A STUDY AND REPORT CONCERNING THE USE
OF TASERS AND OTHER LESS LETHAL MEANS OF
FORCE BY VERMONT LAW ENFORCEMENT

APRIL 7, 2007

WILLIAM H. SORRELL
JOHN TREADWELL
THOMAS HOWELL
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
109 STATE STREET
MONTPELIER, VT 05609
WWW.ATG.STATE.VT.US

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction

2

Summary Findings

3

Recommendations

4

Process of Study

6

Less Lethal Means of Force

7

Tasers and Vermont Law Enforcement

17

Brattleboro Protest Incident

30

Brattleboro Retreat Incident

40

Conclusion

42

1

INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years there has been much public
focus both within and outside Vermont on law enforcement
use of deadly force. Similarly, as technology has evolved
and law enforcement agencies have made progress adding
less lethal means of force alternatives to the options open to
police officers in the effective performance of their duties,
public concern about the appropriate use of these
technologies, particularly Electronic Control Devices (ECDs),
has been on the rise. Since the ECDs industry leader for law
enforcement nationally and in Vermont is Taser
International, in this report we use the term “taser” when
we refer to any ECD.
The Attorney General’s Office has been asked to look into
two particular taser incidents that occurred in Brattleboro,
Vermont during the summer of 2007. In one case, two
individuals protesting a contemplated commercial
development were tased when they refused police orders
that they leave their protest site. In the other case, police
responded to a call for assistance at the Brattleboro Retreat,
a residential treatment facility for individuals experiencing
mental health, addiction and/or other issues. A teenaged
boy in state custody was tased after he had barricaded
himself in his room and was damaging property.
In the first incident, then Brattleboro Police Chief John
Martin asked the Attorney General’s Office to review the
appropriateness of the tasing of the protestors. In the
second incident, Governor Douglas, by letter of August 2,
2007, asked the Attorney General to study the
appropriateness of the tasing of the youth in state custody.
Rather than look only at the two Brattleboro incidents, we
decided to look generally at the use of less lethal means of
force by Vermont law enforcement agencies and more
specifically at police use of tasers, with particular focus on
2

the two situations confronted by the Brattleboro police. The
results of the study are set forth in this report.
SUMMARY FINDINGS
1.
Less lethal means of force are and can be effective and
efficient weapons available to Vermont law enforcement
personnel in a use of force continuum. When used
appropriately, they can save lives and greatly reduce injuries
to law enforcement and rescue personnel, the general public
and to individuals who are the subject of police
interventions.
2.
Like all weapons, less lethal means of force, including
tasers, OC (pepper spray), beanbags and batons, are
subject to abuse and misuse.
3.
Tasers are Electronic Control Devices (ECDs), also
called Conductive Energy Weapons (CEWs), which override
the body’s central nervous system by means of a stream of
50,000 volts of electrical current.
4.
More than 7,000 police agencies in the US, including
approximately 28 in Vermont, provide tasers to their
personnel.
5.
The hierarchy of the Brattleboro Police Department
failed to provide adequate supervision and direction to the
officers assigned on July 24, 2007 to handle a peaceful
protest at the site of a contemplated commercial
development.
6.
On July 24, 2007, the Brattleboro Police Department
should have given greater consideration to options involving
the disassembly of a barrel mechanism used by two
protestors at a peaceful protest.

3

7.
On July 24, 2007, the Brattleboro Police Department, in
apparent violation of its then-existing Use of Force Policy,
erred in repeatedly tasing two protestors engaged in a
peaceful sit-in.
8.
On or about February 8, 2008, the Brattleboro Police
Department Use of Force Policy was amended to make it
clear that tasers should not be used against subjects
displaying only passive resistance.
9.
The Brattleboro Police Department has been negligent
in not accurately recording and maintaining data detailing
the dates and durations of its taser deployments.
10. Considering the evidence made available, on July 3,
2007, it was appropriate for the Brattleboro Police to use a
taser to promptly halt the destructive and threatening
behavior of an out-of-control youth at the Brattleboro
Retreat. However, without additional evidence to establish
otherwise, the duration of the tasing of the youth was
unnecessary and inappropriate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
Law enforcement in Vermont, before making tasers
available to departmental personnel, should engage in a
process to obtain community or non-law enforcement
feedback on appropriate and inappropriate uses of tasers.
2.
Vermont law enforcement agencies are advised to have
written protocols governing the use of lethal and less lethal
means of force, reporting obligations when force is used in
the line of duty and mechanisms in place to review the
appropriateness of the use or uses of force deployed in
specific situations.
3.
For departments with the technology, the use of force
policy should contain specific provisions relating to tasers.
4

Consideration should be given to addressing the
appropriateness of taser deployments in the “drive stun” and
“probes” modes, against particular classes of individuals
and/or in particular situations and when multiple tasings or
extended continuous tasings of a subject are appropriate.
4.
Consideration should be given to inclusion in the
written protocols as to when medical personnel will be used
to remove probes or to otherwise treat or examine a person
who has been tased.
5.
Tasers should not be used against passively resistant
individuals who pose no danger to themselves or others.
6.
As is the case with any lethal or less lethal means of
force, personnel should be appropriately trained by
competent instructors in the use of the taser. Consideration
should be given to a requirement that an officer be
subjected to being tased or at least afforded the opportunity
to be tased before being authorized to carry a taser in the
line of duty.
7.
There should be a written record of any taser
deployment with such record reviewed by a supervisor to
determine the appropriateness of the deployment.
Consideration should be given to a requirement of such
recording obligation when a taser is removed from its
holster, even if not fired. The written records should be
retained for an appropriate length of time.
8.
Tasers should be calibrated and periodically checked to
assure accurate recording of the date, time, number and
duration of any unit deployments.
9.
Information stored in a taser’s data port should be
downloaded periodically, retained and compared for
accuracy to written deployment reports.

5

10. There should be periodic reviews of the departmental
use of force policy after consideration of experiences in the
field, to determine whether amendments to the policy should
be made.
PROCESS OF STUDY AND INVESTIGATION
In preparation for the completion of this report, the Office of
the Attorney General communicated with all Vermont state
and municipal law enforcement agencies soliciting
information on what less lethal means of force are used by
each agency, what, if any, written protocols exist concerning
the use of these tools and written reports or information
concerning actual experiences with tasers, pepper spray,
etc. during the period from August 1, 2006 through July 31,
2007. We experienced a 100% response to our survey
requests.
We obtained police and other reports concerning the two
Brattleboro taser incidents that prompted this review, and
traveled to Brattleboro and St. Johnsbury to interview many
of those familiar with the two incidents. Our interviews
included the two protestors, staff at the Brattleboro Retreat
and several Brattleboro police officers. We observed a
lengthy demonstration of the taser, OC and beanbags at
Burlington Police Department HQ and interviewed other law
enforcement personnel.
We collected and reviewed voluminous written reports
concerning tasers and other less lethal means of force
technology, including the results of national and
international studies as well as reports by the police
departments of Seattle, Phoenix and Oakland, among
others. It should be noted that we also obtained and
reviewed reports critical of tasers, e.g. Amnesty
International’s “Excessive and lethal force? Amnesty
International’s concerns about deaths and ill-treatment
involving police use of tasers” and the American Civil
6

Liberties Union of Northern California’s “Stun Gun Fallacy:
How the Lack of Taser Regulation Endangers Lives.”
We did not approach this task from the perspective of public
health experts with the intention of making findings as to
the health risks of tasers when deployed generally, used on
certain types of subjects or when a person has been
subjected to numerous tasings within a relatively brief
period of time. We leave medical questions to medical
experts. We are mindful, however, that at least hundreds of
Vermonters have been tased and evidence of any resulting
serious bodily injury has not been brought to our attention.
We are grateful to all those who cooperated with us in
obtaining the information we reviewed during this endeavor
and the interviews we conducted with individuals with
knowledge of particular tasing incidents and/or more general
information about tasers and their use both within and
outside Vermont. We particularly wish to express our
gratitude to Burlington Police Department Deputy Chief
Walter Decker, to former Burlington Chief, now
Commissioner of Public Safety, Thomas Tremblay and to
UVM Police Services Deputy Chief Lianne Tuomey.
LESS LETHAL MEANS OF FORCE
Subjects interacting with the police are typically described as
fitting into one of the following categories:
Co-operative – appropriately responsive to the officer’s
presence, direction and control.
Resistant (Passive) – the subject refuses, with little or
no physical activity, to appropriately respond to the
officer.
Resistant (Active) – the subject uses non-assaultive
physical activity to resist, e.g. walking or running away.
7

Assaultive – by actions or attempts, exerts force
against another or presents an imminent threat to do
so, e.g. kicking, shoving and/or punching.
Grievous Bodily Harm or Death – by the subject’s
actions, there is a reasonable fear that he/she will
imminently cause or attempt to cause death or serious
bodily injury to self or another, e.g. through the use of
a weapon.
In the performance of lawful duties, police are authorized
and expected to obtain compliance or cooperation from
those whose behaviors fit into the last four categories. In
certain situations, they do so through the use of force,
ranging from verbal commands, hand-to-hand physical
force, so-called intermediate weapons and in the most
serious cases by using lethal force, most typically through
the use of deadly weapons.
Trying to describe the “typical” scenario when police resort
to use of force is fraught with peril. Indeed, virtually every
such situation is unique, representing an interplay of factors
including the individual profiles of all persons involved in the
event, the psychological and physical functioning of each,
individual subjective and objective perceptions, the physical
setting and other factors too numerous to describe in this
report.
At the same time, however, national studies and anecdotal
reports from Vermont law enforcement support the
conclusions that police uses of force are more likely during
interactions with persons who are under the influence of
drugs or alcohol and on some occasions when dealing with
subjects manifesting mental health issues. Subjects against
whom force is used can be combative or assaultive,
engaging in active, physical resistance to police efforts to

8

control the situation and can intend to inflict harm on
themselves or others.
When scrutinizing a police use of force, the main question is
whether the use of force was objectively reasonable in that
particular time and place. Factors considered in making a
determination on reasonableness focus primarily on: 1. the
seriousness of the underlying behavior for which the police
are interacting with the subject; 2. whether the suspect
posed an imminent threat to the officer or another person;
and 3. whether the subject was actively resisting or
attempting to evade arrest.
Studies have shown that physical injuries to officers occur in
approximately 10% of general use of force situations, most
often when hand-to-hand physical force is used. These
same officer injury rates climb to 30-40% when using force
against mentally ill and impaired subjects. In general,
during use of force situations, approximately 38% of
subjects are reported injured, most typically having suffered
bruises or abrasions.
Most police departments have a use of force policy
describing the various options available to officers when use
of force is appropriate and leaving it to the officers involved,
again, held to an objective reasonableness test, to
determine the appropriate use of force in a given situation.
Typical police use of force protocols do not require the use of
option A before employing option B, etc.
What follows below is not an exhaustive list of all less lethal
or intermediate means of force but does encompass the vast
majority of such means currently available to and used by
various Vermont law enforcement personnel. We do not
focus on the use of the older generation stun gun.
I.

Baton

9

The baton or nightstick is carried by or is at least available
to nearly all Vermont uniformed law enforcement personnel.
When used to control a subject, the officer typically strikes
the subject in the elbows, knees and/or abdomen. Batons
are useful only in close quarter contact situations. When
displayed, like other less lethal means of force, they can be
effective in causing some subjects to cease disruptive
behavior. When used in a physical confrontation, however,
batons typically result in bruising and/or other potentially
disabling injuries to the subject of the blows. Like other
conventional impact weapons, police studies have shown
that batons have a “high potential for escalation of subject
resistance if they were not immediately effective.”
II.

Oleoresin Capsicum (OC or Pepper Spray)

OC is a chemical mixture delivered via a spray or, in the
case of a “pepper ball”, in a powdered form delivered via
round gel-like projectiles fired by a weapon similar to those
used in paintballing. The instrument or launcher used to
discharge pepper balls has the advantage of being able to be
loaded with up to 150 projectiles and thus can be used when
confronting a large number of disruptive subjects. A pepper
ball can be used relatively accurately in that a particular
subject may be targeted from a distance of ten or more feet.
A subject struck by a pepper ball suffers pain and potential
bruising associated with being hit by the projectile and then
is impacted by the OC powder released when the capsule
breaks open.
As a spray, OC can be delivered at relatively close range to a
single or small number of targets from a small canister
carried by an officer or directed at an unruly crowd at a
distance of up to approximately twenty feet from a fogger,
i.e. a large canister and hose configuration.
OC’s active ingredients are those found in hot peppers.
They inflame the mucous membranes in the eyes and
10

breathing passages and incapacitate by causing severe pain
and difficulty seeing and breathing. Some subjects vomit
after inhaling OC.
OC’s advantages include effectiveness in rendering many
unruly subjects unable to continue their behaviors and an
ability to be simultaneously deployed from a safe distance
against numerous subjects. Police departments adding OC
to their use of force options have found a reduced need for
use of batons. Among its disadvantages is that, particularly
when used in confined spaces, OC can incapacitate nearby
law enforcement and/or rescue personnel and innocent
bystanders. It can be ineffective and inaccurate in windy
conditions. There is anecdotal evidence that its use can
escalate the behaviors of some subjects. Further, the pain,
irritation and disabling effects of OC can persist for hours
after first contact. There are reported deaths attributable to
OC, particularly when the subject struck by pepper spray
suffers from asthma or a similar breathing disability. OC is
less effective in cold weather and it reportedly has little or
no effect on approximately 15% of the population.
III. Beanbags
Beanbags are a specialty impact munition, intended to
deliver a severe concussive blow to a subject. They offer
the advantage of being able to be deployed from distances
that enhance the safety perimeter of the police, although the
concussive impact is reduced the further the distance to the
target. The projectile, delivered in what appears to be a
typical shotgun shell, is a cloth bag containing a number of
small lead BBs. It is fired from a shotgun and incapacitates
primarily from the pain suffered when being struck. Display
of the shotgun can cause some subjects to halt their
combative and/or unruly behaviors.
In a study conducted by the Orange County (FL) Sheriff’s
Office (OCSO), approximately 80% of subjects hit with a
11

beanbag suffered some injury, most typically severe bruising
or abrasions. Some subjects have suffered permanently
disabling injuries depending on where hit and the distance
from which the beanbag has been fired. The OCSO study
reported 8 deaths in 373 deployments.
IV. Tasers
“The M26 taser is intended to provide officers
with a force option to help in overcoming a
subject’s combative intent, physical resistance,
and/or assaultive behavior; in disabling or
subduing persons bent on harming themselves or
others; or in providing self-defense. As with all
applications of force, officers using less lethal
options are expected to use necessary and
reasonable force to effect a lawful purpose.
‘Necessary and reasonable’ uses are defined by
the totality of the circumstances that confront
officers.”
Seattle Police Department Special Report 2002
(The more modern taser model is the X26.)
A taser is a handheld Conductive Energy Weapon (CEW) that
causes electromuscular disruption (EMD). The most popular
CEWs are manufactured by Taser International. In this
report, “taser” is used to describe all CEWs. The use of
tasers by law enforcement is steadily increasing. There are
now more than 7,000 police departments that include this
weapon among the less lethal means of force available to
their personnel. Currently there are approximately 28
Vermont law enforcement organizations, including several of
the largest municipal departments, using tasers, with more
actively considering employing taser technology.
A taser is typically used to deliver 50,000 volts of electricity
at low amperage for five seconds. The voltage causes
12

severe muscular contraction and the individual is rendered
essentially unable to voluntarily control his/her behaviors
while the current flows.
When discharged, a taser stores downloadable data,
including the date and time of discharge and the number of
cycles employed. In the “probes mode”, small pieces of
confetti-like paper are discharged. These “AFIDS” contain
information unique to the cartridge used in the deployment
and can be collected at the scene.
In the probes mode, two sharply pointed probes are fired
from a cartridge attached to the end of the barrel of the
taser. The probes are propelled by a nitrogen gas and travel
at approximately 200 feet per second. They remain
connected to the cartridge by thin copper wires. The most
common wire lengths carried in Vermont are 21 feet or 25
feet. To be effective, the probes must puncture the skin or
be in close proximity to the skin. At a distance of 10 feet,
the probes will typically spread approximately 20 inches.
The length of charge is a standard five seconds in tasers
used for law enforcement purposes. This charge can be
abbreviated by turning off the taser. It can be extended if
the deploying officer continues to depress the trigger. As
long as the probes remain in place, a second or subsequent
charge cycle can be inflicted.
In “drive stun mode”, which requires direct contact between
the taser and the subject, the taser does not typically
incapacitate the subject by muscular contraction but is a
pain compliance implement. In this mode, the taser
discharges current for as long as the person in control of the
weapon depresses the trigger and remains in contact with
the subject. It should be noted that there have been reports
on the part of police volunteering to be tased not only of a
burning sensation when being tased in the stun mode but of
significant skin redness at the contact site(s) which lasted
approximately a week after the tasing.
13

There are tasers available for private sale on the market.
These can deliver a ten second and a thirty second charge
cycle. The taser models used by law enforcement sell for
approximately $900 per unit. There are now models on the
market that include a videocamera (presently used by UVM
police) and cost approximately $1250 per unit. The models
available for private use cost approximately $300 apiece.
Except in cases in which serious injuries are suffered – most
often when the subject is injured during a fall while
experiencing the muscle contraction or when a probe strikes
a particularly vulnerable location, e.g. the eye, the
significant pain or discomfort experienced during the tasing
cycle ends abruptly once the current flow has ceased. The
probes are relatively easily removed, typically without the
need for intervention by medical personnel. Other than a
possible spotting of blood as might be experienced after
having a flu shot, there are seldom injuries suffered of even
a short-term duration.
To be sure, nationwide there have been approximately 280
deaths of subjects following tasing incidents. For the vast
majority, if not all of these deaths, there have been
indications that some other cause, e.g. heart disease, acute
cocaine or other drug intoxication, excited delirium
syndrome, positional asphyxiation et al., rather than the
taser, has been the primary cause of death. Interactions
with police, particularly if involving a physical struggle,
handcuffing and/or other restraint, etc. can be extremely
stressful. Since in many cases this stress is exacerbated by
one or more of the conditions mentioned above, there are
medical experts of the opinion that a number of the subject
deaths would likely have occurred even if no tasing had
taken place. There are reports on in-custody deaths in
Canada and the United States occurring in psychiatric
hospitals and geriatric care facilities when restraints have
been applied but no tasings have taken place.
14

Depending on the probes’ locations and due to the intense
muscular contraction during a tasing cycle, normal
respiratory patterns can be significantly altered. There have
been studies on pigs that have been subjected to multiple
tasings over a brief period of time (three minutes of five
seconds on, five seconds off cycling) that have shown
dramatic physiological effects on the animals. Clearly, more
study is called for before health concerns generally and in
the cases of particular classes of individuals can be known
with certainty. Thus, multiple tasings of an individual over a
brief period of time should be avoided if reasonably possible.
We are certainly not equipped to definitively rule on the
conflicting medical opinions concerning the dangers inherent
in taser use. We are mindful of Amnesty International’s call
for a suspension of taser use until more study of their effects
on subjects has been conducted. At the same time, we are
mindful of studies like that presented during the fall of 2007
to the American College of Emergency Physicians’ Research
Forum in Seattle. Lead study investigator Dr. William
Bozeman, an emergency medicine specialist at Wake Forest
University, reported that in his analysis of 597 tasing
incidents, serious injuries were suffered approximately 0.3%
of the time. This is roughly consistent with the results
provided to us anecdotally and through written reports from
Vermont law enforcement.
When the Bozeman study was released, Dr. Corey Slovis,
professor and chair of emergency medicine at Vanderbilt
University, was quoted as saying: “Tasers save lives, but
tasers are not perfectly safe. A taser should not be used
unless force is absolutely necessary…” Similarly, Dr.
Bozeman was quoted as follows: “These are not 100 percent
safe. These are weapons and must be treated as such.”
Law enforcement in Vermont should continue to be mindful
of these realities.

15

Given Vermont’s relatively small number of law enforcement
personnel and the relatively recent deployment of tasers by
law enforcement in the state, some of our observations and
conclusions concerning taser use must come from reports by
large out of state police agencies that have used tasers for a
number of years. These include the Columbus, Ohio,
Phoenix and Seattle police departments.
Phoenix police, the first major city police department in the
country to fully deploy tasers to patrol officers, reported
employing tasers 354 times during 2003, an increase of
139% over its 2002 usage numbers. At the same time, its
officer-involved shootings fell 54% and its fatal shootings fell
31%.
In a Columbus police report on six months of taser use
during 2005, there was a reported nearly 24% drop in
citizen complaints about the police, an over 25% reduction
in excessive force complaints, injuries to officers from
physical confrontations declined over 23% and injuries to
subjects involved in physical confrontations with police
declined over 24%. Further, the report described twelve
documented incidents when subjects attempting suicide
were tased and taken into custody and fourteen incidents
when tasers were deployed but deadly force was justified.
A particular area of concern in the use of tasers is the
deployment against a subject who is not actively resisting
police orders. Simply because a taser does not typically
result in serious injury to a subject, typical use of force
policies do not allow for or encourage the use of a taser
when it would be inappropriate to use baton strikes, OC or
bean bags against a subject. Following a reported review of
model policies and studies conducted in the US and Canada,
the Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute has
suggested that use of force policies prohibit the use of tasers
against passively resistant subjects.

16

TASERS AND VERMONT LAW ENFORCEMENT
Of the approximately 72 state and local law enforcement
agencies in Vermont, approximately 28 have a total of
approximately 220 individual taser units available for use by
their personnel.
As of the completion of the surveys prepared in conjunction
with this study, of those agencies owning taser units,
availability ranges from one unit for the 5 members of the
Ludlow Police Department to 30 units for the 39 law
enforcement personnel of the South Burlington Police
Department and 44 units owned by the Burlington Police
Department.
THE BURLINGTON EXPERIENCE
“Use of Electronic Control Device – The ECD
is designed as a tool to respond to threat levels,
which place the officer or other individuals in the
threat of physical harm due to the actions and
behaviors of a suspect. The suspect must be
actively aggressive and presenting a risk of
injury to the officer(s), him/herself or others
…ECDs are not to be used in a punitive or
coercive manner, and shall not be used to…
gain compliance from passively resistant subjects.”
Burlington Police Department Use of Force Policy
(Emphasis added.)
The Burlington Police Department (BPD) is the largest
municipal police force in the state. Deputy Chief Walter
Decker began considering the feasibility of using the taser
while enrolled at the Police Executive Research Forum’s
Senior Management Institute during 2004. Decker learned
that the Cincinnati Police Department, under federal court
order after numerous allegations of police brutality and civil
17

rights violations, was issued tasers by the federal
government.
BPD first provided information on tasers to and obtained
training for its firearms instructor, its use of force instructor
and one of its corporals. All responded positively to the
possibility of adopting the taser as a less lethal means of
force option for the department.
To assist the lay Burlington Police Commission in
determining the appropriateness of taser use by the
department, a special committee was formed to look in more
depth at taser-related issues. There was a medical
component and a community input component to the
committee’s efforts. Interested parties were invited to
presentations concerning the weapon, including
demonstrations of taser deployments.
In looking at adopting a written policy for use of the taser,
BPD considered a model policy from the International
Association of Chiefs of Police and policies from a number of
other police departments from around the country. These
were reviewed by the committee and there was much
discussion about the appropriate thresholds for use of the
taser, including consideration of special populations, e.g. the
very young, the elderly and pregnant women, and particular
situations, e.g. school settings, when a subject is in control
of an automobile, the physical location of a subject, etc.
Ultimately, after an approximately year long process, the
Police Commission adopted a written policy concerning taser
use. The policy remains subject to periodic reevaluation and
change.
BPD adopted a standard protocol that includes a reporting
obligation when a taser is even brandished in the
performance of duty. Departmental experience is that
brandishing incidents outnumber actual deployment by
approximately 3 to 1. After deployment, BPD officers pose
18

standard questions to subjects, including whether the
individual is on any drugs, has a pacemaker or other similar
medical device, etc. Initially, medical or rescue personnel
were always engaged to remove probes and/or to examine
subjects who had been tased. BPD received medical advice
that this was not necessary. Its written protocols currently
mandate medical evaluation of a subject who has been tased
if the subject “has exhibited signs of extreme uncontrolled
agitation or hyperactivity prior to the ECD exposure or does
not appear to recover properly after being energized.”
Medical personnel may be engaged depending on location of
the probes, e.g. in the groin area, or on the answers to
certain standard questions.
There are 66 uniformed officers at BPD. A phased
deployment of the taser was begun in May, 2006. The
department now owns approximately 44 tasers, of which
approximately 39 are in active use. Training is provided by
three in-house instructors for a minimum of six hours.
Deputy Chief Decker reports that the tasers have proven
effective over 80% of the times they have been deployed.
Their use has dramatically reduced and all but eliminated
workers’ compensation claims by officers due to injuries
sustained in combative situations. There has been only one
complaint of excessive force lodged by a subject who has
been tased and in that case, the allegation of multiple
tasings was disproved by the taser unit deployment history
recording mechanism. It is standard practice for the units’
use history data to be downloaded regularly in order to
confirm the accuracy and reliability of the use of force
reporting procedures.
Given factors including the size of Burlington, its busy
downtown area with numerous bars and a large population
of college students and residents in their 20s and the fact
that BPD has more tasers than any other law enforcement
agency in the state, tasers have been brandished and
19

deployed more times in Burlington than anywhere else in the
state. What follows below are descriptions from officers’
reports of a few Burlington tasing incidents.
On January 11, 2007, at approximately 4:45 PM, Burlington
police officers were dispatched to a location in response to a
complaint of a stolen motor vehicle. They were advised that
the subject was outside the vehicle. On arrival, they located
the vehicle in question with an open rear door and a man
doing something in the back seat. The man stood
approximately 6’4” tall and weighed approximately 325
pounds. He was apparently startled by the police arrival.
Wanting to see his hands to make sure he wasn’t armed, the
police ordered him to show them his hands and to approach
them. He shouted “No” and backed away from the police.
He began to reach for his waistband and then started to run
up the street with the police in pursuit yelling for him to
stop. He ran into a narrow alley and appeared to be
reaching for his pockets. A Burlington officer fired his taser,
causing the subject to fall to the ground. He rolled onto his
back despite police orders for him to get onto his stomach.
When he reportedly reached quickly for his pants, an officer
drew his firearm and threatened the subject. Shortly
thereafter he allowed himself to be handcuffed.
While searching him incident to the arrest, the police found
multiple crack stems, two packets of heroin and a
Leatherman tool in his pocket.
On May 28, 2007, just before 1 AM, Burlington police were
alerted that a suicidal male had walked away from Fletcher
Allen Health Care. Shortly thereafter the man in question
was located wearing hospital clothing on upper Main Street
near the UVM campus. When a second officer arrived on the
scene, the man took off running with the police in pursuit.
After a brief chase he stopped but refused the police order
to get on the ground. He stated: “I have a gun” and said
something to the effect that the police should go ahead and
20

shoot him. He continued to refuse to get on the ground
after being advised that he would be tased. He was tased
and promptly fell to the ground but began to get up
immediately after the flow of current stopped. He was tased
for another cycle. This time he remained on the ground,
was handcuffed and soon thereafter returned to the hospital.
While searching him, the police found no weapon, only a cell
phone.
On August 10, 2007, just before 1:30 AM, Burlington police
were dispatched to ACT 1, an alcohol treatment facility, to
respond to a complaint of an intoxicated male who was
causing a disturbance. Upon arrival, the responding officer
was advised that the male had admitted himself earlier for
detox but that he was being disruptive and needed to be
sent to another facility. The officer confronted the subject in
a hallway near an emergency exit. He swore at the officer,
shouting that he wasn’t going anywhere. He then went out
the exit and held the other side of the door preventing the
officer from following. Assistance was requested but the
subject let go of the door and began to run through some
bushes into an adjacent driveway. He was ordered to stop
and place his hands behind his back. Instead, he grabbed a
ladder and began swinging it at the officer. The officer had
unholstered his taser. He fired it and the subject was
immediately incapacitated. A second officer arrived on the
scene and handcuffed the subject, who was then taken to a
secure detox facility after it was determined that he was the
subject of an outstanding arrest warrant.
And in one of numerous incidents in and around Burlington
bars, on August 26, 2007, shortly after midnight, police on
downtown patrol were approached by an employee of a
Church Street bar who requested their assistance. In the
front of the bar they found several bar employees wrestling
with an individual on the ground. A responding officer
ordered the combative male subject to turn onto his
stomach. The subject refused and attempted to get up.
21

Two Burlington officers grabbed his arms to obtain his
compliance but he told them he wouldn’t comply. Instead,
he grabbed onto a nearby table, thus preventing the officers
from getting him onto his stomach. He was threatened with
being tased and told the officers to go ahead and do so. He
was tased and became briefly compliant but then continued
his resistance. Ultimately the table he was grasping was
flipped over, thereby releasing his grip and he was
handcuffed.
He remained combative while being brought to a cruiser for
transport and once in the cruiser he continued yelling
threats at the police and tried to kick out the rear window.
He stopped the kicking only after being threatened with
being pepper sprayed. He continued his verbal threats and
lack of cooperation with the police, ultimately being lodged
at the correctional center for several offenses.
Finally, on Christmas Eve afternoon of 2007, BPD officers
were dispatched to an apartment on College Street in
response to a complaint that an identified male subject was
threatening another male with a knife. Upon arrival, the
police recognized the allegedly armed individual from a prior
history of interactions. Although they could see the subject
seated at a table in the kitchen, he ignored police knocks on
the door.
The police gained entry and observed the subject pick up a
bottle of tequila. He initially ignored police orders to put the
bottle down, first taking a drink. It appeared to the police
that the subject was intoxicated. He grabbed a steak knife
from his lap and pointed the knife at one of the officers,
saying: “You don’t want a piece of this.” The officer had his
taser unholstered and ordered the subject to put down the
knife or he’d be tased. The subject complied, throwing the
knife on the table. He was ordered to stand and place his
hands behind his back. He did so but asked the officer if he
wanted to fight and on the way to the correctional facility
22

yelled that he would kill the officer. He was lodged and
charged with assault on a law enforcement officer.
As reflected in the excerpt from the BPD Use of Force Policy
quoted at the beginning of this section, BPD would not have
used a taser in the handling of the peaceful protest situation
confronted by Brattleboro police on July 24, 2007. At the
same time, Deputy Chief Decker is in agreement with the
Brattleboro officer who opined that the taser is perhaps the
best advancement for law enforcement that he has seen in
the last twenty years.
OTHER VERMONT EXPERIENCES
RUTLAND
One night in July 15, 2007, at approximately 10 PM, Rutland
police were dispatched to a location to deal with a reported
suicidal 14-year-old male with a knife who was threatening
to harm himself. Upon arrival at the scene, the responding
officer observed two adult males struggling with a subject
down on the sidewalk. The subject was attempting to free
himself from two adult males, ultimately identified as the
juvenile’s father and stepfather. The subject was swearing
at the men as well as his mother, who was on a nearby
porch.
The officer inquired of the juvenile where the knife was
located. Eventually he was told that it was in a pocket. The
officer told the subject that if he didn’t stop fighting, he
would be tased. The juvenile said he would stop fighting.
The officer asked the adult males to let the juvenile up. The
juvenile followed a command to stand up but when he was
told that he’d be handcuffed until the situation had stabilized
and any weapons had been secured, he became resistant,
pulled away from the officer and reached towards his
pocket. The officer wrestled the subject to the ground,
unholstered his taser and ordered the juvenile to put his
23

hands behind his back. The juvenile ignored the order and
began getting back up.
In probes mode, the officer fired his taser, striking the
subject in the left rib cage area. He was immediately
incapacitated. When the five seconds cycle was over, he
promptly obeyed an order to put his hands behind his back
and he was handcuffed. A knife was removed from his
pants pocket and the officer then removed the probes. The
juvenile, upset over a breakup with a girlfriend, admitted to
having consumed alcohol and taken some prescription
medication.
Since the juvenile had become calm, his mother offered to
let him remain with her after he promised there would be no
further problems. He was left in the care of his mother,
facing the possibility of future juvenile court proceedings.
SOUTH BURLINGTON
On September 10, 2007, South Burlington Police were
dispatched to Country Club Drive just before 2 AM, in
response to multiple complaints of a male “yelling and
smashing things”. They arrived on the scene and located an
apparently intoxicated 21-year-old male walking with a
bicycle. Although he contended that he had not been
drinking, he gave a sample of his breath, which produced a
reading of over .19%.
The officers informed the subject that he was going to be
placed into protective custody and that he was to place his
hands behind his back. When the officers grabbed his hands
to handcuff him, he began to actively resist, throwing an
elbow and almost striking one of the officers in the face. He
was wrestled to the ground, the officers delivering multiple
strikes to his body in order to gain compliance. These were
unsuccessful as the subject continued to kick and flail about.
One of the officers tased the subject in the stomach in drive
24

stun mode. This was not successful in causing him to stop
fighting, so the officer backed away and fired his taser in
probes mode, striking the subject in the chest and thigh.
He was then taken into custody but continued to be
combative and disorderly to the police and rescue personnel
who were called to evaluate his condition. He was
transported to the hospital where he continued to yell and
manifest mood swings, including paranoia. Ultimately, he
refused medical care. The police were of the view that the
man had ingested something other than alcohol. Just before
5 AM, the subject was discharged from the hospital and
detoxed, facing criminal charges of disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest.
SPRINGFIELD
On September 29, 2006, at approximately 12:30 AM,
Springfield police were attempting to arrest a man for
disorderly conduct after responding to an alleged domestic
assault. The individual refused to be handcuffed and
approached the police in a threatening posture. He was
pushed to the ground but then continued to resist being
handcuffed and attempted to get up. He grabbed one
officer’s wrist and held it underneath him. The officer freed
his wrist and then sprayed the subject with OC on the right
side of his face. The OC had no immediate effect so the
officer drew his taser, removed the probe cartridge and
pressed the taser into the man’s back, threatening to tase
him. Rather than being tased, the subject promptly placed
his hands behind his back, was handcuffed and taken into
custody.
In another Springfield incident, on May 26, 2006, at
approximately 7 PM, police received a complaint from a
person who wished to remain anonymous, reporting
concerns that a 17-year-old female who had been vomiting
outside a residence might have overdosed. The girl was
25

allegedly the girlfriend of an identified male subject. Upon
arrival at the location, the police were informed by the
boyfriend that his girlfriend had left a half hour earlier. But
another person present advised the police that the girlfriend
was in the bathroom.
The male subject denied this, saying that it was his mother
in the bathroom and that she was taking a shower. He took
a position in front of the bathroom door. An officer
attempted to open the bathroom door but the boyfriend
pushed it shut and braced himself against the door. The
officer grabbed the subject’s wrist to pull him away from the
door but the subject pulled his wrist away and took up a
fighting stance. Another officer attempted a neck pull down
on the boyfriend but he successfully avoided the attempt.
When it appeared that the male was going to throw a punch,
one officer hit him with his flashlight, using it as an impact
weapon. In the tight quarters the two officers and the male
subject fought. It was unclear to one officer whether he was
successfully hitting the male with the flashlight but any hits
were not stopping the fighting. The other officer then
unholstered his taser and fired probes into the boyfriend’s
torso. The deployment seemed to achieve muscular
disruption only intermittently. The subject was on the floor
and continuing to thrash about. One officer hit him with the
flashlight on his thigh.
The subject only complied with orders to put his hands
behind his back when he was threatened with being tased a
second time. He was handcuffed and the police saw blood
on the floor. He was found to have an approximate one-inch
cut above his left eye. It was unclear whether the cut was
caused by a flashlight blow or from broken glass that was on
the floor or from shelving or food items that were strewn
about. Rescue personnel were called and brought him to the
hospital for treatment. The 17-year-old girlfriend was
located in the bathroom and found to have a BAC of .13%.

26

UVM POLICE
At approximately midnight on September 2, 2006, UVM
police were dispatched to a residence hall in response to a
complaint that a nude male was assaulting a resident of the
dorm. They encountered a nude 19-year-old male exhibiting
signs of impairment by a drug or drugs. He had muscle
rigidity, was perspiring and his pupils were dilated. The
officers were in the hallway outside a room in which the
male was located. He was ordered to get down on the floor,
but instead of complying, he began to swing his fists at the
police. One officer had unholstered his taser and when
ordered by a superior officer, fired probes into the subject’s
abdomen.
He fell to the floor, was handcuffed behind his back and
subsequently transported to the hospital. Prior to going to
the hospital, he advised the police that he had consumed “a
lot” of “ecstasy and mushrooms”. The police learned that
before they were called, he had entered a dorm room
uninvited and fondled a female student. After discharge
from the hospital he was lodged at the Chittenden County
Correctional Center for multiple felony charges.
Vermont State Police
At present, the Vermont State Police, although the state’s
largest law enforcement organization, has only 18 tasers.
They are assigned to its Tactical Services Unit personnel.
Consequently, VSP has few taser deployments. A more
typical VSP use of force incident occurred in Lunenburg at
approximately 7:00 PM on November 8, 2006. Troopers
responded to a female’s 911 call reporting an argument with
a male subject. Upon arrival at the scene, they found a
heavily intoxicated male who admitted that he and his
girlfriend had been having a fight over financial and other
matters. One trooper got the male out of the residence
while the other trooper talked to the female.
27

The male told one trooper that he could stay at a relative’s
house for the night and that he did not wish to be arrested
again because he had been arrested in the past “for beating
up cops”. The trooper offered to drive him to the relative’s
house. Soon after, the male subject attempted to reenter
the residence, saying he wanted to get a beer. He was told
that he could not reenter the residence until the
conversation with the female complainant had been
completed. Eventually, for a second time, the male subject
began to walk away from the property. He was told that he
could not leave until the investigation had been completed.
The subject ignored the trooper’s statement but ultimately
did stop and was informed that he was going to be detoxed
for the evening. He was ordered to place his hands behind
his back because he was under arrest. The subject swore at
the trooper and refused to comply. He pulled away when
the trooper grabbed his arm.
Eventually the trooper took out his OC and sprayed him
directly in the face. The subject yelled: “you f----g sprayed
me.” He continued to resist the trooper’s efforts to control
him. When it appeared that he was about to throw a punch,
he was sprayed again to the right side of his face, including
his right eye. The subject proceeded to charge the trooper
and try to tackle him. The trooper eluded the charge and
then wrestled the subject into the side of a motor vehicle
and onto the ground. The subject, on all fours, continued to
fight, ignoring orders to put his hands behind his back. It
appeared to the trooper that the subject was trying to grab
something from the trooper’s belt. He became concerned
that the subject would grab his baton. The trooper punched
the subject with a closed fist in the face and then kneed
him.
Due to fatigue and/or the delayed impact of the OC, the
subject began to struggle less. The second trooper came
out of the residence and assisted in placing the subject in
28

handcuffs. The male had superficial cuts to his face and
hands and requested medical treatment. He was taken to
the hospital, treated and then taken for detox, ultimately
facing several criminal charges.
Although relatively few troopers are provided with tasers,
VSP does have a written taser deployment policy. In part, it
reads as follows:
“3.3 Tactical Considerations and Limitations – Do not use
the taser in any of the following situations:...
(2) Any known or obviously pregnant female...
(6) Should not be used as a tool of coercion or
punishment.
(7) Excessive use of the X26 Taser in subduing
a subject is forbidden.
Vermont State Police Rules & Regulations –
Operational Policies & Procedures
(Emphasis not added.)
In a VSP taser incident, during August, 2006, troopers were
dispatched at approximately 9:30 PM to a residence in
Rutland County. Prior to arrival, the troopers were advised
by dispatch that a male in his 20s was damaging his
mother’s residence. They were also advised that the male
had a history of mental health issues, was becoming
increasingly violent and was in the process of strangling his
dog. One of the troopers had had numerous non-violent
interactions with the subject prior to this date.
The troopers found that the front and back doors of the
residence had been kicked in. There was broken glass in the
back porch area. A scared woman answered the troopers’
knocks and reported that her son was having a violent
episode. The son was seen standing in the living room
swinging a large dog bone and striking the wall with it. He
was ordered to drop the bone. He did not do so but made
some growling noises and went into his bedroom. A trooper
29

unholstered his taser and advised the male that if he did not
drop the bone he would be tased. The male subject
proceeded to pound the floor the floor with the bone and
attempt to go under his bed and strike his dog with it. The
dog bit the subject’s hand and then exited the room.
The male subject stood, still holding the bone, and advanced
on the troopers. He was shot in the chest area with the
probes. He immediately dropped to the floor and was
handcuffed. He promptly became docile, was brought to a
standing position and the probes were removed. The
subject advised that he would no longer be a problem. His
mother thanked the troopers for their prompt and injury free
actions. Her son was transported to the hospital for an
emergency mental health evaluation.
As is readily apparent from these descriptions of tasing
incidents in Vermont, in the hands of a trained officer
making reasoned decisions on appropriate deployment, the
taser can be very efficient in allowing police to promptly
control a stressful and potentially dangerous situation. And
further, that compared to other uses of force, this prompt
taking of control can typically be realized without serious
injury or even other than temporary discomfort to the
subject involved, the police and any bystanders.
BRATTLEBORO PROTEST INCIDENT
“The Tasers are NOT for use on strictly
non-compliant subjects without some
information or fear that the suspect is
going to do harm to the officer or
someone else.” Rutland PD 12/13/06
directive to Sergeants (Emphasis not added.)
We interviewed the two protestors who were tased in this
incident and all of the police officers who were at the scene.
What follows is a description of what happened. Clearly,
30

there are differing views, perceptions and interpretations of
what happened and why. The following description reflects
a desire to present the recollections of the major
participants.
During July, 2007, a group of approximately 20 individuals
who reside in the Windham County area were concerned
about the possible commercial development of a vacant lot
located on the Putney Road in Brattleboro into a truck stop
or other form of strip development. The group decided to
conduct a protest on the property to raise public awareness
of the issue. Their intention was to begin a community
garden by planting flowers on the site and to maintain a
physical presence for two to three days.
Whereas most of the group planned to be at the site only
periodically, Jonathan Crowell and Samantha Kilmurray,
both 32 and residents of West Dummerston, intended to
remain on the site throughout the protest and to make it
difficult for anyone attempting to remove them while the
protest was in progress. Their preparations included the
construction of a barrel mechanism to which they could
attach themselves and hinder police efforts to clear the site.
A metal 55 gallon drum was partially filled with concrete in
which steel rebar was vertically set. Two holes were created
on opposite sides of the barrel with PVC piping large enough
to accommodate a human forearm running horizontally from
the holes to the rebar. Much of the rest of the barrel was
filled with dirt.
Crowell and Kilmurray each had chains and mountain
climbing carabiners attached to their wrists. The barrel
mechanism design allowed them each to place an arm inside
the PVC piping and to clip the carabiner on the chain
attached to the wrist to the rebar configuration. At the
same time, the police or others would not be able to access
the inside of the barrel without removing the dirt, etc.
31

Kilmurray estimated that the barrel weighed approximately
300 pounds. It was brought to the protest site in a pickup
truck. A blue tarp was used to create a makeshift tent over
the barrel in order to shield Crowell and Kilmurray from the
elements.
The protest began on Monday, July 23 shortly before noon.
Kilmurray describes the day as rainy and chilly. The barrel
was placed under the tarp and flowers were planted. Within
roughly an hour of the beginning of the protest, police
arrived on the scene. Upon their arrival, Kilmurray and
Crowell were locked into the barrel. The police were “cordial
and polite” as were the protestors. The police made clear
that the protestors were trespassing and had to leave the
property. They were told that if they were still present when
the police returned that they would be charged with
trespassing.
The police contend that they were content to let the
protestors make their point, get media attention to
dramatize their cause and have the incident resolved
without arrests, criminal charges or other law enforcement
intervention.
Later in the afternoon two police officers returned. Most of
the protestors had departed. Lieutenants Robert Kirkpatrick
and Jeremy Evans were the two officers at the scene.
According to Kilmurray, they were “not very aggressive”.
The police told Kilmurray and Crowell that they would have
to leave but the couple made clear that they intended to
remain. One of the officers allegedly said that there would
be “no arrests on my clock” and indicated how long his shift
would run. Kilmurray thought that perhaps they would not
face arrest.
According to Evans and Kirkpatrick, when Kilmurray and
Crowell refused to vacate the premises, they asked the
dispatcher to communicate with the property owners. This
32

was done and permission was obtained for the protestors to
remain on the property overnight, as long as they vacated
by the next morning. This was communicated to Kilmurray
and Crowell before Evans and Kirkpatrick left the scene.
There are clear differences between written reports and
witness testimony on the issue of whether supervisory
directives were issued to the police concerning appropriate
uses of force attendant with attempts to resolve the protest
situation. For the day shift commencing at approximately
7:00 AM on the 24th, Lieutenant Kirkpatrick was the shift
supervisor. Kirkpatrick contends that neither on the 23rd
after first visiting the site nor at any time before returning to
the site the next day, did then-Chief John Martin or any
captain at Brattleboro PD discuss with him or issue orders on
the issue of appropriate uses of force to resolve the protest
situation.
To the contrary, in several updated written communications
on police department letterhead to Acting Town Manager
Barbara Sondag, dated July 30, 2007 and August 1, 2007,
then-Captain and present Acting Chief Gene Wrinn wrote
that then-Brattleboro Police Chief John Martin on July 23 had
directed that the officers assigned to responding to the
protest “would take a laid back approach” to the problem.
Allegedly Martin “again talked with Lt. Kirkpatrick and
reiterated that he did not want a heavy handed approach
used with protestors.”
There appears to be no dispute that there were no
supervisory communications to Lt. Kirkpatrick on appropriate
uses of force on the morning of July 24, 2007. Nor were any
captains or the then-chief present at the scene.
On July 24, 2007, the police department did have a written
use of force policy. The policy had an effective date of
December 17, 2003. Provisions of the policy included:
“When officers reasonably believe it is necessary in the
33

defense of themselves or others and in the performance of
legal duties, appropriate force may be used. Officers are
expected to make an objectively reasonable choice from
among the force options, based on the facts and
circumstances known to them at the time.” (Emphasis
added.)
The policy had no specific provisions concerning appropriate
or inappropriate uses of force when officers confront passive
resistance on the part of subjects with whom they interact.
At the same time, the department required officers to
complete a “Response to Aggression or Resistance” form
whenever a taser, OC or any other weapon described in the
departmental “Use of Force Continuum” has been used or
brandished. The form asks the officer to indicate whether
at the time of the deployment of the force, he/she “was
engaged in: Effecting arrest, Defending Self, Defending
another, Restraining Subject for Own Safety, Preventing a
Violent Felony or Other (please explain)”.
Thus, and potentially contrary to the then-existing Use of
Force Policy, it is at least arguable that the departmental
protocols allowed a use of force in effecting an arrest, even
if the officers were not “in the defense of themselves or
others”. The officers at the scene believe they were fully
justified in the actions they took since they were “Effecting
arrest”.
One couple remained with Kilmurray and Crowell for most of
the night but then departed about 5:00 AM on Tuesday the
24th. At approximately 7:00 AM, the police returned and
Kilmurray described their tone as different than that of the
day before. There were four Brattleboro officers at the
scene: Detective Michael Gorman, Lieutenant Robert
Kirkpatrick, Officer Peter DiMarino and Lieutenant Charles
Aleck. When the police arrived, the couple was not attached
to the barrel but they promptly reconnected to the rebar.

34

According to the police, they again made clear to the couple
that they were trespassing, that the owners wanted them
removed from the property and that they could avoid
criminal charges if they promptly departed. The police also
either showed the couple a story in that day’s local
newspaper about the protest or told the couple of the
existence of the story. The police tried to convince the
couple that they had accomplished their goal of dramatizing
the issue of the potential commercial development of the
site and that they could now depart with a feeling of
accomplishment. When the couple refused to move, the
police told them that they would be charged with criminal
trespass but not be arrested. When again they refused to
move, they were legally placed under arrest. The police
then had to confront how to take the couple physically into
custody.
According to the couple, the police almost immediately
began moving the couple’s belongings. The police contend
that they removed the blue tarp in order to more clearly
examine the barrel and to strategize how to extricate the
couple. Crowell and Kilmurray were each under a sleeping
bag. The police, wanting to clear the area and to make
certain the couple had no weapons, removed the sleeping
bags. Officer DiMarino described Kilmurray as passive but
Crowell as more actively resistant in that he flailed and
kicked at the police when his sleeping bag was removed and
what they found to be a water bottle was obtained from
Crowell’s possession. After observing this behavior,
Lieutenant Aleck allegedly opined as to Crowell that he
would physically fight the police, once removed from the
barrel.
According to DiMarino, the protestors were largely silent but
at one point early on he asked them to “Give us an option to
stop this.” Crowell allegedly suggested that they be denied
food and water for three days. The police did not see that
as a viable option for a variety of reasons. They then
35

discussed how to most expeditiously resolve the situation.
The police first used a shovel to try to dig the dirt from the
barrel. Soon they discovered wire, the rebar and concrete
and came to the conclusion that even accomplishing the
difficult task of removing the dirt was not going to solve
their problem.
Next, believing that the couple was actually holding hands
within the barrel, the police tried physically pulling them
apart. According to DiMarino, Crowell and Kilmurray cried
out in pain and the police stopped trying to extricate them
by force. DiMarino said the police discussed tipping over the
barrel but the couple protested that this could break their
arms so the police decided to leave the barrel upright.
The police considered the available less lethal means of force
at their disposal. They rejected using nightsticks due to
their feeling that that would be brutal treatment and could
cause significant bruising and possibly more serious injuries.
OC was considered and rejected since it can be very
ineffective but can also cause significant pain and discomfort
for a prolonged period after exposure to a direct application.
Eventually, the police decided to employ their tasers as a
pain compliance technique. DiMarino thought that using the
tasers in the probe mode, causing the intense muscle
contractions would be more effective.
According to Kilmurray, Lieutenant Kirkpatrick appeared to
be in charge. In fact, he was. He decided to use his taser
for the first time in the line of duty and to do so in the “drive
stun” mode. He and DiMarino removed the probe cartridges
from their tasers. DiMarino “sparked” his taser to show the
couple the current flow. He made clear that they were going
to use the tasers unless the couple cooperated. They were
warned “this will hurt a lot.” Crowell and Kilmurray began to
feel anxious and Crowell told the police: “You don’t have to
do this.” He suggested taking away their food and water to

36

“wait us out”, bringing in the fire department to dismantle
the barrel or bringing in a mediator.
The police were not dissuaded from their plan. Allowing the
violation of the criminal trespass law to continue into the
indefinite future did not seem to them a reasonable law
enforcement response. And one can reasonably speculate
there could have been a public uproar about inhumane
treatment of the protestors if the police had denied them
food and water for a number of days.
According to Crowell, it was explained to the couple that
they would be simultaneously tased for three seconds.
A second tasing, if necessary, would be for five seconds.
Kirkpatrick and DiMarino unholstered their tasers.
The couple was simultaneously tased, Kirkpatrick on
Kilmurray, DiMarino on Crowell. The police then tried
unsuccessfully to pull Kilmurray from the barrel. They
warned of a second tasing and one to two minutes after the
first tasing, again simultaneously tased the couple.
The police and the couple disagree on the length of the
tasings. One of the worthwhile features of tasers is the
ability to record the exact date, time, number and duration
of the times a unit is fired. Over the past two plus months
we repeatedly requested the download data from the tasers
used at the protest site. We only recently received a
response to our requests. Unfortunately, it appears that
Brattleboro PD was at least lax in accurately calibrating its
tasers to provide accurate firings data. Further, its
recordkeeping of downloaded data has been deficient.
The department was only able to provide us with data
concerning one taser unit’s use at the site of the protest.
The information demonstrates that the unit was fired twice
for five seconds each, the firings being exactly one minute
apart. This purports to be data relating to the protestors’
incident but the downloaded data reflects the firings to have
37

occurred on March 12, 2000 at 16:44:41 and 16:45:41,
whereas the tasings took place on July 24, 2007 at
approximately 7:00 AM. The number of firings and the
duration are consistent with Lieutenant Kirkpatrick’s account
of his tasings of Kilmurray.
Of even more concern is that Brattleboro PD has produced
no information concerning the data downloaded from the
taser unit carried by DiMarino. The Department apparently
did not properly track the assignment of particular tasers to
specific officers and failed to properly synchronize the
tasers. As a result, Brattleboro PD has indicated there are,
at a minimum, very significant barriers to the recovery of
accurate information concerning DiMarino’s use of a taser at
the protest site. Consequently, we have no independent
data on the number of firings or the durations of the cycles
deployed against Crowell.
Kilmurray, with her left arm in the barrel up to her forearm,
said that the taser was in direct contact with her skin in the
area of her elbow. Although Kirkpatrick reported that the
couple suffered no injuries, Kilmurray indicated that she
suffered “burn-like lesions” for ten to twelve days after the
incident. After the second tasing, Kilmurray said: “I can’t do
this anymore. I’m going to release.” She did so, was
handcuffed and brought to a police cruiser.
Crowell was advised that he’d be tased a third time in the
stun gun mode but then the taser would be used with the
prongs shot into his back. The barrel was tipped over but
Crowell remained clipped in. He was again tased on the
bare arm near his elbow, after which he said: “OK, OK, I’m
done. I’m going to release.” He did so and, like Kilmurray,
was handcuffed, brought to a cruiser, to a local rescue
squad headquarters for a brief physical exam and ultimately
to the police station for processing and release with a
citation to appear in court to answer to a charge of unlawful
trespass.
38

Lt. Kirkpatrick completed “Response to Aggression or
Resistance” forms for the tasings of both protestors. In
each case he checked boxes that the tasings took place
while the police were “Effecting arrest” and “Restraining
Subject for Own Safety”. Clearly, the former was accurate
but the latter is most typically used when a subject is
exhibiting suicidal or other self-destructive behavior. That
was not the case here.
Acting Chief Wrinn has reported that on the morning of July
24, then-Chief Martin left Brattleboro to attend a meeting
with other chiefs of police and Vermont State Police
hierarchy. There is little doubt in our minds that the
hierarchy of Brattleboro PD should have provided more
direction and guidance to the officers dispatched to the
protest site.
It is unclear to us why Crowell’s suggestion that the Fire
Department or other personnel be called in to dismantle the
barrel mechanism was not given more serious consideration.
In the past, the Burlington Police Department has
encountered scores of abortion protestors who occupied
private property and used tires, a large truck and specialized
locks to hinder police efforts to effect their removal and
arrest. Rather than resort to batons or other “pain
compliance” methods, Burlington Police used equipment
normally used at motor vehicle accident scenes to free and
remove the abortion protestors.
There was significant public outcry in the Brattleboro
community after the protestors’ tasings took place. The
Town Manager and Select board were actively involved.
Acting Chief Wrinn described a July 25 meeting of upper
management of the police department at which it was
decided to “not use force for future protests unless life or
property is at risk”.

39

It is remarkable that none of the Brattleboro PD officers to
whom we spoke on January 30, 2008, indicated that there
had been any official policy change on appropriate uses of
force in conjunction with incidents similar to that presented
by the protestors. In fact, the revised Use of Force Policy,
issued on October 26, 2007, appeared to make the use of
tasers in future passive resistance protest incidents even
more acceptable than was the case under the policy in
effect on July 24, 2007.
However, on or about February 8, 2008, Brattleboro
released its own report on the protestors’ tasing incident.
The report, prepared by Attorney Gordon Black, opines that
the use of the tasers in this instance was “unwise and
unreasonable under the circumstances”. Attorney Black also
advised that the Brattleboro use of force policy be further
amended to clarify that a taser can be used only against a
subject exhibiting “active aggression”. Effective February 9,
2008, the Brattleboro Police Department Use of Force Policy
was amended and in relevant part makes clear that “Tasers
should not be used, either through the use of a shot probe
or through Drive Stun mode: …Against any person
displaying passive resistance…”
BRATTLEBORO RETREAT INCIDENT
We initially intended to describe this incident in this report in
significant detail. But on reflection, after reviewing Vermont
statutes on the confidentiality of records concerning alleged
criminal behavior on the part of juveniles, we have elected
to be brief and only superficially descriptive.
The incident in question involved a youth in state custody
and a call for police assistance to help address the fact that
the youth had barricaded himself in his room and was
manifesting significant destructive behaviors. The police
responded, ultimately gained access to the room and tased

40

the juvenile in the probes mode. He promptly calmed down
and was moved to a “safe room”.
After reviewing police and Retreat records, interviewing
Retreat and police personnel and considering all of the
surrounding circumstances, it is the opinion of this office
that a tasing of the juvenile was appropriate.
Like the tasers data from the protestors’ incident, over the
past two months we repeatedly requested from Brattleboro
PD the downloaded data from the taser used during the
Retreat incident. It was only very recently that we received
a response to our requests. Of significant concern is the fact
that the taser unit downloaded data reflects a firing on July
3, 2007 at 16:19:26. The date is correct but the time is off
by approximately two hours. Of much greater concern is the
fact that the downloaded data reflects a taser cycle of 10
seconds rather than the normal 5 seconds.
We reviewed no evidence to support the need for or the
appropriateness of a 10 second firing. Assuming the
information provided from the taser unit is accurate as to
duration of the cycle, absent additional or different evidence,
we believe that the duration of the tasing was excessive,
inappropriate and unnecessary.
It should be noted that we also reviewed Brattleboro Police
Department records of other interactions with residents of
the Brattleboro Retreat, including incidents in which tasers
were brandished and readily obtained compliance with police
directives and one particular incident in which a taser was
deployed from a distance in probes mode and prevented
further seriously self-destructive and injurious behavior on
the part of a female juvenile.

41

CONCLUSION
“The most powerful asset in a police officer’s arsenal
is public support. Anything that erodes that support
reduces the ability of an officer to successfully
discharge his/her responsibility on behalf of the
public. For that reason, law enforcement use of the
conducted energy weapon (CEW), and other use of
force techniques, is a public policy issue. The very
nature of policing and the dynamics of the relationship
between the police and those who are policed call into
question actions and techniques vested with law
enforcement personnel that would otherwise be illegal
to most citizens.”
RCMP Use of the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW)
Interim Report December 11, 2007
Providing alternatives between wrestling on the one hand
and lethal means of force on the other, less lethal means of
force such as the baton, OC, beanbags and tasers are
valuable tools for Vermont law enforcement in controlling
subjects who are at least actively resisting lawful police
orders. Still, they are weapons and should be treated as
such. Officers should be properly trained in their use and
they should be deployed only in accordance with a written
departmental use of force policy.
Vermont law enforcement should seek public input during
the process of creating and revising a use of force policy.
Departmental protocols should require completion of written
incident reports whenever weapons are used in the line of
duty. These reports should be reviewed by superior officers
to determine the appropriateness of the deployment and
whether changes in officer training and/or the department’s
use of force policy should be revised.
The taser has proven to be an effective law enforcement
tool, both in Vermont and nationally. When used
42

appropriately, it has reduced the use of lethal force and has
significantly lessened subjects’, officers’, rescue personnel
and bystanders’ injuries in situations when uses of force are
reasonably necessary to control a situation. There remain
questions about the safety of the taser’s use in certain
situations and on certain categories of subjects. These
questions are particularly important in situations when
multiple tases or extended continuous tasings of a subject
are inflicted and when subjects are manifesting a condition
called “excited delirium”. Continued study of the safety and
health effects of tasers is warranted.
A departmental use of force policy should address issues of
appropriate taser use against certain classes of subjects, in
certain situations and multiple tasings of a subject. Given
the possibility of abuse and/or excessive use of taser
technology, it is recommended that departments prohibit
deployment against subjects who are passively resisting
police directives, absent overriding public safety concerns.

43