OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
STATE OF WASHINGTONTE

OF

W A S H I N G T O N

LOSS PREVENTION REVIEW TEAM
ASSESSMENT OF
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS INCIDENTS
INVOLVING SUPERVISED OFFENDERS
REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

JANUARY 2005

Visit the Loss Prevention Review Team website at
http://www.ofm.wa.gov.rmd/lprt/loss.htm

OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
LOSS PREVENTION REVIEW TEAM REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Offenders Re-offending While on Community Supervision

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION 1 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................1
Context...................................................................................................................................................... 1
The Incidents ............................................................................................................................................ 1
Summary of Conclusions.......................................................................................................................... 1
Summary of Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 2

SECTION 2 - REVIEW PROCESS ...............................................................................................4
General Process ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Methodology ............................................................................................................................................. 4
Team Members......................................................................................................................................... 4

SECTION 3 - FACTS RELATING TO INCIDENTS UNDER REVIEW .........................................6
Daniel Haggarty and Anthony Shirihama ................................................................................................. 6
Incident that Occurred While Under DOC Supervision ........................................................................ 6
Criminal History .................................................................................................................................... 6
Supervision by the Department of Corrections .................................................................................... 7
Supervision History............................................................................................................................... 7
Substance Dependence History........................................................................................................... 8
Criminal Conduct ................................................................................................................................ 10
Anthony Shirihama ................................................................................................................................. 11
Criminal History Prior to Department of Corrections Supervision ...................................................... 11
Supervision by the Department of Corrections .................................................................................. 11
Supervision History............................................................................................................................. 12
Daniel Mario Rodriguez .......................................................................................................................... 12
Incident That Occurred While Under DOC Supervision ..................................................................... 12
Criminal History Prior to Department of Corrections Supervision ...................................................... 13
Supervision by the Department of Corrections .................................................................................. 13
Supervision History............................................................................................................................. 13

SECTION 4 – ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................16
Brief Agency History ............................................................................................................................... 16
Sentencing Reform ................................................................................................................................. 17
Restorative Justice ................................................................................................................................. 17
DOC Culture and Structure..................................................................................................................... 18
Staff Supervision..................................................................................................................................... 19
CCOs Work Environment ....................................................................................................................... 20
Probation Supervision Tools and Services............................................................................................. 22
DOC Hearing Process ............................................................................................................................ 25
Impact on CCO Decision Making ....................................................................................................... 25
Employee Morale and Effectiveness of Efforts to Supervise ............................................................. 26
Sanctions do not Provide Sufficient Deterrence................................................................................. 27
DOC Staffing........................................................................................................................................... 28
Information Technology and Technical Services................................................................................... 29

SECTION 5- CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................31
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A - INCIDENT REPORTS ..................................................................................... A-1
APPENDIX B - LOSS PREVENTION REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS ......................................... B-1
APPENDIX C - TEAM MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES.................................................................... C-1
APPENDIX D - DOCUMENT LOG ........................................................................................... D-1
APPENDIX E – DOC RESPONSE ........................................................................................... E-1

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Office of Financial Management
Loss Prevention Review Team Report

Assessment of
Department of Corrections Incidents
Involving Supervised Offenders

SECTION 1 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CONTEXT
Under the Loss Prevention Review program, state agencies report to the Office of
Financial Management (OFM) the “death of a person, serious injury to a person, or
other substantial loss…alleged or suspected to be caused at least in part by the actions
of a state agency” (RCW 43.41.370 (1)). OFM assesses these incidents, and in some
cases, a review team is appointed to evaluate the incident to identify risk reduction and
elimination strategies the reporting agency may adopt. The Department of Corrections
(DOC) reports incidents to OFM, and the OFM Director selected two incidents involving
three offenders from 2003 for such a focused, independent review.
THE INCIDENTS
In compliance with RCW 43.41.370 (4), DOC reported two incidents involving three
offenders to the Office of Financial Management in January and March of 2003. The
offenders were on supervision, and while on supervision, were arrested and charged
with murder. The Director of OFM, pursuant to RCW 43.41.370(1), determined that
these incidents merited review and appointed a team to conduct the review.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It is the team’s basic conclusion that systemic problems were more to blame for the
incidents reviewed than any individual acts of corrections employees. Prevention of
criminal behavior is a complex task that is the collective responsibility of numerous
government organizations, political bodies and persons, including taxpayers. Although
responsibility for managing offenders has, in large part, been delegated to DOC,
successful assessment and management of offender risk actually requires the
participation of all. Agencies such as DOC cannot do this task alone. Any ‘system’ that
wishes to reduce re-offending, or recidivism – and this broad definition of ‘system’
includes the various social systems that impact the lives of offenders -- must come to
grips with this fundamental reality of shared responsibility.

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In addition, any system that has as its aim the reduction of harm or loss associated with
criminal recidivism must take into account two interlocking components of the task:
(a) risk assessment, and (b) risk management. Risks cannot be managed unless they
are first identified. Thus, any risk management system is first a risk detection system.
Our ability to perform both tasks is limited by how much contemporary science knows
about recidivism risk and by the resources available to accomplish them.
Careful review of the two incident cases before the Loss Prevention Review Team
(LPRT) identified some serious, but correctable problems in Washington’s offender risk
assessment/risk management system. The team’s conclusions are more fully
discussed in the body of this report.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Culture Adaptation: The team recommends that DOC be even more
proactive than it currently is in assessing the Offender Accountability Act’s
(OAA) performance in relation to its stated goals, and requesting needed
amendments from the Legislature. (Recommendation 2)
2. Supervision and Staffing: The team recommends that DOC closely examine
the actual activities of supervisors and staff, and take steps to adjust job
descriptions, examine policies and procedures, and follow-through on current
employee management and job assignment policies so that the work of the
Community Correctional Officers (CCOs) is more closely aligned to the goals
of the OAA, providing a greater likelihood of achieving those goals for
offenders and the community. (Recommendations 3, 4, 5, 12, 13,14, and 15)
3. Hearing Process: The team recommends that certain aspects of the hearing
process be critically examined, based on the conclusions reached by the
team during these case studies. The critical examination should focus on the
ability of the system to respond to offender behavior, the effectiveness of
available sanctions, and assessing whether the post-sentencing
administration of managing offender violations through hearings within DOC,
rather than through the courts, achieves the planned outcomes contemplated
when the hearing process was moved under DOC’s control.
(Recommendations 10 and 11)
4. Risk Assessment Process: Evaluate the risk assessment process in terms of
whether the risk assessment should also be performed prior to sentencing,
and adjust the post-sentencing risk assessment process to include
reassessment both periodically and after an obvious change in the offender’s
circumstance. Based on its work, the team concluded that more effective
sentencing would occur if judges had a risk assessment available prior to
imposing sentence. (Recommendations 7, 8 and 9)

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5. Information Technology and Other Resources: Provide CCOs with current
technology devices, such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), to offer them
critical information while they are still in the field, and the opportunity to enter
information about offenders into the system on a real-time basis. Semiautomate assessment tools so that reports are available and can be
forwarded to the judge, providing the court with the most up-to-date
evaluation. Expand the available ancillary services in rural areas.
(Recommendations 1, 6 and 16)

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SECTION 2 - REVIEW PROCESS
GENERAL PROCESS
OFM selected these incidents for review because they are of a type that DOC reported
to OFM on a recurring basis. Review team members, subject matter experts in relevant
fields, are asked to analyze the incidents with a focus on causal factors and on
preventative measures for DOC to consider for future implementation. As part of the
process, the team interviewed DOC employees involved in the incidents and in the
programs related to the incident, reviewed documents provided by DOC, and evaluated
other relevant records.
This report presents the team’s findings and recommendations based on this case
study. Using the information provided, agencies receiving a review team report then
evaluate the case study conclusions and recommendations, and develop an
implementation plan regarding the recommendations, which it provides to the Loss
Prevention Review program within 120 days after it receives the report.
The review expressly excluded formulation and expression of opinions on the
performance of specific DOC personnel.
METHODOLOGY
The Loss Prevention Review Team interviewed DOC employees who were involved
with the incidents, DOC managers and supervisors familiar with agency policy and
procedure related to the incidents. The team met seven times and reviewed documents
provided by DOC at the team’s request, as well as other documents researched by the
team. Appendix D contains the logs of the interviews and of the documents reviewed
by the team.
Prior to report publication, DOC representatives met with OFM after reviewing the
conclusions and recommendations. DOC provided comments to the team and
additional information. The team then finalized the report, and, pursuant to
RCW 43.41.380, the report was delivered to the Director of OFM and made public.
TEAM MEMBERS
Review team members were selected for specific subject-matter expertise. Full
biographies appear in Appendix B.
They were:
a) Dayle Crane, Director, Kitsap County District Court Probation Department;
b) Gregg J. Gagliardi, Ph.D., Clinical Associate Professor, the Washington Institute,
Western Branch, University of Washington Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences, Division of Public Behavioral Health & Justice Policy;
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c) Michael Olivero, Department of Law and Justice Central Washington University;
and
d) Phil Stanley, Corrections Consultant and part-time college instructor in Criminal
Justice at Central Washington University.

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SECTION 3 - FACTS RELATING TO INCIDENTS UNDER REVIEW
Two incidents were selected for review. One of them involved two offenders who
committed the crime together. Therefore, the report addresses three examples of
community supervision that ended in recidivism.
DANIEL HAGGARTY AND ANTHONY SHIRIHAMA
INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER DOC SUPERVISION
On January 13, 2003, Daniel Haggerty had not been making payments on his legal fees
and Woods, his Community Corrections Officer (CCO) threatened to lodge a violation.
At this point, the case supervision was only monetary. Woods was informed on
January 21, 2003, that Haggerty had been charged with murder.
The Spokane Police Department officers responded to a call on January 19, 2003. A
victim was found bleeding in a street. He was transported to a hospital where he later
died. Anthony Shirihama and Daniel Haggerty were alleged to have bludgeoned the
victim to death with a cane and a bat. He had received a broken arm, broken ribs, and
nine major blows to the head.
Following transport of the victim to the hospital, police went to the victim’s residence
and forced themselves inside where they found and arrested Shirihama and Haggerty.
Haggerty and Shirihama were charged with 1st degree murder. Shirihama and Haggerty
provided the police with changing stories about what had happened and blamed the
other as the principal aggressor and killer. Evidence was found indicating that the
victim’s wallet was taken and that there was an attempt to clean the blood in the
apartment.
CRIMINAL HISTORY
Daniel Haggerty had a criminal history prior to his supervision by the DOC. His
conviction (not arrests) record available through court documents to the community
correctional officer included the following:
Convictions

Sentencing Date

Assault 3

08/14/1997

Malicious Mischief 2

09/08/1993

Taking Motor Vehicle Without
04/30/1992
Owner’s Permission (TMVWOP)
DWI

04/30/1992

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SUPERVISION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Initial Sentencing: Daniel Haggerty came under the supervision of DOC subsequent
to convictions for 2nd degree burglary and 3rd degree malicious mischief. On
January 29, 1999, Haggerty pled guilty to 2nd degree burglary. The prosecutor agreed
to recommend the low end of the standard sentencing range of four months, amended a
charge of residential burglary to 2nd degree burglary, and dismissed a 4th degree assault
and a 3rd degree malicious mischief charge. There was no pre-sentence investigation
and the reason for this is not provided. He was sentenced to 12 months confinement at
Geiger Correctional Center and ordered to pay legal financial obligations.
Supervision After Release: After release, he was to report to CCO Bruce Woods
monthly in person, within the first three working days, or as directed. The conditions,
requirements, and instructions form signed by Haggerty and Woods included a
restraining order, participation in an alcohol program at Geiger Corrections Center, no
use or possession of any non-prescribed controlled substances to be monitored by an
agency approved at the discretion of the community correctional officer, and payment of
his legal fees.
Additional Conviction and Sentence: Haggerty also pled guilty to 3rd degree malicious
mischief on September 1, 1999, and was ordered into confinement for 12 months, to run
consecutively with the conviction for 2nd degree burglary. In relation to this offense, he
was ordered to enroll in some type of 12-step program such as Alcoholics Anonymous
following his release from confinement, and he was to participate in drug/alcohol
programs at Geiger Correctional Center. Following release he was also to submit to an
alcohol/drug evaluation and be subject to additional treatment if the evaluation indicated
that it was necessary.
SUPERVISION HISTORY
Woods assessed Haggerty using the LSI-R1 and gave him a risk management
classification as well. CCO Woods repeatedly assessed Haggerty using the LSI-R (the
LSI-R scoring sheets were not made available to the LPRT). The following table shows
the LSI-R assessments:

1

The Level of Services Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) is a quantitative survey of attributes of offenders and
their situations relevant to level of supervision and treatment decisions. Designed for ages 16 and older,
the LSI-R inventory is designed to predict parole outcome, success in correctional halfway houses,
institutional misconducts, and recidivism. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) is
presently conducting an empirical validation study of the LSI-R with Washington offenders as part of a
larger study of the impact of the Offender Accountability Act that is mandated by RCW 72.09.610. (See
WSIPP document number 03-12-1202.)

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Date
September 30, 1999

October 12, 1999
May 2, 2000
June 21, 2001

Results
Woods reassessed Haggerty with the
LSI-R. There is nothing in the record
about a previous LSI-R. His percent
chance to re-offend was 48.1.
Woods reassessed Haggerty with the
LSI-R with the same results as
previous.
Another LSI-R was performed by
Woods with identical results as before.
Haggerty’s risk management
classification was completed and he
was rated RM-C2.

Several issues of importance distinguished Haggerty’s supervision history, including:
substance abuse or dependence and a failure to get into treatment and to maintain
sobriety, ongoing criminal conduct, and a failure to abide by supervision requirements.
SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE HISTORY
Throughout his period of supervision, CCO Woods attempted to get Haggerty treatment
for substance abuse and dependence.
September 12, 1997 - Haggerty completed an intake with CCO Woods. Haggerty had
an extensive criminal history and suggested that his conduct was the result of
alcohol abuse. He claimed, “…at the time of sentencing he told the judge that he
was an alcoholic. The condition imposed was ‘not consume alcohol to excess,
subject to monitoring for alcohol abuse.’” There is nothing in the written court
documents that suggests that this was a condition imposed by the judge. The
conditions imposed by the court are cited above.
Apparently, Woods took this assessment of Haggerty’s needs on faith.
December 16, 1997 - Haggerty was arrested for two 4th degree assault charges. The
victims were family members. Woods reported that Haggerty had been drinking
at the time of the incident. However, this was not a violation because of what the
judge asserted about drinking to excess. Woods wrote, “I requested a copy of
the police report. If reports reveal he drank to ‘excess’ then a viol.”
Woods repeatedly attempted to have Haggerty in treatment and to address his
substance abuse issues.

2

Risk management classification is the designated risk level for recidivism assigned as a result of
completing the LSI-R. The scale identifies A as the highest risk, and D being the lowest risk for reoffending.
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February 12, 1998 - Woods met with Haggerty in jail. Haggerty said that he was
required to get an alcohol evaluation as the result of the assault charges. He
admitted to being an alcoholic, but had not committed to treatment.
June 11, 1998 - Haggerty was placed in jail as the result of a warrant requested by
Woods. Haggerty agreed to go to treatment for alcoholism, but had not “reached
the point where he was fully committed to stop.” He was directed to contact The
Alternative to Street Crimes (TASC) if he wanted inpatient treatment.
August 13, 1998 - Haggerty was released from Geiger.
August 14, 1998 - Haggerty reported to Woods. Woods called and scheduled an
appointment for Haggerty at TASC while Haggerty was in his office. He was
scheduled for an intake on September 21, 1998.
October 12, 1998 - The record suggests that Haggerty went to his intake and was
complying with treatment recommendations. It stated that he was submitting
urine checks to TASC and had not been drinking.
October 26, 1998 - Haggerty was placed back in Greiger for failing to get treatment in a
timely manner related to the assault charges.
December 10, 1998 - Haggerty was apparently out of jail. He told Woods that he was
applying for the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment and Support Act (ADATSA)
funding in an effort to get outpatient treatment.
December 21, 1998 - Hearing scheduled on compliance with the assault charges
conditions.
January 5, 1999 - Haggerty reported to Woods and said that he had an evaluation with
ADN and applied for ADATSA funding.
April 17, 2000 -TASC reported that Haggerty had completed IOP and recommended
AA/NA aftercare with a sponsor.
August 3, 2000 - Haggerty reported again and said that he had a sponsor.
October 5, 2000 - Haggerty was instructed by Woods to participate in AA/NA and to
connect with a sponsor.
October 20, 2000 – Haggerty was instructed to do the same thing.
January 12, 2001 - Haggerty was released from jail and reported to Woods. He was
directed to contact Interim Detox Services for treatment.
August 10, 2001 - Haggerty was arrested for unlawful imprisonment and had been
consuming alcohol.
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April 1, 2002 - Woods met with Haggerty and he agreed that he needed inpatient
treatment.
June 10, 2002 - Haggerty reported that he had an appointment with ADN/HAS.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Haggerty was returned to jail or Geiger Correctional Center for several other offenses,
many of which were alcohol related. It should be noted that Haggerty repeatedly was
released from jail and CCO Woods would not find out about it until he committed
another crime.
Haggerty was supervised for monetary obligations to his victim, which affected the level
of supervision he received. During that time frame, Haggerty’s criminal arrests
included:
October 13, 2000 - arrested for stealing a truck and pleaded guilty to taking a motor
vehicle without the permission of the owner. He was convicted and sentenced to
three months confinement and to pay various costs.
November 2, 1997 - in jail for two misdemeanor assault charges.
March 12, 1998 - Woods was contacted by the Washington State Patrol indicating that
Haggerty had been arrested on February 14, 1998, for taking a motor vehicle
without permission.
June 16, 1998 - Woods also reports that Haggerty had disorderly conduct charges.
July 20, 1998 - The Washington State Patrol informed Woods that Haggerty was
arrested for 2nd degree burglary on May 26, 1998.
March 11, 1999 – The Washington State Patrol reported that Haggerty was arrested for
3rd degree malicious mischief on January 15, 1999.
September 1, 1999 - Woods was contacted by the Washington State Patrol who said
that Haggerty had been arrested on June 27,1999, for residential burglary.
December 6, 2000 - Woods found that Haggerty had been arrested on
October 14, 2000, for TMVWOP in Benton County.
April 4, 2001 - Haggerty was arrested for a misdemeanor theft warrant.
August 10, 2001 - arrested for unlawful imprisonment and had been consuming
alcohol.
February 19, 2002 - Woods found that Haggerty had been arrested on
January 18, 2002 for 2nd degree assault and unlawful imprisonment.
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Haggerty demonstrated evidence of troublesome adjustment to the community, as
reflected by the following incidents. The level of response available to DOC is limited as
well, despite the repeated number of sanctioned actions by the offender.
November 4, 1997 - Haggerty turned himself in at the jail for a warrant issued for failure
to provide a blood test.
December 19, 1997 - Woods requested warrants for failure to report and to pay legal
fees and on January 13, 1998, CCO Douglas reported that Haggerty was at
Geiger WR with an unknown release date.
March 4, 1998 - Haggerty was in jail and agreed to serve 90 days on the violations and
to report to Woods upon release.
June 11, 1998 - Haggerty was arrested on a warrant requested by Woods and an FTC
for the two 4th degree assault charges. Haggerty agreed to serve 120 days for
his supervision violations.
December 19, 2000 - Haggerty was brought to Spokane County jail where he agreed to
serve 45 days for violating his supervision requirements.
April 4, 2001 - Haggerty was arrested for violation of his supervision requirements
probation violation and a misdemeanor theft warrant. He agreed to serve 90
days.
April 1, 2002 - Woods met with Haggerty in jail and agreed to serve 60 days in jail for
violation of his supervision requirements.
ANTHONY SHIRIHAMA
CRIMINAL HISTORY PRIOR TO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SUPERVISION
Anthony Shirihama had a criminal history previous to his supervision by DOC. His
conviction (not arrests) record available to the community correctional officer through
court documents included the following:
Convictions

Sentencing Date

Assault 2

02/04/1987

TMVWOP

06/30/1986

SUPERVISION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Anthony Shirihama was charged with, and subsequently convicted on May 13, 2002, of
2nd degree assault and 1st degree malicious mischief. According to an officer from the

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Spokane Police Department, he had gone through his neighbor’s house, broken out all
the windows, busted up doors and chased the homeowner around.
He was sentenced to less than a year in jail and to serve three months in confinement
for each offense, to be served concurrently. He was to pay legal fees and was
restrained from having contact with the victim. In addition, he was to serve 12 months
in community custody with the DOC. There is nothing in court documents about
substance dependence or abuse. A pre-sentence investigation was not performed.
SUPERVISION HISTORY
On May 20, 2002, Shirihama reported to the DOC as directed and completed an
offender report. He was instructed to contact the DOC in three weeks and did so.
An assessment by CCO Kinner on June 13, 2002, using the LSI-R concluded that his
chance to re-offend was 76 percent with a Risk Management Classification of RM-A.
CCO Schilling’s assessment on June 13, 2002, with the LSI-R concluded that he had a
77 percent chance to re-offend. However, Schilling reported that Shirihama’s Risk
Management Classification was RM-D, rather than RM-A3.
Shirihama reported on October 7, 2002, that he had obtained a chemical dependency
evaluation and was on a waiting list for outpatient treatment. CCO Schilling encouraged
Shirihama to attend AA meetings and to break ties with drinking/drugging associates.
He remained on the waiting list and was directed to provide releases so that Schilling
could speak with treatment providers. On December 4, 2002, Schilling reported that
Shirihama was still not in treatment and had not signed releases so he was unable to
confirm “if he is scamming me or still on the wait list as he claims.”
Throughout his supervision his KIOSK Reporting Sessions Status was successful.
During his supervision, Schilling counseled Shirihama on staying away from the victim,
criminal peers, and familial relations. Shirihama was arrested on January 19, 2003, for
1st degree murder with Haggerty as described above.
DANIEL MARIO RODRIGUEZ
INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER DOC SUPERVISION
Daniel Rodriguez was arrested and charged with 1st degree murder for the death of
Armando Perea on March 29, 2003.

3

DOC informed the team that the CCO became aware of the error and corrected it in the system the
same day. However, the existing computer technology precludes erasure of entries once entered, and
therefore, the team could not tell from its records when the error was detected.
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CRIMINAL HISTORY PRIOR TO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SUPERVISION
Daniel Rodriguez had a criminal history prior to his supervision by DOC. His conviction
(not arrests) record available through court documents to the community correctional
officer included the following:
Convictions

Sentencing Date

Residential Burglary

10/16/1997

Second Degree Burglary

10/16/1997

VM/D Cont Substance

04/29/1998

Residential Burglary

02/19/1998

Residential Burglary

01/20/1999

SUPERVISION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Rodriguez was convicted of 2nd degree unlawful possession of a firearm on
January 3, 2000. He was sentenced to six months confinement and 12 months
community supervision with DOC. He was to pay legal fees, report to the DOC within
24 hours of release, not to possess any controlled substances, and to report to the DOC
for urinalysis.
January 17, 2002 - he was convicted of 2nd degree possession of stolen property. He
was sentenced to six months confinement and 12 months community supervision
with the DOC. He was to pay legal fees and have no contact with victims. The
boxes were checked on the Community Custody Order for abstinence from
alcohol, no possession of a controlled substance, report for a urinalysis and not
drive without insurance or a license and they were marked out and initialed by
the judge apparently withdrawing them.
August 2, 2002 - Rodriguez was convicted of 3rd degree assault. He was sentenced
to four months confinement and 12 months community supervision with the DOC
and to pay legal fees.
No pre-sentence investigation was performed.
SUPERVISION HISTORY
Rodriguez reported to DOC and CCO Mungia on January 28, 2000. He was assessed
with the LSI-R and scored a 48.1 percent chance to re-offend (the LS-R scoring sheets
were not made available to the CCO). He told Mungia that he had an extensive juvenile
record, had been punished 30 times at Maple Lane (the juvenile institutional record was
not available), had an 8th grade education, no income, came from an abusive
household, had no pro-social friends, had a drug problem and preferred marijuana, and
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displayed an attitude about not caring about going to jail. He was directed to sign up
with the ABC program, to report monthly, submit random urine analysis and attend
AA/NA as deemed necessary.
May 18, 2000 - CCO Elder asked for a warrant for failing to report, failure to change
address, failure to pay financial obligations.
July 10, 2000 - CCO Elder reassessed with the LSI-R and gave Rodriguez a
57.3 percent chance to re-offend. He performed the LSI-R again on
July 31, 2000, to reflect changes. The instrument provided identical results.
August 28, 2000 - Rodriguez was arrested on the warrant and for failing to obey a
police officer. He agreed to serve 20 days in jail.
September 12, 2000 - Elder reminded Rodriguez to report within 24 hours of his
release. He was released and failed to report on September 13, 2000, and
disappeared. Elder went looking for him and could not find him. On
September 19, 2000, Elder asked for a warrant for failure to report, pay and
report his change of address.
December 6, 2000 - Elder met with Rodriguez in jail and told him to report within
24 hours of release. Rodriguez agreed to serve 40 days in jail.
January 25, 2001 - Elder reassessed with the LSI-R and Rodriquez scored a
76 percent chance to re-offend. His risk management classification was
completed and set at RM-B.
February 9, 2001 - Rodriguez was released from jail and failed to report. Elder asked
for a warrant on February 14, 2001, for failure to report.
October 1, 2001 - Rodriguez was in jail for the warrant, as well as a charge of
residential burglary and MIP. He agreed to serve 60 days and to report within
24 hours of his release. He was released from jail on December 6, 2001, and
failed to report.
December 12, 2001 - Elder went searching for Rodriguez and could not find him. Elder
asked for a warrant.
December 31, 2001 - Rodriguez was in jail for the warrant, as well as MIP and stolen
property.
January 2, 2002 - Elder met with Rodriguez and directed him to meet with him
24 hours after release.
January 3, 2001 - Elder met with Rodriguez again and he would not agree to serve time
without a hearing on the failures to comply. He also admitted that he had
problems with alcohol and crack and wanted to get treatment.
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January 30, 2001 – Rodriguez pleaded guilty to the failures to comply and received
80 days in jail.
April 13, 2002 - Rodriguez got out of jail and reported on April 15, 2002.
May 7, 2002 - Rodriguez reported as expected, but would not produce a urine
specimen. He left the building saying that he was going for a soft drink and
never returned. He then disappeared and Elder searched for him.
May 23, 2002 - Elder had warrants initiated.
June 11, 2002 - Rodriguez was arrested on warrants and 3rd degree assault on a police
officer.
June 14, 2002 - Rodriguez agreed to serve 120 days in jail for failures to comply. This
is an exception to the sanctions permitted to DOC by law and was imposed by
the courts.
September 26, 2002 - Rodriguez reported as expected following release from jail.
Rodriguez explained his living situation and admitted to being a gang member.
He was directed to report in again on October 15, 2002.
October 15, 2002 – Rodriguez reported as required. He had an injured hand from a
fight and denied any drug use. He provided a urine sample with negative results.
November 5, 2002 – Rodriguez reported as expected and his urine was positive for
methamphetamine. He disappeared again and Elder searched for him. Elder
secured another warrant and Rodriguez was arrested on January 2, 2003, for
failures to comply.
January 7, 2003 - Rodriguez agreed to serve 30 days. He also received jail time for
other issues and received a total of 150 days in jail.
March 28, 2003 - Rodriguez was released from jail.
March 29, 2003 – Rodriguez got into an altercation at a convenience store. He shot
two people, killing one instantly and wounding the other. According to the
information contained in the CCO’s file, the incident might have been gang
related.
March 31, 2003 - Rodriguez was arrested and charged with 1st degree murder and was
later convicted for the offense.

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SECTION 4 – ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS
BRIEF AGENCY HISTORY
The Department of Corrections came into existence in 1981 after having been a subagency within the Department of Social and Health Services. There had been riots and
criticism of management of prisons in the late 1970s. For example, the Washington
State Penitentiary in Walla Walla was reputed to be liberally run, with inmates having
influence over its operation. There was an outcry about the “inmates running the
prisons.” As a separate agency, DOC received specific funding and throughout the
1980s and 1990s there was a building boom to house a growing number of prisoners.
This additional population was driven by various “get tough” measures primarily in the
form of sentencing reform.
In 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act did away with the Parole Board and for a brief time
there was no post-release supervision ordered for sentenced felons. This reflected the
then-prevailing theory that “if you do the crime, you do the time.” After 1984, the
Legislature gradually brought back post-release supervision for specific crimes, to the
point where, at the present time, most prison-bound felons receive some type of postrelease supervision. The supervision of these offenders, coupled with community
custody supervision is labeled “community supervision.” The Probation and Parole
Officer staff providing the supervision of these offenders were renamed CCOs.
During most of the 1980s and 1990s, the “get tough” approach to sentencing was
financed by healthy state revenues also used to build additional prisons and supervise
larger number of offenders in the community. At the end of the 1990s, state revenues
began to dwindle and new approaches were needed.
A national trend to deal with the “harm done” to the community by offenders resulted in
various approaches, usually called restorative justice, reparation, or community justice.
The Washington State version, the Offender Accountability Act (OAA), was passed in
1999 and became effective July 1, 2000. This legislation created a risk based model for
addressing offender supervision, which includes community outreach and engaging the
offender in restoring justice and requiring restoration for the harm done to the
community.
As a result of this legislation, DOC was significantly reorganized, with increasing
emphasis on supervision strategies for offenders in the community. A risk management
tool, the LSI, was introduced to encourage supervision for the “riskiest” offenders.
Other offenders not deemed to be a high risk were then managed administratively, for
the most part. This reprioritization of CCO effort was done in recognition that the DOC
did not receive substantial additional resources in the budget to implement the OAA.
CCOs were both encouraged and trained to do more outreach with the community,
working with the police, treatment agencies and community groups to provide a
“combined” effort to reintegrate the offender back into the community. The model for

Page 16

this outreach had been pioneered in Washington in the “cop shops” in Spokane. This
was the approach to case management being used at the time of these offenses and is
still the approach today.
SENTENCING REFORM
Prior to 1984, community supervision for both probationers and parolees was fairly
traditional. A probationer was a felon sentenced by a Superior Court to a period of
probation supervision. A parolee was a felon sentenced by the Superior Court to
prison, who served prison time, and parole supervision after release from prison was
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Prison Terms and Parole.
With the advent of the Sentencing Reform Act, and subsequent revisions, periods of
supervision and conditions of supervision have been legislatively mandated, rather than
under the control of Superior Court judges and Parole Board members. The array of
sentence structures has consistently been criticized by CCOs as difficult to decipher
and manage within high caseloads. Since 1984, the Legislature has repeatedly added
community supervision requirements to criminal statutes, resulting in a confusing
number of implementation dates, jurisdictional dates, and supervision responsibilities.
CCOs clearly describe the frustration of determining how each offender should be
supervised based on varying sentence requirements.
The original intent of sentencing reform was to standardize sentencing and remove
discretion from the hands of judges and parole board members due to perceived
inconsistency. It was felt that this would be a fairer system. However, the constant
tinkering with the sentence types and conditions have led to new questions of fairness
and consistency. For example, there have been 35 changes in the standards since the
first SRA was instituted in 1984.
The law requires courts to sentence offenders based on the statute in effect at the time
of sentencing. This means that a confusing system of sentencing standards exist, since
an offender may be supervised under more than one standard if more than one offense
occurred, and it is difficult for CCOs to track which standards apply to their supervisees.
Since it is unlikely that the sentence structures will be revised in the interest of
simplifying the supervision parameters, it is essential that DOC develop extensive
information for community correction staff about the types of sentences and the
differences so that CCOs can be both knowledgeable and effective.
Recommendation 1:
Make the type and terms of the offender’s sentence readily available to
CCOs so that there is no confusion or ambiguity in the CCOs mind about
what the offender is required to do.
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
As noted above, Washington State, through passage of the Offender Accountability Act,
has joined the national trend of states that want their offenders to recognize the harm
Page 17

they have done to the community. Taken to its ideal state, the community would
actively engage the offender and the offender would, in some manner, repay the
community for his/her transgression (the original crime). This was the original intent of
the “accountability” aspect of the law. The ideal is difficult to achieve.
In many ways, supervision of offenders has not changed a great deal since the days of
traditional probation and parole supervision. It remains basically the interaction
between the CCO and the offender. The CCO needs to employ verbal coercion,
persuasion, counseling, and other forms of influence to affect offender behavior. The
law enforcement aspect of a CCOs role has been better realized through an
improvement in the level of interaction with local law enforcement in most communities.
But, the connection with the community “structure” has been more elusive. Community
leaders are reluctant to consider reintegration of offenders as a high priority. Until
significant changes can be made in this equation, supervision will still be primarily the
business of CCOs and police to hold offenders “accountable” within the community.
DOC CULTURE AND STRUCTURE
Structure of the Agency: For most of the past twenty-five years, DOC has been
structured much like most states corrections agencies across the country. That meant
that a central office directed operations, dividing operational staff into a community
corrections division and a division of prisons. Since 1997, DOC was reorganized to
have just one operational division, the Office of Correctional Operations (there is also an
Administrative division).
Of additional note, DOC staff have benefited from having stable leadership, with only
three Secretaries of Corrections over its 24-year history. Compared with a national
average of changes of directors every 2.5 years, this stability has provided a
dependable organizational structure for staff to operate within.
Under this organization, prisons and community corrections were administered within
five regions covering the state. It was felt that the divisional barriers between prisons
and community corrections impeded the flow of communication and cooperation within
DOC. The offender was viewed as the constant objective to be managed by prisons or
community corrections, depending on sentence severity and treatment or supervision
needs. The hope was that with improved communication the offender would benefit
from more consistent intervention.
It is difficult, at this time, to assess whether the “barriers” have broken down. To some
extent, community corrections staff and prison staff still feel that they are working
opposite sides of the street. Some of this will always be true, since many of the
offenders under DOC never go into a prison. The LPRT did not find that the
organizational structure of DOC was a factor in these incidents.
Recommendation:
There is no recommendation for organizational change at this time.

Page 18

Culture of the Agency: The internal culture of DOC has been relatively stable for long
stretches of time because of the longevity of the leadership tenure. Mirroring this,
correctional staff are primarily committed to their work as a career, rather than as
something to do until something better develops. As with any large bureaucracy, there
are periods of instability or uncertainty about agency mission, but the upper level
stability has ameliorated most significant issues.
At the same time, there is a realization that corrections is a stressful career. Most DOC
staff feel that they work in an environment that they understand, but they feel the
general public misunderstands their work. Correction’s approaches to the management
of offenders can be difficult to communicate to the public, leading to suspicion or simply
to lack of information. One example of this is the public’s lack of knowledge about the
OAA.
DOC needs to continue its efforts to assess the various impacts of the OAA4. In
presenting its account of the OAA to the public, as much practical research should be
used as possible.
Recommendation 2:
DOC should continue its efforts to study how well the OAA is meeting its
intended social goals and use the empirical outcome feedback to inform
legislative changes that can keep the OAA on target and further refine it.
This requires identifying key performance indicators for purposes of an
evidence-based assessment.
STAFF SUPERVISION
Within community corrections, the ratio of staff supervised by each supervisor is
approximately one supervisor per 8 to 12 staff. Due to geography and distance, there
can be variation of this ratio. As the LRPT talked to staff involved in these incidents,
there was no direct criticism of supervisors by line officers. However, it was clear that
the data or computer input function of an officer’s workday was the primary criteria by
which a supervisor managed their staff. The emphasis on data input is frustrating to
most officers. They spoke about wanting to be in the community to a more extensive
degree providing supervision, but the data input requirements precluded that.
Supervisors also felt that they were required to monitor the computer data input function
of their officers as the primary tool for evaluation. There was no indication that line
officers and supervisors spent significant time in case conferences regarding strategies
to impact individual offenders. The LRPT felt that this is a significant dynamic that
requires more discussion and change. The supervisor should be auditing cases and
participating in case conferences as much as possible, and while this is a requirement
in the Supervisor Manual, the team did not see any evidence of it occurring.
4

The Legislature funded an evaluation of OAA by the Institute for Public Policy, and two reports have
been published. There is no data yet on recidivism. This recommendation is directed toward a need for
internal review and self-assessment.
Page 19

While interviewing staff, there was reference made to a case approach that involved
“peer coaching”, which is a more recent aspect of the program since these incidents
occurred. During interviews, staff referenced the concept of discussing cases with
peers. While that type of case conference can be helpful, the supervisor is the voice of
experience that should be leading these groups. More support for staff is needed in
addition to this approach. The supervisors interviewed were very supportive of their
staff, commenting on the liability concerns of supervising dangerous offenders.
Recommendation 3:
DOC needs to audit supervisor compliance with the Supervisor Manual
standards, and institute changes to support supervisors in performing the
case audits, and implementing the other aspects of CCO support
envisioned by the manual’s standards.
CCOS WORK ENVIRONMENT
Even with the utilization of a risk management tool such as the LSI, line officers are
increasingly concerned with liability. As they have seen fellow officers sued, their
general approach has grown more conservative. Yet, some of the traditional tools for
offender management have continued to be restricted5.
The interviews with officers indicated that the fear of liability prevents the creation of a
strong foundation for officer effectiveness in the management of offenders. The team’s
interviews identified that officer’s caseloads do not typically permit them to have more
than 20 minutes to an hour of contact with each high-risk offender each month. DOC
2002 data and procedure indicates that the workload system in place gave two hours a
month for a high-risk offender. Further, each of the offenders in the reviewed incidents
had similar levels of risk assessment, but were supervised at different levels as a result
in part of the actual workload time available to the CCO.
This leaves the offender with many hours to engage in negative behavior. The belief
that an officer having an offender under supervision provides the community all the
safety it requires is naïve at best. Even though this is a stressful work environment, line
officers appear willing to meet the challenge, but there is hope they can be provided
additional tools to maximize their effectiveness. The CCOs expressed that, and the
team agrees, lifting the threat of tort action to them as individuals would go a long way
toward improving the environment.

5

There was significant comment to the LPRT about the Offender Accountability Act hearing process,
which will be discussed later. In general, officers feel that this hearing process does not support them
when they feel that an offender poses community risk. At the same time, some of the treatment options
in the community are difficult to access. Admitting offenders to mental health services and substance
abuse treatment can be difficult. Offenders have few financial resources and these services typically
admit those who have the resources over those who don’t. These services are often operating over
capacity and offenders can be difficult clients.

Page 20

Sharing of responsibility for case decisions and case planning would lessen the
overwhelming responsibility and concern for “liability” that the CCOs have. Team
supervision efforts should be encouraged and responsibility for cases when there is an
extended absence should be outlined in policy and supported by staffing resources. In
the Anthony Shirahama case, it was evident to the LPRT that the CCOs were
supervising this individual effectively, but, at a crucial juncture when Shirahama needed
intervention, the CCOs were attending to family issues and were absent from the job.
There was no system for “backup.” DOC administratively has systems designed to
provide backup, contained in the Supervisor Manual. In this instance, the CCO relayed
to the team that no backup was available. This issue requires more discussion
internally so that cases of high risk get the consistent attention required.
Recommendation 4:
Encourage team supervision efforts, and identify a standard process to use when
a CCO is absent for an extended period of time, to ensure that supervision of
offenders continues. This also relates to the need to reinforce supervisor activity
that conforms to the Supervisor Manual.
One suggestion that the LPRT heard consistently was that staff resources should be
reprioritized. Because LPRT did not survey a statistically significant segment of the
staff, the team believes there is more evaluation needed by DOC to validate this.
However, this view was uniformly expressed, and the team bases its recommendation
on that.
There is a sense that the basic mission of the department, providing protection to the
community, is diluted by a number of “specialists” providing ancillary services. As
examples, the team identified safety program specialists, community involvement
specialists, risk management specialists involved in transition planning. DOC advised
the team that as of January 1, 2005, transition-planning specialists will handle
caseloads. Otherwise, these specialists don’t carry caseloads but there was a sense
that some of them could be pressed into case supervision activities to reduce the
burden on the current CCOs. Given the burdens carried by CCOs, more effective
supervision may be possible with smaller caseloads. This issue should be discussed at
more length internally so that even if there is no reassignment of staff, at least the line
staff have a better understanding of the role of specialists.
Recommendation 5:
Establish a series of mandatory internal workshops that discuss the
“basics” of corrections under the OAA. The focus should include providing
staff with a better understanding of the available DOC resources and the
priorities of allocation of resources. One outcome would include
developing plans for reprioritizing deployment of staff that includes a
method of providing backup or team supervision to avoid supervision
gaps. Overall, this should lead to better understanding by all staff of the
finite resources of DOC staff. This could also lead to concrete
suggestions for reprioritizing deployment of staff.

Page 21

PROBATION SUPERVISION TOOLS AND SERVICES
The OAA was implemented in 2000 to provide a method for individual planning for
offenders. This act was to allow officers to impact an offender’s sentence with
conditions that would both address the offender’s needs and provide the greatest
protection to the community. Unfortunately, community support services available to
offenders are not equal across the state. What is available in the larger, metropolitan
areas (primarily western Washington) is not available in the smaller or rural areas
(primarily eastern Washington). CCO’s working in smaller areas have fewer community
resources to offer their offenders and might be less likely to meet the offender’s needs
and affect the offenders recidivism.
Recommendation 6:
DOC should consider developing additional regional treatment
services to provide more opportunities for offenders in smaller rural
communities.
Along with OAA, a risk assessment system was implemented, the LSI-R. While the tool
existed prior to the OAA, DOC was not using it until the advent of the OAA. Specific
scores are referenced in the statute in relation to the tool. When the DOC staff was
interviewed two issues seemed clear: (1) this instrument takes significant time to
administer and score, and (2) once the LSI-R is completed, it is only used internally
because it is completed after the sentencing. The court never has the benefit of highly
detailed information about the offender’s potential risk to the community and their
behavioral needs. This is not a problem caused by DOC, but impairs the agency’s
ability to most effectively use the tool.
Table 1 summarizes the risk assessment data for the three cases presented to the
LPRT (DOC was unable to provide complete data for case 3). Ten of the eleven risk
areas identified by the LSI-R6 are presented along with:
(a) Whether the assessment identified a need for intervention,
(b) Whether that risk was addressed in the judge’s judgment and sentence (J&S),
and
(c) Whether that risk was a target for intervention in the offender’s Offender
Accountability Plan (OAP).

6

DOC’s Offender Accountability Plans do not include one LSI-R risk-needs score based on the offender’s
school history.
Page 22

Pound signs (#) designate risk areas that DOC identified for intervention in the OAP.
LSI-R Risk Factor
Criminal history
Education/employment
Financial
Family/marital
Accommodation
Leisure/recreation
Companions
Alcohol/drugs
Emotional/personal
Attitudes/orientation
LSI-R Total Score

Case 1 Rodriguez
Need Targeted?
J&S¹ OAP
N/a
High
Med
High
High
High
High
High
#
N/a
High

Case 2 Shirihama
Need Targeted?
J&S OAP
N/a
High
Med
High
High
High
High
#
High
#
High
High

Case 3³ Haggerty
Need Targeted?
J&S² OAP

44

43

31

¹ “No sentence conditions found for this sentence” (p. 5, OAP)
² “No supervision ordered/monetary supervision only” (p. 1, conditions, requirement and instructions)
³ LSI-R data was not provided to LPRT

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------As can be seen from inspection of the table, seven high-risk areas were identified for
case 1 and eight for case 2. Yet, these risks were not addressed as a supervision
condition by the judge in the judgment and sentence (J&S). Because of the differing
standards in effect at the time of sentencing, the judge may not have had the ability to
impose such conditions.
Only one risk was targeted for intervention in the OAP for case 1 (i.e., only 1 out of
7 risk needs) and only two areas of risk were targeted for case 2 (i.e., 2 out of 8 risk
needs). In both cases, the total LSI-R score was extremely high (44 and 43). Under
DOC Policy Directive 320.410, LSI-R scores of 41 or higher are considered evidence of
high risk to re-offend, resulting in a risk management classification level of RM-A or at
least RM-B. According to the Canadian test norms tabled in DOC’s “Offender
Management Overview” (p. 16), these two offenders had a 76 percent or higher risk to
re-offend.
The possible reasons that so few of the identified risk areas were addressed are worth
considering. First, these risk findings were obtained after sentencing and, hence, they
could not have been available to the prosecuting attorney during pre-trial negotiations
(i.e., plea bargaining) or for the judge at the time of sentencing. For example, had they
been made available earlier, it is possible that the judge could have targeted some of
them as conditions of supervision. Indeed, given the magnitude of the LSI-R total
scores, it is possible that the prosecuting attorney may have argued for a sentence at
the high end of the range, or even for an exceptional sentence. The judge could have
taken these scores into account in considering an exceptional sentence (see
RCW 9.94A.390). Had the judge been able to order supervision conditions to address
these areas of risk, this would have given DOC the authority necessary to provide
Page 23

additional supervision of these offenders. The standards did not permit longer
sentences or more comprehensive supervision that may have prevented two homicides.
Recommendation 7:
Risk assessments need to be completed prior to sentencing so that the
court can receive the benefit of the important information gathered in the
process for use in determining appropriate sentencing conditions.
Although LSI-Rs were originally to be re-administered on a regular schedule in the
community to stay abreast of changes in risk (with additional event-driven
administrations completed at the discretion of the CCO), more recently DOC has
adopted a practice of limiting re-administrations to times when some significant event
has occurred (e.g., failure to comply with a term of supervision). According to DOC
personnel interviewed by the LPRT, this decision may have been motivated to conserve
time and costs associated with repeat LSI-R administrations.
However, re-administering the LSI-R contingent on an offender’s action assesses risk
too late. It also leaves the impression that reassessment serves mainly as a post-hoc
justification of the CCOs actions, or as a way to “cleanse the record” after the fact to
give others an impression that responsible action was taken. Reinstituting the original
vision of LSI-R use, where the tool is administered both on a regularly scheduled basis,
as well as when events occur indicating a change would be the most efficacious
procedure.
The process of reassessment needs to be sensitive to both reductions as well as
increases in offender risk to be effective and efficient. Offenders who are showing by
their behavior that they are making pro-social changes should be supervised less
frequently, allowing the CCO to reallocate their time by focusing relatively more on
those offenders who are struggling to adjust to the community.
Recommendation 8:
In addition to event-triggered reassessment, risk reassessments need to
be done on a periodic basis according to the offender’s current needs and
level of risk.
The LSI-R contains items and scales that are sensitive to risks that are both unchanging
(static risk factors) and those that fluctuate over time and conditions (dynamic risk
factors). Reassessments therefore involve attending mainly to dynamic factors, which
compromise a smaller subset of LSI-R items and scales.
It would not be difficult to develop a set of brief dynamic risk factor scales from the
LSI-R that would permit the CCOs to constantly monitor changes in offender dynamic
risk while under supervision. The team is aware that DOC is seeking federal funding to
develop a practical set of dynamic risk scales that CCOs can use in the field in the
course of performing their normal duties, and supports this as a way of identifying
predictor behaviors, on the premise that many crimes occur close in time to when they
are conceived by the offender. The Bureau of Justice Assistance recently expressed
Page 24

interest in funding research of this type at the meeting of the Association of State
Correctional Administrators/Corrections Technology Association in Chicago,
May 2-5, 2004. This is a grant DOC is currently working on.
Recommendation 9:
Adapt the LSI-R to create a set of brief dynamic risk scales to monitor
changes in offender risk or design new scales to measure changes in
offender risk. Seek expanded federal funding (in addition to the current
grant being sought) from BJA to support development of a set of practical
dynamic risk scales. Provision needs to be made for keeping this risk
data readily accessible via the CCO’s PDA.
DOC HEARING PROCESS
One of the changes the OAA made is to remove the violation hearing process from the
court and vest it within the department. After 2000, DOC gradually began to administer
the hearing process for all offenders under their jurisdiction.7 Prior to this, probationers
had been subject to a violation hearing process presided over by Superior Court judges.
Offenders released from prison were subject to a set of standardized sanctions related
to violation behavior. The hearing process administered by DOC was not standardized.
The team consistently heard from CCOs they interviewed that this process is not
working8, and that this additional assumption of responsibility has not served DOC well
in a number of ways.
IMPACT ON CCO DECISION MAKING
Taking on the responsibility of hearings for the Superior Courts has essentially lifted the
post-sentence responsibility from judge’s shoulders. This has added significant “weight”
to the decision making process for CCOs who must deal with the offender in the
community. CCOs are less likely to use alternative sanctions such as treatment, when
they feel the burden of “responsibility” for the decision and its outcomes.
The prospect of liability flowing from post-OAA litigation impacts the CCO decision
making process in the area of sanctions. Judges have statutory immunity for their
decisions; CCOs do not. A general concern for both the team and the staff interviewed
centered on how decisions are made about the supervision of offenders. These
decisions seem to be more liability driven than offender needs driven.

7

DOC reports that the prosecutors and judges associations asked DOC to take over the hearings on
sentence violations. DOC is aware that the current hearing system applied by DOC contains an inherent
tension between the personnel administering the hearings and the CCOs. One benefit of the current
system is that DOC has developed a high risk offender warrant system and can currently generate
warrants in one day, which is much sooner than the time to process warrants through the court system.
8
Statistically, the number of CCOs interviewed do not represent a majority of the CCOs employed by
DOC. However, those interviewed were independently unanimous in their comments on this subject.
Page 25

The duty of a probation officer to control a probationer she/he supervises proceed from
the seminal Washington case regarding the duty of a parole officer to protect against
the conduct of a parolee, Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195,822 P.2d 243 (1992).
The court held that, “parole officers have a duty to protect others from reasonably
foreseeable dangers engendered by parolees’ dangerous propensities.” Other cases
quickly followed, Bishop v. Miche, 137 W.2d 518, 973 P.2d 465 (1999), and Hertog v.
Seattle, 138 W.2d 265, 979 P.2d 400 (1999) that reinforced the scope of duty for CCOs.
These cases brought forward successful arguments that the probation officer had the
absolute responsibility to protect the community and control the offender’s behavior. In
some cases, probation officers took all the steps that we would ordinarily expect:
frequent monitoring, reporting violations to the court, and recommending revocation of
sentence. When the court took an alternative or no action and the offender committed
another violent act, it was the probation officer (and the governmental body) who was
found to be at fault.
Working within an environment where the probation officer is expected to “control the
behavior of the probationer” without having the sole authority to change conditions of
sentence or to take away freedoms places the officer in a difficult position. These and
many other cases in Washington State focus the complete responsibility for an
offender’s behavior squarely on the probation officer. The probation officer has much
less ability compared to prosecutor and judges to definitively take action on the offender
to changes conditions or limit freedom and who have much fewer protections from
liability. This dynamic means that supervisors and line staff make decisions based in
part on how they can protect themselves and the department when the lawsuit is filed.
EMPLOYEE MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EFFORTS TO SUPERVISE
As the LRPT interviewed DOC staff members, it was clear that CCOs were frustrated
that bringing violation behavior to the attention of Hearing Officers resulted in
“ineffective” sanctions for the offender (in their view). Internally, this issue is becoming
a morale issue. Hearing Officers need to discuss line officer expectations of the hearing
process, and at the same time, line officers must understand the restrictions that
Hearing Officers work under. The team’s primary suggestion is to return probation
violation hearings to the Superior Courts. Since it may be unlikely that DOC will give up
this hearing process responsibility, it is recommended that there be more internal
discussion and/or education for staff about the hearing process.
One aspect of the hearing process that begs for additional analysis is the understanding
of how a Hearing Officer can apply stronger sanctions than those described in policy.
The policy says that a hearing officer may only give stronger sanctions with concurrence
of the Hearings Program Administrator. How often are exceptions granted? How often
are they requested? Can the process be made easier? Can the sanction grid be
strengthened or revised? If there is the possibility of revision, line CCOs should be
involved to let them have some investment in the outcome.

Page 26

SANCTIONS DO NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT DETERRENCE
The process does not support the CCO by imposing sanctions that are deterrents to
offenders. The hearing process within DOC basically pits one DOC staff member (the
CCOs) against another DOC staff member (the Hearing Officer). In addition, CCOs feel
that sanctions as a result of violation hearings are not strong enough to support their
work with the offender in the community. The maximum period of jail time a hearing
officer may impose is 60 days without getting approval for an exception from the
Hearing Program Administrator. The program in place does not allow the CCO to
increase the level of supervision despite the fact that the maximum 60-day sentences
available did not modify his behavior. Hearing Officers are constrained by a sanctions
grid as well as knowledge that negative consequences such as jail time are restricted by
policy. This issue came into focus with the Daniel Rodriguez case.
Daniel Rodriguez had been unsuccessful on community supervision, serving a number
of short periods in jail for a string of probation violations. He was described as being
able to do time “standing on his head” meaning that it did not have a negative effect on
him in short bursts, such as 60 days in the county jail. The CCOs felt powerless to
change Rodriguez’s behavior unless he could be put into jail for a longer period of time.
The Hearing Officer duly found Rodriguez guilty of the charged violations and gave him
the sanction outlined in policy. While it is uncertain that longer periods in jail would
have prevented the murder that Rodriguez committed, at a minimum it would have
further delayed or interrupted the destructive path that Rodriguez was traveling.
Instead, he simply served his 60-day sentence, was released, failed to report or comply,
was violated, and would serve another minimum jail sentence for each new violation. In
short, the jail time had no effect on Rodriguez’s behavior. When he admitted to having
an alcohol/drug problem, the court or Hearings Examiner never ordered him to
treatment. The team identified a cycle of offender behavior that repeated itself over the
next two years, culminating in the incident being reviewed.
Recommendation 10:
Review the DOC hearing process to determine whether the agency should
recommend amendment to either improve its ability to respond
appropriately to offender’s behavior by imposing more severe sanctions,
return the process to the court, or some other solution to address the
difficulty in creating effective sanctions for offender behavior.
Recommendation 11:
The current hearing process represents a significant negative morale issue within
the internal culture of DOC. Discussion and possibly reorganization of the
hearing process should occur very soon. All DOC staff need to understand the
hearing process better. Hearing Officers need to better understand the
frustrations of CCOs, and at the same time, CCOs need to better understand not
only the role of Hearing Officers, but also the constraints they work under. It
would be most desirable if the hearing process for probationers could return to
the Superior Court. Sanctioning prison releasees by a separate agency may be
Page 27

another solution. Providing the supervision and sanctioning of offenders within
the same agency leads, as it currently does, to the potential for
counterproductive conflict.
DOC STAFFING
Both line staff and first line supervisors were interviewed. Neither category of staff had
any criticisms of the other. Two broad issues were identified from the interviews:
(1)
(2)

The growing number of DOC staff who have no direct responsibility for the
supervision of offenders, and
The lack of direction provided to supervisors by DOC.

Line staff seemed frustrated by the growing number of “specialized” staff and units that
provide support but no direct supervision of offenders. It was suggested that if even
some of these positions were re-assigned to direct services, the staff to offender ratio
could be improved without hiring any additional staff. The obvious result would be the
closer supervision of more offenders and perhaps the expansion of services to again
include Pre-sentence Investigation (PSI) reports for all sentencing.
Recommendation 12:
All categories of staff be reviewed, especially the financial obligation units,
safety units, hearing examiners, and the large number of staff associated
with the LSI-R function for possible reassignment to offender supervision.
It seemed apparent that there were gaps in both communications and responsibilities
between line and supervisory staff. In the Shirihama case, the supervising CCO stated
that he would have liked to see the offender actively supervised while he was on
emergency leave. Insuring the availability of a staff person would provide a continuum
of service to the offender and liability protection to the department.
Recommendation 13:
Use supervisors to provide coverage for line staff when line staff is not available
to the offender for reporting.
Supervisors reported there was no specific policy about auditing line staff cases on
either how often or how many files to audit. This seems to be an activity that while
performed, is not well guided by DOC policy. Line staff expressed the fact that while
supervisors are available for staffing, time spent discussing cases seems to be more
crisis oriented. A pro-active approach envisions CCOs and their supervisors discussing
a case strategy on a difficult offender before a crisis occurs. The LPRT felt that little
case staffing time is spent developing resources and a case plan to impact a particular
offender’s behavior based on the needs identified in the LSI-R (e.g., see Table 1).
Recommendation 14:
As previously urged, the supervisor’s role needs to be more clearly
described in a consistent, measurable manner, to include timed and
Page 28

defined case audits, expectations for in-house training, role of the
supervisor as a backup for line staff, and clear expectations for the
supervision of staff and the effective running of field offices.
A general overview also suggested that supervisors receive little initial training after
promotion to a supervisory position and little or no ongoing, annually required training
regarding the supervision of staff. The LPRT questioned whether supervisors had any
specific training in areas of culture and diversity, which certainly were a factor in several
of the cases the team reviewed. Supervisors confirmed they receive a week of training
on these issues. More sensitivity in these areas might have produced different case
management actions but this was an area that the team did not investigate in any great
detail other than to question the way gang violence is discounted for purposes of
assignment to a risk management level. The OAA as implemented by DOC assigns a
higher level of risk to other acts of violence (e.g., when the victim is a stranger) but does
not appear to recognize gang related acts of violence as “violence.”
Recommendation 15:
The department provides more training and management development for
supervisory staff, including areas of diversity and cultural awareness.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

AND TECHNICAL SERVICES

A clear theme that occurred throughout the interviews with both line staff and
supervisors was that paperwork and computer input was taking more and more time.
CCOs felt that they spent more time doing paperwork than monitoring their offenders
and partnering with their resource and treatment community. Supervisors felt that they
were expected to judge a CCOs performance based on data input and reports. The
team identified high levels of frustration by both CCOs and supervisors over this
performance measure, which affects the morale and buy-in to the department’s mission
of offender accountability and victim safety.
In addition, important information about offenders past history, potential risk to the
community and needs are not always available to the court at sentencing. The
Rodriguez case is an unfortunate example. With convictions of four residential
burglaries, firearms, controlled substance and possession of stolen property, he was
sentenced in August 2002 on 3rd Assault with no PSI information. The sentence was
four months confinement and twelve months supervision. Eight months later he was
back in custody for murder.
The Sentencing Reform Act, although originally intended to standardize sentencing has
in fact created a number (17 cited by one CCO interviewed) of different categories of
cases all carrying different sentence requirements. CCOs are on their own to determine
the supervisory requirements on a case-by-case basis. This exercise of professional
judgment contributes to the liability situation described previously. The CCOs
interviewed all felt that this has created a situation that is time consuming, but more

Page 29

concerning, has created so much confusion that cases might not be supervised and
conditions might not be imposed correctly, which the LPRT felt might have been an
issue in the Shirihama case.
Recommendation 16:
That automation and the electronic medium be used to:
• Facilitate the creation of semi-automated Pre-sentence Sentence
Investigations (PSIs) from the Offender Accountability Plan (OAP) for all
offenders. The current semi-automated RAR could form the basis for such
an instrument that goes to the judge. This is despite an assertion by DOC
that the judges maintain they don’t need that level of information.
•

Allow CCOs to collect data on changes in offender dynamic risk via PDAs
in the field. Create software that will permit the CCO to quickly use the
PDA to ascertain the terms and conditions of the offender’s sentence.
Insure that the OAP and PSI are included on the PDA for each offender
under the CCO’s supervision.

•

Create reports and generate statistics by importing standard language and
offender ID information from file notes to eliminate repetitive, timeconsuming data entry tasks.

•

Automate reports by importing standard language and offender ID
information from file notes. Generate statistics from file notes that mirror
supervision goals and outcomes.

•

Use WI-FI technology to allow CCOs to connect to network programs from
the field.

Page 30

SECTION 5 - CONCLUSION
DOC has undergone a material change in policy and process since 2000, and such
dynamic change can be expected to require a level of self-analysis and course
correction along the way. The team identified issues surrounding supervising offenders
after their release into the community reflecting some of the impacts of this change, and
recommends the agency be proactive in addressing these three primary areas. They
are:
First, revisit the policy decisions associated with the OAA sanction and hearing
process, and the workload of the judicial system to determine whether the
hearing process is being administered in the optimal way to deter re-offending;
Second, manage the supervision, work assignments and resources available to
CCOs so that a lack of backup, a focus on paperwork and an inability to have
greater contact with high risk offenders are eliminated; and
Third, re-open the issue with the judiciary about the benefits of using
comprehensive risk assessment prior to sentencing so that the most effective
sentences for purposes of supervision can be imposed. Act as an advocate for
the policy that DOC’s experience in this area indicates is the most effective in
eliminating recidivism.

Page 31

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX A - INCIDENT REPORTS

FORM FOR REPORTING INCIDENTS TO OFM
This report is submitted to OFM for the sole purpose of fulfilling the notification requirement in
RCW 43.41.370(4) as further described in the Guidelines for Reporting Incidents to OFM. This
report is not an admission of fault nor has any determination of fault been made. The
information reported is a brief summary of known facts at this time and is subject to change.
AGENCY NAME:
Department of Corrections
NAME OF PERSON MAKING REPORT:

Kathy Gastreich, Risk Manager, Department of Corrections
DATE OF INCIDENT OR LOSS:

January 19, 2003
NAME OF PERSON, DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT OR LOSS:
Anthony Shirihama DOC 958172 and Daniel Haggerty DOC 769729 were arrested for
allegedly murdering John Roberson DOC 781854.
AGENCY CONTACT PERSON (NAME, TITLE, TELEPHONE NUMBER AND EMAIL
ADDRESS)
Kathy Gastreich, DOC Risk Manager
360-664-0380

HAS THE AGENCY CONVENED AN INTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS? IF YES, PROVIDE
INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE REVIEW:

A-1

FORM FOR REPORTING INCIDENTS TO OFM
This report is submitted to OFM for the sole purpose of fulfilling the notification requirement in
RCW 43.41.370(4) as further described in the Guidelines for Reporting Incidents to OFM. This
report is not an admission of fault nor has any determination of fault been made. The
information reported is a brief summary of known facts at this time and is subject to change.
AGENCY NAME:
Department of Corrections

NAME OF PERSON MAKING REPORT:
Kathy Gastreich, DOC, Risk Manager
DATE OF INCIDENT OR LOSS:
March 29, 2003

NAME OF PERSON, DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT OR LOSS:
Daniel Rodriguez DOC 805027, an offender on supervision, was arrested and charged with 1st
degree murder for allegedly shooting Armando Perea, Isasis Rodriguez was also shot, but
was treated and released.

AGENCY CONTACT PERSON (Name, title, telephone number and email address):
Kathy Gastreich, DOC Risk Manager
360-664-0380
HAS THE AGENCY CONVENED AN INTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS? IF YES, PROVIDE
INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE REVIEW:

A-2

APPENDIX B - LOSS PREVENTION REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS
Agency: Department of Corrections Review

DAYLE CRANE
Director, Kitsap County District Court Probation Department
LV Bollard Bldg.
614 Division Street MS# 39
Port Orchard, WA 98366

GREGG J. GAGLIARDI
Clinical Associate Professor
The Washington Institute, Western Branch, University of Washington
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
9601 Steilacoom Boulevard SW
Tacoma, WA 98498-7213

MICHAEL OLIVERO
Department of Law and Justice
Central Washington University
Ellensburg, WA 98926

PHIL STANLEY
Corrections Consultant
3026 12th Avenue W.
Seattle, WA 98119

B-1

APPENDIX C – TEAM MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES
DAYLE CRANE
Director, Kitsap County District Court Probation Department. 28 years in law and
justice programs.
Past involvements:
President of the Washington State Misdemeanant Corrections Association,
Chair of the Kitsap County Domestic Violence Task Force,
Member of the Washington State Law & Justice Advisory Council.
Honors:
2000 Kitsap County Women of Achievement Award,
1997 Washington State Corrections Association "Professional of the Year"
Award.
Speaker & trainer in the areas of: probation department development, risk
management in probation, case management systems, restorative justice
programs in probation, sentencing alternatives for courts, community
partnerships, domestic violence.
Educational Credentials:
Undergraduate degree in Sociology from Pacific Lutheran University
Post Graduate work in Chemical Addictions
GREGG J. GAGLIARDI, Ph.D.
Clinical Associate Professor, The Washington Institute, Western Branch,
University of Washington, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences,
Division of Public Behavioral Health & Justice Policy. Dr. Gagliardi received his
Ph.D. in psychology from SUNY-Albany in 1977 from 1982-1985; he served as a
captain and clinical psychologist with the USAF. From 1985 to 1996, he
practiced as a staff psychologist at Western State Hospital, most of his tenure
spent working in the Center For Forensic Services conducting forensic
psychological evaluations. Dr. Gagliardi has been employed by The Washington
Institute since 1996 where he directs a post-doctoral training program in forensic
clinical psychology jointly sponsored by the University of Washington Department
of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, The Washington Institute and Western
State Hospital. He is also a consultant to DOC and the Department of Social and
Health Services, and he conducts clinical research on mentally ill offenders,
particularly on the assessment of future dangerousness. He has published
numerous articles, monographs and book chapters.

C-1

APPENDIX C – TEAM MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES (CONT.)
MICHAEL OLIVERO
Michael Olivero has a Ph.D. in sociology from Southern Illinois University, a
master's degree in Social Work from Eastern Washington University, a master's
degree in Criminal Justice Science from Illinois State University and two
bachelor's degrees from San Francisco State University. He is the former chair
and a full professor of Law and Justice at Central Washington University in the
Department of Law and Justice. He has worked in various capacities in criminal
justice, including as a police officer and a correctional officer. He has also
published books and scholarly articles in the field.

PHIL STANLEY
A graduate of the University of Washington (Sociology) and Seattle University
(Masters of Public Administration). A native of Washington, he has worked in
corrections in Washington State and New Hampshire for thirty-four years. Phil
Stanley was employed with the Washington Department of Corrections for thirty
years before retiring in 2000. Upon retirement in Washington, he became
Commissioner of DOC for New Hampshire until November 2003. He is currently
a corrections consultant and part-time college instructor in Criminal justice at
Central Washington University. While with the Washington Department of
Corrections, he worked as a probation and parole officer, a work release
supervisor, Associate Superintendent at Twin Rivers Correction Center in
Monroe, Superintendent of Coyote Ridge Correction Center in Connell,
Superintendent of the Special Offender Center in Monroe and Superintendent of
the Washington Correction Center in Shelton. Prior to retirement, he was the
Regional Administrator of the Northwest region for DOC.

C-2

Loss Prevention Review Team

Department of Corrections

APPENDIX D – DOCUMENT LOG
Incident No.:
Agency:

03-52 and 03-58
DOC Review

DOCUMENT
Matter Report (1/19/03)-03-52
Matter Report (3/29/03)-03-58
Incident Report (1/19/03)-03-52 (staff: C. Schilling)
Incident Report (3/29/03)-03-58-(cco:Kurt Elder)
Offender Accountability Act of 1981
WA State DOC Community Supervision Policies (Policy Directives)
Current Criminal Charges for Shirihama/ Haggerty- including
Affidavit (filed 1/30/03))
Court Documents for Prior Convictions - Haggerty
Offender Chrono Report-Haggerty (officer-Beck Marnee)
Criminal History-Haggerty-(intake dates-8/14/97-12/8/00)
Court Documents for Prior Convictions – Shirihama (2002)Offender Chrono Report-Shirihama (Officer: Chris Schilling)
Criminal History-Shirihama (intake dates-9/18/89-5/17/02)
Current Criminal Charges for Rodriguez
(filed 4/3/03)
Email from Charles Malone, DOC Risk Mitigation Manager to
Michelle Whetsel, LPRT Leader-Guilty Plea for Rodriguez
Court Documents for Prior Convictions-Rodriguez (crime dates9/96-8/2-02)
Offender Chrono Report-Rodriguez (Officer: Kurt Elder)
Criminal History- Rodriguez
(Intake dates-1/03/00-8/2/02)
LSI-R Offender Management Overview-2003 edition
WSIPP Current Study Assignments (studies directed by the 2003
Legislature)
“Washington State to Release Prisoners Early”-Drug Policy News
(5/1/03)
“Veterans’ Incarcerated Project Lowers Recidivism”-Join Together
Online
“Understanding and Implementing Effective Offender Supervision
Practices and Programming”-Rural Teleconferences
Course: Basic Safety Workshop for Probation and Parole OfficersBJA
Log of OAA-DOC staff development activities
Policy Directive-DOC 280.530 (3/6/03) and File Maintenance
Checklist (1/29/03) DOC
Adult Services Academy-CCOs Student Manual-OAA Violation &
Hearing Process-Version 1.0- Year 2000
Offender Risk Management Offender Accountability: From Policy
to Practice Notebook, Version 2.1-2000

D-1

SOURCE
OFM
OFM
DOCHQ
DOCHQ
RCW Index
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC-OFM
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
Websitedrugpolicy.org/news/05_01_03wa
shington.cfm
Websitejointogether.org/sa/action/dt/news
/reader/0,2812,566363,00.html
Website- appanet.org/grant%20and%20special
%20projects/understa.htm
Website
appanet.org/interactives/workshop01/i
ntro.htm
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC

CONFIDENTIAL

Loss Prevention Review Team

Department of Corrections

DOCUMENT
Insert In Offender Accountability Notebook: From Policy to Practice
Notebook-LSI-R Electronic File Review Checklist-Version 1.1-2000
Insert In Offender Accountability Notebook: From Policy to Practice
Notebook-Tools for LSI-R Prep and Documentation-OBTS ScreensVersion 2.0-2000
Adult Services Academy Seattle Notebook-Risk Management
Information-Version 3.1-2002
(including OAA Plan Key Question Small Insert)
Field File-John P. Roberson (Victim/Offender) (3/8/04)
Field File-Daniel M. Rodriguez (Offender) (1/22/04)
Field File-Anthony M. Shirihama (Offender)( 1/12/04)
Field File-Daniel J. Haggerty (Offender)
Offender Risk Management Implementation
“Implementing Offender Accountability From Policy to Practice”
Conference Participant Manual June 13-15, 2000
Email between Michelle Whetsel, Team Leader and Gary Andrews,
DOC Risk Management-RAR and Warrant Teams
Email between Michelle Whetsel, Team Leader and Charles
Malone, DOC Risk Management-SSI and field file information
Shirihama, Rodriguez, Haggarty judgment and sentence
information
OAA Implementation Memo #27 via email from Lynn Scott to Anne
Fiala
Community Based Chemical Dependency Treatment Site List and
provider list
Offender Behavior Response Guide
Workload Management for Supervisors, March 1999
Supervisors Guide to Offender Risk Management Version 2.1,
March 2004

D-2

SOURCE
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
LPRT program
LPRT program
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC

CONFIDENTIAL

Loss Prevention Review Team

Department of Corrections

APPENDIX E – DOC RESPONSE
This section is reserved for the Department of Correction’s response to this report. The Loss
Prevention Review program should receive this response within 120 days of DOC receiving this
report. The report and response will be posted on the LPRT website at
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/rmd/lprt/reports.htm.

E-1

WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
INSURANCE BUILDING PO BOX 43113
OLYMPIA, WA 98504-3113
(360) 902-0555 FAX (360) 664-2832