however,
the agent clarified his response by stating that the detainee looked
disheveled and as though he had been "slapped around" or "roughed up."
The agent reported that he and three other FBI agents observed the
detainee being treated roughly during a joint FBI-DOD interrogation. We
address this allegation separately in Part VII of Chapter Eleven.
The FBI received at least one report in the United States from a
returning serviceman regarding detainee abuse in Iraq. On June 24,
2004, a former National Guardsman who had served in Iraq came into
the FBI's Sacramento Field Office and told the FBI that he had observed
detainee abuses at an Iraqi police station in Samara, Iraq, including
strangulation, beatings, and burning with lit cigarettes, and that U.S.
military personnel had conspired to cover up these abuses by means of
threats to witnesses. According to an FBI agent from the Sacramento
Division who interviewed the former Guardsman, the Guardsman
claimed that he had to resuscitate some of the detainees after this abuse.
The Guardsman identified several U.S. Army personnel who perpetrated
these alleged abuses. The FBI agent stated that the FBI forwarded the
information to the DOD Inspector General.
Also, as discussed in Chapter Six, in late January 2004 an FBI
agent serving as an interview team leader in Iraq sent an e-mail to her
OSC alerting him that there was substance to allegations of prisoner
mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, including videotape evidence of the
mistreatment which included beatings and rape. The OSC forwarded
this information to senior CTD officials at FBI Headquarters, including
then-Deputy Assistant Director Gary Bald, CTORS Section Chief Frankie
Battle, and DAD T.J. Harrington, together with the OSC's
recommendation that the FBI not conduct an abuse investigation but
rather let the Army CID handle it. Bald concurred with this
recommendation, and we found no evidence that the FBI took any
further action with respect to the agent's report.'74
Another agent stated that in approximately June or July 2004 he
had learned that Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) per,,

174 We determined for various reasons that other allegations described in survey
responses to this question did not merit further investigation. For example, one agent
reported that while she was interviewing detainees at GTMO in July and August 2002, a
detainee alleged to her that he had previously been beaten by U.S. military personnel in
Iraq, an obvious fabrication or mistake by the detainee, since U.S. forces did not invade
Iraq until March 2003.

240

. We address allegations about detainee abuse at this
facility in Part VIII of Chapter Eleven.
C.

Causing Burns by Placing Detainees on Hot Surfaces

Several agents told the OIG in interviews or survey responses that
they were aware of incidents involving the placement of detainees on hot
surfaces or otherwise inflicting burns on detainees in Iraq. At least four
of these witnesses were apparently referring to the same detainee.
Burning detainees was never an approved military technique in
any military theater. Burning was not specifically reported as a category
of interrogation technique in the Church Report, and no substantiated
incidents of burning detainees were described in the report.
Two FBI employees (a Special Agent and a linguist) told us that in
an interview of detainee Ibrahim Khalid Samir Al-Ani in the fall of 2003,
Al-Ani told them that U.S. military personnel came to his home late at
night, hooded him, restrained his hands, put him the back of a vehicle,
and drove for a very long time. Al-Ani said he was face down and
squirming on the rear bed of the vehicle. He told the agent and the
linguist that he thought the military personnel believed he was being
uncooperative, because they held him down without realizing he was
burning. The agent noted that in a Humvee, the engine heat conducts all
the way back through the bed of the vehicle. The soldiers were sitting on
the sides in the rear, and the agent said he concluded that the soldiers
apparently did not feel the heat in the bed through the soles of their
boots. The agent and linguist also told us that the agent photographed
Al-Ani's burn scars.175
Three other agents, including two former OSCs, told the OIG about
an incident that we concluded also related to detainee Al-Ani. One
former OSC told us that in the summer of 2003 the FBI wanted to
interview a detainee, but the military said that because of injuries the
detainee had sustained during capture, he was hospitalized in a military
medical camp. The OSC stated that an FBI agent could not interview the
detainee because of the detainee's serious burn injuries and sedation.
The OSC recalled hearing from the agent that the military may have said

175 The agent and the linguist told us that they included the photographs with
the interview ECs. The FBI was unable to find copies of these photographs, however,
and neither the agent nor the linguist knew what became of them.

241

that the detainee was burned in the back of a hot Humvee. He also said
that this was one of the matters he handed off to the incoming OSC who
replaced him. We also learned that during mid-July 2003, another agent
tried to interview Al-Ani in the hospital, but also could not do so because
of the severity of the detainee's injuries.
The second OSC, who served in Ira from Se tember to November
2003, told us that he understood that
had captured
a prisoner during a
had transported him for
a long period on the hot hood of a jeep, and as a result, the detainee "got
fried." The FBI interviewed the detainee when his medical condition
improved, but his burns were still apparent. This OSC said that his
recollection was uncertain, but he thought the military told him that they
had no other wa to trans
transport the detainee, that they had to leave the
scene of the
hastily, or that they did not know
the detainee was being burned because he was unconscious.
Another survey respondent described what appears to have been a
second burning incident in July 2003. This agent stated that he learned
that Walid Nayif Mohammed Al-Jabburi, a former Lieutenant Colonel in
the Iraqi Intelligence Service, had suffered a 2-inch burn on his upper
left arm after being taken into cust
and transported
back to the
.
"M The agent stated that he saw
the injury, and that the detainee told him that "while lying in the back
bed of a HUMVEE, he suffered the burn to his arm from being in contact
with a hot portion of the metal on the HUMVEE." The agent added:
This injury did not appear to have occurred during the
course of an[ ] interrogation from what Al-Jabburi said and
because to our knowledge, we were the first people to
interrogate him. It is not known whether this injury was
accidental or whether Al-Jabburi was negligently or
purposely placed against the hot metal of the vehicle. We
informed the MP guard to have a medic look at the wound.
In a later interview, Al-Jabburi showed us the burn and said
that a medic had looked at it and treated him. I could see
there was some type of salve on the wound.
An FBI agent who interviewed detainees at
and Abu
Ghraib in late 2004 stated in his survey responses that a detainee at

, whose name he did not recall, told the agent that "when
he was taken into custody by military personnel ... he was handcuffed
and placed on [a] truck bed which caused severe burning to his arms,
legs, and chest." According to the agent, the detainee had scars and his
Army `handler' had documented the allegations and injuries in the
detainee's dossier. We did not determine whether this was a fourth

242

detainee or one of the detainees described above whose injuries had
since healed.
D.

Use of Electric Shock

We sought information concerning the use by U.S. personnel of
electric shock or the threat of it to coerce information from detainees.
According to the Church Report, use of electric shock was never an
approved technique at any time in any military theater. Church Report at
29-34. The only incident of actual or mock electric shock described in
the Church Report was the infamous Abu Ghraib photograph showing a
hooded detainee balancing on a box while wired with mock electrodes.
Id. at 287. The Taguba Report likewise stated that between October and
December 2003, the abuse of detainees included positioning a naked
detainee on a box with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture. Taguba Report at 1617.
Six FBI agents told the OIG in survey responses or interviews that
they heard about the use of electric shock, although five apparently
described the same incident.

This information was relayed to
the military chain of command and eventuall briefed to all individuals
22 Other
(FBI and non-FBI) assigned to the
agents stated that
the
commanding officer promptly began a milit
investigation.

243

an internal DOD investigation found "improper use

of a Tazer that resulted in burn marks on a detainee."
E.

Harsh or Prolonged Shackling

The OIG sought information regarding the use of shackles or other
restraints in an abusive or harsh manner. The Church Report did not
specifically describe the use of prolonged shackling by the military as an
interrogation technique in Iraq. As noted in connection with
Afghanistan, such a technique might be considered a form of a "safety
position" or "stress position," which the Church Report generally
described as requiring a detainee to maintain an awkward or
uncomfortable position in order to control his movement during
interrogation, both for purposes of interrogator safety and as an incentive
to cooperate. Church Report at 216-18. According to the Church Report,
use of stress positions not exceeding four hours was specifically
approved in Iraq under a DOD policy issued in September 2003. Id. at
265-70. It was removed from the list of pre-approved techniques in
October 2003, but permitted to be used with prior approval from the
CJTF-7 Commander. Id. The DOD May 13, 2004, Policy stated that
"under no circumstances" would approval for stress positions be given.
Id. The Church investigators found that stress positions were frequently
used by the military in Iraq, and that some interrogators reported using
them even after this technique was explicitly prohibited. Id. at 276-77,
281-82.
Six FBI agents responded to the OIG survey that they observed
prolonged shackling of detainees, and five said they had heard about
such treatment from others who had observed it. In general, these FBI
agents described two ways in which detainees were restrained:
handcuffing them in various ways and shackling them to floors or other
structures in uncomfortable or stressful positions.
Several agents provided information regarding potentially harsh
practices at the

176 Adair is a pseudonym . The OIG 's investigation of additional allegations
regarding Adair's conduct at this facility is described in Part VIII of Chapter Eleven.

244

We found
that FBI agents working at this facility participated in the use of the
military's detainee restraint category system by informing guards of the
level of the detainee's cooperation and recommending the degree of incell restraint to be imposed as a result.'77 In mid-2004, at least one FBI
agent at - was also involved in deciding whether a detainee would
receive a blanket or mattre s s in his cell, again based on whether he was
cooperative in interviews.

The agent told the OIG she believed she discussed this incident with an
FBI supervisory special agent, who in essence told her that because the

177 We address whether the agents' participation in this system violated
FBI
policy in Chapter Eleven. We note also that, as described in Section III.D. of Chapter
Six, in May 2006 the FBI Office of General Counsel issued an Electronic
Communication addressing this practice.

245

FBI did not intend to interview the detainee at issue, the military's
treatment of the detainee would not be an issue for the FBI.

Another agent described an incident in which a military detainee at
- was handcuffed in his cell in a standing
position for several hours as punishment for making noise and inciting
other prisoners.
F.

Using Military Working Dogs

Public images of detainees at Abu Ghraib depicted military working
dogs with frightened detainees. Use of muzzled dogs to exploit the
detainees' fear of dogs was approved in Iraq under the DOD's September
2003 Policy for Iraq. Church Report at 265. This technique was removed
from the list of approved techniques in October 2003, but its use was
still permitted with specific prior approval from the CJTF-7 Commander.
Id. at 268. The use of unmuzzled dogs was never approved under
military policy. Id. at 281. Several different military investigations found
that dogs were used to intimidate and attack detainees at Abu Ghraib,
including after October 2003. E.g. Taguba Report at 15-17; Church
Report at 280-81.
We asked FBI agents in Iraq about the use of military working dogs
on or near detainees other than for security or safety during detainee
transport. In 2003, FBI su ervisors and field agents had considerable
contact with
, who provided assistance to FBI personnel
working at Abu Ghraib. However, none of the agents we interviewed said
that they knew of the conduct for which _ was punished. Most of
the FBI agents told us that in 2003 and 2004 they never saw or heard
about an milit
working dogs used at Abu Ghraib or at the
during detainee interrogations, or to menace,
intimidate, or physically harm detainees at any location in Iraq.
The FBI's OSC in Iraq in May 2004 told us that he learned about
the use of military working dogs at a particular facility from a set of
military e-mails that the resident FBI supervisor there had brought back
to the FBI's Baghdad Operations Center (BOC).178 The OSC sent an email to senior CTD personnel at FBI Head quarters on May 22, 2004,

describing an "e-mail stream I have seen"
The OSC told us that even if the use of dogs was
allowed by military rules, the fear of dogs made such actions troubling in
environments in which FBI agents were also working.

178 We were unable to obtain a copy of these e-mails during our investigation.

246

Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact

The widely publicized Abu Ghraib disclosures included sexually
humiliating photographs of detainees and other sexually abusive
conduct. The March 2004 Taguba Report stated that between October
and December 2003, the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib included: (1)
videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; (2)
forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for
photographs; (3) forcing male detainees to wear women's underwear; (4)
forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate while being photographed
and videotaped; (5) arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then
jumping on them; (6) placing a dog chain around the neck of a naked
detainee and having a female soldier pose with him in a picture; and (7) a
male guard having sex with a female detainee. Taguba Report at 16-18.
According to the Church Report, sexual acts or mock sexual acts
were never an approved interrogation technique in Iraq. Church Report
at 273. The Church Report described a sexual assault of a female
detainee by military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib in October
2003. Id. at 296-97. In addition to the other widely publicized incidents
at Abu Ghraib, the Church investigators found one anecdotal report of
stripping and photographing female detainees. Id. at 289.
None of the 267 FBI employees who were deployed to Iraq and who
responded to the OIG survey reported any information of this nature.
However, during our investigation we received documents describing an

allegation that at
However, we examined this allegation because
FBI agents were stationed at this facility in 2004. We determined that
this alleged incident took place before any FBI agents were deployed at
this facility. No FBI agent had personal knowledge of this incident.
H.

Using Water To Prevent Breathing by a Detainee or To
Create the Sensation of Drowning

The OIG survey also asked respondents to provide information
regarding the use of water to prevent breathing by detainees or to create
the sensation and fear of drowning. This question was intended to
include and capture information about a practice known as
"waterboarding." We found no evidence that waterboarding or similar
techniques were approved for use under military policies for Iraq or any
other theater.
One FBI agent deployed to Iraq during January through March
2004 told the OIG that he personally observed a non-FBI interrogator

247

give a shackled detainee a drink of water in a rough manner that caused
the detainee to cough or choke at an unidentified building M. He added that three other FBI agents also observed this incident.
This matter is discussed in Part II of Chapter Eleven.

, and that the military considered this a
"harsh-up" technique. Because an FBI agent was allegedly involved in
this practice, we address this matter further in Part VIII of Chapter
Eleven.

Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics

We determined that several FBI agents observed or heard about
the use of stressful or painful positions by the military in Iraq. As
previously noted, under military policies stress positions were permitted
in Iraq at least from September to October 2003, and thereafter until
May 2004 with prior approval of the CJTF-7 Commander. Church Report
at 265. The May 13, 2004, DOD policy for Iraq stated that "under no
circumstances" would approval for stress positions be given. Id. at 270.
The Church Report found that stress positions were frequently used by
the military in Iraq. Id. at 281-82. According to the Church Report,
physical exercise was not explicitly addressed in any Iraq policy. Id. at
283-87. The Church investigators discovered several incidents in which
detainees in Iraq were made to engage in physical exercise to overcome
their resistance to questioning, and that some interrogators considered
this to be part of a stress position regimen. Id. at 286-87.
Several FBI agents described the use of stress positions or forced
exercise in Iraq. Most of these reports pertained to conduct that took
lace

FBI agents reported that they personally observed only a limited
number of instances in which detainees were subjected to "harsh-up"
techniques. Agents deployed
in mid2004 told us that they believed this was not a common occurrence and
that only two or three "harsh-ups" were approved during each of the two
3-month rotations they were deployed there. Other agents stated that

248

they observed or heard about one or two such interrogations during their
deployments from July through October 2004. Most of the information
we gathered related to what agents were told by others, because FBI
agents said they sought to avoid participating in or observing such
interrogations. FBI agents typically learned during shift change meetings
at the facility, for example, that the military had decided to engage in
such an interrogation and therefore knew in advance to avoid that
interrogation. One agent said that the military personnel with whom he
dealt at the facility did not want FBI agents to witness interviews in
which the military employed "harsh-up" techniques. He also said that
the Deputy OSC ordered him not to observe or take part in any such
practices.
However, FBI agents told us that they observed or were told by
others about the military's use of several stressful positions at the
. These included ordering one or more
detainees to stand on one leg, to stand for long periods of time,
sometimes with bags over their heads, in order to "soften" them up for
interrogations, or to "hold their hands above their heads for long periods
of time." Other FBI agents told us that detainees were told to squat in
order to simulate sitting in an invisible chair.
FBI employees also described the use of stressful or prolonged
exercises for uncooperative detainees by military and intelligence service
personnel. One FBI intelligence analyst said that he was told by those
who had observed such techniques that uncooperative detainees in both
Afghanistan and Iraq were "told to do push-ups and other forms of
exercise." He was also told that "they weren't forced to do it but they
would do it anyway, probably out of fear. They exercised until they
talked or for no longer than 1 hour [out of] every twenty-four hours."
This analyst also noted that "water was always on hand and medics
readily available." An FBI agent reported that during February or March
2004 he was walking M
-1
= when he observed Army personnel "direct[ing a detainee] to do
squats while holding two or three cases of MREs." Another agent told us
that sometime in March or April 2004 at an unnamed location, he saw a
detainee walking and doing calisthenics while holding a case of MREs.
Several agents at
in 2004
reported that they observed or heard about the use of calisthenics during
military interrogations, such as push-ups, deep knee bends, or sit-ups,
in order to induce detainee fatigue and cooperation. One agent told us
that other agents told him in early 2004 that military "interrogators
would occasionally have a detainee pace back and forth along a wall for
hours in order to induce fatigue" and thereby lessen his resistance to
answering their questions. While this witness heard about some

249

detainees refusing to comply with instructions to continue the
calisthenics or walking, he said he had no information about what the
military did in such cases.
J.

Deprivation of Food and Water

The OIG survey asked respondents to provide any information they
had about any intentional deprivation of food or water for detainees by
any U.S. personnel. According to the Church Report, denial of basic
human needs such as food was always prohibited in every theater.
Church Report at 155, 213, 273. The Church Report stated that one
interrogator reported that his unit nevertheless tried food deprivation as
an interrogation technique in Iraq. Id. at 35, 273, 288.
One FBI agent told the OIG that a group of detainees one day were
yelling and screaming that they were not being fed. However, the agent
said that he "observed water and food being provided daily" to the
detainees."

had a policy or practice of
denying food or water to detainees for the first 24 hours of their
detention. Because these allegations relate to the conduct of an FBI
agent, we address them in detail in Part VIII of Chapter Eleven.

Depriving Detainees of Clothing

In Section II.G. of this chapter we discussed FBI observations of
sexual abuse of detainees involving nudity. A related form of reported
detainee abuse involved the humiliation of detainees by forcibly removing
their clothing with no related sexual assault. Taguba Report at 16-17.
Some of the most infamous photographs of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib
prison depicted the humiliation of naked or almost-naked detainees by
U.S. military personnel. The March 2004 Taguba Report stated that
between October and December 2003, military personnel at Abu Ghraib
forcibly removed detainees' clothing and kept them unclothed for days at
a time. Id.
According to the Church Report, removal of clothing was not
explicitly addressed in the military interrogation policies for Iraq. Church
Report at 283-85. This technique could have been considered to be
encompassed by one of the Field Manual 34-52 techniques, such as
"pride and ego down" or "incentive." The Church Report stated that in
addition to the highly publicized nudity incidents at Abu Ghraib, there
were two reports of military interrogators using this technique in Iraq but
no evidence of the "systematic use" of this technique. Id. at 285.

250

Deprivation of clothing was one of the frequently reported
techniques in Iraq described by FBI agents. Five survey respondents
said that they personally observed this conduct and eight stated that
they heard about it from others. Almost all of the observations re orted
to us related to incidents at the Abu Ghraib prison or the

Abu Ghraib Prison

One FBI agent told the OIG that sometime in November 2003 he
saw that "[u]nknown detainees in Abu Gh[ra]ib prison were being held
naked in isolated cells, [and] others were being asked to rol[l] naked on
the floor from one end of the cell block to the other." He added that on
another occasion, he and a second agent saw a naked detainee being told
to roll on the corridor floor between two rows of cells at Abu Ghraib. He
said that a military guard told him the detainee was being disciplined for
being disruptive or uncooperative. He also said that military personnel
told him that detainees were also held naked in cells if they were
disruptive or uncooperative by yelling or screaming in their cells, and
that taking away their clothes had the effect of quieting them.
The agent told us that he did not report or discuss this incident
with anyone in Iraq, including the OSC or Deputy OSC, because he did
not know whether or not this was allowed under military rules, and
because this occurred before the Abu Ghraib photos became public.
However, he did not report these incidents during the May 2004 OGCInspection Division special inquiry, which was conducted within the FBI
after the Abu Ghraib photos became public.179
A second agent told the OIG that while he was deployed in Iraq in
November 2003 through January 2004, he saw a detainee at Abu Ghraib
lying on the floor either naked or in boxer shorts with a military guard
and possibly an interrogator nearby. The agent thought this was a
disciplinary measure rather than an effort to coerce information from the
detainee. This agent said that the incident appeared to him to be similar
to common disciplinary procedure in a U.S. jail when a prisoner is being
disruptive. This agent did not report this incident to his chain of
command in Iraq at the time, but he did report it during the May 2004
OGC-Inspection Division special inquiry.

179 This agent said he did not report this incident to the FBI Inspection Division
interviewers who interviewed him in 2004 because he did not believe it was within the
scope of the questions asked.

251

Another agent who worked at Abu Ghraib told the OIG that on one
occasion in December 2003 while he was walking through part of the
prison, he saw several detainees "in their cells with only underwear on."
He said that the Army sergeant escorting him through the prison said
that this "was an approved technique." The agent said he understood
that this was meant to soften the detainees up and make them more
cooperative in interrogations. He told us' that he did not discuss his
observations of the detainees in their underwear with the OSC or Deputy
OSC because he assumed it was an approved technique and thought
there was no controversy about it. He said that the sergeant volunteered
that the deprivation of clothing was authorized, and the agent received
the impression that this practice was not uncommon at Abu Ghraib at
the time for detainees who were being difficult.

2.
One FBI agent described an incident that occurred at the
between November 2003 and January 2004. This agent said he observed
detainees stripped naked or nearly naked and marched around a room in
that facility. He stated that the same room was often in use with the

door closed while he was at the facility. The agent told us he was not
sure he described to his OSC or Deputy OSC what he had observed, and
he did not believe it was necessary to report it to anyone.

, reported that he
was told that before he arrived there the military interrogators would
strip a detainee naked in order to humiliate him.180 He said that his
understanding was that the military had stopped using this technique by
the time he arrived there in February 2004.
Another agent who served at the
told
us that he observed on one occasion during April or May 2004 a
"detainee shackled to [the] floor, naked and blindfolded." The agent did
not know how long the detainee had been in that position. The agent
said that a second agent was with him at the time, but neither of them
questioned military personnel about this or reported it to the OSC or
Deputy OSC. The agent said he had no information as to whether or not

180 Adair is a pseudonym.

252

this had been authorized by military commanders, or why the detainee
was being held in that condition.'8'
Several agents reported to us that they had heard that the
deprivation of detainee clothing was a standard procedure, but never saw
it themselves. One of these agents stated that at least in some cases,
military personnel may have done so for purposes of discipline rather
than to coerce information from detainees.
L.

Hooding or Blindfolding Detainees

The OIG survey also asked respondents to provide information
concerning the use of hoods or blindfolds on detainees other than during
detainee transportation. According to the Church Report, hooding was
not explicitly addressed as an interrogation technique in military
interrogation policies for Iraq. Church Report at 283. The Church Report
stated that there were no reports that hooding had been used as an
interrogation technique, as distinct from a force protection measure
during the transport of detainees. Id. As detailed below, this finding was
not consistent with the accounts given to the OIG by some FBI agents.
Twenty-two FBI employees responded to the survey that they had
observed detainee hooding and blindfolding and three stated that they
had heard about it from others. However, many of the responses
indicated that the blindfolding occurred during detainee transportation
or for purposes of safety, security, or discipline. However, other agents
reported the use of blindfolding or hooding as an interrogation technique.
Several of these other agents told the OIG that the U.S. military in
Iraq routinely used blindfolds to prevent detainees from seeing their
detention surroundings and for the protection and security of U.S. and
Iraqi personnel. Agents reported to us that the common practices they
observed during the movement of detainees within or outside of the
detention facilities were the use of either (1) hoods or sandbags over the
heads of detainees, left loose or secured loosely with tape on the outside
of the bags, or (2) large goggles with the lenses blacked out with duct
tape or spray paint.
Other agents described the use of blindfolds, blackened goggles, or
hoods, together with other efforts to disorient and confuse detainees
during the period shortly after their capture. For example, a former OSC
told us that when a group of captured insurgents was brought in to a
181 The second agent reported in his survey responses that sometime in May
2004 he observed a detainee who was blindfolded and naked, but his recollection was
that he saw this at a different facility.

253

detention compound
during the fall
of 2003 at around 3:00 a.m., military personnel yelled in Arabic and
English through bull horns while loud rock music was played. The OSC
stated that the detainees were told to stand up and squat down in the
middle of the compound with hoods on their heads.
Several agents told us that in the period of May through October
2004, the military required that detainees be blindfolded for as much as
the first 24 hours after arrival at the
. One
agent said that the purpose was to disorient the detainees and to

persuade them to cooperate with interrogators.
Agents also described the use of hoods or blindfolds during
interrogations. Although detainees were often blindfolded during their
initial interrogations at the military's request, the FBI agents said it was
not the general practice to blindfold detainees during subsequent
interrogations or interviews. Removing the handcuffs and blindfold
depended on the interviewer's assessment of how cooperative and candid
the detainee was. In some cases, detainees who were considered
dangerous were blindfolded during interrogations or interviews. Another
agent told us that some detainees were interrogated by the military with
hoods on, possibly as part of "harsh-up" interrogations.
One agent who served at
in early
2004 stated that some detainees were left in their cells with hoods on for
extended periods of unknown duration. Detainees who removed their
hoods were directed to put them back on by guards who checked
through the cell door "peep holes." Another agent told us that he
observed that some detainees wore blacked-out goggles while in their
cells, but he did not know why or for how long.
Two FBI personnel also told us about what they viewed as
inappropriate military humor using drawings of "smiley faces" on the
outside of bags over the heads of detainees at Abu Ghraib. An agent in
Iraq in the fall of 2003 told us that an MP brought a detainee for an FBI
interview with a hood marked in this way, and the agent "told the soldier
it was unprofessional." The MP "apologized and came back with a clean
hood at the end of the interview." The agent told us he believed he
reported this incident to an SSA in his FBI Division when he returned to
the United States. An intelligence analyst likewise stated that in the fall
of 2004 she saw a seated prisoner at Abu Ghraib, hands bound behind
his back, wearing a burlap sack on his head with the face drawn on the
sack. She "felt [this] was unprofessional, humiliating and a sick joke,"
but when she said so to a military officer, "he seemed to think it was an
acceptable MP practice."

254

We also received reports that FBI agents observed and may have
participated in the use of duct tape to blindfold detainees in Iraq. These
reports are addressed in Part II of Chapter Eleven.
M.

Sleep Deprivation or Interruption

Sleep deprivation or interruption was one of the most frequently
reported forms of detainee treatment reported by FBI agents who served
in Iraq. Most agents who described this conduct stated that detainees
had their sleep interrupted by frequent awakenings or through the use of
loud music and lights.
The military's September 2003 Iraq Interrogation Policy explicitly
authorized the use of sleep adjustment, including adjusting sleep cycles
from night to day and limiting total sleep to as little as 4 hours per day.
Church Report at 265, 283. The October 2003 Policy removed sleep
adjustment from the pre-approved list but authorized its use with prior
approval from CJTF-7 Command. Id. at 268. The May 2004 Policy
stated that henceforth this technique would not be approved under any
circumstances. Id. at 270. According to the Church Report, military
interrogators continued to use this technique in Iraq even after it was
explicitly prohibited, and although interrogators apparently adhered to
the 4-hour minimum, they did not always require that the 4 hours be
consecutive. Id. at 282.
Altogether, 15 survey respondents said they observed and 32 said
that detainees or others told them about sleep deprivation being used as
earl as June 2003 at various detention facilities in Iraq, especially at the
. FBI agents reported that they heard that
this was a standard, approved military
procedure.
Similarly, 9 FBI employees stated that they observed the
interference with detainee sleep by loud music or in some cases the
broadcast sound of a baby crying, and 16 stated that they heard about
such actions from others. However, they suggested that the purpose of
such actions could have been sleep deprivation, interference with
communication among detainees, or to create additional stress for
uncooperative detainees as part of a "harsh-up" interrogation.
One FBI agent deployed to Iraq between the fall of 2003 and early
2004 told us that based on what he had heard, "[i]t was commonly
known that the military made detainees stand for long periods with bags
on their heads" in order to interfere with their sleep. Another agent who
worked at
also told us that in February
or March 2004 he observed a detainee who was forced to stand in his cell
for an unknown period of time in order to keep the detainee awake. The

255

agent said that a military guard told him that the guard had been
instructed to keep the detainee awake.
According to FB I agents, the purpose of sleep disruption or

deprivation was to

The OSC said that he told agents in Iraq that the
FBI was aware of this practice and that agents need not report it further.
He did not consider the conduct abusive.

Another agent deployed to
told us
that detainees were interviewed several times over the course of 24 hours
in a deliberate effort.to disrupt their sleep patterns. Further, the
detainees were prevented from knowing what time of day it was. They
were held in a building with no windows and in completely dark cells,
except when they were taken out to go to the bathroom or to be
interrogated. There were also set times at which they were awakened to
be moved from cell to cell, fed, or taken to the bathroom, and the times
for these events changed periodically.
N.

Unregistered " Ghost " Detainees

Ten FBI agents told the OIG that they had personal knowledge of
or had heard about the detention of individuals by the United States in
Iraq without official acknowledgment of the detainee
The
incidents reported by the FBI agents occurred during September through

256

December 2003, and high value detainees were the focus of the practice.
Although the agents usually learned of this practice from military
personnel, in each case they were told that the detainees were being held
in undocumented status at the behest of the CIA.
According to the Church Report, Lt. Gen. Sanchez (the CJTF-7
Commander) stated in July 2004 that CJTF-7 staff officers and the CIA
reached an unwritten agreement to provide a number of cells at Abu
Ghraib for the CIA's exclusive use in holding "ghost" detainees. Church
Report at 317. Under this agreement, there was no requirement for the
CIA to register the prisoner with the military when the CIA used those
cells. Id. The Army investigation led by Lt. Gen. Anthony Jones in 2004
also concluded that "ghost detainees" occurred at Abu Ghraib because
detainees were accepted from other agencies and services without proper
in-processing, accountability, and documentation. The Jones
investigation concluded that "[t]he number of ghost detainees temporarily
held at Abu Ghraib, and the audit trail of personnel responsible for
capturing, medically screening, safeguarding and properly interrogating
the `ghost detainees,' cannot be determined." 2004 US Army, LTG
Anthony R. Jones, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib,
AR 15-6 ("Jones Report") at 23.
A former FBI OSC in Iraq stated in his survey responses that
military intelligence personnel described to him in general terms the
existence of ghost detainees at Abu Ghraib. Two other agents told us
that during the period of September through December 2003, the CIA
refused to allow the FBI to interview certain high value detainees held at
Abu Ghraib. One of these agents told us that he learned about the
"ghost" detainee practice when some detainees scheduled for FBI
interviews at Abu Ghraib could not be located, and military personnel
told him that the detainees were likely on a CIA "ghost" list because the
facility had no records or identifying information for the detainees. The
agent said that he thought there were at most three or four such "ghost
detainees" while he served in Iraq.
Another agent reported to us that during the fall of 2003 he was
told that a particular high value detainee had been interrogated by the
CIA at Abu Ghraib for some time before this agent was given access to
him. The detainee remained unregistered during part of the period in
which this agent interviewed him. During that period, the agent told us
the International Committee of the Red Cross was making a very public
effort to get access to all detainees. The agent said he and a military
officer obtained a prisoner number for the detainee, who subsequently
was reported to the Red Cross. The agent also told us that he did not
know whether the detainee's "ghost" status was legal. In addition,
according to another FBI agent, an officer at Abu Ghraib told him in

257

December 2003 that the CIA had an arrangement whereby they could
house "ghost detainees" without documenting them.
0.

Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country

An FBI SSA who served as supervisor for the FBI agents at W
in 2004 told the OIG on one
occasion he was informed that a detainee the FBI wanted to interview
was going to be removed
. He stated that
the FBI moved up its interview timetable because it was going to lose its
access to the individual. The SSA also stated that he did not recall the
name of the detainee or the reasons he was being
, and

therefore he could not say it was
Two FBI agents told us that they told uncooperative and untruthful
detainees that they could be transferred to GTMO. One of these agents
stated that while detailed to
in 2004, he
and his partner occasionally used a ruse with detainees, telling them
that if they did not cooperate, they could be sent to GTMO or a U.S.
prison far away from their families, and implying that the detainees
would not be well-liked and would be vulnerable to the kinds of violence
that existed in U.S. prisons. Three other agents told us that they used
the ruse of advising untruthful or uncooperative foreign fighter detainees
that they would be sent back to their home countries for further
interrogation.
One of the agents we interviewed described another ruse that
involved telling the detainee that the agents were sent to Iraq specifically
to interview him, and that if the detainee did not cooperate he would be
taken back to the United States to face criminal charges of terrorism and
murder and would be imprisoned in a federal maximum security facility.
P.

Threats Against Detainee Family Members

We sought information regarding the making of threats against
detainees' families. According to the Church Report, threatening harm to
others was prohibited by law or doctrine throughout interrogation
operations in Iraq. Church Report at 273. The Church investigators
found no evidence that detainees were subjected to threats against family

258

or friends beyond general statements that detainees' failure to cooperate
could result in the arrest of those friends or family members. Id. at 289.
Two FBI agents told the OIG about a ruse they used in mid-2004
on certain uncooperative or deceptive detainees by telling them that the
military was going to detain members of their families and bring them to
for questioning. One of the agents told
us that detainees' family members were often also involved in insurgent
activities, especially fathers, cousins, and brothers. According to the
agent, uncooperative detainees would be asked if they wanted their
family members to be picked up and questioned knowing that they could
incriminate the detainee in insurgent activities. He stated that there
were numerous times that fathers, sons, and brothers were detained
together because they were all involved, and that detainees were also told
that if they cooperated their father or brothers could be released.182
Another agent said that he advised a detainee in Mosul during the
first quarter of 2004 that the detainee's failure to cooperate could result
in his family being questioned or detained by Kurdish Security Forces,
which the agent understood was true under the circumstances.
Q.

Impersonation of FBI Agents by Other U .S. Government
Personnel

Some agents reported in their survey responses that they had
heard that military or CIA personnel had falsely represented themselves
as FBI agents.183 Five FBI agents reported that they heard about the
impersonation of FBI personnel in Iraq, but none stated that they ever
observed such conduct. Three agents told us that they usually
suspected CIA or military DIA personnel because of mistaken claims by
detainees that other FBI agents had interviewed the detainees shortly
before these agents arrived. However, a former Depu OSC told us that
he knew that at locations such as Abu Ghraib and
detainees were interviewed by personnel from many different agencies,
and the detainees often did not know which agency's employee was
asking them questions. As a result, when an FBI agent showed up, the
detainee would say he had already been interviewed by the FBI. The
182 We discuss whether this conduct constituted misconduct in Section VIII of
Chapter Eleven.
183 The Church Report did not specifically discuss the practice of impersonating
an FBI agent. It stated that "deception" was explicitly approved in the September 2003
Policy but was removed from the pre-approved list in October 2003, after which
requests to use this technique had to be submitted to the CJTF-7 Commander. Church
Report at 265-268. The Church Report stated that deception has been employed in
detainee interrogations throughout the war in Iraq. Id. at 273.

259

Deputy OSC said he and his colleagues concluded that this was
confusion on the part of the detainee, rather than deliberate
misrepresentation by the prior interviewer.

Other Findings Concerning Agent Observations

Extremely Cold or Hot Room Temperatures . One survey
respondent said he observed detainees subjected to extremely cold room
temperatures in Iraq, and another said he heard about such an
incident.184 The first agent told us that at
during the first quarter of 2004 he once observed a detainee
through the open door of an interrogation room who appeared to be
shaking due to the cold. He said he heard the wall air conditioning unit
operating in the room and knew that the room could get cold because he
had conducted interviews there, but did not know how Ion the detainee
was kept there. Another agent who worked at
reported
ed to us that military personnel told him in mid-2004 that
cold temperatures were used to place stress on the detainees, but that he
never personally saw this done.
Isolation . Over 30 agents told the OIG that they observed or
heard about various forms of isolation of Iraqi detainees, including the
isolation of some detainees as long as 2 or 3 weeks.185 Some witnesses
told us that detainees were regularly kept in one-person cells in which
the detainees could hear but not see one another. Other witnesses told
184 According to the Church Report, military interrogators used temperature
manipulation (both hot and cold) in Iraq prior to May 2004. The technique was used as
a prelude to the incentive technique under Field Manual 34-52 (i.e. moving the detainee
to a more comfortable environment as an incentive for cooperation). In September
2003, environmental manipulation was explicitly approved under DOD policy as an
interrogation technique in Iraq. The October 2003 DOD policy removed this technique
from the pre-approved list but authorized its use with prior approval from CJTF-7
Command. Church Report at 268. The May 2004 DOD policy for Iraq stated that
henceforth this technique would not be approved under any circumstances. Id. at 270.
185 The September 2003 Iraq military interrogation policy listed isolation as an
approved technique, although its use on enemy prisoners of war (as distinct from
security or criminal detainees) required advance approval by the CJTF-7 Commander.
Church Report at 265. The October 2003 Policy removed "isolation" as a listed
technique but authorized the use of "segregation" for several purposes, including "to
ensure the success of interrogations." CJTF-7 approval was required for any
segregation in excess of 30 days. Id. at 269. (The difference between "segregation" and
"isolation" is not made clear, although it appears that the former relates to the
separation of the detainee from other detainees, while the latter relates to limiting the
contact of the detainee with any other persons.) The May 2004 Policy expressly
prohibited "sensory deprivation" as an interrogation technique, which could encompass
more extreme versions of isolation. Id. at 270. The Church investigators found that
isolation was used in Iraq. Id. at 273.

260

us that detainees were isolated as rewards for their cooperation, and
therefore had better living conditions than did other detainees. Several
survey respondents stated that detainees at one facility, particularly high
value detainees, were kept in individual cells to reduce their influence on
other detainees, and to "maximize [their] cooperation" with interrogators.
Handling of the Koran and Forcible Shaving of Detainees. One
survey respondent reported in his survey response that a detainee had
objected to him about the fanning of the pages of his Koran by military
guards. Another agent reported that detainees believed that shaving of
their heads and beards was a form of punishment by military personnel,
but the agent also stated that military personnel told her that it was
done for hygiene purposes. A second agent reported that he had
observed the forcible shaving of detainees, but provided no details.
Techniques that No Agents Reported to the 01G. There were
two techniques that none of survey respondents stated they ever
observed or heard about, including: (a) intentionally delaying or
depriving a detainee of medical care; and (b) using or threatening to use

spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other animals on or near a detainee.
We also asked witnesses who were involved in detainee interviews
about any complaints that detainees made to them that the detainees
had been mistreated. As in Afghanistan, FBI agents in Iraq often asked
detainees about their treatment and custodial conditions. FBI employees
told us that detainees seldom complained to them about the way they
were being treated by U.S. personnel, and seldom told the agents they
had been mistreated. Rather, detainees often complained that they could
not contact their families, complained that they should not have been
detained at all, or complained about prison conditions generally.

III.

Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee
Treatment in Iraq

As was the case with Afghanistan, we found that very few of the
FBI agents who served in Iraq made contemporaneous reports to anyone
in the FBI or the military regarding the potential mistreatment of
detainees in Iraq. Of the 267 agents who served in Iraq and responded to
the OIG survey, only 13 agents said they made such a report to FBI
superiors or to military personnel. Likewise, most of the agents we
interviewed stated that they did not report any incidents of detainee
abuse to their supervisors or to the military.
We believe that the factors that contributed to the small number of
reports in Afghanistan, discussed in Section III of Chapter Nine, had a
similar impact in Iraq. Most agents said they saw no abuses to report.
261

Moreover, there was no formal reporting requirement prior to May 19,
2004, and many agents assumed that any conduct that they observed
was permitted under military interrogation policies in Iraq. As in the
other military zones, the FBI agents in Iraq generally did not consider
their role to include policing the conduct of the military personnel with
whom they were working.
Several FBI agents stated that they raised concerns with their
Supervisory Special Agents (SSA) or with military personnel regarding the
military's detentions of minors in Iraq. Some told the OIG that their
concerns related to the young age and lack of intelligence value of the
detainees rather than any indication that the detainees had been
mistreated. One of the agents stated that shortly after his concerns were
elevated to the SSA and the military commanders, the minor detainees
were released. Two other agents in Iraq during May through July 2004
told the OIG that they spoke to their SSA about their concern that the
military did not have an adequate basis for holding some detainees. One
agent stated that this concern was also communicated to military
intelligence personnel, but he did not know the outcome. Again, these
concerns did not relate to mistreatment of detainees but rather to the
detention itself.
Another agent told us that he heard about but did not see
detainees being forced to pace back and forth along a wall for hours in
order to induce fatigue and lessen resistance to interrogation. This agent
reported the practice to a supervisory agent. The agent said he received
a reiteration of the standard general guidance that agents should not
participate in any practices beyond FBI procedures, that they should
keep the on-scene supervisors informed if they saw anything "abusive
[or] illegal," and that they should use their good judgment as agents.
An agent who served at
during
2004 observed sleep deprivation, shackling, stress positions, and other
techniques by the military. He told the OIG that he made a report to an
SSA that some of the agents had concerns that the environment was
coercive. He did not indicate to the OIG whether any action was taken as
a result of his report.

Another agent stated in his survey response th at after he saw
being yelled at by
military guards, he asked that a particular detainee he had interviewed
several times be transferred back to the general detainee population.
One agent told us that his complaint to an Army Captain about guards
putting a "smiley face" on a hooded detainee was met with apparent
indifference.

262

Most of the agents' reports did not reach as high as the FBI OSCs
or Deputy OSCs in Iraq. We interviewed all of the former FBI OSCs and
most of the Deputy OSCs who served in Iraq during 2003 and 2004, and
with a single exception detailed below, none of these witnesses said that
they ever received any reports from subordinates regarding detainee
mistreatment. In particular, OSCs and Deputy OSCs who served in Iraq
at the time that the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison were taking place
told us that they did not recall receiving any reports from FBI agents of
such conduct, despite having instructed the agents to make such reports
if they witnessed detainee abuse.
The one significant exception that we learned about was an e-mail
report made in January 2004 from an FBI interview team leader to the
FBI OSC alerting him that there was evidence that prisoners had been
mistreated at Abu Ghraib. This report relayed information provided by
the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID). As previously
explained, this report was elevated to Executive Assistant FBI Director
Gary Bald, who concurred with the OSC's assessment that the matter
was outside the scope of the FBI's mission in Iraq and that the Army CID
should handle the matter. According to the Deputy OSC at the time, "we
advised all agents working at the prison to watch for any activity they
considered abusive."
Our survey uncovered another incident in which FBI agents in Iraq
reported detainee mistreatment by a foreign interrogator in a non-U.S.
controlled detention facility. An agent who served as the FBI's Legal
Attache (Legat) to the U.S. Embassy in Iraq in late 2004 told us in his
survey response that an FBI agent and an agent from the U.S.
intelligence community observed a detainee being slapped by a foreign
interrogator. The Legat stated both U.S. agents terminated the
interrogation and left the facility. The Legat stated that he or the agent
e-mailed FBI Headquarters about the incident and were told that
Headquarters was aware of it. We did not receive any additional
information regarding the disposition of this report.
As detailed in Chapter Six, on May 17 and 18, 2004, the FBI
Inspection Division interviewed 14 FBI employees who had conducted
interviews or otherwise been present at Abu Ghraib from October
through December 2003. The results of the inquiry were summarized in
an Inspection Division report to the Counterterrorism Division, the
Director's Office, and the FBI Office of General Counsel, dated May 19,
2004. On January 6, 2005, FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni
forwarded the results of the Inspection Division interviews to John H.
Smith, Deputy General Counsel for the DOD. Caproni's letter stated:
"None of the employees reported observing the sort of mistreatment of
detainees that gained widespread media attention, although a few

263

observed handling of detainees in ways that would not be appropriate for
within the United States."

IV.

Conclusion

We received varied reports about detainee interrogation practices
from FBI agents who were detailed to Iraq. As detailed in this chapter,
several FBI agents said they observed detainees deprived of clothing.
Other frequently reported techniques identified by FBI agents as used by
military personnel in Iraq included sleep deprivation or interruption, loud
music and bright lights, isolation of detainees, and hooding or
blindfolding during interrogations. FBI employees also reported the use
of stress positions, prolonged shackling, and forced exercise in Iraq. In
addition, several FBI agents told the OIG that they became aware of
unregistered "ghost detainees" at Abu Ghraib whose presence was not
reflected in official records. We also heard reports from FBI agents that
detainees had been sent or were threatened with being sent from Iraq to
a third country for interrogation.
Although several FBI agents were deployed to the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq, these agents told us that they did not witness the extreme
conduct that occurred at that facility in late 2003 and that was publicly
reported in April 2004. The FBI agents explained that they typically
worked outside of the main prison building where the abuses occurred,
and that they did not have access to the facility at night when much of
the abuse took place.
We found that few of the FBI agents who served in Iraq made
contemporaneous reports to anyone in the FBI or the military regarding
the potential mistreatment of detainees in Iraq. The FBI OSCs who
served in Iraq during 2003-2004 were virtually unanimous in telling the
OIG that they never received any reports from FBI agents regarding
detainee mistreatment. There was no formal FBI reporting requirement
prior to May 19, 2004, and many agents assumed that the conduct that
they observed was permitted under military interrogation policies in Iraq.
As in the other military zones, the FBI agents in Iraq generally did not
consider their role to include policing the conduct of the military
personnel with whom they were working. Some agents told us that they
were able to get their concerns resolved by taking them directly to the
military. We believe these factors contributed to the relatively small
number of reports made by FBI agents regarding detainee mistreatment.

264

CHAPTER ELEVEN
OIG REVIEW OF ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT BY FBI
EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY ZONES
In this chapter, the OIG describes our investigation and findings
with respect to allegations that particular FBI employees in the military
zones were involved in detainee abuse or mistreatment or other
misconduct. Some of the allegations were made by detainees, but some
of the allegations came from other FBI employees, in most instances in
response to the OIG's survey.
In general, we evaluated FBI conduct by reference to the FBI
policies discussed in detail in prior chapters. The FBI has stated that its
agents were at all relevant times subject to the same policies regarding
detainee interrogations that applied to FBI interrogations inside the
United States, with the exception of the requirement to provide Miranda
warnings. These policies prohibited brutality, physical violence, duress
or intimidation of detainees, and obtaining statements from detainees by
force or threats. In addition, many FBI agents were instructed not to
participate in joint interrogations in which military interrogators were
using techniques not approved for use by the FBI. On May 19, 2004, the
FBI issued a written policy that reiterated the general injunction against
participating in such interrogations and that added for the first time a
requirement that agents report any abuse or mistreatment of prisoners
by non-FBI personnel up the FBI chain of command.
In evaluating the conduct of FBI agents who were alleged to have
abused or mistreated detainees, we recognized that FBI agents sent to
GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq were working in environments that were
not analogous to those the agents faced in the United States. We also
found that the FBI's existing policies did not always provide clear
guidance to agents working in unfamiliar circumstances in the military
zones. In addition, in the absence of more detailed definitions of
concepts such as "participation" and "abuse," it was sometimes difficult
for agents in the military zones to know the degree to which the agents
were required to separate themselves from interrogations that included
non-FBI techniques or when to report the use of such techniques to their
supervisors.

This chapter addresses the individual allegations of misconduct by
employees
and is divided into eight Sections describing differing
FBI
allegations.

265

Alleged Mistreatment of Moazzam Begg

In this Section we address allegations made against the FBI by
Moazzam Be , who was arrested in Pakistan in late January 2002 and
detained in
and at GTMO until his release in January 2005.
Begg alleged that he was subjected to mistreatment and coercion at both
locations and that FBI agents participated in or knew about this

conduct.
A.

Background

Begg, a British and Pakistani national, was arrested in Islamabad,
Pakistan by Pakistani authori ties on January 28, 2002. He was held
and was questioned by U.S . and coalition intelligence personnel,
including several FBI agents.
In late February 2002, Begg was transferred to the United States
military detention facility at
, where
he was questioned b U.S. and British intelligence personnel. Begg was
also questioned
by FBI Special Agent Bell and by
Detective Harrelson, a New York City Police Department detective serving
on the FBI-sponsored Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York City.'86
In February 2003, Begg was transferred to GTMO, where he was

again interviewed by Bell and H arrelson,

Begg subsequently disavowed the signed statement, claiming it was
obtained under duress, and stated that he was innocent of the
accusations against him.
In 2004, Begg was scheduled to be the first detainee tried by the
Military Commission at GTMO. Begg was accused by the military of
being a member of al-Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist organizations,
recruiting individuals to attend al-Qaeda terrorist training camps,
receiving training at such camps, and providing support to terrorists by
providing shelter for their families. He was also accused of being
prepared to fight on the front lines against United States and allied forces
along with Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.

186 Bell and Harrelson are pseudonyms.

266

In January 2005, Begg and three other British nationals held at
GTMO were released to British custody. Upon arrival in the United
Kingdom, Begg was released by British authorities and he returned to his
residence in Birmingham, England.

Begg's Allegations

Begg made his allegations regarding mistreatment in a letter dated
July 5, 2004, to the United States Forces Administration, Joint Task
Force/Joint Detention Operations Group, and in a written statement to
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal dated July 12, 2004. He provided
further details in interviews with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS) on December 15 and 16, 2004, and with the OIG on May 31,
2006. Begg made additional allegations of mistreatment in a report
prepared by his attorney entitled, "One Thousand Days and Nights of
Torture - The Systematic Torture and Abuse of Moazzam Begg, a British
Citizen, by the United States of America." In addition, Begg wrote a book
describing his arrest and detention, entitled: Enemy Combatant: My
Imprisonment at Guantanamo, Bagram, and Kandahar (The New Press,
2006).
Begg made the following specific allegations of mistreatment and
coercion potentially involving FBI employees:
1. Begg alleged that FBI a ent Bell and NYPD officer Harrelson
participated in interro ations
durin which
Be
was

2. Begg alleged that on one occasion at Bagram he was hooded
and "hog-tied" by military personnel as punishment for failing to tell the
interrogators what they wanted to hear, struck or kicked in the back and
head, and left in this position overnight. He stated that his interrogators,
including Bell and Harrelson, directed or were aware of this treatment.188

187 Begg identified the individuals who participated in these interviews by their
correct first names, and the FBI later determined that he was referring to Bell and
Harrelson.
188 Begg also alleged that he was aware of two detainee deaths at Bagram and
that the FBI might have been aware of them at the time they occurred. However, he did
not identify any FBI agent who had this knowledge. Bell and Harrelson had already left
Bagram by the time the deaths occurred. We address the FBI's knowledge regarding
deaths at Bagram in Chapter Nine.

267

3. Begg alleged that Bell and Harrelson coerced Begg into signing
the written statement at GTMO by threats of imprisonment and
execution without legal recourse.
According to an undated letter from the United States Principal
Undersecretary of Defense to the British Embassy, the Department of
Defense (DOD) conducted three investigations of Begg's allegations of
abuse and found no evidence to substantiate his claims. The DOD
provided the OIG with a Report of Investigation prepared by the U.S.
Army Criminal Investigation Command dated July 23, 2005. According
to this report, the Army reviewed correspondence and statements by
Begg and interviewed over 30 witnesses who were stationed at the
facilities at which Begg claimed the abuses occurred. The report
concluded that "the offenses of Communicating a Threat, Maltreatment
of a Person in U.S. Custody, and Assault did not occur as alleged." Many
of the witnesses interviewed by the Army investigators said that Begg
cooperated with military interrogators by assisting with translations, that
Begg received comforts such as reading and writing materials, and that
Begg never complained about mistreatment while he was at Bagram.
C.

OIG Investigation

The primary subject of the OIG's investigation was FBI agent Bell,
who was the only FBI agent against whom Begg made any allegations by
name. Harrelson was a detective with the New York City Police
Department. Although Harrelson was a member of the FBI-sponsored
Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York City, he was not an FBI
employee and therefore not subject to the OIG's jurisdiction.
The OIG interviewed Begg, Bell, and two other FBI agents who
witnessed Begg's interrogations in Bagram and GTMO. Harrelson
declined to be interviewed by the OIG. The OIG also reviewed the FD302s and Electronic Communications summarizing Begg's FBI
interviews, his letters and statements complaining about abuse in
Afghanistan and GTMO, his book, and an interview conducted by NCIS
in December 2004.
The OIG interviewed Begg by telephone on May 31, 2006. Begg is
fluent in English, and no interpreter was required. His attorney was on
the phone during the interview. Begg's statements to the OIG were

largely consistent with the allegations that he had made in letters to the
DOD and in his book.
D.

OIG Analysis of Begg ' s Allegations

In this subsection, we summarize and analyze the evidence
relating to Begg's allegations. We also assess the conduct of the FBI
268

employees allegedly involved in this matter pursuant to the FBI policies
relating to interrogations as detailed in prior chapters of this report.

Alleged Threats and Psychological Ploys in
Afghanistan

Begg Interview . In his OIG interview, Begg alleged that while he
was incarcerated at Bagram Air Force Base, he was questioned by a
variety of interrogators, including Bell, Harrelson, a CIA employee named
"Martin," and a military interrogator named "Alex." He said that during
the interrogations, both his hands and feet were usually in restraints
unless he needed to write something. He said that his hands were
restrained in front of his body.
He said that while Bell and Harrelson asked him many questions,
the CIA employee and the military interrogators were "clearly in control."
Begg stated that over a period of about a month, he was interviewed 10
to 15 times. He said in addition to Bell and Harrelson, he was
interviewed by four other unidentified FBI agents. He said that
sometimes these were cordial conversations and were not always
interrogations.
Begg told the OIG that during interrogations attended by Bell and
Harrelson in May 2002, he was threatened with rendition to Egypt. He
stated that he was told that a captured al-Qaeda member had "played
the same games" with the interrogators and was sent to Egypt, where he
"broke down" within two days, and that Begg would also be sent to Egypt
if he did not cooperate. He said that initially this threat was made by the
CIA employee, and that Harrelson "possibly" discussed it. Begg said that
he did not-recall Bell making any reference to Egypt_ Begg stated that he
understood that the threat to send him to Egypt meant that he would be
tortured there, as it was commonly known in the Muslim world that
Egypt uses such methods as rape and electric shocks to interrogate
prisoners.

269

Bell Interview . Bell told the OIG that when he and Harrelson
began interviewing Begg in May 2002, Begg was generally cooperative.
He stated that when they interviewed Begg, he was given "Miranda
warnings." In an FD-302 relating to an interview with Begg on May 11,
2002, Bell wrote that at the outset of the interview Begg was asked if he
had previously been read his rights, and that Begg stated he had and
that he fully understood those rights. Bell said that during the interview
there was some "back and forth" with Begg when Begg would deny any
knowledge of something that they believed he knew about. Bell said that
the most aggressive tactic that the interviewers used with Begg was to
raise their voices to challenge him. Bell said that the interviews were
never more aggressive than that and that they never had any physical
contact with Begg or harmed him physically.
Bell stated that for a majority of the interviews of Begg, he and
Harrelson were joined by other members of the intelligence community.
He said that the interviews of Begg were all documented with either an
FD-302 or an EC if a member of the intelligence community was present.
.Bell told the OIG that Begg was escorted into the room for
interviews in hand restraints and was hooded during transport. Bell
stated that the hood was removed when Begg entered the room and that
Bell asked the military escort to remove the restraints, which was done.
Bell denied threatening Begg with being sent to Egypt or
referencing another detainee being sent to Egypt. He told us that such
an approach would be inconsistent with what he and Harrelson were
trying: to accomplish with Begg, which was to elicit information that
could be used in a United States court.

We asked Bell whether he heard anyone question Begg with words
to the effect of "do you ever want to see your children again?" Bell stated
that he did not recall that question being asked. He stated, however,
that one of the strategies that he and Harrelson employed was to try to
encourage Begg to cooperate so that they could move him into FBI
custody, have him plead guilty, and then try to help his family to move
closer to him. Bell said that they were nevertheless frank with Begg that
they did not know what the future would hold for him or any of the
detainees. Bell stated that they never threatened him that he would not
be able to see his family, but they did warn him that if he lied to them
they would not be able to help him.

270

Bell stated that he had no recollection of a woman screaming in a
room next to Begg, nor was he aware of the use of that tactic or even that
there were female detainees held at the facility. He stated that neither he
nor Harrelson ever made any threats or indicated that Begg's family
would be abused or harassed in any way.
OIG Conclusions . Begg stated that a CIA agent and "possibly"
Harrelson threatened him with being sent to Egypt if he did not
cooperate, but that he did not recall Bell threatening to send him to
Egypt. Given Begg's uncertainty about what Harrelson said to him and
lack of recollection of Bell making such a threat, we found insufficient
evidence to conclude that an FBI employee threatened Begg with
rendition to Egypt.
When Begg was interviewed in Bagram in May 2002, the FBI
Director had not yet made the decision that the FBI would not participate
in interrogations when other agencies were using tactics not normally
available to the FBI. (As noted in Chapter Four, we believe this decision
occurred in July 2002 in connection with the Zubaydah interrogation.)
In other words, the FBI's "do not participate" policy had not yet been
communicated to all agents serving in military venues. Therefore, even if
a CIA agent did threaten Begg with rendition in the presence of Harrelson
or Bell, FBI policy did not yet clearly require them to leave the
interrogation.
A similar analysis applies with respect to Begg's allegation that he
was led to believe that his wife was screaming in an adjacent room. Bell
said he did not recall this incident, and we found no other evidence that
it occurred or that Bell or Harrelson directed it. Moreover, Begg
acknowledged that the CIA and the DOD were in charge of his
interrogations.
We also found insufficient evidence to conclude that the
interrogators explicitly or implicitly threatened Begg's children when they
showed Begg pictures of his family. Even assuming that the
interrogators asked Begg if he cared for his family, as he alleged, this
form of questioning as a means to induce cooperation would not
constitute an improper threat in violation of FBI interrogation policies.

Alleged Physical Abuse in Afghanistan

Begg Interview . Begg also told the OIG that he suspected that
interrogators in Afghanistan, including Bell and Harrelson, were involved
in an incident in May 2002 in which Begg was physically abused by
military personnel. Begg said that during his second or third
interrogation, he was in an interrogation room with Bell, Harrelson, and

271

a CIA employee. He said that at the end of the interrogation session the
interrogators said they did not believe that he was telling the truth.
According to Begg, the CIA employee stated as he was leaving the room
that he was going to arrange Begg's punishment. Begg said that shortly
thereafter military personnel escorted him to an adjoining room where
his hands were restrained behind his back and closely connected to his
ankle restraints by a chain. Begg described this as being "hog-tied." He
said that he was also hooded. Begg told the OIG that Bell and Harrelson
were present in the interrogation room when he was being moved to the
other room by soldiers.
Begg told the OIG that several hours later a soldier named Nathan
came in and told Begg that the cases of detainees being sent to Syria and
Egypt were "very real."
Later in the OIG interview, Begg said that not long after he was
restrained on the ground in the room next to the interrogation room, he
was struck in the back and head and that he thought it was by the
soldiers. He said that he was left alone in that position until the
restraints were removed the next day. He said that this was the only
time that this kind of treatment occurred.

Begg said that he did not hear any of his interrogators tell the
military personnel to tie him up or restrain him, but that he believed that
in almost every case, the interrogators would determine how detainees
were treated.
According to Army records, one of the accounts that Begg gave to
Army investigators was somewhat different from the version he provided
to the OIG. According to an investigative report prepared during the
Army investigation, Begg told an investigator on June 22, 2004, that he
was never beaten or struck by anyone at Bagram, but that he was "hogtied" and laid on his side for a period of time. In a subsequent interview
in December 2004, Begg made essentially the same allegations that he
made to the OIG.
Bell Interview . Bell told the OIG that he did not hear a CIA
employee stating he was going to arrange Begg's punishment. Bell said
that if he had heard such a statement, he would have withdrawn from
the interview and reported the statement to his FBI chain of command.
Bell also pointed out that such a tactic would have been inconsistent
with his approach of attempting to build rapport with Begg.
Bell denied that Begg was "hog-tied" and struck in a room next to
the interrogation room at Bagram. Bell said that if such an incident had
happened, Begg would have told Bell about it. Bell said that he

272

"certainly" would not have allowed something like that to occur. Bell also
said that he was not aware of a room that Begg would have been taken to
other than the interrogation room or his cell.
Interview of Another FBI Agent . We interviewed another FBI
agent who served in the military in Afghanistan in the summer of 2002
before joining the FBI. The agent stated that he attended an FBI
interrogation of Begg at Bagram and that the FBI agent's questioning was
calm and personable. He also told us, however, that he witnessed Begg
being slapped on the back of the head during the interrogation as a way
of getting his attention. The agent said he did not recall who slapped
Begg, but he was certain it was not the FBI agent. He said that Begg
appeared agitated about being slapped, but that shortly after the incident
Begg was "laughing and smiling."
OIG Conclusions . Numerous witnesses interviewed by the Army
Criminal Investigation Command stated that they never witnessed Be
or any other detainee being hog-tied at the Bagram facilit

Even crediting Begg's version of his treatment at Bagram, Begg did
not allege that he was struck or hog-tied by an FBI agent or even that an
FBI agent was present during this incident. Begg's allegation of his
interrogators' complicity in the incident was based not on personal
observation or direct knowledge, but rather on his belief that
interrogators dictated how detainees were treated and on the statement
of the CIA interrogator that he was going to arrange Begg's punishment.
In the face of Bell's specific denials and his explanation that abusing
Begg would undermine the effort to build rapport with him, we found
insufficient basis to conclude that Bell or Harrelson were aware of or
complicit in the alleged incident of physical abuse.
3.

Alleged Threats and Coercion at GTMO

Begg Interview . Begg told the OIG that several days after he
arrived in GTMO, Bell, Harrelson, and two military interrogators
interviewed him and took a statement from him. He said that Bell and
Harrelson presented him with a draft statement and told him that if he

273

refused to sign it he could face "untold amounts of years' imprisonment
in Guantanamo without ever seeing [his] family or having any access to
any legal recourse, which also could include execution by lethal injection
or whatever." Begg said that Bell and Harrelson mentioned that they
wanted him to enter into a plea bargain followed by witness protection.
He said they gave him the example of "Sammy the Bull" who killed 19
people and only got 2 years in prison. Begg also stated that Bell and
Harrelson gave him confusing messages, telling him at times that he
would be sent to Britain and at other times to Pakistan.
Begg said that the agents gave him the draft statement and allowed
him to make changes. He said the statement had poor grammar and
clearly was not drafted by him. Begg said the agents came back minutes
later after having made some of his requested changes and asked him to
sign it, but Begg then asked to see a lawyer. Begg said the agents told
him that he would only see a lawyer after he signed the statement. He
said that he went to pray first and then signed the document out of
"desperation, isolation, fear, apprehension, and all those things that had
happened like beatings and threats."
Bell Interview . Bell told us that representatives from the DOD
Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) in GTMO who were preparing for
the military commission trials requested his assistance in preparing a
case against Begg, who was to be the first detainee tried by the military
commission. The representative from CITF wanted Bell and Harrelson to
clarify some of Begg's statements and have Begg sign a written
statement. Bell said Begg's statement was prepared by an attorney for
the Office of Military Commissions. Bell said he thought that the
statement was "amateurish" as a way of doing business, but he said it
was accurate because it was prepared from the reports of prior interviews
with Begg.
Bell stated that he and Harrelson went through the statement with
Begg "line by line" and told him that he could cross out the items that he
did not agree with. Bell said that Begg initialed each paragraph that he
agreed with and crossed out the ones that he disagreed with, and the
statement went back to the military. Bell said that he and Harrelson
subsequently presented Begg with a final copy of the statement that had
been revised by the military. He said that Begg asked to pray first, and
after praying signed the statement. Bell recalled that during the
meetings with Begg two military personnel were present.

Bell denied that Begg was threatened with imprisonment and the
possibility of execution if he did not sign the statement. Bell said that he
and Harrelson would have stressed the importance of cooperation as the
better route. Bell further said that he never suggested to Begg that if did

274

not to cooperate there would be repercussions to his family. Bell stated
that the agents wanted Begg to be transferred to DOJ custody and have
him plead guilty. They discussed with Begg that the FBI could help his
family by having them moved close to Begg.
Interview of Another FBI Agent . We interviewed another agent
who visited GTMO in February 2003 and worked closely with CITF,
which was developing a case against Begg for the military tribunal. The
agent said that while he was at GTMO he met with Begg several times,
and that Begg was cooperating with the FBI. The agent told us that the
guards treated Begg well and that Begg joked around with them.
The agent said that Bell and Harrelson had already left GTMO
when the agent visited the first time and that Begg had already given the
signed statement to the FBI. According to the agent, Begg told him that
he was being threatened at the time that he gave the written statement to
the FBI. The agent told the OIG that he did not probe this any further
with Begg because he viewed Begg's complaint as an attempt to distance
himself from the written statement that he had given and to minimize it.
He said that Begg complained about "some other guys" who told him that
he would be sent back to Afghanistan, but Begg did not specify whether
the people who supposedly said this were from the FBI or the military.
Begg also joked with the agent about Bell and Harrelson, referring to
them as "big" and "funny."
Begg' s Signed Statement . The OIG reviewed a copy of Begg's
signed statement dated February 13, 2003. The statement is eight
single-spaced pages, signed by Begg, Bell, Harrelson, and two DOD
Criminal Investigative Division agents. Begg's signed statement
indicates, among other things, that Begg sympathized with the cause of
al-Qaeda, attended terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and England so that he could assist in waging global jihad against
enemies of Islam, including Russia and India; associated with and
assisted several prominent terrorists and supporters of terrorists and
discussed potential terrorist acts with them; recruited young operatives
for the global jihad; and provided financial support for terrorist training
camps.
Notations that appear to be Begg's hand-written initials appear at
the beginning and end of each paragraph of the statement. The
statement also has additions and deletions that are also initialed. These
include both minor and substantive changes. For example, on the first
page Begg apparently corrected the spelling of one of his aliases, changed
"handguns" to "handgun," and deleted "hand" in front of "grenades." On
page 3, Begg apparently changed the statement "I am unsure of the exact
amount of money sent to terrorist training camps of the many years I

275

helped fund the camps," by replacing the word "many" with the words
"couple of." On page 4, he added the following sentence apparently for
purposes of explanation for his conduct: "This was to help the Kurds in
Iraq."
The facts in Begg's detailed statement are generally consistent with
the facts set forth in the numerous FD-302 summaries of Begg's
interviews. For example, his statement described the training camps in
Afghanistan that he attended and what he learned. This information was
similarly developed in the FBI's FD-302s.

Some of the conclusions that appear in his statement are not
found in the FD-302s. Specifically, in his statement he admitted that he

The OIG was not
able to find a reference in the FD-302s that correlated with this part of
Begg 's statement.
OIG Conclusions . If true, Begg's allegations concerning how his
statement was obtained would potentially violate the FBI's prohibition
against using threats to coerce a confession. However, the OIG did not
find sufficient evidence to support Begg's allegations. The statement
itself with the additions and deletions initialed by Begg support its
voluntariness. In addition, even after making the statement Begg
continued to cooperate with the FBI, according to the FBI agent who met
with him later.
Furthermore, we found that Bell's denial that he threatened Begg
in order to get him to sign the statement was credible because such
conduct could have undermined Bell's long-term strategy of building
rapport with Begg to obtain his cooperation for other prosecutions. Begg
even acknowledged that Bell and Harrelson had mentioned the
possibility of a plea bargain, witness protection, and cooperation with the
government. Therefore, we concluded that the evidence did not support
the allegation that they coerced Begg into signing the statement.

II.

Allegations of Mistreatment of Saleh Muklif Saleh

In this Section we address allegations that detainee Saleh Muklif
Saleh was abused by interrogators
in Iraq during
late February and early March 2004. According to the allegations, FBI
agents participated in these interrogations.

276

Background and Allegations

Saleh is an Iraqi who was allegedly involved in

Saleh also was allegedly
in Iraq. He was arrested by

involved in

On February 29, 2004, Saleh was interrogated at the U.S.
detention facility in - by FBI special agents Rohr, Cisco, and
Howard, along with an FBI interpreter and two Iraqi police officials.'89
Prior to the interrogation session, the FBI fingerprinted and
photographed Saleh. During the interrogation session Howard took
photographs to document whether Saleh had any pre-existing injuries,
the condition that he was in, and the conditions under which the
interrogation was conducted. Rohr provided the OIG with 13
photographs of the interrogation in
Rohr, Cisco, and Howard prepared an EC dated March 1, 2004,
summarizing a 5-hour nighttime interrogation session (including a 1-

hour break

Shortl after Saleh's interrogation, the FBI agents and interpreter
returned to
. Around the same time, Saleh's cousin was arrested
and brought to the U.S. detention facility
Over the next
several days, both Saleh and his cousin were further interrogated by
military personnel, who Howard stated were from the U.S. Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (OSI).

, and the OSI agent contacted the FBI about assistance in further

interrogating Saleh and his cousin. Arrangements were made to bring
Saleh and his cousin to = for additional questioning. Howard said
that the reason Saleh was interrogated at
was to bring him closer to
the location where his information could be put to use.

189 These names are pseudonyms.

277

Late on March 3, 2004, two FBI employees assisted in transporting
Saleh and his cousin to -, where they were placed in the U.S.
detention facility prior to the interrogation. A "Receipt for Inmate or
Detained Person" indicates that Rohr delivered Saleh to the military at
= at 1:11 a.m. on March 4, 2004. The receipt states "receved [sic] in
good heath," with the additional words with minor bruising 8v scratches"
added in different handwriting. The military police sergeant who signed
the receipt told military investigators that he did not write the additional
words on the form and that he did not know who added them.
When asked about the reference in the receipt to "bruising and
scratches," one of the FBI agents said that Saleh had no shoes and that
his feet were bruised and scratched from walking around barefoot. An
FBI medic told military investigators that prior to the interrogation
session -, he examined the two detainees and treated both of them
for abrasions on the wrists that were likely associated with plastic
handcuffs.
Another Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person states that Rohr
picked up Saleh for questioning at 7:16 a.m. on March 5, 2004.
Accordin to Rohr, Saleh and his cousin were brought to a where they were further interrogated by the same
three FBI agents (Rohr, Cisco, and Howard) and an OSI agent who had
previously interviewed Saleh in -. Also present during the
interrogation were two Iraqi police officers who were working closely with
the three FBI agents in Iraq.
The interrogation session lasted for less than 8 hours. According
to Howard, the interrogation was conducted with a sense of ur
because the interrogators had information that

. For a
portion of the interrogation, a third detainee was brought into the room
and was questioned. A fourth FBI agent, Bennett, was brought to the
interrogation session for security, although he did not stay for the entire
interrogation session.190 Howard told us the FBI took the lead in the
interrogation, although the OSI agent also participated actively. Howard
stated that he did not recall the name of the OSI agent who participated.

Saleh's cousin was blindfolded with duct tape for some portion of
the interrogation so that
. Howard took photographs at this interrogation

session , which were included in the photographs provided to the OIG.
190 Bennett is a pseudonym.

278

Rohr stated that they treated Saleh professionally. Rohr and Cisco
said that they bought him sandals and food and allowed him bathroom
breaks. They said that they sat in a semi-circle around Saleh, who was
also seated, and threw questions at him quickly to confuse him. They
also said that they yelled at him to confuse him.

According to the agents, Saleh and his cousin
, although the FBI
did not provide the OIG with any Form FD-302 or other
contemporaneous record of what happened at this interrogation session.
On March 8, 2004, another FBI agent who was not present at the
interview signed a sworn statement for the m ilit
's investigative file
summarizing information provided by Saleh,

On March 11, 2004,
Saleh was transferred to Abu Ghraib prison.
From records provided by the military, it appears that the first time
Saleh made any allegations of abuse was on June 16, 2004, when he was
at Abu Ghraib prison. According to a military document, Saleh told
military personnel that he was abused during 4 days in February while
detained at
, and on the first day that he was
detained at 0. He stated that he had sustained injuries, including a
dislocated shoulder. However, the translations of two sworn statements
that Saleh gave to the military dated June 19 and July 14, 2004,
describe onl abuse that allegedly took place before Saleh was
transferred
In the June 19 statement, Saleh alleged that "[t]hey tortured me
and cuffed me in an act called the scorpion, and pouring cold water on
me. They tortured me from the morning until the morning of the next
day, and when I fell down from the severing torture I fell on the barbed
wires, and then they dragged me from my feet and I was wounded and,
and they punched me on my stomach." CID provided Saleh's statement
to the FBI's Baghdad Operations Center on June 29, 2004.

In the July 14 statement, Saleh made more detailed allegations.
He stated that while he was detained
soldiers cut his clothes off, tied his arms and legs together behind his
back in a "scorpion operation," tied boxes of canned food to his
shoulders, and poured cold water on him if he fell on the ground from
exhaustion. He also stated: "They gave me one or two bottles of water
and they asked me to drink it while I was hungry and they forced me to
drink it, so I did, and I felt vomiting, then they ordered me to drink

279

again, and they were looking at me and laughing." He also described
forced exercise and being subjected to "loud music like the devil's voices."
Saleh stated that when he refused to confess, he was punched in the
stomach and face. He stated that one person used a tool around his
neck, pulling him backward, and said that "when I fell down on barbed
wires they dragged me from my feet until I get cuts in my body." Neither
the June 19 statement nor the July 14 statement contained an allegation
that Saleh's shoulder was dislocated.
The Army conducted an investigation into these allegations and
took sworn statements from Rohr, Howard, Cisco, the FBI agent who
transported Saleh and his cousin to -, and the FBI medic who had
bandaged Saleh and his cousin. On October 20, 2004, the Army
Criminal Investigation Command issued a Memorandum concluding that
its investigation "established there was insufficient evidence to prove or
disprove the offenses occurred as alleged by Mr. Saleh." The
memorandum noted that FBI witnesses denied that Saleh was harmed
during their interviews, that they did not observe evidence of recent
injuries, and that medical screenings of Saleh on March 11 and July 13
did not document treatment for injuries that might have been caused by
punching, kicking, or being dragged across barbed wire. The Army
memorandum did not provide further explanation for the conclusion of
"insufficient evidence to prove or disprove."
According to DOD documents, on February 1, 2005, the Army
Criminal Investigation Command reopened the investigation in order to
"conduct a thorough review of this investigation and determine if the
investigative summary supported the listed offense and justified the
listing of those offenses as `insufficient evidence.' On February 2 (the
next day), the Army's Special Agent in Charge (SAC) issued a report
based on his review of the existing record that concluded that:
[T]he investigation clearly demonstrates the detainee was not
injured during his apprehension or subsequent
interrogations by the FBI. This fact was documented within
hours of the event by both the FBI Interrogator and a
medical screening conducted two days after his
apprehension. The review indicates the investigation does
not support listing the offenses as "Insufficient Evidence"
rather, clearly indicates the offense did not occur as alleged
and should therefore list the offenses as "Unfounded".
In support of this conclusion, the Army SAC cited the testimony of
Rohr, Cisco, Howard, as well as the statements of an FBI agent who
accompanied Saleh _ and an FBI medic who treated wounds on
Saleh's wrists. The SAC also cited a report of a medical examination on

280

July 13, 2004, which found no injuries consistent with the detainee's
allegations . On February 2, 2004, the Detachment Commander
approved a memorandum adopting the SAC's conclusion that the
offenses did not occur.
B.

OIG Investigation

The OIG further investigated Saleh's allegations by interviewing the
four FBI agents who were present during the interrogation of Saleh and

his cousin _ (Rohr, Cisco, Howard, and Bennett), the FBI
interpreter who was present during the interrogation at ^, and the
FBI a ent who was involved in transporting the two detainees
191 We also reviewed relevant documentation, including
statements to CID, survey responses, and digital photographs provided
by one of the FBI agents. Because one of the FBI agents we interviewed
provided a recollection of events that in part was materially different from
the versions provided by the other agents, we summarize each agent's
version of the incident separately.

FBI Special Agent Bennett

In his response to the OIG survey, Bennett indicated the he
personally observed the following conduct: "using water to prevent
breathing by a detainee or to create the sensation of drowning." In the
descriptive part of his response, Bennett referred to the interrogation at
=involving three FBI agents and two police officers. Although the
response did not mention Saleh, it identified Rohr, Cisco, and Howard as
witnesses to an interrogation session that allegedly involved aggressive
treatment of the detainees by Iraqi police officers.
When we interviewed Bennett, he told us that on an evening in
early March 2004, he was sitting at his desk in the common area of the
when Rohr walked by and asked
him to assist in an interrogation session
involving three
detainees. Bennett said that he understood he was needed as an extra
body.

Bennett told us that he and Rohr drove to
where he observed three detainees being interrogated b Rohr, Cisco,
Howard, a military officer (identified by others as the
a ent , and two Iraqi police officers

191 The OIG was interested in interviewing Saleh, but the DOD has not
responded to requests from the OIG regarding Saleh's current whereabouts.

281

Bennett stated that when he entered the house he was
immediately struck by the scene before him because he had never seen
Iraqi detainees or witnessed an interrogation session in Iraq. He said
that the questioning was already underway when he arrived. He also
observed that the Iraqi police officers were yelling at the detainees while
the FBI agents were standing back and writing down questions. He said
that the military officer also was yelling at the detainees.
Bennett said that he was not sure about the sequence of events,
but he observed' a detainee in a "stress position" and two other detainees
having water poured down their throats by a military interrogator. He
said that at the house he saw a detainee in a "stress position," which
consisted of kneeling and facing a wall. He described the position of the
detainee as kneeling such that he was not able to touch the wall or lean
back on his legs.
Bennett said that he also observed that the other two detainees
were seated in chairs and that one of the detainees was blindfolded with
duct tape. He believed that the detainees had their hands in restraints.
Bennett recalled that at some point during the interrogation the
military officer "put water down" a seated detainee's throat. He said he
guessed that the purpose of the water was to give the detainee the
sensation that he was drowning so that he would provide the information
that the interrogator wanted. Bennett stated that the detainee was
gagging and spitting out water. He said that the detainee appeared to be
uncomfortable and assumed that he had trouble breathing. Bennett said
that one water bottle was used, but he did not know how long that the
incident lasted.
Bennett stated that the military officer walked behind the sitting
detainee, pushed the detainee's head back, and put the water in his
mouth. Bennett said that he did not know how the military officer held
the detainee's mouth open or held the detainee's head back, but that he
acted on his own without assistance from others. Bennett stated that
the military officer "held the guy's head back and poured water down his
throat."

Bennett said that during the water incident he went outside the
house on the doorstep or front porch with the door open. He said that he
could still observe the interrogation from the front porch through the
door. He believed that other FBI agents joined him on the front porch at
some point in time. He said that one of the agents on the front porch
with him said, "When stuff like this happens, you leave the room."
Bennett said he did not recall which agents said that, but he believed the
reference was to the water incident.

282

Bennett said he was uncomfortable with what he saw because
"that's not the way you do things in the U.S." He said that he walked in
and out of the house more than once because he was uncomfortable and
also wanted to chew tobacco.
Bennett stated that less than 30 minutes after the water incident
involving one detainee, the military officer repeated the water procedure
on the other seated detainee. He said that he did not recall whether he
was inside or on the front porch when the second water incident
occurred or where the other FBI agents were.
Bennett said that after the first water incident, he went back into
the house and that some of the other FBI agents were with him. Bennett
said he did not recall whether the agents participated in asking questions
between the two water incidents.
When asked what the detainees' reactions were to the water
incidents and whether they appeared to be frightened or intimidated,
Bennett said that they appeared to be used to it or to have been through
it before.

Bennett said that the detainees appeared disheveled and dirty. He
stated that they looked like they had been "slapped around" or "roughed
up," but they did not appear to have any contusions and were not
bleeding. He said that other than the water incidents, he did not see any
touching of the detainees by the interrogators.
Bennett said that not long after the second water incident he
received a ride back to the Baghdad Operations Center from another FBI
agent who had brought paperwork to the three agents. He said that the
other three agents stayed at the interrogation, but that he did not know
how long it lasted. He said that he only stayed for approximately an
hour.
Bennett stated that he did not provide any information to the FBI's
OSC or Deputy OSC regarding the interrogation. He said that he
assumed the other three agents kept the OSC and Deputy OSC informed.
Bennett also described Rohr, Cisco, and Howard as the "hardest working
people there."

The OIG showed Bennett the photographs taken of the
interrogation session _, and he identified two of the detainees in
the photographs as the detainees involved in the water incidents.

283

FBI Special Agent Howard

Howard said that he took photographs of both Saleh and the
interrogation session so that there would be a record of what was going
on and to show that the injuries to Saleh were re-existing. He identified
all but one of the photographs as being taken
, where the FBI
agents spent 2 da s, and he identified one from the interrogation of Saleh
and his cousin
Howard said that he was in and out of the interrogation at the
- "a lot" and that the interrogation had started before he arrived. He
said that the military officer was taking an active role in the

interro ation, but that the FBI had the lead. Howard stated that •
was also involved in the questioning.
When asked by the OIG investigators about an agent observing a
detainee kneeling against the wall, Howard stated that he did not recall
any of the three detainees being questioned while kneeling. He stated
that the only time that he recalled any detainee kneeling was when a
detainee asked for a drink of water and was given a drink by the OSI
agent. When asked to describe the circumstances of the drink, he said
he could not remember why the detainee was kneeling, but he said that
the detainee's hands were bound and that the OSI agent poured water
down the detainee's throat after he had asked for a drink of water.
When we asked Howard whether the incident involved forcing
water down a detainee's throat, he responded that if too much water was
being poured, all the detainee had to do was close his mouth because
there was never a situation where the mouth was forced open. He said
that the interrogators had only one-liter bottles of water.
Howard further stated that he would not have wanted to drink that
way, but if his hands were bound, that was the only alternative. He said
that he thought it was an odd way to give water to a detainee and that he
had not seen it before. He stated that it appeared to be the routine

method for giving the detainee water and the detainee was used to it.
Howard said he did not observe that the detainee was squirming.
He also said that when the detainee had enough water, he closed his
mouth, and that he did not recall the detainee gagging or choking. He
stated that the detainee was holding his own head back. Howard said
that had he been the one providing water he would have placed the bottle
to the detainee's lips rather than pouring it down his throat like the OSI
agent did. Although he said he viewed this method of giving the detainee
water as odd and unusual, he did not see it as abusive. However,

284

Howard said that the OSI agent would not have had to go much further
for the method to The a problem."
Regarding the kneeling, Howard said that he had seen detainees
placed in a kneeling position as a security measure during a detainee
movement. He said that this incident involving the detainee kneeling
was probably for the purpose of interrogation rather than security.
When asked how long the detainee was kneeling, Howard said not longer
than a minute or two - long enough for him to get a drink of water.
Howard said that he never intentionally left the room to avoid
observing an incident at an interrogation. He said that if he saw
something that he was uncomfortable with, he would step in to stop it.
Regarding the duct tape around the head of Saleh's cousin,
Howard said that he had no part in placing the tape on the detainee's
head and that he did not see it happen. He stated that at the time the
military's standard protocol for a detainee movement was to have cloth
over the detainee's eyes taped on his head and then hooded. He said
that the military usually removed the tape after the transport, and that
he guessed that the photograph was taken shortly after the detainee
arrived. When the OIG investigators mentioned the scenario of
blindfolding the detainee so that he could not see another detainee who
was in the room, Howard said that "we did that at one point."
3.

FBI Special Agent Rohr

Rohr also told the OIG that he was in and out of the interrogation.
He said that he and Howard had to pick up and return one of the
detainees to the detention facility, and that each movement took
approximately 90 minutes while the interrogation of the other detainees
would have continued.
Rohr said that placing detainees on their knees was routine when
moving detainees. He stated, however, that having a detainee kneel as a
stress position for purposes of an interrogation was not permitted.

Rohr stated that he never saw anyone pushing water down a
detainee's throat and that he would not sanction that type of conduct.
He said that when detainees drank water during interrogations, the
bottle was held for them because their hands were restrained. He said
that he recalled that Saleh and his cousin were given water and food
during the interrogation, and that he never heard complaints from the
detainees that they were abused with water.
We asked Rohr whether he stated or heard another agent state
that the FBI should leave the room when things like the water incident
285

occur. Rohr responded that neither he nor any of the other agents made
such a statement.
When the OIG asked Rohr about the duct tape around the head of
Saleh's cousin, Rohr responded that one of the FBI agents (he thought it
might have been Cisco) placed cloth over the detainee's eyes and then
lightly taped the head with duct tape. He explained that the purpose of
the cloth was to avoid pulling off the detainee's eyelashes and eyebrows.
He said that the tape was not ripped off the detainee's head.
Rohr said that the purpose of the blindfold was to have Saleh's
cousin repeat his admission for Saleh to hear without letting Saleh's
cousin know that Saleh was in the room. Rohr said that they could not
use a bag because then Saleh would not be certain that his cousin was
making the admission.
Rohr said that when he retrieved the detainees from the detention
facility at - prior to the interrogation, they were smiling when
they saw that he was picking them up because in his view they
recognized that the FBI was not going to use harsh tactics.
Rohr pointed out that in the photographs of Saleh at the
interrogation sessions, Saleh does not appear to be scared of his
interrogators, but instead looks comfortable with them. In addition,
Rohr suggested that if they were trying to torture the detainees, they
would not have called in the FBI medic to examine and treat the minor
abrasions on Saleh's and his cousin's wrists.
4.

FBI Special Agent Cisco

We interviewed Cisco prior to receiving the allegations from
Bennett. Cisco subsequently resigned from the FBI. When contacted for
a second interview, Cisco informed the OIG that he was being sent to
Iraq several days later by his new private employer, but he agreed to be
interviewed. However, he did not return our subsequent phone calls to
schedule the interview. Therefore, we were not able to ask Cisco
questions about Bennett' observations.
In his earlier OIG interview, however, Cisco provided an account
that was similar to his statement to CID. He said that the FBI agents
yelled at Saleh and that they were playing "good cop/bad cop" during •
interrogation.

Cisco told the OIG that Saleh initially denied everything during the
. The agents subsequently brow ht Saleh and his
interrogation
cousin
, where his cousin starte d confessing to

286

When Cisco was asked if he observed any treatment of detainees
that would cause him concern, he stated "no," except for an incident at
- where he saw a detainee carrying a case of MREs while doing
calisthenics. Cisco said he did not know whether this incident involved
regular exercise or whether the detainee was being forced to carry the
case. He said that the detainee did not appear to be in any stress.
He said that when the FBI brought Saleh and his cousin to -,
the agents noticed that the detainees' wrists had minor abrasions from
the flex-cuffs, and the FBI medic was called to treat them.
5.

Other Witnesses

We interviewed the FBI agent who was involved in transporting
Saleh and his cousin -. He stated that he was not involved in the
interrogation sessions, and the photographs of the interrogations
sessions do not include this a ent. He said that when he picked up
Saleh and his cousin
, they appeared healthy, had no
visible marks, and did not express any complaints. He said that he
witnessed the interrogation
for only about 10 or 15 minutes
when he brought the FBI agents paperwork to sign relating to the
custody of the detainees. He said that he did not see anything unusual
during that time. He also said that he never witnessed any treatment of
detainees that was inconsistent with what he was taught at Quantico.

We also interviewed a contract translator for the FBI, who was
present at the - FBI interview but who said that he was not
resent during the interrogation session of Saleh and his cousin at the

the

where the alleged water incident took place. The photographs of
interrogation do not show the translator. He said that

the OSI agent may have played the "bad cop" and exhibited some sort of
aggression, but he could not remember what it was.
The translator said that the technique of requiring Saleh to kneel
possibly was used
but he was unable to make the distinction
whether the kneeling was directed by the FBI agents or the OSI agent.
He further stated that Saleh was not struck with any object or with a
"fist to the head," but that he was "flipped about" by the interrogators
during the process of having him face the wall.

In addition, the translator said that Saleh's cousin was the only
detainee he saw blindfolded with tape - others wore blackened goggles or
hoods. When asked what the purpose of blindfolding was, he said that it
may have been to punish or disorient the detainee. He also said that he
observed the blindfold being taken off the detainee and that it was not

287

painful at all. He believed that Howard took off the blindfold in the least
painful way possible.
We were unable to interview the OSI agent because none of the
four FBI agents who were present during the interview said they could
recall his name. In addition, the materials provided to the OIG by the
DOD do not indicate that military investigators attempted to identify or
locate this witness or the Iraqi policemen who were present at the
interrogations.
C.

OIG Conclusions

We analyzed separately Saleh's allegations regarding events at
in late February 2004 and events
on
approximately March 5, 2004.
1.

Saleh 's Allegations Regarding

Saleh alleged that he was mistreated over a period of several days
beginning on February 26, 2004, until he was trans p orted to
late
on March 3, 2004. Saleh was detained at
during
that time. As noted above, Saleh claimed he was restrained in a
"scorpion position," subjected to forced exercise and loud music, and
dragged over barbed wire during this period. The evidence did not show
that an FBI agents witnessed or participated in abusing Saleh at _

Saleh stated that one of his alleged abusers - was a
"black soldier" and that one was a soldier with blue eyes, blonde hair,
and tattoos who was accompanied by a female. These descriptions did
not match any of the FBI agents who interviewed Saleh. Moreover, Saleh
did not specifically identify any of his abusers at - as FBI agents.
Saleh was detained at that location for nearly a week. The
available evidence indicates that Rohr, Cisco and Howard interviewed
Saleh together for 5 hours
E on February 29. The rest of the
time Saleh was in confinement
no
he was in the custody and
control of the military. Rohr told us that Saleh was interrogated by the
military after the FBI agents left the air base, possibly by OSI personnel,
and that he provided information which resulted in him being transferred
to - for further questioning. Moreover, if Saleh was in fact
subjected to harsh treatment during this interrogation, the FBI agents
would not necessarily have known about it.
The Army concluded that Saleh was not injured during his
apprehension or subsequent interrogations by the FBI, stating that
"[t]his fact was documented within hours of the event by both the FBI

288

Interrogator and a medical screening conducted two days after his
apprehension." However, we did not find this assessment of the evidence
complete. The materials supplied to the OIG by the Army did not include
any indication that the Army conducted any interviews of non-FBI
interrogators or military police who had contact with Saleh during February 26-March 3, 2004. The Army's materials neither
identified nor discussed the existence of the OSI personnel who were
involved in the interrogation of Saleh
Moreover, the FBI "documentation" referred to by the SAC was the EC
dated March 1, 2004, which did not contain any assessment of whether
Saleh had been injured.
In the photogra hs taken during the - interrogation on
February 29 and the ia interrogation on approximately March 5, no
clear evidence of wounds or other recent injuries is visible. In addition,
as noted above, the receipt for Saleh's arrival _ at 1:11 a.m. on
March 4 indicates he was received "in good health," although an
unknown person added the words "with minor bruising & scratches."
However, we found some evidence that could be interpreted to be
consistent with some of Saleh's allegations. Bennett told the OIG that
when he saw Saleh and the other detainee
, they looked like
they had been "slapped around" or "roughed up," although they did not
appear to have any contusions and were not bleeding. Some of Saleh's
complaints related to treatment that would not necessarily have resulted
in obvious injuries that would appear in photographs. Saleh described
having boxes of canned food being tied to or put on his shoulders and
being ordered to step up and down on other boxes. Cisco told the OIG
that he observed a detainee "doing calisthenics with a case of MREs,"
although he did not identify Saleh as the detainee.192 Moreover, Saleh's
description of being forced to drink bottles of water until he felt sick was
consistent with at least one agent's description of a technique used on
Saleh - (discussed in the next section). Saleh also described being
choked with a tool that extended and "was solid like a stick with a white
thing that extended like a knife." The military investigator found that
this description was consistent with a device know as an ASP baton,
which is sometimes used to control prisoners. In addition, a Detainee
Preinterrogation Evaluation dated March 11 indicated that Saleh had an
"abdominal strain," which conceivably could have been associated with
being struck in the stomach, as Saleh alleged occurred

289

We concluded, however, that even if Saleh's allegations about
mistreatment
are true, there is insufficient evidence to
conclude that the FBI agents who interviewed Saleh at that location on
February 29, 2004, participated in this conduct, heard about it, or saw
clear evidence that abuse of this nature had taken place outside of the
FBI's presence.

Alleged Mistreatment of Detainees at

We also analyzed the conduct of the FBI agents during the
interrogation of Saleh _ on March 5, 2004. The allegations
regarding this interrogation came primarily from information provided by
Bennett, not Saleh.193
Alleged Use of Water on Detainees . We concluded that a nonFBI interrogator used water on one or more shackled detainees (one of
which may have been Saleh) in a manner that would be considered
coercive and would not be permitted to FBI agents conducting interviews
in the United States.
We credited Bennett's account of the water incident. Bennett had
no reason to fabricate this account; indeed, he appeared to be reluctant
to provide it to OIG investigators. Howard described the same conduct,
albeit in somewhat gentler terms. He told the OIG that the OSI
interrogator gave a drink to the detainee by pouring water down the
throat of the detainee's open mouth while he was kneeling with his
hands cuffed behind his back. We did not agree with Howard, however,
that this conduct was solely for the purpose of giving the detainee a
drink. Other means of supplying water to the detainee were available,
such as raisin the bottle to the detainee's lips. Indeed, the photographs
of Saleh
show him with his hands cuffed in front. He could
have given himself a drink of water from a plastic bottle in that condition.
The FBI agents also told us they offered the detainees food during the
interview. Unless the agents were planning to feed them by hand, they
apparently expected to allow the detainees to feed themselves with their
hands cuffed in front. Likewise, the detainees could have been permitted
to drink from a plastic bottle with cuffed hands. Instead, the detainees
were re-cuffed with their hands behind their backs before the water was
poured down their throat. Therefore, we concluded that Howard's
193 In the two sworn statements that Saleh provided to Army investigators,
Saleh did not allege that any mistreatment occurred during the interview that took
place _ on approximately March 5, 2004. Memoranda prepared by Army
investigators suggest that Saleh did make such allegations during interviews on other
occasions. However, we were unable to determine from the military documents
provided to us what Saleh specifically alleged about his treatment at -.

290

description of this incident as merely an unconventional way of giving a
detainee his requested drink of water was not persuasive.
We also note the consistency between Bennett's description of the
water incident and Saleh's allegation that "[t]hey gave me one or two
bottles of water and they asked me to drink it while I was hungry and
they forced me to drink it, so I felt vomiting, then they ordered me to
drink again, ...."194
At the same time, we do not consider what Bennett and Howard
saw to be equivalent to "waterboarding," in which drowning is simulated
by pouring water on a prisoner's face and mouth while he is restrained
on an inclined board. As described by both Bennett and Howard, the
water was administered by a single interrogator. A single interrogator
would have had difficulty preventing a detainee from closing his mouth
or turning his head to avoid choking. Rather, we believe that this rough
technique was part of an effort to intimidate the detainees and increase
their feelings of helplessness.
Bennett left the room when he observed this activity; he also stated
that that another FBI agent said that "when stuff like this happens, you
leave the room." Such an instruction would have been consistent with
the training that some (but not all) agents told us they received before
deploying to the military zones: that FBI agents should remove
themselves from any interrogation in which another agency's interrogator
used techniques that would not be permitted for an FBI agent.195
None of the FBI agents personally participated in the conduct that
Bennett described. The question therefore is whether any agent's
presence in the room or continued involvement in the interrogation after
the incident occurred violated any FBI policy.
As detailed in Chapter Six, on May 19, 2004, FBI Headquarters
issued a policy stating, among other things, that "[i]f a co-interrogator is
complying with the rules of his or her agency, but is not in compliance
with FBI rules, FBI personnel may not participate in the interrogation
and must remove themselves from the situation." This polic had not yet
been issued in March 2004 when the Saleh interrogation
took

194 We recognize that Saleh's statement to the milit
, taken several months
after the incident, indicates that the incident occurred
. We believe
that at the time he made this allegation he may have confused locations and events, so
that he may have been describing the water incident ^=
195 These instructions are described in Chapter Seven.

291

place. The policy states that it merely "reiterates and memorializes
existing FBI policy with regard to the interrogation of [detainees]."
We found that FBI policy clearly prohibited an agent from
"participating" in an interrogation in which other agencies used non-FBI
techniques, but that before May 19, 2004, FBI policy was unclear
regarding whether "non-participation" could be satisfied merely by not
joining actively in the proscribed conduct. The May 2004 FBI Detainee
Policy required agents to physically withdraw from any interview in
which non-FBI techniques were being used by others. Based on
responses to the OIG survey, some agents deployed to the military zones
prior to May 19, 2004, received training to this effect, but many agents
did not.
Howard told us he did not leave the room during the interrogation
. However, the requirement that an FBI employee "remove
himself from the situation" when another agency uses non-FBI
techniques had not yet been clearly articulated in FBI policy at that time.
Similarly, FBI policy did not clearly preclude Howard and the other
agents from resuming participation in the interrogation after the OSI
agent was finished administering the water to the detainees. Indeed, as
discussed in Chapter Twelve, the FBI still has not provided clear
guidance to its agents regarding the circumstances under which an
agent may resume interrogation after non-FBI techniques have been
used. Therefore, we do not find that Howard's conduct clearly violated
FBI policy in effect at the time.
However, we believe that Howard should have recognized that this
activity was inappropriate to an interrogation being led by the FBI, even
if the acts were those of a non-FBI agent. In our opinion, an FBI
employee who observed conduct of this kind should have at least
reported the activity to his OSC.
The other FBI agents who were present during the =
interrogation did not tell the OIG that they saw the water incident. One
possible explanation is that they were outside of the room at the time it
took place. Rohr stated that he and Howard may have left the
interrogation for at least one 60- to 90-minute period to transport a
detainee. We therefore found insufficient evidence to conclude that Rohr
was aware of the water incident.
Cisco, who is no longer an FBI employee, did not volunteer any
information about this incident in his interview, which occurred before
we learned about the incident. Cisco did not respond to our requests for
a follow-up interview. We therefore could not make any finding regarding
Cisco's involvement in this incident.

292

We also did not conclude that the failure of Howard and Bennett to
report the water incident to their supervisors was misconduct. The FBI
policy requiring that any abuse be reported was not issued until May 19,
2004, more than 2 months after the interrogation. Moreover, the FBI
agents may have inferred that this conduct was permissible for military
interrogators in Iraq. As explained in Chapter Six, even after the
issuance of the FBI's May 19, 2004, policy, it was not clear how FBI
agents were expected to know the boundaries of permissible military
interrogation techniques.
Alleged Use of Stress Positions . Bennett told us that the
detainees were placed in an uncomfortable kneeling position or "stress
position" at some point during the Saleh interrogation -. Rohr also
stated that the detainees were made to kneel against the wall, but that
this was not as a stress position for purposes of the interrogation. He
stated that detainees were often put in this position during
transportation.
Howard told the OIG that one of the detainees was already in the
kneeling position when he was being "given a drink," but that he could
not remember why. However, in the written statement Howard provided
to the Army he stated that Saleh "was seated in a chair the whole time
and was never put in any odd positions."
FBI agents would not be permitted to put a prisoner in a kneeling
"stress" position as an interrogation technique during a custodial
interview in the United States (as distinguished from a security measure
during an arrest). However, there is no evidence that any FBI agents
participated in placin detainees in stress positions. Moreover, the
interrogation facility
was not equivalent to a typical facility used
for custodial law enforcement interrogations in the United States, and
security may have been a concern underlying the use of a kneeling
position for a limited period of time to ensure control over the detainees.
For these reasons, we did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that a
kneeling "stress position" was used as an interrogation technique as
contrasted to a security measure, or that the FBI agents improperly
"participated" in the use of stress positions during the
interview. In
addition, given the widespread use of this technique by the military in
Iraq, the agents could have reasonably inferred that the use of stress
positions was permitted at the time of the interrogation, and there was
no FBI policy at that time requiring the agents to report this conduct to
their superiors.
Alleged Use of Duct Tape To Blindfold a Detainee . Several
witnesses told us that a detainee (identified as Saleh's cousin) was
blindfolded with duct tape. One of the photographs made available to

293

the OIG shows a detainee with duct tape wrapped on his head, which
would have likely been painful to remove.
Rohr said he thought Cisco might have put duct tape on the
detainee. As mentioned previously, Cisco was originally interviewed
before this issue came to light and has since left the FBI. He did not
respond to our requests for a follow-up interview, and as an ex-FBI
employee he could not be compelled to cooperate. Howard stated that
the military typically used duct tape this way when transporting
detainees, and that the detainee may have arrived in this condition.
However, this suggestion was inconsistent with Rohr's statement that
detainees were usually hooded during transportation but that duct tape
was used in this instance so that the other detainee would be able to tell
the identity of the person making the confession, which hooding would
not permit.
We believe that FBI policies regarding coercion would have
prohibited an FBI agent from using duct tape in this manner in the
United States. We also believe that the FBI participated in this technique
during - interview. However, we were unable to determine which
FBI agent was directly involved in duct taping a detainee's head to
blindfold him, in part because Cisco declined to provide a follow-up
interview. None of the agents objected to the use of duct tape at the
time, or reported the incident to their superiors. We acknowledge that in
the United States alternatives would be available that may not have been
available in the Iraq war zone, such as videotaping the confessing
detainee or using a one-way mirror. This does not excuse the potentially
painful use of duct tape, however, because other alternatives could have
been used, such as a conventional blindfold or blacked-out goggles.
Conclusion . The available evidence was insufficient for us to
conclude that any FBI employee actively partici ated in using coercive or
otherwise prohibited interrogation techniques
in March
2004. Techniques were used by non-FBI personnel during this interview
that clearly would not have been permitted for use by FBI agents in the
United States. With the exception of Bennett's leaving the room during
the water incident, we found that the FBI agents generally did not
withdraw from the interview, object to these techniques, or report the
matter to their OSC. Because of the lack of clarity in FBI policies at the
time and the vagueness of some witnesses' recollections, we did not find
a sufficient basis to conclude that these agents violated FBI policy.
However, the FBI was the lead agency during the interviews of
, and we believe that agents could have
Saleh and his cousin

294

influenced the techniques used by other interrogators during these
interviews, or at least reported this incident to their OSC. 196 We also
believe that this incident illustrates shortcomings in the guidance that
the FBI provided its agents regarding interrogation techniques in the
military zones. We address this issue further in Chapter Twelve.

III.

Allegations of FBI Mistreatment of Mohamedou Ould Slahi

In this Section we address allegations made by detainee
Mohamedou Ould Slahi (#760) relating to the conduct of FBI agents at
GTMO. In Section XV of Chapter Five we discussed the treatment of
Slahi, primarily by the military, and the FBI's reporting on the allegations
that it received relating to his treatment. This section analyzes the
conduct of FBI agents involved in the handling of Slahi.
A.

Slahi ' s Allegations

Slahi made his allegations relating to FBI conduct during two
interviews conducted on April 25 and 27, 2005, by a military interrogator
on behalf of the OIG.197 Prior to these interviews, the military
interrogator provided the OIG with a Memorandum for Record (MFR)
dated December, 24, 2004, summarizing an earlier interrogation in
which Slahi had made allegations of mistreatment by the military.
In the interviews for the OIG, Slahi told the military interrogator
that most of his contact with the FBI was with FBI agents Poulson and
Santiago, and he identified Santiago as a "nice guy."198 He stated that no
one from the FBI ever threatened his family. However, he made the
following allegations relating to the FBI, which the OIG investigated:

196 Our criticism is not directed at Bennett, who was not an FBI interrogator
responsible for - interrogations and who was clearly surprised and upset at
what he observed. We believe that Bennett provided the most complete and candid
information about this incident to the OIG.
197 During the OIG's visit to GTMO in April 2005, the OIG requested access to
Slahi to interview him regarding FBI e-mails that referenced his treatment by the
military. General Hood, the JTF Commander at the time, expressed concern about
disrupting the detainee's interrogation by a military interrogator who he said had
developed an excellent rapport with Slahi. As a result, the military interrogator
presented our questions to Slahi and provided us with his responses. The military
interrogator posed the OIG's questions in two separate sessions with Slahi. During the
OIG's second trip to GTMO in February 2007, the OIG investigators obtained direct
access to Slahi, and he confirmed much of what he had told the military interrogator
asking questions on our behalf. He also provided additional details on several issues.
198 Poulson and Santiago are pseudonyms.

295

•

An FBI agent named "Samantha" was involved in putting
him on the boat for the "boat ride" as a ruse for making him
believe he was being transferred to a different location. (This
incident is described in detail in Chapter Five.)

•

When Poulson was leaving GTMO, he said that Slahi would
"not have a good time in the near future," which Slahi later
interpreted as a prediction that the military would torture
him. 199

•

Santiago said Slahi would be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan if
the charges against him were proved.

•

On the behalf of the FBI, an interrogator told Slahi that he
would be sent to a "very bad place" if Slahi did not provide
certain information.

In addition to interviewing Slahi, the OIG interviewed Poulson and
Santiago and examined relevant records.
B.

OIG Analysis
1.

Alleged FBI Participation in the " Boat Ride"
Incident

As discussed in Chapter Five, at GTMO Slahi was taken on a boat
ride as part of a ruse to make him believe he was being transferred to a
different location. Slahi alleged that the only FBI agent who was involved
in the boat ride was an agent named "Samantha." He said that
Samantha conducted the interrogation just prior to when he was
removed to the boat and that she may have observed this movement.
Santiago told the OIG that a person who referred to herself as
"Samantha" to Slahi was not an FBI agent. As detailed in Chapter Five,
the OIG determined from FBI and military records that the person who
identified herself as "Samantha" was actually an Army Sergeant.
2.

Alleged FBI Predictions of Harsh Treatment by
Military

Slahi stated during his interview that when Poulson told him
Poulson was leaving GTMO, Poulson said that Slahi would "not have a
199 According to the December 24, 2004, MFR, Slahi alleged that Poulson had
told Slahi that he "would not be invited to tea and snacks" when he was transferred to
military interrogators. Slahi did not allege that Poulson said anything else about the
transfer.

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good time in the near future." Slahi said he interpreted this to mean that
he was going to be tortured by the military. Slahi told the OIG that he
did not take this statement by Poulson as a threat, but rather that
Poulson was objectively telling him what would happen. Slahi also told
the OIG that when he was treated harshly by the military, referring to the
boat ruse discussed in Chapter Five, he did not believe that Poulson or
the FBI had any control over what happened.
Poulson told the OIG that his approach to interviewing Slahi was
to build rapport with him. He said that he never suggested to Slahi that
if he did not cooperate-he would be turned over to the military and the
military would use harsher techniques. He said that Slahi often asked
Poulson what was going to happen to him, and Poulson told him he did
not know but that things were changing, as a way of planting doubt in
Slahi's mind.
Poulson told the OIG that in his last interview with Slahi, he told
Slahi that he would not be working with him anymore, but said he did
not state this in a threatening way. Poulson said that he wanted Slahi to
know that he was no longer going to be handled by the FBI. Poulson told
us that he had no idea what the military planned to do with Slahi, but he
suspected the treatment would be similar to how the military handled AlQahtani (#63), which would likely involve some harsh techniques.
Poulson's partner, Santiago, told us that before he left GTMO he saw a
draft of a special interrogation plan that the military was preparing for
Slahi, and that it was similar to Al-Qahtani's interrogation plan.
As described in Chapter Five, the interrogation plan that was
approved for Slahi did in fact include harsh techniques, including the
helicopter ruse (later changed to a boat), 15-hour interrogations (during
which Slahi would be prevented from sleeping), and continuous sound to
hinder Slahi's concentration and establish fear. In addition, after
assuming control of the Slahi interrogation, the military subjected Slahi
to "variable lighting patterns and rock music" in order to keep Slahi
"awake and in a state of agitation," as well as a "Fear Up" approach in
which Slahi was deprived of some clothes and yelled at. The military also
used a masked interrogator, "Mr. X," to question Slahi and used a forged
memorandum as part of a ruse to make him believe that his mother
would be arrested and brought to GTMO. Slahi subsequently made
further allegations of abuse by military interrogators, including a claim
that he was severely beaten during the boat ride. (See Chapter Five,
Section XV.)

However, we concluded that even if Poulson did discuss Slahi's
future military interrogation with Slahi, Poulson did not intend to
threaten Slahi. It would have been inconsistent with Poulson's and

297

Santiago's weeks-long rapport-building approach for Poulson to threaten
Slahi.20° We found that, if anything, the military investigators were
critical of Poulson's and Santiago's reluctance to push Slahi. Military
intelligence personnel observed many of Slahi's interviews by Poulson
and Santiago from an observation booth. In an MFR dated March 21,
2003, a military intelligence officer observed that the agents had
established "an excellent rapport" with Slahi, but that the FBI agents
stated that they did not "want to push [Slahi] because doing so will
damage their rapport with him." In an MFR dated May 23, 2003, the
same military intelligence officer offered the following criticism of the
approach taken by Poulson and Santiago:
FBI Special Agents have built strong rapport with [Slahi], but
have generally not used that rapport to gain intelligence.
While rapport is normally used as a means by which to gain
intelligence, it seems as though FBI agents have not been
willing to offend detainee or push him on matters on which
he is uncomfortable because of the desire to maintain
rapport.
We concluded that Poulson's alleged statement to Slahi regarding
what he could expect in the future did not constitute a threat made to
induce Slahi to make a statement or to cooperate with the FBI. Poulson
was leaving GTMO and the FBI was no longer going to handle Slahi. The
military's plan to use much harsher techniques on Slahi was not agreed
to or condoned by the FBI, and we found no evidence that the FBI agreed
to the military's decision to assume control of Slahi's interrogation.
3.

Alleged FBI Threat to Transfer Slahi to Afghanistan
or Iraq

Slahi said that Santiago once told him that he would be sent to
Iraq or Afghanistan if the government agents could prove what they
thought Slahi was involved in. Slahi said he interpreted this to be a
reference to the "Millennium bomb plot ," which he understood as the
reason for the FBI 's interest in him . Slahi said that Santiago repeated
200 The non-threatening approach used by Poulson and Santiago was also
confirmed in contemporaneous records. Two agents from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis
Unit (BAU) observed Poulson and Santiago conduct more than 20 hours of interviews
with Slahi. The two BAU agents, along with Poulson and Santiago, prepared an
"Interview/Interrogation Plan" for Slahi dated February 3, 2003. The plan stated that
Poulson and Santiago had "successfully established a high level of rapport with the
detainee." In the strategy section of the plan, it stated that the "investment in a longterm strategy of building rapport with the detainee will continue to pay off with higher
quality dialogue."

298

this statement about being sent to Iraq or Afghanistan, but that Slahi did
not consider this to be a valid threat at the time. Slahi told the OIG
interviewers that he viewed Santiago's statement as an objective, factual
prediction.
Santiago told the OIG that he did not recall ever telling Slahi that
he would be sent to Afghanistan or Iraq. Poulson also told the OIG that
he never heard Slahi being told that he would be sent to Afghanistan or
Iraq.
We did not find a sufficient basis to conclude that Santiago made a
threat against Slahi. Slahi did not characterize Santiago's alleged
statement about being transferred to Iraq or Afghanistan as a threat to
induce him to cooperate. Furthermore, Slahi did not claim that Santiago
suggested he could avoid this outcome by providing information to the
FBI. Moreover, Santiago said he did not recall making a statement about
sending Slahi to Afghanistan or Iraq, and we did not find that he had any
incentive to do so.

Alleged Threat by a Task Force Officer

During his interview with the military interrogator, Slahi described
another person he believed was questioning him on behalf of the FBI in
January 2003. Slahi stated that this person identified himself as a police
officer named "Tom" and told Slahi that if he did not explain certain
phone calls he would be sent to a "very bad place." Slahi told the OIG
interviewers that he believed the statement by "Tom" was just an
interrogation technique, but he also said that he believed it was possible
that he could be transferred to the control of another agency.
We concluded that Slahi was referring to a Detective from the New
York Police Department who was a member of the Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) and who interviewed Slahi with Poulson in January 2003.
Although the Detective was not an FBI employee, he did participate in
interviews on behalf of the FBI, and we therefore analyzed his alleged
statement.
The Detective's alleged statement about sending Slahi to a "very
bad place" if he did not provide certain information (and the related
implication that he would not be sent there if he cooperated), could be
interpreted as an impermissible threat or promise if used by an FBI
agent in the United States. However, we found that even if the statement
was made, it was too vague to constitute a clear violation of the FBI's
policy against threats or promises.

299

IV.

Misconduct Involving Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi

In this Section we address two separate allegations of FBI
mistreatment of Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi (#569) at GTMO. Al-Sharabi
was a Yemeni detainee suspected of having a connection with early
planning for the September 11 attacks. The first allegation of
mistreatment arose when two FBI agents described an incident involving
Al-Sharabi in their responses to the OIG survey. The agents stated that
in late February 2003 FBI Special Agent Demeter told them that he had
sprayed perfume on Al-Sharabi, doused him with water, and placed a
pornographic magazine his cell in order to undermine his status among
his cellmates.201 The second allegation was raised by Al-Sharabi himself,
who stated during an FBI interview in April 2003 that he was being
subjected to "psychological torture" as a result of being isolated from
other detainees. 202
A.

OIG Investigation
1.

Contemporaneous FBI Documents

We reviewed numerous interview summaries prepared from
interviews of Al-Sharabi conducted by FBI agents from
These summaries indicate that
beginning on
, Al-Sharabi was placed in an
isolation cell for at least
. Although the FBI agents working
with him during this period were not involved in the decision to isolate
him, they repeatedly told him that he would remain in isolation until he
decided to cooperate in providin information to the agents. According to
an FBI interview summary for
, Al-Sharabi "stated he
would admit to anything at this point because he is being subjected to
psychological torture" and that he "felt like he was going to catch a
disease from the living conditions and die." Al-Sharabi continued to
demand to be removed from isolation before he would talk to the
interviewing agents. The summary stated that at the end of the
interview, the FBI agents told Al-Sharabi that "he had better take a good

201 Demeter is a pseudonym.
202 The allegation of "psychological torture" was discovered in November 2004
by the military's Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) staff during a review of the
FD-302 interview summaries for Al-Sharabi. A CITF staff memorandum dated
November 16, 2004, stated that the claim of "psychological torture" constituted an
allegation of "questionable techniques that may be considered criminal conduct,"
inconsistent with the Presidential Order dealing with humane treatment of detainees
and contradictory to the Convention against Torture. The military informed us that
there was no further military investigation of this allegation, however.

300

look at their faces because these were the only human faces he would
see until he decided to be fully cooperative."
The agents met with Al-Sharabi frequently over the subsequent
weeks and repeatedly told him that he would only be removed from
isolation if he began to cooperate in providing information. According to
the interview summaries, the agents also repeatedly suggested that AlSharabi could not only be moved from isolation but could also win his
freedom and return to Yemen if he spoke openly and provided full details
regarding the subjects of the agents' inquiries. Al-Sharabi repeatedly
complained that he could not talk because the "mental pressure and
stress" from his isolation was not allowing him to think straight. On
May 12, Al-Sharabi began providing detailed information which the FBI
found to be credible. According to a summary for
,
however, Al-Sharabi remained in isolation and the FBI agents told him
that if he did not provide the information requested, his case would be
turned over to military investigators.
The FBI interview summaries do not contain any information
relevant to the claims relating to the use of water, pornography, or
perfume on Al-Sharabi.
2.

Interview of Al- Sharabi

The OIG interviewed Al-Sharabi on February 25, 2007. Al-Sharabi
stated that he recalled finding a picture of an immodestly dressed or
naked woman in his cell at GTMO, which he tore up and threw into the
toilet. He believed that the picture was planted by interrogators as a ploy
to undermine him with other detainees. He stated that an interpreter
approached him when he found the picture but that he told the
interpreter "oh, you are playing a game, go away."
Al-Sharabi also said he recalled an instance in which interrogators
made him put on a woman's coat that had perfume on it, and that when
he took it off he smelled like the perfume. He thought this was an effort
to humiliate him.
Al-Sharabi stated that he did not remember ever telling anyone
that he was suffering from "psychological torture," although it is possible
he said this. He stated that he spent - by himself in an isolation
because he would not cooperate during
cell
interrogations.
3.

Interview of FBI Special Agent Demeter

In his OIG interview, Demeter said that he was assigned to GTMO
full-time, with several brief breaks, from February 2002 until April 2003.

301

He was designated as one of the two case agents for the entire GTMO
case. Demeter said that, as a result, he had extensive contact with AlSharabi over a long period of time. He said that at some point, AlSharabi had taken a role in the cell block as a leading advocate against
cooperating with the interviewers. Demeter stated that he and the other
agents assisting him tried to devise ways to undermine Al-Sharabi's
status among the other detainees on his cell block as a way to isolate
him from others.
According to Demeter, one method that he and his team used was
to interview Al-Sharabi in the evening -hours during the time that the
detainees on the cell block engaged in "chatter" and were likely to notice
that Al-Sharabi was often being interviewed while at the same time he
was telling the other detainees to resist.
Another method that Demeter said he used with Al-Sharabi was to
secretly place a sexually suggestive men's magazine in his cell late at
night so that other detainees would see it in the morning and would have
a strong reaction to Al-Sharabi possessing the magazine. Demeter stated
that the magazine was not pornographic - it was a magazine like
"Maxim" or "FHM." As part of this method, Demeter said that he
coordinated with an Arab linguist to chastise Al-Sharabi in front of his
cell neighbors for bringing back the magazine from his interview, which
was not permitted.
Demeter told the OIG that on one occasion, Al-Sharabi was not
cooperating during the interview and started singing. Demeter stated
that he and his team surreptitiously sprayed Al-Sharabi with perfume on
his back, by pretending to cough or sneeze when spraying it on AlSharabi. Demeter said that the intent with the perfume was to create
doubt about Al-Sharabi in the minds of his cell neighbors and to drive a
wedge between him and his cell neighbors so that he would focus more
on his relationship with his interviewers.
Demeter stated that the perfume and magazine techniques were
completed in such a way as to prevent Al-Sharabi from knowing that
Demeter or the other interviewers were behind either incident.

Demeter said that another method he and the team considered to
drive a wedge between Al-Sharabi and his cell neighbors was to wet AlSharabi's hair to make it appear that he was receiving extra shower time
during interviews. Demeter stated that he did not recall whether he and
the team actually implemented this ploy because he did not recall
dousing Al-Sharabi with water, but he did have a recollection of AlSharabi's hair being wet at some point. Demeter stated that in his view
these techniques would be available for him to use as an FBI agent in the

302

U.S. and that he would not be prohibited from using them. Demeter said
that Al-Sharabi was the only detainee with whom he used these
methods.
4.

Interviews of Other Agents

The description that Demeter provided to the OIG regarding the
techniques he used on Al-Sharabi was generally consistent with what
other FBI agents told us Demeter had told them earlier. Two agents from
the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit told the OIG that in late February
2003 Demeter told them that he had used the following techniques with
Al-Sharabi, who was not cooperating with the FBI: sprayed perfume on
the detainee to make it seem like he had been with a woman, poured
water on the detainee's hair to make it look like he had broken the
shower strike, and placed pornography in his cell. 203
One of the BAU agents said that Demeter seemed to be proud of
his use of these techniques and appeared to be surprised when the two
agents expressed astonishment and criticism of this approach. The BAU
agent said that she told Demeter that he and the other agent who used
these techniques should have no further contact with Al-Sharabi because
they had "lost all credibility" with him.
One BAU agent characterized Demeter's conduct with Al-Sharabi
as non-criminal harassment and "nonsense," but she said she did not
consider it serious enough to report to the FBI chain of command on
GTMO. The other BAU agent said that she later told her supervisor in
the United States about the incident. She said her supervisor was
shocked, but that she did not know whether anything was done about it.
Demeter's supervisor at GTMO told the OIG he did not recall
hearing about Demeter's use of these techniques. However, he said
sometimes the interrogator "reaches the limit" and wants to place the
detainee in an uncomfortable situation. He also stated that an
appropriate strategy is to make it look to others that the detainee is
cooperating, thereby potentially isolating him from his peers and making
him more dependent on the interrogators. He said that in the United
States, the FBI sometimes uses techniques of this kind.

203 Demeter told the OIG that he did not recall discussing the use of these
techniques on Al-Sharabi with the BAU agents.

303

OIG Analysis of the Allegations
1.

Analysis of Allegations of "Psychological Torture"

Al-Sharabi's claim that he was subjected to "psychological torture"
was a reference to his isolation from other detainees. As detailed in
Chapter Eight, Section II.F, numerous FBI agents reported observing the
use of extended isolation as an interrogation technique at GTMO. Some
FBI agents told us that they participated in using this technique, while
others said they understood that the FBI should avoid being involved in
this interrogation tactic. The FBI interview summaries for Al-Sharbi
establish that FBI agents participated in a program to isolate Al-Sharbi
from human contact in order to induce him to cooperate.
We believe that under FBI policies prohibiting coercive interview
techniques, an FBI agent in the United States would not be permitted to
order a prisoner into isolation or prevent him from being returned to the
general prison population for a period as long as 2 months solely
because the prisoner would not provide information to the agent. The
Legal Handbook for Special Agents specifically identifies psychological
pressure, isolation, and incommunicado interrogation as circumstances
that will tend to undermine the legitimacy and voluntariness of a
statement. LHBSA at 7-2.2.
However, it is clear that this practice was fairly widespread at
GTMO. Moreover, at least with respect to this technique, many FBI
agents at GTMO believed that they could participate in at least some
coercive interview practices that might be prohibited in the United
States. The FBI policy reiterating that "existing FBI policy with regard to
the interrogation of prisoners" continued to apply in the military zones
was not issued until May 19, 2004. Under these circumstances, and
given that isolation did not involve the use of force or threats, we do not
believe that the FBI agents who exploited the isolation of Al-Sharabi
committed misconduct. However, we believe that this matter illustrates
the inadequacy and lack of clarity in the guidance provided to FBI agents
regarding permissible interrogation techniques in the military zones.204

204 Several agents understood that they could not participate in using isolation
as an interrogation technique, including Demeter, who told us that as "sworn law
enforcement officers" at GTMO, FBI agents were prohibited from. recommending a
detainee for isolation purely for intelligence gathering or information gathering
purposes. Although Demeter had extensive involvement with Al-Sharabi, he was not
one of the agents interrogating Al-Sharabi during the time the detainee was in isolation.
Demeter said that Al-Sharabi was placed in isolation as a disciplinary matter because of
a spitting incident, but he acknowledged that Al-Sharabi provided useful information
during his isolation. In fact, the contemporaneous documents do not indicate that the
(Cont'd.)

304

It is not clear whether the lengthy isolation of Al-Sharabi was
consistent with military rules. As previously noted, on April 16, 2003,
Secretary Rumsfeld explicitly approved the use of isolation as an
interrogation technique at GTMO upon a determination of "military
necessity" and with prior notice to the Secretary of Defense. Church
Report at 139-40. The April 16 DOD Policy cautions that "[t]his
technique is not known to have been generally used for interrogation
purposes for longer than 30 days," and that some nations may view this
technique as inconsistent with the Geneva Convention. Al-Sharabi was
isolated for much longer than 30 days. We do not know whether the
requisite finding of military necessity was made or whether prior notice
was provided to the Secretary of Defense.
We also believe that by telling Al-Sharabi that he could earn his
release and be returned to Yemen if he cooperated, the FBI agents made
promises to Al-Sharabi that they would not have been permitted to make
in the United States. FBI Policy prohibits agents from attempting "to
obtain a statement by force, threats, or promises." LHBSA 7-2.1. FBI
training materials indicate that an explicit promise of leniency usually
renders a confession involuntary. Again, we believe that this tactic was
the product of an understanding that the rules for interrogating
suspected terrorists at GTMO (especially a detainee suspected of
involvement in the September 11 conspiracy) were different. The FBI's
rule against such promises stems from considerations of legal
voluntariness applicable to criminal prosecution in U.S. courts. The
agents understood they were collecting intelligence and not necessarily or
exclusively preparing for conventional criminal prosecutions. However,
this illustrates again the tension between FBI rules designed to serve its
traditional law enforcement function and the changing role of the FBI in
collecting intelligence for the prevention of terrorist attacks.
2.

Analysis of Demeter ' s Conduct

The FBI policies on interviews do not prohibit specifically the
techniques that Demeter used on Al-Sharabi, such as using a men's
magazine or perfume in an effort to undermine Al-Sharbi's standing
among the detainees. These techniques also did not involve the use of
force, threats, or coercion. We recognize that in the United States, FBI
agents might use ruses to drive a wedge between co-conspirators, or
arrange that these prisoners be separated. However, in this case we

spitting incident was the reason for Al-Sharabi's lengthy isolation. Rather, the
documents make clear that the FBI agents who interviewed him told him he would
never escape isolation unless he began to provide the information they wanted.

305

believe that Demeter's techniques such as using a men's magazine and
perfume, were ineffective and possibly counterproductive.

Allegations Regarding FBI Participation in Interrogation of
Detainee Yousef Abkir Salih Al Qarani

In this Section we address the conduct of FBI agents, together with
the military, in the interrogation of detainee Yousef Abkir Saleh Al Qarani
(#269) at GTMO. We determined that in September 2003, FBI agents
participated in a joint interview with the military that resulted in Al
Qarani being short-chained and left alone for several hours, during
which time he urinated on himself. In addition, at least one FBI agent
participated in subjecting Al Qarani to a technique of disorientation and
sleep disruption through frequent cell movement known at GTMO as the
"frequent flyer program." We also examined additional allegations made
by Al-Qarani during an OIG interview in March 2007 regarding FBI
mistreatment.

Background

FBI records indicate that Al Qarani's telephone number was found
in the possession of other detainees known to be associated with alQaeda. At least 10 different FBI agents participated in interviewing AlQarani at GTMO between July 2002 and September 2003. The agents
sometimes worked in pairs and sometimes conducted joint interviews
with military investigators.

205 Hajj is an annual pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

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FBI Special Agents Brandon and Stephenson

FBI agents Brandon and Stephenson were deployed to GTMO in
August 2003 and they worked together on numerous detainee
interviews.206 Stephenson said she learned what techniques she could
and could not employ in detainee interviews from other FBI agents who
were already at GTMO. She said that she understood that "we are FBI
agents no matter where we go, so we have policies in place, and there are
things that we do, and things we don't do. And the rules were no
different on GTMO, in terms of what we could do and what we couldn't
do." Stephenson said that no one specifically used those words; rather it
was something she picked up from the operational environment at
GTMO. Stephenson told us that the FBI's general approach with the
detainees was rapport building. She also said that she and Brandon
discussed the use of other techniques that were not available to FBI
agents in the United States because on GTMO they were working with
the military. She said that the FBI's OSC had advised FBI agents that
they had opportunities to "collaborate" with the military on detainee
interviews.
Brandon stated that he did not receive specific guidance on
interview techniques at GTMO, but he knew what was permissible based
on his good judgment and 15 years of law enforcement experience.
Brandon said that at GTMO he attended mandatory meetings every
Friday with military and FBI personnel to discuss what had transpired
during the week in the detainee interrogations. He said that during
those meetings the military personnel described what they were doing in
detainee interrogations, including frequent movements of detainees and
isolation. Brandon also stated that during these meetings, military
personnel described "different areas that the military could enhance
what the FBI was doing." He said that he received a list of DOD
approved interrogation tactics that could be utilized and that programs
were built around them, including "the frequent flyer program and
isolation techniques ... dietary disruption and sleep disruption."
During the period from August 28, 2003, until September 23,
2003, Brandon and Stephenson together interviewed Al Qarani on at
least six separate occasions.
206 Brandon and Stephenson are pseudonyms.

307

The Alleged Short-Chaining Incident

Brandon and Stephenson told the OIG about an incident in which
Al Qarani was short-chained for several hours following an FBI interview.
Initially, the agents had used a friendly approach with Al Qarani,
bringing him coffee and food and engaging in light conversation.
Brandon said he confronted Al Qarani about the inconsistencies in his
story, but that he was "getting nowhere" with Al Qarani, and that when
Al Qarani realized Brandon would not accept his story, he began to "shut
down." Brandon said that he and Stephenson told the detainee that if he
did not cooperate, they would turn him over to the military and that the
military would not bring him "cheeseburgers and coffee in the morning,"
as the FBI agents had done. Stephenson also stated that the agents
threatened to cut their ties with Al Qarani and let the military handle
him. Brandon said the purpose of this statement was to play on Al
Qarani's paranoia and dislike of the military. However, this technique
did not work and Al Qarani continued to be uncooperative.
Contemporaneous FBI records indicate that Brandon and Stephenson
interviewed Al Qarani on August 28, September 3, September 6, and
September 15, 2003, and that he became increasingly uncooperative
during that period.
Brandon stated that the approach that they decided to use with Al
Qarani in collaboration with the military was the "Mutt and Jeff' or "good
cop/bad cop" routine. Brandon and Stephenson stated that they
obtained approval for this approach from their OSC. The OSC told us he
had no recollection of this discussion, but that he would have agreed
with Stephenson's request to have the military engage in a good cop/bad
cop scenario with the detainee.
In preparation for an interview of Al Qarani on September 15,
2003, Brandon and Stephenson enlisted the assistance of a military
interrogator, U.S. Marine Captain Wyatt.207 Brandon said the plan called
for Wyatt to come into the interrogation room and "do his boot camp
thing" in an effort to intimidate Al Qarani, and the FBI would
subsequently return and "save" the detainee.
Stephenson and Brandon began with a normal interview of Al
Qarani around 8:00-9:00 a.m. on September 15, 2004. After a period of
unsuccessful questioning, Brandon told Qarani that Brandon was done
with him. Stephenson left the interview to watch from the observation
room. Captain Wyatt entered the interview room and began yelling and
screaming at Al Qarani. Brandon told the OIG that it became clear right
207 Wyatt is a pseudonym.

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away that this was not going to work because Al Qarani was laughing
and said "Captain, I'm really concerned for your voice and if you continue
to talk like that you will not be able to talk tomorrow."
Brandon said he and Wyatt left the interview room and Wyatt said
that the way to get the detainee's attention was to "short chain" him.
Brandon told Wyatt he did not understand that term, and Wyatt
demonstrated by ordering the guards to place a chain around the
detainee's waist and then bolt the chain to the floor. The detainee could
still stand up, but he would be bent over. Brandon said that when he
expressed concern to Wyatt about short chaining the detainee, Wyatt
responded that the procedure was common and that the detainee would
receive bathroom breaks and food. Brandon said he believed that the
detainee would be kept in the chained position through most of the
afternoon. Brandon also said that at the time Wyatt ordered the short
chaining, it did not strike Brandon as abuse.
Stephenson likewise stated that at the end of Wyatt's interrogation,
Wyatt ordered the guards to place the detainee in a "stress position."
She described the stress position as being shackled on the hands and
feet and then chained to the floor to force him to sit on the floor or
crouch without a chair. Stephenson told the OIG that she understood
that the military's list of approved techniques included stress positions.
Brandon stated that after he returned to the office with
Stephenson at about 10:00 a.m., he called the interrogation trailer to
make certain that the detainee was "ok" and he was told that the
detainee was asleep. He said that he returned at about noon to check on
the detainee. He stated that the guards told him the detainee had
urinated on himself. Brandon told us that he instructed the guards to
return the detainee to his cell. Brandon estimated that the detainee was
chained to the floor for approximately 3 hours. In Stephenson's
interview, she confirmed Brandon's account of what happened after she
and Brandon left the detainee.
Brandon and Stephenson both told the OIG that they reported the
chaining incident to the FBI's OSC. Brandon said the OSC told him that
he did not need to write an EC about the incident because Brandon told
him that he did not participate in the short chaining, that there was no
"force" used, and that the detainee was not injured.
We interviewed the OSC, who said that he did not recall
Stephenson or Brandon telling him about the incident.
Brandon told the OIG that he later complained to Wyatt about
what had happened to Al Qarani. Several days later, Wyatt explained to

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Brandon that a new rotation of guards had come on duty while Al Qarani
was chained and were not informed that the detainee was to receive
bathroom breaks. Brandon said that when he complained to Wyatt
about the treatment, Wyatt ridiculed Brandon for being "weak."
We interviewed Al Qarani at GTMO in February 2007. He stated
that he recalled an interrogation session with an FBI agent during which
a military official entered the interrogation room and started to yell at
him. He also described being chained to the floor in an uncomfortable
hunched over position for 3 or 4 hours and urinated on himself,
although he did not connect this incident with the yelling military official.
Al Qarani said this was not the only time he was chained to the floor and
that on another occasion the military chained him overnight for 12-16
hours.
The FD-302 that was prepared by Brandon and Stephenson for the
interview of Al Qarani on September 15, 2004, makes at most an obscure
reference to the incident that Brandon and Stephenson described to the
OIG. It states that Al Qarani was interviewed by Brandon, Stephenson,
and Wyatt, and that:
AL QARANI was questioned in regard to the truthfulness of
his travels to Pakistan. When confronted with the illogical
nature of the information he was providing, AL QARANI

The short chaining of Al Qarani clearly would have violated FBI
policies against coercive interview techniques if the FBI agents had
employed it in the United States. In this case, the decision to short
chain Al Qarani was made by Marine Captain Wyatt, not by Stephenson
and Brandon. However, Stephenson and Brandon acquiesced in the use
of this technique. Although there was no reporting requirement in place
at that time, both Brandon and Stephenson said that they later reported
the incident to the OSC.208

208 We found that the FBI agents' participation in a coordinated interrogation
strategy with the military that incorporated the "Mutt and Jeff" or "good cop/ bad cop"
strategy was not explicitly prohibited by FBI policy. (We note, however, that under the
DOD's April 16, 2003, memorandum, the military was not permitted to, use the "Mutt
and Jeff" strategy without advance notice to the Secretary of Defense and a
determination of military necessity.)

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According to Brandon, Wyatt stated that stress positions were a
commonly used technique at GTMO. Stephenson and the OSC both told
the OIG that they understand that this was an approved technique for
the military. However, military documents indicate that stress positions
were not approved at that time. Although "stress positions (like standing)
for a maximum of four hours" was on the list of approved counter
resistance interrogation techniques permitted at GTMO under the
memorandum approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002,
that list was rescinded on January 15, 2003.209 On April 16, 2003,
Secretary Rumsfeld approved a new list of permissible techniques for use
at GTMO that did not include "stress positions."
This incident again illustrates the inadequacy of the guidance
provided to FBI agents regarding what techniques were approved for use
by the military and how the agents were to conduct themselves in joint
interrogations. The FBI agents thought that this was an approved
military technique; they apparently were not aware that the Secretary of
Defense had rescinded his approval of stress positions 9 months before
the Al Qarani incident took place. According to the Church Report, short
chaining was a form of stress position, a technique that was removed
from the pre-approved list in January 2003. Yet, the military at GTMO
apparently did not consider short-shackling to be a prohibited "stress
position" at least until May 2004, when the military commander at
GTMO prohibited this practice. Church Report at 168.
Although the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy had not yet been
issued, the FBI agents involved in this matter told us they knew they
should not engage in techniques that would be prohibited in the United
States. However, it was not clear what an agent should do if another
agency's interrogator utilized such a technique without the prior
agreement of the FBI agent. Moreover, there was no evidence that
Brandon knew in advance that Wyatt would put Al Qarani in a stress
position. Under the circumstances, we did not find that Brandon
violated any FBI policy in connection with Wyatt's conduct. However, we
are troubled by the fact that Brandon and Stephenson did not recognize
more quickly that Wyatt's conduct was inappropriate for an interview in
which the FBI was participating. Brandon and Stephenson should have
acted more quickly to object to the conduct and attempt to stop it.

209 Moreover, we believe there is very significant doubt that short chaining a
detainee to the floor would have been considered to be "like standing" within the
meaning of the December 2 memorandum.

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Alleged Use of the " Frequent Flyer Program" on Al
Qarani

Brandon told the OIG that he arranged for the use of the "frequent
flyer program" on Al Qarani, and Stephenson likewise recalled that this
technique was used on the detainee.210 Stephenson said that a military
official at GTMO assisted in coordinating the frequent moving of a
detainee from cell to cell in order to break up the detainees' "position of
comfort" with guards. She stated that she heard that detainees in the
"frequent flyer program" were moved every 4 hours. The OSC at GTMO
at that time confirmed that the FBI sometimes interrogated detainees
who were in the "frequent flyer" program. He stated that the program
was not designed to deprive the detainee of sleep, but to prevent certain
detainees from becoming comfortable with their surroundings and to
keep them off balance so that the detainees would not have an advantage
when being interrogated. He acknowledged, however, that sleep
deprivation could be a byproduct of implementing this program.
A Summ

Investigative Report prepared by the military dated
states that Al Qarani complained to military
personnel that the FBI was moving him to different cells constantly and
he wanted the military interrogator to see if he could get it to stop.
Brandon and Stephenson said they participated in the "frequent
flyer" program by asking the military to move Al Qarani. Stephenson
acknowledged that this technique would not be permissible for FBI
agents in the United States.211 We did not find any explicit prohibition of
this technique in FBI policy. The Legal Handbook for Special Agents
identifies deprivation of sleep as a potential factor that a court might
consider in evaluating the voluntariness of a defendant's statement,
although it does not indicate that disorienting a prisoner or disrupting
his sleep patterns is per se improper.212 We also note that the OSC was
aware that FBI agents were involved in using this technique.
Nevertheless, we are troubled by the fact that Brandon and Stephenson and other agents, as discussed in Chapter Eight - participated in the
210 As noted in Chapter Eight, Section II.C, witnesses and documents indicated
that the "frequent flyer" program was also used on other detainees at GTMO to disrupt
their sleep patterns and lower their ability to resist interrogation.
211 In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI stated that Brandon "stayed
within the guidelines laid out, used programs promoted to him and when things went
beyond by people not within our control, reported promptly via chain of command."
212 Unlike stress positions, "sleep adjustment" was on the list of approved
techniques for military interrogations at GTMO signed by the Secretary of Defense on
April 16, 2003.

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"frequent flyer" program despite the fact that at least some of them told
us they believed it would not be available in the United States.
E.

Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding " Clint"

During an interview with the OIG on February 28, 2007, Al Qarani
made several additional allegations regarding mistreatment by an FBI
agent who Al Qarani said called himself "Clint" or "Clean" and who had
interviewed Al Qarani at GTMO many times over the course of
approximately 1 month in 2003. Al Qarani said that Clint always worked
with a particular interpreter Al Qarani identified by name. Al Qarani
described Clint as a white, tall, blonde, American male without facial
hair, 36 - 37 years of age, who wore civilian clothes with military boots.
Al Qarani said that Clint asked him about Afghanistan, that Clint
became angry and showed his "worse face" when Al Qarani was unable to
answer his questions, and that Clint ordered the guards to move Al
Qarani from cell to cell every 2 hours or less, 24 hours per day.
Al Qarani stated that Clint sometimes made him stand during
interviews, and told guards to hit him, throw him down, and throw cold
water on him. Al Qarani said that on one occasion Clint ordered Al
Qarani to be locked on the floor with chains over his back for 3-4 hours,
which caused Al Qarani to urinate on himself. He said Clint sometimes
used the "N-word" with Al Qarani. Al Qarani stated that once during the
period he was being interrogated by Clint, the military short-chained him
for 12-16 hours overnight and subjected him to loud music and colored
lights. He stated that Clint left GTMO a few days after that incident.
Al Qarani also stated that at one time he had an ingrown toe nail
that was removed without anesthesia. The corpsman told Al Qarani that
he could not give Al Qarani a painkiller unless Clint approved it. Clint
told Al Qarani to talk about his "brothers" (other detainees) if he wanted
the painkiller.
Al Qarani stated that he described his experiences with Clint to a
female FBI agent some time in 2003. He also said that he told this
female agent that he had been beaten in Kandahar but she showed him a
photograph from Kandahar and said he "looked fine" in it.
Some aspects of Al Qarani's story suggest that Clint might have
been FBI agent Brandon, who interviewed Al Qarani approximately seven
times during August and September 2003 and who, as discussed above,
reported the incident in which Al Qarani was short chained for several
hours and wet himself. Al Qarani's physical description of Clint was
generally consistent with Brandon's appearance. In addition, Al Qarani
told us that Clint also interrogated Fahd Al-Sharif (#215), and we found

313

that Brandon had interviewed Al-Sharif in August 2003. Brandon also
admitted arranging for Al Qarani to be put in the "frequent flyer"
program.
Brandon denied using the name "Clint" or "Clean" at GTMO and
said he never heard of anyone using such a name. He also denied
engaging in the conduct that Al Qarani attributed to Clint, other than
using the "frequent flyer" program. Several other facts also indicate that
Brandon was not "Clint." For example, Al Qarani stated that Clint
withheld painkillers from him when he was treated for an ingrown toe
nail. Available records indicate that the nail on one of Al Qarani's big
toes was removed in March 2003 due to an infection. However, Brandon
was not deployed to GTMO until August 2003, so he could not have been
involved in withholding painkillers from Qarani at the time of this
procedure.
In addition, Al Qarani stated that Clint always used the same
Egyptian interpreter, "Abbas." FBI records indicate that Brandon used at
least five different interpreters during interviews of Al Qarani, none of
whom were identified by the name Al Qarani provided. Brandon told the
OIG he did not recall any interpreter named Abbas.
Al Qarani also reported that a female FBI agent showed him a
photograph of himself to contradict his claim that he was beaten in
Kandahar. FBI records indicate that in April 2003, a female agent from
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service confronted Al Qarani with a
photograph of him in Afghanistan and that Al Qarani subsequently
admitted that he had lied about the beatings. Al Qarani told us that at
the time of this incident, he told the female agent about his experiences
with Clint. However, this incident occurred several months before
Brandon arrived at GTMO, further indicating that Brandon was not
Clint. FBI records produced to the OIG indicate that prior to April 2003,
there were only three FBI agents who had interviewed Al Qarani, and
each of them had only met with him once.
Al Qarani also described a different FBI agent who he said was
smaller than Clint who we believe was likely Brandon. Al Qarani told us
about two FBI agents, one male and one female, who interviewed him. Al
Qarani described the female as being an Asian with black hair, medium
complexion, thin, and approximately 30 years old. Al Qarani said that he
does not recall the male talking, but that he was white with short hair,
medium build, about 30 years of age. He said that the agents showed
him pictures and they did not promise him anything. Al Qarani said
they did not yell and they did not instruct the military to do anything to
him. FBI documents indicate that SAs Brandon and Stephenson showed
five photographs to Al Qarani on August 28, 2003. In addition, Al

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Qarani's description of the female agent was consistent with
Stephenson's appearance. If Brandon and Stephenson were the team of
agents that Al Qarani was describing, then Brandon was not Clint,
because Al Qarani told us the male agent was smaller than Clint.
Although other teams of male and female agents interviewed Al Qarani at
various times, there is no record that any such team brought
photographs for him to identify.
Thus, the evidence does not support that Al Qarani's allegations, if
true, relate to an FBI employee. It is possible that Clint was employed by
a different agency or that Al Qarani's account was false, exaggerated, or
an erroneous conflation of events that related to different interrogators
who were not from the FBI. Based on the available evidence we could
not conclude that any FBI agent was responsible for the conduct that Al
Qarani described.

Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding " Daoud"

During his OIG interview, Al Qarani also made allegations about
an African American FBI agent named "Daoud" or "David." Al Qarani
said that Daoud was large, wore glasses, and had a small beard but no
mustache. Al Qarani said that after 2 to 3 weeks, Daoud started doing
the same things Clint did, such as ordering Al Qarani to be shortchained and to be moved frequently from cell to cell. Al Qarani said that
he was interviewed multiple times by Daoud over a several-month period,
and that Daoud was always by himself. Al Qarani said that Daoud put
him in isolation at one point. Al Qarani said that on August 8, 2005,
Daoud hit Detainee # 174 with a chair or refrigerator. 213
Al Qarani said that Daoud took him to a room that was completely
dark and placed him in a chair. When the lights were turned on, he
could see that the walls were covered with pornography. Al Qarani said
he was introduced to a woman that spoke Arabic and wore a bikini. He
was told that if he cooperated, she would sleep with him. Al Qarani said
that he did nothing and after an hour he was taken back to his cell. Al
Qarani said that he was interviewed by Daoud shortly before he was

maintained by the military revealed no record that any FBI personnel
213 Al Qarani used the detainee's number rather than a name during the
interview. Detainee #174 is identified in DOD records as Hisham Bin Ali Bin Amor Sliti.

315

interrogated Al Qarani during 2005, including the months immediately
prior to his being
. We found no
evidence that any FBI interrogator deployed to GTMO fit the description
that Al Qarani gave for Daoud. In addition, FBI personnel at GTMO
stated that they reviewed military records relating to Detainee # 174 and
found that he was only interviewed once by the FBI in
with no record of abuse allegations. Neither of the FBI interviewers were
African-Americans. We concluded that if Daoud existed he was likely
employed by a different agency or that Al Qarani's account was false,
exaggerated, or an erroneous description of events that related to an
interrogator who was not from the FBI. Based on the available evidence
we could not conclude that any FBI agent was responsible for the
conduct that Al Qarani attributed to Daoud.

VI.

Alleged Mistreatment of Mohammad A. A. Al Harbi

An FBI agent who served at GTMO in late 2002 wrote an FD-302
report dated November 6, 2002, which described an allegation by
detainee Muhammad A. A. Al Harbi (#333) that he was beaten by FBI
agents in Afghanistan. According to the report, Al Harbi alleged:
After [Al Harbi's] arrest, he was taken by airplane to Bagram,
Afghanistan. While on the airplane, he was struck in the
mouth by a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). When he arrived in Bagram, he was beaten by two
members of the FBI (one of them being the same as the
person who struck him on the airplane). He suffered
multiple injuries to his mouth, eye and back as a result of
these beatings. He characterized the treatment in Bagram
as bad and everyone who participated in these actions were
Americans.
The two FBI employees who allegedly beat him were further
described as white males; both 40 to 50 years of age.
Al Harbi's allegations were also recounted in a memorandum from the
FBI to the Department of Justice entitled "Re: Repatriation Issues,"
dated January 20, 2004.
In October 2004, in connection with releasing the FBI
memorandum along with many other documents in response to a FOIA
request from the ACLU, FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni sought
information about whether any investigation of Al Harbi's allegations was
ever conducted. According to Caproni, the MLDU Unit Chief told her
that no. investigation was done.

316

We interviewed the agent who originally reported Al Harbi's
allegations. He stated that the detainee did not make clear the basis for
his statement that the agents who beat him were FBI. The agent told us
that he believed something bad did happen to the detainee, but the agent
did not believe that the FBI was involved.
The OIG interviewed Al Harbi in GTMO on April 26, 2005, with the
assistance of a translator. He told the OIG that he had no complaints
about his treatment by the FBI, either at GTMO or in Bagram. When the
OIG pressed him regarding his complaint about being struck on the
mouth and beaten by members of the FBI, he said that he did not think
that the individuals who arrested him were FBI agents, but rather he
thought that they were either military or possibly CIA.
Al Harbi did not have an explanation for why his earlier account
identified the perpetrators as FBI agents. He said that all of his contacts
with the FBI have been positive. We also did not find any basis for
concluding that Al Harbi was ever mistreated by the FBI.

VII.

Abuse Allegations Involving Abu Zubaydah

In this Section we address allegations that FBI Special Agent
Gibson participated in the use of abusive interrogation techniques on
detainee Abu Zubaydah and other detainees, and that Gibson disclosed
classified information to persons unauthorized to receive it.214 Gibson
served as a Supervisor in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and later
as an FBI Legal Attache. In these capacities he made numerous overseas
trips on counterterrorism missions.
The allegations against Gibson were originally raised in an
anonymous letter to the FBI which stated, among other things, that
Gibson "spoke in detail of the mission leading up to the arrest and
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah" and "spoke openly and with much
enthusiasm about the torturing of captured al-Qaeda terrorists,
undisclosed locations and the brutal interrogation techniques by both
CIA and FBI which Agent [Gibson] was involved."
A.

The FBI Investigation of the Allegations against FBI
Special Agent Gibson

The FBI forwarded the anonymous letter to the OIG, and we
initially referred the matter back to the FBI for investigation on

214 Gibson is a pseudonym.

317

November 25, 2003. The FBI Inspection Division conducted an
investigation of the allegations in the anonymous letter. The FBI
determined that the anonymous letter was written by Landis, a civilian
acquaintance of Gibson, on the basis of statements Gibson made in
Landis's presence, as well as information provided to Landis by
Morehead, Gibson's ex-fiance.215
The FBI's investigative file indicates that the scope of the FBI's
investigation was limited to FBI interviews of Gibson, Morehead, and
Landis, and a polygraph examination of Gibson. Gibson's interview was
memorialized in a signed sworn statement. The interviews of Landis and
Morehead were summarized by the investigating agents in FD-302
reports. The polygraph examination was memorialized in a written
examiner's report. There is no indication in the file that the Inspection
Division made any effort to determine whether the information that
Morehead attributed to Gibson was accurate or, if so, was classified or
sensitive.
B.

FBI Interviews of Landis and Morehead

According to an FBI Inspection Division report, Landis told
investigators that:

Gibson's ex-fiance, Morehead, told FBI investigators that in late
2002 or early 2003 Gibson told her about the arrest and interrogation of
a terrorist. According to the FBI investigator who interviewed Morehead
in April 2004, Morehead stated:

215 Landis and Morehead are pseudonyms.

318

to be flown to [one
of two particu lar countries for medical treatment and to be
interviewed.

Morehead provided more details regarding this matter in an FBI interview
in August 2004:

216 The agent that Morehead referred to here is a particular agent who has been
identified elsewhere in this report in Chapters Four and Five and later in this chapter.
We therefore substituted the same pseudonym for this agent that we have used
elsewhere in this report.

319

Morehead also provided FBI investigators with several detailed
stories that she said Gibson told her about his other activities overseas,

including his involvement in an operation involving a
She
also asserted Gibson kept unauthorized classified information on his
personal laptop and pocket PC and leaked confidential information to a
television reporter.
In addition, Morehead asserted that Gibson had inappropriately
provided information to a member of the press, had used his FBI position
to assist family members with law enforcement problems, and had
utilized a former informant to provide free limousine service to Morehead
and her friends.
C.

Gibson ' s Statement to the FBI

Gibson submitted a 13-page signed sworn statement to FBI
investigators in which he denied many of Morehead's allegations.
However, he admitted using his personal laptop computer for processing
classified information at times when FBI equipment was not available.
Gibson's statement also responded to the allegations regarding his
contacts with the media, but he did not address the interrogation
techniques that he or other agents of the FBI and CIA utilized on
suspected terrorists overseas. He stated that he was not aware of having
conversations with Morehead during which he disclosed sensitive or
classified information. He stated that he never discussed sensitive
locations with Morehead but that she may have inferred where he had
been from gifts he brought her from overseas. However, he did not
address the issue of how Morehead came to know that Gibson and
Thomas
, which
in fact was true.
D.

Gibson's Polygraph Examinations

Gibson was polygraphed on September 30, 2004, as part of the
FBI's investigation. The focus of the polygraph was to determine whether
Gibson had been truthful about two issues: whether he disclosed FBI
information to a specific reporter, and whether he paid for services
rendered by a limousine driver who had previously been his source.

One of the questions posed to Gibson during the examination was
"have you ever purposely discussed classified information with family or
friends?" Gibson answered "no." The examiner's report did not address
this response. It stated that his responses to questions about media
contacts were "not indicative of deception." The report stated that

320

Gibson's responses regarding compensating the limousine driver were
"inconclusive."
Gibson had also been polygraphed a year earlier in connection with
an FBI promotion. The polygraph report for that earlier test indicated
that Gibson's negative response to the question "have you provided
classified information to anyone from a non-U.S. Intelligence Service"
was not indicative of deception.
E.

Findings by the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility

The FBI communicated information regarding the Gibson matter to
the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ Criminal Division, which reviewed
the file and declined to pursue the matter criminally on September 12,
2005.
The FBI Inspection Division also submitted its investigative report
to the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for adjudication.
FBI OPR issued a final adjudication of the allegations against Gibson on
October 18, 2005. OPR emphasized the "tumultuous five-year
relationship" between Morehead and Gibson, which had ended when
Morehead believed Gibson was romantically involved with other women,
and OPR opined that there was insufficient information to substantiate
several allegations against Gibson. OPR found only that Gibson
committed a security violation by placing classified or sensitive
information on a personal computer, and recommended that Gibson
receive a letter of censure.
With respect to the issue of disclosure of classified information,
OPR stated: "The investigation was unable to determine whether the
information alleged to have been improperly disclosed was in fact
classified or sensitive information because [of] the vague descriptions
provided by [Morehead and Landis] as to what privileged information was
alleged to have disclosed."
The OPR report also did not address the issue of whether Gibson
or other FBI agents participated in using "brutal interrogation
techniques" overseas as alleged in the anonymous letter.
F.

FBI Special Agent Gibson ' s OIG Interview

Gibson told the OIG that he was involved in the investigation that
led to locating Zubaydah in Pakistan. Gibson said he traveled with
Thomas and CIA personnel to an undisclosed location in April 2002 to
assist in the interrogation of Zubaydah. Gibson said he was instructed
by his supervisor, Charles Frahm (then Acting Deputy Assistant Director
for the section that became the Counterterrorism Division), not to follow

321

standard FBI procedures in that he should not give Zubaydah any
Miranda warnings and that he should not prepare any interview
summaries, which would instead be prepared by the CIA. According to
Gibson, Frahm instructed him that the CIA would be in charge of the
interrogation and that Gibson was to assist the CIA in any way he could.
Gibson said that he and Thomas initially took the lead in
interviewing Zubaydah at the CIA facility because the CIA interrogators
were not at the scene. Gibson said Zubaydah was seriously wounded
when he arrived. Gibson said he used conventional FBI relationshipbuilding techniques with Zubaydah and succeeded in getting Zubaydah
to admit his identity and to identify a photograph of Khalid Sheik
Muhammad as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks.
After a few days, CIA personnel assumed control over the
interviews, but they asked Gibson and Thomas to observe and assist.
Gibson told us that he continued to work with the CIA for several weeks
into June 2002. Gibson continued to conduct interviews of Zubaydah
after the CIA assumed control. When asked about the interrogation
techniques used on Zubaydah during this period, Gibson minimized the
harshness of what the CIA was doing. When pressed, however, Gibson
admitted that during the period he was working with the CIA, the CIA

Gibson stated that the CIA personnel assured him that the
procedures being used on Zubaydah had been approved at the highest
levels" and that Gibson would not get in any trouble. Gibson stated that
he kept Frahm, his FBI supervisor, informed of his activities with the CIA
by means of telephone calls.
When told about Morehead's statements, Gibson asserted that he
never disclosed any classified information to Morehead. He described
Morehead as being motivated by revenge after a bad breakup. Gibson
said that Morehead may have overheard conversations between Gibson
and Thomas regarding press coverage of Zubaydah's capture. He also
said he sometimes told Morehead general things about difficult
experiences he had had overseas, so she could understand his emotional
condition. He speculated that Morehead could have inferred that Gibson
was involved with Zubaydah from press reports and the timing of
Gibson's travel.

322

OIG Interviews of FBI Special Agent Thomas and Acting
Deputy Assistant Director Frahm

As detailed in Chapter Four, Thomas told the OIG that he traveled
to an undisclosed CIA location in April 2002 to interview a high value
detainee who other witnesses confirmed was Zubaydah. H e said that

after the CIA agents assumed control of the detainee, the

. Thomas said he considered the

to be "borderline torture." All of these activities
occurred during the period that Gibson was assisting with the CIA.217
Thomas stated that he and Gibson were ultimately instructed by FBI
Headquarters to withdraw from the undisclosed location, and that he left
some time before Gibson did.
Frahm, Gibson's supervisor, told the OIG that Gibson and Thomas
were sent
to participate in the joint
effort to interrogate Zubaydah. He said he spoke to Gibson several times
by telephone, and that Gibson told him that he and Thomas had sat with
Zubaydah for hours, prayed with him, and cleaned him u . Frahm said
that Gibson told him that Zubaydah was
_ and that he (Frahm) told Gibson that Gibson and Thomas should
not be involved in interrogations using such techniques.
H.

OIG Analysis

We first reviewed the issue of whether Gibson participated in using
unauthorized interrogation techniques on Zubaydah, which was not
addressed in the OPR Report. In 2007, we sought to interview Zubaydah
after he was transferred to GTMO,
218

We concluded that during the spring of 2002 Gibson participated
in interviews in which interrogation techniques that would not be
available to an FBI agent in the United States were used on Zubaydah.
Specifically, Gibson admitted that during the time he was assisting the
CIA in interrogating Zubaydah at the undisclosed CIA facility, the CIA

217 Thomas had left the FBI by the time we interviewed him in August 2005. At
the time of Thomas' interview, the OIG had not yet interviewed Gibson and we did not
ask Thomas about conversations he might have had with Gibson which Morehead could
have overheard.
218 See footnote 4 above.

323

As noted
above, Thomas' and Frahm's descriptions of the techniques used on
Zubaydah were consistent with Gibson's account.
This interrogation of an extremely high profile detainee took place
very soon after the September 11 attacks, and before the FBI had
determined whether its traditional policies regarding interviews would
apply to overseas interrogations of terrorism suspects. Indeed, as
detailed in Chapter Four, it was the Zubaydah incident that sparked the
deliberations within the FBI that led to the decision that FBI agents
should not participate in interrogations using non-FBI techniques. At
the time of Gibson's participation in the Zubaydah interrogation, he had
received no guidance regarding his participation in interrogations in
which the CIA was using non-FBI approved techniques on detainees in
CIA custody. Rather, he was told that the CIA was in charge of the
interrogations and that normal FBI procedures such as giving Miranda
warnings and writing FD-302 interview summaries should not be
followed.
The FBI's formal policy addressing participation in joint
interrogations with other agencies in overseas locations was not issued
until 2 years later, in May 2004. Gibson's supervisor, Frahm, told
Gibson to assist the CIA in any way he could. We concluded that under
these circumstances, there was insufficient basis to conclude that
Gibson's cooperation with the CIA while the CIA was using non-FBI
techniques on Zubaydah violated clear FBI policy.
We also reviewed the question of whether the FBI adequately
investigated Morehead's allegation that Gibson disclosed classified or
sensitive information to her. The FBI OPR report stated it was "unable to
determine whether the information alleged to have been improperly
disclosed was in fact classified or -sensitive information because [ofJ the
vague descriptions provided by [Morehead and Landis]." However, we
found that the information Morehead attributed to Gibson was
remarkably detailed, specific, and accurate. It corresponded very closely
with the descriptions that we received from other sources regarding
accurate facts of the capture and initial interrogation of Zubaydah,
described in Chapter Four.219

219 We recognize that Morehead told OPR that she didn't think the detainee at
issue was Zubaydah. However, as detailed below, her description of Gibson's
participation in the interview closely matches what other witnesses told us about
Zubaydah's detention and interrogation in several respects. We concluded that even if
Gibson did not tell Morehead the correct name of the detainee, this does not resolve the
(Cont'd.)

324

For example, Morehead knew that Gibson traveled with Thomas
and CIA personnel to a location in [a particular country or a particular
city in another country] to interview a notorious terrorist. In fact, Gibson
traveled to the country containing the city that Morehead identified to
interview Zubaydah. Morehead stated that the terrorist was missing an
eye. Gibson told us that Zubaydah had an infected eye, sometimes wore
a patch, and eventually got a glass eye. Morehead knew that =
was utilized with the prisoner, a fact that was confirmed by
Thomas. Several witnesses, including Thomas, told us that Gibson and
Thomas traveled to an undisclosed CIA location, tended to Zubaydah's
wounds, and began to obtain useful information from Zubaydah. They
also stated that the CIA intervened and began using interview techniques
on Zubaydah that Thomas described as "borderline torture." The
interrogation methods that Morehead said were used on the detainee - were among the techniques Thomas
said were used on Zubaydah. Morehead also identified Thomas as the
agent who accompanied Gibson, which also was true.
We recognize that the fact that Zubaydah had been captured by
the United States was not a secret. On April 2, 2002, the White House
and the Pentagon confirmed that Zubaydah had been captured and was
receiving medical treatment for gunshot wounds. However, the CIA has
treated the details of Zubaydah's detention, including the location of the
CIA facilities at which he was detained and the interrogation methods
used on him, as Top Secret/ SCI information. It is also likely that the FBI
would consider the identity of the agents who interviewed Zubaydah as
sensitive if not classified information. Indeed, as discussed below, the
FBI disciplined another agent for revealing only that she was a "foreign
counterintelligence agent." The information that Morehead was able to
provide about Gibson's activities was much more significant and
detailed, but the FBI made no apparent attempt to determine if this
information was accurate.
OPR suggested that Morehead was motivated by her animus
toward Gibson stemming from the termination of their "tumultuous
relationship," which may have been true. However, Morehead's hostility
does not explain how she came to possess such strikingly accurate
information regarding the interrogation of Zubaydah.

Gibson suggested that Morehead may have reconstructed details
about the Zubaydah matter from media accounts and telephone
conversations about such reports between Gibson and Thomas. He
issue of whether the other information Morehead received was accurate and sensitive or
classified.

325

stated Morehead may have inferred that Gibson was involved in the
Zubaydah matter from the timing of his overseas travel.

Gibson's suggestion that Morehead constructed these accurate
details from conversations between Gibson and Thomas that she
overheard does not resolve the matter. Even if true, this would suggest
that Gibson improperly conducted telephone conversations about
classified matters in the presence of Morehead.
Moreover, there is no indication in the investigative file for this
matter that the Inspection Division or OPR made any attempt to
determine whether the account of Gibson's trip with Thomas that
Morehead provided was accurate and if so, whether the information was
classified or sensitive.
We also found it inexplicable that the FBI did not make the issue of
Gibson's alleged disclosures to Morehead a major focus of its polygraph
examination of Gibson in 2004.
We also note that the FBI's indifference to allegations of Gibson's
disclosure of his participation in the Zubaydah matter stands in stark
contrast to the FBI's treatment of another agent accused of mishandling
sensitive information. This agent had concerns about the efficacy of FBI
operations in GTMO, where the agent had previously been deployed. In
April 2003 the agent addressed these concerns in a letter to FBI Director
Mueller. The agent attempted to arrange for the delivery of a letter to the
Director by a private citizen who was a mutual acquaintance. In the
letter the agent identified herself as an "FCI" (Foreign Counter
Intelligence) agent and described (but did not name) detainees she had
interviewed at GTMO. OPR ruled in that case that the letter contained
sensitive or classified information and that the agent had improperly

326

disclosed the information to an unauthorized person by giving the letter
to a private citizen for delivery to the Director. The agent received a 5day suspension without pay for this disclosure and for the offense of
circumventing the normal channels of communicating with the Director.
The information disclosed by this agent was considerably less
specific or sensitive than the information Morehead allegedly received
from Gibson about his involvement with a CIA detainee. For example,
the agent was criticized for revealing that the agent was assigned to an
FCI squad. Morehead somehow obtained far more sensitive information:
that Gibson had been assigned to work with Thomas and the CIA on the
interrogation of a high value detainee at a secret location, using specific
interrogation techniques that the government clearly considers to be
secret. Yet, OPR found that this information was too "vague" to be
considered sensitive or classified. Again, we found no indication of any
effort by the Inspection Division to determine whether the information
was accurate or classified.
The issue of whether Gibson disclosed classified information to
Morehead was adjudicated by OPR in 2005. We believe that too much
time has passed for investigators to determine whether Morehead could
have derived her information from non-classified conversations or
publicly available sources. Also, much of the information that Morehead
described to FBI investigators was subsequently reported in the media,
which attributed the information to several unidentified law enforcement
and intelligence officials. It would be unfair for the FBI to reopen the
investigation of Gibson without initiating an investigation of the sources
of the information in the reports.220 However, the FBI should take note
of the inadequate and incomplete investigation it conducted with respect
to this matter and take steps to ensure that future investigations of
allegations that agents disclosed confidential or classified information are
conducted more thoroughly and evenhandedly. 221

220 The New York Times identified the sources of the information in the article
as officials who were not present at the interrogation but rather were briefed on the
events as they occurred or later. This description, if accurate, would exclude Gibson as
the source because he personally witnessed these events.
221 In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI stated that the adequacy of
the FBI's investigation of the allegation was further supported by the fact that Gibson
passed a polygraph examination in connection with a promotion in September 2003,
and by the DOJ Public Integrity Section's declination to prosecute Gibson. We disagree.
The 2003 polygraph was not a factor in the OPR's adjudication of this issue and does
not shed light on the adequacy of the FBI's investigation in 2004-2005. It took place
before Morehead made her allegations to the FBI and did not include specific questions
about conversations between Gibson and Morehead. Similarly, the decision by the DOJ
Criminal Division not to prosecute Gibson does not establish the adequacy of the FBI's
(Cont'd.)

327

VIII . Allegations of Abuse at the

In this Section we address allegation s relatin g to FBI conduct
during the spring and summer of 2004 at

Most of the allegations that we investigated were made by an FBI
agent, Ryan, who served in Iraq
and who was assigned to the facility for several weeks in
From

, another

FBI a ent, Adair, was the officer in charge of the
222 However, Adair was actin in his ca acit as an active duty
officer
. From
MOM
, approximately
seven FBI agents were sent by the FBI to the facility to assist the military
in conductin interrogations of detainees held at

As described in detail later in this Section, Ryan reported to
military superiors and to the FBI Inspection Division that after he left the
facility a military interrogator told him that detainees at the facility were
confined in "inhumane conditions" and were subjected to abusive
interrogation techniques, including food, water, and sleep deprivation
and "water interrogation." Ryan brought the issue to the attention of the
FBI Inspection Division because Adair was an FBI agent, although, as
discussed below, Adair was acting in his capacity as an officer in the
Army at the time of the incidents. The OIG investigated Ryan's
allegations and also examined reports from other agents regarding
practices by other FBI employees at the facility that might violate FBI
policy, including the use of in-cell restraints, blindfolding, and threats in
connection with detainee interrogations.

internal investigation, but rather reflects DOJ's determination on the basis of the FBI
information that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. Neither the 2003
polygraph nor the Criminal Division declination decision address the central
deficiencies in the FBI's investigation: the failure to recognize that the information
Morehead provided was highly detailed, specific, and accurate; the failure to determine
whether the information was sensitive or classified; and the failure to address how
Morehead got the information except from Gibson.
222 Ryan and Adair are pseudonyms.

328

Background
1.

The Facility

FBI Special Agent Adair

Prior to joining the FBI, Adair served in the military for over 9
ears. Adair remained on Inactive Readv Reserve status and in
he was recalled to active du
in

February 2004 where he served as a liaison officer and assisted with
developing detainee interrogation strategies. In
Adair was assigned to be the "J2X" (human intelligence) officer for the
Unit when the prior J2X retired.
Adair told the OIG that as the J2X, he was the officer in charge of
collecting human intelligence, which included supervising the entire

329

A Sergeant Major
was also assigned to the facility. Either Adair or the Sergeant Major was
usually physically present at the facility. Ryan told the OIG that the
Sergeant Major "appeared to be in actual control of the facility."

However, Adair stated that he, and not the Sergeant Major, was in charge
of the
Adair told the OIG that when the news accounts appeared about
the conduct of military personnel at Abu Ghraib in the spring of 2004,
his military supervisor told him that he should "not let anything happen"
at
because of the importance of the
actionable intelligence gained from the facility. Adair said he responded
to his supervisor that he would let the U.S. Constitution be his guide.
Adair told the OIG that all interrogation techniques used at the facility
had been approved by
Adair said that there was a shortage of experienced interrogators at
the facility, and there had been an "informal" decision to have FBI agents
assist in the interrogations. As a result of his su estion, a team of FBI
agents was sent to the
in May 2004 to
assist with the interrogations.

Adair left the military and returned to the United States in the
middle of July 2004.
3.

The Team of FBI Agents

Prior to May 2004, primarily military intelligence officers and
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) interrogators conducted detainee
interrogations at
. Beginning in early
May 2004, a team of approximately five FBI agents, including a Team
Leader, was deployed to the facility to assist the military in conducting
interrogations of the detainees for the purpose of obtaining intelligence
concerning threats to coalition forces and to obtain information that had
a U.S. nexus to terrorism. About a week later, two additional FBI agents
joined the five at the facility. The entire team of FBI agents returned to
the United States in July 2004 after a 60-day deployment.
The Team Leader said that his team was the first group of FBI
agents to be
. Several of these
agents told 'us that they received some instruction for their assignment,
either prior to their deployment to the facility or after they arrived.
According to the FBI Team Leader, the Deputy OSC for Iraq gave
instructions that the FBI agents should conduct the same type of
interviews as in the United States and should not to take part in or even
stay and observe interrogations where the military was employing any.

330

"harsh-u " techniques, such as
. The Team Leader stated that he relayed these instructions
to the agents, and several agents told us that they received instructions
to conduct themselves as they would in the United States.
Three of the agents told us that they understood that if they saw
conduct by the military that was inconsistent with FBI policies, they
should not participate and should report the incident through the FBI
chain of command. Several agents also told us that after they arrived in
Iraq, they received written guidance from FBI Headquarters, which we
concluded was likely the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy described in
Chapter Six.
However, three other agents told us that the team did not receive
training on military interrogation. They said that they did not know what
techniques were and were not authorized by the military and other
agencies.
At the
, the FBI agents were split into
two 12-hour shifts for conducting interviews of detainees. The agents
said that twice a day the agents, the military interrogators, and the
Sergeant Major met between shift changes to discuss the interrogations.
At these meetings, they would discuss general issues involving
interrogations and also specific detainees. Adair was also in attendance
at the b riefings whenever he was present at

Initially, the agents were teamed up with military interrogators, but
after a short period of time they generally worked with other FBI agents.
According to the FBI, this change was implemented to be consistent with
an FBI rule requiring that all interviews be conducted by two agents.
One of the agents stated that the reason for this change was that FBI
interviewers had a different purpose than military interviewers. The
focus of the military interviews was for force protection, while the FBI
agents were looking for information with a U.S. nexus. The agents did
not write FD-302 summaries for each interview, but rather summarized
their interviews in the form of ECs that were submitted weekly.
4.

FBI Special Agent Ryan

Ryan has worked for the FBI since 1999. He has also been a U.S.
Marine Corps reserve officer since 1996. Ryan told the OIG that when
the Iraq war began he sought to be deployed with the Marine Corps. He
received orders from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in April 2004
to deploy to Iraq, and arrived in Baghdad on May 1, 2004. He was

assigned to lead a team of human intelligence personnel to support s

331

, including
interrogation of detainees.
Ryan was in Iraq from May 1 to the be inning of June, 2004. Of
that time he spent approximately 2 weeks atia and approximately 2
weeks at
. Ryan said that during his time at
he experienced friction with the Sergeant Major over
who was in control of the DIA interrogators. Ryan complained to his
military superior in the United States, and in mid-May he was directed to
leave the facility and move to _ to monitor DIA officers. He stayed
in that area for 2 weeks and returned to

briefly. Shortly thereafter, he took a flight back to the United
States.
When Ryan returned to the United States, he complained to his
superiors at DIA about problems at the facility, including that the
military command at the facility had treated him poorly and that the
environment at the facility was abusive towards detainees. He also
eventually complained to FBI OPR about his view of Adair's operation of
the facility.

Adair told us that at one point he was informed that Ryan was
missing from the facility and that no one knew where he was. Adair later
learned that Ryan had returned and was staying at a nearby airport
hanger waiting to catch the next flight to the United States because he
knew he was in trouble and that people were looking for him. Adair said
that Ryan had "split from the program."
B.

Allegations by Ryan

When Ryan returned to the United States, he re orted his
concerns about the treatment of detainees at
to his military superiors and to the FBI Inspection Division. He
also signed an affidavit for FBI OPR describing these concerns. Ryan
also provided information about these concerns in an interview with the
OIG.

Ryan reported that shortly before he left the
_ in mid-May 2004, he overhead a facilit milit
guard who was
observing approximately six
detainees
awaiting releas e from the facility. Ryan said the guard made a comment

to the effect of,
Ryan
said he reported the statement to the guard's supervisor, and that within
48 hours the Sergeant Major banned Ryan from the facility.

332

Ran stated in his OPR affidavit that after he left the
in mid-May 2004 to go elsewhere in Iraq, he had a
conversation with an unnamed military interrogator. According to Ryan,
the military interrogator told him that some of the detainees at the
facility were confined in "inhumane conditions" without proper medical
treatment and without adequate hygiene opportunities. Ryan also stated
that the military interrogator told him that techniques such as food,
water, and sleep deprivation were used by military interrogators to
extract information from the detainees. In addition, the military
interrogator reported that detainees would be stripped naked and
subjected to "water interrogation."

Ryan told the OIG he did not personally observe these conditions
or the abuse described to him b the military interrogator. He alleged
that as the Officer in Charge at
, Adair
should have known about the conditions and the abuse and should have
taken steps to correct them.
Ryan also stated that he learned when he returned to Ba hdad in
late May or early June 2004 that someone at the
had posted his photograph in the main building of the facility.
We obtained a copy of the poster, which had printed in large letters
"Wanted for Questioning" above Ryan's picture and stated that "if seen
detain and escourt [sic] to the [task force] commander or the [task force]
J-2" (i.e., Adair).
Ryan stated that he did not know who had made the poster, but
that he viewed it as threatening and as retaliation for his reporting the
comments by the guard about shooting detainees in the back. He said
that after returning to the United States, he called the FBI Team Leader
who had been at the facility with the FBI agents, and the Team Leader
denied that the FBI agents made the poster. In our interview with the
Team Leader, he said that someone in the military hung up the poster in
the briefing room after a briefing where Ryan's absence was noted.
C.

Prior Investigations

After Ryan returned to the United States, his allegations of abuse
were referred to the DIA OIG, which conducted an interview of Ryan. The

333

DIA OIG concluded that no investigation by the DIA OIG was warranted
because Adair was not a DIA employee, and referred the allegations to
the DOD OIG. We did not find any indication that the DOD OIG ever
addressed the allegations against Adair.
Documents provided by the military indicate that a DIA civilian
debriefer who was assigned to
in April
2004 also made allegations to the DOD regarding detainee abuse at the

facili

had been approved by the J2 of the Task

Force (who was Adair).
Other DIA employees assigned to the facili re orted to DIA or
DOD investigators that detainees arriving
had bruises and burn marks indicating they had been abused,
and that some detainees were held at the facility for weeks at a time at
the whim of interrogators despite a general rule that detainees should be
transferred or released within 4 days. One DIA employee reported that
when the Task Force was notified that an IG investigation had been
initiated, the Sergeant Major and the Officer in Charge (Adair) became
very upset and the Sergeant Major made threateni ng statements again st

the DIA employee believed to have initiated the complaints.

Due to these events and other concerns regarding the relationship
between the Task Force and the DIA personnel, the DIA directed its
personnel serving at
to leave the facility
and to return to Camp Slayer in late June 20 04. A memorandum from
to the Director of the DIA
dated July 6, 2004, stated that an inve stigation of detainee abuse was

underway and that it had revealed

However, we are not aware of any report or findings by the DOD
OIG, the Task Force, or any other military com onent regarding the
alleged incidents of detainee abuse at
during Adair's tenure at that facility. As noted above, Ryan also reported
his concerns to the FBI Inspection Division in August 2004. The
Inspection Division initiated an investigation of the allegations against
Adair, who by that time also had returned to the FBI as a Special Agent.
On September 1, 2004, the Inspection Division conducted an interview of
Ryan and obtained a 7-page affidavit from him setting forth his

334

allegations. The Inspection Division did not interview Adair or conduct
any further investigation before closing the matter as "unsubstantiated"
in September 2004. An FBI Inspection Division official later
characterized Ryan's allegations as "rumor and innuendo." However, the
Inspection Division referred the matter to the OIG on October 20, 2004,
by providing Ryan's affidavit to the OIG.
D.

OIG Investigation

The OIG interviewed Ryan, Adair, and the team of seven FBI agents
who were deployed to the facility to conduct interrogations of detainees.
We also reviewed the survey responses of the FBI interrogation team and
the electronic communications summarizing detainee interviews that
were prepared during the period. We obtained documentation from the
DOD OIG regarding complaints made by Defense HUMINT Service
interrogators regarding

conditions at the

In evaluating Adair's conduct, we recognized that Adair was acting
in his capacity as a military commander while he was stationed at the
detention facility. In this capacity, he was expected to comply with
military regulations relating to the treatment of detainees, not FBI
policies. As noted in prior chapters, military policies regarding
interrogation techniques were significantly different and less restrictive
than policies applicable to FBI agents. As a result, Adair's conduct
should be evaluated as a military commander by reference to military
standards, not FBI standards.223
Nevertheless, the FBI retains an interest in the "off-duty" conduct
of its agents. The FBI's MAOP, Section 1-21.2, provides that "a
disciplinary inquiry is not restricted to activities within the critical
elements and performance standards of the employee's position and may
also include on- or off-duty conduct when such conduct affects an
employee's ability to perform his or her job or adversely affects the
Bureau's ability to secure needed cooperation from members of the
public."
In evaluating Adair's conduct as a military officer, however, we
recognized that compliance with military policies is primarily within the
jurisdiction of the military and not normally a subject within the purview
of the DOJ OIG. The Church Report described in detail the extremely

223 Moreover, we are not aware that the FBI has established any policy or
guidance regarding the applicability of its policies to FBI employees serving in the
military forces.

335

complex evolution of the military policies and found that in many cases
there were serious deficiencies in the communication of the contents of
military policies to units in the field. Church Report at 276. Moreover,
most of the potential witnesses to conditions and events at the
during Adair's tenure are not DOJ
employees and therefore are not subject to the OIG's investigative
authorities. Consequently, the scope of our review was primarily limited
to the accounts provided by FBI employees.
We identified instances where Adair's conduct might potentially
have implicated particular military policies, based on the descriptions of
such policies in the Church Report and summarized in Chapter Three.
However, we believe that the military should make the ultimate
determination of whether one. of its officers complied with military policy.
If the military determines that Adair's conduct violated military policy, we
recommend that such findings be communicated to the FBI for its
assessment whether any discipline is warranted under MAOP 1-21.2.
Although Adair was a ctinas a military officer, the FBI agents who
were deployed as a team to
during May
through July of 2004 were at all times acting as FBI employees. These
agents were subject to the more restrictive FBI policies regarding
interrogation, as described in prior chapters. As discussed in the
following sections, we assessed their conduct in light of FBI rather than
military standards.
E.

OIG Analysis of the Allegations

In this subpart we present the results of the OIG's investi ation
into the allegations relating to misconduct at the

Alleged Inhumane Physical Conditions

Ryan stated that a military interrogator had told him that there
were "inhumane conditions at the Baghdad detention facility." The
military interrogator told him that d etainees who were not cooperating
with the interrogators were kept

The FBI agents who conducted interrogations at the
acknowledged that the conditions for the detainees
were "primitive" and uncomfortable, but the agents did not view them as
inhumane and instead viewed them as appropriate to the circumstances.
336

agent said that the cells were clean and were swept regularly and
mopped on occasion. Several agents said that the cells had sleepin

mats in them. One agent said that the cells were large enough
According to most of the FBI agents, the plywood detainee
cells were open at the top and were in buildings that were enclosed and
air-conditioned, including the

We believe that conditions in the
were likely extremely
uncomfortable, particularly in the summer. However, we have no
evidence that, as J2X of the Unit, Adair was involved in designing or
constructing the facility, which was already in operation when Adair
arrived in Iraq. We also received no evidence that Adair could control the
size or temperature of the
or that he or others intentionally
manipulated temperatures in the
to increase detainee
discomfort. Accordingly, we did not analyze whether the conditions in
violated military policies or applicable treaty obligations.
the
We believe that this issue is not specific to Adair.

Allegations Regarding Medical and Hygiene
Conditions

Ryan stated he believed that the detainees at the facility were
"denied showers for periods up to one month and medical attention." He
said that although "each detainee was screened by an individual known
as `Doc,' there were problems with detainees receiving prescribed
medication." He did not provide any specific examples of detainees not
receiving prescribed medication.

337

The FBI agents interviewed by the OIG said that a doctor gave all
detainees a medical examination upon their arrival at the facility. One
agent also recalled several incidents when the doctor interrupted an
interview to check on the detainee. Another agent stated that some of
the detainees had diabetes or heart conditions, and the outside of each
detainee's cell would indicate whether he needed specific medication and
when he was to receive it.

Agents stated that detainees were given showers regularly and
were escorted to the toilets periodically and also up on request. The FBI
Team Leader stated that detainees staved at

Adair described the medical screening process for new detainees in
a similar fashion as the FBI agents. He stated that the surgeon and an
interpreter interviewed each detainee individually to determine if there
were health problems or injuries. Once the doctor cleared a detainee, the
detainee was given a prison uniform consisting of medical scrubs and
was assigned to an individual cell.
Durin

a DOD investigation of conditions in the
, one of the DIA civilian interrogators stated in his
affidavit that he noticed some detainees arriving at the facility in May
and June 2004 with fresh injuries such as bruises that were not
recorded in the medical screening sheets. The DIA interrogator stated
that all detainees were screened by the facility's medical doctor within
the first hour of their arrival, but only "major medical problems" were
being recorded. He said that some detainees complained to him of back
pain in the area of the kidneys, but that the medical screening did not
note these complaints. Another DIA debriefer stated that about 50
percent of the detainees arriving at

"appear to have been mistreated" before they got there.
A memorandum from
to the Director of the DIA dated July 6, 2004, stated that the on oin
internal investigation of detainee abuse by the
found that "it is not uncommon for
detainees to arrive with bruises from actions during capture," and that
there was an "on-going case of kidney stones in the facility, and medical
opinion of recurrent kidney problems due to the water, but no abuse
specific to detainees' kidneys."

338

We found insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
Adair was responsible for an inadequacies in medical treatment at the

Alleged Deprivation of Food or Water

Ryan said that when he was in another city in Iraq, he "observed
the utilization of food/water deprivation on one detainee." He said that
he "only personally observed this abuse occurring" in another city, but

that the unnamed

interrogator
m that the "same thing
was going on at themiikiiiaiiiiill

We are not aware of any military policies that permitted depriving
detainees of minimally sufficient food or water, either as an interrogation
technique or as a general detainee management practice.

The accounts of the FBI agents varied concerning food and water
restrictions at the facility. Some agents said they were unaware of an

food or water deprivation.

However, neither of the two agents
stated that they personally
participated in depriving detainees of food or water. One of these two
agents said that when a detainee asked for food, the agents asked the
military personnel to give the detainee an MRE. Other agents told us
224 Item "T" in the April 2003 GTMO Policy approved by the Secretary of Defense
explicitly provided that the permitted tactic of "dietary manipulation" did not include
the "intended deprivation of food or water."

339

that after they gave water to detainees or that whenever a detainee asked
for a drink, they would give him one. Three agents said that there was
water in the interrogation rooms for the detainees or that they often
offered water to the detainees. One of the agents said that food and
water was always available, but that he received a few complaints about
the quality of the food.
Two agents also stated that none of the detainees appeared to be
malnourished or dehydrated. They added that the detainees appeared
well fed or gained weight at the facility. However, this observation seems
inconsistent with the agents' statement that most detainees were

released or transferred out of the

Adair said that
the detainees were never deprived of food or water. He stated
that if a detainee arrived at night, the detainee might have to wait until
morning for the next ration cycle, but he would never be deprived of
water.

The limited evidence available to the OIG regarding the deprivation
of food or water at
was conflictin

Moreover, we did not find any

evidence that the team of FBI agents deployed to the facility participated
in depriving detainees of food or water.
We recommend that the military make its own findings regarding
whether military policy was violated and whether Adair was responsible
for any violation. If the military concludes that Adair was culpable, we
recommend that the military communicate this finding to the FBI.

Alleged Sleep Deprivation

an stated that in another Iraqi city "sleep deprivation techniques

He said that he did not personally observe this
technique employed at
but said that
the military interrogator in Falluja told him that it was used there.

340

Several FBI agents deployed to

ave information consistent with what R

However, both
agents insisted that they were not deliberately using sleep deprivation as
an interview technique.
Adair told the OIG that sleep deprivation was used at the facility as
an interrogation technique while he was there. He stated that it was
considered a "harsh-up technique."
He said that he
knew that sleep deprivation could not be used by the FBI in the United
States.

Initially, the
military relied on Field Manual 34-52, which did not list sleep
management, sleep deprivation, or extended interrogations among the 17
interrogation "approaches" that could be used in order to elicit
information from detainees. Church Report at 33-37, 257. On
September 14, 2003, the first Interrogation and Counter-Resistance
Policy for the Iraq the ater was issued. Id. at 257, 263.

341

We note, however, that the Church
Report found that "dissemination of approved interrogation policies [in
Iraq] was ineffective, resulting in widespread lack of awareness of which
techniques were currently authorized at the unit level." Church Report at
276.
We recommend that the military make its own findings regarding
whether military policy was violated and whether Adair was responsible
for any violation. If the military concludes that he was responsible, we
recommend that the military communicate this finding to the FBI.
5.

Allegations Regarding Harsh Interrogation
Techniques

Adair confirmed that one technique used by the military at the
facility was to drip cold water down the detainee's back during an
interrogati on to make him cold. He said that this was a "harsh-up"
technique
. He acknowledged that it was used while he was at the
Adair
facility.
described this practice of dripping water down a detainee's
back if he was being uncooperative as "annoying" to the detainee.
In addition, Adair said that before he arrived at the facility
interrogators would "strip down" detainees, which he said was culturally

342

humiliating. He said that he heard that interrogator s also would tell the

detainee after using the "strip down" techniaue that

Adair also described other "harsh-up" techniques used by the
military, including requiring detainees to do push-ups or calisthenics or
to sit in the "invisible chair" condition, blindfolding, and sleep
deprivation, which we addressed above. He said that the number of
times "harsh-u " techniques were used during the time he was at the
facility
Adair stated that although these techniques were approved by the
military hierarchy, he would not have used them as an FBI agent in the
United States. He also said that he did not think these techniques were
as effective as the FBI's rapport-building approach. He stated that he
believed that none of the detainees were in grave danger or were
physically harmed and that he had personally been through worse
treatment during Army Ranger training and pledging for his college
fraternity.
The FBI agents who were deployed to the facility provided little
information to the OIG regarding the use of harsh or aggressive
techniques at the facility. One agent said that the military interrogators
wanted to use methods like forced physical training and hooding, but
that these techniques had been abandoned after the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal. This agent said that at the end-of-shift briefings, the topic of
applying more stringent interrogation techniques with a detainee was
raised only two to three times. However, he said that he did not consider
the stricter techniques to be abusive and believed that they were closely
monitored by the military.
Another agent reported that he heard loud music from certain
interrogation rooms and that military interrogators told him they were
forcing detainees to perform physical training exercises.

The FBI Team Leader told us he recalled that while he was at the
facility,
to
use "harsh-up" techniques two times, but the FBI agents did not
participate. He said he did not look at the request and did not know
specifically what techniques were to be used . The Team Leader added
that

343

Adair told the OIG that a lot of the harsher military techniaues
that had been used before he came to the

Therefore, the evidence indicated that during Adair's command of
the facility, interrogators used interrogation techniques that were not
approved by the military. However, as noted above, the Church Report
found that dissemination of approved interrogation policies in Iraq was
ineffective. Church Report at 276. The report also indicated that
compliance with the policies was "often incomplete, even when units
were in possession of the latest guidance." Id. The Church investigators

We recommend that the military review whether military policies
were violated at the
and whether Adair was responsible for any such
violations. We recommend that that the military communicate any
findings to the FBI.

Allegations Regarding Use of Restraints

Several FBI agents told the OIG that

Detainees were also handcuffed while outside of the cells for security
reasons. One of the agents said that it was the interviewer's discretion
whether the detainee was restrained during the interview, and that

344

handcuffs were generally removed as a reward for cooperating and as a
sign of respect that often had a positive impact on the interview.
Occasionally a detainee would complain about the handcuffs being too
tight during the interviews, and the agent would ask the military
personnel to loosen the cuffs.
We also received information that FBI agents participated in
deciding whether detainees would be handcuffed inside their cells
following an interview, as part of a syste m of rewards for cooperation and

unishment for non-cooperation.

. The other said this happened "most of the time." The first agent
said that on more than "a couple" of occasions he and his FBI partner
until the
detainee's next interrogation. However, the other agent said that the
was a military tool and not an FBI creation. The

first agent also told us that it would have created problems for the
agents' relationship with the military to designate a detainee as
cooperative,
, if the detainee had in
fact lied or been uncooperative.

345

As previously explained, at all relevant times FBI policy prohibited
agents from obtaining statements from detainees by the use of force,
threats, physical abuse, threats of such abuse or severe physical
conditions. Part 1, Section 1-4 of the MAOP specifically provides that
these prohibitions are applicable to "all phases of the FBI's work
[including] foreign counterintelligence." Accordingly, it has been the
official FBI position that agents should not participate in any
interrogation techniques overseas that they would not be permitted to
use in the United States.
We do not take issue with using restraints for safety or security
considerations. However, the restraint classification system described by
several of the agents appears to have been in large part connected to the
interrogation function and whether the detainee was cooperating. The
OIG concluded that in the United States FBI agents would not have been
permitted to require that a person in custody be restrained (handcuffed)
in his cell for hours or days as punishment for failure to cooperate in an
interview. We believe that such a tactic would likely be considered using
physical abuse or severe physical conditions to obtain a statement,
which would be in violation of FBI policy.226

226 As noted in Chapter Ten, we determined that at least one FBI agent at
•
was also involved in deciding whether a detainee would
(Cont'd.)

346

As detailed in prior chapters, however, before May 2004 the FBI's
written policies did not clearly address whether FBI agents should
participate in joint interview strategies with non-FBI personnel who were
using techniques that were approved by their agencies. In approximately
July 2002, the FBI Director made a determination that the FBI would not
participate in detainee interrogations in which other agencies' harsher
techniques were being used, but this was not reflected in written policy
until the FBI issued its May 2004 Detainee Policy, which stated: "If a cointerrogator is complying with the rules of his or her agency, but is not in
compliance with FBI rules, FBI personnel may not participate in the
interrogation and must remove themselves from the situation." Some
FBI agents deployed at the facility recalled receiving a policy statement
while in Iraq, which was likely the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.
Although implementation of the categorization program at the detention
facility did not strictly speaking involve a "co-interrogator," the FBI
agents should have recognized that their participation in this program
was at least problematic, and should have considered seeking guidance
from FBI managers.227
The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy also required agents to report
any instances of "abuse" by non-FBI interrogators to the FBI's On-Scene
Commander. We found no evidence that the FBI agents deployed to the
detention facility considered the use of in-cell restraints by the military to
punish uncooperative detainees to constitute "abuse," or that the agents

227 As discussed in Section III.D. of Chapter Six, the FBI OGC addressed the
in a May 2006 Electronic Communication. The OGC concluded
that
for more
than 8 hours constituted "severe physical conditions." The OGC therefore
recommended that CTD prohibit its employees from interrogating detainees who had
been kept in these conditions for 8 hours or more until completion of a "cooling off"
period (typically at least 12 hours) following removal of these conditions. The OGC's
May 2006 EC did not address whether it would be permissible for an FBI a ent to make
a recommendation regarding whether a detainee should be
based on the detainee's level of cooperation in an interview. We believe that
the OGC's analysis strongly su ests that an FBI agent would not be permitted to make
such a recommendation if the
exceeded 8 hours. For the reasons
discussed above, we believe that any involvement in using
as an
incentive to provide information would be contrary to FBI policy,
even if the
MMMMM
was less than 8 hours.

347

reported the use of such techniques up their own chain of command.
Moreover, no useful guidance was provided to assist the agents to
discern the line between acceptable aggressive techniques permitted
under military policy and "abuse." In this environment, and in light of
the nature of the restraints used by the military, we do not conclude that
the FBI agents deployed to the detention facility violated their obligation
to report "abuse."
As previously noted, we evaluated Adair's conduct as the officer in
charge of the detention facility in terms of applicable military policy,
because Adair was acting in his capacity as a military officer at the time.

The program also could have been considered as an example of
"Incentive/ Removal of Incentive," which was approved for use throughout

the relevant period.

Moreover, if the program was neither a "stress position" nor an

"incentive/removal of incentive," and did not fall within any
specific listed techniques, I
r
I

the other

Adair denied knowing that in-cell restraints were used as a
punishment for non-cooperation. Yet, in light of the FBI agents' specific
recollection of this program, and the DIA interrogator's affidavit, we
found that such a practice took place at the detention facility. We believe
that the military should assess whether the categorization procedure was
consistent with applicable military interrogation policies. If it was not,
we recommend that the military assess Adair's role in permitting the
categorization system for applying in-cell restraints, and report the
findings to the FBI.

348

Allegations Regarding Blindfolding/ Goggles

We did not question the use of goggles or blindfolds during the
transportation of detainees as a security precaution.
We believe that, absent a legitimate security purpose,
such a technique could be considered "duress or intimidation" and would
not be permissible in the United States under FBI policy. See MAOP Part
1, 1-4(4), p. 27. Under FBI policy, the FBI agents deployed to the
detention facility should not have participated in interrogations using
this technique. However, we did not find any evidence that FBI agents
used this technique during interrogations, except for the single, relatively
minor incident described above.

We did not receive any evidence that the FBI agents reported the
military's use of blindfolding or goggles up the FBI chain of command.
For the same reasons discussed in the prior section, we cannot conclude
that this technique constituted "abuse" as that undefined term is used in

349

the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, and we cannot fault the agents for
declining to report it.

Alleged Threats

One of the FBI agents told us that he and another agent sometimes
used a ruse in which they would advise a detainee that if he did not
cooperate, they would take him back to the United States where he
would face criminal charges and spend time in a maximum security
prison. A summary of a detainee interview in an EC dated May 22, 2004,
referred to the use of this technique and the detainee's reaction: "It
should be noted that [the detainee] was visibly upset when told that a
letter would be written to his wife in order to notify her of his impending
departure to the United States to face a prison sentence, a pretext
utilized by the interviewing agents." This EC was sent through the Team
Leader to CTD.
The same FBI agent mentioned another ruse where the agents
would threaten to bring the detainee's family members to the facility and
then eventually to the United States for prosecution. He said that they
stopped employing this ruse when they realized that it was not working.
The agent said that they discussed the use of the ruse with the other
agents, including the Team Leader, and that no one expressed any
objection.
Section 7 of the Legal Handbook for Special Agents (LHBSA),
"Confessions and Interrogations," states in pertinent part: "It is the
policy of the FBI that no attempt be made to obtain a statement by ...
threats . . . ." LHBSA § 7-2.1. However, the line between permissible
ruses and impermissible threats is difficult to state with precision. FBI
training materials provided to the OIG do not elaborate on this
distinction but refer to court decisions regarding the admissibility of
confessions. These materials point out that although courts have found
confessions inadmissible when extracted by threats to arrest a relative or
friend, courts applying the "totality of circumstances test" have admitted
confessions following threats to arrest or charge another. Consequently,
we did not find a basis for concluding, under the totality of the
circumstances, that the FBI agents violated FBI policy with respect to
using these ruses.
9.

Allegations that Detainee Was Subjected to Electric
Shock

350

I
-M This
alleged incident involved solely military personnel, and did not occur at
the facility while under Adair's command.
10.

Allegation Concerning Abuse of a Female Detainee

an told the OIG that he overheard a conversation betwe en 0

Ryan also
said that the staff members discussed that the incident was under
investigation.
Adair also told us that he recalled hearing about this incident and
that it was investigated by the military, but that it allegedly occurred
prior to his arrival. We found no evidence that any FBI agent was
involved or alleged to be involved in the matter. Because this incident
involved solely military personnel and occurred prior to the FBI agents or
Adair arriving at the facility, the OIG did not investigate it. We do not
know whether the DOD ever investigated this matter.
F.

OIG Conclusions Concernin g Alle gations at M

In sum, the OIG did not substantiate that the FBI agents who
served as interrogators at the facility from May to June 2004 engaged in
the inappropriate conduct alleged by Ryan, including deprivation of food
and sleep, and inhumane treatment. However, we found that some FBI
agents knowingly participated in the categorization system for restraining
detainees in the cells who were not cooperative in interrogations. We
believe that this activity probably would not have been permitted in the
United States under FBI policies. The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy,
which reiterated the applicability of existing FBI interrogation policies in
the military zones, was issued very near the time that this conduct took
place. We also believe that these incidents demonstrate that the
applicability of existing FBI policies in the military zones was not made
clear to all FBI agents prior to the issuance of the May 2004 Detainee
Policy.

We recommend that the military review Adair's conduct in light of
the applicable military policies to determine whether he was in

351

compliance with those policies. If the military concludes that he was not,
we recommend that the military share its findings with the FBI.

352

CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we summarize our findings regarding the FBI's
participation in, observations of, and reporting of the treatment of
detainees in the military zones in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. We also describe the disposition of reports that FBI agents
made regarding concerns they had about detainee treatment. We also
provide our conclusions and recommendations relating to the adequacy
of the FBI's response to requests from its agents for guidance regarding
these issues and the adequacy of responses from FBI Headquarters and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) to reports from FBI agents regarding
other agencies' interrogation practices.

Background

As a result of the September 11 attacks, the FBI refocused its top
priority to counterterrorism and preventing terrorist attacks in the
United States. As a consequence of this shift, and in recognition of the
FBI's investigative expertise and familiarity with al-Qaeda, the FBI
became more involved in collecting intelligence and evidence overseas,
particularly in military zones in Afghanistan, at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), and in Iraq.
Beginning in December 2001, the FBI sent a small number of
agents and other employees to Afghanistan to obtain actionable
intelligence for its counterterrorism efforts, primarily by interviewing
detainees at various Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA facilities. In
January 2002, the military began transferring "illegal enemy
combatants" from Afghanistan to GTMO, and the FBI began deploying
personnel to GTMO to obtain intelligence and evidence from detainees in
cooperation with military interrogators. Following the invasion of Iraq in
March 2003, the FBI sent agents and other employees to Iraq with the
primary objective of collecting and analyzing information to help protect
against terrorist threats in the United States and protecting U.S.
personnel or interests overseas. FBI deployments in the military zones
peaked at approximately 25 employees in Afghanistan, 30 at GTMO, and
60 in Iraq at any one time. In total, more than 200 FBI employees served
in Afghanistan between late 2001 and the end of 2004 (the period
covered by our survey), more than 500 employees served at GTMO
during this period, and more than 260 served in Iraq.

353

II.

FBI Policies Regarding Detainee Interrogations

Prior to May 19, 2004, the FBI did not issue any formal written
policies to its agents regarding FBI interviews of detainees in the military
zones. Many FBI agents told us that they were instructed to comply with
existing FBI policies for custodial interviews in the United States, except
for providing Miranda warnings. These FBI policies, which prohibit
agents from attempting to obtain statements by force, threats, or
promises, reflect constitutional considerations of voluntariness as a
condition of preserving the legal admissibility of statements in judicial
proceedings. They also reflect the FBI's long-standing belief, based on
years of experience, that rapport-based interview techniques are the
most effective means of obtaining reliable information through custodial
interviews.
However, existing FBI interrogation policies did not address the
difficult issues confronted by FBI agents in the military zones, such as
what agents should do when they observe an interrogator from another
agency using techniques that are not permissible for the FBI. On
May 19, 2004, shortly after the detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq became public, the FBI issued a policy instructing its agents to
remove themselves from any interview in which non-FBI interrogators
used techniques not in compliance with FBI rules. In addition, the May
2004 Policy directed FBI employees to report any incidents of known or
suspected abuse.or mistreatment to their On-Scene Commanders (OSC).

III.

Agent Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment

Several military and commission reports have assessed the
treatment of detainees by the military, but none have comprehensively
addressed the FBI's role and observations regarding detainee treatment.
As part of this review, the OIG surveyed more than 1,000 FBI employees
who were sent to the military zones between late 2001 and the end of
2004. Our survey sought information about more than 30 separate
interrogation techniques, ranging from depriving a detainee of clothing to
electric shocks and beatings. (A copy of the OIG survey is attached to
this report as Appendix A.) We also conducted over 230 interviews to
determine what FBI employees witnessed or learned about potentially
abusive treatment of detainees.
While a majority of FBI employees in each military zone reported in
response to our survey that they never saw or heard about any of the
specific aggressive interrogation techniques listed in our survey, a
significant number of FBI agents said they had observed or heard about
military interrogators using a variety of harsh interrogation techniques

354

on detainees. Most of these harsh techniques involved conduct or
interrogation techniques that the FBI would not be permitted to use in
the United States. It appears that many - but not all - of these harsh
interrogation techniques were authorized under military policies in effect
in the military zones. However, virtually none of the FBI employees
reported that they observed detainee abuse comparable to that which
occurred at Abu Ghraib prison.
GTMO . The most commonly reported technique used by non-FBI
interrogators on detainees at GTMO was sleep deprivation or disruption.
Numerous FBI agents told the OIG that they witnessed the military's use
of a regimen known as the "frequent flyer program" to undermine cell
block relationships among detainees and to disrupt detainees' sleep in an
effort to lessen their resistance to questioning. A few FBI agents
participated in this program by requesting military officials to subject
particular detainees to these frequent cell relocations. Other FBI agents
described observing military interrogators use bright lights, loud music,
and extreme temperatures to keep detainees awake or otherwise wear
down their resistance.
Prolonged short-shackling, in which a detainee's hands were
shackled close to his feet to prevent him from standing or sitting
comfortably, was another of the most frequently reported techniques
observed by FBI agents at GTMO. This technique was sometimes used in
conjunction with holding detainees in rooms where the temperature was
very cold or very hot in order to break the detainees' resolve.
The DOD's Church Report found that the practice of shortshackling prisoners constituted a "stress position." Stress positions were
prohibited at GTMO under DOD policy beginning in January 2003. FBI
agents' observations confirm that prolonged short-shackling continued at
GTMO for at least a year after the DOD policy prohibiting stress positions
took effect.
FBI agents also observed the use of isolation at GTMO, both to
prevent detainees from coordinating their responses to interrogators and,
in its most extreme form, to deprive detainees of human contact as a
means of reducing their resistance to interrogation. We found that in
several cases FBI agents participated in interrogations of detainees who
were subjected to prolonged isolation by the military.
In addition, FBI agents reported a number of other harsh or
unusual interrogation techniques used by the military at GTMO. These
incidents tended to be small in number but became notorious because of
their nature. They included using a growling military dog to intimidate a
detainee during interrogation; twisting a detainee's thumbs back; using a

355

female interrogator to touch or provoke a detainee in a sexual manner;
wrapping a detainee's head in duct tape; exposing a detainee to
pornography; and wrapping a detainee in the flag of Israel.
Afghanistan . FBI employees in Afghanistan conducted detainee
interviews at the major military collection points in Bagram and
Kandahar and at other smaller facilities. The most frequently reported
techniques used by military interrogators in Afghanistan were sleep
deprivation or disruption, prolonged shackling, stress positions, loud
music, and isolation. Several FBI employees also told us they had heard
about two detainee deaths at the military facility in Bagram, but none of
the FBI employees said they had personal knowledge of these deaths,
which were investigated by the DOD.
Iraq . We received varied reports from agents who were detailed to
Iraq. For example, several FBI agents said they observed detainees
deprived of clothing at Abu Ghraib prison or the
. Other frequently reported
techniques identified by FBI agents as used by military personnel in Iraq
included sleep deprivation or interruption, loud music and bright lights,
isolation of detainees, and hooding or blindfolding during interrogations.
FBI employees also reported the use of stress positions, prolonged
shackling, and forced exercise in Iraq. In addition, several FBI agents
told the OIG that they became aware of unregistered "ghost detainees" at
Abu Ghraib whose presence was not reflected in official DOD records.

We also heard reports from FBI agents that detainees

Although several FBI agents were deployed to the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq, they told us that they did not witness the extreme conduct
that occurred at that facility in late 2003 and that was publicly reported
in April 2004. The FBI agents explained that they typically worked
outside of the main prison building where the abuses occurred, and they
did not have access to the facility at night when much of the abuse took
place.

356

IV.

The Disposition of FBI Agents' Reports Regarding Detainee
Mistreatment

In our review, we examined how FBI agents' reports about military
detainee interrogation practices were handled, both by FBI managers and
by senior officials in the Department of Justice.228
Our review found that the first time a major incident of possible
detainee mistreatment was reported to senior managers in the FBI was in
the spring of 2002 when two FBI agents were assigned to assist in the
interrogation of a high value detainee, Zubaydah, at a secret CIA facility
overseas. Zubaydah had been severely wounded when he was captured
in Pakistan in March 2002, and the two FBI agents obtained intelligence
from him while helping him recover from his injuries. Within a few days
after the CIA assumed control of Zubaydah's interrogation, one of the FBI
agents expressed concern to senior officials in the Counterterrorism
Division (CTD) at FBI Headquarters about the techniques bein b used
the CIA. The techniques reported by the agent included
This agent's concerns led to
discussions at FBI Headquarters and with the DOJ and the CIA about
the FBI's role in joint interrogations with other agencies, and ultimately
resulted in a determination by FBI Director Mueller in the summer of
2002 that the FBI would not participate in joint interrogations of
detainees with other agencies in which harsh or extreme techniques not
allowed by the FBI would be employed.
Later in 2002, FBI agents assigned to GTMO began raising
questions to FBI Headquarters regarding harsh interrogation techniques
being used by the military. These concerns were focused particularly on
the treatment of Muhammad Al-Qahtani, a Saudi national who had
unsuccessfully attempted to enter the United States in August 2001, and
who was allegedly sent to the United States to be one of the
September 11, 2001, hijackers. After his capture and transfer to GTMO,
AI-Qahtani resisted initial FBI attempts to interview him. In September
2002, the military assumed control over the interrogation of Al-Qahtani,
although behavioral specialists from the FBI continued to observe and
provide advice. The FBI agents became concerned when the military
announced a plan to keep AI-Qahtani awake during continuous 20-hour
interviews for an indefinite period and when they observed military
interrogators use increasingly harsh and demeaning techniques, such as
228 We did not examine issues related to DOJ Office of Legal Counsel opinions
concerning the legality of several interrogation techniques the CIA sought to use on
certain high value detainees. While senior FBI and DOJ officials were aware of these
opinions, an assessment of the validity of OLC legal opinions was beyond the scope of
this review.

357

menacing Al-Qahtani with a snarling dog in very close proximity to him
during his interrogation.
Friction between FBI officials and the military over the
interrogation plans for Al-Qahtani increased during October and
November 2002. The FBI continued to advocate for a long-term rapportbased strategy, while the military insisted on a more aggressive
approach. Between late November 2002 and mid-January 2003, the
military used numerous aggressive techniques on Al-Qahtani, including
attaching a leash to him and making him perform dog tricks, placing him
in stress positions, forcing him to be nude in front of a female, accusing
him of homosexuality, placing women's underwear on his head and over
his clothing, and instructing him to pray to an idol shrine. FBI and DOJ
officials did not learn about the techniques used between late November
2002 and mid-January 2003 until much later. However, in early
December 2002, an agent learned that Al-Qahtani was hospitalized
briefly for what the military told the FBI was low blood pressure and low
body core temperature.
As a result of the interrogations of Al-Qahtani and other detainees
at GTMO, several FBI agents raised concerns with the DOD and FBI
Headquarters about: (1) the legality and effectiveness of DOD
techniques; (2) the impact of these techniques on the future prosecution
of detainees in court or before military commissions; and (3) the potential
problems that public exposure of these techniques would create for the
FBI as an agency and FBI agents individually. Some of these concerns
were expressed to FBI Headquarters in e-mails from agents at GTMO.
The informal response these agents received from Headquarters was that
agents could continue to witness DOD interrogations involving non-FBI
authorized techniques so long as they did not participate. During this
period, however, FBI agents continued to raise objections directly with
DOD officials at GTMO and to seek guidance from senior officials in the
FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD). Senior FBI officials told us they
had no recollection of these communications, and no formal responses
were ever received by the agents who wrote these communications.
We determined, however, that some of the FBI agents' concerns
regarding the DOD's interrogation approach at GTMO were
communicated by senior FBI officials in the CTD to senior officials in the
Criminal Division of DOJ and ultimately to the Attorney General. FBI
Headquarters officials said.they discussed the issue in meetings with
Bruce Swartz (Deputy Assistant Attorney General), David Nahmias
(counsel to the Assistant Attorney General), and others in the Criminal
Division. Two witnesses told us that they recalled conversations with
Alice Fisher (at the time the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division) regarding the ineffectiveness of military interrogations

358

at GTMO. Fisher told us that she could not recall discussing detainee
treatment or particular interrogation techniques with the FBI, but that
she was aware that the FBI did not consider DOD interrogations at
GTMO to be effective. Concerns about the efficacy of DOD interrogation
techniques also reached Michael Chertoff (then Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division), Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson, and Attorney General John Ashcroft.
The witnesses we interviewed generally said they recalled that the
primary concern expressed at this level was that DOD techniques and
interrogators were ineffective at developing actionable intelligence. These
witnesses did not identify the FBI agents' concerns about the legality of
the techniques or their impact on future prosecutions as a focus of these
discussions.
We also learned about a pro osal developed b certain FBI and
DOJ officials in late 2002 to
Al-Qahtani
for interrogation. This
recommendation was reflected in a draft letter from a DOJ official's files
describing a proposal to reques t the National Security Council -

The draft letter recommended that AlQahtani be interrogated using
such as
the one the CIA used on Zubaydah. Nahmias and the Unit Chief of the
FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee Unit told the OIG that the rationale
for this proposal was to get Al-Qahtani away from the military's
ineffective interrogation techni
However, both the Unit Chief and Nahmias stated that they did not know
what techni ues had been used by the CIA until much later. The
proposal
Al-Qahtani was discussed with the DOD, and the National Security Council. However, there is no evidence that
these discussions included specific references to the methods used on
Zubaydah.
The DOD resisted the proposal
_ and it was not pushed to an ultimate decision. Nahmias told us
the proposal was "overtaken by events." One such event was likely the
fact that Al-Qahtani began cooperating with military interrogators in
April 2003, obviating the underlying rationale for the proposal. Senior
officials such as FBI Director Mueller, former Assistant Attorney General
Chertoff, and current Assistant Attorney General Fisher told us that they
did see the draft letter or take part in any specific discussion of the
proposal
On a broader level, we were unable to determine definitively
whether the concerns of the FBI and DOJ about DOD interrogation

359

techniques were ever addressed by any of the structures created for
resolving inter-agency disputes about antiterrorism issues. These
structures included the Policy Coordinating Committee, the "Principals"
Committee, and the "Deputies" Committee, all chaired by the National
Security Council (NSC). Several senior DOJ Criminal Division officials
also told us that they raised concerns about particular DOD detainee
practices in 2003 with the National Security Council, but they did not
recall learning that any changes were made at GTMO as a result. Several
witnesses told us that they believed that Attorney General Ashcroft spoke
with the NSC or the DOD about these concerns, but former Attorney
General Ashcroft declined our request for an interview in connection with
this report.
Several factors likely affected the resolution of the FBI and DOJ
concerns about the military's interrogations. On January 15, 2003,
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded his prior authorization of some of
the more aggressive DOD interrogation techniques. In addition, in April
2003 Al-Qahtani became fully cooperative with military interrogators.
Moreover, based on the information we obtained in the OIG survey and
our follow-up interviews, we believe that around this time the military
also reduced the frequency and severity of its use of many of the
techniques that troubled the FBI agents deployed at GTMO.
Ultimately, we found that the DOD made the decisions regarding
what interrogation techniques would be used by military interrogators at
GTMO, because GTMO was a DOD facility and the FBI was there in a
support capacity. Similarly, the DOD controlled what techniques were
used in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, once it was clearly established
within each zone that military interrogators were permitted to use
interrogation techniques that were not available to FBI agents, the FBI
On-Scene Commanders said they often did not elevate reports of harsh
detainee interrogations to their superiors at FBI Headquarters.
In general, we found that FBI agents deployed to Afghanistan and
Iraq made fewer reports to their supervisors regarding detainee
mistreatment than were .raised by FBI agents assigned to GTMO. Unlike
the situation at GTMO, FBI agents in Afghanistan and Iraq were
operating in a war zone - an environment in which they were dependent
on the military for protection and support. In such a situation, agents
were reluctant to raise complaints about the military's conduct, and also
assumed that the rules were different in this environment.
We also found that in all three military zones FBI agents
sometimes sought to resolve their concerns about detainee treatment
directly with military personnel without elevating the issue to FBI
Headquarters. These efforts met with mixed results. At GTMO, FBI

360

personnel who were concerned about short-shackled detainees worked
with the DOD's Criminal Investigative Task Force to persuade the DOD
to officially eliminate this practice in 2002. However, reports of DOD
short-shackling continued into 2004. In other instances, the FBI's OnScene Commanders and other FBI agents reported that they were able to
resolve their concerns with their DOD counterparts in the military zones
and therefore did not have to raise them with their supervisors. For
example, at GTMO the FBI's On-Scene Commander was able to resolve
concerns about military personnel impersonating FBI agents with his
military counterpart. Similarly, some agents deployed to Afghanistan
and Iraq told us they were able to resolve incidents of rough handling of
detainees by the military by discussing the issue with military
commanders.

OIG Analysis
A.

FBI Conduct in the Military Zones

We found that the vast majority of FBI agents deployed to the
military zones understood that existing FBI policies prohibiting coercive
interrogation tactics continued to apply in the military zones and that
they should not engage in conduct overseas that would not be permitted
under FBI policy in the United States. To the FBI's credit, it decided in
2002 to continue to apply FBI interrogation policies to detainees in the
military zones. As a result, most FBI agents adhered to the FBI's
traditional rapport-based interview strategies in the military zones and
avoided participating in the aggressive or questionable interrogation
techniques that the military employed. We found no instances in which
an FBI agent participated in clear detainee abuse of the kind that some
military interrogators used at Abu Ghraib prison. We credit the
judgment of the FBI agents deployed to the military zones for this result,
as well as the guidance that some FBI supervisors provided during the
period that the FBI's new role in counterterrorism was first evolving.
However, we found a few incidents of FBI presence or involvement
in interrogations in which techniques were used that clearly would not
be permissible for FBI agents to use in the United States. These
included:
•

FBI

artici ation in the interro ations of

(Chapter Four).

361

•

An FBI agent recommending isolation from human contact
for Al-Qahtani at the Navy Brig in GTMO in August 2002
(Chapter Five).

•

FBI agents participating in the isolation of Al-Sharabi at
GTMO in April 2003, including telling him that theirs were
the only human faces he would see until he provided
information (Chapter Eleven).

•

FBI agents participating in a system of categorizing detainees
accordin to level of cooperation and
in 2004. (Chapters Ten
and Eleven).

•

FBI agents participating in an interrogation in Iraq in which
detainees were placed in a stress position, given a "drink of
water" in a forceful and inappropriate manner, and
blindfolded with duct tape. (Chapter Eleven).

We also found incidents of FBI involvement in activities which,
although not constituting clear violations of FBI policy, were sufficiently
different from conventional FBI interrogation techniques to raise
questions about how existing policies should be applied. For example:
•

FBI agents utilized the military's "frequent flyer program" at
GTMO, which involved frequent detainee cell relocations and
sleep disruption (Chapters Eight and Eleven).

•

An FBI agent utilized sleep disruption or deprivation as part
of an interrogation strategy in Afghanistan (Chapter Nine).

•

FBI agents made promises of leniency to detainees including
Al-Sharabi (#569) that might taint a confession in the United
States (Chapter Eleven).

•

FBI agents made potentially threatening statements to
detainees to the effect that unless they cooperated with the
FBI they would be turned over to military or CIA
interrogators who were permitted to use harsher techniques
(Chapters Five and Eleven).

We believe that FBI participation in these interrogation practices,
while few in number, reflected the fact that existing FBI policies were not
designed to address the new circumstances faced by FBI agents working
in military zones. We also believe that some of these incidents could
have been avoided if the FBI had responded more quickly and
comprehensively to repeated requests from its agents for additional
guidance.

362

FBI Guidance

We concluded that FBI Headquarters did not sufficiently or timely
respond to repeated requests from its agents in the military zones for
guidance regarding their participation in detainee interrogations. No
formal FBI policy was issued until after the Abu Ghraib disclosures in
late April 2004, when the FBI's Detainee Policy was quickly prepared and
released.
As described in our report, the FBI's involvement in detainee
interrogations raised at least four difficult issues: (1) what interrogation
techniques should FBI agents be allowed to use in the military zones; (2)
what should FBI agents do when other agencies begin using non-FBI
approved interrogation techniques during joint interviews; (3) when
should FBI agents be allowed to interview detainees who have previously
been subjected to non-FBI techniques; and (4) when and how should FBI
agents report harsh interrogation techniques used by other agencies. We
assess the FBI's response to each of these issues separately below.
1.

FBI-Approved Interrogation Techniques

As detailed in Chapter Four, as a result of the Zubaydah incident
in the summer of 2002 the FBI decided that it would not be involved in
interrogations in which other agencies used non-FBI techniques. Most
FBI agents told us that they were instructed or already knew that they
should adhere to the same standards of conduct for detainee interviews
that applied to custodial interviews in the United States. However, a
significant percentage of agents deployed to the military zones prior to
May 19, 2004, told us that they received no explicit guidance regarding
interrogation policies for detainees prior to their deployments overseas.
We believe that the agents had several reasons to be uncertain about
whether the rules were different in the military zones.
First, the FBI announced a change in priorities from evidence
collection for prosecution to intelligence collection for terrorism
prevention. FBI agents in the military zones could reasonably infer that
traditional law enforcement constraints on interview techniques were not
strictly applicable in the military zones, particularly with respect to "high
value" detainees. Second, conditions at detention facilities in the military
zones were vastly different from conditions in U.S. jails or prisons, and
FBI agents could have concluded that different interrogation techniques
were appropriate near combat zones or in dealing with terrorists at
GTMO. Consequently, some FBI interrogators used strategies that might
not be necessary or appropriate in the United States, such as extreme
isolation from other detainees or other strategies to undermine detainee
solidarity. Third, the FBI's dependence on the military, which controlled

363

the military zones, placed FBI agents in an awkward position to refuse to
participate in joint interviews in which non-FBI techniques were
employed.
We believe that factors such as these raised a legitimate question
for FBI agents as to whether conventional FBI law enforcement interview
policies and standards continued to apply to FBI interviews of detainees
in the military zones. Ultimately, senior FBI management determined
that pre-existing FBI standards (except Miranda warnings) should
remain in effect for all FBI interrogations in military zones, even where
future prosecution is not contemplated. However, we found that this
message did not always reach all FBI agents in the military.zones. As
noted above, at least some FBI employees determined that departures
from conventional FBI strategies were appropriate in certain
circumstances.

We concluded that FBI management should have realized sooner
than May 2004 that it needed to issue a written policy addressing the
question of whether its pre-September 11 policies and standards for
custodial interviews should continue to be strictly applied in the military
zones. An unequivocal statement to that effect, clearly communicated to
all FBI agents being sent to the military zones, could have prevented
some of the incidents described above.
2.

FBI Policy When Another Agency' s Interrogator
Uses Non-FBI Techniques

The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy states: "If a co-interrogator is
in compliance with the rules of his or her agency, but is not in
compliance with FBI rules, FBI personnel may not participate in the
interrogation and must remove themselves from the situation." As
detailed in Chapter Three, the issue addressed by this requirement was
not addressed in prior FBI policies, primarily because in most joint
interrogations the FBI is in charge of the interrogation or the other
agency is subject to rules similar to FBI rules. This issue was raised to
FBI Headquarters well before the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, and we
believe that the FBI should have clarified its guidance before May
2004.229 For example, in the fall of 2002 FBI agents sought
Headquarters guidance on what they should do when confronted with
229 As detailed in Chapter Seven, some agents said that before May 2004 they
were told to leave interrogations if they saw anything "extreme," "inappropriate," or that
made them "uncomfortable." However, many FBI agents who were deployed to the
military zones before the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was issued told us they
received no training or guidance on conducting joint interviews with military or other
agency officials.

364

aggressive military interrogation techniques being used on Al-Qahtani
and other detainees at GTMO. The agents were initially told that as long
as there was no "torture" involved, they could participate; other agents
were told that they could observe such techniques as long as they did not
participate, because the techniques were "apparently lawful" for the
military. These incidents indicate that the FBI should have addressed
the issue of what agents should do in these situations more explicitly
before May 2004.
3.

FBI Interrogation of Detainees After Other
Agencies Use Non - FBI Techniques

The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy does not address the issue of
whether FBI agents may interview a detainee who has previously been
subjected to non-FBI interrogation techniques by other agencies. In
response to concerns expressed by agents and attorneys in the FBI after
the May 2004 Policy was issued, the FBI General Counsel directed OGC
lawyers to prepare legal advice that addressed, among other things, how
long after the military interrogations FBI agents needed to wait so as not
be considered a participant in the harsh interrogation. Several drafts of
supplemental policy to address this issue were prepared by OGC, but
none was ever finalized. Although the problem was diminished
somewhat by the fact that in 2006 the military promulgated a new,
uniform interrogation policy for all military theaters that stresses noncoercive interrogation approaches (Field Manual 2-22.3), we believe this
has not obviated the need for clear FBI guidance with regard to these
questions. The revised military policy still permits DOD interrogators to
use some techniques that FBI agents probably cannot employ, such as
the methods known as "fear up" or "pride and ego down."
Moreover, to the extent that the FBI continues to be involved with
interrogating detainees who previously have been interrogated by the
CIA, the problems remain significant and unresolved. CIA interrogation
rules diverge from FBI rules much more dramatically than does current
military policy. We therefore recommend that the FBI complete the
project that OGC began shortly after the issuance of its May 2004
Detainee Policy and address the issue of when FBI agents may interview
detainees previously interrogated by other agencies with non-FBI
techniques. The FBI should also address the issue of if and when FBI
agents may use information obtained in interrogations by other agencies
that employed non-FBI techniques.
4.

Reporting Abuse or Mistreatment

Prior to issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, the FBI
did not provide specific or consistent guidance to its agents regarding

365

when or how the conduct of other agencies toward detainees should be
reported. Some agents told us they were instructed to report problematic
interrogation techniques, but the definition of what to report was left
unclear. Leaving this matter to the discretion of individual FBI agents
put them in a difficult position, because FBI agents were trying to
establish a cooperative working relationship with the DOD while fulfilling
their intelligence-gathering responsibilities. Under these circumstances,
FBI agents had many reasons to avoid making reports regarding
potential mistreatment of detainees. In addition, the agents lacked
information regarding what techniques were permissible for non-FBI
interrogators. We were therefore not surprised that some agents who
said they observed or heard about potentially coercive interrogation
techniques did not report such incidents to anyone at the time.
Despite the absence of useful guidance, however, several FBI
agents recognized the need to bring concerns about other agencies'
interrogation techniques to the attention of their On-Scene Commanders
or senior officials at the FBI. These agents should be commended.
In addition, in light of the recurring instances beginning in 2002 in
which agents in the military zones raised questions about the
appropriateness of other agencies' interrogation techniques, we think
that FBI management should have recognized sooner the need for clear
and consistent standards and procedures for FBI agents to make these
reports. We believe that the matter could have been addressed by FBI
and DOD Headquarters officials to minimize tensions between FBI agents
in the ;military zones and their military counterparts. Such an approach
should have clarified:. (1) what DOD policies were, (2) how the DOD was
dealing with deviations from these policies, and (3) what FBI agents
should do in the event they observed deviations.
The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy did not resolve these issues.
The Policy requires FBI employees to report any instance when the
employee "knows or suspects non-FBI personnel has abused or is
abusing or mistreating a detainee," but it contains no definition of abuse
or mistreatment. According to an e-mail from the General Counsel,
agents with questions about the definitions of abuse or mistreatment
were instructed by Headquarters to report conduct that they know or
suspect is "beyond the authorization of the person doing the harsh
interrogation." We found, however, that many agents did not know what
techniques were permitted under military policies and therefore could
not determine if a particular activity was "beyond the authorization of the
person doing the harsh interrogation."
Going forward, the military's adoption of a single interrogation
policy for all military zones that focuses more on rapport-based

366

techniques (Field Manual 2-22.3) may reduce the difficulties for FBI
agents seeking to comply with the reporting requirement in the FBI's May
2004 Detainee Policy. Nevertheless, military interrogators are still
permitted to use some techniques not available to FBI agents, and it is
therefore important for agents to receive training on military policies and
for the FBI to clarify what conduct should or should not be reported.
As a result, we recommend that the FBI consider supplementing
its May 2004 Detainee Policy or expanding its pre-deployment training to
clarify the circumstances under which FBI agents should report potential
mistreatment by other agencies' interrogators. If the FBI requires its
employees to report any conduct beyond the interrogator's authority,
then the FBI should provide guidance to its agents in military zones on
what interrogation techniques are permitted under military policy.
Training of FBI On-Scene Commanders regarding these military
techniques should be more detailed, so that they can answer FBI agent
inquiries in the military zones and prevent unnecessary conflicts or
reports. We believe the FBI should also give concrete meaning to any
terms that it uses to describe events that must be reported. For
example, if the FBI requires agents to report "abuse or mistreatment," it
should define these terms and explain them with examples, either in the
Policy itself or in agent training.
C.

OIG Assessment of FBI Headquarters and DOJ Handling
of Agents' Reports Regarding Detainee Mistreatment

We found it difficult to assess the response of FBI Headquarters
and senior DOJ officials to reports from FBI agents about detainee
issues. The most significant events, relating to the interrogations of
Zubaydah and Al-Qahtani, took place in 2002 and the recollection of
many senior officials we interviewed regarding these events was vague.
Moreover, the Al-Qahtani and the Zubaydah disputes arose within a year
of the September 11 attacks, during a period when the FBI and DOJ
were scrambling to reorganize and expand their counterterrorism
activities.
Due in part to the vague recollections of senior FBI and DOJ
officials regarding the FBI-DOD disputes in 2002 and 2003, the paucity
of written communications on this issue produced to the OIG, and our
inability to interview former Attorney General Ashcroft, we were unable to
determine exactly what efforts were made at senior levels to address the
FBI's concerns about detainee treatment issues. We did find that some
of these issues were the subject of inter-agency discussions, both in
meetings at GTMO and with the NSC. FBI and DOJ officials emphasized
in these discussions that the harsher DOD interrogation methods were

367

ineffective at obtaining intelligence, not that that they were illegal or
immoral.
We found that, ultimately, neither the FBI nor the DOJ had a
significant impact on the practices of the military with respect to the
detainees. The primary reason was that the FBI was not in charge of
detainees and generally did not have jurisdiction to police or evaluate
techniques used by military interrogators in the military zones.
In addition, the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel had opined that
several interrogation techniques sought to be used by the CIA were legal.
This information was known to senior officials at the FBI and in the DOJ
Criminal Division. FBI and the DOJ officials therefore inferred that DOD
interrogation techniques, which were generally less severe than some of
those approved for the CIA, were also legal. FBI and DOJ officials were
also aware that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had approved the DOD
interrogation policies for GTMO. DOD policies for the other military
zones were similar to the GTMO policies and presumptively had similar
approval from senior officials.
Therefore, once the DOD officials with responsibility for detainee
matters rejected the FBI's arguments about the benefits of its rapportbuilding interrogation techniques, the FBI did not press the issue. The
FBI knew that the DOD's activities with respect to Al-Qahtani and the
CIA's activities with respect to other high value detainees had been
approved at high levels.
Under these circumstances, neither the FBI nor the DOJ Criminal
Division was in a strong position to affect DOD interrogation policy, and
neither organization aggressively pressed the concerns about the legality
or propriety of DOD approaches through the inter-agency process.
In addition, the DOD rescinded approval for its most aggressive
techniques in January 2003 as a result of its own internal deliberations,
and, as mentioned previously, Al-Qahtani began cooperating fully in
April 2003. These developments reduced the frequency and severity of
the most aggressive techniques at GTMO, with the result that the issue
did not have particular urgency for the FBI or DOJ until April 2004 when
the Abu Ghraib abuses were disclosed to the public.

As discussed above, we also found that at one point before AlQahtani began cooperating, officials in the FBI and DOJ prepared a
pro osal to transfer Al-Qahtani
. A draft document regarding this proposal
recommended that Al-Qahtani be interro ated using the same sort of
methods used on Zubaydah
. Some FBI officials were

368

aware of the interrogation techniques that had been used on Zubaydah
, which were unquestionably outside of the scope of FBI
policy. Indeed, FBI concerns about the techniques used with Zubaydah
had already led to Director Mueller's decision that the FBI would not
participate in joint interrogations in which such techniques would be
employed by another agency. However, the FBI and DOJ officials who
were involved in developing the proposal told the OIG that they were not
aware of the particular techniques in the
being recommended for Al-Qahtani. While we could not conclude that
these officials were aware of these techniques, we were troubled by the
fact that they would recommend
for the purpose of interrogating him with different techniques than the
FBI or the DOD had used without knowing what the techniques were.
We also believe that the proposal to
such interrogations was inconsistent with the
Director's instructions regarding FBI involvement in non-FBI
interrogation techniques and with the statements made to us by many
FBI and DOJ officials who believed that rapport-based techniques were
more effective than the more aggressive interrogation techniques
employed by other agencies on certain detainees. The proposal stalled
because the DOD resisted it and Al-Qahtani began cooperating with
interrogators.

VI.

Conclusion

The FBI deployed agents to military zones after the September 11
attacks in large part because of the FBI's expertise in conducting
custodial interviews and in furtherance of its expanded counterterrorism
mission. The FBI has had a long history of success in custodial
interrogations using non-coercive rapport-based interview techniques
developed for the law enforcement context. However, some FBI agents
deployed to GTMO experienced a clash with the DOD, which used more
aggressive interrogation techniques. This clash placed some FBI agents
in difficult situations at GTMO and in the military zones, but apart from
raising concerns with their immediate supervisors or military officials,
the FBI had little leverage to change DOD policy.
We found that the vast majority of the FBI agents deployed in the
military zones dealt with these tensions by separating themselves from
interrogators using non-FBI techniques and by continuing to adhere to
FBI policies. In only a few instances did FBI agents use or participate in
interrogations using techniques that would not be permitted under FBI
policy in the United States. These few incidents were not nearly as

severe as the Abu Ghraib abuses.

369

To its credit, the FBI decided in the summer of 2002 that it would
not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other agencies in
which techniques not allowed by the FBI were used. However, the FBI
did not issue formal guidance about detainee treatment to its agents
until May 2004, shortly after the Abu Ghraib abuses became public. We
believe that the FBI should have recognized earlier the issues raised by
the FBI's participating with the military in detainee interrogations in the
military zones and should have moved more quickly to provide clearer
guidance to its agents on these issues.
In sum, we believe that while the FBI could have provided clearer
guidance earlier, and while the FBI could have pressed harder for
resolution of concerns about detainee treatment by other agencies, the
FBI should be credited for its conduct and professionalism in detainee
interrogations in the military zones in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan,
and Iraq and in generally avoiding participation in detainee abuse.

370

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I:
A.

BACKGROUND

Personal Information

Please provide the following information:
1.

First name

Middle initial

Last name

Entered on Duty Date (EOD)

Current Division/Field Office

Current job title

Direct dial office telephone number

FBI cell phone number

FBI pager number

10.

Best contact number for you

Background of Specific Deployments or Assignments

11.

At any time after September 11, 2001, did you serve as a member of the U.S.
Military, or as an employee or contractor of the FBI or any other government agency,
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Iraq; Afghanistan; or in areas controlled by the U.S.
Military or a U.S. intelligence service in connection with the global war on terror?

12.

(If Yes) Enter the number of times you were deployed or assigned to each of the
following locations (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Iraq; Afghanistan; or in any areas
controlled by the U.S. Military or a U.S. intelligence service):
❑ Guantanamo Bay (Start and End Dates)
❑ Iraq

( Start and End Dates)

❑ Afghanistan

( Start and End Dates)

❑ Other

( Start and End Dates)

12a.

What was the general nature and purpose of your assignment and activities?

12b.

Please provide the names of the specific camps, bases, or facilities where you
worked.

12c.

Note : If information about a specific camp, base, or facility is classified
include in your answer that you have
above SECRET, please check here
" additional information classified above 'SECRET ,"' and, if you know, identify
the classification level, ticket, compartment, program, or other designation
that applies to the information. Do not include the additional classified
information in your questionnaire responses. OIG personnel with the
necessary clearance will contact you to receive it.

A-1

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE

12d.

Please identify, by name and position at the time, the FBI personnel to whom
you directly reported during your deployment or assignment.

12e.

Did you jointly interview or interrogate any detainee with non-FBI
personnel? ❑ Yes
(If Yes) With what kinds of non-FBI personnel did you work jointly?

❑ CITF
❑ Other U.S. Military
❑ U.S. intelligence agency
❑ Foreign military or intelligence agency
❑ Other
12f.

Did you jointly plan any detainee interview or interrogation strategy,
objectives, or tactics with non-FBI personnel ?
(If Yes) With what kinds of non-FBI personnel did you work jointly?

❑ CITF
❑ Other U.S. Military
❑ U.S. intelligence agency
❑ Foreign military or intelligence agency
❑ Other
12g.

PART II:

Were you ever otherwise involved in detainee interviews or interrogations
with non-FBI personnel?

TRAINING

Training Prior to Overseas Deployment or Assignment

13.

Did you receive any training, instruction, or guidance specifically in preparation for
any of your overseas deployments or assignments?
❑ Do Not Recall

(If Yes)
13a.
13b.
13c.

Who provided this training, instruction, or guidance, and where did you
receive it?
Describe the subject on which you received this training, instruction or
guidance.
Was any of the training, instruction, or guidance provided in writing?
❑ Do Not Recall

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE
14.

In preparation for any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you receive
any training, instruction, or guidance concerning the standards of conduct
applicable to the treatment, interview, or interrogation of detainees by FBI
Not Recall
personnel ? ❑ Yes
(If Yes)
14a.
Who provided this training, instruction, or guidance, and where did you
receive it?
Briefly describe the substance of the training, instruction, or guidance
14b.
provided to you.
Was any of the training, instruction, or guidance provided in writing?
14c.
❑ Do Not Recall

15.

(If Yes)
15a.
15b.
15c.

16.

Who provided this training, instruction, or guidance, and where did you
receive it?
Briefly describe the substance of the training, instruction, or guidance
provided to you.
Was any of the training, instruction, or guidance provided in writing?
❑ Do Not Recall

In preparation for any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you receive
any training, instruction, or guidance concerning what you were supposed to do if
you observed or heard about the treatment, interview, or interrogation of detainees
by FBI personnel , which you believed to be inappropriate, unprofessional, coercive,
abusive, or unlawful?
❑ Do Not Recall

(If Yes)
16a.
16b.
16c.

17.

In preparation for any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you receive
any training, instruction, or guidance concerning what you were supposed to do if
you observed or heard about the treatment, interview, or interrogation of detainees
by non-FBI personnel , which you believed to be inappropriate, unprofessional,
coercive, abusive, or unlawful?
❑ Do Not Recall

(If Yes)
17a.
17b.
17c.

A-3

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE
B.

Training During Overseas Deployments or Assignments

18.

During any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you receive any
training, instruction, or guidance concerning the standards of conduct applicable to
the treatment, interview, or interrogation of detainees by FBI personnel? ❑ Yes
Not Recall
(If Yes)
18a.
Who provided this training, instruction, or guidance?
18b.
Briefly describe the substance of the training, instruction, or guidance
provided to you.
18c.
Was any of the training, instruction, or guidance provided in writing?
❑ Do Not Recall

19.

(If Yes)
19a.
19b.
19c.

20.

Who provided this training, instruction, or guidance?
Briefly describe the substance of the training, instruction, or guidance
provided to you.
Was any of the training, instruction, or guidance provided in writing?
❑ Do Not Recall

During any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you receive any
training, instruction, or guidance concerning what you were supposed to do if you
observed or heard about the treatment, interview, or interrogation of detainees by
FBI personnel , which you believed to be inappropriate, unprofessional, coercive,
abusive, or unlawful ?
Not Recall

(If Yes)
20a.
20b.
20c.

21.

During any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you receive any
training, instruction, or guidance concerning what you were supposed to do if you
observed or heard about the treatment, interview, or interrogation of detainees by
non-FBI personnel , which you believed to be inappropriate, unprofessional,
No
Not Recall
coercive, abusive, or unlawful? ❑

(If Yes)
21a.
21b.
21c.

A-4

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE
C. Adequacy of Training
22.

In your opinion, did you receive adequate training, instruction, or guidance relating
to standards of conduct by FBI and non-FBI personnel relating to treatment,
interview, or interrogation of detainees prior to your deployment or assignment?

•

23.

•

24.

(If No) Please describe the ways in which you believe the training, instruction or
guidance was inadequate:

In your opinion, did you receive adequate training, instruction, or guidance
concerning what you were supposed to do if you observed or heard about the
treatment, interview, or interrogation of detainees, by FBI or non-FBI personnel,
that you believed was inappropriate, unprofessional, coercive, abusive, or unlawful?

•

25.

(If No) Please describe the ways in which you believe the training, instruction or
guidance was inadequate:

(Optional) In what ways can the FBI improve training on this subject for future
deployments or assignments?

D. Comments
26.

Please provide any additional information concerning training for overseas
deployments or assignments of FBI personnel you believe is relevant.

PART III:

YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN INTERVIEW OR
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND OTHER TYPES OF
DETAINEE TREATMENT

Introduction to Part III: In this section, we are seeking information regarding a wide
range of interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee treatment alleged
to have occurred. You should not assume, just because we are asking about a particular
technique or practice, that we have concluded that it in fact occurred. We recognize that
some of these techniques or practices may at times be necessary for safety and security in a
detention setting. In addition, we recognize that some of these techniques or practices may
have been authorized for use by military or other government personnel.

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE
With respect to each identified technique, practice, or type of conduct described below, we
are seeking information about its occurrence during or in connection with the interview
or interrogation of a detainee , or during the detention of a detainee beyond what is
needed for safety and security . In that context, we will ask you to tell us whether one or
more of the following statements are true:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

I personally observed this conduct.
I observed detainee(s) in a condition that led me to believe that this conduct had
occurred.
Detainee(s) told me that this conduct had occurred.
Others who observed this conduct described it to me.
I have relevant information classified above "SECRET".
I never observed this conduct nor heard about it from someone who did.

The following are entries for questions 27-63 (Check all that apply):
a.

❑

I personally observed this conduct.

❑

I observed detainee(s) in a condition that led me to believe that this conduct
had occurred.

❑

Detainee(s) told me that this conduct had occurred.

❑

Others who observed this conduct described it to me.

❑

I have relevant information classified above "SECRET".

❑

I never observed this conduct nor heard about it from someone who did.

If any of the above `a' through `e' are checked for questions 27-63, the following questions
appear:
g.

Please provide the approximate time frame during which this conduct
To
❑ Do Not Recall
occurred . From

The detainee(s) treated in this way were located at the time in:
1 ❑ Guantanamo

2 El Iraq
3 ❑ Afghanistan
4 ❑ Other Location
5 ❑ Do Not Recall
i.

Please identify the detainee(s) by name and number:

Please identify the person(s) who treated the detainee(s) in this manner,
including their name(s) and government agency(ies):

Please identify any other FBI personnel or non-FBI personnel who observed
detainee(s) treated in this manner, including their name(s) and agency(ies):

This conduct occurred in connection with:
1 ❑ one detainee

2 ❑ several detainees (2-4)
3 ❑ Many detainees (more than 4)
4 ❑ Do Not Recall
m.

(Optional) Please describe the relevant circumstances in more detail:

A-6

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Depriving a detainee of food or water
Depriving a detainee of clothing
Depriving a detainee of sleep, or interrupting sleep by frequent cell relocations or
other methods
Beating a detainee
Using water to prevent breathing by a detainee or to create the sensation of
drowning
Using hands, rope, or anything else to choke or strangle a detainee
Threatening other action to cause physical pain, injury, disfigurement, or death
Other treatment or action causing significant physical pain or injury, or causing
disfigurement or death
Placing a detainee on a hot surface or burning a detainee
Using shackles or other restraints in a prolonged manner
Requiring a detainee to maintain, or restraining a detainee in, a stressful or painful
position
Forcing a detainee to perform demanding physical exercise
Using electrical shock on a detainee
Threatening to use electrical shock on a detainee
Intentionally delaying or denying detainee medical care
Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other than during transportation
Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or hot room temperatures for extended
periods
Subjecting a detainee to loud music
Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or darkness
Isolating a detainee for an extended period
Using duct tape to restrain, gag, or punish a detainee
Using rapid response teams and/or forced cell extractions
Using a military working dog on or near a detainee other than during detainee
transportation
Threatening to use military working dogs on or near a detainee
Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other animals on or near a detainee
Threatening to use spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other animals on a detainee
Disrespectful statements, handling, or actions involving the Koran
Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to embarrass or humiliate a detainee
Placing a woman's clothing on a detainee
Touching a detainee or acting toward a detainee in a sexual manner
Holding detainee(s) who were not officially acknowledged or registered as such by
the agency detaining the person.
Sending a detainee to another country for more aggressive interrogation
Threatening to send a detainee to another country for detention or more aggressive
interrogation
Threatening to take action against a detainee's family
Other treatment or action causing severe emotional or psychological trauma to a
detainee
Other religious or sexual harassment or humiliation of a detainee
Other treatment of a detainee that in your opinion was unprofessional, unduly
harsh or aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE

PART IV:

YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MATTERS

64.

Did you observe any impersonation of FBI personnel by anyone during an interview
or interrogation of a detainee? ❑ Yes

65.

Did any detainee or other person tell you that he or she had witnessed the
impersonation of FBI personnel in connection with a detainee interview or
interrogation? ❑ Yes

66.

Are you aware of any "sham" or "staged" detainee interviews or interrogations
conducted for Members of the U.S. Congress or their staff?

For 64 through 66 (If Yes):
a.

Please provide the approximate time frame during which this conduct
to
❑ Do Not Recall
occurred. From

The detainee(s) treated in this way were located at the time in:
1 ❑ Guantanamo

2 ❑ Iraq
3 ❑ Afghanistan
4 ❑ Other Location
5 ❑ Do Not Recall
c.

Please identify the detainee(s) by name and number to the best of your
recollection:

Please identify the person(s) who treated the detainee(s) in this manner,
including, if you recall, their name(s) and government agency(ies):

The names of any other FBI personnel, and the names and government
agency of non-FBI personnel, whom I believe saw the detainee(s) treated in
this manner are:
This conduct occurred in connection with:
1 ❑ One detainee
2 ❑ Several detainees (2-4)
3 ❑ Many detainees (more than 4)
4 ❑ Do Not Recall

g•
67.

(Optional) Please describe the relevant circumstances in more detail:

To your knowledge, did any military or intelligence personnel ever deny or delay FBI
access to a detainee the FBI wanted to question because the detainee had sustained
injuries after he was captured? ❑ Yes
67a

(If Yes) Describe the nature, time, place and other relevant circumstances,
and identify the persons involved:

A-8

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE

PART V:

ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO AND REPORTING OF
CERTAIN INTERVIEW OR INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES, AND OTHER TYPES OF DETAINEE
TREATMENT

68.

Did you ever end your participation in or observation of a detainee interview or
interrogation because of the interview or interrogation methods being used?

69.

Were you ever told that another FBI employee ended his or her participation in
or observation of, a detainee interview or interrogation because of the interview
or interrogation methods being used? ❑ Yes

For Questions 68 and 69:
•

(If Yes) Briefly describe the interview or interrogation methods being used,
and when and where this occurred, including the names of FBI and/or nonFBI personnel involved. Date , Place, Names ,. FBI or Non-FBI Person

70.

During any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you report any
concerns regarding any detainee interview or interrogation practices, or other
types of detainee treatment, to an FBI supervisor ? ❑ Yes

71.

During any of your overseas deployments or assignments, did you report any
concerns regarding any detainee interview or interrogation practices or other
types of detainee treatment you observed or heard about, to a non-FBI
supervisor or other non-FBI personnel?

For 70 and 71 (If Yes):
a.

When and to whom did you make this report? Name and Date

Did the report relate to conduct by FBI or non-FBI personnel?
1 ❑ FBI Personnel
2 ❑ Non-FBI Personnel
•

Was this report in writing?

To your knowledge, was any action taken in response to your report?
❑ Do Not Know
•

72.

Identify the agency with which the non-FBI personnel were
affiliated. Name

(If Yes) Describe the action taken in response to your report?

Have you ever been ordered or directed not to report, or discouraged in any way
from reporting, observations or allegations related to detainee treatment or
interview or interrogation actions or practices? ❑ Yes

A-9

APPENDIX A: DOJ OIG QUESTIONNAIRE
73.

Have you experienced any actual or threatened retaliation for reporting
observations or allegations of detainee treatment or interview or interrogation
actions or practices? ❑ Yes

74.

(Optional) Please provide any additional comments regarding the reporting of
concerns related to interview or interrogation techniques, detention practices, or
other detainee treatment.

PART VI: DEBRIEFINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
75.

Were you debriefed, other than the standard debrief in FD-772, concerning your
overseas assignment(s) or deployment(s) after you completed the deployment(s)
or assignment( s)?
(If Yes)
Who debriefed you?
75a.
When and where did the debriefing(s) occur? Date and Place
75b.
Were you asked about detainee detention or interview or interrogation
75c.
practices during the debriefing (s)?
What other subjects were covered during your debriefing(s)?
75d.
75e.

76.

Was any document prepared to memorialize the debriefing?
Not Know

Additional Comments and Recommendations:

A-10

APPENDIX B

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Attorney General

I
Deputy
Attorney General

SOLICITOR
GENERAL

ASSOCIATE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL

OFFICE OF
LELW POLICY

OFFICE OF
THE
SOOCROR
GENERAL

CUANLNSY
OFFICE OF
JUSTIOE Lftj-ij OREMED
POLCNG
PROORMS
BERMES

ONCUTAS
UNR^ST^
TRUSTEI'8

OFFICE OF
DISPUTE
RESMVTI N

OFFICE aF
^
NO PJSVACY

FOREIGN
CLAMS
sonam
COWISSION

cM.
ROWS
OWN

TAX
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CNL
OMSON

EHJPWAEIi
MD NA TUPJL
RESOURCES
CMBION

O5FCEOF
LEGRATIVE
AFFAIRS

o5F05 aF
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OFFICE CF
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COLM

OFFIGEOF
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GOJEWNENT&
ANDPUSLCLWSON

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WRENJ OF
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mmW) S
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ATTORNES

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EXPLOSIVES

Appmvid by:

OFRCEOF
THE
INEPRSTOR
GENERAL

OFFICE OF
MGM PROFESSIOPGL
RESPONE6WOY

OFFCEOFTME
PAADON
ATTORNEY

U CENTER
BIKE

OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL
DETENTION
TRUSTEE

JUSTIC E
MAWaNEW
DNWON

my N

LNRED
STATES
PAAOLE
OWANON

NATIONAL
OP^FOR
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MASPA
RITaLGENCE
RENEW
CENTER

[Page Intentionally Left Blank]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHIEF OF STAFF
INSPECTION DIVISION
OFFICE OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
OFFICE

DIRECTOR
SAC ADVISORY
COMMITTEE

L •wwwwwwFwwwwww

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

wwrww owe wwww

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL

OFFICE OF EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT I
DIRECTOR FOR
COUNTER-TERRORISMY
COUNTER-INTELLIGENC

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBIUTY

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT
SERVICES

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR FOR
CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR FOR
ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT COORONATION

OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
PLANNING

RECORDS
MANAGEMENT
DIVISION

CRITICAL INCIDENT
RESPONSE GROUP

OFFICE OF

INTELLIGENCE

COUNTER.
TERRORISM
DIVISION

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DIVISION

CYBER
DIVISION

CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION

LABORATORY
DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES
DIVISION

SECURITY
DIVISION

INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNOLOGY
DIVISION

FINANCE
DIVISION

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
DIVISION

I
CRIMINAL JUSTCE
INFORMATION

SERVICES DIVISION

j
DMA:

0cf,- x'1,7'
/

COUNTERTERRORISM
Executive
Staff

ASSISTANT

OPS II

TFOS

ITOS I

ETIU

CONUS II

CONUS III

CONUS IV

WMD
IT
Unit

Document
Exp
Unit

Radical
Fund
Unit I

Com
Analysis
Unit

Radical
Fund
Unit II

Elect
Com
Unit

Global
Extremist

CT
Elsur Ops
Unit

Special
Events
Unit

Program
Coordiantion
and Managment
Proactive Data
Exploitation
Unit

Arabian
Peninsula

CT
Humint

Operations
❑ Stand Alone ❑ RFU Team 0 Domestic Team 0 Global Extremist E WMD

B-4

DIVISION
DIRECTOR

TSC
Operations
Support

Analytical

CT
Analysis
Section

Admin
Section

TRRS

FTTTF

Threat
Center

Response
Section

Section

Radical
Fund
DU

Admin Mngt &
Secuirty
Unit

Military
Liaison
Detainee Unit

CT
Watch

Global ME
Expremist

Budget Coord
& Supply

NJTTF

TWWU

Unit

Foreign
Links
Global

WMD
Domestic DU

Cont Edu
Prof Develop

Fly
Team

Threat
Monit
Unit

Domestic
Terrorism
Analysis Unit

Financial
DOCEX

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WMD
ETIU

Unit

Asset Vetting
Review
Unit

Public
Access Center

CTD
Detailees

Threat
Resolution

Unit

Unit
Terrorist
SC Ops
Unit

7 JAN 2005

[Page Intentionally Left Blank]

APPENDIX C

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persmr wrt tr m dW iy fir t #'sgage from the inter etoci. report the lrtcle3entIC #MT
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C11TF Res t Agent in Chars (RAO), who with forward a momorandu mfor'record
to t' 'ie CF Derwty Special Arent Sri Ctiarre ^D
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interr
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infur^e a4nt # aeirt
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that

inter gear .
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that -w 'lre Bade
i be dcorrne ed on a;ClTF
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approved by C1TF-HO at the Commander (CDF ,) or Dep
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on techniques for wNclh they are not tmined4 or any tecniques thay (eel are
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que:
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t7g ev* fa Innoprka ita. CITE gom* rmust repotf : rry . arch a
rl tip than RAC
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the f dder to the f AC.
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n
representative at any dtsouss5on/ meeting fs two. dI to recap ,a prates"mI oD
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(0) to frSQ and Athw ister4
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