Utah Legislative Audit on Doc Jail Contacting 2008

• Topics: Misconduct/Corruption, Corrections Audits

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REPORT TO THE
UTAH LEGISLATURE

Number 2008-08

A Performance Audit
of
Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

August 2008

Audit Performed By:
Audit Manager

Darin Underwood

Audit Supervisor

Kade Minchey

Audit Staff

August Lehman

Digest of
A Performance Audit of Utah’s
Jail Contracting Program
Chapter I:
Introduction

Chapter II:
Past UDC Contract
Management
Inadequacies
Contributed to Jail
Escapes

Chapter III:
Jail Contract
Requirements
Need Review

The jail contracting program is used by the Department of Corrections
(UDC or department) as a way to alleviate prison overcrowding by
placing state inmates in county jails. The department decides which state
inmates they want to send to county jails. However, a clause in the jail
contract allows the jails to reject any state inmate that is offered to them.
UDC Should Have Ensured That Security Problems at Some Jails Were
Corrected. In some cases, the department was aware of security and

operational concerns at a few of the contract county jails, but then did not
ensure that improvements were made. The concerns went uncorrected
primarily because the department: 1) had not adequately defined their
authority in the contract, 2) did not conduct adequate monitoring, and
3) did not follow up with and enforce remedies to the deficiencies in the
jails. In the past four years, at least eight notable security or operational
problems have occurred—to some extent—because of the department’s
inadequate management of the jail contract. Further, for many years, past
UDC management had not made needed improvements to the program.
Consequently, current UDC management has inherited a system that is in
need of significant improvement.
The Jail Contract Should Be Linked to a Measurable Standard. The

current jail contract does not adequately require the jails to meet basic
performance standards or clearly establish the department’s expectations.
Performance measurements are needed in the contract to help ensure the
jails are operating at an acceptable level. Each contracted jail should be
required by the contract to be held to a measurable standard that is set
forth in the county jails’ policies and procedures. We recommend that
UDC choose and require a competent measurable standard. We further
recommend the department devise a grading/scoring system to better
communicate and correct any contract noncompliance.
Other Technical Clarifications Should Be Made to the Jail Contract.

–i–

records, inmate grievance records, and so forth. Clarifying these contract
clauses can better explain UDC’s authority over and expectations of the
jails. We recommend that UDC revise the contract to include the abovementioned provisions.
Chapter IV:
Jail Contract
Monitoring Can
Improve

UDC Has Not Adequately Monitored Its Jail Contract. UDC made a

number of efforts to monitor its contracts with jails, but we do not believe
these efforts to be adequate. A primary reason for the department’s
monitoring shortfall is the incongruent monitoring system that was
implemented. The department utilized several entities within the
department to review and monitor the jail contracts, but these efforts
lacked enforcement and were incomplete. It appears that current UDC
management is beginning to implement a new system of monitoring, but
it has not been verified. We recommend that UDC assign contract
monitors the responsibility of continuously monitoring the jail contract.
UDC Should Improve the Management of Jail Contracting. UDC can

better manage some critical aspects of the jail contracting process. The
department can benefit by instituting basic management systems and
processes to oversee and control the jail contracting program. We
recommend that UDC improve the management over jail contracting by
implementing inmate screening policies, better tracking program
outcomes, better measuring the performance of the jail contracting
program, and implementing an extra-capacity plan.
Chapter V:
Jail Contract
Enforcement
Needed

UDC’s Enforcement Is Inadequate. Implementation of recommendations

from contract monitoring and jail inspections has not been adequate.
Inadequate enforcement is largely due to the poor system of coordination
utilized by past department management. It appears staff at UDC were
not aware of who was responsible for follow-up on jail contracts.
UDC Should Develop a Corrective Action Plan. The department should

develop a coordinated enforcement program for its jail contracts, which
includes a system to document contract noncompliance; a specific
enforcement plan, which includes both unannounced and scheduled
inspections; and a corrective action plan that denotes the consequences of
noncompliance. The corrective action plan will help the department
formalize and standardize their enforcement response. When added to the
jail contract, the corrective action plan can clearly communicate
expectations to counties.

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Table of Content
Page
Digest .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Chapter I
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Audit Scope and Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter II
Past UDC Contract Management Inadequacies Contributed to
Jail Escapes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
UDC Should Have Ensured That Security Problems at Some Jails
Were Corrected.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter III
Jail Contract Requirements Need Review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Jail Contract Should Be Linked To a Measurable Standard. . . . 21
Other Technical Clarifications Should Be Made to the Jail
Contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Jails Not Adhering to Standards Have Allowed Some Security
Concerns.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter IV
Jail Contract Monitoring Can Improve.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Monitoring Should Be a Standard Component of Contracts. . . . . . 29
UDC Has Not Adequately Monitored Its Jail Contracts. . . . . . . . . 32
UDC Should Improve the Management of Jail Contracting.. . . . . . 38
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Table of Contents (Cont)
Page
Chapter V
Jail Contract Enforcement Needed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
UDC’s Enforcement Is Inadequate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
UDC Failed to Obtain and Utilize Management Information. . . . . 49
UDC Should Develop A Corrective Action Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Recommendation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Agency Response.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Chapter I
Introduction
Inadequate contract
oversight has
contributed to som e
jail escapes and
other operational
problems.

The Utah Department of Corrections (UDC or department) has not
been adequately overseeing the contracts of inmates housed in county
jails. Inadequate contract oversight has contributed to some jail escapes
and other operational problems. Fortunately, many county jails
independently operate at a high level and have not experienced significant
security or operational problems. Nevertheless, because of the severe risk
of even one jail escape, it is imperative that UDC increase their oversight
over all county jails to help ensure similar events do not occur in the
future.
This report outlines three key areas where the department should
improve in order to provide better oversight to county jails that house
state inmates and to better protect public safety. UDC should:
• Revise the jail contract to include clear performance measures and
clarify certain provisions in the jail contract (Chapter III).
• Better monitor each county’s compliance with the jail contract and
improve the overall management of the jail contract (Chapter IV).
• Improve follow-up and enforcement of recommendations to
correct deficiencies that are identified during contract monitoring
(Chapter V).
Chapter II discusses public safety and operation incidents that have
occurred in recent years. We believe these incidents are partially due to
UDC’s failure to properly address the three areas mentioned above.
This chapter provides introductory information on the jail contracting
program, as well as a brief history of its policy changes over the years.
Legislators asked us to review aspects of the jail contracting program,
which we outline in the Scope and Objectives section of this chapter.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

–1–

Jail Contracting Differs
From Jail Reimbursement
Under the jail
contracting
program, an
individual is
sentenced to prison,
then later
transferred to a
county jail under a
w ritten contract
betw een UDC and
the jail.

Currently, there are not enough beds in the prison system to house all
state inmates. Consequently, contracting with county jails to house state
inmates is a method the state uses to manage the prison population. The
department decides which state inmates they want to send to county jails.
(Under jail reimbursement, individuals are sentenced to county jails and,
therefore, counties must accept and house the inmates.) Until recently,
the department had no formal screening criteria to determine which
inmates could be placed in these jails (discussed more in Chapter IV). A
clause in the written contracts allows the jails to reject any state inmate
that is offered to them. Figure 1.1 summarizes some of the primary
differences between jail reimbursement and jail contracting.

Figure 1.1 Jail Contracting Compared to Jail Reimbursement. Jail
contracting differs from jail reimbursement in both the status of the inmate
and the reimbursement rate received by the counties.

Some benefits exist
in housing state
inmates in county
jails.

–2–

Aspects of Programs

Jail Contracting

Jail Reimbursement

Sentencing

Felony conviction

Inm ate status

Inm ate sentenced to prison
but housed in a county jail
under a contract between
UDC and the county

Inm ate sentenced to
county jail by court for 365
days or less, as a
condition of probation

County
paym ent rate

70% of state daily
incarceration rate ($45.00)

42.1% of state daily
incarceration rate ($27.10)

Housing State Inmates in Jail Can Be Beneficial. Besides
alleviating prison overcrowding, housing inmates in a county jail rather
than in the state prison has several benefits. First, it is less expensive for
the state to house inmates in county jails. For fiscal year 2009, the
Legislature set the average cost of housing state inmates in county jails at
$45 per inmate day. This amount is significantly less than the current cost
of housing inmates in the state system, which is about $70 a day. Second,
UDC reports some benefit to inmates and their families. Inmates can
request to be sent to a county jail that is closer to family through UDC’s
regionalization program. Finally, county jails provide UDC alternative
housing for protective custody inmates, or those inmates who are at risk
when housed in prison. It is important to note that the number of
A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

inmates in the regionalization and protective custody programs is
relatively small.
Through jail
contracting,
counties can build
new er facilities and
bring jobs into rural
areas.

The jail contracting program is also beneficial to the counties. The
program helps smaller counties build newer facilities that otherwise may
not have been economically feasible. The program can also bring in jobs
and development into the rural areas of the state. For the larger counties,
the jail contracting program fills a few beds that might have otherwise
been empty.
Utah’s Jail Contracting Program Is
Unique Among Surrounding States
Utah’s jail contracting program is unique among other surrounding
states, in that most western states do not heavily contract with county jails
to house state inmates. Utah, on the other hand, has about 20 percent of
the state inmate population in county jails. The only other states we could
find that have similar populations in county jails were primarily in the
South. Louisiana has about 44 percent, Kentucky 30 percent, and
Tennessee 25 percent. However, it appears that some differences exists
with their programs and Utah’s program, which makes strict comparisons
difficult. Figure 1.2 shows how Utah compares with surrounding states.

Figure 1.2 Utah Jail Contracting Percentage Compared with
Surrounding States. Utah has a much higher percentage of state inmates
in county jails than surrounding states; however, Utah has a much smaller
percentage of inmates in private facilities.

State

2006 Percent of
State Inmates Held
in County Jails

Utah

20.70%

Idaho

6.40

2006 Percent of
State Inmates Held
in Private Prisons
0.00%

2006 Prisoners
Per Capita
(per 10,000 Residents)

25.22

27.00

48.58

New Mexico

2.10

44.10

33.97

Colorado

1.90

21.60

47.29

Nevada

1.10

0.00

51.70

W yom ing

1.00

37.00

41.05

.10

14.50

58.21

Arizona

Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

–3–

M ost surrounding
states utilize private
prisons rather than
contracting with
county jails.

Most surrounding states utilize private prisons rather than contracting
with county jails. In fact, Utah’s use of county jails is 14.3 percent higher
than Idaho, the next closest state. Another interesting difference between
Utah and surrounding states is that Utah has the lowest per-capita
incarceration rate.
Most Counties Contract Jail-Bed Space to the State. Of the 29
counties in Utah, only eight do not participate: Salt Lake, Utah, Tooele,
Emery, Rich, Morgan (no jail), Piute (no jail), and Wayne (no jail).
Figure 1.3 shows the 21 counties that contract with the state and the
percentage of each jail’s total capacity that is committed to the state.

Figure 1.3 Counties Participating in the Jail Contracting Program. Data
from UDC shows that most counties participate, though the percent of
participation varies.

County

Total
Capacity

State
Beds

%
State
Beds

County

93%

Sum m it

State
Beds

%
State
Beds

103

22%

Total
Capacity

Beaver

400

370

Garfield

110

Cache

360

Daggett

Box Elder

168

103

Davis

800

100

Juab

172

100

Sanpete

Grand

Millard

115

Carbon

Sevier

148

W eber

1,186

Uintah

104

Iron 1

333

W ashington

502

130

San Juan
W asatch
Duchesne
Kane

Source: UDC as of May 2008
1. Iron County is in the process of contracting for 10 beds.

As this figure shows, county participation in the jail contracting program
varies. Beaver County has the highest utilization rate at 93 percent, and
Iron County has the lowest utilization rate at 3 percent.

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Some county jails
rely on the jail
contract to operate
and maintain their
jails.

Some County Jails Rely on the Jail Contracting Program. As
shown in Figure 1.3, there are two categories of counties that contract
with the state. The first category is comprised of counties that primarily
incarcerate county inmates and use the jail contract to supplement county
revenue. Counties in the second category fill half or more of their beds
with state inmates and rely on state-funded beds to operate their jails.
Eight of the 21 counties involved in the jail contracting program have
nearly half or more of their beds committed as state beds. Beaver County,
for example, has committed 93 percent of its beds to state inmates. In the
foreseeable future, it is not likely that Beaver County will utilize 400 beds
for county inmates. On the other hand, Davis and Weber counties, for
example, plan on growing into their jails and will eventually have to cease
contracting with the state.
It should also be noted that any remaining county-bed availability
shown on the previous chart does not necessarily mean those beds are
filled with county inmates. Some counties contract with the federal
government to house federal inmates.
History of the Jail Contracting Program

According to UDC,
jail contracting
started as a w ay to
protect certain
inmates who were in
danger w hile in
prison.

The jail contracting program has undergone several changes since it
first began in the early 1980s. Many of the changes involved alterations in
program funding, and growth in the program. The following timeline
shows the significant changes that have occurred during the history of the
jail contracting program.
Year

Description

1983 1984

Six inmates were housed in county jails.
According to UDC, jail contracting started as a protective
custody program, or as a way to protect certain inmates who
were in danger in prison. It appears UDC had no formal
contracts in place with the counties that were part of the
protective custody program.

1985 1989

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

A contract was established with the counties to house state
inmates that were serving a sentence in the prison. More
inmates were contracted out to the county jails. Reportedly,
it was during this time the jail contracting program began to
be a revenue source for counties to build or expand their jails.
–5–

Jail contracting
increasingly becam e
a way to alleviate the
prison’s space
concerns.

An estimated 1,400
state inm ates, or 20
percent of the prison
population, will be
housed in county
jails in fiscal year
2009.

–6–

1992 1997

Because of overcrowding in the prison, jail contracting
increasingly became a way to alleviate the prison’s space
concerns.

1997 2001

Reportedly, UDC openly encouraged the jails to participate in
the contracting program as a way to alleviate prison
overcrowding. Some counties also saw the jail contracting
program as economic development for their counties, or as a
way to upgrade an older jail facility.

1999

House Bill 118 in the 1999 General Legislative Session
connected the jail reimbursement and jail contracting
programs by establishing a core rate that applied to both
programs. Counties were paid 100 percent of the core rate
for housing inmates under both programs.

2001

The Legislature began formally approving new jail contracting
beds through joint resolutions.

2002

House Bill 319 in the 2002 General Session changed funding
to the jail reimbursement program from 100 percent to 70
percent of the core rate. Jail contracting funding remained at
100 percent of the core rate.

2007

House Bill 438 in the 2007 General Session repealed the use
of the core rate and enacted the “state daily incarceration rate”
to set the rates for jail contracting and jail reimbursement.
H.B. 438 stipulates that county jails be paid 70 percent of the
state daily incarceration rate (jail reimbursement is paid at 50
percent of the state daily incarceration rate).

2008

For fiscal year 2009, $24 million was appropriated to the jail
contracting program. An estimated 1,400 state inmates, or
22 percent of the prison population, will be housed in county
jails.

As this history shows, the jail contracting program has been funded at
various levels since its inception, and it has greatly increased in size and
scope. Figure 1.4 shows how the jail contracting program has grown
over time.

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Figure 1.4 Historical Numbers of Inmates in the Jail Contracting
Program.

Source: UDC

Shown in Figure 1.4, the jail contracting program has grown from 78
inmates in 1989 to over 1,300 in 2008. With this growth of state inmates
in county jails, funding for the jail contracting program has also increased.

Audit Scope and Objectives
We were asked to audit the state’s jail contracting program and address
concerns raised by the Legislature. The scope of our audit included the
following objectives:
• Review the written jail contracts for sufficiency and completeness.
• Evaluate the monitoring and managing efforts completed by the
department, including what methodologies and policies UDC has
implemented.
• Review enforcement and follow-up completed by the department,
including a review of methods used to ensure the safety and
security of state inmates incarcerated in county jails.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

–7–

This Page Left Blank Intentionally

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Chapter II
Past UDC Contract Management
Inadequacies Contributed to Jail Escapes
Deficient contract
management by
UDC has, in som e
cases, contributed
to jail escapes.

Fortunately, many
jails have operated
independently
w ithout serious or
reoccurring
incidents.

Current UDC
management has
inherited a system in
need of significant
improvem ent.

The Utah Department of Corrections (department or UDC) has been
deficient with certain aspects of jail contract management. In some
instances, the deficient management has contributed to jail escapes and
other security concerns at the jails. Recently, a number of dangerous state
inmates have escaped from county jails. In at least one instance, escaped
inmates greatly compromised public safety.
It is the responsibility of jail management to operate a secure,
operationally sound jail facility. It is the responsibility of UDC to
monitor the jail contract and remove state inmates when jails are not
secure or operationally sound. In the absence of sufficient oversight by
UDC, it is fortunate that many county jails have independently operated
securely without serious or reoccurring incidents. Even some of the jails
that have had recent security concerns in their facilities appear eager to
continually improve security in their facilities, and there are signs that this
is occurring.
Nevertheless, to reduce the risk of future inmates escaping from
county jails, much improvement must be made in the way UDC manages
the jail contract. For many years, UDC has not made improvements to
the way it provides oversight to jails that house state inmates. Past
department directors have not ensured that the jail contracting program
grew in sophistication as the number of inmates in the program also grew.
Consequently, the sophistication of the contract, monitoring conducted,
and follow-up completed are antiquated and do not satisfy the demands of
the current program. Current UDC management has inherited a system
that is in need of significant improvement, and some improvements may
take time to implement.
This report highlights three primary areas where improvement is
needed. Improvement in these areas can reduce the risk of future security
and operational problems at the jails. Each area is covered in a subsequent
chapter. The three areas are enhancing the jail contract (Chapter III),
improving monitoring of the contract (Chapter IV), and increasing
contract enforcement (Chapter V). The remainder of this chapter details

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

–9–

the problems that have occurred in the past, partially due to insufficient
contract management by the department.

UDC Should Have Ensured That Security
Problems at Some Jails Were Corrected
UDC was aw are that
som e jails had
security and
operational
concerns but did not
ensure
improvements were
made.

In some cases, the department was aware of security and operational
concerns at a few of the contract county jails, but then did not ensure that
improvements were made. The concerns went uncorrected primarily
because the department: 1) had not adequately defined their authority in
the contract, 2) did not conduct adequate monitoring, and 3) did not
follow up with and enforce remedies to the deficiencies in the jails.
In the past four years, at least eight notable security or operational
problems have occurred—to some extent—because of the department’s
inadequate management of the jail contract. The following list briefly
describes each of these eight examples.
• Escape by a state inmate convicted of rape and kidnapping from
Beaver County Jail in October 2007 (discussed further in Chapter
IV).
• Escape by two state inmates convicted of murder from Daggett
County Jail in September 2007.
• Escape by a state inmate convicted of manslaughter from the
Garfield County Jail in August 2007 (discussed further in Chapter
V).
• Sexual misconduct committed against two female state inmates by
staff of the Washington County Jail in March 2006.
• Escape by three county inmates from the Daggett County Jail in
July 2004, which resulted in 11 state inmates obtaining and using
methamphetamine.
• Escape by a state inmate convicted of aggravated robbery from the
Duchesne County Jail in July 2004.
• Multiple fire, life, and safety violations by some county jails that
were repeatedly identified, but not corrected.
• UDC mandated inmate-to-staff ratio was challenged by one
county. However, the vagueness of the jail contract did not allow
UDC to enforce this staff ratio.

– 10 –

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

The next two sections provide more information on some of these
examples. Significant detail is given on the Daggett County example
because it illustrates the greatest public safety risk and one of the most
significant lapses of contract management by UDC.
Daggett County Escapes Might Have Been Avoided if Past
UDC Management Required Needed Security Improvements
As will be discussed more in Chapters IV and V, UDC has not
adequately monitored and enforced the jail contract. In the case of the
Daggett County Jail, the department’s lack of enforcement left security
concerns uncorrected.
The Daggett jail’s
security problem s
w ere identified, but
it appears little effort
w as made to correct
the problems.

It appears that Daggett’s security problems had been present for some
time. UDC staff conducted a post-incident security review of the Daggett
jail in 2004 after a jail escape. In the 2006 fire, life, and safety jail review,
the staff noted reoccurring security concerns. Unfortunately, as discussed
more in the remainder of the report, we could find little evidence that
suggests UDC actively followed up to ensure correction of the security
violations. Indeed, the security problems were still present in 2007 when
two state inmates convicted of murder escaped the facility. Figure 2.1
illustrates the major security breaches and notable UDC reviews that went
unheeded.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

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The tim eline show s
UDC’s was aw are of
problem s at Daggett
jail, but still left state
inmates in the
facility.

– 12 –

Figure 2.1 Notable Security Threats and Enforcement Inadequacies
Existed at Daggett Jail Since 2001. The following timeline shows that UDC
was aware of security problems at Daggett jail, but did not ensure they were
corrected. The noted security concerns directly led to the jail escapes in
2004 and 2007.

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Had the department removed inmates sooner and enforced the necessary
security changes, the escapes might have been prevented.
Inm ates escaped
from the Daggett jail
in 2004. Security
problem s leading to
that escape
persisted into 2007.

Uncorrected Security Concerns Led to Escapes in 2004. In July
2004, three county inmates escaped from the jail by climbing an
unmonitored perimeter security fence in a minimum security area known
as the “Green House.” The Green House is the former residence of a
previous sheriff and was used to house about 20 state inmates. Of the
three inmates who escaped, two fled in a vehicle to the local marina, and
the other inmate returned with methamphetamine and distributed the
drugs to 11 state inmates.
In talking with officials at UDC and the Utah Sheriffs’ Association, we
were able to determine that security concerns were known by UDC, but
they were not corrected. However, we were not able to document a
security review by UDC at the Daggett jail until 2004, shortly after the
escapes. UDC officials indicated informal inspections were conducted and
security threats known, but they were never documented. UDC should
have been documenting reviews completed and following up to ensure
that any noted deficiencies were corrected. We were also able to locate
only one copy of a Utah Sheriffs’ Association inspection completed in
2000.

Inmates reported to
UDC after the 2007
escape that security
lapses w ere know n
among the inm ates.

An official involved in the sheriffs’ association inspections told us that
security concerns were identified as early as 2001. This official reported
that it was common knowledge with UDC and other sheriffs that the
Daggett jail had some notable security deficiencies, but they were not
corrected. In fact, one of the inmates who escaped told a UDC
investigator in the post-incident review that inmates were aware of the
jail’s security weaknesses. The inmate told the investigator that he
“overheard other inmates discussing how easy it would be to escape.”
UDC Conducted a Security Review of Daggett Jail After 2004
Escapes but Did Not Enforce the Recommendations. A month after
the escape, UDC staff conducted a post-incident review at the request of
UDC’s executive director. The security review found that the Daggett jail
facility had critical security concerns that needed correction. Some of the
notable security concerns included:
• The use of an unsecured housing facility termed the Green House
• Inadequate jail security hardware

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 13 –

• Lax jail management and insufficient supervision
The Green House, or
a m inimal security
housing area, was
know n to create
significant security
concerns, yet UDC
allow ed state
inmates to be
housed there.

The report noted the following specific concerns relating to the Green
House:
[The Green House is only monitored] directly, on an intermittent
basis. . . . The area is not directly or constantly supervised for
medical lay-ins [inmates under medical assistance] or on weekends,
holidays or other times of the day.
Further, the housing of inmates in the Green House facilitated movement
between the Green House and the jail facility. This movement was not
properly supervised and allowed inmates of various classification levels
access into less secure areas.
Due to these concerns with the Green House, UDC recommended to
the previous executive director that UDC “house no state inmates in
the . . . Green House facility.” Unfortunately, this recommendation was
not heeded by the previous executive director. Some security
improvements were completed after this review, but the facility still had
multiple uncorrected security concerns.

Daggett security
concerns were again
reported in 2006. It
appears little effort
w as made by UDC to
correct the security
issues, and state
inm ates continued
to be sent to the jail.

In 2006, Security Concerns at Daggett Jail Were Again Left
Uncorrected. UDC staff again noted some security concerns in the 2006
fire, life, and safety jail inspection; chief among them was the use of the
Green House. Speaking about the security concerns; UDC staff wrote:
UDC offenders are being housed . . . in the Green House. This
area is not managed and monitored by direct and constant staff
supervision. . . . This supervision may be further taxed by staff
having little correctional experience, turnover vacancies and a
facility, which often operates at or near capacity.
UDC staff again suggested that either the Green House be closed or direct
and constant supervision of the area be maintained by the jail. However,
inmates continued to be housed there without the needed security
improvements in place.

Known, but not
corrected, security
problems led to the
2007 jail escapes.
– 14 –

Two Inmates Escaped from Daggett Jail in 2007. It appears
UDC management required little improvement from the Daggett jail over
the course of several years and multiple reviews. Consequently, little
A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

improvement was made, and UDC management continued to send state
inmates to the Daggett facility. The uncorrected security problems led
directly to two state inmates, convicted of murder, escaping from the
Daggett jail in September 2007.
In September 2007, the two state inmates walked through an
unlocked and insufficiently monitored door that led to the Green House.
The inmates then climbed an unalarmed fence and escaped. The two
inmates were at large for six days and bound a man with duct tape at
knifepoint before being apprehended by Wyoming authorities. The
timeline for major events leading to the escape is shown in Figure 2.2.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 15 –

Figure 2.2 Previously Reported Security Problems Led to Daggett Jail
Escapes in 2007. Security problems that had been identified by UDC staff,
but uncorrected by the jail and UDC management, contributed to the 2007
escapes.

Tw o inm ates
convicted of murder
escaped the Daggett
Jail and the escape
w ent undetected for
over five hours.

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Identified but Uncorrected Security Problems at Daggett Jail Led to
The 2007 Escapes. Previous UDC inspections and management
observations identified at least three security problems that led to the
2007 escapes. These concerns and their consequences are listed below:
• Unsecured Housing Facility (Green House) – The existence of
the Green House, and the consequent inmate travel from the
Green House to the jail, minimized the security of what was
supposed to be a secure door located in the inside recreation yard.
At times, inmates controlled the door and had the ability to prop
the door open. The escaped inmates used this door, which was not
properly secured, to flee the facility.
• Insufficient Security Equipment – The fence that the inmates
climbed over to gain access to the jail’s roof did not have sufficient
razor wire and was not properly equipped with sensors that would
have sounded an alarm in the control room signaling an escape was
occurring. Also, not all security cameras were working, so the
cameras did not detect which direction the inmates fled.
• Lax Jail Management, Insufficient Supervision, Inexperienced
Correction Officers – Problems with lax jail management,
insufficient supervision and inexperienced officers led to the
improper supervision of inmates in the recreation yard. After the
escape these problems led to faulty body counts being conducted,
which afforded the inmates five and one-half hours before being
detected missing.
The Daggett jail
escapes clearly
illustrate the
consequences of
poor contract
managem ent.

Along with the
Daggett jail escape,
several other
incidents have
occurred that relate
to insufficient
contract
management by
UDC.

The 2007 escapes from the Daggett County Jail clearly exemplify the
consequence of not properly overseeing and managing state inmates in
county jails. However, we found that other notable events have also
occurred due to UDC’s poor contract management.
Poor UDC Oversight Has Contributed
To Other Concerns at County Jails
As previously described in the example with Daggett County, UDC
can improve its contract management and enforcement with county jails.
The following examples illustrate other concerns that might have been
avoided with better contract monitoring by UDC.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 17 –

• Duchesne Jail Escape, July 2004 – A state inmate convicted of
aggravated robbery escaped through an unsecured kitchen door
and over an unmonitored perimeter fence. A UDC post-incident
review concluded that poor jail security hardware and insufficient
supervision apparently contributed to the escape. UDC could have
been more diligent in rectifying these concerns.
• Sexual Misconduct, discovered in March 2006 – Washington
County Jail staff sexually exploited two female state inmates over a
five-year period. UDC internal auditors concluded that ineffective
staff supervision and deficiencies in UDC’s monitoring of the jail
contract may have contributed to the conditions that allowed the
sexual abuse to go undetected.
• Scope of Authority, November 2007 – The jail contract was not
adequate in identifying UDC’s scope of authority over state
inmates in county jails (discussed more in Chapter III). Prompted
by two state inmates walking away from a state road crew and
other general security concerns, UDC ordered all state inmate road
crews (operated by the prison and the jails) to temporarily shut
down while security measures were reviewed. However, the
vagueness of the jail contract did not allow UDC to enforce this
order. The Washington County Sheriff ordered state inmate road
crews back to the streets.
Some fire, life, and
safety issues
continued on year to
year. UDC should
have required the
jails to correct these
concerns.

• General Fire, Life, and Safety Concerns Have Not Been
Corrected – Between 2002 and 2006 each of the contract jails was
inspected annually, principally for compliance to fire and life safety
standards. Some notable deficiencies continued on from year to
year that UDC should have required to be corrected, and for the
most serious violations UDC should have removed inmates. These
deficiencies included not routinely checking fire extinguishers, not
properly securing medicine and medical syringes, and storing oil
and volatile solvents in boiler rooms.
To Reduce Risk of Future Escapes, UDC Should
Improve Oversight of Contracted State Inmates
UDC must improve its oversight over county jails that house state
inmates. UDC’s past oversight system has not sufficiently controlled
security and operational risks of state inmates in county jails. A recent

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

internal audit also verified UDC’s poor oversight over county jails. The
internal audit found that much improvement is needed in the way UDC
oversees state inmates in county jails. The UDC internal audit stated:
. . . It appears poor contract standards and deficient oversight have
become the accepted norm for doing business. This norm has
contributed to the conditions that allowed inmates to simply walk
through unlocked doors and climb over perimeter fencing to
escape . . . this norm also contributed to a county’s decision to
override the UDC Executive Director’s directive that mandated a
minimum oversight [ratio] . . . on road crews.
The remaining
chapters of the
report will outline
three critical areas
UDC should correct
to improve jail
contract
managem ent.

The next three chapters will outline three critical areas that UDC should
improve to bolster contract management. These areas are:
• UDC should improve the language in the jail contract to include
clear performance measures, adequate security standards, and
clarify certain expectations and desired procedures (Chapter III).
• UDC should better monitor the counties’ compliance with the jail
contract and improve certain management areas pertaining to state
inmates in county jails (Chapter IV).
• UDC should improve its follow-up and enforcement of concerns
that are identified during monitoring (Chapter V).
We believe that improvements in these three areas will greatly enhance the
department’s oversight of state inmates located in county jails.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

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This Page Left Blank Intentionally

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Chapter III
Jail Contract Requirements
Need Review
The current jail
contract is not
sufficient, which has
led to some security
and operational
concerns involving
state inm ates.

The current jail contract is insufficient in some key areas. The
inadequate jail contract has led to insufficient control and monitoring of
the contract with county jails, which has led to security and operational
concerns discussed in Chapter II. The Utah Department of Corrections
(UDC or department) should rewrite the contract to contain at least the
following items:
• A requirement that jails match their security and operational
policies and procedures to a measurable standard
• New clauses, or revisions to current clauses, that will improve
clarity on various technical items (e.g., inmate grievance reporting
requirements and UDC access to jail facilities) and better
communicate UDC’s expectations and oversight
• A clear monitoring program consisting of dedicated, independent
contract monitors (Chapter IV)
• An enforcement protocol that has set expectations and
consequences for noncompliance (Chapter V)
These additions to the jail contract should provide UDC with the
additional strength and clarity needed to properly manage state inmates in
county jails.

The Jail Contract Should Be Linked
To a Measurable Standard
The department
should require
contracted jails to
be held to a
measurable
standard.

The current jail contract does not adequately require the jails to meet
basic performance standards, or clearly establish the department’s
expectations. Performance measurements are needed in the contract to
help ensure the jails are operating at an acceptable level. Each contracted
jail should be required by the contract to be held to a measurable standard
that is set forth in the county jails’ policies and procedures. UDC should

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 21 –

then require, in contract, access to the entirety of the jails’ policies and
procedures.
Many county jails are already, independently, meeting self-imposed
performance measures. However, formalizing measurable standards in
the jail contract will help ensure that all contracted jails are operating at a
similar acceptable level. The measurable standards should provide
specific, prioritized areas that, when analyzed, provide UDC with a clear
picture of each contracted jail’s performance in key areas, such as: security,
staffing, training, safety, and other various operational areas.
We recommend that UDC choose a competent, measurable standard
and then require the jails in the jail contract to tie their policies and
procedures to the standard.
Best Practices Suggest Importance
Of Performance Measures/Standards
Performance
measurement is a
fundam ental best
practice for good
managem ent.

DOJ recom mended
in 2001 that their
contracts with
county jails needed
consistent
performance
measures.

Measuring performance is a fundamental best practice for good
management. The Auditor General’s Best Practices for Good Management
report states that, “Performance measures are indicators of how well the
organization is achieving a specific goal or objective. Performance
measures also show where programs are strong and where improvements
are necessary.” Performance measures should be relevant, responsive,
valid, and clear.
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), like the State of Utah, uses
contract facilities to house some of its inmates. The DOJ reviewed federal
contracted correction facilities in 2001 and recommended that clear,
consistent performance measures were needed in their jail contracts. DOJ
stated:
The use of nonfederal facilities may create a situation in which two
or more sets of detention standards apply to detainees inside the
same facility. The USMS [United States Marshals Services] and
INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] standards are
similar but not identical, and may be quite different from state or
local standards in a given location. In fact, an internal review of 40
nonfederal facilities revealed numerous instances in which medical
sanitation, and safety practices failed to meet the detention
standards. The review also identified many significant security

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

breaches in these facilities. . . . these incidences suggest that
consistent performance measures and adequate monitoring on a
DOJ-wide basis are needed.
UDC internal
auditors also
recently reported
that performance
measures are
needed in the jail
contract.

A recent audit conducted by the UDC’s internal auditors also
recognized the need for measurable standards in the jail contract. The
internal auditors stated:
We think each contracted jail should be required by the contract to
maintain policies and procedures that provide measurable specifics
in certain areas described in the contract. UDC monitors can then
determine the extent that jails have performed according to their
own policies and procedures.
To ensure that contracted jail facilities are adhering to performance
standards, the department should require that the jails follow a measurable
standard in the jail contract.
UDC Should Require Jails to Adopt Standards
And Policies That Are Measurable

The current jail
contract does not
adequately utilize a
measurable
standard to rate the
performance of
contracted county
jails.

The current jail contract has oversight provisions, but little mention of
performance review or standards. It does not adequately tie the
performance of county jails to a set of measurable standards.
Consequently, it is not clear from reading the contract the basis or
judgment the department would use to engage in oversight activities. For
example, a stipulation allows UDC to cancel the jail contract for
nonperformance, but there is no mention of how nonperformance would
be identified or measured.
To remedy this problem, the department should require, by contract,
that the jails implement a set of competent, measurable standards. The
department should also require the jails to tie their policies and procedures
to the standard. The department should then approve a jail’s policies and
procedures, based on the agreed standard, before a jail contract is signed.

UDC should require
the contracted jails
to perform to a
measurable
standard.

Currently, jails base their policies and procedures on the Utah Sheriffs’
Association Standards. The use of the sheriffs’ association standards are so
prevalent that, recently, UDC revised some of the jail contracts to require
compliance with these standards. We did not validate the sheriffs’
standards, but we did speak to some jail and prison professionals who

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 23 –

believed the standards to be competent. Regardless, if UDC decides to
utilize the sheriffs’ association standards, or a different standard, in the
future, we believe the standards must be measurable.
In the absence of
measurable
standards, it has
been unclear from
jail inspections how
w ell the jails are
actually operating.

Previous Jail Reviews Have Not Been Measured. A complete
measurement and prioritization system can help UDC gauge a jail’s
compliance with the approved jail standards. Further, prioritizing the
standards will help UDC and the jails understand the severity of
noncompliance with the various standards. Previous jail reviews
conducted by UDC did not utilize a prioritization system. Consequently,
past jail inspections that have reported the compliance rate of jails with the
sheriffs’ association standards have been vague. For example, a 2005
UDC jail review states:
This facility has a history of partial compliance [with] Sheriffs’
Association Jail Standards. . . . the jail operation is noncompliant
with 23 and partially compliant with 267 [sheriffs’ standards].
However, there is no scale or prioritization of the importance of the
standards the jail is not compliant with. Another UDC review states:
For the past several years, the jail administration has made little
progress in improving its partial compliance with approximately
177 [standards] and noncompliance with 120 of the approximately
600 standards published by the sheriffs’ association.
It is unclear whether being noncompliant with 23 standards is any better
than being noncompliant with 120. It is conceivable that the jail with 23
standards violations has serious breaches in critical security areas, whereas
the jail with 120 standards violations might be noncompliant in relatively
minor areas.

Based on a
measurable
standard, UDC
should devise a
grading system that
clearly denotes the
level of the jails’
operations.

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UDC Should Devise a Grading/Scoring System. Once UDC has
established a system to measure jail standards and jails’ policies and
procedures, then UDC should develop a grading/scoring system to
monitor each jail’s compliance, and ensure the jails are meeting an
acceptable minimum standard. The scoring system should be
accompanied by a clear explanation of action the department will take
depending on the level of an unacceptable score.

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

For example, federal inspectors use a three-tiered system of
satisfactory, unsatisfactory, and unacceptable. Each rating is accompanied
by an action statement and rationale for the action.
We recommend the department devise a grading/scoring system and
use the system to better communicate expectations and correct any
contract noncompliance by the jails.

Other Technical Clarifications
Should Be Made to the Jail Contract
To further
strengthen the jail
contract, UDC
should add other
various contract
clauses.

Along with tying the jail contract to specific performance measures,
the department could improve the contract by clarifying or adding other
procedural and operational amendments. For example, the department
should clarify its access to jails’ standards and policies, disciplinary action
records, inmate grievance records, and so forth. Clarifying these contract
clauses can better explain UDC’s authority over and expectations of the
jails.
In discussions with department and jail officials, we identified various
clauses in the jail contract that can be improved. Changes to these clauses
should help clarify expectations for both UDC and the jails. These
contract changes are the result of both past concerns the department has
encountered and the desire to mitigate potential future concerns. Figure
3.1 provides a brief summary of some of the needed clarifications. The
list should not be considered exhaustive; the department may have
additional revisions it desires to make.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 25 –

Figure 3.1 Some Technical Changes Needed in the Jail Contract. The
following technical changes will help clarify the department’s expectations
and bring more uniformity of services between counties.
M edical Emergencies – The contract should clarify the definition of m edical
em ergencies and provide clearer param eters on the level of approval needed for
m edical em ergencies. This will allow UDC to m ore fully control m edical billings, as
well as clarify reporting expectations for the counties.
UDC Access to Jail Facilities – The current contract allows UDC access to state
inm ates but does not specifically state that access is granted to the jail facility,
creating an inconsistency. Therefore, the contract should be clarified to also
include the jail facility. This will allow UDC m ore flexibility when m onitoring the jail
facility, and clear up questions for the jails as to UDC’s access authority.
Additional contract
clauses will help
clarify UDC’s
expectations of the
counties.

UDC Access to Jail Standards and Policies – The contract does not stipulate
access to the jails’ standards. Currently, UDC m ust pay to gain access to the
sheriffs’ association standards. UDC should stipulate in the contract that the jails
m ust provide their standards and all of their policies and procedures.
Disciplinary Action Records – UDC should clarify in greater detail what
disciplinary inform ation, taken by the jail regarding UDC inm ates, they want and
when they want to receive it (e.g., receiving inform ation before or after cases are
heard). This practice will give UDC a better picture of the disciplinary actions taken
against UDC inm ates. It will also clarify the jails’ reporting responsibilities.
Grievance Records – UDC should clarify the breadth of inform ation on state
inm ate grievance records to include all grievances filed by state inm ates. This will
give UDC greater knowledge into the concerns of UDC inm ates.
W ork Program – UDC should clarify levels of approval the jails m ust obtain when
using state inm ates in work program s. This will provide UDC m ore control over
state inm ates when they are out of a secured environm ent, and will clearly
com m unicate to the jails UDC’s authority.
Action Plan – UDC should clearly stipulate actions that will be taken when jails do
not adequately perform . This will m ake it m ore clear what actions UDC will take
when jails violate contract provisions or do not perform at an acceptable level
(discussed m ore in Chapter V). This will also establish expectations for the jails.

Clarifying the above-mentioned contract clauses should help explain the
department’s expectations for the jails and help ensure the department
receives adequate information and necessary jail access.

Jails Not Adhering to Standards
Have Allowed Some Security Concerns
As previously noted in Chapter II, some jails have had significant
security and operational problems. In some cases, these problems could
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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

have been avoided had the jails been following the sheriffs’ association
standards and the jails’ own policies and procedures.
Application of Standards/Policies May
Have Prevented Past Jail Problems
Some security
concerns could have
been avoided if the
jails had adhered to
the sheriffs’
association
standards.

If the Daggett jail
had been in
compliance with the
door security
standard, the jail
escapes might have
been avoided.

As previously discussed, clear standards are essential to ensure that
consistent and adequate service is being provided across the system. In
some instances, security and operational concerns noted in Chapter II may
have been avoided if the jails had adhered to the standards they had
adopted. All of the sheriffs adopted the sheriffs’ association standards 15
years ago as guidelines; some have implemented these standards into their
policies and procedures. However, good standards are not useful if they
are not being followed; UDC must ensure that a standard is being
consistently followed.
For example, if Daggett County Jail had been in compliance with the
sheriffs’ association standards, the escapes may have been avoided. As
mentioned in Chapter II, the inmates escaped through an unsecured
security door, facilitated by inmate movement to the Green House.
Naturally, door security is an important standard. Figure 3.2 illustrates
what the sheriffs’ association standards say about door security.
Figure 3.2 Utah Sheriffs’ Association Standard on Door Security. The
sheriffs’ association standard requires the jails to ensure the security of
doors and warns of jail escapes if the standard is not followed.
Jail officials shall ensure that all security doors rem ain closed and locked when not
opened to perm it authorized m ovem ent of staff, prisoners, and others. . . . One of
the m ost frequent breaches of security in jails and prisons is the failure of staff to
keep doors closed and locked when not in im m ediate use. Staff leave security
doors open for a variety of reasons (i.e., convenience, to perm it staff faster
m ovem ent between security zones, laziness, a lack of understanding of the risk to
personal safety and facility security, com placence). Open doors have lead to
escape, death, and even the loss of entire facilities to prisoner takeover. . . . Jail
inspectors should be particularly alert during jail inspections to discover any
breaches of door security.

This is one example where the failure to adhere to one jail standard
facilitated a jail escape. Further, as stated in the above standard, jail
inspectors must be alert to discover noncompliance with jail standards, or
the future risk of security and operational problems remains high.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 27 –

As discussed in the
next tw o chapters,
UDC should improve
their monitoring and
enforcement efforts.

In conclusion, the department should rewrite the jail contract to
include provisions such as a requirement that jails match their security and
operational policies and procedures to a measurable standard, and new or
revised clauses that clarify UDC’s expectations and oversight. As
discussed in the next two chapters, UDC should also establish, by
contract, a clear monitoring program consisting of dedicated, independent
contract monitors, and an enforcement protocol with a clear corrective
action plan.

Recommendations
1. We recommend that UDC choose competent measurable
standards, and then require the jails in the jail contract to tie their
policies and procedures to the standard.
2. We recommend UDC devise a grading/scoring system and use the
system to better communicate and correct jail contract
noncompliance.
3. We recommend that UDC revise the contract to include such
provisions as discussed in Figure 3.1, which are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

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Medical emergencies
Access to jail
Access to jail standards/policies and procedures
Disciplinary action records
Grievance records
Work program
Action plan

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Chapter IV
Jail Contract Monitoring
Can Improve
M onitoring
contracted jails is
essential to ensure
state offenders are
secure.

The department also
needs to improve in
the overall
management of the
jail contracting
program.

It is essential that UDC adequately monitor jail contracts, given the
consequences to public safety if jails fail to securely house state offenders.
Monitoring of contracts ensures that jails are in compliance with standards
and other provisions of the contract. We believe UDC can improve its
monitoring of county jails. The department has a system of monitoring
that lacks enforcement and completeness.
UDC also needs to improve in the overall management of the jail
contracting program in four areas. First, UDC should finalize an inmate
screening policy to avoid sending security-risk inmates to county jails.
Second, the department needs to more adequately track programming
outcomes. Such measures would be useful in helping inmates housed in
county jails achieve their programming goals such as substance abuse
treatment, life skills, and anger management. Third, Inmate Placement
Program (IPP) needs to implement and track performance measures.
Finally, UDC can improve management of state inmates by developing a
plan to best allocate state resources when extra bed capacity exists within
the prison system.

Monitoring Should Be a Standard
Component of Contracts
Monitoring is essential to guarantee that contractual obligations are
being met. Indeed, both UDC’s own policy and relevant state statute
require that the department conduct adequate contract monitoring.
However, UDC’s monitoring has been insufficient. Best practices from
other states and the federal government also point to a need for
consistent, reliable monitoring of contract compliance.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

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UDC Policy Requires Monitoring
And Review of Contracts
UDC policy requires the department to engage in effective, annual
reviews and continuous monitoring of agency contracts. Figure 4.1
shows the importance of contract monitoring in UDC policy.
Figure 4.1 UDC Contract Monitoring Policy. UDC policy requires an
annual review of contracts and a continuous monitoring program for every
contract. However, UDC’s compliance with this policy has been
uncoordinated and inconsistent.

UDC policy requires
monitoring of
contracts, but the
department has not
adequately
monitored the jail
contract.

It is the policy of the Department that the Division [DIO] shall:
• Perform a thorough review of all agency contracts at least annually;
• Designate staff members who are knowledgeable in the administration
of contracts to conduct the review;
• Establish and maintain a review monitoring system to ensure the
agency contract providers comply with contract provisions and
applicable laws;
• Continuously monitor all agency contracts to ensure proper service is
being rendered and the proper cost is being charged as outlined in the
contract.

In order to carry out contract monitoring, UDC policy breaks out the
process into two roles: an annual contract review conducted by DIO, and
a contract monitoring by jail coordinators (discussed more in the next
section).
The department did conduct annual reviews and some monitoring
functions. However, as will be discussed further in the next section, the
review and monitoring efforts made by the department were
uncoordinated, inconsistent, and lacked enforcement. Chapter V shows
that the department did not follow through on the monitoring that did
occur.
Private Prison Statute Requires UDC to
Monitor Facilities Incarcerating State Inmates
The private prison
statute requires UDC
to monitor the
performance of
facilities
incarcerating state
inm ates.
– 30 –

Though Utah Code does not specifically require the department to
monitor county jails, a statute referring to private prisons, Utah Code 6413d-106, says, “The executive director or his designee shall monitor the
performance of all facilities incarcerating inmates under the jurisdiction of
the department.”
A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

In many ways, private prison contracting is similar to jail contracting
because the state is allowing another agency to incarcerate inmates that are
under the state’s jurisdiction. If monitoring contracts with private prisons
is considered necessary to ensure that contractual obligations are being
met, state contracts with jails should be under similar requirements,
considering the consequences of jail failures.
Other States and the Federal Government Have Dedicated
Contract Monitors to Ensure Jail Security and Safety
Some other states
and the federal
government have
implemented
dedicated
contracted monitors
to inspect county
jails and private
prisons.

Utah’s jail contracting program is not identical to programs in other
states; however, other states do house state inmates in county jails (the
arrangements vary) and private facilities. As was shown earlier in
Figure 1.2 of Chapter I, most surrounding western states do very little jail
contracting. Therefore, in order to find a more comparable program, we
surveyed other states that do a significant amount of jail contracting
(Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana and Mississippi) and the Office of
Federal Detention Trustee, which manages jail contracts for several federal
agencies. Most of the states surveyed and several federal agencies have
organized a separate agency, department, or individuals whose main
purpose is to monitor contracts with jails and private prisons to ensure
these facilities meet minimum standards.
Having separate agencies conduct the inspections gives some degree of
independence to the inspectors to allow them to be more impartial and
less influenced by the contractor or contractee. Of the nine states we
looked at, all monitor their contracts with jails and private prisons; seven
of them have dedicated monitors. Among those entities surveyed:
• Tennessee has a separate state agency that monitors and certifies
jails.
• Kentucky has six full-time jail inspectors.
• The Office of Federal Detention Trustee has its own Detention
Standards and Compliance Division that conducts Quality
Assurance Reviews of jails for the U.S. Marshals and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
• Idaho—the western state with the second-most contracted inmates
(6.4 percent)—has established a virtual prison, with a warden,
security personnel, contract managers, and program managers to
manage and monitor their inmates in county jails.

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– 31 –

Based on this criteria from other states and the Office of Federal
Detention Trustee, we believe that to ensure monitoring is a priority,
UDC needs dedicated monitors that will focus on jail security, jail safety,
and contract compliance.

UDC Has Not Adequately
Monitored Its Jail Contracts
UDC’s monitoring
efforts have been
incomplete and
inconsistent.

UDC has made a number of efforts to monitor its contracts with jails,
but we do not believe these efforts to be adequate. A primary reason for
the department’s monitoring shortfall is the incongruent monitoring
system. The department utilized several entities within the department to
review and monitor the jail contracts, but these efforts lacked enforcement
and were incomplete. For example, Figure 4.2 identifies the four main
entities the department utilized to monitor and review the jail contracts, a
brief description of their monitoring efforts, and a description of the
monitoring shortcomings.

Figure 4.2 Past UDC Monitoring Efforts Had Shortcomings.
M onitoring Entity

M onitoring Effort

Primary Concern

Office of Com pliance
Review(OCR)/Internal
Adit

Conducted an annual
fire, life, and safety
inspection

W as not a com plete review of
all relevant jail operations (e.g.,
security), and lacked
enforcem ent by UDC
m anagem ent

Division of Institutional
Operations (DIO or
division)

Supposed to conduct
annual contract review

Inconsistently and incom pletely
conducted reviews, and had no
enforcem ent

Inm ate Placem ent
Program (IPP), Jail
Coordinators

Supposed to conduct
security inspections

Inconsistently and incom pletely
conducted reviews, and had no
enforcem ent

UDC Staff and
Internal Audit

Conducted acute postincident inspections

W as not a com plete review of
all relevant jail operations, and
lacked enforcem ent by UDC
m anagem ent

Along with the disjointed monitoring activities they employed, the
department failed to adequately enforce the recommendations made when

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

monitoring occurred; this concern will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter V.
OCR and Internal Audit
Inspections Were Not Enforced
The Office of Compliance Review (OCR), and then later internal
audit conducted annual fire, life, and safety inspections of each county jail
from 2002 to 2006. These inspections generally included reviews of
various fire safety issues like egress access, fire extinguishers, and fire
hazards, but did not typically include security. However, from time to
time, the inspection reports identified glaring security concerns that if
corrected might have prevented some jail escapes. However, it appears
department management did little to ensure that recommendations from
these inspections were enforced.
In our opinion, had
UDC management
implemented
recommendations
from the fire, life,
and safety reviews,
it is likely that som e
escapes and
operational
concerns could have
been avoided.

DIO contract reviews
w ere inconsistent
and incomplete.

As will also be shown in Chapter V, very little follow-up/enforcement
of the fire, life, and safety inspections was completed, primarily because
no coordinated effort existed between IPP management and those
conducting inspections. UDC management did not follow up to ensure
enforcement was completed. If recommendations of the fire, life, and
safety reviews would have been enforced, in our opinion, it is likely some
of the escapes and other operational concerns could have been avoided.
DIO Contract Reviews
Were Insufficient
According to UDC policy, the Division of Institutional Operations
(DIO) is supposed to annually review all contracts the division employs.
However, it appears that the department has not been compliant with this
policy. The little monitoring that DIO conducted was not sufficient to
ensure acceptable contract performance. We could only find two reviews:
one complete review conducted in 2007 by IPP jail coordinators, and a
partial, insufficient review conducted in 2006 by DIO.
UDC policy stipulates that the division annually review and monitor
all division contracts. Figure 4.3 provides the language in UDC policy.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

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Figure 4.3 UDC Policy Requires DIO to Assign Reviewers to Each
Contract and Conduct an Annual Review.
According to UDC policy, a reviewer is “a designated staff member who
reviews the contract for contractor compliance and is designated by the
Division Director/designee.” The reviewer “conduct[s] an annual review to
gather any information necessary; write[s] the Review Reports; and
present[s] the Review Reports to the Contract Monitor and the Contract
Coordinator.” The Reviewer “determine[s] if and by what method the
contract is being continuously monitored.”

In 2006, it appears that contract reviewers collected safety, health, fire,
and food inspections but did not actually determine if the jails were being
continuously monitored for compliance with their contracts. We could
locate no other documents showing any reviews were done, notes were
taken, or corrective action was given. It appears that the review process
did not bring any concerns to light.
Comments by UDC
staff suggest the
DIO review was not
adequate.

In the 2007 review—which was the only complete review we could
find—the reviewers could not obtain adequate information to assess the
contract compliance of the jails. We found the following comments by
the jail coordinators conducting the reviews, which suggest the review was
not adequate.
• “I don’t know what ‘adequate’ is defined as or what acceptable
minimum core staffing is.”
• “I cannot say there are adequate officers without reviewing shift
schedules and staffing patterns. I see staff working but have no
idea what their overall schedule looks like or even what adequate
implies.”
• “In most cases there appears to be an adequate number of
Correctional Officers in [the] Jail, but . . . would need more time
to examine scheduling patterns and standards on this subject to
give a more definitive answer.”

W e could find no
corrective action
plan or enforcement
for jails that had
deficiencies in the
contract review
process.

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Even with the lack of information and confusion, the reviewers still
graded 16 out of 21 jails as “clean, efficient and secure.” In this March
2007 review, the Daggett County Jail was stated as being clean and
efficient, but “could be more secure.” We could find no corrective action
plan, follow-up, or enforcement on jails deemed unclean, inefficient, and
insecure. If security issues had been specifically identified and addressed
with action plans in March 2007 (when these reviews occurred), the
A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Daggett escapes, which occurred six months later, may have been
prevented.
IPP Jail Coordinators’
Monitoring Was Insufficient
Jail coordinators
w ere tasked with jail
monitoring, but
other
responsibilities
often got in the w ay.

W e could find no
documentation of
jail coordinators
conducting formal
security reviews.

Jail coordinators
w ere assigned
conflicting roles.
They were to be
congenial with jail
staff, but were also
to be critical of jail
security.

The task for monitoring security at the jails was an official
responsibility given to IPP jail coordinators. Jail coordinator duties
involve handling inmate issues such as: filling out board of pardon
reports, conducting inmate reassessments, screening inmates, facilitating
inmate and family contact, entering data, acting as jail liaison, as well as
other duties. Because of these duties, it appears that the jail coordinators
were simply too overwhelmed to provide, consistent, adequate contract
monitoring.
We could not locate any jail coordinator inspection reports suggesting
continual monitoring occurred. Instead, the only documentation
suggesting monitoring was the 2006 DIO review previously mentioned.
This review was assigned to jail coordinators in 2006. One former IPP
director said he conducted informal security walk-throughs of each jail
twice a year but admits these inspections were not documented.
The coordinators’ role of jail liaison requires they maintain a congenial
relationship with jail management, but this conflicted with their other role
of security monitoring, which required them to be critical of jail security.
Given these conflicting roles and their workload, security inspections
became secondary notations of glaringly obvious security issues as
coordinators walked in and out of the jails. IPP staff admit that thorough
jail security inspections and contract monitoring by jail coordinators did
not occur.
Assigning jail coordinators the task of monitoring security was not
sufficient enough to establish an effective jail-contract-monitoring
program. Not only did conducting security inspections conflict with the
coordinators’ duty to be the jail liaison, but the importance of the
monitoring role was not taken into consideration given the many duties of
the coordinators. While it does appear the jail coordinators were qualified
to conduct security inspections, they were just simply not given the time,
tools, and training to function as security monitors. UDC management is
now in the process of designating full-time contract monitors. UDC

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

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reports these monitors will be located in the department’s Law
Enforcement Bureau, providing them independence from IPP.
Post-Incident Inspections
Lacked Enforcement
UDC conducted
post-incident
inspections, but
often management
failed to enforce the
recom mendations.

Post-incident inspections were often conducted by UDC’s internal
auditors or in conjunction with other UDC staff after an inmate escape or
after a major breach of security. For example, after several incidents in
2007, UDC management decided to send department staff from DIO to
do post-incident reviews on all the jails, even though not all the jails had
experienced security or operational problems.
As previously stated, after two inmates escaped from Daggett County
Jail in 2004, the post-incident security review sent to the UDC executive
director recommended that either staffing patterns improve or no state
inmates be housed in the Daggett County Jail Green House facility. The
department, at the time, did not ensure these recommendations were
implemented, and inmates continued to be housed in the insecure facility.
Perhaps some of the most alarming post-incident recommendations
that were not implemented were aimed at UDC itself. Three such
recommendations occurred after allegations in 2006 of sexual misconduct
between officers and female offenders at the Washington County Jail. Of
the many recommendations made in the post-incident inspection, these
stand out because they focus on UDC’s lack of a systematic mechanism to
monitor the jail’s day-to-day operations and ensure it consistently met the
standards contained in UDC jail contract. These recommendations state
that:

A 2006 UDC postincident inspection
recom mended that
UDC more clearly
define monitoring
functions. It
appears this
recommendation
w as not
implemented.

• UDC should consider auditing each jail more often than “as
situations arise.”
• UDC should also consider a more clearly defined jail-contractmonitoring function, assigning a specific person or persons to
complete this function as their primary duty and responsibility.
• Jail contract monitoring should be independent of direct
supervision by IPP and likely report to either the UDC director’s
office or administrative services.
These recommendations were not implemented at the time of the audit,
but the department reports they are now in the process of

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

implementation. If the department had heeded and implemented the
recommendations before the escapes, sexual misconduct, and other
operational problems occurred, these problems might have been avoided.
UDC Needs Dedicated, Independent Contract
Monitors to Conduct Regular Inspections
Regular security inspections and management follow-up on
recommendations could have prevented some of the jail escapes.
We could find no regular, thorough security inspections of jails.
However, in October 2007, after the latest escapes from Daggett County
Jail, UDC conducted a thorough security inspection of all contracted
county jails. One recommendation from those inspections noted that
Beaver County Jail lacked a secondary perimeter fence and needed
upgraded razor wire along the yard portion of the building. A short time
later, an inmate escaped over the primary yard fence as an officer watched
him from a monitor. The inmate might have been caught quickly if a
secondary perimeter fence existed, but by the time officers could get out
of the security doors, he was gone.
There was little time from the end of the inspection to the time of the
escape for Beaver to have installed the perimeter fence. However, if such
thorough inspections had occurred regularly in past years and were
enforced, Beaver would have had time to install the fence and might have
avoided the escape.
UDC needs
dedicated,
independent
contract monitors to
continually review
and inspect
contracted county
jails.

UDC needs to assign dedicated contract monitors the responsibility of
security inspections and other continuous monitoring functions as is done
in other states and by the federal government. This will help unify the
segregated and ineffective efforts that UDC has made in the past. These
monitors should conduct regular inspections, track corrective action plans,
and work with IPP and the jails to ensure that improvements are made.
These monitors should have independence from IPP to avoid conflicts of
interest. Most importantly, communication and coordination of efforts
must be established between monitors, IPP, and jail staff so that
deficiencies are corrected and recommendations are enforced.
In Chapter V, we discuss the lack of enforcement by UDC on
recommendations. The final section in this chapter discusses other
management issues related to jail contracting that need improvement.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

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UDC Should Improve the
Management of Jail Contracting
The department can
improve the
management of
some aspects of the
jail contracting
process.

In addition to improving the monitoring function, UDC can better
manage some critical aspects of the jail contracting process. The
department can benefit by instituting basic management systems and
processes to oversee and control the jail contracting program. Specifically,
we found that improvements are needed in the following areas:
• Formal inmate screening policies need to be developed by IPP to
avoid sending security-risk inmates to county jails.
• UDC needs to track inmate programming outcomes to ensure
inmates in county jails are receiving needed treatment and training.
• IPP needs to better measure their performance to guide
improvements and gauge their outcomes.
• UDC should develop a plan to better utilize resources when there
are extra prison beds.
UDC Had No Jail Screening
Policies Prior to 2007 Jail Escapes

UDC should finalize
the implementation
of policies and
procedures
governing inmate
referrals to county
jails.

Until recently, the department did not have formal policies and
procedures detailing the screening and referral process of state inmates to
county jails. The lack of policies was a contributing factor in the escapes
that occurred in 2007, especially the escape from Daggett County Jail.
Shortly before the escapes occurred, the department hired new staff to
manage the IPP program. The new staff did not have experience
managing the program, and previous staff had not developed policies and
procedures to help guide the new staff decisions. In the absence of clear
written procedures, the new department staff sent inmates to Daggett
County Jail with security threat levels greater than what the jail could
handle.
UDC is currently in the process of adopting new policies and
procedures for the screening of inmates. Figure 4.4 illustrates what was
informally in place before the escapes and what new staff have recently
developed.

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Figure 4.4 History of Inmate Screening. Until recently, UDC did not have
adequate policies for screening inmates sent to county jails.

Prior to the 2007 jail
escapes, the
department had few
guidelines as to
w hich inm ates
qualified for county
jail placem ent.

Before 2007
Jail Escapes

After 20007
Jail Escapes

No form al policy was in
place. Consequently,
m ost inm ates qualified for
the jail contracting
program .

After the jail escapes, the form er director of IPP
established som e screening criteria in a Jan 16, 2008
m em o. Those criteria, along with a few extra
provisions have now been adopted through a UDC
general order. The new criteria are:

The following criteria
were inform ally
established:

• 2nd and 3rd degree felons are allowed. No 1st
degree felons are allowed unless approved through
an established process (1st degree felons were
restricted from jails on Novem ber 16, 2007).
• Inm ates that have attem pted an escape within
5 years are not eligible.
• Level 1 and 2 inm ates are not allowed. (Level 2
inm ates with protective custody status are allowed.)
• A board hearing or release date m ust be within
10 years to be eligible.
• Inm ates can have no loss-of-life crim es, unless
approved through an established process.

• Inm ates with certain
m edical conditions were
not sent to county jail.
• IPP attem pted to lim it
inm ates in county jails
to 3 years or less.

As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the department had not begun to develop
written policies until after the high-profile escapes in 2007. Without
screening policies and procedures in place new management and staff may
continue to make the same errors that led to the Daggett escapes. We are
encouraged, however, that the current IPP director has developed policies
and procedures in the jail contracting area.
UDC Needs to Better Track Programming
Outcomes for Inmates in Jails
UDC has not been
adequately tracking
programming
outcomes for state
inmates in county
jails.

UDC has not been adequately tracking programming outcomes for
state inmates in county jails. This training and treatment data has also not
been reliably collected. When we requested information comparing
programming outcomes of inmates who spent time in a county jail to
those who have not, the department had no such analysis nor could it
quickly obtain the data, due to the lack of collected information.
We are surprised the department has not adequately tracked such a
fundamental measurement as programming outcomes. Programming is a
major activity of the prison system and by tracking their efforts in this
area, the department can better gauge their performance.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 39 –

In order to compare the amount of programing received by inmates in
jails to those in prison, we asked IPP to have the coordinators enter the
necessary data (class end dates). With the class end dates entered, the
department was able to compare the programming needs of inmates
currently in jail to those currently in prison. Figure 4.5 illustrates that
inmates in county jails have about the same number of programming
goals yet to complete as inmates in state prison. However, the inmates in
jails are about half as likely to be in active programming. It is important
to note that this is the current status and not the status upon parole,
which may or may not be different.

Figure 4.5 Programming Data Results. Analysis shows that inmates
currently in jails are about half as likely to be in active programming.
Programming goals
for inmates in prison
and jails are about
the same, though
few er inmates in
jails are in active
programming.

County Jails

State Prison

Num ber of Program m ing Goals

1.97

2.01

Percent in Active Program m ing

15.6%

35.8%

Source: UDC

Though this data shows that inmates currently in jails have the same
number of programming goals as those currently in prison, we still could
not determine if those paroled have completed their programming. Only
recently has there been a completion level code added to the database that
will help determine this. Therefore, at the time of this audit, UDC could
not compare those who spent time only in prison to those who spent
some time in jail to see if they received differing amounts of programming
during their sentences.
The department
should start doing a
better job of tracking
programming
outcomes of
inmates in county
jails.

– 40 –

UDC has developed a management information system that is used to
assign programing requirements to inmates and track their individual
goals, yet UDC has not been analyzing and tracking program completion
of those sent to jails. UDC needs to start recording and tracking overall
completion levels of its inmates’ goals to determine its overall effectiveness
at providing programming to inmates.

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

IPP Needs to Better
Measure Its Performance
IPP should develop
specific
performance
measures and track
performance
outcom es.

IPP can improve the way it measures its performance. One way to do
so is through the Governor’s Balanced Scorecard. In August 2006, the
Governor introduced the Balanced Scorecard Initiative for which
departments are to measure key performance indicators in order to
continuously improve strategic performance and results. These
performance indicators show the status of the agency, give diagnostic
feedback to guide improvements, and allow the agency to track
performance over time.
The Department of Corrections does have a scorecard, but the intent
of the scorecard initiative is for divisions also to adopt key performance
measures. IPP, as part of DIO, should track and measure its performance
outcomes. With the complexity of managing contracts with 21 jails and
the potential impacts from unsafe and unsecured jails, performance
outcomes will give IPP important diagnostic information.
We are encouraged that the new IPP director has recently begun
implementation of the Governor’s Balanced Scorecard. The new director
has implemented systems to measure items such as: programming
outcomes, contract monitoring activities, and inmate referral statistics.
We recommend that IPP continue to implement and track performance
measures.
UDC Can Improve Management of
Inmates by Developing a Capacity Plan

UDC should develop
a plan to best
manage its
resources w hen
extra capacity
exists.

Currently there is some extra bed capacity in the system, and UDC
does not have an adequate plan in place to manage inmates in county jails
when extra capacity exists at the prison while not the primary focus of the
audit. UDC should implement a plan in order to better manage state
inmates in county jails. This is important to ensure that the department is
best utilizing its allocated resources.
In 2001, the Legislative Fiscal Analyst discussed the need for UDC to
better manage state inmates in county jails at times when extra capacity
existed at the prison. The Fiscal Analyst recommended that UDC devise a
method to distribute beds when extra capacity exists.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 41 –

UDC again is faced with excess beds in the prison system (including
county jail beds). Figure 4.6 shows that, recently, the department’s
incarcerated count, or the number of currently incarcerated inmates, has
dropped, leaving extra bed capacity in the system.

Figure 4.6 UDC Currently Has Extra Capacity in the Prison – Including
Jail Contracting Beds.

Source: UDC

In the beginning of 2008, UDC had maximum capacity (red line in
figure) for 6,886 total beds in the system (including jails), and 6,650
operational capacity beds (green line in figure). At the same time the
department had 6,465 inmates incarcerated, which left vacant 421 total
beds, or 185 operational beds. UDC management prefers to keep prison
populations at operational capacity, which is a small percent below
maximum capacity, this gives the department extra bed space to move and
manage inmates.
The department’s current strategy is to not remove inmates from
county jails when extra capacity exists. Instead, the department is putting
even more inmates in jails. In February 2008, UDC had 1,224 jail beds
filled and 1,391 available beds, or 88 percent of the available beds filled.
In contrast, in May 2008, UDC increased the number of state inmates in
county jails to 1,323, or 95 percent of the available beds filled.

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

UDC management
believes there are
various reasons to
fill county jail beds
before filling prison
beds, such as
keeping county jails
financially secure.

Department management believes there are various reasons to fill
county jail beds before filling prison beds. For example, management
believes it is important to fill jail beds to keep the county jails financially
secure and to keep inmates in programming offered at some of the county
jails. We believe that the department should devise a clear extra capacity
plan to help guide its actions in instances where extra capacity exists. The
department should consider the following points when extra capacity
occurs, the department could:
• Shut down portions of the prison that need maintenance and
circulate inmates to jails.
• Shut down costly areas of the prison and circulate inmates to jails.
• Re-designate bed space to better suit the classification and
programmatic needs of the prison community.

In conclusion, UDC
should improve both
the monitoring and
management of the
jail contracts.

In sum, UDC needs to better monitor its jail contracts by assigning
dedicated contract monitors the responsibility of continuously monitoring
these contracts. The department should also improve its management of
jail contracts and track inmate programming outcomes. IPP needs to
adequately measure their performance and establish and implement
inmate screening policies. Finally, UDC should also develop a plan to
better utilize excess bed capacity.

Recommendations
1. We recommend that UDC assign contract monitors the
responsibility of continuously monitoring jail contracts. These
monitors should have independence from IPP.
2. We recommend that IPP develop and implement inmate screening
policies for sending inmates to jails.
3. We recommend that UDC better track programming outcomes for
inmates in jails.
4. We recommend that IPP implement and track performance
measures.
5. We recommend that UDC develop an extra capacity plan for when
state bed availability is below operational capacity needs.
Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Chapter V
Jail Contract
Enforcement Needed

The lack of
oversight by the
department has
allow ed for great
risk in the jail
contracting
program.

The Utah Department of Corrections (UDC or department) has not
adequately enforced security or corrected operational concerns at some
jails. This lack of oversight by the department has allowed for great risk
in the jail contracting program, evident in the recent escapes by state
inmates from county jails.
To reduce the risk of future security and operational problems at the
jails, the department should improve enforcement by 1) consistently
engaging in enforcement activities, 2) obtaining better management
information, and 3) developing a specific corrective action plan.

UDC’s Enforcement
Is Inadequate

The department has
not clearly
established a followup and enforcement
plan for correcting
the deficiencies of
som e contracted
county jails.

Implementation of recommendations from contract monitoring and
jail inspections has not been adequate. Inadequate enforcement is largely
due to the poor system of coordination utilized by past department
management. It appears staff at UDC were not aware of who was
responsible for follow-up on jail contracts. This is apparent in the 2007
Division of Institutional Operations (DIO) post-incident security reviews
that mostly sat ignored until a new director in the Inmate Placement
Program (IPP) recently began follow-up activities. The effect of UDC’s
inadequate enforcement is evident in the security and operational
problems that have existed at some jails. Inadequate enforcement has also
produced a lack of contractually required management information from
the jails (discussed in the next section). We recommend that UDC
coordinate follow-up, document noncompliance with its jail contracts,
and enforce its contracts with jails.
No Clear Follow-Up and Enforcement
Procedure Has Been Established
The department has not clearly established a follow-up and
enforcement plan for correcting the deficiencies of some county jails under

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 45 –

contract with the state. Department management has not clearly held the
division or persons accountable that were responsible for enforcement.
Consequently, it has not always been clear to staff at UDC who was to
follow up on deficiencies and ensure corrective action plans were followed
or impose sanctions if improvements were not made.

W e received
conflicting
information
concerning who was
responsible for jail
follow-up.

As discussed in Chapter IV, the department has not implemented a
unified follow-up and enforcement system. In discussions with
department personnel involved in the jail contracting program, we
received conflicting information concerning who was responsible for jail
follow-up. The fire, life, and safety inspector/auditor, housed in the
internal audit bureau, was told he had only a reporting responsibility, not
a follow-up role. However, UDC personnel in IPP, who are responsible
for administering the jail contract, believed that the fire, life, and safety
inspector/auditor was conducting the follow-up.
Assuming that the fire, life, and safety inspector had conducted followup activities, as an auditor, auditing standards would not allow him to
enforce the follow-up. Auditors do not enforce management activities.
However, the IPP office had responsibility over moving inmates to county
jails, as well as the responsibility of removing inmates from jails suffering
from security and/or operational concerns. Therefore, IPP should have
been intimately aware of all enforcement activities.
Inadequate Follow-Up Occurred
After Most Recent Jail Reviews
Evidence of the uncoordinated follow-up procedure is apparent in the
department’s most recent monitoring attempt (shown in Chapter IV). In
October 2007, after four escapes in a few months, the department sent
out a qualified team of professionals from the DIO to review every
contracted county jail’s operations. These DIO post-incident reviews
were the result of several incidents that had occurred in the preceding
months (see Chapter II).
However, it appears the department had done little follow-up or
enforcement with the information gathered in the reviews until recently,
when a new IPP director was hired. This is unfortunate because the DIO
monitoring exercise provided the department with some valuable
information on particular strengths and weaknesses of county jails. It

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

should be noted that some county jails took exception to the findings in
the DIO post-incident review.
Follow-Up Needed, but Not Completed, with at Least One Jail.
We found in at least one instance, follow-up of the DIO post-incident
review is needed but has not yet been sufficiently completed. The Garfield
jail had an escape in August 2007. The general problems contributing to
the escape were identified as being present in the October 2007 DIO
review, but the department has not actively pursued corrective action
against the jail.
In August 2007, a state inmate convicted of manslaughter escaped
from an outside exercise area at the Garfield County Jail. The escape was
precipitated by staff who inadequately supervised an inmate in a relatively
unsecured outside recreational area. In the recreation area, the inmate
gained access to a civilian bus that was not adequately searched and fled
the facility in the bus’ storage compartment. DIO’s security review that
occurred two months later also highlighted similar problem areas that led
to the escape. Specifically, the review noted problems at the jail with staff
training, inmate movement procedures, and staff supervision of inmates.
W ith concerns
identified, the
department should
have immediately
implemented a
corrective action
plan for Garfield
County Jail.

With these concerns noted, the department should have immediately
implemented a corrective action plan to ensure these concerns were
corrected. However, follow-up did not occur for several months later,
and it appears some problems are still present at the Garfield facility.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the lack of follow-up by UDC.

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 47 –

Figure 5.1 Enforcement Needed After Jail Escapes. Details of the
Garfield County Jail escape illustrate the need for more enforcement by
UDC.

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A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

The escaped state inmate had been in the Garfield County Jail for over
three years and was likely aware of the security weaknesses in the jail.
Security problems that led to the inmate escaping from the Garfield Jail
included:
• Improper search of school bus (staff training issue)
• Improper supervision in the recreation yard
The department’s October 2007 security review found several areas where
the jail needed improvement. Some notable areas for improvement that
the October 2007 review found included the following:
• Jail staff needs more training.
• Inmate movement within the jail facility could improve;
specifically, better supervision of inmates is needed.
• Razor wire needs upgrading along security fences and around the
tops of buildings.
• Improved inmate-count process is needed.
• Items in the control room obstructing views should be removed.
The department did
not conduct formal
enforcement
activities at the
Garfield County Jail
until 6 months later,
and problems
appear to still be
present at the jail.

It appeared from our walk-through of the jail in April 2008 that the razor
wire has still not been upgraded, the control room still has obstructed
views, and some staffing issues still seem unresolved. With these areas of
improvement identified, the department still did not conduct formal
enforcement activities until April 2008, which was six months after the
review. However, it appears problems at the jail persist.
This is concerning due to the connections between the escape that
occurred in August and the concerns noted in October. Further, the
October review found other important security and operational areas that
need to be enforced at Garfield and other county jails.

UDC Failed to Obtain and
Utilize Management Information
Because the department has not been vigilant in enforcing the jail
contract, the department has received very little required management
information. The jail contract stipulates that the jails must provide certain
types of management information. For example, the contract requires the
jails provide their inspection reports and updates to their policies and
Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 49 –

procedures. The lack of management information is evident with 1) the
poor rate in which UDC received required information from the jails, and
2) UDC’s failure to document enforcement action taken against the jails.
Most Jails Do Not Provide
UDC-Required Information
The department has
not enforced
contract stipulations
that require jails to
provide needed
management
information.

The department has not received required management information
because it appears UDC has not enforced a provision in the contract
requiring the county jails to provide this information. For example, the
jail contract requires the county jails to provide UDC with some specific
information. The jail contract requires the following:
• Jails agree to provide UDC a copy of all reports of any inspection
of the jail performed by any other agency.
• Jails agree to provide a copy of their jail’s policies and procedures
to the IPP director.
Figure 5.2 shows the jails’ low compliance rate with the above contract
stipulations.

Figure 5.2 UDC Has Not Enforced Compliance with Jail Contract. The
jails have not been compliant with some provisions of the jail contract, and
UDC has not enforced compliance.
Requirement

Results From 2004 to 2006

Provide Inspection Reports

10.7% Compliance Rate

Provide Updates to Policies and
Procedures

33.9 % Compliance Rate

Source: UDC

It is important for the department to receive this management
information. Inspection reports from other entities (sheriffs’ association,
federal government, etc) provide valuable insight into the strengths and
weaknesses of the jail. Updated policies and procedures are necessary to
know what processes the jails have adopted and to review the sufficiency
of the policies. However, as shown in Figure 5.2, there is only an
11 percent compliance rate for providing inspection reports and a
34 percent rate for policies and procedures.
– 50 –

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

To calculate compliance, we reviewed each jails’ inspection report for a
three-year period (2004 to 2006) and tallied the noted compliance
statements. We also corroborated the information by reviewing the jail
contract files and noting the deficiency of this information in UDC’s
contract files. In sum, it seems difficult for department management to
provide effective oversight when they are not receiving important
management information regarding the status of the jails.
UDC Jail Files Document
Little Enforcement Action
W e could find little
information in UDC
files pertaining to
jail contract
enforcement
activities.

A review of the jails’ contract files maintained at UDC produced very
little in terms of documentary follow-up and enforcement information.
For example, we could find little information pertaining to recent jail
inspections, policies and procedures, and management decisions. Even
the jails with known security and operational concerns have very little
information in their files.
Some jail files had virtually no information in them. For example, one
jail contract file contained only a copy of the jail contract and a 2005
certified mail receipt. Another file contained the jail contract and two
outdated letters discussing contract details. One letter dates back to 2002,
the other 1997.
To help ensure that follow-up is completed and to help ensure
consistency among the jails, the department should establish a clear
follow-up and corrective action plan and document the follow-up and
enforcement efforts.

UDC Should Develop
A Corrective Action Plan
The department should develop a coordinated enforcement program
for its jail contracts, which includes a system to document contract
noncompliance; a specific enforcement plan, which includes both
unannounced and scheduled inspections; and a corrective action plan that
denotes the consequences of noncompliance. The corrective action plan
will help the department formalize and standardize their enforcement
response. When added to the jail contract, the corrective action plan can
clearly communicate expectations to counties.
Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 51 –

Other States Have Developed
Enforcement Plans
Other states with jail
contracting have
developed
enforcement plans.

We found that other states that do a significant amount of jail
contracting have developed enforcement plans, and they have steps and
processes they follow for noncompliant jails. As noted in Figure 1.2 of
Chapter I, western states do not utilize county jails beds at the same rate
as Utah does. However, we found some southern states with utilization
rates that are similar to Utah’s.
For example, in Louisiana, where 44 percent of the prison population
is housed in county jails, the jails are given 120 days to correct problems
or they face removal of state inmates. In Tennessee, where 25 percent of
state inmates are in county jails, a jail that fails to meet standards is
decertified and must use 75 percent of state reimbursement to make the
required improvements. Most other states we reviewed remove state
inmates unless corrective action is taken. However, in Utah, no defined
corrective action plan has been developed.
Action Plan Should
Be Developed

The department has
no set policy
describing what
level of contract
noncompliance
w ould warrant the
removal of inm ates
from county jails.

The department has not implemented a set action plan to enforce
contract noncompliance with the county jails. It was reported to us that,
in the past, the department has removed a few inmates or deprived the
county of new referrals. However, we could find no documentation of
such action, and the department has no set policy describing what level of
contract noncompliance would warrant the removal of inmates from
county jails.
We were able to document that, recently, UDC removed inmates from
the Daggett County Jail. It appears that this action finally got needed
security improvements made at the jail (see Chapter II for needed
improvements). The department should learn from this recent experience
and formalize a corrective action plan in the jail contract. The corrective
action plan should clearly denote what specific actions will be taken for
various violations to the jail contract, and/or jail standards and policies
and procedures.

– 52 –

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Recommendation
1. We recommend UDC develop a coordinated enforcement program
for its jail contracts, which includes:
• A system to document contract noncompliance
• A specific enforcement plan, which includes both unannounced
and scheduled inspections
• A corrective action plan that denotes the consequences of noncompliance

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 53 –

This Page Left Blank Intentionally

– 54 –

A Performance Audit of Utah’s Jail Contracting Program

Agency Response

Office of the Utah Legislative Auditor General

– 55 –

Department of Corrections
THOMAS E. PATTERSON
Executive Director

State of Utah

ROBYN WILLIAMS
Deputy Director

JON M. HUNTSMAN, JR.
Govemol'
Governor

MIKE HADDON

Deputy Director

GARY R.
R, HERBERT
Lieutenant Governor

August 14, 2008

John M. Schaff, CIA
Auditor General
W315 State Capitol Complex,
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Dear Mr. Schaff:
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your draft report, "A Performance Audit of Utah's Jail
Contracting Program." We express our sincere appreciation for your thorough examination and
discussion of jail-contracting issues needing our attention. Your staff have been most helpful in
discussing each of their findings with us, and we commend them for their professionalism.
As you are aware, we are already under way in correcting the problems your audit identified. The
Department's jail contracting program has not been managed as well as it should have been over the
past decade and a half. With the help of your audit and the cooperation of our county partners,
pmtners, we
believe we will reach a new level of performance and accountability that will serve the best interests of
Utah's citizens.
Below is our response to each of your recommendations.

CHAPTER 3 RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that UDC
UDe choose competent measurable standards, and then require
the jails in the jail contract to tie their policies andprocedures to the standard

UDC RESPONSE

UDC agrees there must be measurable jail contract standards. UDC is developing mInimum
measurable standards that contracting county jails must meet. We anticipate having these standards
finalized by October 2008. The Department's contract with each jail will require that these standards
be tied to the jail's policies and procedures.

14717 South Minuteman Drive, Draper, UT 84020· telephone (801) 545-5513· facsimile (801) 545·5726
545-5726

We recommend UDC devise a grading/scoring system and use the system to better
communicate and correct jail contract noncompliance.

UDC RESPONSE
UDC agrees there is a need to implement a grading/scoring system for jail contract compliance. UDC
is developing a system for cOl1111lunicating compliance issues with jails, based on measurable
standards that are concurrently under development. Together with the standards, this grading/scoring
system will provide each jail with adequate information and appropriate time frames for correcting
compliance problems. We expect the completion of this grading/scoring system within 3 months after
minimum contract standards are completed.

We recommend that UDC revise the contract to include such provisions as discussed in
Figure 3.1, which are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Medical emergencies
Access to jail
Access to jail standards/policies and procedures
Disciplinary action
Grievance records
Work program
Action plan

UDC RESPONSE
UDC agrees with the Audit recol1111lendation to revise county jail contracts. The Department also
intends to include contract provisions containing other key education and treatment requirements that
will benefit State inmates. It is anticipated the new contract will be completed before the majority of
the county contracts expire in 2009.

CHAPTER 4 RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that UDC assign contract monitors the responsibility of continuously
monitoringjail contracts. These monitors should have independence from IPP.

UDC RESPONSE
We agree with the Audit recol1111lendation to employ independent contract monitors. Four independent
contract monitor positions have been established under the Law Enforcement Bureau, which reports
directly to the Department's Executive Director. Recruitment for these positions is awaiting resolution
of retirement issues with URS.

We recommend that IPP develop and implement inmate-screening policies for sending
inmates to jails.

14717 South Minuteman Drive, Draper, vr 84020' telephone (801) 545·5513 • facsimile (801) 545·5726

UDC RESPONSE
UDC agrees with the Audit recommendation for inmate screening policies. Policies that set specific
criteria for inmate housing in county jails have been revised and are effective as of 7/1 0/08.

We recommend that UDC better track programming outcomes for inmates in jails.

UDC RESPONSE
UDC agrees there is a need to better track programming outcomes for State inmates in county jails. A
program outcome scorecard for these inmates was formalized and implemented in April 2008. The
monitoring of this scorecard is ongoing.

We recommend that IPP implement and track performance measures.

UDC RESPONSE
UDC agrees with the need to track performance measures as recommended by the Audit. IPP's
scorecard will track programming, contract monitoring, and inmate referral statistics.

We recommend that UDC develop an extra capacity plan for when state bed
availability is below operational capacity needs.

UDC RESPONSE
UDC agrees with the Audit recommendation for a plan to utilize extra capacity in state beds. A new
policy that implements this concept has been written and is pending final approvaL.
approval.
CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

jail contracts,
We recommend UDC develop a coordinated enforcement program/or
program for its
itsjail
which includes:
A. A system to document contract noncompliance
B. A specific enforcement plan, which includes both unannounced and scheduled
inspections
C. A corrective action plan that denotes the consequences o/noncompliance
ofnoncompliance

UDC RESPONSE
UDC agrees with the Audit recommendation for a coordinated jail contract enforcement program.
Contract monitors who are independent from IPP will systematically document contract compliance
issues. These monitors will provide written reports to both the jails and to IPP so an appropriate
document trail is maintained. IPP captains and administrators have been conducting after-hour,
unannounced and scheduled inspections since January 2008, and will continue to do so. The findings

84020' telephone (801) 545-5513· facsimile (801) 545-5726
14717 South Minuteman Drive, Draper, UT 84020·

from these inspections are documented in individual files related to each jail. As appropriate, a jail's
progress in taking corrective actions on compliance issues will be noted in these files. IPP
administration conducts routine follow-up reviews as problems are noted in these inspection activities,
these reviews are documented in the individual jail files.
and the results of
ofthese
UDC agrees with the need for corrective action plans. UDC will develop and implement a process for
documenting and tracking corrective actions taken by jails when contract compliance issues arise. This
process will employ consequences appropriate to the facts and circumstances of the compliance issue,
and applicable to the terms of the contract. The Department expects to complete the development and
implementation of this process prior to the majority of contracts expiring in early 2009.
Sincerely,

14717 South Minuteman Drive, Draper, ur 84020· telephone (801) 545-5513' facsimile (801) 545-5726